---
author: New York Times Podcasts
date: '2026-03-30'
guest: ''
layout: post.njk
source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlFMdCWxbOg
speaker: New York Times Podcasts
tags:
  - iran-us-relations
  - negotiations
  - nuclear-program
  - geopolitical-strategy
  - economic-impact
title: 美伊冲突与谈判僵局：深度分析
summary: 本期播客深入探讨了美国总统特朗普寻求通过谈判结束与伊朗冲突的努力，以及伊朗方面因缺乏信任和地缘政治考量而表现出的犹豫。节目分析了美国提出的15点方案及其伊朗的反应，揭示了双方在核计划、经济制裁、地区稳定等核心议题上的分歧。同时，讨论了以色列在此冲突中的独特立场，以及战争对全球经济和政治格局产生的深远影响。最后，节目简要提及了美国国内的抗议活动和机场安保问题。
insight: ''
draft: true
series: ''
category: geopolitics
area: geopolitics
project: []
people: []
companies_orgs: []
products_models: []
media_books: []
status: evergreen
---
### 美伊僵持：谈判与冲突的十字路口

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 来自《纽约时报》，我是迈克尔·布巴罗。这里是《每日》播客。尽管**唐纳德·特朗普总统**（President Trump）曾威胁要升级冲突，但他似乎越来越决心通过**谈判**来结束与**伊朗**（Iran）的冲突。他的问题是：伊朗并不在同一频道上。今天，**大卫·桑格**（David Sanger）将讨论何时从战争转向**外交**的对峙。今天是3月30日，星期一。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: From
 the
 New
 York
 Times,
 I'm
 Michael


Bubaro.
 This
 is
 the
 Daily.


Despite
 his
 threats
 of
 escalation,


President
 Trump
 seems
 increasingly


determined
 to
 end
 the
 conflict
 in
 Iran


through
 negotiations.
 His
 problem:
 Iran


isn't
 on
 the
 same
 page.


Today,
 David
 Sanger
 on
 the
 standoff
 over


when
 to
 turn
 from
 war
 to
 diplomacy.


It's
 Monday,
 March
 30th.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 很高兴能与你通话，迈克尔。这个月真是疯狂。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Mr.
 Sanger,
 thank
 you
 for
 making
 time


for
 us
 on
 a
 Sunday
 of
 all
 days.


Great
 to
 be
 with
 you,
 Michael.
 What
 a


month.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 是的，的确如此。而且这场战争开始至今差不多整整一个月了。大卫，我想从一个在寻常情况下应该很简单，但现在却存在公开辩论和普遍困惑的“是”或“否”问题开始：**美国**（United States）目前是否正在与**伊朗**进行**谈判**，以结束这场战争？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Yes,
 indeed.
 And
 it's
 been
 exactly


pretty
 much
 a
 month
 since
 this
 war


began.
 And
 David,
 I
 want
 to
 start
 with


what
 should
 be
 a
 simple
 yes
 or
 no


question
 under
 ordinary
 circumstances,


but
 there's
 open
 debate
 about
 it
 and


genuine
 confusion.
 Is
 the
 United
 States


currently
 negotiating
 with
 Iran
 to
 bring


this
 war
 to
 an
 end?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**:  well，正如你所建议的，迈克尔，这比听起来要复杂得多。我可以说，简单来说，**美国**目前正在开展行动来促成与**伊朗**的**谈判**，但我不会说**谈判**已经开始。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 as
 you
 suggest,
 Michael,
 it's
 a


more
 complicated
 question
 than
 it
 sounds


like.
 And
 I
 would
 say
 the
 simple
 answer


is
 that
 the
 United
 States
 is
 engaging
 in


operations
 right
 now
 to
 shape
 a


negotiation
 with
 Iran,
 but
 I
 wouldn't


say
 the
 negotiations
 have
 yet
 started.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 让我来解释一下困惑的来源。上周，**特朗普总统**（President Trump）发表了非常明确的声明。我将引用他的话：“我很高兴地报告，美利坚合众国与伊朗这个国家，就中东地区我们之间敌对关系的完全和彻底解决，进行了非常好且富有成效的对话。” 好的，这是一个明确的**谈判**声明。几个小时后，**伊朗**政府发表了一份声明，说了完全相反的话：“我们否认美国总统唐纳德·特朗普关于美利坚合众国与伊朗伊斯兰共和国之间任何**谈判**的说法。”

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 let
 me
 highlight
 some
 of
 the


source
 of
 the
 confusion.
 Last
 week,
 we


had
 this
 very
 explicit
 claim
 from


President
 Trump.
 I'm
 going
 to
 quote
 him.


I
 am
 pleased
 to
 report
 that
 the
 United


States
 of
 America
 and
 the
 country
 of


Iran
 have
 had
 very
 good
 and
 productive


conversations
 regarding
 a
 complete
 and


total
 resolution
 of
 our
 hostilities
 in


the
 Middle
 East.
 Okay,
 that's
 that's
 an


explicit
 claim
 of
 negotiation.
 A
 few


hours
 later,
 Iran's
 government
 issues
 a


statement
 that
 says
 the
 precise


opposite.
 quote,
 "We
 deny
 what
 US


President
 Donald
 Trump
 said
 regarding


any
 negotiations
 between
 the
 United


States
 and
 the
 Islamic
 Republic
 of


Iran."

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 那么，他们两人在很大程度上都在撒谎，对吗？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: So,
 they
 were,
 both
 fibbing
 to
 some


considerable
 degree,

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 总统先生，你难道不震惊吗？你会相信谁呢？美利坚合众国总统还是**伊朗**政府？在这种情况下，我其实不会相信任何一方。总统想让人觉得，他通过强大的军事力量，导致**11,000**个目标被击中，迫使**伊朗**人最终坐上了**谈判**桌。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: huh?
 Both


the
 president,
 aren't
 you
 shocked?
 Who


are
 you
 going
 to
 believe
 here?
 The


president
 of
 the
 United
 States
 or
 the


Iranian
 government?
 And
 in
 this
 case,
 I


would
 not
 really
 believe
 either.
 The


president
 wants
 to
 make
 it
 sound
 as
 if


he
 has
 forced
 the
 Iranians


through
 the
 show
 of
 brute
 strength,
 that


has
 resulted
 in
 11,000
 targets
 being
 hit


to
 finally
 come
 to
 the
 negotiating


table.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 出于民族自尊和明智策略的考虑，**伊朗**人此时此刻想表明，他们不是在美国的 terms 下来**谈判**桌。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: The
 Iranians
 want
 to
 show
 for
 reasons
 of


national
 pride
 and
 good
 strategy
 at
 this


moment
 that
 they
 are
 not
 coming
 to
 the


negotiating
 table
 on
 America's
 terms.
 H

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 所以我们陷入了一种僵局，**伊朗**人基本上在说：“嘿，我们之所以还活着，就意味着我们在赢。”

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: and
 so
 we're
 at
 a
 bit
 of
 a
 standoff
 in


which
 the
 Iranians
 are
 fundamentally


saying,
 "Hey,
 we're
 winning
 by
 virtue
 of


the
 fact
 that
 we're
 still
 alive."

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 嗯。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Mhm.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 而**特朗普总统**则处于一个不寻常的境地，他不得不从呼吁无条件投降，转变为呼吁某种形式的** talks**（会谈）。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: And
 the
 president
 is
 in
 the
 unusual


position
 here
 of
 having
 to
 move
 from


calling
 for
 an
 unconditional
 surrender


to
 calling
 for
 some
 kind
 of
 talks,

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 对吧？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: right?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 而**talks**（会谈）几乎总是意味着妥协。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: And
 talks
 almost
 always
 mean
 compromise.

