采访者：王路飞

受访者：厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安 (Ervand Abrahamian)

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安教授是国际知名的伊朗及中东历史学家。他出生于德黑兰，在牛津大学和哥伦比亚大学接受教育，并曾在普林斯顿大学、纽约大学和哥伦比亚大学等著名学府任教。他著有多本具有影响力的书籍，如《两次革命之间的伊朗》和《伊朗的石油危机》，为该地区复杂历史提供了深刻见解。

第一部分：1953年政变及其影响

王路飞:

Hi everyone. Today I have the honor of speaking with Professor Ervand Abrahamian, a renowned historian of Iran and Middle East history. Born in Tehran and educated at Oxford and Colombia, Professor Abrahamian has taught at prestigious institutions like Princeton, NYU, and Colombia. He is the author of several influential books such as *Iran Between Two Revolutions* and *The Oil Crisis in Iran*, providing very deep insight into the region's complex history. Professor, thank you so much for joining my show.

I recently read your book *The 1953 Coup* and I found that book really fascinating. I think anyone who is interested in Iran's modern history should definitely read that book. And I found, given your extensive research on that coup, how would you say it set the stage for the modern US and Iran relationships?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Thank you for the invitation. Well, it's the background to it, but I don't think it sort of fixes the inevitable conflict between Iran and the US. It was something that, of course, in Iran people were aware of it. It doesn't mean that there was an ingrained anti-Americanism. In fact, I think after the revolution, after 1979, there were quite a few attempts, even by the Iranian regime headed by the president, of reaching out to the United States for some sort of normalization. But it was often actually on the American side, often pressured by Israel not to normalize relations, hoping to have some sort of regime change. And also, of course, the hostage crisis, when after the revolution, the Iranian students took over the US embassy and took a number of diplomats hostage. That created a bad taste in Washington, and a lot of people haven't forgiven Iran for that. Basically, they consider it a major crime. But I think Iranians were much more willing to forget or put aside 1953, while the US was not so willing to put aside the hostage crisis.

摩萨德格的历史形象与政策

王路飞:

Yeah. I kind of see that it's a very complex situation between the US and Iran after all these different events and accidents. I think in that book, the Prime Minister at that time, Mohammad Mosaddegh, his historical image is generally positive in the minds of the Iranian people. Is that correct?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Well, yes. I think he's often known for having nationalized the Iranian oil company from the British. So he's seen as a father of the nation because by nationalizing the oil, it was seen as a sort of declaration of independence for Iran from British colonialism. You know, in other countries, there was a declaration of independence after World War II. Iran felt that they were, if not a full colony, a semi-colony of Britain because so much of the natural resources, oil, were actually under British ownership. So taking over the oil company was equivalent to basically a declaration of independence from the British. This gave Mosaddegh a great deal of popular appeal. But added to that is another issue that is often forgotten abroad. He also epitomized the ideals of the constitutional revolution of 1906, which were the ideals of basically the European enlightenment—of liberalism, equality, liberty, parliamentary government. A monarch would be one that would reign, not rule. So in many ways, he brought together these ideals of Iranian both national independence and also of basically some sort of democracy.

王路飞:

Yeah. I also made a video about your book on that topic and there are some audience members who criticized me for saying the author is over-glorifying Mosaddegh's historical image. Do you think your book has that tendency or do you think you have a very balanced view of his policies and his historical image?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Well, no, I think it depends who you talk to. But for all the Shah's reign, in fact, he was a non-person. Mosaddegh was never even mentioned in the press as if he never existed. And anything that there was during his basic period or the whole of that era before '53 was seen as a sort of chaotic, bad period that you shouldn't really admire. But there's always been this admiration for Mosaddegh. And ironically, now, in some ways, his ideas are more actually contemporary because his ideals of equality, liberty, some sort of civil society, democracy, is what a lot of people in Iran want. And their criticism of the Islamic Republic is that it has actually strayed from these ideals of the enlightenment.

