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>> Hello
and
welcome
to
another
episode
of
the
OddLotss
podcast.
I'm
Joe
Weisenthal
>> and
I'm
Tracy
Aloway.
>> Tracy,
you
know,
we're
several
months,
I
guess
like
five
months
or
so,
recording
this
September
16th.
5
months
or
so
since
liberation
day,
since
the
uh
trade
war
started.
>> By
and
large,
>> the
world
is
still
kind
of
working,
right?
You
could
see
its
effects
for
sure
in
certain
categories
and
so
forth,
but
by
and
large,
I
don't
think
the
contours
of
the
economy
look
that
much
different
than
they
did
say
in
March
or
April.
>> Look,
I'm
still
missing
my
auction
item
that's
supposed
to
be
mailed
from
the
Netherlands.
So,
it
has
affected
me
directly.
>> Wait,
what
happened
with
it?
Wait,
wait.
Say
more.
Say
more
about
So,
I
I
won
something
from
a
Dutch
auction
house
and
um
they
were
supposed
to
mail
it
in-house
shipping
and
instead
of
mailing
it,
they
sent
out
an
email
saying
that
they
can't
mail
it
because
everyone's
trying
to
figure
out
the
new
tariff
schedule
and
customs
and
things
like
that.
I
still
haven't
heard
from
them,
but
it
still
feels
like
something
happened.
There
was
some
sort
of
rupture.
kind
of
hard
to
imagine
going
to
a
March
2025
world
again,
but
also
hard
to
imagine
going
to
a
pre-Trump
one
world
ever.
Like,
it's
hard
for
me
to
imagine
that
in
my
lifetime
that
there
will
ever
be
a
sort
of
2015
style
trading
relationship
between
the
US
and
China.
>> I
could
be
wrong.
>> Never
say
never,
but
>> it's
just
hard
for
me
to
see
at
this
point.
>> At
this
point,
like
it's
not
a
single
administration
thing,
right?
We've
had
Trump
1.0
And
then
Biden
continued
a
lot
of
the
tariffs
and
even
added
some
new
ones.
And
then
we
have
Trump
2.0
which
is
arguably
going
even
harder
on
China.
So
it
does
seem
like
at
least
a
durable
trend,
not
a
flash
in
the
pan.
>> And
as
we've
discussed,
you
mentioned
the
fact
that
Biden
was
a
continuation
arguably
an
expansion
of
Trump
won
particularly
with
some
of
the
export
restrictions
on
technology.
Um,
yeah,
this
is
one
of
the
rare
trade
rethinking
the
global
trading
system,
whatever
that
means,
is
one
of
the
rare
areas
of
bipartisan
consensus
in
DC
as
has
come
up
in
many
episodes.
>> Yeah,
that
and
housing
uh
that
and
housing,
right?
That
housing
is
very
expensive.
We
really
do
have
the
perfect
guest.
Someone
who
has
a
very
big
picture
view
on
trade.
Someone
who
has
been
directly
involved
in
trade
negotiations.
Someone
who
remembers
the
sort
of
pre-Trump
one
>> the
long
long
long
ago
the
long
long
long
ago
global
trading
system
and
uh
who
could
talk
about
whatever
remnants
of
that
are
left
or
even
maybe
who
can
explain
to
me
what
the
global
trading
system
was.
We're
going
to
be
speaking
with
Michael
Froman.
is
the
president
of
the
council
on
foreign
relations
and
he
was
the
former
US
trade
representative
during
the
Obama
uh
Obama
2
administration
2013
to
2017
has
continued
to
write
a
lot
about
this
topic
so
uh
Michael
Frman
thank
you
so
much
for
uh
coming
on
outlaws
thrilled
to
have
>> thanks
for
having
me
>> absolutely
what
does
the
US
trade
representative
do
you
you
had
that
job
I
actually
realize
I
don't
really
know
>> like
it's
fine
it's
a
great
job
um
uh
it
really
has
the
function
of
negotiating
trade
agreements
okay
um
and
enforcing
US
trade
rights
under
previous
agreements.
Um
the
reason
I
love
the
job
is
that
it
combines
high
diplomacy,
sitting
down
with
ministers,
presidents,
prime
ministers
of
other
countries
trying
to
reach
agreements
with
having
to
have
a
really
detailed
understanding
of
elements
of
the
US
economy.
I
mean,
I
learned
more
from
American
farmers
teaching
me
the
500
things
you
can
do
with
a
molecule
of
milk
and
how
they
manipulate
a
molecule
of
milk
to
to
circumvent
trade
restrictions
and
get
around
tariffs.
You
export
it
as
butter
or
as
whey
or
as
low
calorie
powder
or
whatever.
>> This
is
a
whole
episode,
right?
A
whole
episode
right
there.
But
that's
only
one
example
of
of
the
literally
thousands
of
issues
you
have
to
learn
as
US
trade
rep
to
be
able
to
sit
down
with
your
counterparts
in
other
countries
and
negotiate
agreements.
>> Can
you
give
us
an
idea
or
a
sense
of
the
average
negotiation?
What
exactly
is
the
process?
Like
do
you
meet
for
the
first
time
in
a
designated
room
somewhere
or
is
there
prep
that
goes
into
these?
You're
exchanging
emails.
What
exactly
happens?
So
in
the
in
the
in
the
past
and
of
course
it's
a
very
different
situation
now
but
in
the
past
the
US
or
another
country
might
come
up
with
an
idea
of
what
they
wanted
to
do
in
a
trade
negotiation
a
set
of
issues
they
wanted
to
take
on
a
set
of
countries
they
wanted
to
negotiate
with
and
they
would
go
around
and
do
consultations
with
other
countries
float
the
ideas
see
what
kind
of
feedback
they
got
and
scope
out
the
nature
of
the
negotiation.
Is
it
going
to
be
just
about
goods
and
tariffs?
Is
it
going
to
touch
upon
agriculture
and
regulations
and
services
and
labor
and
environment
and
all
various
other
issues
that
have
become
part
of
trade
negotiations
in
the
past
and
get
agreement
by
the
other
countries
that
this
was
the
agenda
and
then
in
the
past
usually
it's
the
US
that
has
been
sort
of
driving
the
agenda.
These
would
be
the
topics
we
would
deal
with.
The
US
would
come
up
with
proposals
of
what
are
the
disciplines
that
we
would
like
to
see
in
each
of
these
areas.
What
are
the
rules
that
we'd
like
to
see?
And
it
was
the
way
the
US
brought
other
countries
along
to
adopt
high
standard
rules
across
one
sector
or
one
subject
matter
or
or
another.