</details>

### 外交的动因与局限

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 那么，让我们稍微聚焦一下，为什么**特朗普总统**似乎如此热衷于为这场战争寻找一个**外交**的出路。因为尽管打击了**伊朗**的**11,000**个目标，**美国**不仅发现了其在**伊朗**的**军事力量**的局限性，还发现了其带来的**blowback**（反噬效应）及其带来的问题。正如我们在之前的节目中所建立的，**伊朗**政权遭受了重创，但并未崩溃。目前，**政权更迭**（Regime change）似乎不太可能。这场战争锁死了**霍尔木兹海峡**（Strait of Hormuz），使**全球能源行业**（global energy industry）陷入瘫痪。这场战争的**经济**（Economic）**repercussions**（连锁反应）每周都在增长。而**美国**的盟友并没有响应**特朗普**的号召参与进来。所以，**特朗普**正在寻找一种**外交**途径来解决所有这些问题。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 let's
 focus
 for
 a
 little
 bit
 on


why
 the
 president
 seems
 so
 invested
 in
 a


diplomatic
 off-ramp
 to
 this
 war.
 Because


despite
 striking
 11,000
 targets
 in
 Iran,


the
 US
 has
 discovered
 not
 just
 the


limits
 of
 its
 military
 force
 in
 Iran,


but
 the
 blowback
 and
 how
 problematic


it's
 become.
 And
 just
 to
 summarize
 what


we
 have
 established
 in
 previous


episodes,
 the
 Iranian
 regime
 is
 badly


diminished,
 but
 it's
 not
 collapsing.


Regime
 change
 is
 not
 in
 the
 offing
 at


the
 moment.
 The
 war
 has
 locked
 up
 the


straight
 of
 Hormuz
 and
 paralyzed
 the


global
 energy
 industry.
 Economic


repercussions
 of
 this
 war
 have
 grown


week
 by
 week.
 And
 US
 allies
 are
 not


answering
 Trump's
 call
 to
 get
 involved.


So
 Trump
 is
 looking
 for
 a
 diplomatic
 way


to
 end
 all
 of
 those
 problems.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 是的。他把自己置于了一个真正的困境中，正如你所建议的，他发现他所动用的**军事力量**并没有带来他所设想的那种**政治**结果，而且肯定没有在他设想的时间内带来。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Yeah.
 He
 has
 put
 himself
 in
 a
 real
 box


here
 where
 he
 has
 discovered
 as
 you


suggest
 that
 the
 kind
 of
 military
 power


that
 he's
 exercised
 has
 not
 brought


about
 the
 kind
 of
 political
 result
 that


he
 envisioned
 and
 it
 certainly
 hasn't


brought
 it
 about
 in
 the
 time
 period
 he


had
 in
 mind.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 嗯。他可以进行所有这些轰炸，但这并不一定会导致**政权更迭**。他可以试图加速**投降**，但如果**伊朗**人处理得当，**经济**影响就会不断扩大。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Mhm.
 that
 he
 can
 do
 all
 of
 this
 bombing,


but
 it
 doesn't
 necessarily
 lead
 to


regime
 change.
 That
 he
 can
 try
 to
 speed


along
 a
 capitulation,


but
 if
 the
 Iranians
 play
 it
 right,
 the


economic
 impact
 just
 keeps
 snowballing.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，大卫，考虑到这一点，请帮助我们理解**美国**为了将**伊朗**带到**谈判**桌而付出的努力，尽管迄今为止情况很混乱，但**技术**上来说，它们实际上是什么样的？**美国**的**outreach**（接触）进行了哪些？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 David,
 with
 that
 in
 mind,
 help
 us


understand
 what
 the
 US
 efforts
 to
 bring


Iran
 to
 the
 negotiating
 table,
 as
 messy


as
 they've
 been
 so
 far,
 what
 they


actually
 look
 like,
 kind
 of
 technically


speaking,
 what
 the
 US
 outreach
 has
 been.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，迈克尔，到目前为止的**outreach**（接触）基本上局限于一份两页的文件，上面有15项内容。其中12项是对**伊朗**的要求，3项是对**伊朗**的**提议**。但其本质是这样的，迈克尔：**伊朗**放弃任何成为**核武器**（nuclear weapon）制造者的希望，放弃任何可能导致**核武器**的步骤，将其**导弹**（missiles）**武器库**（arsenal）限制在无法触及**以色列**（Israel）的非常有限的数量。作为回报，**美国**提供了一些**incentives**（激励措施），首先是解除**制裁**（sanctions），这将为**伊朗**重新进入**国际经济**（international economy）提供一条途径。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 Michael,
 the
 outreach
 so
 far
 has


pretty
 much
 been
 limited
 to
 a
 two-page


document
 that
 had
 15
 items
 on
 it.
 Mhm.


12
 of
 them
 were
 demands
 on
 Iran
 and


three
 of
 them
 were
 offers
 to
 Iran.
 But


the
 essence
 of
 them
 is
 this,
 Michael,


that
 Iran
 gives
 up
 any
 hope
 of
 ever


being
 able
 to
 enrich
 nuclear
 fuel,
 do


any
 of
 the
 steps
 that
 could
 lead
 to
 a


nuclear
 weapon,
 that
 it
 limit
 its


arsenal
 of
 missiles
 to
 a
 very
 limited


number
 that
 can't
 reach
 Israel.
 And
 in


return,
 the
 US
 has
 provided
 some


incentives,
 starting
 with
 the
 lifting
 of


sanctions
 that
 would
 give
 Iran
 a
 pathway


to
 re-entering
 the
 global
 international


economy.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 明白了。那么，**伊朗**对这份15点**提案**（proposal）的回应是什么？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Got
 it.
 And
 what
 has
 Iran's
 response


been
 to
 that
 15-point
 proposal?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 你知道，回应有点像是一种“不回应”，迈克尔。它提出了他们自己的5个要点，基本上是以“让我们来谈谈你过去一个月对**伊朗****基础设施**（infrastructure）和人民造成的损害赔偿”开始。然后是，“哦，对了，我们希望你承认我们对整个**霍尔木兹海峡**（Strait of Hormuz）的主权”。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: You
 know,
 the
 response
 was
 kind
 of
 a


nonresponse,
 Michael.
 It
 was
 five
 of


their
 own
 points
 that
 basically
 started


with,
 "Let's
 talk
 about
 compensation
 for


all
 of
 the
 damage
 you've
 done
 to
 Iran's


infrastructure
 and
 people
 over
 the
 past


month.
 And
 oh
 by
 the
 way,
 we
 want
 you
 to


recognize
 our
 sovereignty
 over
 the


entire
 straight
 of


**Michael Bubaro**: Hormuz,


**David Sanger**: which
 we
 think
 is
 a
 pathway
 to
 expanding


what
 the
 Iranians
 have
 been
 doing
 in


recent
 days,
 which
 is
 charging
 a
 very


large
 toll
 for
 any
 ships
 that
 want
 to


make
 it
 through.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 对。这听起来不像双方在**谈判**什么问题上接近达成一致。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Right.
 That
 doesn't
 sound
 like
 two
 sides


being
 anywhere
 near
 close
 to
 even


agreeing
 on
 what
 they're
 negotiating.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 那是正确的。这也许可以解释为什么你听到**特朗普总统**从声称**伊朗**人想**谈判**，转变为声称如果**伊朗**人不**谈判**，他将给予他们更严厉的打击。但**幕后**，**美国**正在为**谈判**可能是什么样子做**提前**规划。事实上，他们曾希望**谈判**可能在这个周末就开始，但没有发生。那么，从**美国**有**谈判**计划，并且假设在这个冲突的某个时候会有**谈判**的程度来看，他们认为谁将是**美国**方面**谈判**的代表？以及这位**谈判**者将被授权获得和放弃什么？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: That's
 right.
 And
 it
 might
 explain
 why


