---
area: "life-family"
category: culture
companies_orgs: []
date: '2025-07-10'
guest: null
insight: null
layout: post.njk
products_models: []
project: []
source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jz8tuCLbLWc&t
speaker: 北美王路飞
summary: 1953 年政变与美伊关系,政变为后续美伊紧张提供“历史底噪”，却非宿命式敌对的唯一成因；伊朗社会愿意淡化此事，而美国政坛因人质危机等事件持续“记仇”，加深了对伊不信任。摩萨德格的历史定位,国内广泛尊其为“国父”：①成功收回伊朗石油主权，被视为宣告摆脱半殖民地地位；②继承
  1906 年宪政革命的自由-平等-议会理想。
tags:
- history
- iran
- society
title: 专访伊朗历史专家厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：从1953年政变到当今核危机
---
**采访者：王路飞**

**受访者：厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安 (Ervand Abrahamian)**

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安教授是国际知名的伊朗及中东历史学家。他出生于德黑兰，在牛津大学和哥伦比亚大学接受教育，并曾在普林斯顿大学、纽约大学和哥伦比亚大学等著名学府任教。他著有多本具有影响力的书籍，如《两次革命之间的伊朗》和《伊朗的石油危机》，为该地区复杂历史提供了深刻见解。

## 第一部分：1953年政变及其影响

王路飞:

> Hi everyone. Today I have the honor of speaking with Professor Ervand
> Abrahamian, a renowned historian of Iran and Middle East history. Born
> in Tehran and educated at Oxford and Colombia, Professor Abrahamian has
> taught at prestigious institutions like Princeton, NYU, and Colombia. He
> is the author of several influential books such as \*Iran Between Two
> Revolutions\* and \*The Oil Crisis in Iran\*, providing very deep
> insight into the region's complex history. Professor, thank you so much
> for joining my show.
>
> I recently read your book \*The 1953 Coup\* and I found that book really
> fascinating. I think anyone who is interested in Iran's modern history
> should definitely read that book. And I found, given your extensive
> research on that coup, how would you say it set the stage for the modern
> US and Iran relationships?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Thank you for the invitation. Well, it's the background to it, but I
> don't think it sort of fixes the inevitable conflict between Iran and
> the US. It was something that, of course, in Iran people were aware of
> it. It doesn't mean that there was an ingrained anti-Americanism. In
> fact, I think after the revolution, after 1979, there were quite a few
> attempts, even by the Iranian regime headed by the president, of
> reaching out to the United States for some sort of normalization. But it
> was often actually on the American side, often pressured by Israel not
> to normalize relations, hoping to have some sort of regime change. And
> also, of course, the hostage crisis, when after the revolution, the
> Iranian students took over the US embassy and took a number of diplomats
> hostage. That created a bad taste in Washington, and a lot of people
> haven't forgiven Iran for that. Basically, they consider it a major
> crime. But I think Iranians were much more willing to forget or put
> aside 1953, while the US was not so willing to put aside the hostage
> crisis.

### 摩萨德格的历史形象与政策

王路飞:

> Yeah. I kind of see that it's a very complex situation between the US
> and Iran after all these different events and accidents. I think in that
> book, the Prime Minister at that time, Mohammad Mosaddegh, his
> historical image is generally positive in the minds of the Iranian
> people. Is that correct?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Well, yes. I think he's often known for having nationalized the Iranian
> oil company from the British. So he's seen as a father of the nation
> because by nationalizing the oil, it was seen as a sort of declaration
> of independence for Iran from British colonialism. You know, in other
> countries, there was a declaration of independence after World War II.
> Iran felt that they were, if not a full colony, a semi-colony of Britain
> because so much of the natural resources, oil, were actually under
> British ownership. So taking over the oil company was equivalent to
> basically a declaration of independence from the British. This gave
> Mosaddegh a great deal of popular appeal. But added to that is another
> issue that is often forgotten abroad. He also epitomized the ideals of
> the constitutional revolution of 1906, which were the ideals of
> basically the European enlightenment—of liberalism, equality, liberty,
> parliamentary government. A monarch would be one that would reign, not
> rule. So in many ways, he brought together these ideals of Iranian both
> national independence and also of basically some sort of democracy.