And
the
idea
was
uh
we
know
we
live
in
a
high
wage
um
highly
regulated
economy.
We
compete
with
economies
that
often
times
have
lower
wages,
lower
regulation.
And
if
we
could
raise
other
count's
standards
closer
to
our
own,
it
would
level
the
playing
field
for
American
workers
and
farmers
and
ranchers
and
make
it
easier
for
us
to
compete.
>> I
mean,
for
better
or
worse,
it
really
just
seems
like
a
totally
different
era.
Now,
the
idea
of
getting
to
the
idea
of
going
back
to
some
world
where
the
US
is
actively
working
with
a
bunch
of
country
on
rules
rather
than
rates,
tariff,
it
really
does
seem
it
seems
like
ancient
history.
It
just
seems
so
right.
>> Look,
I
think
that's
right.
First
of
all,
I
think
I
think
the
the
international
trading
system
had
been
under
stress
for
some
time.
President
Trump
in
some
ways
put
was
the
final
nail
in
the
in
the
coffin
of
it.
But,
you
know,
the
global
multilateral
rulesbased
system,
that's
like
the
WTO,
the
World
Trade
Organization,
where
160
plus
countries
got
together,
agreed
to
a
set
of
rules,
agreed
to
some
mechanisms
for
enforcing
those
rules
and
for
monitoring
them.
That's
been
under
stress
for
for
a
long
time.
There's
been
dissatisfaction
and
I
think
now
in
fact
is
you're
you're
right.
I
think
we
can't
go
back
to
the
way
things
were
pre-Trump.
We're
going
to
have
to
think
about
what
comes
next.
>> Just
to
play
devil's
advocate
for
a
second,
to
what
extent
did
we
actually
have
a
rules-based
trading
system
in
the
sense
that
everyone
was
actually
beholdened
to
the
same
limitations
or
the
same
rules?
Because
looking
back,
there
were
always
accusations
about
China
cheating
or
maybe
the
US
was
taking
advantage
in
in
some
way.
And
in
fact,
you
could
argue
that
that
sense
of
unfairness
is
kind
of
what
got
us
to
where
we
are
today.
So,
was
it
really
rules-based
for
everyone?
>> So,
I
think
we
have
to
look
back
at
the
the
whole
history
of
the
post-war
period.
Uh
because
for
decades,
China
wasn't
a
factor.
It
wasn't
part
of
the
global
trading
system.
It
wasn't
a
major
economy
and
it
was
the
US
and
Europe,
Japan,
others
who
came
together
to
really
form
this
set
of
rules
and
it's
never
a
perfect
system.
You
my
my
sense
is
you
what
what
rules
means
is
that
most
countries
follow
most
of
the
rules
most
of
the
time.
Not
that
it's
100%
perfection.
By
the
way,
that's
true
when
you
have
laws
in
the
United
States.
I
mean,
we
have
laws
in
the
United
States
because
people
do
commit
crimes.
The
existence
of
laws
does
not
prevent
people
from
committing
crimes.
That's
why
you
need
enforcement.
Same
thing
is
true
on
the
international
side.
Uh
as
well
the
big
difference
as
you
pointed
out
Tracy
is
when
China
became
a
major
factor
in
the
global
economy
and
began
to
integrate
globally.
Um
on
one
hand
there
was
an
opportunity
to
say
okay
this
is
an
opportunity
for
bring
China
into
the
global
system.
Get
them
to
adopt
these
set
of
rules
that
the
rest
of
us
have
all
agreed
to
because
they
appear
to
be
on
this
path
towards
market
reform,
openness,
liberalization.
Right?
I
think
what
happened
in
reality
is
that
that
trajectory
wasn't
as
linear,
didn't
go
as
far,
didn't
go
as
fast
as
people
anticipated.
And
what
we
did
not
anticipate
is
that
somebody
like
President
Xi
would
come
in
and
in
fact
stop
or
reverse
it.
And
so
now
we
have
an
economy
that
is
huge,
second
largest
economy
in
the
world,
biggest
manufacturing
part
of
the
uh
the
global
economy,
likely
to
be
accounting
for
something
like
45%
of
all
global
manufacturing
in
a
few
years,
which
is
the
biggest
that
any
country
has
ever
been
in
history.
And
it's
following
a
fundamentally
different
set
of
rules.
And
that
has
led
to
a
lot
of
the
stress
in
the
international
system.
[Music]
Can
you
explain
maybe
the
philosophical
premise
behind
the
idea
that
trade
with
China
I
guess
why
do
we
care
about
what
their
internal
rules
are
right
theory
of
trade
it's
sort
Okay,
they're
cheaper
for
whatever
reason
or
they're
more
efficient,
etc.
And
so,
you
know,
comparative
advantage,
we
benefit
from
that.
Why
does
the
global
trading
system,
why
is
it
or
was
it
or
is
it
premised
on
this
notion
that
all
of
the
participants
would
trend
in
some
sort
of
more
liberal
direction
with
their
domestic
economies?
You
know,
I
think
it's
because
the
actions
that
China
has
taken
domestically
to
drive
their
really
quite
remarkable
economic
growth
over
the
last
few
decades
uh
does
have
ramifications
outside
of
China
has
ramifications
for
the
rest
of
the
world
for
manufacturing
in
the
rest
of
the
world
for
for
other
factors.
And
so
it's
it's
not
something
that
can
be
limited
to
China.
If
if
China
gets
to
where
it's
going
because
it
steals
intellectual
property
uh
because
it
produces
overcapacity
so
it
produc
creates
far
more
factories
than
it
needs
to
for
the
reasonable
demand
for
a
product
in
order
to
drive
other
producers
out
of
the
market
in
other
countries
that
has
an
adverse
effect
on
us.
If
they
subsidize
stateowned
enterprises
um
or
even
private
enterprises
in
such
a
way
that
it
creates
this
unlevel
playing
field
then
it
affects
the
rest
of
us
as
well.
And
I
think
that's
what's
really
happened
is
that
uh
China
whether
it's
a
stateowned
enterprises
subsidization
intellectual
property
rights
theft
government
intervention
into
the
private
sector
all
towards
positioning
China
as
the
leading
manufacturer
but
it
has
come
at
the
expense
of
other
industrialized
countries
in
some
cases
other
emerging
economies
and
that's
why
there's
been
this
counter
reaction.