you've
 heard
 the
 president
 move
 from


making
 the
 case
 that
 the
 Iranians
 want


to
 talk
 to
 making
 the
 case
 that
 if
 the


Iranians
 don't
 talk,
 he's
 going
 to
 hit


them
 even
 harder.
 But
 behind
 the
 scenes,


the
 US
 is
 thinking
 ahead
 toward
 what
 a


negotiation
 would
 look
 like.
 And
 in


fact,
 they
 had
 hoped
 that
 one
 might


begin
 as
 early
 as
 this
 weekend,
 but
 it


didn't
 happen.
 Well,
 to
 the
 degree
 that


the
 US
 has
 a
 plan
 for
 negotiation
 and


assumes
 that
 at
 some
 point
 in
 this


conflict
 there
 will
 be
 a
 negotiation,


who
 do
 they
 see
 as
 being
 the
 face
 of


these
 negotiations
 for
 the
 US
 and
 what


would
 that
 negotiator
 be
 empowered
 to


get
 and
 give
 up?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，他们还没有明确说谁会参加**谈判**，但他们**dangled**（抛出）了一个消息，即副总统**JD·万斯**（JD Vance）将领导这项工作。**政府**官员告诉我，这是为了向**伊朗**人发出信号，表明这是一次严肃的谈话，我们派出了该国排名第二的官员，被授权做出决定，并能让**特朗普总统**亲自通话。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 they
 haven't
 said
 precisely
 who


would
 participate
 in
 the
 negotiations,


but
 what
 they
 have
 dangled
 is
 that
 JD


Vance,
 the
 vice
 president,
 would
 lead


the
 effort.
 and
 administration
 officials


have
 said
 to
 me
 that
 this
 is
 an
 effort


to
 signal
 to
 the
 Iranians
 that
 this
 is
 a


serious
 conversation
 that
 we're
 sending


the
 country's
 number
 two
 official


empowered
 to
 make
 decisions
 and
 to
 get


President
 Trump
 on
 the
 phone
 on
 one


ring.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 哇。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Wow.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: **Negotiate**（进行谈判）。令人着迷的是，到目前为止，我们还没有看到**万斯副总统**（Vice President Vance）参与任何**谈判**。当然，**万斯**（Vance）是广为报道的、最不情愿开始与**伊朗**发生冲突的人，对吗？他曾对这场战争持怀疑态度，这是否可能使他在结束战争方面拥有更大的**可信度**？或者这仅仅是因为他是我们体系中排名第二的人物，应该为他作为**谈判**者增添一些声望和**可信度**？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: To
 actually
 negotiate.
 What's


fascinating
 about
 this
 is
 we
 haven't


seen
 Vice
 President
 Vance
 involved
 in


any
 of
 the
 negotiations
 to
 this
 point.


And
 of
 course,
 it's
 Vance
 who
 is
 widely


reported
 to
 have
 been
 the
 least


enthusiastic


about
 getting
 into
 a
 conflict
 with
 Iran


to
 begin
 with,
 right?
 Does
 the
 fact
 that


he
 has
 been
 skeptical
 of
 this
 war


potentially
 give
 him
 greater
 credibility


in
 bringing
 it
 to
 an
 end?
 or
 is
 this


simply
 just
 the
 fact
 that
 he's
 the


number
 two
 in
 our
 system
 that's
 supposed


to
 lend
 some
 prestige
 and
 credibility
 to


the
 idea
 of
 him
 as
 a
 negotiator?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 我认为，迈克尔，这包含了所有这些因素。**伊朗**人认为他可能是他们最想与之交谈的对象，因为他们认为他从一开始就反对这个想法。我认为，对**特朗普总统**来说，这是展示他认真对待这些**谈判**的一个机会。而且我认为，第三个信息是发给**MAGA**（Make America Great Again）**基地**的。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: I
 think
 it's
 all
 the
 above,
 Michael.
 The


Iranians
 view
 him
 as
 probably
 the
 one


they'd
 most
 like
 to
 talk
 to
 because
 they


think
 he
 opposed
 this
 idea
 from
 the


start.
 I
 think
 to
 President
 Trump,
 its


an
 opportunity
 to
 show
 to
 the
 Iranians


that
 he's
 serious
 about
 these
 talks.
 And


I
 think
 the
 third
 message
 that
 it
 sends


is
 actually
 to
 the
 MAGA
 base.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: “别担心，一切都在掌控之中。” **JD·万斯**（JD Vance），他一直是最积极主张不卷入**外国战争**的人，现在由他来负责结束这场战争。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: It's
 don't
 worry,
 this
 is
 under
 control.


JD
 Vance,
 who
 was
 the
 most
 outspoken
 in


favor
 of
 staying
 out
 of
 foreign
 wars,
 is


the
 one
 we've
 put
 in
 charge
 of
 ending


this
 one.

</details>

### 美以目标差异与地区动态

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 在结束关于**美国****谈判**计划的对话之前，似乎很难不提及**以色列**（Israel），它是这次整个行动的**伙伴**。我感觉**以色列**对于结束这场战争的热情可能与**特朗普总统**的热情不尽相同，因为**以色列**在这个冲突中涉及的事情更多。即使在继续攻击**伊朗**的同时，它还在**黎巴嫩**（Lebanon）有地面部队。在某种程度上，它在这个冲突中拥有更多的议程。随着这场战争每周的过去，**美国**和**以色列**之间不同的目标对我们来说变得越来越明显。**特朗普总统**显然非常担心**股市**（stock market）的影响，**石油**（oil）和**天然气**（gas）无法通过**霍尔木兹海峡**（Strait of Hormuz）的影响，他从**欧洲**（Europeans）、**亚洲盟友**（Asian allies）那里得到的** backlash**（反噬）。**以色列**真的几乎不关心那些，对吧？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: It
 seems
 difficult
 to
 close
 out
 the


conversation
 about
 the
 US
 plans
 for


negotiation
 without
 mentioning
 Israel.


its
 partner
 in
 this
 entire
 operation.


And
 my
 sense
 is
 that
 Israel's
 enthusiasm


for
 ending
 this
 war
 may
 not
 be
 the
 same


as
 President
 Trump's
 because
 Israel
 has


simply
 more
 going
 on
 in
 this
 conflict.


It's
 got
 ground
 troops
 in
 Lebanon
 even


as
 it's
 also
 continuing
 to
 assault
 Iran.


has
 more
 of
 an
 an
 agenda
 in
 this
 conflict


in
 a
 way.
 With
 every
 passing
 week
 of


this
 war,
 the
 differing
 objectives
 of


the
 US
 and
 Israel
 have
 become
 more
 and


more
 evident
 to
 us.


President
 Trump
 is
 obviously
 quite


concerned
 about
 the
 effects
 on
 the
 stock


market,
 the
 effects
 of
 oil
 and
 gas
 not


making
 it
 through
 the
 straight
 of


Hormuz,
 the
 backlash
 that
 he's
 getting


from
 the
 Europeans,
 from
 Asian
 allies.