王路飞:

> Yeah. I also made a video about your book on that topic and there are
> some audience members who criticized me for saying the author is
> over-glorifying Mosaddegh's historical image. Do you think your book has
> that tendency or do you think you have a very balanced view of his
> policies and his historical image?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Well, no, I think it depends who you talk to. But for all the Shah's
> reign, in fact, he was a non-person. Mosaddegh was never even mentioned
> in the press as if he never existed. And anything that there was during
> his basic period or the whole of that era before '53 was seen as a sort
> of chaotic, bad period that you shouldn't really admire. But there's
> always been this admiration for Mosaddegh. And ironically, now, in some
> ways, his ideas are more actually contemporary because his ideals of
> equality, liberty, some sort of civil society, democracy, is what a lot
> of people in Iran want. And their criticism of the Islamic Republic is
> that it has actually strayed from these ideals of the enlightenment.

王路飞:

> So do you think like at that time given Mosaddegh's position and his
> popularity with all the populist groups, like all the people in Iran,
> his policy towards nationalizing the oil field is a little bit too
> aggressive? What if he negotiated better with the US and Great Britain?
> Maybe he could actually exercise his ideology for pushing for democracy
> and liberty in Iran.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Well, his priority, his main thing was the nationalization, and that's
> why he became prime minister. He was elected in order to implement the
> nationalization law. No, he was willing to actually negotiate with the
> West, especially with the British oil company, for some settlement where
> he would basically compensate for nationalization. So it wasn't like he
> was intransigent and refused. He was built up in the Western press as a
> sort of erratic man who refused to negotiate. In fact, when you look at
> the documents, the intransigence actually came from Britain and then
> also from the US. They were willing to talk softly, to talk about, yes,
> they accept the principle of oil nationalization. But when it came to
> the crux, and this is what I found in the documents, and the press never
> admitted that at the time, was that when it came to the crux, the
> Americans supported the British position that Iran under no condition
> should control its own resource oil industry, which means actually
> refusal to accept nationalization. In fact, some oil executives in
> America said it would be even better for America for Iran to become
> communist rather than succeed in nationalizing oil.

王路飞:

> Really? So that actually contradicts the American narrative, because
> they were saying that at that time the US government was afraid that
> Iran may fall into the Soviet Union's, you know, their communist wing,
> so they try to push this coup to kind of prevent that.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Yes. I mean, they said there wasn't really a coup. There was a
> counter-coup because the communists were about to carry out a coup. But
> if Mosaddegh had given up nationalization, basically said, "Okay, I
> claim I have nationalized it, but you can run the oil company," then of
> course he wouldn't have been overthrown. There would have been no reason
> for it. So from that point of view, yes, people are right. If Mosaddegh
> had basically given up his principle, then there would have been no need
> for a coup d'état.

### 威权主义的“合理性”与政变的长远后果

王路飞:

> Yeah. So I kind of see that. I mean, I feel very sad after reading that
> story. I think he's a person with a highly moral standard, but that kind
> of person may not be suitable for the highest-ranked political position.
> I think if he had been a little bit corrupted, he could have been bought
> by the US and Great Britain's politicians or company officials. Then he
> could potentially push forward his democracy agenda. I don't know if you
> agree with that kind of perspective. I just feel a little bit sad for
> what happened to him. It's like a tragedy.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Yeah. Now, one of the parts of his charisma, and I think that's
> important because his personality actually could override other issues,
> was his incorruptibility. Other politicians in Iran, especially the
> Shah, were seen as corrupt, but he was seen as non-corrupt. So if he had
> basically given up nationalization and said, "Okay, I'll forget
> about that and I'll talk only about democracy," he would have lost his
> charisma because people would now see him as being actually bought by
> the British to sell out the national goal for the benefit of remaining
> in power.