M
so
I
know
you
were
a
trade
representative
before
the
tensions
with
China
really
ramped
up
um
under
the
first
Trump
administration
but
how
were
you
thinking
back
then
about
incentivizing
other
countries
when
it
comes
to
trade
negotiations
like
carrot
and
stick
strategy
was
it
mostly
about
incentives
and
if
so
what
were
you
giving
them
or
was
it
sometimes
maybe
threats
>> so
you
have
to
use
both
I
think
on
the
threat
side
it's
not
really
threats
it
was
enforcement
that
we
would
bring
cases
against
countries
including
China
at
the
WTO
or
against
other
trading
partners
where
we
had
arrangements
uh
if
they
we
felt
that
they
were
violating
our
rights
under
those
agreements.
Uh
we
brought
during
the
Obama
administration
I
think
we
brought
the
most
cases
ever
brought
against
China.
We
won
all
the
cases
that
got
to
conclusion.
The
problem
was
China
would
find
ways
either
of
delaying
implementation
or
by
the
time
the
fix
was
implemented
the
relevant
industry
in
the
United
States
or
elsewhere
was
gone.
And
so
it
was
really
sort
of
cold
comfort
and
that's
one
of
the
challenges
I
think
that
we
saw
in
the
in
the
World
Trade
Organization.
I
think
on
the
incentive
side
that's
where
trade
agreements,
real
trade
agreements
come
into
play.
Uh
I
was
involved
in
something
called
the
Trans-Pacific
Partnership
which
was
12
countries
around
the
Asia-Pacific
region
that
were
working
on
opening
their
economies
to
each
other
abiding
by
a
high
standard
set
of
of
rules.
Some
of
the
countries
already
had
free
trade
agreements
with
us.
about
half
of
them
did.
So
we
weren't
giving
them
any
more
access
to
our
economy.
We'd
already
given
them
access,
but
at
the
table
we
had
Japan.
And
Japan
was
a
economy
that
had
never
really
opened
up
to
other
markets.
And
these
other
countries
knew
that
they
couldn't
get
Japan
to
open
on
their
own.
But
if
the
US
was
pushing
Japan
to
open,
they
would
benefit
from
it.
M
so
you
had
countries
like
Peru
or
Chile
who
had
already
had
free
trade
agreements
with
us
willing
to
raise
their
labor
standards
or
willing
to
enforce
environmental
laws
because
they
were
getting
access
not
to
our
market
but
to
Japan
and
that
incentive
was
one
that
was
powerful
for
them.
>> That's
a
very
uh
that's
a
very
interesting
dynamic.
talk
a
little
bit
more
about
those
years
2013
pre-Trump
and
the
actions
toward
China
because
if
you
said
by
that
point
Obama
had
already
introduced
a
record
number
of
actions
against
China
winning
many
of
them
or
winning
all
of
them
did
you
say
>> all
of
them
that
went
to
conclusions
all
of
them
that
went
to
conclusion
but
it
didn't
really
matter
because
either
there
was
some
way
to
evade
or
the
US
industry
had
been
decimated
was
there
something
pre-Trump
I
mean
I
don't
know
whenever
that
was
was
there
a
feeling
that
something
has
to
change
fundamentally
in
how
the
US
and
China
trade
or
the
rules
governing
that
trade
even
at
that
point.
>> No,
absolutely.
Look,
the
the
day
one
of
the
Obama
administration,
uh
the
the
world
had
been
involved
in
something
called
the
Doha
round
of
negotiations
at
the
World
Trade
Organization.
It
had
been
going
on
since
2001.
And
I
remember
going
to
a
G20
summit.
There
was
one
in
April
in
London.
and
all
the
other
leaders
around
the
table.
Here
was
the
new
president
of
the
United
States
on
their
mind
was
asking
him,
okay,
what
are
you
going
to
do
to
bring
the
Doha
round
to
successful
conclusion
this
year?
And
the
president
said,
"All
right,
we're
going
to
go
back
and
take
a
look
at
this."
And
he
asked
a
group
of
us
to
do
a
study.
And
by
the
summer,
uh,
we
had
come
back
to
him
and
said,
"This
Doha
round
isn't
going
to
get
done."
Uh
but
the
DA
round
was
founded
on
this
fundamental
premise
in
2001
that
basically
developing
countries
should
it
was
called
the
development
round
and
the
primary
beneficiaries
of
the
DA
round
would
have
been
developing
countries
not
industrialized
countries
and
the
fundamental
premise
was
developing
countries
shouldn't
have
to
live
by
too
many
rules.
industrial
countries
should
and
this
would
help
the
developing
countries
catch
up.
By
2009,
when
we
saw
what
had
happened
with
China
between
2001
and
2009,
there
was
no
way
that
an
agreement
that
gave
China
a
pass
on
rules
so
that
it
could
continue
to
expand
its
manufacturing
and
undermine
manufacturing
around
the
world
that
that
was
going
to
fly.
And
the
president
went
back
to
the
other
leaders
at
the
next
G20
meeting
and
said
the
Doha
round
is
not
going
to
get
done
on
the
path
that
is
currently
on.
And
I
remember
we
were
at
a
G20
summit
and
the
other
leaders
all
went
around
and
read
their
talking
points.
The
traditional
talking
point
at
the
time
was
a
Doha
round
will
get
completed
by
December
this
year
or
by
the
ministerial
this
year.
And
you
know,
President
Obama
intervened.
He
made
his
point.
the
other
leaders
read
their
talking
points
and
he
put
his
flag
back
up
and
said,
you
know,
you
guys
aren't
listening.
This
isn't
going
to
happen.
And
that
was
the
first
indication
that
something
needed
to
change.
Yeah.
And
then
we
were
sitting
down
with
the
Chinese
bilaterally
in
lots
of
consultations
um
sort
of
unending
consultations
and
we'd
have
this
conversation
with
them
and
remind
them
that
their
tremendous
success
was
based
on
a
benign
international
environment
the
capacity
to
export
to
the
rest
of
the
world
and
that
if
we
didn't
address
these
underlying
concerns
stateown
enterprises
subsidization
IPR
rights
etc
that
benign
international
environment
was
going
to
disappear
and
that
of
course
is
exactly
what's
happened
and
that's
the
bipartisan
consensus
against
China
that
has
now
emerged.
We
started
warning
them
of
that
back
in
2009
2010
and
I
think
we
made
some
modest
progress
during
the
Obama
administration
to
get
them
change
certain
certain
practices
but
by
the
time
President
Xi
came
in
and
made
it
clear
he
was
going
to
be
dominant
in
the
following
sectors
he
was
going
to
reduce
his
dependency
on
the
rest
of
the
world
and
increase
everybody
else's
dependency
on
China
the
the
game
was
over.
Actually,
this
leads
into
my
next
question,
which
is
we've
talked
a
lot
about
how,
you
know,
there
was
this
break
in
the
rules-based
liberal
trading
order.
Was
there
a
single
moment
where
you
went
like,
"Aha,
this
has
fundamentally
broken
instead
of
just
like
slowly
declining,
slowly
changing.
