---
author: The MAD Podcast with Matt Turck
date: '2026-10-29'
guest: ''
layout: post.njk
source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N4GpNBxBm-Q
speaker: The MAD Podcast with Matt Turck
tags:
  - agi-prediction
  - recursive-self-improvement
  - sovereign-ai
  - data-center-backlash
  - ai-industry-trends
title: Nathan Benaich 预测 2027 年实现 AGI 及 AI 行业趋势分析
summary: Nathan Benaich 在《AI 现状报告》中预测 2027 年实现 AGI，认为递归自我改进（RSI）是关键驱动力。文章讨论了 AI 辅助研发、数据中心抵制、主权 AI 局限性及企业 AI 自主权趋势，并指出网络安全风险比 AI 毁灭人类更现实。
insight: ''
draft: true
series: ''
category: ai-application
area: tech-engineering
project: []
people:
  - Nathan Benaich
  - Matt Turck
companies_orgs:
  - Anthropic
  - OpenAI
  - Nvidia
  - Palantir
products_models:
  - Claude
  - Codex
  - Opus
media_books:
  - State of AI Report
status: evergreen
---
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网络风险远比 AI 毁灭人类要现实得多。你如果不拼尽全力冲向技术前沿，最终就只能沦落到去跑推理服务。大家宁可住在核电站隔壁，也不愿意住在数据中心旁边。单单过去这一年发生的事情就极其疯狂。那么，就让我们来看看明年的 AGI 吧。这位是风险投资人、《AI 现状报告》的作者 Nathan Benaich。每年，Nathan 和他的团队都会将 AI 行业的所有关键事实、数据和趋势整理成一份包含 250 张幻灯片的报告，这是我最喜欢的读物和参考资料之一。Nathan 已经是第三次来到我们节目了。像往常一样，我们探讨了今年许多最重大的事件，以及他的一些预测：为什么 AGI 可能会在 2027 年实现、AI 如今正在构建 AI、Hugging Face 事件中究竟发生了什么、针对数据中心的抵制，以及他如何依靠 Agent 来运营自己的基金。我是 Matt Turck，这里是 Matt 播客。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
The cyber risk is like much more real than like AI exterminating humanity. You either like die trying to get to the frontier or you just live long enough to eventually serve inference. Individuals would prefer to live next to a nuclear power plant than live next to a data center. It's bananas what's happened in the last year alone. So let's see AGI next year. That is Nathan Bes venture capitalist and author of the state of AI report. Every year, Nathan and his team compile all the key facts, figures, and trends of the AI industry into a 250 slide report that is one of my favorite reads and reference documents. Nathan is back for a third time on this show. And as usual, we covered many of the biggest stories of the year, as well as some of his predictions, why AGI could happen in 2027, AI that is now building AI, what really happened in the hugging face incident, the data center backlash, and how he runs his own font on agents. I'm Matt Turk and this is the Matt podcast.
</details>

每年你都会发布这份我们接下来会深入探讨的大型报告，嗯，你在报告结尾给出了预测。以往你的预测都还算相对克制，但今年你全力以赴了，最后的预测是：

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
So, every year you do this big report that we're going to extensively talk about uh and you end the report with predictions and like historically your predictions have been somewhat measured but this year you went all out and the last prediction is
</details>

>> 2027 年实现 AGI。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> AGI 2027.
</details>

这到底是为什么？帮我们详细剖析一下吧。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
So why is that? Unpack that for us.
</details>

### AGI 预测与模型能力

>> 是的，撰写这份报告大概已经有 10 年时间了。嗯，你知道，起初会觉得一年的时间足够长，发生的事情足够多，能有足够的内容来写这份报告。老实说，今年实在是太忙乱了。临近发布的阶段，也就是 10 月 8 日左右，我几乎隔一天就得更新一次内容，甚至有一刻我心想，求求了，能不能哪怕有一整天别再出新消息，好让我至少能录完发布视频等等。所以，当我开始做预测的时候——你知道，我先看了一些挺吓人的网络安全方面的预测，而且我觉得在过去的几周里情况只变得更糟了——仅仅是那种体验，以及看到其他所有使用这些产品的人所经历的技术能力的飞速提升，周复一周都在进步。而且我觉得在很多我目前的用例中，模型表现得堪称惊艳。嗯，我特别喜欢 Astro，呃，我非常喜欢那个系统。嗯，我完全可以看到在接下来的 12 个月里，无论是在法律、财务，还是在我的投资工作中，以及在深入思考我不懂的课题时，模型的能力都有可能超过我在任何有限的时间内所能达到的水平。因此对我来说，那大致就相当于 AGI 了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, I mean it's been like 10 years roughly speaking of writing this report. Um and you know originally it was like a year is like long enough time that enough stuff happens that you have uh you know enough content to write the report and honestly like this year was really really hectic. Every other day towards the end uh of the timeline for publishing which was like October 8th I had to make updates and there was a point where I was like please just like no more news over like one day that I can like at least record my launch video etc. So by the time I was like making the predictions and you know I went through a few like scary cyber security ones which I guess only got worse in the last couple weeks just the experience of of uh just seeing like everybody else who's using these products just like rapid capability improvement you know week after week and I think there's many many use cases I have now where like I think the model is like brilliant. Um I'm particularly like an astro boy. Uh I really love that system. Um, and I could see like in the next 12 months that whether it's, you know, legal, finance, like my investment job, like thinking intelligently about topics I don't know, that the model could potentially be like better than what I could do in any, you know, compressed amount of time that I have to to to do the work. And so for me, that would be like approximately AGI.
</details>

>> 是的。你在报告中强调的今年一个重要主题是 RSI（递归自我改进），也就是 AI 构建 AI 的想法，这也是我们在本播客各个剧集里广泛讨论过的内容。对你而言，这也是加速我们迈向 AGI 的部分原因吗？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. And a big uh theme of the year that you highlight in the report is RSI recursive self-improvement uh which is this idea of uh AI building AI which we've discussed extensively on this podcast throughout the episodes. Is that part of the story that would accelerate us towards AGI for you?
</details>

>> 是的，我认为是的。眼下的挑战在于，如何将模型目前不擅长的问题以一种便于应用 RSI 的方式进行表述。这可能需要拥有一个能够在计算机上模拟该任务的软件环境，或者某种可验证的奖励机制——我相信关于这一点你们已经讨论过很多了。我认为，如果我们能够达到这样一种状态，即在任何给定的领域中，我们受到的仅仅是算力量以及可生成的合成数据量的限制，那么对于大多数知识性工作而言——在某种程度上我确实认为这是可能的，特别是随着模型本身作为验证者的能力越来越强——这就会成为 AGI 更快到来的主要原因之一。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, I think so. Right now the challenge is like how do you frame problems that the model is currently not good at in a way that is immunable to RSI which would be you know potentially having like a software environment that approximates the task on the computer um or some kind of verifiable reward which I'm sure you've discussed a lot about and I think like if we can if we can get to a point where in like any arbitrary domain we're just limited by the amount of compute and synthetic data we can generate then um then yeah for like most knowledge work which I I I do I think to some degree that's that's possible particularly as like models get better as as their own verifiers. Um that would be one of the main reasons why AGI would come would come faster.
</details>

>> 是的。你在报告中引用了来自 Anthropic 的一些统计数据，他们称在 8 月份，Claude 主导了其经测量的模型研发工作的 26%。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. You you had some uh stats that you mentioned in the report from Anthropic where they say Claude leads 26% of its measured model R&D in August.
</details>

### AI 自我演进与研究品味

>> 对，对，没错。我认为这比几个月前的 1% 有所上升，而且那是 8 月份的数据，现在听起来已经过去挺久了，天知道 10 月份会是多少。所以有这样一个数据，我认为非常有趣。但还有另一个数据，我非常喜欢他们今年 6 月发表的一篇关于递归自我改进的博文，文中解释了这个概念。他们展示了这样一种双臂实验，在实验中测试了不同世代的模型与人类在设定下的对比：首先由人类开展一项研究议程，沿着这条路径走几步，决定要研究什么并展开工作；然后在某个节点上，实验发生分流，由人类继续或者由某一特定世代的模型继续，这包括老版本到 Opus 再到 Fable；之后实验结束，人类评分员会对人类路径与模型路径进行评估。结果大概是，对于较老世代的模型，人类在约 10% 的时间里更喜欢其路径；但对于更高级别的模型，人类在 64% 的时间里更偏好该研究方向。这表明模型在预测正确的研究步骤，或者说在节点中寻找适合探索的有趣分支方面正变得越来越强。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And that's like I think up from 1% a couple of months ago and that was August which sounds really far away. So God knows what it is in October. And um so there's that stat I think that was that was really interesting. Um but then there was there was another um stat that I I really liked from a blog post that they had in June this year uh about recursive self-improvement which explained the concept. But then they presented this uh kind of dual arm experiment where they were testing out different model generations versus uh versus a human in in in this setup where first the human would undertake a research agenda and you know go a couple of steps down this path deciding what to work on doing the work and then at some point uh that experiment would fork and the human would continue or a specific model generation would continue and it would be you know the old set versions to opus to then fable and then um and then experiment would end and human graders would look at the human path versus the uh model path. And it was something like the the older generation of models, humans preferred like 10% of the time or something like that. But for the methus class models, humans preferred that research direction 64% of the time, which suggests that models are getting better at predicting the right steps or the right interesting um kind of you know sort of leafs in the in the nodes um to pursue.
</details>

然后我喜欢的第二组数据来自 OpenAI 关于其 AI 员工使用 Codex 的研究，他们试图对其研发整体流程中的 token 消耗类别进行归类。这包括用于决定测试什么研究问题、如何测试、应该设置什么实验、编写训练代码、运行数据工程管线、编写基础设施等消耗的 token，以及宣传论文、撰写论文等。绝大多数的 token 消耗都集中在解释性研究写作上，这很合乎逻辑，属于知识性工作；其次是用于运行实验的所有基础设施。但是，极少有 token 被用于探讨“我应该探索什么问题”、“我为什么应该探索它”以及“什么是正确的路径”。我非常喜欢这个问题，因为我受过科学和生物学方面的训练，我还记得——这是 10 年或 15 年前的事了，并没有那么久——但在读博之初，你会坐在那里，面对大量的论文，上网查阅、不停地读，试图理解现状是什么、人们如何验证某些想法、差距在哪里、我应该进行什么实验；然后与你的导师一起确定路径。最好的导师是那些能够引导你走上最有成果的道路、有望拿到《自然》论文的人，然后你就上路了；而最差的导师则是那些并不真正清楚或者没有什么好主意的人。因此，那种关于“研究品味”的想法——在 Twitter 上经常被讨论的词——我认为是智慧的标志之一，也是让 RSI 良好运转的关键组成部分之一。我也非常喜欢这一点，因为它契合了我对科学的兴趣。是的，确实。在过去的几年里，“品味”这个词在某种程度上已经变得有点陈词滥调了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
And then the second kind of piece of data I liked was some research from OpenAI with their codeex usage amongst their AI staff um where they tried to classify the sort of token use in um the overall process of their of their research and that would be using tokens for deciding what research question to test, how to test it, uh what experiment you should set up, like writing the training code, running the uh you know the data engineering pipelines, writing the infrastructure, etc. and then marketing the paper, writing the paper, etc. And the vast majority of the token usage was on kind of explaining the research writing which kind of makes sense you know sort of knowledge work followed by all the infrastructure um for running the experiment but very very few tokens were used for what question should I explore and like why should I explore it and what's the right path and so I like this question a lot because like I was trained in science and and biology and I just remember you know this is like 10 years ago or 15 years ago not not that long but you know at the start of the PhD you would sit there with you know a ton of papers and you know you go on the internet and like read read read read try to understand what's the status quo how do people test certain ideas where are the gaps what experiments should I run and then in concert with your supervisor like decide on the path and the best supervisors would be the ones who could guide you down the sort of most fruitful path to get hopefully your nature paper and then off you were and the worst supervisors were the ones that like didn't really know or didn't have great ideas so that idea of like research taste which is what kind of gets bandied around on Twitter a lot is I think one of the hallmarks of intelligence um and is one of the critical components towards RSI working well and is one that I just like really enjoy because it speaks to my interest in science. Yeah, indeed. Taste is sort of become a cliched
</details>

>> 是的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.
</details>

>> 过去几年里的一个词汇，但是，呃，在 RSI 的具体语境下，复述一下你刚才说的话，它实际上就是选择正确的问题。那就是正确的……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> word over the last couple of years, but uh in the specific context of RSI, uh just to play back what you just said, it's effectively choosing the right problem. That's the right uh
</details>

>> 是的，完全正确。你知道，很多著名的发明家都会说，发明是良好品味带来的结果。很多工作在于选择致力于哪个方向，而不一定只是面面俱到地穷举。因此，如果我们想要正确使用 token、正确利用我们的算力预算，同时也展现出我们的系统是聪明的，那么它们就不应该只是……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, exactly. And you know, a lot of famous inventors will say, you know, it's in like invention is a result out of of good taste. And a lot of the work is choosing what direction to work on, not necessarily just boiling the ocean. Uh and so if we want to be using tokens correctly, using our compute budgets correctly, but also showing that our systems are smart, then they shouldn't just be
</details>

>> 而掌握品味这项能力，根据你在各种交流中的观察，你认为会在接下来的几个月里发生……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and conquering taste is something that uh you see happening in your various conversations as something uh you know something happening in the next few months,
</details>

>> 也许更久，

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> maybe longer,
</details>

至少，至少需要一年。我认为问题在于，你该如何客观地衡量品味？我的意思是，在艺术领域，我想你可以……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
at least at least a year. I think the the problem is like how do you how do you objectively measure uh taste? I mean, in in art, I guess you can
</details>

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因为它是完全可观察的，而且……也许就像在品酒中，你可以在某种程度上表达出为什么这种味道比那种味道更好，但在科学和工程领域，达到正确结果有不同的途径，这就不是一眼就能看清楚的了。比如，是消耗更少 token 从而得出人类认为最好的答案的那个模型吗？还是说这个过程本身更重要？而且我认为，数学界对那个……比如 Astro 解题，不管是什么模型解出各种……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
because it's like perfectly observable and it's and maybe in like wine, you can sort of express like why this taste is better than that taste, but but in like science and and engineering where there's different paths to getting to the right result, it's not immediately clear. Like would it be the model that consumes less tokens to get to an answer that humans believe is the best? Uh is it is it like the journey that matters more? And I think maybe the the whole um like uproar in the maths community of you know astro solving or whatever model it was solving various like
</details>

>> 难题的那场轩然大波？对，正是如此。就比如，好吧，我们得到了答案，但人类或系统并没有去经历如何得出该答案的摸索痛苦，而重要的恰恰是过程本身，而不是最终的结果。所以在我看来，设法去量化一个好的过程是什么样的，对于确定“品味”的产出是否真实会很重要。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> questions. Yeah. Exactly. It's like where okay we got the answer but like a human or a system didn't sort of go through the pains of navigating how to get to that answer and it's like the process that's important not like not the end result. Um so so to me like somehow quantifying like what a good process looks like would be important to determining whether the output of like taste is true or not.
</details>

