---
author: Money & Macro
date: '2026-04-03'
guest: ''
layout: post.njk
source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01V3IEn2MsY
speaker: Money & Macro
tags:
  - gulf-economies
  - oil-exports
  - economic-disruption
  - geopolitical-risk
  - water-security
title: 海湾经济体严峻挑战：战争、能源与生存的博弈
summary: 本文深入分析了地缘政治冲突对海湾国家经济的潜在影响，探讨了短期中断、长期战争和灾难性场景下的经济韧性，重点关注石油出口、关键进口、财富储备以及水资源安全等因素，并预测了对区域和全球经济的深远波及。
insight: ''
draft: true
series: ''
category: macro-economy
area: finance-wealth
project: []
people: []
companies_orgs:
  - Goldman Sachs
  - The Economist
products_models: []
media_books: []
status: evergreen
---
### 海湾经济体的脆弱性：石油依赖与霍尔木兹海峡的阴影

位于中东的海湾国家，如伊拉克、科威特、巴林、卡塔尔、阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯，其经济命脉在很大程度上依赖于石油。为了规避风险和实现经济多元化，它们也大力发展了航空业等其他领域，并试图成为中东地区的安全避风港。然而，当前的地缘政治冲突，特别是对霍尔木兹海峡的封锁，正以前所未有的方式威胁着这一切。许多人可能尚未完全认识到这场危机对海湾经济的“灾难性”影响。

以卡塔尔为例，其经济约42%依赖石油和天然气，而这些出口几乎全部需要通过霍尔木兹海峡。尽管卡塔尔已成为国际航空枢纽，航空业贡献了其经济的10%以上，旅游业也占据约10%的GDP，这些看似明智的多元化举措，在如今空域和海峡都可能关闭的情况下，意味着至少62%的卡塔尔经济可能陷入完全瘫痪。作为对比，乌克兰2022年经济萎缩了约30%，美国在四年间的大萧条时期也只收缩了29%。虽然卡塔尔是世界上最富裕的国家之一，短期封锁尚可承受，但冲突的持续升级和对关键基础设施（如海水淡化厂）的潜在袭击，尤其是巴林已成为目标，预示着一个更严峻的“灾难情景”：整个国家可能需要被疏散。这不禁引发疑问：海湾经济是否正面临全面崩溃的边缘？伊朗要求美军撤出中东的声明，是否预示着它将通过扼杀海湾经济来迫使美军撤离？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
They are literally built
their entire economies on oil
and then to diversify to the risk,
if you will,
they build some of the biggest airliners
in the world.
And they became a so-called safe
haven in the Middle East.
But now this war
and specifically the blockade of Hormuz
are threatening
all of it at the same time.
And honestly, I don't think people realize
yet how unfathomably
big this crisis is for the Gulf economies.
For example, take Qatar.
Its economy depends on oil,
and especially natural
gas for roughly 42%.
And almost all of that has to go
through the Strait of Hormuz to de-risk.
Though Qatar became an international
air travel hub,
which means now aviation accounts
for a little over 10%
of its economy and tourism.
For another, roughly 10%
of GDP seemed very smart
just a few months ago.
But now, with both its airspace
and the strait close, it means that
at least 62% of Qatar's
entire
economy is in a state of total paralysis.
But just for context, Ukraine's
economy contracted by roughly 30% in 2022.
The US economy contracted for 29%
during the Great Depression
over the course of four years.
But of course, Qatar is not Ukraine.
It is one of the wealthiest countries
in the world.
So a month long shutdown was manageable.
So if the war ends in a month.
A Goldman Sachs economist has estimated
that Qatar's economy
will only contract by 14% in 2026.
Still, that is a substantially bigger
recession than happened during Covid.
But of course, like after Covid,
Qatar will bounce back from this.
No problem.
However, the thing is, this conflict, it
doesn't look like it's getting any better.
In fact, I've read some pretty
alarming reports that Gulf states like
Qatar depend for 99%
of their
drinking water on these
six desalination plants,
which have in Bahrain
already been targeted in the war.
This means that in a true disaster
scenario, the entire country
may need to be evacuated.
So that raises the question are Gulf
economies facing a total collapse?
Iran has said it wants U.S.
troops out of the Middle East.
Could it soon forced Gulf economies
to eject U.S.
troops simply by choking their economies?

