--- author: TVO Today date: '2026-02-19' guest: '' layout: post.njk source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hucodhEMlNk speaker: TVO Today tags: - foreign-interference - china-canada-relations - national-security - economic-coercion - geopolitical-strategy title: 中国对加拿大民主的渗透与影响：历史、策略与应对 summary: 本访谈深入探讨了中国长达五十余年针对加拿大的隐蔽行动，包括其历史渊源、干预手段（如影响舆论、窃取知识产权、经济胁迫）以及与传统游说活动的区别。专家指出，中国已成为加拿大情报部门认定的头号威胁，并分析了其在贸易、科技及国家安全领域带来的风险。访谈还对比了加拿大与美国应对中国挑战的策略差异，并提出了建立外国代理人登记制度等建议，以维护加拿大主权和民主制度。 insight: '' draft: true series: '' category: geopolitics area: geopolitics project: [] people: [] companies_orgs: - PRC products_models: [] media_books: - 'Under Assault: Interference and Espionage in China''s Secret War Against Canada' status: evergreen --- ### 中国干预历史溯源 **主持人**: 丹尼斯·莫利纳罗（Dennis Molinaro）是加拿大联邦政府前国家安全分析师和政策顾问，也是《受攻击：中国秘密对加拿大战争中的干预与间谍活动》（Under Assault: Interference in Espionage in China's Secret War Against Canada）一书的作者。他今天来到演播室。您好，先生。
Original English **Host**: Dennis Molinaro is a former national security analyst and policy adviser for the Canadian federal government, and the author of Under Assault Interference in Espionage in China's Secret War Against Canada. And he joins us in studio. How are you doing, sir?
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 我很好。您呢？
Original English >> Very well. How are you?
**主持人**: 我很好。我们先来上一堂历史课。您在书中提到，中国针对加拿大的隐蔽行动可以追溯到 50 多年前，也就是皮埃尔·特鲁多（Pierre Trudeau）总理时期。这背后是什么故事？
Original English >> I'm doing great. Let's start with a little history lesson here. You say in your book that China's covert actions against Canada go back over 50 years to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. What's the story there?
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 哦，这背后确实有个故事。是的。这可以追溯到中华人民共和国（PRC）寻求获得世界承认的时期，当时共产党希望其政府被承认为中国的唯一执政政府。我从解密文件中了解到，当时一位名叫林保（Paul Lin）的关键人物在推动中国获得承认方面发挥了重要作用，他试图与各国的政府成员、学者、各类政策制定者会面。而通过记录发现，他实际上是加拿大皇家骑警（RCMP）所称的中国“影响代理人”。这确实改变了我们对干预和影响何时开始的认知，因为这表明其历史可能比我们原先认为的要早得多。
Original English >> Oh, there's a story. Yeah. So it goes back really to the time when the PRC, the People's Republic of China, was looking to get recognised by the world and the Communist Party wanted their government recognised as the sole government in charge of China. And so what I learned from declassified documents was essentially one of the principal actors of that era. An individual named Paul Lin was very influential in speaking out in terms of recognition of China that it needed to happen, trying to meet with government members of government, academics, policymakers of all kinds internationally. And it turns out through the records that he was actually an agent of influence, as the RCMP put it, for China. And that really started to change the story of when did interference and influence start? I mean, because it started to look like it was a lot earlier than we may have thought.
### 干预与游说的界限 **主持人**: 当我们谈论干预时，我想确保我们能区分清楚。我们如何区分外国干预和，比如说，游说？
Original English >> When we talk about interference, I want to make sure we distinguish. How do we distinguish between foreign interference versus, say, lobbying.
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 隐蔽性是主要区别，对吧？当某事是隐蔽的，在幕后进行时，它就与公开、合法的游说工作区分开来。当它转向隐蔽领域时，通常可能更具恶意。所以我们关注的是受外国国家指使的恶意活动。
Original English >> The covert aspect is the main element, right? So when when something is covert and being done behind closed doors, that's when it changes from something that is really open and legitimate type of lobbying work. When it shifts into the covert space, it becomes generally could be more nefarious. And so that's really what we're looking at is nefarious activity that is at the behest of a foreign state.
**主持人**: 请举个例子。
Original English >> Give me an example.
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 当然。你可以想象一下，如果我们在谈论中国，就像我们今天这样，试图影响一位社区领袖，让他不要公开批评中国。所以，试图影响社区成员不要发声。有人可能在加拿大境内为中华人民共和国（PRC）秘密地做这件事，而不申报其活动，秘密地为该国工作，骚扰异见人士，或者影响政界人士采取某种政策立场，甚至通过建立合作关系来窃取知识产权。
Original English >> Sure. So, well, you could think about trying to influence a community leader to not speak out against China in some way if we're talking about China, which we are today. So trying to influence community members not to. So somebody could be covertly doing that for the PRC, for China, within Canada, not declaring that activity so secretly working for the state and harassing dissidents or harassing people could be influencing politicians to take a certain policy line, could be stealing intellectual property by getting into partnerships.
### 中国渗透的领域 **主持人**: 丹尼斯，大多数观众和听众可能熟悉围绕选举干预的指控，但中国还针对哪些其他领域？
Original English >> Dennis, most viewers and listeners may be familiar with the allegations around election interference, but what other areas has China targeted?
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 正如我提到的，还有其他一些领域，比如研究合作。这可能涉及与中国机构或公司建立合作关系，而这些机构或公司可能受到国家影响。试图与学者合作，建立研究和资金合作协议。而在幕后，可能存在转让知识产权的条款。这是另一种试图施加影响并为中国获取战术优势的方式。
Original English >> So as I mentioned, a little bit of other areas like research partnerships. So it would be trying to partner with a Chinese institution or company, maybe that's got a state linked influence, trying to partner with academics, trying to form partnership agreements for research and for funding. And behind the scenes, there are clauses to turn over intellectual property. So that's that's another way of trying to influence and trying to gain tactical advantage for China.
### 贸易与干预的关联 **主持人**: 当我们谈论贸易和干预时，这看起来是怎样的？
Original English >> When we talk about trade and interference, what does that look like?
**丹尼斯·莫利纳罗**: 贸易是另一个长期存在的领域，中华人民共和国（PRC）一直试图建立贸易联系，以获取不同技术。同样，知识产权也是如此。但在当前现代时代，如果我们谈论贸易，那么我们可能在谈论中国的电动汽车（EVs），对吧？这里的风险开始显现：一是中国的战略性商品和技术进入北美供应链，这会成为一个问题，尤其考虑到我们与美国的关系以及一体化的汽车行业。你还会看到一些公司传统上受到国家的大量补贴，这会损害加拿大劳工和制造商的利益。还有一些不常被谈论的途径，因为在中国，许多公司被纳入所谓的“军民融合”体系。这意味着这些公司直接或间接为中国的军事野心做出贡献。如果我们的技术、汽车或其他产品依赖于与中国有军民融合联系的公司，那么我们就是在间接协助中国人民解放军（PLA）。
Original English >> Trade is is another one that has a long history in terms of the PRC looking to build trade linkages, which would give them access to different technologies. Again, intellectual property over time, but also in this case, if we're talking about trade in the present modern day era, then we're talking about potentially PRC EVs, right? So the risks here start to become one. Chinese goods and technologies that are strategic, entering into