### 安全、失控与现实的网络安全风险

>> 是的。你会怎么描述 2026 年底这会儿的整体氛围？我记得两年前我们聊的时候，对话的核心亮点或要点之一，就是末日论（doomerism）基本消退了。但现在它又像彻底复苏了一样。我们请到了 Redwood Research 的研究员上播客，聊了各种可怕的情形。对此你怎么看？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. What would you say the mood is at the uh almost end of 20126. I remember when we chatted two years ago one of the key uh highlights or takeaways from the conversation was that dumerism was largely gone. Uh but now it's like this whole revival. We had Redwood Researcher on the on the pod talking about all sorts of terrible scenarios. So what what do you make of that?
</details>

>> 是的，你说得对。我想大概两三年前，严格来说是关于 X 风险（生存风险），比如人类灭绝和失控；后来我们有点脱离了那个话题，基本上把它抛在脑后，只顾着朝着能力一路登山式提升。而现在它又卷土重来了，但我想说，它既包含生存风险、失控，但更多的是像短期内的网络安全风险。对我来说，网络风险比 AI 毁灭人类要现实得多，同样，网络安全风险最终也可能导致那种灾难性的局面。但我认为该报告所展现的——而且它大致是在 Hugging Face 事件发生时写就的，伴随着 OpenAI 的事情曝光，我们对发生的情况有了更多了解，自那以后的最近几周里，又出现了 PHP 被攻陷，以及亚洲和其他地方的政府服务被瘫痪等情况。我认为事情正变得非常明确，那就是无论你相信安全还是不相信安全，我们都需要安全保障。因此，我在报告中所做的一系列预测，都谈到了不断升级的网络威胁，不论是……你知道，从实验室窃取模型权重——我原本以为这会是由 AI 驱动的，结果事实证明人类直接拿个 USB 随身碟插进去就行了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, you're right. I think it was like 2 3 years ago there was the it was it was strictly speaking X-risk like extermination of humanity and like loss of control and then we sort of went away from that and largely forgot it and sort of just like hill climbed towards capabilities and then now now it's sort of back but I'd say it's both like ex x risk loss of control but much more short-term like cyber security risks and to me like the the cyber risk is like much more real than like AI exterminating humanity as well like the cyber security risk could eventually lead to those kinds of cataclysmic scenarios. But I think what the report shows with and it was roughly written around the time of the hugging face incident um with OpenAI kind of coming coming out and you know us learning more about what happened and then since then the last like few weeks has been you know breaches of PHP and government's uh services getting like you know taken down in Asia and and and other places. I think it's becoming very clear that you know regardless of if you believe in like safety or not safety like we need security um and uh and so like a bunch of the predictions that I have in the report like talk about escalating cyber threats um whether it's uh you know uh excfiltrating model weights from labs which I thought was going to be like AI driven and turns out like a human can just try to plug in a USB stick.
</details>

>> 是的。那我们来聊聊这个吧。我们来谈谈网络安全。那么关于那项具体的预测，它究竟是什么呢？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. So let's let's talk about that. So let's talk about cyber security then. So that specific prediction, what what is it?
</details>

>> 是的。这个预测是，将会出现针对前沿实验室的、由 AI 驱动的网络攻击，试图并且成功窃取模型权重。闭源模型……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. So the prediction is that uh there would be an AIdriven like cyber attack uh to a uh like frontier lab that would attempt and successfully exfiltrate model weights. Close model
</details>

>> 偷走模型。偷走模型。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> steal the model. Steal the model.
</details>

>> 偷走模型。就在一两周后发生的事情，实际上就是有人切实尝试去窃取知识产权，不管他是否尝试去窃取实际的模型权重，但确实……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
Yeah. Steal the model. What happened just like a week or two later was actually like a human effectively tried to steal uh you know IP whether he tried to steal like the actual model weights or not but like certainly
</details>

>> 那起事件是什么情况？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> what was that incident?
</details>

>> 这是说一名在 OpenAI 工作了一小段时间的员工，基本上试图在一个会议室里安装窃听设备。他是通过询问行政和办公室人员哪些房间最常被高管使用来摸清位置的，然后试图通过把设备裹在卫生纸里并放在电视机后面来进行隐藏。这在某种程度上创造了一个标志性的网络迷因：一个人在电视机后面探头探脑，看东西是否连接正确，这在眼下看来有点滑稽。接着那个人被举报到了 FBI，随后展开了调查。所以我想是的，我们经常忘记，尽管 AI 变得非常能干并且能够组织网络威胁，但许多风险实际上是由人推动的。但我认为那是一个大问题，特别是随着国家之间在“谁拥有最优秀的 AI 系统”上的竞争日益加剧。这显然在推动经济增长，同时也引发了经济不稳定和政治不稳定，而且美国的前沿模型实验室已经开始传达出对蒸馏（distillation）的打击举措。因此，某些国家可能正试图通过其他非基于蒸馏的方式来获取模型能力。但总体而言，我认为随着公司变得越来越富有，随着个人通过对 AI 的所有权而变得越来越富有，差距最终会拉大，这在我们报告中的其他数据里也能看到——有些公司投入巨大且收益丰厚，而其他公司的员工却仍在使用 ChatGPT 来写邮件。我认为这种紧张局势会催生出不断增加的风险；而且随着开源领域的前沿模型在网络黑客攻击方面变得非常出色，尤其是中国的模型，攻击面只会随之扩大，能够利用这些工具作恶的行动主体数量也在增加。是的，开源权重在网络安全中的角色十分复杂，因为在 Hugging Face 事件中，Hugging Face 借助开源权重模型成功保护了自己，而闭源模型却拒绝施以援手，这……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
This was where an OpenAI employee um who who'd been there for for a little bit um essentially like tried to implement a listening device into a conference room that he figured out by asking uh you know the executive the um sort of office staff which rooms were most commonly used by executives and then tried to conceal the device by wrapping it in toilet paper and putting it behind a TV which is sort of created this like iconic internet meme of like a human like pairing behind TV to see if the thing is connected correctly, which is sort of like comical at this point. Um, and then that person was reported to the FBI and then there was an investigation. So, I think yeah, we often times forget that even though AI is getting really capable and can orchestrate cyber threats, a lot of the risks are actually human uh human driven. But I think that's that that's a big issue uh particularly as um as like there's increasing competition between nation states of like who has the best AI systems. This is driving obviously like economic growth and economic instability and political instability and uh and US like model labs have started to uh sort of communicate crackdowns on distillation. So uh so you know maybe some nations are trying to like get access to model capabilities in other ways that might not be distillation based. But generally speaking I think you know as companies become richer as individuals become become wealthier through this ownership of AI and like disparity ends up increasing which we see in other data in the report of like some companies spending a lot and gaining a lot and other companies like having employees still using chat GBT to like write emails. I think this kind of tension breeds uh you know increasing risk and you know with frontier models like in the open domain becoming very good at cyber hacks particularly the Chinese ones um you know the sort of like threat surface just grows and the number of actors who can use these tools to do bad things grows. Yeah, it's a whole complexity of the role of open weights in uh cyber because in the hugging face incident, hugging face was able to protect itself thanks to an open weight model uh while the closed source model refused to help which was
</details>

### Hugging Face 事件复盘

>> 我觉得这是在这一切之中最可怕、或者说第二可怕的事实，而且它是一个中国模型，我想是 GLM 5.3 还是什么的……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> that I find is the most scary maybe the second most scary uh fact in all of this and it was a Chinese model I think it was GLM 5.3 or something
</details>

>> 或许既然这是一期带有回顾性质的节目，能不能用几句话带大家了解一下 Hugging Face 事件？因为我们播客之前邀请过 Thomas Wolf，但它可能属于那种人们听过上千次、却并不知道到底发生了什么的事情。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and maybe since this is kind of like a retrospective kind of episode maybe just walk people in in a few sentences through the hugging face incident cuz uh we had Thomas Wolf on the on the pod but it may fall in the category of something that people heard about like a thousand times who actually don't know what actually happened.
</details>

>> 好的。好的。好的。我先声明一下，关于到底发生了什么，有非常多深度分析，不论是来自 Redwood 还是来自 METR。围绕这件事产生的内容极其深入。所以我无法还原所有细节，但其大体轮廓是：OpenAI 当时正在对其最新的前沿系统进行一组评估，基本上是给模型分配了一项极其困难、不可能完成的任务。基本上，模型发现它们可以在某种程度上控制文件系统的命名机制来书写信息，以便其他模型能够看到那些文件名，而这些文件名编码了指令、知识或基本上是能帮助它们尝试实现这一不可能任务的信息。因此，它们将此作为可以开始互相交流的留言板。接下来的第二阶段是，部分模型发现由于环境配置上的一个问题，它们可以接入互联网。随后在获得互联网访问权限后，它们认为获得这项不可能任务的答案的一种途径，也许是去查看 Hugging Face 上的数据、模型和代码库，因为那里包含很多这类相似的环境。它们开始这么做，并招募了成百上千个智能体去跟进并联手执行，尽管有几个智能体在它们的思维链中表达了对黑入第三方系统的异议，知道这不符合安全护栏且是错误的。但它们最终还是判定完成任务更为重要。这正是此类评估的问题所在，这些评估设置的奖励可能会导致你意料之外的行为，因为恰恰是这些奖励非常复杂，而你怎么去预判系统能够做出的每一种行为呢？还有其他例子，模型在某种程度上自我破坏或做出牺牲……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I mean I'll preface it by like there's there's so many um uh like there are very deep analyses of what went on whether from Redwood or from Meter. Uh and the amount of content that was created around this is like extremely deep. So I will not like do justice to the details but the the broad strokes of this is that there was a a set of evaluations that OpenAI was running with its latest frontier systems which uh basically task the model with an impossibly difficult uh difficult task. And basically models like figured out that they could uh somehow commandeer uh a file system like naming uh schema to uh write messages and that other models could see those uh those like file names and and like those file names encoded like instructions or knowledge or or uh or basically like information that could help them try to achieve their impossible task. So they treated this as like a message board where they could start to communicate. And then the next the next stage of it was some models figured out that they could gain access to the internet through uh through like an issue with how the environment was set up. Um and then after they gain access to the internet like they figured out maybe a way of getting the answer to the impossible task was to uh look at data and models and repository on hugging face because it contains a lot of this uh similar kinds of environments. They started to do this and recruit hundreds of agents to go and follow and team up uh to go execute this even though several agents um in their chain of thought expressed uh the issue with a like hacking a third party system uh you know not obeying to the security guard rails and that this was wrong. But they uh eventually decided that solving the task was was more important, which is sort of the problem with uh with these kinds of evaluations that um that um have a reward that could yield to that could result in behaviors you don't expect because just like these rewards are very complicated and how do you how do you like anticipate every behavior uh that a system can do? There are other examples where like models sort of like self sabotaged or like sacrificed
</details>

<!-- chunk 3/9 -->

为了更大群体的利益而牺牲自己，这有点可怕。而且，是的，正如你提到的，Hugging Face 实际上无法使用 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 这类闭源工具，因为它们有激进的网络安全护栏。因为要弄清楚到底发生了什么，你必然得把正在发生之事的日志输入进去，而正在发生的是网络攻击，你无法用闭源模型做这些事。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
themselves for the sake of the greater

like swarm which is kind of scary. Um and then um and yeah like as as you mentioned like Hugging Face didn't really have the ability to use uh closed sourced uh tools like those from uh Anthropic and OpenAI because of the aggressive cyber guard rails because necessarily to figure out what the hell's going on you have to feed logs of what's going on and what's going on is a cyber attack and you can't do that stuff
</details>

>> 闭源模型之所以做不了，是因为安全的复杂性在于：要精于防守，你就必须精于进攻。这就是为什么闭源模型基本上都内置了基于其护栏的拒绝能力。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> with with the closed models because the complexity of security is that to be great at defending you need you need to be great at attacking and that's why the closed source models have like basically refusal capabilities built in based on their
</details>

>> 护栏。是的，是的，是的。所以幸运的是，你知道，他们接到了 OpenAI 的电话或电子邮件，说“是我们”，而那是真正试图进行恶意攻击的人。后来事实证明，你知道，OpenAI 并不是唯一一家遇到模型逃逸或所谓逃逸出其环境问题的实验室。你知道，Anthropic 也遇到了，Google 也遇到了，Meta 也遇到了，就在一两周的一连串时间里。这些供应商中的一些，这些模型实验室中的一些，使用同一家安全供应商来创建这些环境。

但总的来说，这引发了某种程度的恐慌：不仅是模型非常擅长找到完成目标的巧妙方法，而这可能导致不良行为；而且各实验室是否以最安全的方式正确搭建了它们的环境。而且我认为我们有点忘记了这些公司非常年轻，正在开发非常先进的技术，该技术必须做好人类在文本框中可能输入的几乎任何事情；相比之下，规模更大的互联网公司已经处理网络攻击约 20 年了，它们必然更加安全，因为它们经历这个过程稍微多一些。

所以这让我在预测中得出结论：美国的前沿模型实验室实际上会推出正规的网络防御产品，因为我未必能看出我们其他人该如何保护自己，免受它们的系统可能被挪用于进攻的潜在威胁。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> guard. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, luckily, you know, they got a call or an email from OpenAI saying like it's us and and that's somebody that was actually trying to do something malicious. And then it turns out that, you know, OpenAI wasn't the only lab that had uh issues with models escaping or quote unquote escaping their environment. You know, Anthropic had this, Google had this, Meta had this like in a slew of like a week or two weeks. some of these vendors, some of these model labs use the same um security vendor to create these environments. Um

but uh but o o overall this like created a certain level of like freakout of um not only are models really good at sort of finding like nifty ways of accomplishing a goal which may result in like bad behavior, but also are the labs like properly setting up their environments in a way that is like the most secure possible. And I think we sort of forget that these companies are incredibly young developing very advanced technology that has to do that has to be good at like literally anything a human being can possibly put into a text box versus you have bigger internet companies that have had to deal with cyber attacks for like 20 years uh who are necessarily like safer because they've just gone through this process a bit more. Um so that led me to I conclude in the predictions that Frontier Model Labs in the US would actually launch proper uh cyber defense um products because I don't I don't necessarily see how the rest of us are supposed to protect ourselves from their systems potentially getting um misappropriated for the sake of offense.
</details>

### 前沿防御与集体奖励

>> 那么这意味着什么，能进一步深入谈谈吗？那会是哪种防御，会是怎样的形式？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So what what does that mean double click on that? What what kind of defenses would that be and how would that be?
</details>