王路飞:

> Got it. So do you think, I saw some critics saying that given his,
> Mosaddegh's, populist tendencies and the potential dictatorial risk, he
> may become a dictator if he had really kind of pushed forward his agenda
> and then controlled the whole government. Do you think that's a
> reasonable argument?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> No, I think he was very strongly committed to, I would say, the
> constitution and democratic rights, as he was to nationalization. You
> can see this in many places. When he was prime minister, he did not
> actually use censorship to silence the opposition. There were opposition
> newspapers all the way through. And he worked through parliament. What
> is often taken as his dictatorial policy was calling for a referendum to
> close the Majlis (术语:
> Majlis，伊朗伊斯兰议会). And what I've discovered, actually, in a
> follow-up book from the coup book, is that the Americans and the British
> were working very closely with deputies in the Majlis to basically bring
> the government to a standstill. Every time he tried to pass a bill, they
> would walk out and there wouldn't be a quorum. So the result was
> basically the government had come to a stalemate. And to avoid that, he
> went to the public directly and asked for a referendum to close the
> Majlis so he could have a new Majlis. And this was the main argument
> that royalists use, that he was being dictatorial because there was
> nothing about a referendum in the constitution. Therefore, he was going
> outside the constitution to bypass the constitution. And for some people
> at that time, this was an issue because, of course, it was
> unconstitutional. But with hindsight, you see, often, of course, the
> Shah himself, when he wanted to do something drastic, he went for a
> referendum.

王路飞:

> Yeah. I kind of see the similar... I don't know if you learned about the
> Chinese history. During the... after they overthrew the Qing dynasty,
> they tried to do a similar kind of push for democracy. And at that time,
> there is a kind of contradiction. So if your government is too liberal,
> you allow for criticizing views, it's very easy to overthrow a
> government. So you give too much liberty to the media, then your
> government is prone to this kind of coup planned by interest groups.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Well, actually, that's very pertinent because what the coup did, besides
> remove Mosaddegh, it also undermined the whole admiration for liberal
> democracy. Because many people said, well, if you actually are not
> tough, then imperial powers can always overthrow you. That's a
> reasonable argument given all the activities happening at the time,
> which I think is pretty sad because US and Britain, their neocon
> ideology is like, "Oh, we're going to spread this democracy all over the
> world," but at the same time, they are trying to overthrow all the
> government they don't like. Exactly. In fact, you can see this after the
> Islamic Revolution. On the anniversary of Mosaddegh's death, there was a
> huge demonstration of pro-Mosaddegh people criticizing the Islamic
> Republic. And Khamenei, who's now the supreme leader, was at that time
> the main preacher in Tehran. He gave a speech and he didn't want to use
> Mosaddegh's name because they were still in a way scared of the ghost of
> Mosaddegh. He said, "We're not Allende, the Chilean president. We're not
> liberals like Allende that could be snuffed out by the imperialists."

## 第二部分：1979年革命与现代伊朗政治

### 官方历史叙事与审查制度

王路飞:

> Yeah, because the government is actually using that narrative to
> suppress different opinions, right? And I actually want to shift the
> gear a little bit towards the current Iran situation. So one of my
> audience asked a question: in today's Iranian primary and secondary
> school textbooks, how do they portray the modern Iranian history,
> especially the revolution period? Who do they set as a positive figure
> and who do they set as a negative figure when they describe that part of
> history, like maybe from 1953 to the current timeframe?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Well, the narrative of the Islamic Republic is basically fitting or
> distorting history to fit their own ideological position. For them, the
> Islamic revolution really started in 1963 when Khomeini opposed the
> Shah, and therefore the real opposition to the Shah was always the
> Islamic movement. Which is true, but there were other elements there.
> And so they start basically, often in history, where you start talking
> is often set to the conclusion of what you're going to end. So for them,
> the opposition to the Shah from before '63 was not important. Basically,
> they don't talk about the 1953 coup then. They also try to avoid talking
> about Mosaddegh. If they talk, when they talk about '53 or earlier, they
> focus on some of the religious leaders who first supported Mosaddegh and
> then didn't. So they see again the real impetus in the nationalization
> movement as being the clergy rather than Mosaddegh.