</details>

### 三种情景下的经济冲击：短期瓦解与长期生存力分析

我是尤里，一名经济学教授。我花费数日分析了海湾经济体可能遭受的三种潜在情景影响：一是战争迅速结束，可能是美国获胜，或伊朗迫使海湾国家驱逐美军；二是长期战争，届时需计算各经济体在不依赖霍尔木兹海峡出口收入的情况下能维持多久；三是灾难性情景，即海湾经济体耗尽水源或人口流失（部分国家约90%依赖移民）。

**情景一：短期战争**
目前的情况符合此情景。理解短期损害，需审视对海湾国家造成的两大最严重扰动：一是依赖霍尔木兹海峡出口的产业（石油、天然气、制造业）的停滞，二是航空旅行和旅游业的实际停摆。

*   **巴林**：对石油和天然气的依赖度最低（约26%），主要经济支柱为制造业（约15%），但大部分出口也需经霍尔木兹海峡。其旅游业主要服务本地游客，目前尚可。总体而言，约41%的经济目前处于瘫痪状态。
*   **科威特**：35%的经济依赖石油和天然气，贸易、旅游和制造业相对较小。约38%的经济遭受瘫痪。
*   **伊拉克**：约55%的GDP依赖石油和天然气，几乎全部通过霍尔木兹海峡出口。然而，伊拉克已重新开放通往土耳其的管道，可转移约20%的石油出口，且价格翻倍。目前，约33%的经济受影响。
*   **沙特阿拉伯**：34%依赖石油和天然气，33%为制造业，8%为航空，5%为旅游。其经济瘫痪程度难测，部分原因在于其空域、港口和旅游区仍开放，且拥有重要管道能出口60-70%的石油，加上当前油价翻倍，对其有利。我们估计约10%的经济受瘫痪影响。
*   **阿联酋**：24%依赖石油和天然气，虽有管道能出口43%的石油且价格翻倍，但其航空（18%）和旅游业（11%）几近停摆。据估计，约20%的经济受到影响。

关键的**进口中断**是另一大冲击。海湾经济体约70%的关键食品和药品进口依赖霍尔木兹海峡。主要港口如伊拉克的Qasr、科威特港、多哈港南部的港口，特别是迪拜的杰贝勒·阿里港，现已基本关闭。进口不得不依赖约旦和沙特等国的陆路，以及阿联酋的富查伊拉港。卡塔尔则转向成本高昂的空运。这导致了港口拥堵和食品、药品进口成本飙升。尽管多国政府禁止超市涨价并拥有大量食品储备，暂时限制了对消费者价格的影响，但更高的进口成本和贸易路线重塑是普遍的痛点。

根据高盛经济学家预测，若战争在四月底结束，卡塔尔和科威特2026年经济将萎缩约14%，阿联酋为-5%，沙特阿拉伯为-3%，巴林和伊拉克居中。虽然这是比疫情期间更严重的衰退，但鉴于这些国家的财富，预计可控。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