Israel
 really
 isn't
 concerned
 about


almost
 any
 of
 those,

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 对。对他们来说，唯一的问题是，在这个过程结束时，**伊朗**是否已经被“**defanged**”（削弱得无法构成威胁），以至于它甚至无法考虑再次跨越国界进行攻击？**美国**的兴趣是出现一个至少足够有凝聚力的**伊朗**政府，能够做出决定并参与**国际谈判**。**以色列人**可能乐于看到纯粹的混乱。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: right?
 To
 them,
 the
 one
 question
 here
 is


at
 the
 end
 of
 this
 process.
 Is
 Iran
 so


defanged
 that
 it
 couldn't
 even
 think
 of


striking
 beyond
 its
 borders
 again?
 The


US
 has
 an
 interest
 in
 an
 Iranian


government
 emerging
 from
 this
 that
 is
 at


least
 cohesive
 enough
 to
 make
 decisions


and
 engage
 in
 international


negotiations.
 The
 Israelis
 might
 be


perfectly
 happy
 with
 sheer
 chaos


**Michael Bubaro**: that
 would
 then
 lead
 to
 enough
 social


upheaval
 in
 Iran
 that
 it
 would
 overthrow


the
 current
 regime.
 And
 better
 yet,
 as


far
 as
 the
 Israelis
 are
 concerned,
 might


result
 in
 such
 internal
 upheaval
 that


Iran
 can't
 even
 think
 about
 Israel.
 M

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 但对我来说，迈克尔，真正有趣的是，当这种关于**谈判**是否会发生、在哪里发生、何时发生的**舞蹈**在进行时，**以色列人**正在利用每一分钟攻击**伊朗**的更多目标。周五，他们攻击了几个**核设施**（nuclear sites）。而**伊朗**人则利用每一刻攻击**海湾地区**（Gulf）的**美国**目标。并且他们从自己的角度取得了一个重大的成功，那就是他们击毁了两架主要的**美国**飞机。一架是空中加油机，另一架是造价高达五亿美元或更多的指挥中心。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: but
 what's
 really
 interesting
 to
 me,


Michael,
 is
 that
 while
 this
 dance
 takes


place
 about
 whether
 and
 where
 and
 when


negotiations
 would
 take
 place,
 the


Israelis
 are
 using
 every
 available


minute
 to
 hit
 more
 targets
 across
 Iran.


On
 Friday,
 they
 went
 after
 a
 number
 of


nuclear
 sites.
 And
 the
 Iranians,
 for


their
 part,
 are
 using
 every
 moment
 to
 go


after
 American
 targets
 in
 the
 Gulf.
 And


they
 had
 one
 big
 success
 from
 their


point
 of
 view,
 which
 is
 they
 took
 out


two
 major
 American
 aircraft.
 One
 a


in-air
 refueling
 aircraft
 and
 the
 other


one
 of
 these
 command
 centers
 that
 cost


half
 a
 billion
 dollars
 or
 more.
 Wow.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 用于**防御海湾地区**（defend the Gulf）免受**无人机**（drones）和**导弹**（missiles）袭击的。他们在**谈判**地点交换信息的那一天就这么做了。这听起来与**伊朗**准备**谈判**的行动背道而驰。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: That
 are
 used
 to
 go
 defend
 the
 Gulf


against
 incoming
 drones
 and
 missiles.


And
 they
 did
 that
 on
 the
 same
 day
 that


they
 were
 exchanging
 messages
 about


where
 negotiations
 may
 take
 place.


which
 sounds
 like
 the
 opposite
 of
 Iran


getting
 ready
 for
 negotiations.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，也可能是，也可能是一种**谈判**策略本身。我们稍后回来。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 it
 could
 be
 or
 it
 could
 be
 a


negotiating
 gambit
 in
 itself.


We'll
 be
 right
 back.

</details>

### 伊朗的战略犹豫：信任危机与国家生存

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 大卫，正如我们在此已经非常清楚地建立的，**伊朗**目前的立场基本上是告诉**美国**：“祝你的**谈判**式战争结束好运。是你挑起的，我们不会帮你快速结束它。” 你在谈话开始时提到，这可能是出于**自尊**（pride）或**策略**（strategy）的原因。让我们试着深入探究这个问题。如果**特朗普总统**为**伊朗**提供了一个结束每日**攻击**（attacks）的机会，这些**攻击**摧毁了它的最高领袖，削弱了它的军队，摧毁了它的许多**基础设施**，为什么**伊朗**不渴望抓住这个机会呢？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: David,
 as
 I
 think
 we
 pretty
 clearly


established
 here,
 Iran's
 position
 at


this
 moment
 is
 basically
 saying
 to
 the


US,
 "Good
 luck
 with
 your
 negotiated
 end


of
 this
 war.
 You
 started
 it.
 We're
 not


going
 to
 help
 you
 quickly
 end
 it."
 And


you
 had
 suggested
 at
 the
 beginning
 of


this
 conversation
 that
 that
 could
 be
 a


function
 of
 pride
 or
 strategy.
 Let's
 try


to
 get
 to
 the
 bottom
 of
 that
 question.


If
 President
 Trump
 is
 offering
 Iran
 an


end
 to
 a
 daily
 barrage
 of
 attacks
 that


took
 out
 its
 supreme
 leader,
 have


decimated
 its
 military,
 have
 crippled
 a


lot
 of
 its
 infrastructure,
 why
 isn't


Iran
 somewhat
 eager
 to
 take
 up
 that


offer?

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 你知道，迈克尔，这是**总统**（president）经常问他助手的问题，那就是“为什么他们还没有**投降**？” 我认为答案很复杂。但其中一部分是，幸存的**伊朗**领导层问道：为什么我们要**信任**他们进行**谈判**？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: You
 know,
 Michael,
 this
 is
 the


question
 the
 president
 seems
 to
 ask
 his


aids
 very
 regularly,
 which
 is
 why


haven't
 they
 capitulated
 yet?
 And
 I


think
 the
 answer
 is
 complicated.
 But
 the


first
 part
 of
 it
 is
 that
 the
 surviving


Iranian
 leadership
 asked
 the
 question,


why
 should
 we
 trust
 them
 in
 the


negotiations?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 去年6月，他们曾进行过**谈判**，但由于对**福尔多**（Fordo）、**纳坦兹**（Natanz）和**伊斯法罕**（Isfahan）这三个主要**核设施**（nuclear sites）的**攻击**而被中断。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Back
 in
 June
 of
 last
 year,
 they
 were


engaged
 in
 negotiations
 and
 it
 got
 cut


short
 by
 the
 attack
 on
 Fordo,
 Natans,


and
 Isvahan,
 the
 three
 major
 nuclear


sites.
 Nuclear
 sites.
 Yep,

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 是的。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: that's
 right.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 2月，他们正在就一项更广泛的协议进行**谈判**，突然间**以色列人**和**美国人**联手，对整个国家发动了一次明显是精心策划、协调一致的**攻击**。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: In
 February,
 they
 were
 negotiating
 on
 a


broader
 agreement,
 and
 suddenly
 the


Israelis
 and
 the
 Americans
 team
 up
 on


what
 was
 clearly
 a
 wellplanned,


well-coordinated
 attack
 on
 the
 entire


country.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 对吧？**谈判**某种程度上是**美国**攻击**伊朗**的幌子。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Right?
 negotiations
 are
 kind
 of
 a
 cover


for
 the
 US
 to
 attack
 Iran

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 并且是为集结**部队**（forces）争取时间。所以**伊朗**人说：“我们不会听你说了。我们要看你的实际行动。” 而目前他们看到的是，**美国**正在向该地区增派数千名**士兵**（troops），首先是两个海军陆战队远征部队。因此，从**伊朗**的角度来看，他们看着这一切，心想，嗯，**总统**（president）正在为另一次**攻击**做准备，同时还在敦促我们**谈判**。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: and
 to
 buy
 the
 time
 to
 assemble
 the