王路飞:

> So I'm curious, is your book banned in Iran?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Oh no, actually politics often comes into the censorship there. It
> originally was banned, and then when you had the election of Khatami,
> you may remember who was the liberal president, he liberalized the
> censorship. And then some of the academics in Tehran actually had
> already translated the earlier book \*Iran Between Two Revolutions\*. So
> as soon as Khatami came in, the book \*Iran Between Two Revolutions\*
> was published and actually quickly became a bestseller. Not because it
> was good, but because there was so little published on Iranian history.
> People were starving to know what had happened in the past. So yeah,
> that was. And then more recently, the book on the coup, again during a
> more open period, was translated and published. The follow-up book to
> the coup on the new documents came out from the State Department on the
> '53 period, that book was translated by someone I know in Tehran. He
> took it to the censorship office, the Ministry of Guidance, and at first
> they vetoed it. He said, "Well, what parts of the book do you object
> to?" They said, "There's nothing we object to in the book. Our objection
> is the author." But a year later, the same Ministry of Guidance changed
> its position. So why is not clear. So it's now published.

### 伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）与政治军事化

王路飞:

> The second question from my audience is, they're saying Iranian politics
> seem to increasingly become militarized, with the former IRGC commanders
> now occupying key positions in both the government and the parliament.
> Do you see the Guard still primarily serving the supreme leader, or has
> it evolved into a senior partner or even the main driver of the state
> policy? How do you think Iran may become a militarized government
> instead of the current regime?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Yeah, I mean the power structure is still very much in what the Rahbar,
> the leader—I mean, often the Western press calls him the supreme leader,
> actually he's known as the leader—so he has basically his key positions,
> especially the military. So you can't describe it yet as a military
> establishment. But I would say the main instrument of power is the
> Revolutionary Guards. So that's the main institution. But in terms of
> having some legitimacy, it's still based on basically the revolution of
> '79 and the idea that they represent. So the clerics are still very much
> allied with the Revolutionary Guards. But if things unravel and become
> worse, let's say Khamenei is assassinated, then I think the real power
> will shift to the Revolutionary Guards. So it will become a military
> establishment.

### 左翼政党的命运：与霍梅尼的联盟与决裂

王路飞:

> You have written extensively about the Tudeh Party, the communist wing
> in Iran, particularly in the part of an era. The Tudeh Party actually
> allied with Khomeini only to be purged later. His question is, did the
> party have some viable alternative course of action? Was that alliance
> a fatal miscalculation or an unavoidable choice under the circumstances?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> I mean, it wasn't a problem just for the Tudeh Party. I think all
> secular and leftist parties, even the nationalists, once the revolution
> occurred, they expected somehow things would go back to 1953. You would
> have a nationalist movement, you'd have a socialist movement, a
> communist movement. What was surprising was, of course, the Islamic
> movement, how much it was based on his charisma, how much was based on
> actually deep-seated Shia faith is debatable. So all the organizations
> were confronted with how to deal with a political environment that was
> not basically open to secular, liberal, nationalist, socialist, or
> communist positions. Some took an intransigent opposition position right
> away and said this was a fascist organization and we will oppose it, and
> there was a crackdown. The Mojahedin, who were the religious radicals,
> tried an uprising and were crushed. So the Tudeh Party had a separate
> line, which was that we support the Islamic Republic of Khomeini as long
> as they are anti-imperialist. Even though they had a lot of qualms about
> the policies of the government, especially about women, about land
> reform, about property respect for property, and so on. Labor law was an
> issue. They had qualms about all those issues, but they said the
> overriding issue was imperialism.
>
> Where that broke down is interesting. It broke down, of course, once
> Iraq invaded Iran. The thinking was that Iran would collapse, but in
> fact, it caused the population to rally behind the regime to fight the
> Iraqis on a basically nationalistic protection. The Tudeh also supported
> very much the regime and the war. The change came, and this is often
> ignored in the analysis, the change came when Iran liberated the main
> city of Khorramshahr from Saddam Hussein. And then the decision was
> basically in front of the regime: do they end the war by accepting
> Saddam Hussein's peace offer, which was basically going back to before
> the war? It would have been a victory for Iran because Iran then had the
> frontiers it had before. And Khomeini, for reasons we don't know yet
> because they were never really opened up, decided that they would
> continue the war into Iraq. And so the war expanded into Iraq with the
> two slogans: "War until victory," and the other was, "The road to
> Jerusalem is through Baghdad." So it became an expansive war, an
> extension into an Iraqi war. So actually, of the eight years of war, six
> years were after Iran's invasion of Iraq. So when that decision was
> made, the Tudeh Party began to criticize the Islamic Republic. And their
> argument was that if you continue this war, this will give access for
> American imperialism to come back to the Middle East because they will
> then support Saddam Hussein. So they broke with the regime for the first
> time and openly criticized the regime on foreign policy. And that's when
> the crackdown came. And the Islamic Republic was shrewd enough,
> Machiavellian enough, not to actually crack down on the Tudeh on this
> ground, but on the grounds that they were spying for the Soviet Union.
> There was no secret the Tudeh Party was pro-Soviet. And it was open that
> every week an emissary from the Tudeh Party would go to the Soviet
> embassy with basically the memos from the chairman of the Communist
> Party to the chairman of the Soviet Communist Party, giving their views
> on what was happening in Iran. So, but this was all monitored. The
> regime had their own monitoring outside the embassy. They knew everyone
> who was coming in and out. That had been going on actually since the
> revolution, so it was nothing new. But they used this connection with
> the Soviets to claim that actually the Tudeh Party was a spy
> organization. But I would say the real reason was that they broke with
> the regime on an important issue. And this, of course, happened with any
> organization. Once they broke with the regime on an important issue,
> there was a crackdown. When the liberal Muslims like Bazargan, the
> former prime minister, broke his relations with the regime, they were
> automatically arrested as being spies of the CIA. So this was the
> basically discourse of the time.

## 伊朗核问题与地缘政治

### 为何伊朗坚持发展核技术？

王路飞:

> I'm just curious about your perspective on Iran's nuclear bomb
> project. You know, there's a lot of media coverage, particularly
> recently, when Trump ordered the attack of the three nuclear facilities
> in Iran. And then they say, "Oh, Iranians are only weeks away from
> getting the nuclear bomb, maybe nine or 10 nuclear bombs, and then
> Israel may be wiped out by Iranian military force." Do you think that
> argument holds water? Do you think Iran is really pushing for a nuclear
> bomb?
>
> Why does the Iranian government not want to give up that power or that
> capability?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> As long as there was monitoring under the Obama agreement, there was no
> way Iran could get near a nuclear bomb. So once that agreement was
> scrapped by Trump, Iran's position was then, "We can, we'll enrich to a
> higher level." I think it was more of a bargaining position, saying,
> "You know, come back to the agreement, otherwise we'll enrich more and
> more." But of course, by enriching more and more, you are getting closer
> to making, in theory, the position where you can make a bomb. So
> withdrawal from the agreement actually then started this process of
> escalation with the present situation now. They think that by bombing
> the facilities, they're going to solve the problem, but I don't think
> that's the case. If you think about it, as long as there's no regime
> change, they can rebuild those facilities. They can build it in the
> past; they have the technology, they have the capabilities. It just
> delayed that situation. And now, I think from Iran's perspective, they
> have more reason to get a nuclear bomb. Look at North Korea; they got a
> nuclear bomb, and America never goes to bomb them nowadays.
>
> Oh, it's actually somewhat here Mosaddegh is relevant. Nuclear
> technology is in Iran now considered a way of national honor, of being
> an important state, of being scientific, modern, and stuff. It's a way
> of declaring independence from the West. And Iran has actually quite a
> lot of, you can say, scientific knowledge. And it considers it in the
> way that before, oil nationalization was considered the hallmark of
> national independence. Now the view, whether right or wrong, is that to
> be an important, self-respecting nation, you have to have nuclear
> technology. That doesn't mean nuclear weapons, but nuclear technology.
> And that, for the Israelis, is actually potentially dangerous and
> unacceptable.

