--- author: New York Times Podcasts date: '2026-03-02' guest: '' layout: post.njk source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnMYwMquPUo speaker: New York Times Podcasts tags: - iran-politics - regime-change - middle-east-conflict - political-succession - social-polarization title: 伊朗最高领袖身亡：两极反应与未来走向 summary: 本期节目探讨了伊朗最高领袖身亡后，伊朗国内外的两极反应。一方面，反对派和流散海外的伊朗人欢欣鼓舞，庆祝新时代的到来；另一方面，政府支持者则深感悲痛，担心政权稳定。美国和以色列对伊朗的军事打击旨在削弱其压迫工具，促成政权更迭。节目还讨论了伊朗政权的继任计划，以及美国在推动政权更迭与维持地区稳定之间的两难选择。尽管面临巨大挑战，许多伊朗人仍怀揣着建立一个自由、民主、世俗国家的梦想。 insight: '' draft: true series: '' category: geopolitics area: geopolitics project: [] people: [] companies_orgs: - United States - Israel - Hamas - Revolutionary Guards products_models: [] media_books: - The New York Times - The Daily status: evergreen --- ### 最高领袖身亡与伊朗新纪元 **Michael Barbero**: 大家好，我是**《纽约时报》**的**Michael Barbero**，这里是**《The Daily》**。周日，**美国**和**以色列**连续第二天用导弹轰炸**伊朗**，摧毁了政权越来越多的权力中心，据人权组织称，平民死亡人数已超过100人。与此同时，**伊朗**发动了一波致命的报复性袭击。三名**美国**士兵在行动中阵亡，成为这场战争中首批牺牲的**美国**人。作为一个国家，我们为那些为我们国家做出最终牺牲的真正**美国**爱国者感到悲痛。但人们的目光越来越多地投向**伊朗**政府以及长期以来反对它的数百万公民。迫在眉睫的问题是，一个被削弱的**伊斯兰共和国**是否真的会被它自己的人民推翻。今天，我的同事**Farnaz Faci**将带我们了解**伊朗**内部对这一关键时刻的看法。今天是3月2日星期一。**Farnaz**，感谢你在周日抽出时间。真的非常感谢。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: From the **New York Times**, I'm **Michael Barbero**. This is **The Daily**. On Sunday, the **United States** and **Israel** pounded **Iran** with missiles for a second straight day, destroying more and more power centers of the regime and according to rights groups, bringing the civilian death toll there to well over 100. Meanwhile, **Iran** unleashed a wave of retaliatory attacks that proved deadly. Three **US** troops were killed in action, becoming the first Americans to die in the war. As one nation, we grieve for the true American patriots who have made the ultimate sacrifice for our nation. But increasingly, all eyes were on the **Iranian** government and the millions of citizens who have long opposed it. And the looming question became whether a weakened **Islamic Republic** could actually be toppled by its own people. Today, my colleague **Farnaz Faci** brings us the view of this pivotal moment from inside **Iran**. It's Monday, March 2nd. **Farnaz**, thank you for making time for us on a Sunday. Really appreciate it.
**Farnaz Faci**: 谢谢你邀请我，**Michael**。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Thank you for having me, **Michael**.
**Michael Barbero**: **Farnaz**，对于**伊朗**人民以及包括你在内的居住在国外的庞大**伊朗**侨民来说，我们今天谈论的这个周日，是历史上一个转折点。它有“之前”和“之后”。而现在，“之后”的世界是，**伊朗**的**最高领袖**——他已经掌权三十多年了——被杀，不再掌权了。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: So, **Farnaz**, for the people of **Iran** and for the massive diaspora of **Iranians** who live outside of the country, including you, Sunday, today as we speak, is one of those hinge days in history. There was a before and there was an after. And right now the after is a world in which **Iran**'s **supreme leader** who has been in power for over three decades has been killed and is no longer in power.