王路飞:

So do you think like at that time given Mosaddegh's position and his popularity with all the populist groups, like all the people in Iran, his policy towards nationalizing the oil field is a little bit too aggressive? What if he negotiated better with the US and Great Britain? Maybe he could actually exercise his ideology for pushing for democracy and liberty in Iran.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Well, his priority, his main thing was the nationalization, and that's why he became prime minister. He was elected in order to implement the nationalization law. No, he was willing to actually negotiate with the West, especially with the British oil company, for some settlement where he would basically compensate for nationalization. So it wasn't like he was intransigent and refused. He was built up in the Western press as a sort of erratic man who refused to negotiate. In fact, when you look at the documents, the intransigence actually came from Britain and then also from the US. They were willing to talk softly, to talk about, yes, they accept the principle of oil nationalization. But when it came to the crux, and this is what I found in the documents, and the press never admitted that at the time, was that when it came to the crux, the Americans supported the British position that Iran under no condition should control its own resource oil industry, which means actually refusal to accept nationalization. In fact, some oil executives in America said it would be even better for America for Iran to become communist rather than succeed in nationalizing oil.

王路飞:

Really? So that actually contradicts the American narrative, because they were saying that at that time the US government was afraid that Iran may fall into the Soviet Union's, you know, their communist wing, so they try to push this coup to kind of prevent that.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Yes. I mean, they said there wasn't really a coup. There was a counter-coup because the communists were about to carry out a coup. But if Mosaddegh had given up nationalization, basically said, "Okay, I claim I have nationalized it, but you can run the oil company," then of course he wouldn't have been overthrown. There would have been no reason for it. So from that point of view, yes, people are right. If Mosaddegh had basically given up his principle, then there would have been no need for a coup d'état.

威权主义的“合理性”与政变的长远后果

王路飞:

Yeah. So I kind of see that. I mean, I feel very sad after reading that story. I think he's a person with a highly moral standard, but that kind of person may not be suitable for the highest-ranked political position. I think if he had been a little bit corrupted, he could have been bought by the US and Great Britain's politicians or company officials. Then he could potentially push forward his democracy agenda. I don't know if you agree with that kind of perspective. I just feel a little bit sad for what happened to him. It's like a tragedy.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Yeah. Now, one of the parts of his charisma, and I think that's important because his personality actually could override other issues, was his incorruptibility. Other politicians in Iran, especially the Shah, were seen as corrupt, but he was seen as non-corrupt. So if he had basically given up nationalization and said, "Okay, I'll forget about that and I'll talk only about democracy," he would have lost his charisma because people would now see him as being actually bought by the British to sell out the national goal for the benefit of remaining in power.

王路飞:

Got it. So do you think, I saw some critics saying that given his, Mosaddegh's, populist tendencies and the potential dictatorial risk, he may become a dictator if he had really kind of pushed forward his agenda and then controlled the whole government. Do you think that's a reasonable argument?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

No, I think he was very strongly committed to, I would say, the constitution and democratic rights, as he was to nationalization. You can see this in many places. When he was prime minister, he did not actually use censorship to silence the opposition. There were opposition newspapers all the way through. And he worked through parliament. What is often taken as his dictatorial policy was calling for a referendum to close the Majlis (术语: Majlis，伊朗伊斯兰议会). And what I've discovered, actually, in a follow-up book from the coup book, is that the Americans and the British were working very closely with deputies in the Majlis to basically bring the government to a standstill. Every time he tried to pass a bill, they would walk out and there wouldn't be a quorum. So the result was basically the government had come to a stalemate. And to avoid that, he went to the public directly and asked for a referendum to close the Majlis so he could have a new Majlis. And this was the main argument that royalists use, that he was being dictatorial because there was nothing about a referendum in the constitution. Therefore, he was going outside the constitution to bypass the constitution. And for some people at that time, this was an issue because, of course, it was unconstitutional. But with hindsight, you see, often, of course, the Shah himself, when he wanted to do something drastic, he went for a referendum.