### 2015年《联合全面行动计划》(JCPOA)的回顾

王路飞:

> I kind of see the parallel from the Mosaddegh era. The oil
> nationalization is seen as a national pride, and then inside the Iranian
> politics, if you're anti that, your political career may be over, right?
> The people may get angry at you, and it's very difficult for you to push
> for your agenda inside the government. Do you think that's an accurate
> description?
>
> What were the major successes and shortcomings of the 2015 JCPOA in your
> view?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Yeah, also, I mean, I think even the critics of the Islamic Republic
> still wouldn't criticize the Islamic Republic for wanting peaceful
> nuclear technology. I think that agreement was actually a very good
> agreement. The criticism, once you look at it, doesn't hold water. The
> argument was that it's too vague, or you can't trust the Iranians, or
> there's a danger that they will cheat or basically secretly build a
> bomb. But actually, if you look at the details, it was a highly detailed
> agreement. Iran could enrich to 3.67%. This isn't vague. At that time,
> it was actually enriching beyond that; it was reduced to 3.67%. Anything
> extra, and it was a limited amount you could enrich, a limited quantity.
> Anything above that had to be exported, sold only to Russia. And also,
> there were international monitors at all the nuclear sites to make sure
> that this was implemented, that there was no cheating. So it was a very
> good agreement. If you were really worried about Iran going nuclear,
> this was a very good agreement because it accepted the main demand of
> Iran that it had the right to enrich for peaceful purposes. And 3.67% is
> no way you can weaponize it. So that was the agreement that there would
> be no crisis now. So people now argue, "Well, the crisis started when
> Iran started enriching beyond that." But Iran started enriching beyond
> that once Trump withdrew from the agreement.

### 特朗普退出核协议及其后果

王路飞:

> So what do you think are the key reasons behind President Trump's
> decision to withdraw from that nuclear deal?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> To satisfy Israel. I mean, at that time also, he was very much wanting
> both Jewish votes and also Christian evangelical votes that are also
> allied to Israel. So it was, in a way, that political campaigning on
> that issue, which is clever because you get votes on that. You don't get
> votes by being nice to Iran. But the cost of that is what we have now.
> So the present crisis, people start, "Well, you know, there's a crisis
> because Iran is enriching so much," but Iran would not have gotten to
> this enrichment position if that agreement had held. There are some
> people being cynical about that deal, saying that Barack Obama is too
> naive, like Iran will never follow the deal, adhere to whatever they
> agreed, and they're going to build a bomb inside the ground of the
> mountain, and then America will not know, and then Iran will come out
> with all these nuclear bombs. Do you think that's a reasonable critique?
> No, no. It wasn't like Obama was taking the Iranians' word for their
> claims. There was a very robust verification system. There were
> international observers, including Americans in there, who were
> monitoring all the enrichment and where it went. So now, actually, we
> have a nightmare because we have no idea what's going to happen. We
> don't know where the enrichment is taking place, where the highly
> enriched uranium is. But under the agreement, it was verification, but
> not trust, but trust with verification, using Reagan's terminology. So
> this idea somehow, "Well, he was naive, he trusted the Iranians." He
> was, in fact, very rigid, and the agreement was very actually robust in
> monitoring what was going to happen.