**Farnaz Faci**: 这是历史性的一天，我认为对于每一个**伊朗**人来说，无论你是政府的支持者还是反对者，无论你住在国内还是国外，这都是新的一天。这是一个新的**伊朗**。从我们开始听到**哈梅内伊**先生可能被杀的那一刻起，我的手机就开始响个不停。我收到了朋友和家人的短信和电话。我也收到了**伊朗**一些消息来源的短信和电话，他们问我：“你知道什么吗？消息是真的吗？他走了吗？你听说了什么？”无论你站在哪一边，这都是一个划时代的时刻。今天，**伊朗**人醒来，迎来了没有**哈梅内伊**先生掌权的历史第一天。我们还不知道这意味着什么。但这位近四十年来一直对**伊朗**人民命运产生巨大影响的人物，已经不在了。一些**伊朗**人正在庆祝。人们涌上街头。我与**德黑兰**的几位熟人进行了几次视频通话，他们打开摄像头给我看街上汽车鸣笛，人们欢呼。有烟花，人们把头伸出窗外，高喊“自由！自由！”这是一种发自内心的尖叫，几乎是一种解脱的尖叫。对于散布在世界各地的侨民来说，也有类似的感觉。我看到一群家人在**FaceTime**上聚会。一些人在**美国**，一些人在**欧洲**，一些人在**伊朗**。每个人都进行了视频通话，其中一些人哭了。那是解脱、震惊甚至喜悦的泪水。然后他们举杯庆祝。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: It's one of those historic days that I think if for every **Iranian**, whether you're a supporter of the government or you're an opponent, whether you live inside or you live outside, this is a new day. This is a new **Iran**. From the moment we started hearing about **Mr. Khamenei** being potentially killed, my phone started buzzing. I was getting text messages and phone calls from my friends and family members. And I was also getting text messages and calls from some of my sources in **Iran** who were asking me, "Do you know anything? Is the news true? Is he gone? What have you heard?" No matter what side of the divide you were on, this was a monumental moment. And today, **Iranians** woke up to the first day of history without **Mr. Khamenei** in power. And we don't know exactly what that's going to mean yet. But this figure who has loomed very large for almost four decades over the fate of **Iranians** is gone. Some **Iranians** were celebrating. People were pouring to the streets. I had several video calls with several people I know in **Tehran** who turned on the camera and showed me cars honking on the streets, people cheering. There were fireworks, people sticking their heads out of the windows and chanting freedom, freedom. And this visceral scream, like a scream of relief almost. And for the diaspora who's scattered all over the world, it was a similar feeling. I watched a group of family members congregate on **FaceTime**. Some were in the **US**, some were in **Europe**, some were in **Iran**. And everybody did a video call and some of them were crying. They were just these tears of relief and shock and joy even. And then they celebrated with shots.
**Michael Barbero**: 哇。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Wow.
**Farnaz Faci**: 有很多欢呼声。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: And there was a lot of cheers.
**Michael Barbero**: 当你说“侨民”时，你实际上指的是那些曾经在**伊朗**团聚，但自从**1979年伊斯兰革命**后，可能就分散到世界各地的家庭。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: And when you say diaspora, you quite literally mean families who were once together in **Iran** and presumably scattered to the winds across the world once the **Islamic Revolution** came in **1979**.
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。对于许多**伊朗**人来说，这就像一个梦。他们曾经都住在彼此几个街区之外，举行多代同堂的家庭聚会，但在**哈梅内伊**先生的统治下，他们中的许多人无法返回**伊朗**，许多家庭就像星尘一样散布到世界各地，彼此分离。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Exactly. It feels like a dream for many **Iranians** that once they used to all live a few blocks from each other and have multigenerational family gatherings and under **Mr. Khamenei**. Many of them have not been able to return to **Iran** and many families have just scattered like stardust all over the world and separated from each other.
### 两极分化的社会反应 **Michael Barbero**: 那么，这显然是**伊朗**国内外那些在**哈梅内伊**被杀后的24到48小时内可能处于庆祝一方的**伊朗**人。那么那些支持他的人呢？想必你也和他们谈过。你如何描述他们的反应？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: So that's clearly the segment of **Iranians** both inside and outside the country who may be on the celebratory side of the spectrum in the 24- 48 hours since he was killed. What about those who support him? Presumably you've been talking to them as well. What would you characterize as their reaction?