Was
there
something
that
sticks
out
to
you
about,
wow,
this
is
actually
changing
right
now?"
>> So,
I
I
think
that
Doha
moment
back
in
2009
was
one
of
them.
Um
uh
I
also
think
later
on
in
in
the
Obama
administration,
we
were
trying
to
negotiate
an
agreement
over
environmental
goods.
There
was
a
list
of
250
or
so
products
that
would
have
been,
you
know,
good
for
countries
to
buy
more
of
and
produce
more
of
because
it
was
good
for
the
environment,
for
climate
change
or
otherwise.
And
it
failed.
It
failed
over
bicycles.
that
between
China
and
the
EU,
the
EU
was
protecting
the
Polish
bicycle
industry.
The
China
wanted
to
put
bicycles
on
the
list
and
they
couldn't
agree
on
what
to
do
with
bicycles.
And
so
the
entire
agreement
fell
over
that
one
issue.
And
to
me,
it
sort
of
underscored,
okay,
we're
pretty
far
from
reaching
consensus
that
if
we
can't
reach
agreement
over
bicycles,
um,
we're
not
going
to
reach
agreement
over
things
that
are
much
more
meaningful.
>> Were
you
surprised
at
all?
I
want
to
we
start
to
move
a
little
bit
closer
to
the
present.
But
before
we
go
to
the
present,
was
it
inevitable
that
in
your
view
that
the
Biden
administration
ended
up
as
a
continuation
slashexpansion
of
some
of
the
Trump
restrictions?
Was
there
still
an
opportunity
to
turn
somewhere
closer
to
a
pre-Trump
path?
I
I
think
there
was
an
opportunity
to
make
some
changes
but
not
go
back
to
the
way
things
were
before.
The
the
Biden
administration,
for
example,
launched
a
review
of
the
China
tariffs.
And
I
think
in
many
respects,
the
B
administration
was
very
strategic
in
how
it
approached
export
controls
and
foreign
investment
constraints.
It
was
very
targeted.
The
tariffs,
they
launched
a
review
to
try
and
distinguish
between
strategic
and
non-strategic
tariffs.
Like
there's
a
case
to
be
made
for
tariffs
if
there's
unfair
trade
practices
or
if
it's
a
product
that
you
really
need
to
produce
here
in
the
United
States.
You
don't
want
dependency,
but
do
we
need
tariffs
on
t-shirts
and
underwear
and
socks?
Is
that
important
to
our
national
security?
Um,
and
they
never
got
themselves
to
the
position
of
reducing
those
tariffs.
And
to
me,
it's
not
a
necessarily
a
criticism
of
of
the
Biden
administration.
I
think
it
just
goes
to
show
that
tariffs
are
easy
to
put
on
and
hard
to
take
off
because
once
they're
on,
there
are
constituencies
of
that
are
supportive
of
them
and
any
movement
to
to
reduce
tariffs,
particularly
in
this
political
context,
is
seen
as
being
weak
on
China,
even
if
it
makes
pure
sense
from
a
economic
point
of
view.
You
know
who
who
is
hurt
most
by
tariffs
on
underwear,
t-shirts,
and
socks?
It
tends
to
be
low-income
Americans
who
spend
a
disproportionate
amount
of
their
disposable
income
on
imported
goods.
And
you
know,
we
could
afford
to
bring
in
those
products
from
China
without
questioning
our
national
security
without
losing
our
strategic
underwear
producing
capacity.
Although
I
think
the
US
military
does
actually
have
some
strategic
clothing.
There
are
restrictions
under
under
uh
uh
I
used
to
call
it
the
department
of
defense
uh
the
department
of
war
that
require
uniforms,
footwear
and
other
things
to
be
made
in
the
United
States.
>> Fun
fact,
how
would
you
actually
describe
the
current
state
of
the
global
trade
system?
Because
you
know
I'
I've
heard
people
say
there
are
shades
of
mercantalism,
protectionists,
that
sort
of
thing.
what
what's
your
description
of
where
we
are
right
now?
>> Well,
I
think
the
challenge
of
where
we
are
right
now
is
you
have
the
two
largest
economies
in
the
world
uh
the
US
and
China
basically
following
their
own
set
of
rules
rather
than
the
multilateral
rules-based
system
that
the
US
was
very
much
driving
the
creation
and
the
defense
of
over
all
these
um
over
all
these
years.
And
when
you
have
the
two
largest
economies
doing
that,
the
question
is
well
what's
what
are
the
other
economies
going
to
do?
Are
they
going
to
start
imitating
the
US
or
China?
Will
they
continue
to
abide
by
the
rules
if
nobody
else
does?
Uh
I
think
they're
all
sort
of
wrestling
with
that
question
because
for
for
some
of
them
like
the
European
Union,
European
Union
is
more
ideologically
in
favor
of
free
trade,
integration,
the
rules
based
system.
The
whole
notion
of
the
European
Union
is
based
on
that
of
bringing
the
European
countries
together,
let
alone
the
rest
of
the
world.
So,
it's
harder
for
them
to
make
this
leap
than
it
has
been
for
for
the
United
States.
But
I
think
the
reality
is
is
that
the
the
system
is
under
is
under
great
stress
and
we're
going
to
have
to
think
through
how
does
it
evolve?
What
are
the
elements
of
it
that
we
want
to
try
and
preserve
or
or
reconstitute?
Um,
and
how
does
it
need
to
change
to
take
into
account
not
only
the
lessons
of
the
last
80
years
prior
to
Trump,
but
the
lessons
of
the
Trump
administration,
you
know,
some
of
which
will
be
instructive.
[Music]
Let's
talk
more
about
some
of
the
paths
that
things
could
go
because
I'm
thinking
about
setting
aside
even
the
Europe
Europe
and
the
US
uh
you
know
there
was
the
bricks
uh
gathering
recently
these
are
there
are
a
lot
of
countries
whose
own
developmental
trajectory
could
be
undermined
by
China's
manufacturing
success.
Right?
And
yet
perhaps
because
of
the
actions
of
this
administration
etc.
they
don't
feel
that
there
is
a
sort
of
comfortable
home
or
friend
in
DC
and
that
maybe
it
makes
more
sense
for
them
even
given
the
uh
competitive
challenges
to
be
uh
friendlier
with
Beijing
etc.
What
is
your
view
on
that?
Do
you
believe
there
could
be
a
new
I
mean
one
thing
we've
heard
we
were
talking
to
uh
we
recently
interviewed
Robert
Kaplan
vice
chairman
over
at
Goldman
Sachs.
His
view
was
globalization
is
alive
and
well.