Hey, I'm Yuri, I'm a pizza in economics,
and I've spent the last days analyzing
all of the Gulf economies
and how bad they will be affected
by three potential scenarios.
Scenario number one, a quick end
to the war, either because the US wins are
because Iran forces them to push out US
troops, the Gulf countries, that is.
Then there's scenario number two,
a long a war, in which case
I've calculated
how long the various Gulf economies
can survive without export revenue
through the Strait of Hormuz.
And finally, scenario number three,
a disaster scenario
in which either the Gulf economies
run out of water or population
given that some rely
for almost 90% on immigrants.
So let's get into it
with scenario number one.
A short war, which is exactly
what we have been seeing so far.
To understand the damage done so far,
we have to look
at the two biggest disruptions
done to the Gulf countries,
which is exactly what we have seen so far
a short disruption.
But to understand the damage
that has already been done, we have to
look at the two biggest disruptions
that to go of countries have faced.
First, there's the stencil of industries
that depend on the Strait of Hormuz
for exports, such as oil and gas
and also manufacturing,
plus the effective standstill of air
travel and tourism, oil and gas.
So far,
Bahrain is the least dependent on it,
with it
accounting for roughly 26% of its economy.
Actually, its main diversification
strategy has been manufacturing,
which now accounts for roughly
15% of its economy.
But sadly,
that is also mostly for exporting
through the Strait of Hormuz.
Bahrain
is the least dependent on oil and gas,
with it
accounting for roughly 26% of its economy.
Its main diversification strategy,
though, has been manufacturing,
which now accounts for roughly 15%.
But sadly, that is also mostly going
through the Strait of Hormuz.
Bahrain is also a major
tourist destination these days, but
that is mostly for local tourists,
so that seems to be fine so far.
So all in all, I'd say that roughly 41%
of its economy is paralyzed right now.
Compare that to Kuwait,
which depends for 35% on oil
and gas, while trade, tourism
and manufacturing is relatively small.
So I'd say that roughly 38% of its
economy is paralyzed
and its northern neighbor, Iraq,
it depends for about 55%.
That's
quite a lot on oil and gas for its GDP.
And almost all of that
was exported through her moose.
But now Iraq has just reopened its
pipeline to Turkey,
and that will
help it divert about 20% of its oil
at this very important, roughly double
the price as before.
So for them, I'd say that
roughly 33% of their economy is paralyzed,
much less than Qatar, which we've already
discussed to be at 62%.
And now moving on to the big boy
in the region, Saudi Arabia.
It depends for roughly 34% on oil and gas
and 33% on manufacturing
and 8% on aviation.
And 5% on tourism.
However, calculating
how much of Saudi Arabia's
economy is paralyzed
is very difficult for two reasons.
First, much of their airspace,
tourist areas
and many of their ports are actually open.
Second,
they have a hugely important pipeline
which allows them to export
about 60 to 70% of their oil.
But this is more crucial than they think.
Again, because they are currently selling
that oil
at almost double
the price than they were before the war.
Finally, there's the UAE, which depends
for roughly 24% on oil and gas.
But like Saudi Arabia, it has a pipeline
that has been estimated
to help itself 43% of its oil.
And again, because the prices
are roughly double than that
they were before the war,
it means that they roughly have the same
revenue from oil as they had before.
But much like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
they have major manufacturing sector,
and they also have a lot of mining,
unlike these economies.
And a lot of this is actually exposed
to their biggest port being closed.
That's right over here.
That being said, the UAE
and especially of course Dubai relies
heavily on aviation 18% and tourism 11%,
which have both mostly been paralyzed.
So for these two countries
is really anyone's guess.
But let's say
just for the sake of argument, that
the UAE has 20% of its economy
being paralyzed and Saudi Arabia ten.
Of course, it's more in reality,
but both of them are really profiting
now from much higher oil prices.
But of course, stuff doesn't
just go out through the Strait of Hormuz.
In fact, the Gulf economies
also used the Strait of Hormuz
for about 70% of
their crucial food and medicine imports.
However, after the main imports, ports
such as and I hope I'm going to pronounce
this correctly,
Qasr in Iraq
or the port in the city of Kuwait,
or the port south of Doha, and especially,
most importantly,
the port in Dubai known as Jebel Ali,
are essentially now shut down.
Now they have to rely for these imports on
land routes via Jordan
and via Saudi
Arabia, and finally, of course, via
the ports of Fujairah in the UAE.
Meanwhile, Qatar has largely started
importing via air,
which is much more expensive,
and the result of all of this,
these imports has been long traffic
jams at ports
not made for such high volumes of goods,
and therefore a big spike
in the cost of food and medicine imports.
But crucially,
because many Gulf governments
have prohibited
supermarkets from price gouging,
and because many of them have large food
reserves,
so far
the damage from this has been limited
and consumer prices have not gone up
by as much as you would have expected.
So these are, I think, the main
pain points for the Gulf countries so far.
All of them are facing
far higher import costs
for food and medicine,
and a chaotic reshuffling of trade routes.
Qatar and Kuwait.
So Qatar and Kuwait
have been hit the hardest so far,
while Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent
the UAE have been doing fairly
okay so far due to them
getting a much higher price for the oil
that is still being exported
through their pipelines.
And therefore, I think it makes sense
that Goldman Sachs economist
Farouk Snoozer muddled in early March
that if the war ends late April,
so fairly soon,
the 2026 economies of Qatar
and Kuwait will contract
both by roughly minus 14%.
On the other hand,
the UAE would only shrink by minus
5% in 2026 and Saudi
Arabia by minus 3%.
Given what we've seen,
I think Bahrain and Iraq will
then land somewhere
in between these numbers.
Now, all of that is very substantial.
It is a bigger hit than during Covid.
But honestly, me as well as most analysts
think that this will be manageable
given how rich these countries are.
However,
will the war actually end late April?
That assumption is looking
increasingly unlikely, and this brings us
to scenario number two a long war.