**Farnaz Faci**: 对于**哈梅内伊**先生的支持者来说，这感觉像是一个巨大的损失。他的支持者开始大量涌上街头，前往清真寺祈祷和哭泣。这感觉就像他们脚下的土地正在移动。他们不仅失去了一位他们崇敬和信仰的宗教领袖，还失去了一个他们忠于其意识形态的政治体系的领导人。他们觉得这个体系处于危险之中，他们不知道他们所信仰和支持的**伊斯兰共和国**在没有他的情况下是否能存活下来。**Michael**，这就是**伊朗**的现实，这个两极分化的社会。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: For **Mr. Khamenei**'s supporters, this feels like a big loss. His supporters started to come out into the streets in large numbers and going to mosques and praying and crying. It feels like the ground is shifting under them. Not only have they lost a religious figure that they revered and believed in, but they've also lost a political leader of a system that they have ideological loyalty to. It feels like that is in jeopardy that they don't know whether this **Islamic Republic** that they believe in and they support is going to survive or not without him. And you know this is the reality of **Iran**, **Michael**, this polarized society.
**Michael Barbero**: 没错，人们不禁会想，接下来会发生什么，无论接下来出现何种形式的政府，你将如何让这两派人彼此靠近？或者这甚至可能吗？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Right? And one wonders whatever comes next, whatever form of government comes next, how are you going to bring these two sides anywhere close to each other? Or is that even possible?
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。因为那些在家中开香槟庆祝的人，似乎很难将他们的反应和他们的整个世界观与那些在街头紧抱已故**最高领袖**照片的人调和。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Right? Because the people doing shots in their homes uncquiring champagne, those people would seem to have a very hard time reconciling their reactions and and their whole world view with those who are clinging to photos of the now late **supreme leader** in the streets.
**Michael Barbero**: 没错。我不知道这两派人将如何和解。**Farnaz**，如果你要估计一下，你会如何描述这两个阵营的规模？支持者、哀悼者与异议者、反对者，那些庆祝他去世的人？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Exactly. I don't know how these two sides are going to reconcile. If you had to estimate **Farnaz**, how big would you describe both of those camps as the supporters, the mourers versus the dissident, the opponents, those celebrating his death?
**Farnaz Faci**: 我会说，**伊朗**绝大多数人口是政权的反对者，大约**80%**。核心支持者大约是**20%**。我认为我们可以从投票模式中得出这个结论。在过去几年中，当有总统选举或议会选举时，**伊朗**那些政权的铁杆信徒去投票的比例大约是人口的**20%**。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: I would say that the overwhelming majority of the population in **Iran** are opponents of the regime, about **80%** and the core supporters are about **20%**. And I think we can sort of draw this conclusion from voting patterns. In the past couple of years when there's been presidential elections or parliamentary elections, **Iranians** who are hardcore believers of the regime have gone to polls around **20%** has been **20%** of the population.
**Michael Barbero**: 明白了。所以你是从这个角度推断的，这看起来相当合理。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Got it. So you're extrapolating from that which seems quite reasonable,
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。我认为我们可以从中得出结论。而且，比如在1月份，**伊朗**各地，无论是小城镇还是大城市，都爆发了反对政府的抗议活动，包括政府的宗教堡垒地区，那里有很多人走上街头，呼吁结束这个**伊斯兰政权**。如果我们看看1月份被杀害的抗议者的**人口统计数据**，他们来自**伊朗**所有族裔群体、广阔的地理区域和不同的社会经济背景。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: right? We can I think draw from that. And also like in January literally every small and big town all over **Iran** saw protests against the government including the religious sort of stronghold of the government where there were lots of people out calling for the end of this **Islamic regime**. If we look at the demographics of the protesters who were killed in January, they're from all ethnic groups from a large geographic area in **Iran** and different socio economic backgrounds.
### 哈梅内伊的遗产与统治 **Michael Barbero**: 好的，因为他的去世如此突然，而且正如你所描述的，反应如此不同。让我们来谈谈这位引发如此深刻反应的**哈梅内伊**，以及他为何会引发如此强烈的反应。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Well, because his death is so fresh and the reactions as you are describing them are so different. Let's talk about this man who is inspiring such profound reactions, **Khamenei**, and why he inspires such strong reactions.