It's
just
that
the
US
isn't
really
part
of
it
and
that
we're
actually
reemerging
uh
sort
of
free
trade
etc
except
it's
with
China
at
the
helm.
Is
that
a
fair
characterization?
Like
what
is
happening
with
these
massive
other
countries
as
they
think
about
who
their
partners
and
friends
are?
So
first
of
all,
I
I
think
uh
I
think
globalization
is
not
over.
Other
countries
continue
to
move
ahead
to
integrate
their
economies.
European
Union
has
signed
additional
trade
agreements
with
with
Americaur.
They're
working
on
one
with
with
uh
India.
Africa
has
a
continentalwide
free
trade
agreement
signed
a
few
years
ago
that
they're
in
the
process
of
of
implementing.
So
I
think
uh
uh
Robert
Kaplan's
observation
that
it's
the
US
that
has
exempted
itself
is
to
a
certain
degree
correct.
I'm
not
sure
the
next
step
is
that
this
is
all
going
to
shift
to
China
and
it's
going
to
be
a
Chinaled
block
because
there's
no
country
that's
more
concerned
about
the
potential
adverse
impact
of
Chinese
exports
on
their
own
manufacturing
and
economic
aspirations
than
than
India.
India
and
you
could
add
Brazil,
you
could
add
Indonesia,
you
could
add
South
Africa.
They're
all
deeply
concerned
that
if
the
US
and
Europe
begin
to
close
their
markets,
all
that
excess
capacity
from
China
has
to
go
somewhere
and
it
could
well
get
dumped
in
their
markets
and
hurt
their
capacity
to
build
up
their
manufacturing
uh
base
as
well.
And
so
I
I've
been
of
the
view
that
you
know
we
we
had
this
the
the
cold
war
was
about
bipolarity,
US
Soviet
Union.
the
the
wall
came
down,
Soviet
Union
was
dismantled,
and
that
was
kind
of
a
unipolar
moment.
That's
over
now.
That
30-year
period
is
over.
What
we
have
now
isn't
multipolarity.
It's
not
like
you've
got
two
or
three
camps
that
do
everything
together.
A
China
camp,
a
US
camp,
some
other
camp.
I
think
it's
really
more
akin
to
like
polyamorous
life,
right?
Like
in
India
is
the
perfect
>> We
got
our
episode
title.
>> That's
right.
India
is
the
greatest
is
the
greatest
example
of
this.
India
loves
the
United
States
at
least
until
recently
for
technical
technological
cooperation
for
uh
civil
nuclear
cooperation
for
investment
for
the
relationship
between
the
Indian
diaspora
and
our
you
know
entrepreneurial
um
uh
ecosystem
here.
They
love
Russia
for
oil
for
arms.
They
love
Iran
for
oil.
They
love
and
they
hate
depending
on
the
day.
Um
they've
had
it's
one
of
the
countries
they've
gone
to
war
with,
you
know,
on
their
border.
They've
had
skirmishes.
People
have
died
in
armed
conflict
between
India
and
China.
But
then
as
you
saw
recently,
there
was
a
a
conference
in
China
where
you
had
uh
Modi,
she
and
Putin
holding
hands
uh
walking
down
the
red
carpet
together.
So
I
think
India
is
is
archetypal
example
of
trying
to
play
these
relationships.
They
always
were
during
the
Cold
War
too,
right?
They
were
they
were
nonaligned
country,
right?
I
mean,
it's
changed
now.
Then
they
were
non-aligned.
Now,
I
think
they're
multi-aligned.
So,
they'll
be
aligned
with
the
polyamorous.
And
but
you
you
could
use
the
same
analysis
to
I
think
cover
a
lot
of
other
countries,
a
lot
of
the
other
middle
countries.
>> That
makes
it
a
much
more
complicated
world.
You
know,
in
retrospect,
the
Cold
War
was
very
simple.
Was
black
and
white.
You
were
with
us.
You're
with
the
Soviet
Union,
you
know,
and
there
were
some
proxy
wars
in
between,
but
it
was
pretty
it
was
pretty
simple.
This
is
much
more
complicated
and
it
it
leads
to
the
the
view
that
you're
going
to
have
to
be
very
proactive
and
creative
in
creating
coalitions
of
the
willing
around
various
issues
because
sometimes
India
might
be
in
it,
sometimes
they
might
not,
sometimes
China
might
be
in
it,
sometimes
not.
And
and
I
think
that's
the
the
challenge
for
for
the
United
States
to
continue
to
exert
leadership
going
forward.
>> How
resilient
would
those
smaller
coalitions
of
the
willing
actually
be?
because
I
can
imagine
maybe
it's
easier
to
negotiate
with
a
smaller
group.
Maybe
you
don't
get
caught
up
in
debates
over
bicycles
and
things
like
that.
But
on
the
other
hand,
if
you
don't
have
like
a
big
trading
partner
who
is
necessarily
driving
the
agenda,
it
seems
like
it
might
be
a
little
bit
more
difficult
to
enforce.
I
think
you
need
a
combination
of
smaller
groups
of
like-minded
countries
but
it
does
to
your
point
Tracy
require
leadership
and
in
the
past
the
US
has
been
a
leader
of
it.
I
mean
you've
got
some
very
strong
examples
like
NATO
you
know
a
military
alliance
is
the
strongest
example
of
a
pluralateral
group
so
something
less
than
the
whole
world
but
of
like-minded
countries
that
have
agreed
to
do
certain
things
together
because
they
have
a
common
interest
to
do
so.
I'm
not
sure
it
would
exist
without
US
leadership
and
US
driving
it
going
forward.
That
was
true
of
the
Trans-Pacific
Partnership
uh
as
well.
I
think
it
could
be
true
of
of
a
number
of
these
other
things.
And
by
the
way,
China's
very
good
at
this.
I
mean,
the
the
conference,
the
Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization
Conference
that
they
recently
held
uh
where
where
Modi
and
others
were
present,
that's
a
good
example
of
them
pulling
together
coalitions.
Um
uh
bricks
is
another
good
example.
Now,
we
can
talk
about
the
strengths
and
the
weaknesses
of
bricks
and
where
the
countries
actually
have
common
interests
and
conflicting
interests,
but
it's
that
kind
of
drive
that
you
need
a
leader
and
you
need
a
group
of
like-minded
countries.