王路飞:

Yeah. I kind of see the similar... I don't know if you learned about the Chinese history. During the... after they overthrew the Qing dynasty, they tried to do a similar kind of push for democracy. And at that time, there is a kind of contradiction. So if your government is too liberal, you allow for criticizing views, it's very easy to overthrow a government. So you give too much liberty to the media, then your government is prone to this kind of coup planned by interest groups.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Well, actually, that's very pertinent because what the coup did, besides remove Mosaddegh, it also undermined the whole admiration for liberal democracy. Because many people said, well, if you actually are not tough, then imperial powers can always overthrow you. That's a reasonable argument given all the activities happening at the time, which I think is pretty sad because US and Britain, their neocon ideology is like, "Oh, we're going to spread this democracy all over the world," but at the same time, they are trying to overthrow all the government they don't like. Exactly. In fact, you can see this after the Islamic Revolution. On the anniversary of Mosaddegh's death, there was a huge demonstration of pro-Mosaddegh people criticizing the Islamic Republic. And Khamenei, who's now the supreme leader, was at that time the main preacher in Tehran. He gave a speech and he didn't want to use Mosaddegh's name because they were still in a way scared of the ghost of Mosaddegh. He said, "We're not Allende, the Chilean president. We're not liberals like Allende that could be snuffed out by the imperialists."

第二部分：1979年革命与现代伊朗政治

官方历史叙事与审查制度

王路飞:

Yeah, because the government is actually using that narrative to suppress different opinions, right? And I actually want to shift the gear a little bit towards the current Iran situation. So one of my audience asked a question: in today's Iranian primary and secondary school textbooks, how do they portray the modern Iranian history, especially the revolution period? Who do they set as a positive figure and who do they set as a negative figure when they describe that part of history, like maybe from 1953 to the current timeframe?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Well, the narrative of the Islamic Republic is basically fitting or distorting history to fit their own ideological position. For them, the Islamic revolution really started in 1963 when Khomeini opposed the Shah, and therefore the real opposition to the Shah was always the Islamic movement. Which is true, but there were other elements there. And so they start basically, often in history, where you start talking is often set to the conclusion of what you're going to end. So for them, the opposition to the Shah from before '63 was not important. Basically, they don't talk about the 1953 coup then. They also try to avoid talking about Mosaddegh. If they talk, when they talk about '53 or earlier, they focus on some of the religious leaders who first supported Mosaddegh and then didn't. So they see again the real impetus in the nationalization movement as being the clergy rather than Mosaddegh.

王路飞:

So I'm curious, is your book banned in Iran?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Oh no, actually politics often comes into the censorship there. It originally was banned, and then when you had the election of Khatami, you may remember who was the liberal president, he liberalized the censorship. And then some of the academics in Tehran actually had already translated the earlier book *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. So as soon as Khatami came in, the book *Iran Between Two Revolutions* was published and actually quickly became a bestseller. Not because it was good, but because there was so little published on Iranian history. People were starving to know what had happened in the past. So yeah, that was. And then more recently, the book on the coup, again during a more open period, was translated and published. The follow-up book to the coup on the new documents came out from the State Department on the '53 period, that book was translated by someone I know in Tehran. He took it to the censorship office, the Ministry of Guidance, and at first they vetoed it. He said, "Well, what parts of the book do you object to?" They said, "There's nothing we object to in the book. Our objection is the author." But a year later, the same Ministry of Guidance changed its position. So why is not clear. So it's now published.

伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）与政治军事化

王路飞:

The second question from my audience is, they're saying Iranian politics seem to increasingly become militarized, with the former IRGC commanders now occupying key positions in both the government and the parliament. Do you see the Guard still primarily serving the supreme leader, or has it evolved into a senior partner or even the main driver of the state policy? How do you think Iran may become a militarized government instead of the current regime?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Yeah, I mean the power structure is still very much in what the Rahbar, the leader—I mean, often the Western press calls him the supreme leader, actually he's known as the leader—so he has basically his key positions, especially the military. So you can't describe it yet as a military establishment. But I would say the main instrument of power is the Revolutionary Guards. So that's the main institution. But in terms of having some legitimacy, it's still based on basically the revolution of '79 and the idea that they represent. So the clerics are still very much allied with the Revolutionary Guards. But if things unravel and become worse, let's say Khamenei is assassinated, then I think the real power will shift to the Revolutionary Guards. So it will become a military establishment.