forces.
 And
 so
 the
 Iranians
 are
 saying,


"We're
 not
 going
 to
 listen
 to
 what
 you


say.
 We're
 going
 to
 look
 at
 what
 you


do."
 And
 currently
 what
 they're
 seeing


is
 that
 the
 US
 is
 sending
 thousands
 of


more
 troops
 to
 the
 region,
 starting
 with


two
 Marine
 Expeditionary
 Units.
 And
 so


from
 the
 Iranian
 point
 of
 view,
 they're


looking
 at
 this
 and
 thinking,
 well,
 the


president
 is
 building
 up
 to
 another


attack
 while
 he's
 urging
 us
 to


negotiate.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 对。又来了。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Right.
 Here
 we
 go
 again.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 是的。对。当然，迈克尔，我们不知道**总统**（president）是否真的计划使用这些**部队**，或者他是否只是在为**谈判**开始时作为**筹码**（leverage）。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Yeah.
 Right.
 And
 of
 course,
 Michael,
 we


don't
 know
 if
 the
 president
 is
 actually


planning
 to
 go
 use
 these
 troops
 or


whether
 he's
 just
 using
 them
 for


leverage
 for
 whenever
 those
 negotiations


start
 up.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 戴夫，我能问你一个问题吗？因为你这些年报道了很多**外交**事务，人们是否普遍认为，如果你在正式**谈判**期间攻击对方，而且不是一次，而是两次，你真的在**挫伤**（disincentivizing）他们，让他们认为**外交**只是一个**特洛伊木马**（Trojan horse）？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Dave,
 can
 I
 ask
 you
 because


you've
 covered
 a
 lot
 of
 diplomacy
 in


your
 day,
 is
 it
 understood
 that
 if
 you


attack
 people,
 not
 once,
 but
 twice


during
 formal
 negotiations,
 you're


really
 disincentivizing
 them
 from
 ever


seeing
 diplomacy
 as
 anything
 other
 than


a
 Trojan
 horse.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，在我报道的绝大多数**政府**中，而且这是我报道的第五位**总统**，情况确实如此。但在**特朗普**（Trump）**政府**中，我认为有一种更普遍的看法是，**武力**（force）不一定是最后的**resort**（手段）。它可能是一种**早期工具**，你可以在第二次回来**谈判**时使用，然后说：“想要再来一次吗？想要更糟的吗？”

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 in
 most


administrations
 I've
 covered,
 and
 this


is
 the
 fifth
 president
 I've
 covered,


that
 would
 have
 been
 the
 case.
 But
 in


the
 Trump
 administration,
 I
 think


there's
 sort
 of
 a
 more
 general
 view
 that


force
 isn't
 necessarily
 the
 last
 resort.


It
 could
 be
 an
 early
 tool
 that
 you
 use


before
 you
 come
 back
 for
 negotiations
 a


second
 time
 and
 say,
 "Want
 that
 again?


Want
 worse?"

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 所以我认为这个**政府**将使用**武力**视为**谈判**的一个真实要素。我不确定他们的**adversaries**（对手）是否总是以同样的方式看待它。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: And
 so
 I
 think
 that
 this
 administration


views
 the
 use
 of
 force
 as
 truly
 an


element
 of
 the
 negotiations.


I'm
 not
 sure
 that
 their
 adversaries


always
 see
 it
 the
 same
 way.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 好的，那么这是**伊朗**不愿进行**谈判**的一个主要原因。但除此之外，鉴于战争的痛苦不成比例地由该国**政府**承受，**伊朗**能从战争持续更长时间中获得什么？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Okay,
 so
 that's
 a
 major
 reason
 why
 Iran


would
 be
 reluctant
 to
 engage
 in


negotiations.
 But
 beyond
 that,
 what
 does


Iran
 gain
 from
 the
 war
 lasting
 any


longer
 given
 that
 the
 pain
 of
 it
 is
 so


disproportionately
 felt
 by
 that


government?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，正如我们所建议的，可能存在一种**自尊**（pride）的因素，而这是一个非常不受欢迎的**政府**。可能在任何时候，正如我们在过去的节目中讨论过的，大约80%的**伊朗**人都会列举一长串对**经济**管理不善、腐败以及**伊朗**政府残暴统治的抱怨。对吧？所以，当**外国行为者**（foreign actors）เข้ามา攻击社会的**核心**，恐吓那些只想过好普通生活的**伊朗**人时。幸存的**伊朗**领导层可能认为这是一种团结人民的方式，而这些人原本可能憎恨他们。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 there
 could
 be
 an


element
 of
 pride
 to
 this
 as
 we've


suggested
 and
 this
 is
 a
 deeply
 unpopular


government.
 Probably
 at
 any
 given
 point


in
 time,
 as
 we've
 discussed
 on
 past


episodes,


something
 like
 80%
 of
 Iranians
 would


give
 you
 a
 long
 list
 of
 complaints
 about


economic
 mismanagement,
 corruption,
 and


the
 sheer
 brutality
 of
 the
 Iranian


government.
 Right?
 So
 the
 idea
 that


foreign
 actors
 are
 coming
 in
 to
 attack


the
 core
 of
 the
 society,
 terrorize


ordinary
 Iranians
 who
 are
 just
 trying
 to


get
 by.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 有趣。所以，不只是**自尊**，而是一种**战略**理解，即战争持续得越久，**伊朗**人就越有可能疏远这个政权，并开始将其视为力量的来源，或者将其视为**美国**过度行为的受害者。从这个意义上说，时间对他们有利。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Interesting.
 So,
 not
 necessarily
 just


pride,
 but
 kind
 of
 a
 strategic


understanding
 that
 the
 longer
 the
 war


goes
 on,
 the
 more
 likely
 it
 is
 that


Iranians
 alienated
 from
 this
 regime


might
 start
 to
 look
 to
 it
 as
 a
 source
 of


strength
 or
 see
 it
 as
 the
 victim
 of
 US


excess.
 And
 in
 that
 sense,
 time
 is
 just


on
 their
 side.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: well，那是对的。而且时间还为**伊朗**带来了另一件事：让他们能在**唐纳德·特朗普**（Donald Trump）最在乎的地方造成伤害。看着**市场**（markets）下滑，看着**石油**（oil）价格上涨，看着**国际焦虑**（international anxiety）增加，看着**西方联盟**（Western Alliance）分裂。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Well,
 that's
 right.
 And
 there's
 another


thing
 that
 time
 buys
 the
 Iranians.
 The


ability
 to
 hurt
 Donald
 Trump
 where
 it


counts
 the
 most.
 Watching
 markets
 slide,


watching
 oil
 prices
 go
 up,
 watching


international
 anxiety
 increase,
 watching


the
 Western
 Alliance
 fracture.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 而这一切都需要时间。所以让我们看看上周末发生的事情。**总统**（president）周四晚些时候表示，他将允许再有10天时间进行**谈判**。你可能会期望第二天**市场**会跳涨，说“哦，这件事要结束了。” 相反，**市场**的**meltdown**（崩溃）仍在继续。**总统**（president）现在正在**主持**（presiding over）一场人们将开始称之为“**特朗普**（Trump）**slump**（衰退）”或“**伊朗**（Iran）**slump**（衰退）”的局面。而**伊朗**人明白，如果**市场**继续**meltdown**（崩溃），如果**石油**价格继续上涨，那么无论何时**谈判**开始，这只会给他们带来更多**筹码**。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: And
 all
 of
 that
 takes
 time.
 So
 take
 a


look
 at
 what
 happened
 just
 at
 the
 end
 of


last
 week.
 The
 president
 late
 on


Thursday
 said
 that
 he
 was
 going
 to
 allow


another
 10
 days
 for
 negotiations
 to
 take


place.
 And
 you
 might
 expect
 the
 markets


to
 jump
 the
 next
 day,
 saying,
 "Oh,


there's
 an
 ending
 to
 this
 coming."