Let's
talk
a
little
bit
more
about
some
of
these
tensions
that
emerge
because
it
does
sound
like
you
know
bricks
bricks
is
a
nice
acronym
that
Jim
O'Neil
from
Goldman
Sachs
asset
management
came
up
with
in
2001
and
which
may
now
be
um
you
know
this
important
geo
uh
geopolitical
entity
we'll
see
we
don't
really
know
for
sure
yet
but
it
seems
like
one
possibility
is
that
okay
the
US
we
feel
that
we
need
to
have
in
key
strategic
sectors
there's
some
sort
of
you
know
capacity
to
build
semiconductors
or
maybe
capacity
to
build
batteries
at
least
there
was
a
big
push
under
that
under
the
Biden
administration
of
course
China
has
that
and
it's
growing
I
mean
when
people
think
about
the
economy
going
forward
is
there
a
risk
that
essentially
every
country
feels
they
have
to
make
that
decision
that
India
feels
it
has
to
have
its
own
battery
making
capacity
that
Germany
feels
it
has
to
make
its
own
battery
making
capacity
and
that
there
is
a
sort
of
domino
effect
and
we
just
wind
up
in
a
much
costlier,
less
efficient
world.
>> Well,
I
think
we
are
heading
towards
a
costlier,
less
efficient
world.
I'm
not
sure
that's
necessarily
a
bad
outcome.
Okay.
in
that
um
to
to
go
down
the
path
of
greatest
efficiency
could
be
to
at
least
in
the
short
run
to
become
utterly
dependent
on
China
for
all
of
this
product
because
they
can
produce
things
cheaper
not
not
not
always
because
it's
cheaper
labor
but
because
they
become
very
efficient
infrastructure
massive
scale
massive
scale
and
I
think
the
question
is
is
it
is
it
a
good
thing
I
mean
is
it
that
the
US
have
a
battery
industry
and
that
Europe
have
a
battery
industry
it's
probably
a
good
thing
it
may
not
be
as
efficient
as
relying
completely
on
China,
but
having
that
diversification
particularly
over
the
long
run
is
a
positive.
Rule
number
one
of
of
risk
management,
diversification.
And
yet
we
became
very
complacent
and
very
uh
we
became
very
complacent
over
the
years
of
just
relying
on
China
as
our
manufacturing
floor.
And
now
I
think
companies
have
come
to
the
conclusion
whether
it
was
because
of
natural
disasters,
COVID
or
political
intervention
as
we've
seen
with
with
China
that
it's
it's
to
their
benefit,
their
economic
benefit
even
over
the
longer
run
to
diversify
even
in
the
short
run
if
it's
more
expensive.
M
with
your
trade
representative
hat
on,
can
you
maybe
say
something
about
how
you
view
military
strategy
and
I
guess
trade
and
this
idea
of
well
maybe
we
want
to
be
independent,
maybe
we
want
to
have
independent
capacity
in
something
that's
strategically
important
like
semiconductors
or
I
don't
know
making
ballistic
missiles
or
something
like
that.
How
does
the
US
government
actually
think
about
the
relationship
between
trade
and
military
might?
So
I
think
over
time
uh
broadly
economics
and
national
security
have
converged
into
economic
security
and
we're
sorting
through
what
that
means
in
practice.
So
in
the
case
of
the
Biden
administration
they
talked
about
a
small
yard
and
a
high
fence.
So
take
a
limited
number
of
technologies
and
say
these
technologies
we
refuse
to
export
to
our
our
competitors
and
our
adversaries.
uh
we
refuse
to
uh
allow
them
to
buy
US
companies
that
specialize
in
those
technologies
and
refuse
our
companies
to
who
dominate
that
area
to
invest
in
in
China
and
give
them
their
capacity.
But
it
was
a
relatively
few
sectors
relatively
few
technologies.
The
question
is
is
is
there
a
inexraable
set
of
pressures
to
expand
that
yard
and
to
add
more
and
more
things
to
it
and
where
is
it
appropriate
and
and
where
is
it
not
appropriate
and
I
think
that's
what
we're
now
sort
of
of
wrestling
with.
We're
highly
dependent
on
China
for
all
the
ingredients
that
go
into
our
pharmaceuticals.
Do
we
feel
comfortable
with
that?
China's
done
nothing
to
say
they
would
cut
it
off
but
they
could.
And
we've
seen
recently
China
has
used
its
choke
point
capacity,
rare
earths,
magnets
to
demonstrate
that
it
has
leverage
too.
And
it
worked.
The
Trump
administration
raised
tariffs
to
145%
on
China.
China
restricted
the
export
of
certain
rare
earths
and
and
magnets.
And
suddenly
there
was
a
deescalation.
And
so
we
have
to
now
wrestle
with
that
and
decide
over
the
long
run
what
products
do
we
actually
need
to
be
made
in
the
United
States
because
they're
so
critical
to
national
security
or
our
sense
of
of
of
of
national
security
and
which
ones
and
this
is
where
there's
been
I
think
insufficient
attention.
Which
ones
can
we
rely
on
our
allies
and
partners?
Because
we
probably
can't
produce
everything
at
least
in
the
short
run
or
wouldn't
make
sense
to
produce
everything
ourselves.
But
can
we
rely
on
Canada
and
Europe
and
Japan
and
South
Korea
and
Mexico
for
some
of
this
production
uh
or
in
India?
And
how
do
we
differentiate
between
which
products
fit
in
what
group?
And
therefore
then
what
do
we
need
to
do
about
it
to
drive
production
here
where
necessary
and
to
develop
the
relationships
with
the
allies
and
partners
where
possible.
The
idea
of
friend
shoring
or
whatever
you
want
to
call
it
sounds
very
intuitive
and
it's
we
don't
need
to
build
a
ton
of
shipyards.
Maybe
we
could
get
the
Koreans
uh
to
do
that
for
us
or
I
don't
know
the
probably
the
Fins
are
good
at
it.
I'm
not
sure.
Uh
etc.
The
Fins
are
>> Oh,
the
Fins
are
the
icebreaker.
Yeah,
that's
right.
One
of
these
facts
that
we've
learned
over
the
years.
But
is
there
I
mean
when
you
look
at
the
current
administration,
do
you
see
anything
other
than
widening
a
gulf
between
those
partners?
Like
yeah,
it
sounds
great
to
have
a
nice
relationship
with
the
Koreans
for
them
to
build
more
ships
for
us
and
then
that
solves
the
problem
of
scale
and
redundancy,
etc.
But
in
practice,
from
your
perspective,
is
it
going
the
opposite
direction?
Well,
look,
I
I
think
one
of
the
challenges
of
of
any
administration,
but
it's
certainly
evident
in
this
one,
is
the
connecting
of
dots
between
one
policy
objective
and
another
policy
objective.
And
so,
uh,
yes,
in
the
short
run,
it
it's
going
to
take
us
a
while
to
build
up
our
ship
building
industry,
and
it's
going
to
require
a
lot
of
government
support,
and
it's
going
to
require
a
lot
of
policies
that
we've
not
yet
adopted.