左翼政党的命运：与霍梅尼的联盟与决裂

王路飞:

You have written extensively about the Tudeh Party, the communist wing in Iran, particularly in the part of an era. The Tudeh Party actually allied with Khomeini only to be purged later. His question is, did the party have some viable alternative course of action? Was that alliance a fatal miscalculation or an unavoidable choice under the circumstances?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

I mean, it wasn't a problem just for the Tudeh Party. I think all secular and leftist parties, even the nationalists, once the revolution occurred, they expected somehow things would go back to 1953. You would have a nationalist movement, you'd have a socialist movement, a communist movement. What was surprising was, of course, the Islamic movement, how much it was based on his charisma, how much was based on actually deep-seated Shia faith is debatable. So all the organizations were confronted with how to deal with a political environment that was not basically open to secular, liberal, nationalist, socialist, or communist positions. Some took an intransigent opposition position right away and said this was a fascist organization and we will oppose it, and there was a crackdown. The Mojahedin, who were the religious radicals, tried an uprising and were crushed. So the Tudeh Party had a separate line, which was that we support the Islamic Republic of Khomeini as long as they are anti-imperialist. Even though they had a lot of qualms about the policies of the government, especially about women, about land reform, about property respect for property, and so on. Labor law was an issue. They had qualms about all those issues, but they said the overriding issue was imperialism.

Where that broke down is interesting. It broke down, of course, once Iraq invaded Iran. The thinking was that Iran would collapse, but in fact, it caused the population to rally behind the regime to fight the Iraqis on a basically nationalistic protection. The Tudeh also supported very much the regime and the war. The change came, and this is often ignored in the analysis, the change came when Iran liberated the main city of Khorramshahr from Saddam Hussein. And then the decision was basically in front of the regime: do they end the war by accepting Saddam Hussein's peace offer, which was basically going back to before the war? It would have been a victory for Iran because Iran then had the frontiers it had before. And Khomeini, for reasons we don't know yet because they were never really opened up, decided that they would continue the war into Iraq. And so the war expanded into Iraq with the two slogans: "War until victory," and the other was, "The road to Jerusalem is through Baghdad." So it became an expansive war, an extension into an Iraqi war. So actually, of the eight years of war, six years were after Iran's invasion of Iraq. So when that decision was made, the Tudeh Party began to criticize the Islamic Republic. And their argument was that if you continue this war, this will give access for American imperialism to come back to the Middle East because they will then support Saddam Hussein. So they broke with the regime for the first time and openly criticized the regime on foreign policy. And that's when the crackdown came. And the Islamic Republic was shrewd enough, Machiavellian enough, not to actually crack down on the Tudeh on this ground, but on the grounds that they were spying for the Soviet Union. There was no secret the Tudeh Party was pro-Soviet. And it was open that every week an emissary from the Tudeh Party would go to the Soviet embassy with basically the memos from the chairman of the Communist Party to the chairman of the Soviet Communist Party, giving their views on what was happening in Iran. So, but this was all monitored. The regime had their own monitoring outside the embassy. They knew everyone who was coming in and out. That had been going on actually since the revolution, so it was nothing new. But they used this connection with the Soviets to claim that actually the Tudeh Party was a spy organization. But I would say the real reason was that they broke with the regime on an important issue. And this, of course, happened with any organization. Once they broke with the regime on an important issue, there was a crackdown. When the liberal Muslims like Bazargan, the former prime minister, broke his relations with the regime, they were automatically arrested as being spies of the CIA. So this was the basically discourse of the time.

伊朗核问题与地缘政治

为何伊朗坚持发展核技术？

王路飞:

I'm just curious about your perspective on Iran's nuclear bomb project. You know, there's a lot of media coverage, particularly recently, when Trump ordered the attack of the three nuclear facilities in Iran. And then they say, "Oh, Iranians are only weeks away from getting the nuclear bomb, maybe nine or 10 nuclear bombs, and then Israel may be wiped out by Iranian military force." Do you think that argument holds water? Do you think Iran is really pushing for a nuclear bomb?