Instead,
 the
 markets
 kept
 their
 meltdown


underway.
 The
 president
 is
 now
 presiding


over
 what
 people
 are
 going
 to
 begin
 to


call
 the
 Trump
 slump
 or
 the
 Iran
 slump.


And
 the
 Iranians
 understand
 that
 if
 the


markets
 continue
 to
 melt
 down,
 if
 the


price
 of
 oil
 continues
 to
 go
 up,
 that


only
 gives
 them
 more
 leverage
 whenever


negotiations
 begin.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 大卫，请继续。那么，让我们假设**特朗普**的15点**提案**实际上代表了**美国**在任何**谈判**中的立场，而**伊朗**让战争再持续几周，甚至更长时间。**石油**价格保持高位，**市场**动荡。我的意思是，**伊朗**认为他们会突然得到其中一项**提案**被移除，**制裁**会更快被取消吗？我的意思是，从后勤上来说，他们将获得什么来弥补他们每天遭受的损失，对他们的**基础设施**、**军队**、人民造成的损失？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: David,
 just
 play
 that
 out.
 So,
 let's


presume
 that
 the
 15point
 proposal
 from


Trump
 is
 actually
 something
 that


represents
 the
 US
 position
 in
 any


negotiations


and
 Iran
 has
 the
 war
 play
 out
 for
 a
 few


more
 weeks,
 maybe
 even
 longer.
 oil


prices
 stay
 really
 high,
 markets
 are


gyating.
 I
 mean,
 does
 Iran
 think
 that


suddenly
 they're
 gonna
 get
 one
 of
 those


proposals
 removed,
 that
 sanctions
 are


going
 to
 be
 taken
 away
 faster?
 I
 mean,


like,
 just
 logistically,
 what
 are
 they


going
 to
 gain
 that
 would
 compensate
 for


the
 losses
 that
 they're
 going
 to
 be


taking
 every
 single
 day
 to
 their


infrastructure,
 to
 their
 military,
 to


their
 people?

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 我无法爬进他们的脑袋，但我可以凭我之前报道**伊朗****谈判**的经验猜测一下。一个主要的**症结**（hang-up）一直是关于**伊朗**是否将永久放弃其**核燃料**（nuclear fuel）**浓缩**（enrich）的权利。而**美国**坚持认为不行。这一次，**伊朗**人必须同意他们永远不再制造**核燃料**。只有**伊朗**一直坚持他们的立场，他们是**核不扩散条约**（nuclear non-proliferation treaty）的签署国，所有签署国都有权**浓缩**铀，只要他们不将其转移用于**炸弹**（bomb）项目。他们声称自己早就承诺绝不制造**核武器**。我们谁都不相信这一点，但这是他们正式的承诺。我认为他们相信**政府**可能会在这个问题上让步，并且他们会得到几年的**暂停期**，在此期间他们同意不生产任何**核燃料**，之后再进行有限的**浓缩**，让他们留在游戏中。现在，如果**特朗普****政府**同意这一点，这将是他们立场上的一个重大退步。它看起来也会更像**奥巴马总统**（President Obama）在2015年与**伊朗**达成的协议，在该协议中，**伊朗**将几乎所有的**核燃料**运出该国，但保留了低水平的**浓缩**。我想，既然你提到了**核浓缩**和**核武器**，我们应该承认，这场战争到目前为止无疑增加了**伊朗**寻求**核武器**的**动机**。这不是什么**战略**秘密，当你拥有**核武器**时，你被**美国**和**以色列**攻击的可能性就会大大降低，而当你没有时，可能性就很高。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: I
 can't
 crawl
 inside
 their
 heads,
 but
 I


can
 just
 take
 a
 guess
 from
 having


covered
 negotiations
 with
 Iran
 before.


One
 of
 the
 big
 hang-ups
 has
 been
 this


question
 of
 whether
 Iran


will
 permanently
 give
 up
 its
 right
 to


enrich
 nuclear
 fuel.
 And
 the
 US
 has


insisted
 no.
 This
 time
 the
 Iranians
 have


to
 agree
 they'll
 never
 again
 make


nuclear
 fuel.
 only
 Iranians
 have
 had
 a


consistent
 position
 that
 they're
 a


signatory
 to
 the
 nuclear


non-prololiferation
 treaty
 that
 all


signitories
 have
 a
 right
 to
 enrich


uranium
 as
 long
 as
 they
 are
 not


diverting
 it
 to
 bomb
 projects.
 They


maintain
 that
 they've
 long
 committed
 to


never
 building
 a
 nuclear
 weapon.
 None
 of


us
 believe
 that,
 but
 that
 has
 been
 their


formal
 commitment.
 I
 think
 they
 believe


that
 the
 administration
 may
 well
 relent


on
 this
 point
 and
 that
 they
 will
 get
 a


pause
 of
 a
 few
 years
 in
 which
 they
 agree


not
 to
 produce
 any
 nuclear
 fuel
 and
 then


some
 limited
 amount
 of
 enrichment
 after


that
 that
 they
 would
 stay
 in
 the
 game.


Now,
 if
 the
 Trump
 administration
 agreed


to
 that,
 it
 would
 be
 a
 big
 backing
 away


from
 their
 position.
 It
 would
 also
 end


up
 looking
 a
 lot
 more
 like
 the
 agreement


that
 President
 Obama
 got
 out
 of
 Iran
 in


2015
 in
 which
 the
 Iranians
 shipped


almost
 all
 their
 nuclear
 fuel
 out
 of
 the


country
 but
 kept
 low-level
 enrichment.
 I


suppose
 since
 you
 mentioned
 nuclear


enrichment
 and
 nuclear
 weapons,
 we


should
 probably
 acknowledge
 the
 point


that
 this
 entire
 war
 so
 far
 has
 no
 doubt


increased
 the
 incentive
 for
 Iran
 to
 seek


out
 a
 nuclear
 weapon.
 It's
 not
 exactly
 a


strategic
 secret
 that
 when
 you
 have
 a


nuclear
 weapon,
 you're
 a
 lot
 less
 likely


to
 be
 attacked
 by
 the
 US
 and
 Israel
 than


when
 you
 don't.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 绝对。**伊朗人**不可能没注意到**特朗普**（Trump）**政府**没有攻击**朝鲜**（North Korea）。**朝鲜**拥有可以触及**美国**的**导弹**。不是将来，而是现在。**朝鲜**拥有60枚或更多的**核武器**。不是将来某个时候，而是现在。这就是**美国**甚至不考虑攻击**平壤**（Pyongyang）的原因。所以，你知道，根据这一切如何发展，我们可能给了**伊朗**所有**激励**去效仿**朝鲜**模式。大卫，我想最后问你一个你非常熟悉的问题，那就是**美国**和**伊朗**在2015年确实进行了非常严肃且成功的**谈判**。你对此**谈判**进行了非常近距离的报道。我记得读过你的报道。在**谈判**达到顶峰并签署**协议**时，你就在现场。这是一份这两个**宿敌**（mortal foes）之间具有历史意义的**协议**。所以我们知道，如果这两个国家想这么做，它们就有能力进行严肃的、高层次的、历史性的**外交**。它们有能力做到。迈克尔和我确实报道了那次**谈判**，历时一年半到两年。过程漫长而痛苦，最终达成了一项**协议**，**伊朗**在很大程度上遵守了该**协议**，直到**特朗普总统**在2018年退出该**协议**。历史学家们将长期争论，是否能从2018年的那个决定画一条直线到今天的**攻击**。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Absolutely.
 The
 Iranians
 cannot
 have


missed
 the
 point
 that
 the
 Trump


administration
 has
 not
 attacked
 North


Korea.
 North
 Korea
 has
 missiles
 that
 can


reach
 the
 United
 States.
 Not
 sometime
 in


the
 future,
 but
 now.
 North
 Korea
 has
 60


or
 more
 nuclear
 weapons.
 Not
 at
 some


point
 in
 the
 future,
 but
 now.
 And
 that's


the
 very
 reason
 that
 the
 US
 wouldn't


even
 consider
 an
 attack
 like
 this
 on


Pyongyang.
 And
 so,
 you
 know,
 depending


on
 how
 this
 all
 plays
 out,
 we
 may
 have


just
 given
 Iran
 every
 incentive
 to


follow
 the
 North
 Korean
 model.
 David,
 I


want
 to
 end
 just
 by
 asking
 you
 to


reflect
 on
 something
 that
 you
 know
 very


intimately,
 which
 is
 that
 the
 US
 and


Iran
 did
 engage
 in
 very
 serious
 and


successful
 negotiations
 back
 in
 2015.