**Farnaz Faci**: **哈梅内伊**先生是**伊朗**的第二任**最高领袖**。第一任是开国**最高领袖霍梅尼**。他在**1979年伊斯兰革命**推翻君主制后上台。12天前，**霍梅尼**大阿亚图拉接受了手术，试图止住肠道出血。昨天早些时候，他突发心脏病。他低声念诵穆斯林祷文，然后去世了。在**霍梅尼**大阿亚图拉在**德黑兰**一家医院去世不到一天后，**伊朗**任命了**霍梅尼**大阿亚图拉的继任者。49岁的**阿里·哈梅内伊**今天被**伊朗**高级神职人员委员会选为**霍梅尼**的宗教继任者。人们普遍认为，**哈梅内伊**先生在**1989年**继任了他。大阿亚图拉在整个**伊斯兰世界**掀起了反西方浪潮。今天，人们隐约希望他的继任者能不那么有效，如果不是更友好的话。据说，第一任**最高领袖**领导了一场革命，而**哈梅内伊**先生则领导了一个国家。他确实是确保**伊斯兰共和国**从一个革命理念转变为一个巩固了权力的国家的统治者。我们今天所知的**伊朗伊斯兰共和国**，对代理武装团体拥有影响力，并且拥有核力量、导弹和军事力量，所有这些都是**哈梅内伊**先生的愿景。他不仅是全世界什叶派的宗教领袖，而且他领导下的**伊朗**也将成为一个领导**反帝国主义**、**反美主义**、**反以色列主义**的国家。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: **Mr. Khamenei** is the second **supreme leader** of **Iran**. The first was founding **Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini**. He came to power in **1979** after the **Islamic revolution** that toppled the monarchy. 12 days ago, the **Ayatollah** was operated on in an attempt to stem intestinal bleeding. Early yesterday, he suffered a heart attack. He whispered Muslim prayers and died. **Iran** has named a successor to the **Ayatollah Khomeini** less than a day after the **Ayatollah**'s death in a **Tehran** hospital. 49-year-old **Ali Khamenei** was today chosen **Khomeini**'s religious successor by **Iran**'s council of senior clerics. It is widely expected that **Mr. Khamenei** succeeded him in **1989**. **Ayatollah Khomeini** unleashed anti-western passions throughout the **Islamic world**. Today there were thinly veiled hopes that his successes would be less effective if not more friendly. And it is said that while the first **supreme leader** led a revolution, **Mr. Khamenei** led a state. He really is the ruler who made sure that the **Islamic Republic** went from a revolutionary idea into a state that entrenched power. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** that we know today that has influence over proxy militant groups and you know has a nuclear power and missile and military power was all the vision of **Mr. Khamenei**. Not only was he the religious leader of **Shia** around the world, but his **Iran** would also be this country that led **anti-imperialism**, **anti-Americanism**, **anti-Israelism**.
**Michael Barbero**: 没错。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Exactly.
**Farnaz Faci**: 在他臭名昭著的言论中，他说：“**哈马斯**现在拥有火箭并能攻击**以色列**，是因为我们。我们通过训练和资助，使他们从石头和弓箭发展到导弹和枪支。”当然，他最出名的是他在**国内镇压**中的角色。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: In one of his notorious quotes, he said, "The reason **Hamas** now has rockets and can attack **Israel** is because of us. We enabled them to go from rocks and arrows to missiles and guns with our training and with our funding." And of course, the thing that he is known for is his role in **domestic repression**.
**Michael Barbero**: 几天前，这看起来像是第二次革命的开始。**德黑兰大学**校园里的学生要求**政治和社会改革**。但回应是迅速而暴力的。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: For a few days, it looked like the start of a second revolution. Students on the campus of **Tehran University** demanding political and social reform. But the response was swift and violent.
**Farnaz Faci**: **哈梅内伊**先生拥有绝对权力。他以从不让步于改革呼吁而闻名。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: **Mr. Khamenei** had absolute power. He is known for never giving an inch to calls for reform.
**Michael Barbero**: 被派去镇压这种年轻理想主义的不是警察或军队，而是一个名为**巴斯基民兵**的民兵组织，他们是**原教旨主义革命**的捍卫者。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Sent in to crush this youthful idealism. Not the police or army, but a militia called the **Basij**. Defenders of the fundamentalist revolution.
**Farnaz Faci**: 边缘化政治对手。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Sidelining political opponents.
**Michael Barbero**: 这个政府不允许我们说我们想说的话。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: This government won't allow us to say what we want.
**Farnaz Faci**: 监禁异议者。政府的回应是暴力。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Jailing dissident. The government's response has been violence.