Why does the Iranian government not want to give up that power or that capability?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

As long as there was monitoring under the Obama agreement, there was no way Iran could get near a nuclear bomb. So once that agreement was scrapped by Trump, Iran's position was then, "We can, we'll enrich to a higher level." I think it was more of a bargaining position, saying, "You know, come back to the agreement, otherwise we'll enrich more and more." But of course, by enriching more and more, you are getting closer to making, in theory, the position where you can make a bomb. So withdrawal from the agreement actually then started this process of escalation with the present situation now. They think that by bombing the facilities, they're going to solve the problem, but I don't think that's the case. If you think about it, as long as there's no regime change, they can rebuild those facilities. They can build it in the past; they have the technology, they have the capabilities. It just delayed that situation. And now, I think from Iran's perspective, they have more reason to get a nuclear bomb. Look at North Korea; they got a nuclear bomb, and America never goes to bomb them nowadays.

Oh, it's actually somewhat here Mosaddegh is relevant. Nuclear technology is in Iran now considered a way of national honor, of being an important state, of being scientific, modern, and stuff. It's a way of declaring independence from the West. And Iran has actually quite a lot of, you can say, scientific knowledge. And it considers it in the way that before, oil nationalization was considered the hallmark of national independence. Now the view, whether right or wrong, is that to be an important, self-respecting nation, you have to have nuclear technology. That doesn't mean nuclear weapons, but nuclear technology. And that, for the Israelis, is actually potentially dangerous and unacceptable.

2015年《联合全面行动计划》(JCPOA)的回顾

王路飞:

I kind of see the parallel from the Mosaddegh era. The oil nationalization is seen as a national pride, and then inside the Iranian politics, if you're anti that, your political career may be over, right? The people may get angry at you, and it's very difficult for you to push for your agenda inside the government. Do you think that's an accurate description?

What were the major successes and shortcomings of the 2015 JCPOA in your view?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Yeah, also, I mean, I think even the critics of the Islamic Republic still wouldn't criticize the Islamic Republic for wanting peaceful nuclear technology. I think that agreement was actually a very good agreement. The criticism, once you look at it, doesn't hold water. The argument was that it's too vague, or you can't trust the Iranians, or there's a danger that they will cheat or basically secretly build a bomb. But actually, if you look at the details, it was a highly detailed agreement. Iran could enrich to 3.67%. This isn't vague. At that time, it was actually enriching beyond that; it was reduced to 3.67%. Anything extra, and it was a limited amount you could enrich, a limited quantity. Anything above that had to be exported, sold only to Russia. And also, there were international monitors at all the nuclear sites to make sure that this was implemented, that there was no cheating. So it was a very good agreement. If you were really worried about Iran going nuclear, this was a very good agreement because it accepted the main demand of Iran that it had the right to enrich for peaceful purposes. And 3.67% is no way you can weaponize it. So that was the agreement that there would be no crisis now. So people now argue, "Well, the crisis started when Iran started enriching beyond that." But Iran started enriching beyond that once Trump withdrew from the agreement.

特朗普退出核协议及其后果

王路飞:

So what do you think are the key reasons behind President Trump's decision to withdraw from that nuclear deal?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

To satisfy Israel. I mean, at that time also, he was very much wanting both Jewish votes and also Christian evangelical votes that are also allied to Israel. So it was, in a way, that political campaigning on that issue, which is clever because you get votes on that. You don't get votes by being nice to Iran. But the cost of that is what we have now. So the present crisis, people start, "Well, you know, there's a crisis because Iran is enriching so much," but Iran would not have gotten to this enrichment position if that agreement had held. There are some people being cynical about that deal, saying that Barack Obama is too naive, like Iran will never follow the deal, adhere to whatever they agreed, and they're going to build a bomb inside the ground of the mountain, and then America will not know, and then Iran will come out with all these nuclear bombs. Do you think that's a reasonable critique? No, no. It wasn't like Obama was taking the Iranians' word for their claims. There was a very robust verification system. There were international observers, including Americans in there, who were monitoring all the enrichment and where it went. So now, actually, we have a nightmare because we have no idea what's going to happen. We don't know where the enrichment is taking place, where the highly enriched uranium is. But under the agreement, it was verification, but not trust, but trust with verification, using Reagan's terminology. So this idea somehow, "Well, he was naive, he trusted the Iranians." He was, in fact, very rigid, and the agreement was very actually robust in monitoring what was going to happen.