And
 you
 got
 a
 really
 uplose
 view
 of


those
 talks.
 I
 remember
 reading
 your


coverage
 of
 that.
 You
 were
 there
 during


the
 negotiations
 as
 they
 reached
 their


apex
 and
 this
 deal
 was
 signed.
 A


historic
 deal
 between
 these
 mortal
 foes.


So
 we
 know
 these
 two
 countries
 are


capable
 of
 serious
 highlevel
 history


making
 diplomacy
 if
 they
 want
 to.
 They


are
 capable
 of
 it.
 Michael
 and
 I
 did


cover
 that
 negotiation
 for
 the
 year
 and


a
 half
 or
 two
 years
 that
 it
 went
 on
 and


it
 was
 long
 and
 painful
 and
 in
 the
 end


it
 resulted
 in
 an
 agreement
 that
 the


Iranians
 largely
 kept
 to
 until
 President


Trump
 pulled
 out
 of
 the
 accord
 in
 2018.


And
 historians
 will
 be
 debating
 for
 a


long
 time
 whether
 you
 can
 draw
 a


straight
 line
 from
 that
 decision
 in
 2018


to
 this
 attack.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 对？因为那项**外交**旨在确保我们永远不会发生这样的战争，而他却将其撕毁了，现在我们却真的发生了。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Right?
 because
 that
 that
 diplomacy
 was


intended
 to
 ensure
 we
 never
 had
 a
 war


like
 this
 and
 he
 tore
 it
 up
 and
 now
 we


do.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 它的目的是确保**伊朗**的**计划**（program）保持在一个**盒子里**（in a box），并且如果你发现**伊朗人**在**赛跑**（racing）制造**炸弹**（bomb）时，你至少能提前一年得到通知。然后**特朗普总统**退出了，而**伊朗人**在协议上保持了一到两年的**一致**。之后他们决定这样做很蠢，于是他们立刻冲向了**炸弹**的边缘。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: It
 was
 intended
 to
 make
 sure
 that
 the


Iranian
 program
 stayed
 in
 a
 box
 and
 that


you
 would
 have
 at
 least
 a
 year's
 notice


if
 the
 Iranians
 were
 racing
 for
 a
 bomb.


Then
 President
 Trump
 pulled
 out
 and
 the


Iranians
 stayed
 in
 accord
 with
 the


agreement
 for
 a
 year
 or
 two.
 Then


decided
 they
 were
 chumps
 to
 do
 that
 and


they
 did
 race
 right
 to
 the
 edge
 of
 a


bomb.
 Right.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 但是，迈克尔，我在想，我们**不可能**回到2015年那种**谈判**了。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: But
 you
 know,
 Michael,
 I've
 been


thinking
 about
 this
 and


there's
 no
 chance
 that
 we
 can
 go
 back
 to


the
 kind
 of
 negotiation
 that
 took
 place


in
 2015.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 为什么？

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Why

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 那次**谈判**非常有限。它只关注**伊朗**的**核计划**（nuclear program）。即使是**美国**试图将其扩展到**导弹**（missiles）的努力也失败了。但今天，这场战争引发了**核计划**本身之外的更多问题。我的意思是，首先，**伊朗**已经展示了扰乱**全球经济**（global economy）、关闭**霍尔木兹海峡**（Strait of Hormuz）的巨大能力。这现在将成为**谈判**的焦点，其重要性在一个月前甚至没有。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: that
 was
 quite
 limited.
 It
 was
 just


focused
 on
 the
 Iranian
 nuclear
 program.


And
 even
 the
 effort
 by
 the
 US
 to
 expand


it
 out
 to
 missiles
 failed.


But
 today,
 the
 war
 has
 unleashed
 so
 many


more
 issues
 beyond
 the
 nuclear
 program


itself.
 I
 mean,
 first
 the
 Iranians
 have


demonstrated
 a
 huge
 ability
 to
 disrupt


the
 global
 economy
 to
 shut
 off
 the


straight
 of
 Hormuz.
 That's
 now
 going
 to


become
 a
 focus
 of
 negotiation
 in
 a
 way


it
 wasn't
 even
 a
 month
 ago.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 对。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Right.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 2015年，**伊朗**人和**美国人**之间的**信任**（trust）非常少。**奥巴马**（Obama）的**协议**在**华盛顿**（Washington）不受欢迎，在**德黑兰**（Tehran）则更为不受欢迎。我们忘记了这一点，因为没有人相信**美国**会履行承诺并解除**制裁**。今天，**信任**更少了。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: In
 2015,
 there
 was
 very
 little
 trust


between
 the
 Iranians
 and
 the
 Americans.


Unpopular
 as
 the
 Obama
 deal
 was
 in


Washington,
 it
 was
 even
 more
 unpopular


in
 Tehran.
 We
 forget
 that
 because
 no
 one


believed
 the
 US
 would
 carry
 through
 and


lift
 sanctions.
 Today,
 there's
 even
 less


trust.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 嗯。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Mhm.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 当时，**伊朗**人作为2015年**协议**的一部分承诺，他们绝不会寻求**核武器**。我不确定**伊朗**的新**政府**（government）今天能否逃脱这种承诺。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Back
 then,
 the
 Iranians
 committed
 as


part
 of
 the
 2015
 agreement
 that
 they


would
 never
 seek
 a
 nuclear
 weapon.
 I'm


not
 sure
 that
 the
 new
 government
 of
 Iran


could
 get
 away
 with
 that
 today.
 H

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 而且，我认为我们必须认识到，在**战争**（war）开始之后，在**政府**被摧毁之后，在**人民**（people）被轰炸之后，你随后释放了一系列新的**政治力量**（political forces），而我们这些人都无法真正理解。也许这场**战争**会像**特朗普总统**和**本杰明·内塔尼亚胡**（B.B. Netanyahu）在2月28日设想的那样结束，即**伊朗****政府**发生**起义**（uprising）。但**极有可能**的是，我们触发了相反的效果。我们可能要几个月，甚至几年才能知道。所以，尽管2015年的**谈判**（negotiations）已经无比复杂和微妙，但**伊朗**和**美国**之间即将到来的事情将更加如此。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: and
 finally
 I
 think
 we
 have
 to
 recognize


that
 after
 war
 has
 started
 after
 you


have
 shattered
 a
 government
 after
 you


have
 bombed
 its
 people


that
 you've
 then
 unleashed
 a
 whole


series
 of
 new
 political
 forces
 that
 none


of
 us
 really
 understand.