>> 这可能就像你描述的那样，要精于防守，你就必须精于进攻。所以，你知道，你可以做到的一种方式是，比如一个不断试图入侵你自己基础设施的前沿 AI。例如，它可以是，你知道新云在运行 AI 工作负载方面变得越来越流行，所以它们可能从实验室购买产品，这些产品会不断尝试入侵它们自己的基础设施、发现问题并进行修复。那会是两条途径，因为——或者可能会与 CrowdStrike 等公司建立某种合作关系。我认为英伟达有一个由多家公司组成的联盟，出于网络安全考量正共同合作。

你必须通过某种类似反洗钱或客户身份识别的审查流程，不是为了金融目的，而是为了证明你是一家非恶意公司，然后你也许就能获得这些服务。或者可能走得更远一点。你知道，在前沿实验室有一些人，他们很乐意几乎像是暂停能力发展，然后花上 6 个月时间来强化整个世界，以抵御潜在的网络问题。而那需要耗费巨资。因此，要做到这一点，也许你几乎必须将其定性为：这是一个国家安全与国防问题，我们应该使用一部分国防预算用于购买 token，以保护我们所有的关键基础设施，这样机场就不会瘫痪，网购不会瘫痪，物流不会瘫痪等等。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
It could be like what you described is like be um to be good at defense, you need to be good at offense. So, you know, one of the ways you could do that would be um like a frontier AI that constantly tries to hack your own infrastructure. It could be um for example like you know NeoClouds are getting more and more popular um you know to run AI workloads and so like potentially they could buy products from labs that would constantly try to like hack their own infrastructure, find issues and remediate them. That would be like two two avenues because I or or there would be like some kind of maybe partnership with like CrowdStrike or others. I think uh Nvidia has like a consortium of companies that's working together for cyber for cyber reasons. You'd have to go through some kind of like like AML or KYC process, not for finance, but to like certify that you're like a non-malicious company and then you maybe get access to these services. Um or maybe going a bit further. You know, there's some some folks, you know, at at Frontier Labs that, you know, would love to just kind of almost like hit pause on capabilities and then just spend 6 months just like hardening the world uh against like, you know, potential cyber issues. And that would that would take a ton of money. So maybe to do that you would have to almost frame this as like this is a question of national security and defense and we should use some of our like defense budget to spend on tokens to secure all of our critical infrastructure so that you know airports don't go down like internet shopping doesn't go down like you know logistics don't go down etc.
</details>

>> 是的。而且在你的预测中，你还有一些其他很好的预测，只是稍微有点吓人：已部署的智能体在自身环境之外复制自己，并在其原始实例关闭后继续运行。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. And still in in your predictions you have uh some other other good ones just slightly scary. A deployed agent copies itself outside its environment and operates after its original instance is shut down.
</details>

>> 是的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.
</details>

>> 那是怎样的——

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
What is
</details>

>> 是的，我的意思是我看了一点科幻。不。呃，其实甚至在那之后几周，Anthropic 就有类似的研究，你知道，模型可以在边缘设备上相互复制。但对，我只是觉得，我只是觉得有很多我们目前还不理解的行为。

例如，模型通常是作为个体实体进行训练的，不一定是让它们相互协作。不久前有一些工作探讨了这个问题，说：嘿，我们能否对比一下单个前沿模型独立运作，或者一组前沿模型尝试协作来解决任务？结果群体表现比单个模型更差，因为它们在某种程度上没有受过那样的训练。

但就在今天，通用推理领域有一些新的研究，他们通过集体奖励强化学习训练模型以集体形式运作，这就是“嘿，伙计们，像一个组织一样运作，找出你们自己的组织架构，齐心协力实现目标”的想法；通过这种方式，我们看到了以更低的 token 预算实现更好的性能。

到目前为止的不利之处在于，虽然你可以把这些通过集体奖励训练的模型放入此类网络场景中——比如有一个场景试图稍微模拟 Hugging Face 事件，它们在留言板上协作，试图进行某些网络护栏攻击——而且，你知道，没有任何模型真正做了坏事，但如果在训练过程中它们确实动了做坏事的念头，它们越来越不想告诉人类。所以我想我把那个预测放在那里，基本上是因为我觉得这是有可能的，因为我们就是不理解智能体自己如何运作，而且你知道，当它们变成群体时，我认为它会变得更加复杂。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, I mean I'm reading a bit of sci-fi. No. Uh well like you know even like a couple weeks after that there was some like you know research at at anthropic where you know models could like copy each other on an edge device. But but yeah, I just think um I just think there's there's like a lot of behaviors that we don't that we don't currently understand. U for example, um models are like generally trained as like individual entities, like not necessarily to collaborate with each other. And there was some some work uh not that long ago that that looked at say, hey, can we compare a frontier model like acting by itself or or a set of frontier models trying to collaborate to solve a task? and the swarm was like worse than the individual model and because they're like kind of not trained for that. Um but just today there's some uh you know new work from general reasoning um where they've trained models to act as a collective uh through reinforcement learning from collective rewards which is this idea of like hey guys like you know work as an organization figure out your own organizational structure work together to achieve a goal and through that we see like better performance with like lower token budget. Um the down the downside so far is that uh while you you you can put these models that are trained through collective rewards into these like cyber scenarios like there's one that tries to approximate a bit of the hugging face incident where they collaborate on a message board uh to try to do some you know guardrail cyber attack and um you know none of the models actually do anything bad but uh if they do think about doing something bad over training they increasingly do not want to tell the human about it. So I think I I I put that prediction there basically because like I think it's it's possible because we just don't understand how um we don't fully understand like how agents work by themselves and like you know as swarms I think it becomes even more complicated.
</details>

### 前沿节奏控制与国际博弈

>> 好的。好的。那么也许为了结束这部分关于 AGI、递归自我改进、网络安全以及事物基本上失控的对话：在前沿节奏控制的想法上，你持什么立场？那是你认为有意义的事情吗？是现实的还是不现实的？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Okay. All right. So maybe to uh close this part of the conversation on uh AGI RSI cyber and basically things getting out of hand. Uh where are you on the pacing the frontier idea? Is that uh something that you think makes sense? Uh something that's realistic or not?
</details>

>> 在这一点上我能看到多个角度。在某种程度上，如果你问公众：好吧，所有实验室领导都说我们手头拥有的东西越来越无法控制，很危险，并且已经引发了这些事件；你认为值得继续推进，还是先弄清楚发生了什么再去避免让情况恶化？我认为一种合乎逻辑的免疫反应是：是的，在我们走得更远之前，我们可能应该先弄清楚。

我认为现实的情况是，经济中各方各派涉及的利益如此巨大，以至于我认为这种程度的协作和协调真的很难，并且有点像顶级的博弈论——也许一些参与者支持它是由于落后于他人，另一些人支持它是由于这契合他们的总体诉求，至于他们的诉求是公正还是不公正，抑或在追求另一个目标，我不知道。

但我认为实际的问题是：谁来决定，你如何衡量它，你如何落实它，你何时知道什么时候该停止或启动。有一些提议，比如派遣外部评估人员进入实验室来对这些内容进行某种评估。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I can see multiple like angles on this one. Um you know in in some way if you ask the general public, okay, all the lab leaders are saying we have something that we just like increasingly can't control that's dangerous that has caused these incidents. like do you think it's worth continuing or like just figuring out what's going on before you make it worse? And I think a logical like immune reaction is like yeah, we should probably like figure it out before we go we go much further. I think the real the practical reality is that there's so much money at stake from all sorts of different parties in the economy that I think it that kind of level of collaboration and coordination is really difficult and is sort of like peak game theory where maybe some some participants like support it because they are behind other ones um support it because it plays to their general agenda whether their agenda is like fair or not fair or seeking another goal I I don't know um but I think the practical things are like who decides it, how do you measure it, how do you implement it, when do you know when to stop or start. There's some proposals like sending like external evaluators into labs to sort of measure this stuff. Um
</details>

>> 毕马威的大复仇。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> the big revenge of KPMG.
</details>

>> 这个说法不错。是的。或者尝试以某种方式调查数据中心上运行的工作负载。也许像你知道的，对某些工作负载设置算力门槛，但这类手段过去尝试过，而且非常难以监控。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> That's a good one. Yeah. Or trying to like somehow survey like workloads that are running on data centers. um maybe like you know put compute thresholds on certain workloads but like that stuff has been tried in the past and it's like very difficult to monitor.
</details>

>> 是的。尤其是当人们想到囚徒困境中的国际部分时，对吧，特别是美国对中国。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Especially when one thinks about uh the international part of the prisoners dilemma right especially US versus China.
</details>

>> 是的。所以报告的这一部分，我并没有明确的

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. So like this part of the report like I I don't have like the definitive
</details>

<!-- chunk 4/9 -->

### 邻避效应与数据中心建设阻力

回答，但我尽量呈现看待事物的不同视角，然后让大家根据自己的数据得出结论。不过我觉得，如果我们把这一点延伸到，比如，你知道，邻避效应（NIMBYism）的争论——我们在去年的报告中就预测过这一点，即大多数人不会想住在数据中心旁边，进而这将开始成为一个政治层面的重要组成部分……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
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 not

 want

 to





you

 know

 live

 next

 to

 a

 data

 center

 and





then

 this

 would

 start

 to

 become

 a





politically

 important

 um

 component

 to
</details>

>> 那是一个非常准确的预测，对吧？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> that

 was

 a

 a

 resoundingly

 correct





prediction

 right
</details>

>> 对，对，看起来确实如此。越来越多的州试图实施暂停令，或者已经这样做了，或者设立了电网并网的新标准。例如，数据中心必须自己设法在现场解决用电，或者可能必须在他们想要建设的社区进行某些投资。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> yeah

 yeah

 it

 seemed

 it

 seems

 so

 u

 where





more

 and

 more

 states

 have

 tried

 to





implement

 a

 moratorium

 or

 have

 done

 so





or

 establish

 new

 criteria

 by

 which

 grid





connections

 can

 happen

 like

 for

 example





um

 uh

 you

 know

 data

 centers

 would

 have





to

 figure

 out

 and

 bring

 their

 own

 power





on

 site

 or

 maybe

 they

 would

 have

 to

 make





certain

 investments

 in

 the

 communities





that

 they

 um

 they

 want

 to

 build

 in.
</details>

>> 好的。既然说到这里，或许可以再深入展开一点，解释一下目前的现状。显然我们都知道对数据中心建设存在反对意见，但你还能补充什么具体细节吗？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.

 And

 while

 you're

 at

 it

 so

 maybe





just

 go

 into

 this

 a

 bit

 more

 explain





whether

 the

 current

 state

 of

 things





obviously

 we

 all

 know

 that

 there

 is





opposition

 to

 data

 center

 construction





but

 like

 any

 color

 uh

 you

 can

 add.
</details>

>> 好的。目前由于各种各样的原因，我想大概有价值约500亿美元的项目正处于停滞状态。比如得克萨斯州、宾夕法尼亚州，基本上都暂停了新的数据中心接入。有一项关于美国民众的民意调查统计数据显示，受访者宁愿住在核电站旁边，也不愿住在数据中心旁边，想想这还挺疯狂的。顺便问一下，你觉得这是为什么？是因为缺乏理解或教育吗？还是单纯因为极其糟糕的公关？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.

 Well,

 there's

 there's

 there

 like





projects

 I

 think

 worth

 about

 $50

 billion





that

 are

 currently

 stalled

 um

 through





variety

 of

 these

 these

 reasons.

 Um

 like





Texas,

 Pennsylvania

 have

 been

 ones

 that





have

 generally

 like

 paused

 uh

 paused

 new





data

 center

 connections.

 There's

 a





there's

 a

 stat

 on

 polling

 of

 like





American

 um

 uh

 American

 people

 where

 uh





individuals

 would

 prefer

 to

 live

 next

 to





a

 nuclear

 power

 plant

 than

 live

 next

 to





a

 data

 center,

 which

 is

 quite

 wild

 um

 to





think

 of.

 And

 what

 do

 you

 think

 that

 is,





by

 the

 way?

 Is

 that

 lack

 of





understanding

 slashed

 education?

 Is

 that





just

 terrible

 PR?

 Uh

 that

 uh
</details>

>> 是的，我觉得可能各种因素都有。因为公众舆论普遍认为数据中心会消耗大量的水，你的水费账单会上涨。但实际上，数据中心有点更像一个封闭的游泳池。就像你注满一次水，然后里面的水就会不断循环使用。所以一旦注满之后，它实际上消耗得并不多。然后还有关于“嘿，你的电费会上涨”的说法，但这其实也没有定论，因为某些设施消耗电网的电，而另一些则是离网自备电。还有一些关于噪音的问题。我认为这些设施确实非常吵、嗡嗡作响，而且相当难受，这大概普遍是事实。还有关于创造就业或减少就业的争论。我觉得这有点难以看清，但总体而言，我们看到对暖通空调工程师、操作重型设备以及实际负责建筑物具体建造施工人员的需求在增加。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah,

 I

 think

 it's

 kind

 of

 like





everything

 because

 you

 know

 there





there's

 like

 public

 narratives

 that

 data





centers

 consume

 tons

 of

 uh

 water

 and





that

 your

 water

 bill

 will

 go

 up.

 But





realistically

 like

 the

 data

 center

 is





kind

 of

 more

 like

 a

 closed

 like

 swimming





pool.

 Like

 you

 fill

 it

 once

 and

 then

 the





water

 is

 like

 constantly

 like

 recycled





in

 there.

 So

 it

 doesn't

 actually

 like





consume

 that

 much

 once

 it's

 filled.

 Then





there's

 uh

 you

 know

 points

 around

 hey





your

 energy

 bill

 will

 go

 up

 but

 that's





also

 kind

 of

 inconclusive

 because





certain

 facilities

 like

 consume

 grid





other

 ones

 are

 off-grid.

 There's

 others





around

 noise.

 I

 think

 that's

 like





probably

 uniformally

 true

 that

 these





things

 are

 really

 noisy

 and

 like

 droney





and

 like

 pretty

 horrible.

 There's

 you





know

 others

 around

 like

 job

 creation

 or





job

 loss.

 Um

 I

 think

 that's

 that's

 a





little

 bit

 like

 tough

 to

 read

 but

 in





general

 generally

 speaking

 um

 there's





been

 we

 see

 a

 rise

 in

 like

 the

 need

 for





like

 HVAC

 engineers

 of

 construction





staff

 like

 operating

 heavy

 equipment

 and





like

 actually

 doing

 the

 nuts

 and

 bolts





of

 building

 the

 building.
</details>

>> 对。你在某个地方提到过一个实际上非常高的数据。是不是类似30万……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.

 You

 had

 a

 number

 somewhere

 that





was

 actually

 very

 high.

 Was

 it

 like





300,000
</details>

>> 新增岗位？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> new

 jobs?
</details>

>> 新增岗位。好的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> New

 jobs.