**Michael Barbero**: 身穿盔甲的警察骑着高速摩托车袭击抗议者。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Armorcladan police attacking protesters from the backs of speeding motorcycles,
**Farnaz Faci**: 呼吁对示威者进行残酷和致命的镇压。这些是**伊朗**最近传出的一些画面。该政权在1月8日切断了**伊朗**的互联网，希望能阻止对其镇压示威者的报道，包括1月份最近的一波镇压，他亲自下达了**格杀勿论**的命令。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: calling for brutal and lethal crackdowns on protesters. These are some of the most recent images coming out of **Iran**. The regime cut off the internet in **Iran** on the 8th of January, hoping to prevent coverage of its crackdown on protesters, including the recent wave in January, where he personally ordered the shoot to kill order.
**Michael Barbero**: 我们认为造成了数千人死亡。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: that we think killed thousands.
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。他命令安全部队对**手无寸铁的抗议者**开火，使用致命武力。结果，在三天内发生了一场**大屠杀**，因为**哈梅内伊**先生不容忍异议，并希望镇压任何变革的动因。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Exactly. He ordered security forces to open fire on unarmed protesters with lethal force. And as a result, over 3 days, a massacre happened because **Mr. Khamenei** did not tolerate disscent and wanted to suppress any cause of change.
**Michael Barbero**: 激进分子现在表示，在**伊朗**最近对全国性抗议活动的镇压中，有超过**6000人**被杀，他们警告这个数字可能还会上升。然而，尽管**最高领袖**通过如此压制成功地阻止了抗议活动，但我们知道，我们在这个节目中也多次谈到，幕后，政权正在变得越来越弱，因为**美国**和**以色列**越来越厌倦**伊朗**国家支持的恐怖主义，尤其是在**10月7日**之后。他们基本上说受够了。他们开始对**伊朗**发动一波又一波的袭击。所有这些似乎都让政权非常清楚，其处境已经变得岌岌可危。但在过去几天里，我们现在知道，因为**最高领袖**相对轻松地被除掉。他们似乎并没有那么小心或谨慎。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Activists now say that more than **6,000** people were killed in **Iran**'s recent crackdown on nationwide protests and they warned that number could rise. And yet, despite the **Supreme Leader**'s success in holding back protests by being so repressive, what we know, we've talked about it a lot on the show, is that behind the scenes, the regime is getting weaker and weaker because the **United States** and **Israel**, which grew increasingly tired of **Iranian** state sponsored terrorism, especially after **October 7th**. They basically say enough is enough. They start unleashing waves of attacks against **Iran**. All of which would seem to make the regime very aware that its situation had become precarious. But over the past couple of days, we now know because the **supreme leader** was taken out with relative ease. It doesn't seem like they were being all that careful or cautious.
### 政权的脆弱性与继任计划 **Farnaz Faci**: 这很令人惊讶，**Michael**。没有人想到，在**美国**军队在**伊朗**周围集结了军舰和战斗机的时候，他们会发现**哈梅内伊**先生在他的大院里，而且还在地面上。但最终，他上午9点半坐在办公室里，隔壁就是一场高级别会议，基本上所有高级军事指挥官都在为战争制定战略。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: This was a surprise, **Michael**. Nobody thought that they would find **Mr. Khamenei** above ground and in his compound during a time where **US** military had amassed warships and fighter planes all around **Iran**. But at the end he was sitting in his office at 9:30 a.m. and next door to him was a high-profile meeting of basically all the senior military commands strategizing for the war.
**Michael Barbero**: 但为什么呢？为什么他们对这些攻击如此容易受到影响，就像你说的，每个人似乎都知道这些攻击即将到来？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: And why though? Why why were they so accessible to these attacks that like you said everybody seemed to know were coming?
**Farnaz Faci**: 嗯，我认为他们可能有点自满，有点疏忽了。我认为他们计算出袭击会在半夜发生，而不是在工作日的上午9点半、10点，当时有很多孩子在学校，人们在工作。他们以为他们有时间聚集并计划他们认为可能在半夜迫在眉睫的袭击。我认为他们短暂地失算了。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Well, I think that it's possible that they got a little complacent that they got a little sloppy. I think that they calculated that strikes would happen in the middle of the night, not at 9:30, 10:00 a.m. on a work day where lots of children were in school and people were at work. and they thought that they had a window to congregate and plan for attacks that they thought might be imminent in the middle of the night. And I think they miscalculated briefly.