Maybe
 this
 will
 end
 the
 way
 President


Trump
 envisioned
 and
 B.B.
 Netanyahu


envisioned
 on
 February
 28th
 with
 an


uprising
 against
 the
 Iranian
 government.


But
 it's
 very
 possible
 that
 we
 have


triggered
 the
 opposite
 effect.
 And
 we're


just
 not
 going
 to
 know
 that
 for
 months,


maybe
 years
 to
 come.
 So,
 as
 infinitely


complicated
 and
 delicate
 as
 the
 2015


negotiations
 that
 you
 covered
 were,
 what


lies
 ahead
 between
 Iran
 and
 the
 US
 will


be
 even
 more
 so.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 极度更复杂。迈克尔，在**战争**开始前，我们只是在**谈判**他们**核计划**（nuclear program）的**状态**。现在，我们正在**谈判**他们作为一个**国家**（state）的**未来生存能力**（future survivability）。这对**伊朗**来说是完全**生存**（existential）性的。这将大大增加结束这场**战争**的复杂性。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Wildly
 more
 complicated.
 Michael,


before
 we
 were
 just
 negotiating
 over
 the


status
 of
 their
 nuclear
 program.
 Now,


we're
 negotiating
 over
 their
 future


survivability
 as
 a
 state.
 And
 that
 is


completely
 existential
 for
 the
 Iranians.


And
 it's
 going
 to
 add
 dramatically


to
 the
 complexity
 of
 bringing
 this
 war


to
 an
 end.

</details>

**大卫·桑格 (David Sanger)**: 哦，大卫，非常感谢你。一如既往，很感激。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**David Sanger**: Oh,
 David,
 thank
 you
 very
 much.


Appreciate
 it
 as
 always.
 Thanks,


Michael.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 周日晚上，《泰晤士报》报道称，几百名**美国**特种作战部队，包括陆军游骑兵和海军海豹突击队，已抵达**中东**（Middle East），**特朗普总统**正在权衡他的选择。**伊朗**议会议长，任何与**美国**的潜在**谈判**伙伴，警告说，如果**美国**部署任何地面**部队**进入**伊朗**，**伊朗**将“把他们烧成灰烬”。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: On
 Sunday
 night,
 the
 Times
 reported
 that


several
 hundred
 US
 special
 operations


forces,
 including
 Army
 Rangers
 and
 Navy


Seals,
 have
 arrived
 in
 the
 Middle
 East


as
 President
 Trump
 weighs
 his
 options.


In
 the
 latest
 sign
 of
 how
 far
 off


diplomacy
 may
 be,
 the
 speaker
 of
 Iran's


parliament,
 a
 potential
 partner
 in
 any


negotiations
 with
 the
 US,
 warned
 that
 if


the
 United
 States
 deploys
 any
 ground


troops
 into
 Iran,
 that
 Iran
 would
 quote,


"Set
 them
 on
 fire."

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 我们马上回来。下面是其他你需要知道的消息。参议员戴（Senator Day）：“我抗议**特朗普**（Trump）所有非法、不道德、鲁莽且无能的无休止的战争。”

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: We'll
 be
 right
 back.
 Here's


what
 else
 you
 need.
 Senator
 Day.
 I


protest
 all
 of
 Trump's
 illegal,
 immoral,


reckless,
 and
 feckless,
 endless
 wars.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: “我们之所以在这里，是因为我们认为宪法正受到威胁。” 在美国各地的小城镇和大城市，抗议者们周六聚集起来，举行了数千场反对**特朗普总统**（President Trump）的**国内政策**（domestic policies）以及他国内外**军事**（military）使用的集会。我担心一个想当国王的人，一个正忙于为自己和他的亿万富翁们建造一个舞厅的人，打算将**ICE**（美国移民及海关执法局）作为他自己的私人军队来为他效劳，让他成为国王，但他不是国王。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: We're
 out
 here
 because
 we
 feel
 that
 the


Constitution
 is
 under
 threat.
 In
 small


towns
 and
 big
 cities
 across
 the
 US,


protesters
 gathered
 on
 Saturday
 for


thousands
 of
 rallies
 against
 President


Trump,
 his
 domestic
 policies,
 and
 his


use
 of
 the
 military
 at
 home
 and


overseas.
 And
 I'm
 afraid
 that
 a
 wannabe


king
 who
 is
 busy
 building
 himself
 and


his
 billionaires


a
 ballroom


intends
 to
 use
 ICE
 as
 his
 own
 private


army
 to
 do
 his
 bidding
 to
 make
 him
 king


but
 he
 is
 not
 a
 king.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: **组织者**（Organizers）表示，“**没有国王**（No Kings）”集会吸引了数百万人。发言者包括立法者、活动家和表演者，其中包括**布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀**（Bruce Springsteen），他在**明尼苏达州**（Minnesota）首府**圣保罗**（St. Paul）向人群发表演讲。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Organizers
 said
 that
 the
 no
 kings


rallies
 drew
 millions
 of
 people.
 Among


the
 speakers
 were
 lawmakers,
 activists,


and
 performers,
 including
 Bruce


Springsteen,
 who
 addressed
 crowds


outside
 Minnesota's
 state
 capital
 in
 St.


Paul.

</details>

**布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀 (Bruce Springsteen)**: 这里仍然是**美国**，这种反动的噩梦和对**美国**城市的入侵不会得逞。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Bruce Springsteen**: This
 is
 still
 America,


and
 this
 reactionary
 nightmare
 and
 these


invasions
 of
 American
 cities
 will
 not


stand.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 而**特朗普总统**（President Trump）周五签署的向机场安检人员支付报酬的**紧急命令**（emergency order）有望结束该国机场的排队危机。但目前尚不清楚安检队伍何时才能恢复正常。与此同时，由于**国土安全部**（Department of Homeland Security）基本处于关闭状态，永久**解决方案**（solution）仍然难以实现。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: And
 President
 Trump's
 emergency
 order
 to


pay
 airport
 security
 screeners
 signed
 on


Friday
 is
 expected
 to
 end
 the
 crisis
 of


wait
 times
 at
 the
 country's
 airports.


But
 it's
 unclear
 exactly
 how
 long
 it


will
 take
 for
 the
 security
 lines
 to


return
 to
 normal.
 Meanwhile,
 a
 permanent


solution
 remains
 elusive
 because
 the


Department
 of
 Homeland
 Security
 remains


largely
 shut
 down.

</details>

**迈克尔·布巴罗 (Michael Bubaro)**: 本期节目由玛丽·威尔逊（Mary Wilson）和斯特拉·谭（Stella Tan）制作。由克里斯·哈塞尔（Chris Haxel）编辑，瑞秋·奎斯特（Rachel Quester）和玛丽亚·伯恩（Maria Burn）协助。音乐由黛安·王（Diane Wong）和玛丽安·洛扎诺（Marian Lozano）提供。我们的主题音乐由Wonderly创作。本期节目由艾莉莎·莫克斯利（Alyssa Moxley）工程制作。这就是今天的《每日》播报。我是迈克尔·阿博罗（Michael Abooro）。明天再见。

<details>
<summary>Original English</summary>

**Michael Bubaro**: Today's
 episode
 was
 produced
 by
 Mary


Wilson
 and
 Stella
 Tan.
 It
 was
 edited
 by


Chris
 Haxel
 with
 help
 from
 Rachel


Quester
 and
 Maria
 Burn.
 Contains
 music


by
 Diane
 Wong
 and
 Marian
 Lozano.
 Our


theme
 music
 is
 by
 Wonderly.
 This
 episode


was
 engineered
 by
 Alyssa
 Moxley.


That's
 it
 for
 the
 daily.
 I'm
 Michael


Aboro.
 See
 you
 tomorrow.

</details>