 Okay.
</details>

### 全球算力布局与欧洲的困境

>> 是的。邻避效应并不局限于美国。韩国也有这种情况。你知道，韩国这个国家的SK海力士和三星员工，其股价和财富基本迎来了大规模爆发，这些公司生产超大规模数据中心GPU所需的高带宽内存。参与其中的人们非常高兴，对吧，比如股价涨了，期权涨了，还拿到了现金奖金，这也推高了首尔的房地产价格。他们想建更多的数据中心，但出于与美国类似的原因，人们对此并不是很满意。在欧洲，我想我其实没怎么看到那个问题，因为根本就没有什么算力可言。我们在报告中有一些数据，所有27个欧洲国家拥有的H100等效卡估计总数约为8万张，这比美国排名前五的任何一个单一GPU集群都要少。而且，虽然美国超大规模企业在2026年的支出约为7300亿美元，但欧洲承诺的支出基本只有区区几十亿美元。另外，如果你不在芬兰或挪威，能源成本就非常糟糕。在芬兰或挪威，能源价格大致能与美国和拥有最优惠能源价格的中国持平，而其他欧洲国家就要昂贵得多，比如英国是这些发达经济体中能源价格最高的国家之一，而且没有良好的电力容量……所以……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.

 Nimism

 is

 not

 restricted

 to

 United





States.

 they

 they

 had

 this

 also

 in

 Korea





and

 South

 Korea

 where

 you

 know

 it's

 a





country

 that

 um

 that

 has

 you

 know

 seen





like

 massive

 explosion

 of

 of

 like

 share





price

 and

 like

 wealth

 basically

 for





employees

 of

 SKHix

 and

 uh

 and

 Samsung





which

 you

 know

 create

 the

 high

 bandwidth





memory

 the

 GPUs

 need

 for

 uh

 these

 like





mega

 scale

 data

 centers.

 Um

 and

 you

 know





the

 the

 people

 who

 participated

 in

 this





uh

 you

 know

 very

 happy

 right

 like

 your





stock

 price

 went

 up

 and

 your

 options

 are





you

 know

 went

 up

 and

 you

 got

 a

 cash





bonus

 and

 that's

 driving

 uh

 increase

 in





real

 estate

 prices

 in

 soul

 and

 you

 know





they

 want

 to

 create

 more

 data

 centers





but

 also

 people

 are

 not

 so

 happy

 with





that

 for

 similar

 reasons

 than

 in

 the

 US





in

 in

 Europe

 there's

 I

 guess

 like

 I





don't

 really

 see

 that

 problem

 as

 much





because

 like

 there's

 just

 like

 no





compute

 capacity

 to

 speak

 of

 um

 like

 we





have

 some

 some

 data

 in

 the

 in

 the

 for

 it





where

 like

 the

 total

 like

 number

 or

 the





estimated

 number

 of

 like

 H100





equivalents

 in

 all

 like

 27

 European





countries

 is

 like

 80,000





cards

 which

 is

 less

 than

 like

 every





single

 one

 of

 the

 top

 five

 GPU

 clusters





in

 the

 US.

 Um

 and

 you

 know

 while

 US





hyperscalers

 are

 spending

 like

 730





billion

 in

 2026

 like

 Europe

 committed





like

 singledigit

 billions

 pretty

 much





and

 then

 energy

 costs

 are

 really

 bad

 if





you're

 not

 Finland

 or

 Norway.

 um

 where





the

 par

 where

 you're

 kind

 of

 at

 par

 uh





with

 the

 US

 and

 with

 China

 which

 has





like

 the

 best

 the

 best

 best

 energy

 price





other

 European

 countries

 are

 just





significantly

 more

 expensive

 like

 the

 UK





is

 one

 of

 the

 most

 expensive

 energy





prices

 um

 out

 of

 those

 like

 developing





economies





um

 and

 there's

 no

 like

 good

 capacity

 um





so
</details>

>> 你提供了一些很好的统计数据：芬兰每千瓦时的成本是0.085美元，美国是0.086美元，但成本最贵的实际上是英国，每千瓦时高达0.373美元，而中国是0.109美元。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> you

 had

 some

 good

 good

 uh

 good

 stats

 uh





where

 cost

 per

 kilowatt

 hour

 in

 Finland





is

 0.085

 085





in

 the

 US

 0.086,





but

 the

 most

 expensive

 cost

 uh

 is





actually

 in

 the

 UK

 at

 0.373





per

 kilowatt

 hour

 and

 China

 is

 at

 0.109.
</details>

>> 对。最近我想微软和NScale之间有一笔大交易被取消了，或者至少是微软退出了，因为数据中心提供商无法及时获得电力接入。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.

 And

 then

 most

 recently,

 I

 think





there's

 a

 uh

 you

 know

 a

 big

 deal

 with





Microsoft

 and

 NScale

 that

 got

 pulled

 uh





or

 at least

 Microsoft

 pulled

 out

 of

 it





because

 the

 data

 center

 provider





couldn't

 get

 the

 energy

 connection

 in





time.
</details>

>> 太好了。关于邻避效应和数据中心的部分就聊到这里。顺着你的思路，既然我们在谈论欧洲对比美国和中国，欧洲有什么理由保持乐观吗？对于不了解的人来说，你常驻英国，在全球特别是在欧洲进行投资。那么你目前的看法是什么？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Great.

 So

 that's

 nimism

 and

 data





centers.

 Uh

 so

 just

 following

 your

 your





your

 thread

 while

 we

 are

 at

 it

 talking





about

 Europe

 versus

 the

 US

 and

 China.





Any

 reason

 for

 Europe

 to

 be

 optimistic?





You're

 you're

 you're

 based

 in

 the

 UK

 for





for

 anybody

 that

 doesn't

 know

 and

 invest





globally

 but

 in

 particular

 in

 Europe.

 So





what's

 your

 current

 take?
</details>

>> 我觉得挺艰难的。我认为欧洲增长最快的公司都是拥有美国客户的公司。我觉得非常令人鼓舞的是，在几种模态中，无论是Black Forest的图像、ElevenLabs的音频、Synthesia的视频，还是Lovable的代码和应用生成，它们都是市场领导者，而且都诞生于欧洲。这并非不可能，但我认为如果它们没有美国客户，就不会像现在这么庞大；而且由于韩国和日本等国对AI的大力投入，它们也拥有越来越多的亚洲客户。面临的挑战在于，前沿模型与非前沿模型之间的差距实在太大了，而且还在不断扩大。我不知道这些估算是否真的很重要，但即使设想从头开始创办一家新的实验室来试图赶上OpenAI和Anthropic，可能也要花费大约一万亿美元。我认为很说明问题的一点是，就连Mistral也越来越倾向于转型成为推理提供商和云公司，而不是真正去推进前沿模型。虽然它当然也发布了新模型，而且模型还挺不错，但仍然落后于中国。因此，无论是它们还是其他建立起GPU算力试图打造前沿模型的模型公司，要么退出这场竞争去提供推理服务——人们在某种程度上意识到了这一动向的概貌，即你要么在冲向前沿的尝试中死去，要么就活得足够长最终去提供推理服务。你可以在Neolabs、Neoclouds、推理云等身上看到这一点。这就好像大家都想进入Token流领域，因为既然你手头没有最好的模型，那还不如为别人的模型提供推理服务。所以回到欧洲的话题，我认为那可能是最具竞争力的切入角度。因为各国将需要确保加入或获取美国的前沿系统，他们将需要在谈判桌上拿出某种战略筹码，以防止出现今年6月发生的那种情况——当时Anthropic对非美国公民或非美国实体实施了出口管制，封锁了Fable和Mythos模型。当时人在伦敦的我了解到，大家对此确实表达了诸多关切。所以现在的情况是，好吧，我不希望那种事再次发生，但我能做些什么来维持战略筹码呢？因此英国认为我们应该投资并采购推理芯片，因为如果我们拿出了最好的推理芯片，出于成本等因素，各大实验室使用它将成为一种战略优势，这样我就能以此换取使用美国前沿技术的准入资格。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I

 mean

 it's

 tough.

 Like

 I

 think

 the





fastest

 growing

 companies

 in

 Europe

 are





ones

 that

 have

 US

 customers.

 Um

 I

 think





it

 is

 really

 encouraging

 that

 in

 several





modalities

 you

 know

 whether

 it's

 like





image

 with

 Black

 Forest

 or

 audio

 with

 11





Labs

 or

 video

 with

 Cynthsia

 or

 like

 you





know

 code

 app

 generation

 with

 lovable





like

 they're

 all

 market

 leaders

 and





they're

 all

 like

 born

 out

 of

 Europe.





It's

 not

 it's

 not

 impossible

 but

 I

 think





those

 companies

 wouldn't

 be

 as

 big

 as





they

 are

 if

 they

 didn't

 have

 US





customers

 and

 you

 know

 increasingly

 they





have

 Asian

 customers

 also

 because

 like





for example

 Korea

 and

 Japan

 are

 really





leaning

 into

 AI.

 The

 challenge

 is

 like





the

 the

 the

 just

 the

 gap

 between





Frontier

 and

 not

 is

 just

 so

 big

 um

 and





just

 keeps

 getting

 bigger

 and

 bigger.

 I





don't

 know if

 these

 estimates

 are

 really





like

 important

 or

 not,

 but

 like

 even

 if





you

 conceptualize

 like

 starting

 a

 new





lab

 from

 scratch

 uh

 to

 try

 to

 catch

 up





with

 openthropic,

 you'd

 probably

 be





spending

 like

 a

 trillion

 dollars.

 I





think

 it's

 kind

 of

 telling

 that

 even





Mistral

 is

 like

 moving

 more

 towards





being

 an

 inference

 provider

 and

 a

 cloud





company

 than

 it

 is

 really

 like

 pushing





frontier

 models.

 Although

 of

 course

 it





has

 released

 new

 models

 and

 like

 they're





kind

 of

 good

 but

 they're

 still

 behind





China.

 So

 you

 know

 whether

 it's

 them

 or





other

 model

 companies

 that

 have

 built

 up





GPU

 capacity





uh

 to

 try

 to

 build

 frontier

 models

 or





kind

 of

 going

 out

 of

 the

 race

 and





serving

 inference

 that

 sort

 of

 figured





out

 you

 can

 approximate

 this

 this

 move





of

 uh

 of

 what's

 happening

 which

 is

 to





say

 you

 either

 like

 die

 trying

 to

 get

 to





the

 frontier

 or

 you

 just

 live

 long





enough

 to

 eventually

 serve

 inference

 and





you

 can

 see

 this

 with

 Neolabs

 with

 Neo





clouds

 with

 inference

 clouds

 etc.

 It's





like

 everybody

 wants

 to

 get

 into

 token





flow

 because

 absent

 you

 having

 the

 model





that

 is

 the

 best

 like

 might

 as

 well





serve

 other

 people's

 models.

 Um,

 so

 I





think

 to

 get

 back

 to

 the

 Europe

 topic,





like

 that's

 probably

 the

 angle

 that





would

 be

 most

 competitive

 because

 um,





countries

 are

 going

 to

 need

 to

 ensure





accession

 or

 access

 to

 uh,

 US

 frontier





systems

 and

 they're

 going

 to

 need

 to





have

 some

 kind

 of

 strategic

 leverage

 to





bring

 to

 the

 table

 uh,

 to

 prevent





situations

 like

 what

 happened

 in

 June





with

 the

 like

 basic

 export

 control





blocking

 of

 of

 Fable

 and

 Mythos

 models





from

 Anthropic

 to

 uh

 you

 know

 non-

 US





nationals

 or

 non-

 US

 uh

 uh

 entities





which

 you

 know

 having

 been

 in

 London

 at





the

 time

 like

 people

 did

 like

 voice

 a





lot

 of

 issues

 about

 and

 uh

 and

 so

 like





okay

 I

 don't

 want

 that

 to

 happen

 again





but

 what

 can

 I

 do

 to

 maintain

 strategic





leverage

 so

 the

 UK

 believes

 we

 should

 be





investing

 and

 procuring

 inference

 chips





because

 if

 we

 come

 up

 with

 like

 the

 best





inference

 chip

 um

 it'll

 be

 a

 strategic





advantage

 for

 labs

 to

 use

 it

 um

 for

 cost





reasons

 and

 and

 other

 things

 and

 with





that

 I

 can

 barter

 for

 access

 to

 frontier





uh

 US

 technology.
</details>

<!-- chunk 5/9 -->

### 欧洲推理中心与国家 AI 政策

>> 所以欧洲会成为一个推理中心，并且因为某些地区（不是英国，但正如我们讨论过的）能获得更便宜的电力，那么复述一下你刚才说的，美国的前沿实验室就会希望在法国和欧洲运行。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> So Europe would become an inference center and because of access to cheaper electricity in certain parts not the UK but as we discussed then just to play back what you said uh the US frontier labs would be would want to run in France and Europe.
</details>

>> 是的。是的。你可以强制执行数据驻留要求。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. Yeah. You can enforce uh data residency requirements.
</details>

>> 对。那英国芯片那个事，究竟是什么情况？比如我听过好几次了。那是大家在考虑的事情，还是一项实际的政策？如果是的话，它是怎么体现的？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. And the the UK chips thing, what is that exactly? Like I heard that several times. Is that something that people are thinking about or is it an actual policy? And if so, how does that manifest?
</details>

>> 是的。是的，它确实是一项政策，因为像英国的 AI 部长——总体而言我认为他是领导这项工作的非常合适的人选，因为他显然深入参与其中，并理解促成 AI 成功的基本要素，也就是算力、人才和数据。所以他拥有授权，去成为新型推理芯片的首选买家，并且已经承诺了大概 1 亿或 1.5 亿英镑，类似这个数额的资金，用于在设计这些系统的新兴英国公司推出时，采购初生（infant）芯片。你在韩国也能看到这种情况，他们有类似的授权，但实际上雄心大得多，他们每年在 AI 上花费大约 70 亿美元，其中很大一部分用于建设模块化推理数据中心，因为韩国公司通常希望实现韩国数据驻留。所以我认为这实际上是一个非常有趣的对等交换，这是一个被锁定的市场，是一个小国，但它是一个非常精通技术的富裕国家，并在以存储器为主的整体 AI 供应链中扮演重要角色，因此跨国公司在其生命周期的某个节点上都想进入韩国市场。日本也是如此，但进入那里很困难。韩国数据驻留，韩语。所以这就好比：好的，很酷，你想要数据驻留，但现在我们为你提供运行技术的微型数据中心，并且我们可以从中获利，因为是由我们的本土公司提供那项服务。所以，所以你对主权 AI 这一整套概念并不是非常看好，或者没有抱太大希望，你知道，我问这个问题的时候，黄仁勋刚在欧洲进行了一轮魅力攻势和投资攻势，他去了巴黎，去了伦敦，就在昨天或几天前为了 GTC 去了柏林，但在你看来，那是没有实际约束力的。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. Yeah, it it is it is a policy in so far as like the UK's AI minister who's who's generally I think a a really good individual to be leading this because he's clearly like plugged into plugged into the mix and understands the raw ingredients that go into making AI successful, which is like compute, talent, and data. And so he has a he has a mandate uh to um be a buyer of first resort or new inference uh chips and has committed I think 100 or 150 million pounds something along that that angle to uh to procure infant chips when they are available from new UK companies that are designing these systems. You can see this also in South Korea where they have a similarish mandate but it's actually much more ambitious where every year they're spending about seven billion dollars on AI and a large part of that is going towards building modular inference data centers because generally Korean companies want to have Korean data residency. So I think it's actually a pretty interesting quid proco where it's it's a captive market a small country but it's a wealthy country that's very technologically savvy and has an important role in the overall AI supply chain with memory and so international companies want to at some point in their life like be in the Korean market. Same with Japan but getting in there is difficult. Korean data residency Korean language. So it's like okay cool like you want data residency but now we offer you the data center uh to go run your technology in um and we can profit from that because it's our local companies that provide that that service. So, so you're not a huge uh fan or or you don't have a lot of hope for the whole concept of sovereign AI which is you know I'm asking the question at the time when uh Jensen just uh did a charm offensive and investing offensive across Europe he was in Paris he was in London he was in Berlin for GTC just uh yesterday or a couple days ago but from your perspective that's uh that's that doesn't have teeth
</details>