</details>

### 长期战争情景：财富储备是抵御经济崩溃的终极防线

当战争演变为长期拉锯战时，评估海湾经济体的生存能力，关键在于其赚取国际货币以维持战争开销和满足民生需求的能力。鉴于它们高度依赖食品、药品进口，以及可能在长期战争中需购入大量防御物资，对进口需求的维持至关重要。尽管卡塔尔、巴林和科威特经济对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖占其GDP的比例低于或约等于一半，但出口收入的95%却高度依赖此通道。伊拉克的北部管道使其出口收入的风险敞口降至约80%。对于沙特和阿联酋，尽管数据难以精确估算，但凭借其管道运输和油价上涨（尤其在长期战争中），我们保守估计沙特出口收入将面临20%的打击，阿联酋则为30%。

然而，一个值得关注的现象是，海湾货币（如沙特里亚尔、科威特第纳尔、阿联酋迪拉姆）表现出惊人的稳定，与美元挂钩的沙特里亚尔尤为如此。这种稳定并非偶然，而是源于它们雄厚的财富积累。例如，伊拉克的财富基金约60亿美元，但中央银行储备高达8000亿美元。科威特的财富基金达1万亿美元，中央银行储备为540亿美元。卡塔尔拥有5500亿美元的财富基金及720亿美元的额外储备。相对而言，巴林财富基金为170亿美元，中央银行储备仅40亿美元，显得较为贫穷。沙特阿拉伯的财富基金约1万亿美元，央行储备5000亿美元。阿联酋则拥有约2万亿美元的财富基金及2270亿美元的央行储备。

若综合分析这些数据，即使保守估计，仅40%的石油基金可轻易售出而不导致全球市场崩溃，海湾国家也能维持相当长的生存期。沙特阿拉伯凭借其管道，理论上可“永远”维持。高度依赖出口的科威特，凭仗其庞大的财富基金，也能支撑长达十年。卡塔尔和阿联酋亦分别可维持约八年和七年半的进口能力，这得益于其巨大的财富储备、管道以及替代港口。伊拉克则依靠其对土耳其的管道和庞大的中央银行储备，可维持近两年。只有巴林显得尤为脆弱，其对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖和有限的财富基金，使其仅能维持约七个月，但沙特阿拉伯或许有能力提供援助。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