## 第四部分：对年轻学者和历史研究的建议

### 历史研究中的客观性与个人立场

王路飞:

> So how would you compare the ways each regime kind of instrumentalized
> the historical trauma to forge this national identity and consolidate
> power? And to what extent does this dance with genuine ideological
> conviction, or to what extent is it a pragmatic tool for just deflecting
> domestic tensions? I think you've probably seen that a lot as a
> historian. How do you balance your political inclination and historical
> objectivity? As a historian, you basically try to really provide a
> balanced view. How do you kind of fight your own bias or inclination
> inside your heart?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> I think it's a useful tool, and it works to a certain extent, but after
> a long time, people, I think, get wise that it's basically an
> instrumentalist, weaponizing argument to basically stifle any criticism.
> Often, historians are accused of either being leftist or rightist or
> having a political agenda. When you say that, that implies that the
> historian has actually distorted the facts or misinterpreted documents,
> even cooked up documents to fit their theory. That doesn't mean
> historians don't have their basically biases or their own perceptions.
> And the perceptions don't come in terms of basically how you juggle
> facts. It's what questions you raise to investigate. History is about
> questions. It's not about description. It's about asking questions and
> trying to get answers to a question. So if I ask a question, "Why did
> the coup occur in Iran in 1953?" Now, for some people, that itself is a
> leftist question. Because for rightists, there was no coup. There was a
> people's, Shah's, revolt against Mosaddegh. And for American
> conservatives, again, there was no coup. There was a counter-coup
> because the communists are about to take over. To save Iran, the US
> carried out a counter-coup. So usually, with any history, the question
> that is raised to start to answer the question, to focus on the
> question, you could say there is a bias there. So, you know, "Why are
> you asking that question?" So that itself, you can say, "Yeah, if I ask
> a question, 'Why was there a coup?' if you think that is a leftist
> question to ask, then yeah, I have to admit that I'm asking a leftist
> question."
>
> Well, I take seriously if I find information that contradicts what I'm
> saying. If I find a document from the CIA in August of 1953 saying,
> "Yes, the communists are prepared to take over the country," then
> obviously that doesn't fit into my schema, and I would have to then
> change my conclusions. But in the research I basically worked on, I was
> surprised, in fact, finding so much information that fit into my
> narrative that actually the coup had nothing to do with communism. It
> had much to do about control over oil.

### 现代伊朗研究的前沿课题

王路飞:

> What guidance would you offer young students or historians eager to
> research contemporary Iran today? What underexplored themes or questions
> most urgently need some fresh investigation? You can see this question
> is definitely from someone who studied history, right?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Yeah. Well, I mean, what actually a lot of people are studying now is
> the entry of women into politics and their role, both present and past.
> How this fits into the internal politics of the country. The women
> issue, I would say.

王路飞:

> Yeah. I think that's really interesting because there are a lot of women
> in Iran who got educated, and then they definitely need more human
> rights, right? As they get more educated, they have more desire for
> liberal policies. So that's definitely some interesting topic, and that
> creates tension as well in the society.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Exactly.

### 关于个人安全与回归伊朗

王路飞:

> Professor, really thank you for your time. And I have one last question.
> I'm just curious, I know you criticized the Iran government. Have you
> ever been back to Iran recently or, you know, after different regimes?
> Can you do that?

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> I have not risked it. You know, people might read my materials, but the
> intelligence services also have an unhealthy interest in history. So
> they read very carefully, and they can always say, "Oh, you insulted or
> you blasphemed our great leader Khomeini or Khamenei," and I don't want
> to be in a position to have to basically recant whatever I've written.
> So I don't think so, no.

王路飞:

> It's really informative talk, and I think my audience will really like
> your conversation. I will make more videos about your book, introducing
> it to a wider audience, and I really appreciate your time. Thank you.

厄尔凡德·阿布拉哈米安：

> Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you for your good
> questions.