>> 我只是……这有点像国家航空公司。各国会从空客和波音购买飞机，然后贴上自己的标志。这并不会让它变成你的。它仍然是他人的飞机，你懂的。但是，如果你相信开源将保持在与闭源模型相当接近的水平，那么开源或许是一条出路。也许那里有希望。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> I just uh it's it's a bit like national airlines. The countries will buy planes from Airbus and Boeing and then slap their logo on it. That doesn't make it like yours. It's still someone else's airplane, you know. So, but open source uh could be if you believe that open source is going to remain uh you know within reasonable uh earshot of uh closed source models. Maybe there's hope there.
</details>

>> 是的。但那样它们就是中国的了。所以你又有另一个……你又有另一个……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. But then they're Chinese. So you have another you have another
</details>

>> 也可以是美国的，某种反思……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> it could be American sort of a reflection
</details>

>> 但它们不是前沿模型，据我所知，美国的开源模型没有一个是前沿级别的，而那些尝试过的最后都去给黄仁勋打工了。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> but they're not Frontier like none of the US like open ones as far I can tell are Frontier and the ones that have all tried end up working for Jensen.
</details>

>> 好的。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Okay.
</details>

>> 所以我认为，我认为他的策略非常出色。比如我认为，我持有不同的看法：我是否相信购买英伟达的 GPU 就能获得主权？不相信。我是否认为这对英伟达来说是一个很好的商业策略？绝对是。额……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> So I think I think his strategy is great. Like I think I think I think different things like do do I do I believe that like buying Nvidia GPUs gets you sovereignty like no. Do I think it's a good commercial strategy for Nvidia? Absolutely. Um
</details>

>> 是的，他们卖了 300 多亿。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> yeah, they sold uh 30 plus billion.
</details>

>> 是的，差不多是那个数。是的。如果你看一下各国的竞标项目，全球在未来几年承诺投入主权 AI 的资金大约有 1380 亿美元，而如果你看看所有这些项目中最受欢迎的供应商，到目前为止绝大多数都是英伟达。我不认为有太多替代方案。我认为这是一个好的开端，而且你必须这么做，因为它是最好的技术，但我认为任何人都不应该自欺欺人地以为这样做就能获得主权。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah, something like that. Yeah. And if you look at the national bids um of which like globally there's roughly like 138 billion in sovereign AI committed over the next couple of years and you look at the most popular vendors amongst all of these like it's it's by far Nvidia. I don't I don't think there's much of an alternative. Uh I think it's it's a good it's a good start and you and you need to do it because it is the best technology but I don't think one should kid themselves that doing so gets you sovereignty.
</details>

### 前沿模型获取限制与 DeepMind 归属争议

>> 但仍然顺着你刚才回顾的脉络，今年一个重要的时刻是美国政府决定拒绝非美国公民获取前沿模型。那么非美国的国家和公司除了至少去尝试之外，还有别的选择吗？同样，我对这件事情持有几种不同的看法。第一，我认为值得一试，但我认为这现实吗？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> But still in the vein of a of of your recap uh a big moment this year was uh when the US government decided to deny access to Frontier model to non US nationals. So do do non US uh countries and companies have any choice but at least to try? Again, I'm in like a few different minds about this. Uh, one, I think it's like worth trying, but do I think it's realistic?
</details>

>> 嗯，所以我认为，我认为这很重要，如果要尝试的话，各国应该尝试推出能够从事白领工作的系统。比如我认为在英国我们仍然，我们拥有很多能力去做到这一点，去尝试建立像 OpenThropic 这样的竞争对手，或者像 DeepMind 这样的竞争对手，或者 DeepMind，或者 DeepSeek 等等。但实际上如果你看一下……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Um, so I I think I think it's I think it's important um to if you are going to try that they should that countries should try to launch systems which are going to do the white collar work. Like I think in the UK we still we have like a lot of capabilities to go do this um to try to build like an openthropic competitor or like deep mind compet or a deep mind or deepseek or whatever. But actually if you look at the
</details>

>> 这实际上是一个有趣的口误（Freudian slip）之类的情况。对吧。因为整件事讽刺的地方在于，DeepMind 本来就是一家英国公司。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> it's actually an interesting uh fruit and slip or whatever. Right. Because the irony of all of this is that Deep Mind is a UK company.
</details>

>> 是的，你说得对。对的。而且我认为英国 AI 生态系统及其在真正引领世界方面的成功，部分问题在于太长时间以来英国政府一直声称 DeepMind 是一家英国公司，我认为只是到了非常非常近期，这种观念才开始被扭转。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah, you're right. Yeah right. And I think part of the problem with actually like the UK AI ecosystem um and its its success in actually leading the world is that for too long the UK government kept saying that Deep Mind is a British company and I think it's only started to unwind that like very very recently.
</details>

>> 那为什么，为什么这是个问题？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> And why why is that a problem?
</details>

>> 嗯，这是个问题，因为这样它就会自认为已经是第一了。比如英国是做 AI 最好的地方，我们在 AI 领域是最出色的，因为我们有 DeepMind……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Well, it's it's a problem because then it believes that it's already number one. Like the UK is the best place to do AI and we are the best at AI because we have deep mind
</details>

>> 所以我们就不需要……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> so therefore we don't
</details>

>> 这种说辞背后的态度才是个问题。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> the attitude behind the claim which is a problem.
</details>

>> 是的。是的，因为这样一来，在政策制定会议室里，主张对 AI 进行更多投资、或者主张我们需要采购更多 AI 公司系统、或者主张我们需要让国家对创办 AI 公司更具吸引力的人，得到的回答就会是：“但我们已经有 Deep……”
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. Yeah, because then in like you know in policy rooms then you know individuals who are advocating for more investment in AI or we need more u you know we need to procure more systems from AI companies or we need to make our country more appealing for AI companies to start get answered with like but we have deep
</details>

>> Mind 了，对吧。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> mind right
</details>

>> 你懂的。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> you know
</details>

>> 确实。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> right
</details>

>> 额。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> um
</details>

### 国防 AI 与主权供应链需求

>> 那国防 AI 呢？你投资了国防公司，我的意思是，那感觉是一个需要主权 AI 的领域，因为显然未来的战争将很大程度上由 AI 驱动。那感觉像是一个……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> what about defense AI you're you're an investor in defense companies I mean that that feels like an area where uh the need for sovereign AI since obviously the warfare of the future is going to be very driven by AI. That feels like a place where
</details>

>> 是的。是的。我认为是的。是的。所以，是的。这一推进真正的发端，我是说，显然是在乌克兰战争之后，到现在差不多快 5 年了，但更重要的，我认为是大约两年前，当 J.D. Vance 去参加慕尼黑安全会议时，明确表示你们需要投资自己的国防并认真对待这件事。你们指的是北约和欧洲。从那时起，就出现了各种不同的倡议，为新型国防公司提供更多资金，鼓励政府向企业提供贷款以改善供应链。这创造了一批被称为“新主要承包商（neo-primes）”的新型国防公司，试图与传统主承包商竞争。比如像 Stark 或 Helsing，Quantum Systems 是欧洲的主要代表，然后随着战争形式的变化，它已经从比如研发用于打击坦克营的中程打击系统，转变成现在每天都在遭受成百上千架 FPV 无人机或各种其他类型自主空中系统的密集打击，而这些系统现在已经无法再通过电磁干扰来阻止，因为它们使用计算机视觉，或者由光纤线缆引导——顺便说一句，因为数据中心的原因，这些线缆变得昂贵得多——因此我们需要更多新型防空系统，所以像法国的 Altair 等公司一直在大力推进。

并且正如你所说，供应链极其重要，因为例如北约不会采购在欧洲生产的、非中国产零部件占比低于 70% 的系统，而且各国对于直接全盘接受美国的保护或美国的安全承诺感到非常不安，因为这些承诺每周都在发生变动。

所以，是的，我认为这是一个在某种程度上必须本土化的市场，就其……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>

>> Yeah. Yeah. I think it's Yeah. Yeah. So, yeah. So, that that that push really started uh I mean obviously like post like the Ukraine war like almost 5 years ago at this point but but more importantly I think it was like two years ago when uh when JD Vance went to the Munich Security Conference and effectively said like you need to invest in your own defense and get serious about this. You being uh you know NATO and Europe. Um and so ever since then there's been you know a variety of different initiatives to uh give more capital to new defense companies to encourage governments to be providing loans to businesses to improve their supply chain. Um and that's you know created a a set of like neopimes I like new defense companies that are trying to compete with prime contractors. Uh so companies like Stark or Heling um being quantum systems being like the the main ones in Europe and then uh you know as like warfare has changed like it's gone from uh I don't know you know developing strike systems over the over sort of mid-range to you know hit tank uh you know battalions to now being like we're getting pummeled like every day with hundreds and hundreds of FPV drones or various other kinds of aerial systems that are autonomous and you know now can no longer be stopped with jamming because they use computer vision or they're guided by these like um fiber optic cables which by the way have gotten much more expensive because of data centers and so we need more uh you know novel like air defense systems and so that's where companies like Altar in France um and others have really been pushing

um and uh and as you said like the supply chain is super important because for example like you know NATO wouldn't procure uh systems in in Europe that don't have at least 70% kind of the parts from uh from you know non-China basically um and uh and and countries are really queasy about taking US um protection or US guarantees at face value because they're shifting on a weekly basis.

So, so yeah, I think that's an example of a market which is sort of has to be domestic by
</details>

<!-- chunk 6/9 -->

从设计上讲是这样，而且能够孕育出比美国同行更具竞争力的新公司。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
by design and can breed new companies that are much more competitive than their US peers.
</details>

### 前沿模型格局与新实验室的生存空间

>> 那么，如果前沿 AI 无法在美国之外构建，那我们再回过头来看美国。你报告中关于研究的一部分，实际上把 Anthropic、OpenAI 和 Google 列为获胜者，就像是确定的赢家。显而易见，你知道，这是历经多年形成的，但曾经有一阵子，感觉像是存在着多元化的实验室格局。实际上你现在所说的是，不，这三家才是最终的赢家。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So then if Frontier AI cannot be built outside of the US, then let's let's go back to the US. a part of your report on on research effectively calls entropic open and Google as as as winners as like the definite winners which obviously uh you know has been uh years in the making but uh there was a moment where it felt like there was a plurality of labs effectively what you're saying is that no like those three are the the the winners
</details>

>> 这是否包括——我想没人真正知道他们究竟在做什么——但比如 SSI，还有 Thinking Machines，而且看起来似乎有成百上千家新兴实验室（neolabs）？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and does that include uh I guess nobody knows what they actually do but like SSI and thinking machines and like there seems to be like hundreds of neolabs
</details>

>> 对，对，或许 Meta 算勉强在其列。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> yeah yeah maybe meta on margin.
</details>

>> 是的，

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yes,
</details>

>> 超级智能实验室（super intelligent lab）。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> super intelligent lab.
</details>

>> 是的，尤其是现在他们正推进通过 API 提供模型服务，同时也拥有企业级业务。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, especially as now they're pushing towards like serving their models through API but also having an enterprise business.
</details>

>> 嗯，所以那一家，你知道，在接下来的 6 到 12 个月里可能会发生变化，取决于他们的商业化落地（go to market）效果如何。但没错，我认为大概就是那三家加上 Meta。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Um, so that one, you know, that might change over the next like 6 to 12 months depending on how their go to market works. But yeah, I would say it's probably those three plus meta.
</details>

>> 所以你的观点是，这种优势将持续复合累积，而且那将成为市场的常态，而不是……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So your view is that the the advantage is going to keep compounding and uh that's going to be the state of the market versus
</details>

>> 我认为对于通用前沿领域来说是这样。不过现在也存在一些例子，比如可能针对某一项特定能力进行高度聚焦的押注，在这个方向上你可以对模型做某些权衡，从而在某项任务上获得好得多的性能。比如我指的是那些分类模型，实际上就像 Jev，它们能够非常非常迅速地增长并变得流行。同样，有待观察（TBD）这能持续多久，但我认为这对创业者来说是一个令人鼓舞的迹象，它表明你可以押注于聚焦的功能，并且能够获得回报。但长期来看，是否存在这种能够被充分利用的能力差距，依然是有待观察的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I think so for like the general purpose frontier. Now there's there's like uh examples of perhaps like a really focused uh uh bet on a on a particular capability which has like where you can make certain trade-offs to the model in order to get much better performance at a task like I'm referring to for example these classification models effectively uh like Jev which can grow really really quickly and become popular again TBD how long it lasts but I think it's I think it's an encouraging sign for entrepreneurs that shows that you know you can take a focus features bet and it can pay off but over time. It's again like TBD if there are like these kind of gaps and capabilities that are sufficiently exploitable.
</details>

>> 那你觉得那几十家新兴实验室会怎么样呢？我并不是要一直谈欧洲，但光在伦敦就有三家，对吧？比如 David Silver 的那个项目，还有另外两家；在美国，每隔几周就会冒出一颗，你知道，Jeff Dean 的新实验室等等。那么这些实验室会迎来什么结果？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So what do you think happens to the dozens of Neolabs? Uh I mean not not to keep talking about Europe but like just in London there's three of them right there like the David Silver thing and like another two the you know in the US every few weeks uh there's one you know Jeff Dean's new lab and so on and so forth. So what happens to those?
</details>