第四部分：对年轻学者和历史研究的建议

历史研究中的客观性与个人立场

王路飞:

So how would you compare the ways each regime kind of instrumentalized the historical trauma to forge this national identity and consolidate power? And to what extent does this dance with genuine ideological conviction, or to what extent is it a pragmatic tool for just deflecting domestic tensions? I think you've probably seen that a lot as a historian. How do you balance your political inclination and historical objectivity? As a historian, you basically try to really provide a balanced view. How do you kind of fight your own bias or inclination inside your heart?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

I think it's a useful tool, and it works to a certain extent, but after a long time, people, I think, get wise that it's basically an instrumentalist, weaponizing argument to basically stifle any criticism. Often, historians are accused of either being leftist or rightist or having a political agenda. When you say that, that implies that the historian has actually distorted the facts or misinterpreted documents, even cooked up documents to fit their theory. That doesn't mean historians don't have their basically biases or their own perceptions. And the perceptions don't come in terms of basically how you juggle facts. It's what questions you raise to investigate. History is about questions. It's not about description. It's about asking questions and trying to get answers to a question. So if I ask a question, "Why did the coup occur in Iran in 1953?" Now, for some people, that itself is a leftist question. Because for rightists, there was no coup. There was a people's, Shah's, revolt against Mosaddegh. And for American conservatives, again, there was no coup. There was a counter-coup because the communists are about to take over. To save Iran, the US carried out a counter-coup. So usually, with any history, the question that is raised to start to answer the question, to focus on the question, you could say there is a bias there. So, you know, "Why are you asking that question?" So that itself, you can say, "Yeah, if I ask a question, 'Why was there a coup?' if you think that is a leftist question to ask, then yeah, I have to admit that I'm asking a leftist question."

Well, I take seriously if I find information that contradicts what I'm saying. If I find a document from the CIA in August of 1953 saying, "Yes, the communists are prepared to take over the country," then obviously that doesn't fit into my schema, and I would have to then change my conclusions. But in the research I basically worked on, I was surprised, in fact, finding so much information that fit into my narrative that actually the coup had nothing to do with communism. It had much to do about control over oil.

现代伊朗研究的前沿课题

王路飞:

What guidance would you offer young students or historians eager to research contemporary Iran today? What underexplored themes or questions most urgently need some fresh investigation? You can see this question is definitely from someone who studied history, right?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Yeah. Well, I mean, what actually a lot of people are studying now is the entry of women into politics and their role, both present and past. How this fits into the internal politics of the country. The women issue, I would say.

王路飞:

Yeah. I think that's really interesting because there are a lot of women in Iran who got educated, and then they definitely need more human rights, right? As they get more educated, they have more desire for liberal policies. So that's definitely some interesting topic, and that creates tension as well in the society.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Exactly.

关于个人安全与回归伊朗

王路飞:

Professor, really thank you for your time. And I have one last question. I'm just curious, I know you criticized the Iran government. Have you ever been back to Iran recently or, you know, after different regimes? Can you do that?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

I have not risked it. You know, people might read my materials, but the intelligence services also have an unhealthy interest in history. So they read very carefully, and they can always say, "Oh, you insulted or you blasphemed our great leader Khomeini or Khamenei," and I don't want to be in a position to have to basically recant whatever I've written. So I don't think so, no.

王路飞:

It's really informative talk, and I think my audience will really like your conversation. I will make more videos about your book, introducing it to a wider audience, and I really appreciate your time. Thank you.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you for your good questions.