But while Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait's
economies may depend
on the Strait of Hormuz for less than or
about half their GDP,
their export revenues depend on it.
For a whopping 95%.
On the other hand,
Iraq's northern pipeline now
means that it has about an exposure of 80%
when it comes to export revenues.
Meanwhile, again, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE are difficult to estimate,
but thanks to their pipelines
and the increased price of oil,
especially if there is a long war,
for simplicity,
I will assume that the Saudis only take a
20% hit
and the UAE takes a 30%
hit to their export to revenues.
But I feel a lot, honestly,
that would cause an immediate currency
collapse
for 90% of economies around the world,
especially if they lose 95%
of their export revenue.
But as you can see here, the Gulf
currencies look surprisingly stable.
For example, the Saudi Riyadh is nice
and tied to the U.S.
dollar.
The Kuwaiti dinar is very stable
and the Emirati dirham
is also extremely stable.
It may not look very stable like this,
but if you look at these numbers
over here, it's just tiny, tiny,
tiny movements.
These currencies are absolutely fine.
So why is that the case?
Well, it's
because they are extremely wealthy.
Everybody knows that.
But how wealthy?
Let's go back to our map.
Let's go from north to south.
Iraq has the smallest, a wealth fund
estimated at roughly $6 billion worth.
It's tiny, but a central bank.
A war
chest is actually pretty full at roughly
800 billion USD.
Next, let's go to their small
southern neighbor, Kuwait.
Their wealth fund is absolutely massive,
with $1 trillion in assets.
However, its central bank only has half of
what Iraq has at 54 billion.
Meanwhile, Qatar has about $550 billion
in its wealth fund
and about 72 on top of that in reserves.
Now, compared to that, Bahrain looks
very poor indeed, with only 17 billion
in its wealth fund and just 4 billion
in central bank reserves.
Saudi Arabia, the giant, is surprisingly
not the richest country.
It's famous wealth funds.
The piss has an estimated 1
trillion,
so still way, way more than Bahrain.
In its assets.
And then the central bank has about 500
billion in reserves.
And next the UAE is surprisingly richer.
It has about 2 trillion
in all of its wealth funds combined,
and then about 227
billion in the central bank reserves.
But of course, me drawing these numbers
on the screen by themselves,
they are meaningless, right?
Just big numbers.
Bahrain may look poorer,
but it also has a much smaller population
than, for example, Saudi Arabia.
So it doesn't need to import as much.
So what we need to do now
is to put all of that together
and calculate how many years
each Gulf country can keep importing stuff
while exporting way less,
and in some cases, almost nothing.
And this simple exercise
will actually reveal why Gulf currencies
look as stable as ever.
That is,
even if we assume, conservatively,
that only 40% of their oil funds
can be sold
fairly easily without absolutely crashing
global markets.
We will find that Saudi
Arabia can survive actually forever,
thanks to its pipeline.
Hyper exposed Kuwait also quite
surprisingly so 95% less export revenue.
It can still survive a whopping ten years
based on its massive wealth fund,
which is almost as big as that of Saudi
Arabia, which is of course, much bigger.
Qatar also very wealthy.
No more exports
almost can survive for almost
eight years
just based on its massive wealth.
Similarly, the UAE can hold out
for about seven and a half years
despite the destruction of Dubai's
entire business model
thanks to its wealth and, of course, its 
pipeline and alternative harbors.
Over here.
Iraq can hold out almost for two years,
mostly
thanks to now its pipeline to Turkey
and its big central bank of artists.
And it's only really Bahrain
that looks very vulnerable,
being able to survive
only for a seven months
due to its reliance on Hormuz
and relatively small wealth funds.
But honestly, Bahrain is so small
that Saudi Arabia
could simply bail it out if need it.

</details>

### 灾难情景下的生存极限与核心脆弱性：水资源安全的关键挑战

即使在最严峻的“灾难情景”下，如伊朗通过轰炸破坏海湾国家的石油管道或阿联酋临近伊朗的替代港口，其经济韧性依然令人惊讶。在这种情况下，阿联酋可能像卡塔尔一样受阻，但由于人均财富相对较低，其生存期可能缩短至不到两年。而沙特阿拉伯，即使失去管道，凭借其红海沿岸的港口仍能维持约20%的出口能力，并凭借庞大的财富支撑约五年半的经济运转。

然而，一个不容忽视的巨大风险是海湾国家对外国移民的高度依赖。阿联酋和卡塔尔约88%的人口为移民，科威特约70%，巴林53%。如果战争升级，大量移民可能回国，短期内可能导致经济动荡，但长期来看，这将大幅降低对进口商品的需求，从而延长国家的经济生存期。