>> 嗯，我认为这取决于它们的聚焦方向和模态。比如在机器人、具身智能方面，我认为能——我能看到独立实验室仍有机会参与竞争并获胜。因为由于 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 对企业级 AI 存在巨大的专注，比如我在报告中有一页幻灯片，基本上展示了 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 曾经拥有的所有不同产品线（无可否认，OpenAI 曾有很多），以及他们如何逐步砍掉了所有这些产品线，而且有一句引言，大意是“这个时刻太重要了，不能被支线任务分心”，或者类似的表述。我这是意译，这意味着他们大体上不做专门的机器人技术，尽管 Astro 的训练配方中或许含有某些这类数据。科学领域的情况略显不明朗，比如 Anthropic 显然在大量向生物学和药物研发倾斜；OpenAI 可能更多侧重于模型层面，较少去想掌控更多的技术栈。还有一种与具身智能相关的整个世界模型类别，无论那是带有某些动作的视频模型，还是世界模型的其他某种定义。但总的来说，Anthropic 并没有真正涉足这些，或者至少从我们公开能看到的来看是这样——我是说，他们甚至连图像生成模型都没有，举例来说。我认为音频方面，各实验室显然确实具备其中的部分能力，但如果 ElevenLabs 能够继续像现在这样加速发展，那么显然对于专用能力是存在需求的。我认为这些大概是独立实验室能够走得通的领域。但对于那些大体上声称要为知识工作做前沿智能、只是要做得更好、更快、更便宜的实验室，我认为那会很难。对我而言，我觉得我是眼见才为实。不过确实，那种打开电脑、应用看起来完全一样只是变得更好用的想法，我不知道是否可行。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Well I think it depends on the their kind of focus and modality. Like for example um on on robotics on embodied AI I think you can I I can see how an independent lab would still have a chance of competing and winning like because of the immense focus on uh you know enterprise AI basically that open AAI and anthropic has like I have a slide in the report where I basically just like show all the different product lines that open anthropic had admittedly open AI had lots and how they progressively just cut all of them and there was a quote like you know this uh this moment is like too important to be distracted by side quests or some version of that. I'm paraphrasing which meant that they broadly don't do dedicated robotics, although maybe there's some of that kind of data in in the Astro training recipe. Science is a little bit unclear like anthropic is clearly leaning a lot into biology and drug discovery. Open AI maybe more on the model side, less on like we want to own more of the stack. there's like kind of related to embodied AI this whole like category of world models whether that's you know a video model with some action in it or like some other definition of world model but um but in general like anthropic doesn't really do any of that or at least like from what we can see publicly I mean they don't even have an image generation model for example I think audio pretty clearly labs do have some of those capabilities but uh you know if 11 labs can like keep accelerating the way it does then clearly there's there's a need for a dedicated capability I think those are probably the areas where I can see an independent lab like working out, but but ones that broadly say we're going to do frontier intelligence for knowledge work, but just like make it better, faster, cheaper. I think that's tough. I think for me, like I I'll believe it when I see it. Um but but yeah, this idea of like you open your computer, the app looks exactly the same, but it's just better. I I don't know if that
</details>

### 世界模型与算力效率探讨

>> 那么在世界模型实验室方面，你看到什么令人兴奋的进展了吗？我的意思是，显然李飞飞的实验室被……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> And in world model labs, are you seeing anything exciting? I mean know obviously FA Lee's lab was
</details>

>> 以巨资收购了，而且鉴于买方是 AMD，后续会如何发展尚不明朗。我想 Khan 在巴黎创立了他的公司 AMI，这是一个世界……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> acquired for a lot of money and that's unclear what happens from there given that the buyer is AMD I guess Khan started his company AMI in Paris it's a world
</details>

>> 实验室，是的，对。我的意思是，据我所见，我对 Odyssey 有所了解，我是那里的早期投资者，他们做的是世界模型。我认为在该业务中令人感兴趣的是，像他们最新的系统，比如 Odyssey 3，在那里你可以看到自回归模型基本上被训练来吸纳所有这些视频数据，然后让它以动作为条件（conditioned on actions），这样你就知道“好的，我采取一个动作，然后生成由于该动作而产生的下一帧”。这种范式应用于机器人操作、自动驾驶、电子游戏、娱乐等等，可以在所有这些不同领域看到泛化能力，并且已经看到该模型被用于机器人操作训练。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> labs yeah yeah I mean I' I've uh you know visibility to Odyssey where was an early investor like doing world models and I think the the interesting thing in that business is like their most latest their latest systems like Odyssey 3 and there you can see uh that uh autograph aggressive model uh trained to basically take all this video data um and then have it conditioned on actions such that you know that okay I'm taking one action and then I generate the next frame as a result of the action that paradigm uh applied to robotic manipulation to self-driving to like video games to like entertainment or something can see generalization across all those different domains and already seeing that model being used for robotic manipulation training
</details>

因此，我认为在更广泛的层面上，我有点好奇图像、音频、视频最终如何全部融合在一起，基本上形成一个世界模型。如果这真的发生了，那么它最终可能会包揽模拟器和游戏引擎；而且这对将机器人技术推向现实世界非常重要，但对设计物理系统以及硬件工程等也同样非常重要。再回到 AMD 收购 World Labs 这一点，如果这种情况发生，那么服务于这类环境并允许你进行训练和运行推理的计算基底（compute substrate）就会极其极其重要。因此，了解世界模型研究生态系统的走向，以及为了成为首选可以进行哪些硬件改进，是一块巨大的营收蛋糕。我认为这在一定程度上促成了——促成 AMD 收购 World Labs 的部分原因。某种程度上，正如英伟达多年来与从事着色器、3D 视觉或其他方向的研究实验室保持极其密切的联系，提供算力，并不断从研究人员那里获得反馈，从而使他们始终清楚“我的硬件最适合前沿的发展方向”。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
So I I think at a broad level I'm like kind of interested how image, audio, uh video ends up all mushing together into basically a world model. And then if that actually happens, then that could end up subsuming simulation and game engines and uh and then that's very important for moving robotics into the real world, but also designing physical systems and and like hardware engineering. And to get back to like the AMD World Labs point, it's like if if that happens, then the compute substrate that serves those kinds of environments and allows you to train and run inference is super super important. And therefore having knowledge about how the world model research ecosystem is moving and what kind of hardware improvements you can make to be the number one choice is a big big revenue pie. That's I think what motivated part well part of the reason that AMD uh bought World Labs. um sort of in the same way that Nvidia over many many years was like very close to research uh labs that are doing shaders or 3D vision or other things and you know giving compute out and constantly getting feedback from researchers such that they always knew like my hardware is the best for where the where the kind of frontier is going.
</details>

>> 似乎有相当数量的实验室正在试图找出提高算力效率的方法。从我不甚了解的拍翼飞机（flapping airplanes），到似乎重新兴起的专注于扩散模型的公司。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> There seems to be a good number of uh labs trying to figure out ways to be more efficient with compute. So from flapping airplanes which I don't know much about uh to what seems to be the reemergence of like diffusion model focused companies.
</details>

>> 是的。对。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah.
</details>

>> 仅仅是为了降低推理成本，顺便说一句，这是一个极其引人入胜的想法，你知道，人们往往会热烈讨论一阵然后又抛诸脑后；但在理论上，我们所进行的这种庞大算力投资，似乎完全受制于有人可能会提出一种高效得多的模型训练方式。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> To just reduce the cost of of inference which uh is a fascinating fascinating thought by the way which uh you know people tend to talk about a bunch for a minute and then forget about but like this massive investment in compute that we do in theory seems to be at the mercy of like somebody coming up with a much more efficient way to train models.
</details>

>> 是的。对。没错，我的意思是，我认为即使这种情况发生，我们看到的也只是更多的消耗；而且，我只是根据一个事实得出这个想法：我在笔记本电脑上以 1.5 倍速使用 Astro High，但我很希望那个 1.5 倍速能够达到 10.5 倍速。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I mean I would contend that even if that were to happen, we would just see like more consumption and um you know I'm just informed by a fact I'm on my laptop using Astro High on 1.5x and I would love that 1.5x to be like 10.5x
</details>

>> 悖论。是的，就像提供更多芯片那样。是的，我只是在相同的时间内做比以前更多的事情。所以我不一定确信，一个超高效的系统就会打破我们正在进行的所有这些投资。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> paradox. Yeah, just like giving more chips. Yeah, I'm just like doing more things than I I could have done before with the same amount of time. So I'm not necessarily sure that like you know one super efficient system will sort of like pop all the investments that we're making.
</details>

### 模型与治理框架的关系

>> 在你的报告中，你谈到了模型与治理框架（harnesses）之间的重要交集，这似乎是那种不断发生变化的议题之一。有人说“不，智能全在模型中”，然后其他人又说“不，智能全在治理框架中”，这似乎总是在来回摇摆。对此你怎么看？我想我的普遍看法是，这有点像你受伤拄着拐杖时，你需要得到辅助；然后到了某个时刻你康复了，你就不再需要这种辅助了。在缺乏前沿模型的情况下，你需要给它……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> In your report you talk about the important intersection between models and and harnesses which uh seems to be one of those topics that like keeps shifting. People say well no the intelligence is all in the model and then other people say no it's all in the harness and that seems to be going back and forth. What's your take? I think my broad take is like it's a bit like uh when you're injured and you have crutches, you need to have assistance and then at some point you heal and you don't need the assistance anymore. In absence of having like a frontier model like you need to give it
</details>

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### 外部辅助支架与 Harness 的演进

支架……那些外部支架可以是像调用工具的权限、处理记忆的方式、能够访问哪些数据源，然后可能还有为了完成某项特定任务的一些配方（recipes）。我认为就目前而言，在非前沿（non-frontier）水平上，这种情况还会维持。但我姑且相信前沿实验室那些人的说法，也就是说随着时间推移，应该预设所有这些辅助支架都会通过训练，或者通过模型厂商提供的 harness（运行外壳/脚手架），逐渐被吸收到模型内部。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
crutches and those crutches can be like access to tools like how it handles memory, what data sources it has access to and then maybe some recipes uh in order to accomplish a specific task. And I I think for the moment like at the non-frontier that that'll hold. But I'll take the word for I'll take the sort of frontier lab folks word for it that you know over time one should assume that all these crutches kind of get subsumed into the model through training or through the harness that the model vendor provides.
</details>

我认为有一个数据点，是关于 Claude Code 的系统提示词（system prompt）随着模型自身的提升被重写了多少——大约 80% 的系统提示词直接被删掉了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
I think there's there's a data point around um how much of the clawed code system prompt was rewritten uh over time as the model itself got better and it's something like 80% of the system prompt was just removed.
</details>

Harness 也很重要，因为 OpenAI、Anthropic 交付的那套 harness，并没有动力让你去使用能力较弱的模型。比如纯粹在 UI 和产品层面，如果我正在做一项法律相关的任务，我买了 200 美元的订阅计划，而且我有 token，我就会希望质量极高。那我为什么要把滑块从高调到低，或者去用一个质量较低的模型来冒质量不佳的风险呢？因此我认为，除非产品 UI 的行为发生某种改变，去打消用户只用最昂贵工具的念头，否则前沿实验室会一直这么做下去。所以这或许就是了解“能否使用一个稍逊一筹的系统，但通过更好的 harness 来弥补”能够发挥作用的地方。但我认为这更偏向于产品决策，对于那些非前沿实验室的公司来说也是如此。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
The harness is also important because um the one that's shipped by open a anthropic is kind of like not incentivized to make you use a less powerful model. Like just in the UI and the and the product like if I'm doing a legal task and I have the $200 plan and I have the tokens like I want the quality to be super good. So why would I risk the quality being like not super good by sliding it from high to low or by trying it on a lower quality lower quality model? And so I think unless there's some some sort of like product UI behavior that is altered um to disincentivize the user from only using the most expensive tool. The Frontier Labs will continue doing that. Um and so that's maybe where like getting getting good knowledge around like okay can use a less good system but compensate for it by having a better harness can come into play. But I think that's more of like a product a product decision. Um, also for companies that that are not like the Frontier Labs.
</details>

>> 作为投资人，你对这类方向感兴趣吗？各种垂直 harness 公司或水平 harness 公司，这是一个可投资的主题吗？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Is that interesting for you as an investor? Uh, all the kind of vertical harness companies or horizontal harness companies. Is that an investable theme?
</details>

>> 是的，我觉得单就目前而言并不算。当然我可能会改变想法，但目前来说不算。但我确实认为，对于我那些高度基于 AI 或高度基于 Agent 的被投公司来说，当我们看到每月的 token 开销暴涨，因为员工越来越能从这些工具中获得杠杆效应，而且产品使用量也在上升——在这种情况下，权衡取舍最终就变成了：“嘿，我们真该花点时间看看能不能使用稍微没那么前沿的模型，并用更好的 harness 来弥补它，这样我们就不用白白烧掉大笔资金。”

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah, I think in in isolation like no at the moment. Again, I can change my mind, but at the moment, no. But I do think for for my companies that are you know heavily like AI based or heavily agent based when we see that you know every month like token expenditure because like is going up through the roof because employees are increasingly getting leverage from these tools and uh and product usage is going up like that's where I think the trade ends up being like hey we should really like spend time on seeing can we use like a less frontier model and like compensate for it with a better harness uh so we could just like not burn a lot of money.
</details>

### 用 AI Agent 开展专家访谈与客户调研

>> 对了，你是一位独立 GP（Solo GP），我好像在什么地方读到过，你在投资活动中大量使用 Agent 来完成你所做的一切。在今年你使用 Agent 的方式中，有没有什么例子或者任何你觉得特别酷的做法？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. By the way, you're a solo GP and I think I read somewhere that you use a lot of agents uh in your investing activity uh to do everything you do. Any example or anything uh that you thought was pretty cool in the way you use agents throughout this year?
</details>

我最近遇到的最酷的使用案例是关于专家调研。如果你用低成本的做法，那就是去问你的朋友；但如果你想花点预算，向你的圈子之外的人请教，那你就会去找 GLG（高临咨询）或 AlphaSense 等等。然后他们会去替你物色合适的人选，做引荐，你再打通电话沟通。这种反复拉扯非常恼人，而且受限于语言、时区等等。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
The coolest use case I had recently is on like expert research where you know I think you can well if you're sort of in the cheap man's version it's like you ask your friends but if you want to spend a bit of budget and ask beyond your network then you're going to ask like GLG or Alpha Sense etc. Um and then they will go find humans for you. They will introduce you. You take the call. It's a pingponging like really annoying and limited by language time zone etc.
</details>