Uh,
perhaps
it's
something
we
should
do,
but
it
will
take
years.
Yeah.
To
really
build
that
up.
In
the
meantime,
should
we
look
to
Korea?
Should
we
look
to
Japan?
Uh
should
we
look
to
Finland
for
the
ships
that
we
need
right
now?
That's
one
set
of
objectives.
Then
you
have
the
the
raid
on
the
Hyundai
plant,
which
was
another
set
of
objectives,
you
know,
objectives
around
migration,
illegal
migration
and
and
and
illegal
workers.
I
I
I
sometimes
wonder
whether
the
dots
are
being
connected
within
the
administration
or
whether
there's
a
view
and
they
may
be
right,
they
may
be
wrong
that
they
can
have
it
both
ways
that
they
can
come
down
on
Korean
workers
in
the
United
States
and
still
look
to
Korea
and
say
you
will
deliver
us
ships
and
share
your
expertise
and
technical
knowledge
and
all
that
and
help
us
build
ship
uh
building
here
in
the
United
States.
>> I
want
to
broaden
out
the
conversation.
>> Michael's
being
very
ambassadorial
by
the
way.
Anyway,
keep
going.
>> Of
course.
Um,
just
to
broaden
out
the
conversation
though,
back
in
March,
I
wrote
an
Odd
Thoughts
newsletter
titled,
"The
US
is
looking
a
lot
like
China."
I
got
an
enormous
amount
of
push
back
on
it,
but
you
actually
wrote
something
similar.
And
I
don't
even
have
a
question.
Just
tell
me
that
I
was
right.
>> Uh,
you're
right.
Um,
you
were
right.
Thank
you.
Look,
I
think
we
spent
years,
we
we
always
thought
there
was
a
theory
of
convergence
that
by
bringing
China
into
the
international
system,
we
would
become
more
alike.
Now,
our
view
was
they
would
become
more
like
us.
>> Like
us.
Yeah.
More
open,
more
liberal,
more
marketoriented.
And
we
used
to
go
to
them
and
lecture
them
about
don't
be
protectionist.
Uh
don't
restrict
foreign
investment
in
your
country.
Don't
don't
make
it
impossible
for
our
companies
to
invest
in
your
company.
Don't
engage
in
industrial
policy
and
subsidization.
and
don't
take
stakes
in
private
companies
and
and
intervene
in
in
the
private
sector.
And
now
what
are
we
doing?
We
are
protectionist.
Uh
we
have
restrictions
on
foreign
investment.
Uh
we
are
engaged
in
in
limited
industrial
policy.
And
now
we're
beginning
to
take
stakes,
government
stakes
in
private
companies.
So
rather
than
them
becoming
more
like
us,
we
have
become
more
like
them.
And
the
challenge
of
that,
I
think,
is
that
we're
now
competing
with
them
on
their
playing
field
under
their
set
of
rules.
>> I'm
not
at
all
convinced
that
we
can
compete
on
their
playing
field
as
well
as
we
can
compete
on
ours.
Uh
because
we
don't
have
unlimited
we
can't
go
to
Congress
and
say
give
us
unlimited
resources
to
invest
in
this
sector
after
after
that
sector.
Uh
we
can't
subsidize,
you
know,
the
the
the
commanding
heights
of
uh
of
the
technology
uh
competition.
And
I
think
it's
it's
unfortunate
because
I
think
the
Chinese
can
play
that
game
much
better
than
we
can.
>> Yeah,
I
think
this
is
a
really
important
point
because
when
we're
thinking
about,
you
know,
choke
points
in
terms
of
manufacturing
or
whatever,
China
has
the
most
experience
out
of
practically
anyone
in
the
world
of
like
building
up
strategic
capacity
and
doing
it
in
a
very
conscious
and
interventionist
way.
Well,
and
also
a
lot
of
that
sort
of
um
massive
uh
over
supply
that
people
call
it
is
maybe
to
some
extent
intentional
but
maybe
also
just
to
some
extent
a
a
function
of
their
provincial
versus
provincial
relationship
where
the
provinces
are
hyperco
competing
etc
for
market
share.
That's
just
a
dynamic
that
that
does
nothing
like
that
exists
in
the
United
States.
And
so
the
idea
of
moving
in
that
direction
all
kinds
of
conditions
either
by
design
or
just
sort
of
by
happen
stance
of
the
political
structure
of
the
system.
It's
just
very
different.
>> No,
exactly
right
Joe.
I
think
you
know
in
in
their
case
leadership
says
we
want
to
be
dominant
in
these
15
sectors.
Every
provincial
governor
looks
at
that
and
says,
"All
right,
I'm
going
to
take
my
local
state
judged
by
judged
ability
to
produce
this."
And
we
have,
you
know,
in
China,
I
think
there
are
over
a
hundred
EV
companies,
>> right?
>> You
know,
and
so
and
they're
producing
and
they
will
be
producing
enough
cars
for
to
meet
the
demand
of
the
entire
world.
So
where
does
that
leave
the
US
auto
sector?
Where
does
it
leave
the
the
European
uh
auto
sector?
Now,
in
our
case,
I
think,
you
know,
we've
effectively
kept
them
out.
We've
effectively
said
we're
not
going
to
have
Chinese
EVs
here,
at
least
at
the
moment.
Europeans
have
a
slight,
you
know,
more
schizophrenic
about
it.
They've
also
adopted
protectionism,
but
they're
more
open,
I
think,
to
having
uh
Chinese
imports.
>> What
does
that
mean
for
the
future
of
Volkswagen,
for
the
future
of
Renault,
for
the
future
of
the
other
auto
companies?
And
you
know,
in
that
case,
it
could
have
broad
political
implications
in
Europe
uh
as
well
over
time.
I
hesitate
to
ask
this
question,
but
is
there
anything
the
US
can
learn
from
China
in
terms
of,
you
know,
trade
and
building
out
strategic
industries?
>> Well,
look,
I
I
think
China,
we
we
shouldn't
make
China
to
into
more
than
it
is.
China's
made
huge
mistakes.
They've
wasted
hundreds
of
billions
of
dollars
um
on
bad
domestic
investments
and
they've
got,
you
know,
tremendous
challenges,
including
demographic
challenges
that
the
US
uh
uh
currently
does
doesn't
have.
Uh
and
so
we
shouldn't
make
them
out
to
be,
you
know,
12
feet
tall.
I
think
one
thing
that
is
current
is
to
think
through,
okay,
if
there
is
an
industry
that
you
think
is
important
for
national
security
or
otherwise,
what's
the
best
way
of
supporting
it
by
the
government?