真正具有“生存威胁”（existential weakness）的是水资源问题，尤其是对海水淡化厂的依赖。卡塔尔99%的饮用水来自这些设施，巴林为90%，阿联酋和科威特也超过一半。这些工厂形同“活靶子”，一旦被摧毁，将引发严重的人道主义危机，可能导致整个城市被疏散。尽管如此，即使在这种极端情况下，海湾国家（特别是拥有全球化财富基金和强大石油基础的沙特）的经济核心——财富和石油资源——仍将得以保留。这些基础设施的损失可以重建，而伊朗政权被移除后，经济复苏的可能性依然存在。因此，即使在最糟糕的灾难情景下，海湾经济体的整体抗压能力可能比最初设想的更为坚韧。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

Unless, of course, you can goes
truly scorched earth on the Gulf,
bringing us to scenario number three
a disastrous war.
Total war in this scenario, Iran tries
to break Gulf economies export capacities
by bombing their pipelines,
which is, of course possible.
And on top of that, they could really bomb
the alternative ports that the UAE has,
which are fairly close to Iran.
Now, in that case, the UAE may become
just as blocked as Qatar,
but because it is less wealthy per person,
it would now be able to survive
for a little under two years.
On the other hand,
thanks to its red seaports
all across the coast
over there, Saudi Arabia,
even if it no longer has its pipeline,
it would still have some export capacity
left 20%, roughly
allowing it to hold out for about
five and a
half years purely on their massive wealth.
That is still quite a long time.
So okay, now Iran again escalates bombing
major population centers.
This exposes yet another big weakness
in the Gulf economies,
namely their massive,
massive reliance on immigrants.
Specifically, the UAE consists of about
88% immigrants.
The Da also 88% immigrants.
Roughly Kuwait's 70% immigrants.
Still, Bahrain 50 3 a.m.
running out of space to draw on.
But you get the point.
And Saudi Arabia way less 41% immigrants.
Iraq.
It does have immigrants,
but these are mostly Syrian refugees
which are less affected by this crisis.
So yeah, if the war escalates,
a lot of these could be leaving,
going back home, often to South Asia
crashing or Britain crashing.
The Gulf economies.
However, from a pure war
economy perspective, the upside
would then be that the Gulf economies
would need a lot fewer imports,
meaning that they could hold out
quite a bit longer.
So if the war truly escalates,
it may not be in Iran's best interest
to actually bomb all of these population
centers and send the immigrants home.
Honestly,
the only real existential weakness
that I see right now are the water
desalination plants, especially Qatar,
Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE
rely on more than half roughly
for their entire water
supply on the Asian plants,
which is this red bar.
So these are sitting ducks.
And for drinking water, it's even worse.
99% of Qatar's drinking water
comes from these plants, 90% in Bahrain.
And while in Saudi Arabia it is way less.
I'm still betting that you will see
a humanitarian disaster
if Iran destroys them all.
Entire cities would have to be evacuated.
It would be terrible.
Yet again, this could
then also mean that the immigrants
go home
while the native population are evacuated.
Yet then again, this could also mean
that the immigrants will go home while
the native population will be evacuated
to further inland Saudi Arabia.
From there, they could regroup.
And because their central bank wealth
and wealth funds will be unaffected.
After all, these are global.
On top of that,
the foundation of their economy
is their massive oil wealth.
It will all still be there on the ground.
A lot of that infrastructure
then there will be lost.
Of course, now could be rebuilt
once the Iranian regime is out.
So honestly, even in a complete disaster
scenario, the Gulf countries
look more resilient
than I initially thought.

</details>

### 宏观经济风险传导与伊朗的战略困境

总而言之，海湾经济体确实面临着巨大的风险敞口。若冲突持续，可能引发规模空前的经济破坏，迪拜、卡塔尔、巴林多年来为实现经济多元化所做的努力，以及作为一个全球安全港的地位，正面临严峻考验。对海水淡化厂的依赖，可能导致严峻的人道主义灾难。然而，在最极端的战争情景下，海湾经济体的崩溃可能性，比最初分析霍尔木兹海峡依赖度时预期的要低。这正如朋友失业并损失一半财富，但仍保有其法拉利收藏，其整体状况并非一无所有。迪拜的商业模式岌岌可危，沙特阿拉伯的“线性城市”（The Line）等昂贵项目也面临不确定性。