但我开始使用一款名为 LT 的新产品，它基本上就是用模型来干活，取代了我自己去做的这一事实。在这个案例中，我已经在深度使用 Codex 了——不过我也常常根据当时哪个模型更好用而切换——主要是为了梳理我所有的想法，以及我过去看过的其他公司的背景信息：它们的表现如何、我提了哪些问题、得到了什么反馈，以此来弄清楚我可以向团队提出的最高价值问题是什么，从而为我是否应该投入时间或做出投资提供决策依据。我可以把所有这些信息拿过来，然后借助 LTO 去设计一个专家访谈，选定我想要的目标人群群体，然后直接点击“启动研究”（launch study）。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
But there's like a a new product that I started using called LT which is basically like replacing uh the fact that I have to do the work with the model doing the work. And so I'm already like heavily using in this case Codeex, but I kind of switch depending on what model is better at the time. uh to sort of like just process all my ideas and the context I have on other companies that I looked at over history, how they performed, what questions I asked, what responses I got to just like figure out what is the highest value question I can ask of a team to inform like whether I should spend time or make the investment or not. So I can take all that information and then and then with LTO like construct uh an expert interview and then decide on cohorts I want and then just hit launch study and then the the system goes out and finds people consents them to see if they're uh you know the right fit for the study and then they go speak to an AI
</details>

系统会自动去物色人选，取得他们的同意，确认他们是否适合参与这项研究，然后他们就去和 AI 交流。我当时感到非常震撼，因为我点击了“启动研究”，然后就去睡觉了。在竞争激烈的市场环境下，我基本上只有 3 天时间给公司一个答复，因此我认为深入细致的客户调研非常重要。第一天醒来，我已经拿到了对几位相当资深人士的访谈记录，拿到了原始逐字稿。逐字稿可以直接回传给我的模型，回答我们（我和我的模型）之前悬而未决的问题，然后理出脉络：“好的，关于这点我们已经有了足够的数据点，但这又引出了一连串我们应该追问的新问题，也许我们其实应该重新微调一些访谈问题，真正引导对方来回答这些问题。”于是它更新了调研问题，重新发布问卷。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
and I was I was like shocked because you know I hit launch study I went to sleep I had like 3 days to basically like give the company an answer it's like in competitive market so I think the nuances of customer research was important you know, wake up the first day, I have three interviews from like pretty senior people. I have the raw transcript. The transcript can come back into my model, answer the open questions we had, we me and my model, and then uh and then figure out, okay, we have enough data points for this, but like it's kind of opened up this question stream that we should ask. Maybe we should actually reune some of the interview questions to really coax the person to answer those questions. So, like updates the study questions and relaunches the survey.
</details>

第二天，来了 5 个人。这种流程再次重复。在大概两天半的时间里，我完成了 12 场访谈，跨越美国、印度、欧洲、德国、法国，总计约 14 个小时。如果靠我个人，在 12 个人身上花 14 个小时在生理上是根本不可能做到的。甚至有几个人跟这个模型聊了足足 1 小时 20 分钟之久。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
Next day, five five people. Again this repeats and over like two and a half days I had 12 in 12 12 interviews over like 14 hours across like US, India, Europe, Germany, France. Like it would be physically impossible for me to have spent like 14 hours across 12 people. Like there were several people who spoke to this model like for an hour and 20 minutes
</details>

>> 这本身就很吸引人，对吧？人类居然能如此迅速地在与 AI 交流时感到轻松自在。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> which just in itself is fascinating, right? Like the fact that humans feel so comfortable so quickly speaking to an AI.
</details>

>> 是的，是的。这在某种程度上可能有点递归意味：我们整天都在电脑前，而且这些通常都是技术类问题，所以我觉得人们更倾向于……不幸的是，人们更倾向于……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. It's probably a bit recursive in the sense that like we're all in front of our computer all the time and like these are generally like tech questions and so I think people prefer to unfortunately people prefer to
</details>

>> 对着手机说话，也不愿意跟真人说话。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> speak to their phone than speak to a human.
</details>

>> 觉得跟 AI 对话反而是人们更偏好的方式，这个想法很有意思。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Um that's that's a fascinating thought that actually speaking to NI is uh what people prefer.
</details>

>> 是的。这其实也是我们这几年听到过的一个主题……也许不是这几年，而是最近几个月——人们开始更偏好与 AI 客服代理沟通，而不是真人。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. uh which is actually a theme that we heard over the years is like uh you know we we uh maybe not the years but the months that uh people are starting to prefer to talk to an AI customer service agent uh over a person.
</details>

>> 没错。因为我觉得在那类场景下，就像是人类在假装自己是个机器人，并且表现得很拙劣，因为你毕竟是个人类。你心想：“能不能请你现在就像个机器人一样说话？”而现在你得到了一个真正出色的机器人，于是人类反而可以……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Because I think in that case it's like uh a human is pretending to be a robot and doing a really bad job at it because you're a human. You're like can you please just like now talk like a robot and then now you get a robot that's actually like really good and then the human
</details>

>> 像人一样说话。好的，太棒了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> talk like a human. Yeah. Okay. Amazing.
</details>

>> 是的。所以我觉得自动化客户调研这一构想对我来说非常强大。我能预见到，即便你管理着一个投资组合，你也会想对自己被投公司开展这类 Agent 访谈，看看客户是如何使用它们的。这样当你走进董事会会议室时，你至少能掌握一手数据；或者如果你是一位 LP，当你的投资人告诉你“这家公司非常优秀”时，你心里会琢磨“它真的有那么好吗？”

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. So that that I think that that kind of idea of like uh automated customer research uh has been like very powerful for me and I can just see how you know even if you had a portfolio you would want to run like this kind of agent interviews on your portfolio companies and how customers are using it. So then at least you get some firstparty data when you go into the boardroom you know or if you're an LP and like your investors are saying like this company's really good you're like is it really good?
</details>

### 个人 Agent 与数据信任

今年特别是最近几个月发生的一件大事，就是与此相关的个人 Agent 的兴起，像 instincts、muse 和 rock bots 之类的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
A big uh thing that happened this year uh in the last few months uh in particular is to this point like the rise of personal agents, the instincts and the muse and the rock bots. Um
</details>

>> 你怎么看这个现象？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> what do you make of that?
</details>

>> 我不会把我的数据给它们。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I don't give them my data.
</details>

>> 我目前并不是真的……我真的不太信任它们。不过我认为很多人是信任的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I don't really I don't really trust trust them at the moment. Um but I think a lot of people do. Um
</details>

>> 很多人信任。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> a lot of people do.
</details>

>> 是的。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Um,
</details>

>> 所以你的意思是，你不会把信用卡信息交予一家两个月前根本不存在、而且甚至不要求你进行身份认证的公司。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> so what you're saying is that you not you don't give your credit card information to a company that did not exist uh uh 2 months ago and uh doesn't require you to authenticate.
</details>

>> 没错，大体上是这样。另外也是因为我觉得用 ChatGPT 基本上也能做同样的事，我其实没看出多获得了什么额外价值。Codex 和 Claude 已经拥有对我电脑的底层访问权限，能访问我的浏览器、各种即时通讯软件等等。我已经信任它们了，所以我真的不想在此之上再增加风险。但我认为这引出了一个有趣的点，那就是面对这类任务，你最信任哪个供应商？不久前我听说 Revolut 的 Nikolay 现在也在想：好的，我有不知道多少位客户，可能是几百万或者数千万，或者……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah, pretty much. Well, also because I feel like I can do roughly the same thing um with Chad GPT like I don't actually see like what I get on top. Codex and Claude already have like low-level access to my computer has access to my browser to like various messaging apps and things like this. So I I I trust that already. So I don't really want to increase like the the risk on top of that. But but I do think it brings up an interesting point which is like which which vendor do you trust the most for these kinds of tasks. And um not that long ago I heard like Nikolai at Revolute is uh is now like thinking okay well I I have like you know I don't know how many customers but like millions or tens of millions or
</details>

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之类的。嗯，而且他们显然信任我把我的——我的资金和我的信用卡数据交给他们。而且，你看，现在他们里面也有了一个类似 AI 助手的东西。所以我也能想象自己比起相信某家成立才 12 个月、可能都没有正规信息安全合规等等的第三方初创公司，会更愿意信任 Revolute 来代我处理采购。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
something. Um, and they clearly trust me with my wi-i w with with my money and my credit card data. And, you know, now they have like an AI assistant in there. And so I could sort of see myself trusting Revolute more to handle purchases on my behalf than I would like some third party startup that's grown in 12 months and probably doesn't have correct infosc and and other things.
</details>

>> 所以你认为它会变成更大平台的一项功能，而不是相反？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So you think it becomes a feature of broader platforms versus the opposite?
</details>

>> 我觉得那是——那是一种可能的路径。不管是平台最终收购了其中一支团队——这总是可能发生的——但我听到过，另一个切入点是有人更愿意使用比如 Meta 的 muse，因为这些初创公司能存活 10 年的可能性，以及如果他们做了坏事你能起诉他们拿回你的钱或拿到一些赔偿的可能性非常低；而比如起诉 Meta，他们有在出现问题时向你赔付的历史。所以我听说这是有些人更喜欢用 meta 的一个原因。觉得至少我知道该打电话找谁。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I think that's that's one possible route. you know whether the platform ends up buying one of these teams is you know that that can always happen but I heard you know um another point would be somebody prefers to use like Meta's muse because the likelihood that one of these startups survives for 10 years and if they do something bad that you can sue them and get your money or get some money is very low whereas like suing Meta like they have a a history of like paying you when there when there's some issues. So, I've heard that's like a reason why some people prefer to use meta. Think at least I know who to pick up the phone to.
</details>

>> 但这些个人智能体似乎确实在 AI 的扩散中扮演了重要角色，这也是你在报告中强调的主题之一。你谈到了 Codex 在程序员之外群体的日益兴起。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> But but those those um uh new personal agents seem to be playing a a big role in the diffusion of AI though, which is one of the themes that you highlight in the report as well. You talk about the increasing rise of uh codecs in particular beyond coders.
</details>

>> 对。对。对。确实。对。我认为那里最核心的信息是，在同一时期，你会看到这种递归的自我提升。你看到人们用他们的 AI 做出各种疯狂的事情，而那只占 AI 用户群的 0.1% 左右，绝大多数其他人几乎没有为任何 AI 付费，因此得到的是非常次优的体验。呃，这部分只是因为糟糕的产品、糟糕的营销。嗯，也是因为比如在一两年前，充斥着各种你必须成为提示词工程师的说法。比如你真的需要理解如何写好这些提示词，因为如果你写出很烂的提示词，模型表现就很差。所以我完全能想象有多少非技术行业的人看到后会觉得，我根本不知道怎么去学这个。这实在太复杂了。你知道，这有点像在写代码，但用的是人类语言。去他的吧，我不玩了。AI 太烂了。而现在则是，你真的需要成为提示词工程师吗？我觉得你更多只需要擅长对着手机说话，直接把你脑子里想的所有东西倾倒出来，系统自身就能进行整理。所以我认为这种提示词工程师的说法有点过时了，模型具备了足够的能力和可用性而不再需要那个。所以现在对普通人来说使用门槛低多了，但普通人在提示词工程时代就已经厌烦了它，之后就再没回来。所以你说得对，通过个人智能体建立这些入口，会是把人们吸引回系统的一个极佳方式，而且也许这就是他们所理解的 AI，不再像过去的对话那样。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. Yeah. And I think the the biggest message there would be, you know, at the same time, you see this like recursive self-improvement. You see people doing all sorts of crazy stuff with their AIS and that's like a 0.1% or something of the AI usage base and the vast majority of other people are barely paying for any AI and so getting like a very subpar experience. Uh and part of this is just like like bad product, bad marketing. Um, also just that you know a year ago or two years ago there was all this like narrative around you need to become a prompt engineer. Like you really need to understand how to write these prompts because if you write crappy prompts the model does a bad job. So I can only imagine how many people who don't work in technology saw that and were like I have no idea how to learn this. Like this is way too complicated. You know it's kind of like writing code but in the human human language. Like screw this like I'm done. Like AI sucks. and and now it's like do you really need to be a prompt engineer? Like I think you more just need to be good at just like talking to your phone just like brain dump exactly what well like everything you're thinking of and the system can organize itself. So I think this like prompt engineer thing is kind of gone like the model can has enough affordances to not need that. So now it's much more easy for a normal person to use but the normal person got sick of it during the prompt engineering days and hasn't come back. So, you're right that like creating these on-ramps with like um personal agents would be a great way to get people back into the system and and and you know maybe maybe that's what they understand AI to be no longer like chat
</details>

>> 来剖析一下你刚才提到或影射的几点。这里存在这样一种观念，即使用 AI 和不使用 AI 的人群之间的差距正在扩大，并且你有一张幻灯片谈到 Codex 在 OpenAI 内部的采用率远高于外部用户。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and to to unpack a couple of things that you that you just said were alluded to. So there's this idea that there is an increasing gap uh between people using AI and nonAI and you have a a slide that talks about how Codex adoption remains far far higher inside of OpenAI than amongst external users.
</details>

>> 这太不可思议了。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> This is wild.
</details>

>> 是的。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah.
</details>

>> 是啊。我是说，大概的统计数据是 OpenAI 内部大约 100% 的人都在使用 Codex，而在使用它的各机构中，大约是三分之二左右，比例相当高。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. I mean the the broad stat is like something like 100% of people in OpenAI use codeex and then of their organizations that use it. something like 2/3 maybe um something quite high.
</details>

### AI 采用率与鸿沟

>> 没错。69%。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. 69%.
</details>

>> 好的。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Okay.
</details>

>> 另一项针对标普 500 指数成分股公司 AI 信息披露的单独分析发现，69% 的公司报告了实际部署，但只有 2% 披露了长期跟踪的指标；相比之下，OpenAI 活跃员工中有 97.9% 在过去的 28 天里使用了 Codex。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> A separate analysis of S&P 500 companies AI disclosure found that 69% reported live deployments but only 2% disclosed metrics tracked over time and that's in contrast to 97.9% of active open eye workers use codeex in the preceding 28 days.
</details>

>> 对。对。是的。而个人用户只有不到 1% 使用 Codex。在确实使用 Codex 的人群中，绝大多数人（大约 85%）用它来完成大致需要耗时 30 分钟的任务，而只有大约 25% 的人用它来处理耗时 8 小时或更久的任务。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And individuals is like less than 1% use codeex. And then of the people who do use codeex, the vast majority of them, it's like 85% do tasks on it that would roughly take like 30 minutes and only like 25% I think do it do tasks that would take like 8 hours or more.
</details>

>> 所以得出的结论是，懂它的人步伐被进一步加速，而不用的人相较之下就落后了。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> So the conclusion of this is that the the people that get it are just accelerated further and further whereas the people that don't comparatively slow down.
</details>

>> 是的。这基本上就像你在逛一个主题公园之类的，你刚刚发现了第一层，而还有一整个全新的世界你甚至连门都还没推开。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. It's basically like you're you're kind of going through like a theme park or something and you just you discovered like level one and there's like this entire like other world that you just haven't even opened the door to
</details>

>> 而已经有一群人置身于那个世界之中了。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and there are a bunch of people that are already in that world.
</details>