Um
the
Trump
administration's
approach
I
think
has
been
based
largely
on
tariffs,
>> right?
That
if
we
create
this
wall
of
tariffs,
companies
will
have
to
produce
or
have
to
move
their
supply
chain
to
the
United
States.
Uh
and
that's
how
we'll
build
out
this
area.
I
think
what
we've
seen
in
China
is
that
yes,
they've
used
tariffs
and
other
restrictions.
They've
also
used
industrial
policy.
They've
also
invested,
subsidies,
credit,
free
energy.
you
know,
they've
also
invested
heavily
in
R&D
um
in
in
many
sectors,
the
life
sciences,
uh
obviously
AI
among
others,
government
subsidies
and
government
investment.
And
it's
that
combination
of
policies
that
probably
is
more
effective
than
tariffs
alone.
>> To
me,
the
concern
is
we
we're
approaching
this
from
a
position
of
that
tariffs
are
the
answer
to
everything.
We
know
what
the
cost
of
tariffs
are
and
we're
taking
a
gamble
on
whether
the
benefits
will
be
there
uh
and
whether
tariffs
alone
are
going
to
remanufacture
the
United
States
economy.
>> You
mentioned
that
some
degree
of
greater
redundancy
and
higher
costs
is
not
the
end
of
the
world
particularly
if
uh
there's
some
political
it
creates
some
political
sustainability.
What
is
what
does
the
um
the
left
tail
risk
looks
look
like
to
you?
What
is
the
scenario
in
which
things
really
the
wheels
really
come
off?
>> One,
the
US
doesn't
have
a
great
history
with
industrial
policy.
So,
if
we
were
to
multiply
our
efforts
in
in
various
ways
but
not
do
it
well,
that
would
uh
that
would
be
a
waste
of
resources
and
costs
that
we
didn't
need
to
need
to
incur.
I
think
if
we
don't
to
go
back
to
the
point
about
allies
and
partners,
if
we
insist
on
reshoring
everything
and
not
French
shoring
anything,
I
think
we
probably
lose
some
of
the
uh
economies
of
scale
um
and
some
of
the
comparative
advantage
that
we
have.
I
also
think
if
we're
if
the
if
the
existential
threat
is
competition
with
China,
if
they
are
the
pacing
challenge,
com
working
with
allies
and
partners
is
our
way
to
reach
scale.
Mhm.
We're
a
big
economy.
We're
the
biggest
economy
in
the
world.
But
when
it
comes
to
manufacturing,
we're
not
going
to
be
able
to
compete
with
China
alone
necessarily,
or
rather,
we're
going
to
be
able
to
compete
with
China
much
better
if
we
do
so
with
our
allies
and
partners.
>> I
have
just
one
more
question.
This
is
the
most
important
one.
How
good
are
you
at
Tradle?
>> Do
you
ever
play
that?
>> We
do.
I
I
we
I
love
these
games.
Tradal
and
World.
>> Oh,
World.
Yeah,
that's
the
other
one.
I
didn't
get
into
that.
>> Yeah.
Portradal
I
think
is
is
a
great
is
a
great
game.
I
don't
always
get
it
right.
U
but
I
uh
it's
it's
a
good
uh
it's
a
good
reminder
of
just
how
complex
certain
economies
are.
>> After
we're
done
with
this,
could
you
help
us
find
that
dairy
farmer
who
explained
the
500
different
>> Absolutely.
>> Absolutely.
It's
a
fascinating
uh
lesson.
>> Michael
Froman,
thank
you
so
much
for
coming
on
Oddlo.
>> Thanks
for
having
me.
>> Thank
you.
That
was
great.
[Music]
Tracy,
I'm
really
um
I'm
really
a
fan
of
this
neologism
or
wherever
it
came
from
the
the
polyamorous
world
order
because
you
know
people
talk
about
the
uh
the
G7
and
what's
his
name
talks
about
the
G0ero
and
then
other
people
talk
oh
bipolarity
but
uh
but
I
think
this
is
a
good
one.
It
is
kind
of
funny
to
me
that
there's
this
idea
out
there
that
just
because
Goldman
came
up
with
like
a
catchy
acronym
for
the
bricks
that
somehow
that's
going
to
like
create
a
new
strategic
coalition
from
countries.
We
should
have
Jim
O'Neal
on
to
talk
about
we've
never
talked
to
Jim
O'Neal
and
so
the
thought
of
him
coming
up
with
this
paper
these
are
going
to
be
the
big
economies
and
now
they
now
it's
a
rival
block
for
the
West
is
like
a
really
good
>> Oh,
that
would
be
really
interesting.
But
I
do
think
okay
one
thing
you
can
say
about
polyamorous
relationships
is
they
tend
to
come
with
a
lot
of
drama
right
and
so
it
it
definitely
feels
like
um
we're
going
to
have
more
instability
or
at
least
like
more
things
changing
more
things
in
flux
more
volatility
>> right
so
this
idea
that
I
I
I
find
it
compelling
this
idea
that
the
old
globalization
can't
just
be
replaced
with
the
same
globalization
except
the
leader
has
changed,
right?
I
mean,
the
US
was
this
huge
trade
deficit
country.
>> China
is
a
huge
trade
surplus
country.
That
naturally
means
that
its
relationship
with
all
of
its
partners
on
some
level,
even
if
it
wants
to
be
at
the
forefront
of
creating
new
tariff-free
zones,
etc.,
is
going
to
be
of
a
different
type
than
the
relationship
that
the
US
had.
>> Absolutely.
Shall
we
leave
it
there?
>> Let's
leave
it
there.
>> All
right.
This
has
been
another
episode
of
the
Odd
Thoughts
podcast.
I'm
Tracy
Aloway.
You
can
follow
me
at
Tracy
Aloway.
>> And
I'm
Jill
Weisenthal.
You
can
follow
me
at
the
stalwart.
Follow
our
guest
Michael
Froman.
He's
at
Mike
Froman.
Follow
our
producers
Carmen
Rodriguez
at
Kerman
Dashel
Bennett
at
Dashbot
at
Kalebrooks
at
Kalebrooks.
For
more
OddLots
content,
go
to
bloomberg.com/odlots
where
we
have
a
daily
newsletter
and
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of
our
episodes.
And
you
can
chat
about
all
of
these
topics
247
in
our
Discord,
discord.gg/odlots.
gg/odlotss.
>> And
if
you
enjoy
OddLots,
if
you
like
it
when
we
talk
about
the
future
of
global
trade,
then
please
leave
us
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positive
review
on
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And
remember,
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Thanks
for
listening.
[Music]
[Music]