即使在乐观情景下，海湾国家仍将经历严重衰退，复苏之路可能漫长。更糟糕的是，若其被迫出售财富，或大量低收入的南亚移民被迫离开，将对埃及、约旦、巴基斯坦和孟加拉国等负债累累的国家造成巨大冲击。

与此同时，伊朗自身也存在诸多脆弱性。其石油出口同样高度依赖霍尔木兹海峡，且能源设施高度集中在一个岛屿上。伊朗也依赖沿海的水电站，并且缺乏海湾国家那样的金融缓冲。为了更深入理解这些复杂动态，强烈推荐参考《经济学人》的分析，特别是关于伊朗如何通过霍尔木兹海峡赚取石油出口收入，以及伊朗是否会因战争拖延而“过度出牌”的分析。此外，关于在当前海湾战争中，水资源可能与石油同等关键的分析，也揭示了伊朗的脆弱性。这些文章能够提供更广阔的视野，帮助读者独立思考。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

So in conclusion, yes, the Gulf
economies are exceptionally exposed.
If this war continues,
we could see an economic destruction
on a truly gigantic scale.
All the economic diversification
efforts of Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain,
all what they've worked for for years,
even decades, it is now truly all at risk.
And given their dependance on desalination
plants for water, we could even see
a major humanitarian disaster
if the war escalates.
However, honestly, in a true
all out war scenario, the Gulf
economies are less likely to collapse
than I thought.
When I first started my analysis
and found out how much they depended
on the Strait of Hormuz.
It's like if you hear that your friend
just lost his job and half his wealth.
Of course, your first reaction might be
that you think that he is ruined
until you find out he still has half
of his Ferrari collection left.
I think that analogy
kind of sums it up for me.
Those are the Gulf states.
That being said,
these guys have worked for years and years
to become a global safe haven,
and that status is now truly under threat.
Dubai's entire business
model looks very shaky indeed.
And what will happen to Saudi
Arabia's ultra expensive megaprojects
like the line?
Even in our optimistic scenario,
the Gulf states are still facing
a major recession,
and it may take years for them to recover.
But perhaps even worse, if they are forced
to start selling their wealth.
And if
many poor
South Asian immigrants are forced to leave
the Gulf states and go back home,
who is really in trouble?
That's right.
Poor and indebted countries
like Egypt, Jordan,
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
But I have to do a follow up
analysis on that soon.
So let me know if you want to see that.
Finally, there is, of course, Iran itself,
which has many of the same
vulnerabilities that the Gulf has its
oil also has to go
through the Strait of Hormuz,
and it's all concentrated
on a single island.
And it also relies a lot on water
desalination plants all across its ghosts.
And very crucially,
it does not have the same
financial buffers
that the Gulf countries do.
So to get a better sense of that,
I highly recommend
you check out the excellent analysis
by our advertising sponsor, The Economist.
Specifically, I urge you to read this
analysis on how Iran is still making
lots of money from its oil exports
through the Strait of Hormuz.
And on this analysis on
how not just the US.
Also, Iran still risks overplaying
its hand by dragging the war out longer.
And then to better understand
the ultimate doom scenario, I recommend
you read their take on why,
in the current Gulf
War, water may prove as decisive as oil,
which goes into why Iran is vulnerable
as well as these article show,
The Economist delivers insights to let
you see the bigger picture
and think for yourself.
This is why I have almost always
relied on their analysis for my research,
and it's why I highly recommend
you subscribe to The Economist,
which I'm excited to say has agreed
to give a special 35% discount
exclusively for money and macro viewers.
Whether you want daily journalism
in the Economist app,
or you are like me
and prefer to catch up on the global
economy during the weekend
with a nice cup of coffee
and the paper edition,
you'll always stay on top of the latest
global developments and support journalism
that values
factual information, integrity
and an independent point of view.
So don't miss out!
Click the link in the description or top
comment below,
or head over to economist.com/money
Macro to claim
your exclusive 35% discount today.

</details>