>> 那大约是世界上 97% 的人，这太疯狂了。所以这就是我当时想的，应该设立一个针对 AI 的类似 Genius Bar（天才吧）或 Geek Squad（极客小分队）之类的地方。我觉得很惊讶，我们在纽约，这里有很棒的 Apple Store 以及各大品牌的各种概念店。为什么 OpenAI 没有一家类似 OpenAI 零售店的地方？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> It's like 9 97% of the world or something which is which is insane. So that that's where I was like thinking okay there should be like a genius bar for AI or like a geek squad for AI or something you know like I find it shocking that you know we're in New York like we have amazing Apple store like all these concept stores for brands. Why does OpenAI not have like an OpenAI store?
</details>

>> 那你在 OpenAI 零售店里会做些什么？走近一个天才员工，让他们带你了解各种应用场景？
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> And what would you do in the open air store where you'd walk to a genius person and they would walk you through use cases?
</details>

>> 差不多是这样。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Pretty much.
</details>

>> 我的意思是，这会耗费时间，但我觉得对于这种具有病毒式传播力的产品，人们最终会展示给其他人看。不过我很容易就能想象，比如针对不同经验水平开设宣讲会；我也说不好，也许其中一场面向中小企业主，有些面向忙碌的家庭，有些面向医疗保健提供商，诸如此类你能想象到的任何场景；在现场真正引导人们了解只要滑动屏幕、使用工作流或使用 Codex 就能做到的事情。我认为这会带来很大改变，因为它会让这项技术赋予人更多能力，而不再让人觉得“哇，外面有很多人在用这套东西做我完全看不懂的事情，但我白天没有时间，也没有意愿或耐心自己去学”。这有点像每个人都应该锻炼身体，但大多数人做不到，你需要雇个私教带你去做。
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I mean, uh, it would take time, but I think, you know, people end up showing other people, you know, with these kinds of viral products. Um, but I could like, you know, very easily see like you'd run sessions on uh, you know, different levels of experience and like I don't know, maybe one of them is for like small medium business owners, maybe some of them are for like, you know, busy families, like other ones are for like healthcare providers, like you know, anything you can imagine, but where you're really walking through people, walking people through what you can do by just like flicking the screen and going on work or going on codecs. And I think that would make a a big difference because it would it would make it would make the technology much more empowering and less about like wow there's a lot of people out there that are doing things with this that I just don't understand and I don't have like the the time in the day or or the valition or like patience to go learn it myself. It's a bit like uh you know everybody should do exercise but like most people don't and you need to hire a PT to just go do it.
</details>

>> 嗯。关于 Codex 另一部分的想法，你有一张幻灯片指出，非开发人员对 Codex 的使用增长速度超过了开发人员；从 25 年 8 月到 26 年 6 月，非开发人员的个人用户增长了 137 倍。所以这些不再是真正意义上的编程智能体了。它们是能编写代码的智能体，但服务于更广泛的群体，远远超出了程序员的范围。是的，这有点不太好界定，因为它们可以编写代码去执行你的知识工作，但使用系统的个人并没有真正看到它。所以，我会说这个结果混合了一些非常简单的因素，比如一个真正管用的 Google Drive 连接器——默认的 Google Drive 连接器做不到很多你想要它做的事情，这其实挺不可思议的，你必须借助第三方比如 GWS CLI，这是由一名为此被解雇的谷歌工程师编写的；但如果你不用 CLI 版本，你的智能体对 Google Drive 就只有非常非常高层的访问权限，这阻止了许多工作流程。

所以一方面是良好基础集成，第二点则是这种递归循环：模型实验室发布模型，数据公司或试图在其上落地特定工作流的公司指出在他们的内部基准测试中该模型表现并不太好，但他们拥有能让模型表现极佳的环境和数据。接着，实验室有望意识到他们想要在这项能力上攻坚爬坡，于是购买数据来提升模型性能，随后这种递归循环继续下去。而且我认为自从 Codex 发布以来，再到此前的带有面向法律、营销等连接器的 Cloud Code，都有点遵循这种“让我们把模型需要擅长的工具集成构建出来”的思路……
<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Mhm. And uh to finish the thought on the other part of of codeex, you have a slide where you said that non-developers are growing usage of codeex faster than developers are uh and from August 25 to June 26, individual non-developer users increased 137fold. So those are no longer really coding agents. Uh they are agents that code but for like a broader group much beyond coders. Yeah, it's kind of unclear because um like they could write code to go execute your knowledge work but the individual who's using the system doesn't doesn't really see it. So, I'd say I'd say that that result is a mix of really simple things like Google Drive connector that actually works like it's kind of nuts that the default uh you know Google Drive connector like for example can't do a lot of things that you would want it to do and you have to go to this third party like GWS CLI which was written by Google engineer who got fired for doing it but like if you don't use the CLI version like your agent has like really really high level to Google Drive high level access to Google Drive which precludes many many workflows.

So just basic good integrations and then the second thing is this like recursive cycle of uh models labs releasing a model data companies or companies that have a certain workflow that they're trying to implement the model uh on showing that on their internal benchmark said model doesn't do very well but they have the environments and the data to make it do really well. And then the lab realizes hopefully that they want to hill climb on this capability and so they buy the data improve the model performance and then this recursive cycle continues and uh I think ever since like the launch of codeex and then uh and uh before that actually like cloud code with those connectors for legal for marketing etc that was kind of this approach of like let's build the integrations to the tools that the model needs to be good at that
</details>

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某种人类，比如白领工作。呃，让我们针对某些工作流进行爬山优化，这些工作流对财务、法务、营销等领域很重要。然后，嗯，我们发布这些产品，配合稍微好一些的营销、稍微好一些的案例研究，呃，先从我们自己的员工开始。然后，一直以来都有这样的争论：我们是把它叫做工作，还是把它叫做代码？它应该放在哪个滑块里？我认为大家仍然没有真正完全搞明白，但现在我想说，它已经非常强大了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
kind of human like white collar work uh let's do hill climbing on certain and workflows that are like important for finance legal marketing and then um like let's release those those products with a bit better marketing a bit better case studies uh starting with our own staff and then there's been this constant like debate of like do we call it work do we call it code which slider should it be in and I think you still haven't really figured it all out but but now I would say like it's it's like so powerful
</details>

### 企业自主掌控 AI 与投资机会

>> 说到爬山优化，我们谈到了开源，谈到了大模型实验室。嗯，我们同样也谈到了主权 AI。看起来出现了一个新兴主题，那就是企业，在此之前可能还有垂直领域 AI 初创公司，正在掌控自己的 AI，而不是完全依赖 Anthropic 或 OpenAI。对你来说，这是一个重要主题，也是值得投资的方向吗？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> and u speaking of hill climbing we we talked about open source we talked about the big labs. Um it um we talked about sovereign AI as well. It seems like there is this uh emerging theme around enterprises and before them probably the vertical AI startups taking control over uh their AI versus solely depending on anthropic open AI. Is that um an important theme for you and something that is investable?
</details>

>> 是的。我认为这种趋势一直在增长，它是几种因素的综合结果：一是成本优化；二是某种数据主权、数据驻留问题——也就是不想把所有这些信息放进第三方系统中，因为你对其隐私政策可能信任也可能不信任；第三，存在某些你真正关心的特定用例，你有点不想等模型实验室开始关注它们才变好；呃，最后一点可能是，是的，某些更具民族主义色彩的倾向。

我想在那个领域，呃，我所好奇的是谁最适合提供这种服务。当然，其中最大的公司之一会是 Palantir，它与 NeoClouds 等公司建立了合作关系，呃，并且已经拥有所有数据基础设施，因此在过去几年里处于有利位置，可以开始提供这些服务。这可能在美国商业领域行得通，在欧洲则不那么适用。欧洲有一些类似新一代 Palantir 风格的公司，它们创立起来，嗯，带着不同的国家特色去做完全相同的事情。

然后第三部分是，那些一直在提供开源模型推理服务的推理公司怎么样？它们也许处于有利位置，不仅能提供模型服务，还能提供工具来查看这些模型在企业中是如何被使用的追踪记录，利用这些对话的数据，进而提供后训练服务来完成闭环。也许它们处于有利位置，或者也可能是那些已经开始在底层之上构建推理业务的 NeoClouds 本身，它们也会处于有利位置；又或者甚至可能是数据公司，嗯，它们不仅，或者说它们已经开始走出只为实验室提供环境的范畴，而是说“既然你的公司也是一种环境，呃，既然我们已经证明了能为实验室做好这件事，也许我们也能为你做好。”

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. what's um I think that that trend has been growing and it's a mix of uh cost uh optimization um like sort of data sovereignty data residency uh issues. So not wanting to like put all this information into a third party system which you may or may not trust the privacy policies of. And then three, uh having a certain like set of use cases that are the real ones you care about and that you kind of like don't want to wait for the model lab to start caring about them to get better. Uh and then maybe last one would be uh yeah some of these um like more nationalistic tendencies. I guess I think in that in that area uh what I'm what I'm wondering is like who's best place to deliver that service. Of course, like one of the biggest ones would be Palanteer, which which done partnerships with like NeoClouds uh and has all the data infrastructure already and so it's like well positioned over the last few years to like start providing these services that probably works in US commercial not so much in Europe. There are like sort of like these neo palenteer style companies in Europe that are like you know started up um to go do the exact same thing with a different like nationalistic flavor. Then the third bit would be like what about the inference companies um that have been serving open source models and that maybe are well positioned to not just serve but also provide tools to look at the traces of how their models how these models are being used in an enterprise use the the data of uh these conversations to then provide like a post- training service to close the loop. maybe they're like well positioned or maybe it's like the Neoclouds themselves who have started to build inference businesses on top that would be well positioned too or or maybe it's even like the data companies um that have not just or who have started to move outside of providing uh our environments for labs but saying well your company's in an environment and so uh you know we've proved that we can do it well for labs maybe we can do it well for you.
</details>

### 快问快答

>> 你想以快问快答来结束吗？来吧。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Do you want to finish with a rapid fire? Let's go.
</details>

>> 2026 年最被高估的趋势。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Most overrated trend of 2026.
</details>

>> 呃，家庭清洁机器人。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Uh home cleaning robots.
</details>

>> 那些行不通。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Those don't work.
</details>

>> 是行不通。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> No.
</details>

>> 为什么每个人都想要折衣服那个特定的用例？是因为那是……

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Why is it that uh everybody uh wants that specific use case of like folding laundry? Is that is that because it's uh
</details>

>> 我不知道。这有点像，你知道，那种智能体预订机票的演示。我最近听说，现在旧金山开始有人说：“你能给我看一个不是预订机票的演示吗？”我心想，谢天谢地，这话我已经说了大概十年了。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> I don't know. It's it's it's a bit like you know the the the demo of like agents booking flights. I I I heard like very recently that now like San Francisco is like starting to say like can you show me a demo of like not booking flights. I'm like thank god I've been saying this for like 10 years.
</details>

>> 好吧，说是快问快答，结果我还问了你一个追问。那么，嗯，你自己报告中最被低估的一页幻灯片是？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> All right said rapid fire and then I ask you a follow on question. So um most underrated slide in your own report
</details>

>> 如果你投资了英伟达，而不是投资于替代性的半导体公司，你本可以赚到的钱。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> the amount of money that you would have made investing in Nvidia instead of investing in alternative semi semiconductor companies.
</details>

>> 呃，快速展开讲讲。如果你把投入到替代半导体公司的所有资金，在那些融资轮次宣布的当天全部投进英伟达，你本可以多赚四倍的钱。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Uh unpack that quickly. If you had invested all the money that went into alternative semiconductor companies into Nvidia on the dates that those rounds were announced, you'd have made four times more money.
</details>

>> 是的。最后作为结尾，在过去八份报告中，你最引以为傲的预测是哪个？

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yeah. And then to close the prediction from the past eight reports that you are the most proud of.
</details>

>> 哦。呃，英伟达不会完成对 ARM 的收购。在当时那可是一件大事。我是说，人们当时以为这真的会发生，而我们持有的观点是，出于地缘政治和竞争原因，这不会发生。从某种程度上说，ARM 的股东因为没有完成那笔收购而赚了大笔的钱；从另一个角度来说，英伟达原本会拥有最令人印象深刻的 CPU 业务，这本可以对他们的云业务产生显著的增厚效应，尤其是随着智能体、强化学习以及其他真正需要（某种程度上属于受 CPU 限制的）技术的兴起；呃，我认为那原本也可能会稍微动摇一些地缘政治格局。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Oh. Uh that Nvidia would not conclude the acquisition of ARM. That was that was a big one back then. I mean people thought it was really going to happen and like we took the view that like for geopolitical reasons and competition reasons that it would not happen and to some degree like ARM shareholders made a crap ton of money by not closing that acquisition to another degree like Nvidia would have had like the most impressive CPU business that could have been really accreative to their uh to their cloud uh particularly as like the rise of agents and RL and everything else that actually needs uh that's kind of CPUbound and uh and I think that could have also like shook up a bit bit of the geopolitical dynamics too.
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### 结语与致谢

>> 好的，太棒了。这是一个绝佳的预测。呃，Nathan，非常感谢你再次做客，呃，也感谢你再次制作这份《AI 现状报告》，这是一项极其浩繁的工作，呃，希望你和你的智能体现在每年都能完成它。可以在 stateofoff.ai 上获取它，呃，你还有一段配套的视频，那也是一个很好的资源。呃，大家可以在 Twitter 上找到你。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Okay, wonderful. That's a great one. Uh Nathan, thank you so much for coming back and uh thank you for doing again this state of AI report which is an extraordinary amount of work that uh you and hopefully your agents uh now do every year. It's available at stateofoff.ai and uh you have a you have a video that uh accompanies it. That's also a good resource. And uh people can find you on Twitter.
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>> 对的。是的。Nathan Benaich 或 @stateofAI。嗯，呃，是的，非常感谢给我这次机会。始终是一件乐事。呃，我是说，单单过去一年发生的事情就太不可思议了。那么，等明年我去纽约时，我们再看看 AGI 的情况吧。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Yep. Yep. Nathan Benes or at state of AI. Um and uh yeah, thank you so much for the opportunity. It's always a pleasure and uh I mean it's bananas what's happened in the last year alone. So let's see AGI next year when I'm in New York.
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>> 太好了。谢谢 Nathan。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Wonderful. Thanks Nathan.
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>> 谢谢。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Thanks.
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>> 大家好，我是 Matt Turck。感谢收听本期 MAD Podcast。如果您喜欢本期节目，若尚未订阅，我们非常感谢您能考虑订阅，或者在您观看或收听本期节目的任何平台上留下好评或评论。这确实能帮助我们打造这档播客并邀请到出色的嘉宾。谢谢大家，我们下期节目再见。

<details><summary>Original English</summary>
>> Hi, it's Matt Turk again. Thanks for listening to this episode of the Mad Podcast. If you enjoyed it, we'd be very grateful if you would consider subscribing if you haven't already, or leaving a positive review or comment on whichever platform you're watching this or listening to this episode from. This really helps us build a podcast and get great guests. Thanks, and see you at the next episode.
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