**Michael Barbero**: 真有意思。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Fascinating.
**Farnaz Faci**: 许多**伊朗**官员现在表示，**哈梅内伊**先生拒绝离开他的家和他的大院，并向周围的人表示，如果他受到攻击并且战争开始，他宁愿成为**烈士**。我认为在他看来，如果他被视为一个没有躲藏、不害怕的人，他的遗产会得到更好的保护，而如果他遭遇**委内瑞拉**的**尼古拉斯·马杜罗**那样的命运，被捕获，或者如果他的政权被推翻，他就会蒙受耻辱。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: And what many **Iranian** officials now say is that **Mr. Khamenei** had refused to leave his home and his compound and had indicated to people around him that if he's going to get attacked and war starts, he would rather become a martyr. I think that in his mind his legacy would be better protected if he was seen as somebody who was not in hiding was not afraid whereas if he would have the fate of **Venezuela**'s **Nicholas Maduro** and get captured or if his regime would be toppled he would be humiliated right
**Michael Barbero**: 所以我认为他有这种渴望，想要他所设想和想要的结局。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: so I think there was this desire by him to have the kind of ending that he envisioned and he wanted
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错，这也许是事后**伊朗**宣传的一部分，或者可能包含一些真相。关于政权的疏忽或自满，**美国**和**以色列**到底杀死了多少位领导人？对于我们这些不熟悉**伊朗**政府的人来说，这对他政权造成了多大的打击？
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: right which maybe **Iranian** propaganda after the act or may contain some shred of truth. On the subject of the regime's sloppiness or complacency, just how many of its leaders did the **US** and **Israel** kill? And for those of us not as familiar with **Iran**'s government, how big a blow to the regime does it represent?
**Michael Barbero**: 这对政权来说是一个巨大的打击。除了**哈梅内伊**先生，他们还杀害了**革命卫队**总司令、国防部长和其他一些高级官员。但**哈梅内伊**先生已经为此做好了准备。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: It represents a massive blow to the regime. Putting **Mr. Khamenei** aside. They killed the commander-in-chief of the **Revolutionary Guards**, the defense minister and some other senior officials. But **Mr. Khamenei** had planned for this possibility.
**Farnaz Faci**: 他指示所有担任领导职务的人都指定四层继任者。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: He had instructed everyone in leadership roles to name four layers of succession.
**Michael Barbero**: 所以他们计划了这样一种情况：政府中每个职位的三个人都可能在周末的袭击中丧生，但仍然会有人继任。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: So they planned for the idea that three of every position in the government might end up being killed in what ended up being this weekend's attack and there would still be someone to succeed that person.
**Farnaz Faci**: 是的，没错。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Yes. Exactly.
**Michael Barbero**: 哇。那么此刻，我们大约在周日下午3点和你通话。**伊朗**政府的继任情况如何？政府迅速行动，以展现一种控制感和有序过渡，同时他们任命了**最高领袖**的继任者。这似乎是目前的情况。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Wow. So at this moment I we're talking to you around 300 p.m. Sunday. What is the state of that succession in the **Iranian** government? The state moved very swiftly to project a sense of control and orderly transition while they name a successor for the **supreme leader**. That seems to be where things are standing.
**Farnaz Faci**: 好的。嗯，那只是一个过渡的表象。但政权真的控制着**伊朗**吗？我们怎么知道？目前，截至周日下午，政权仍然控制着**伊朗**。我们没有看到任何重大叛逃。他们仍然控制着街头安全。他们的安全机构遍布首都。他们设置了检查站，拦截车辆并进行监视。他们似乎也保持了报复和打击的军事能力。仍在向**美国**军事目标发射弹道导弹。他们正在攻击**以色列**，他们正在向**波斯湾**的**阿拉伯国家**发射导弹和无人机。所以继任正在发挥作用，**哈梅内伊**希望在这次袭击中就位的人仍然在履行职责。他们正在按下按钮。他们正在发射导弹。他们正在确保国家进行报复。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Okay. Well, that's the projection of a transition. But is the regime actually in control of **Iran**? And how do we know? Right now, as of Sunday afternoon, the regime is still in control of **Iran**. We haven't seen any major defections. They are still in control of security on the streets. Their security apparatus are all over the capital. They've set up checkpoints and stopping cars and interesting and doing surveillance. They also seem to have maintained their military ability to retaliate and strike. Still launching a barrage of ballistic missiles at **US** military targets. They are attacking **Israel** and they are firing off missiles and drones to **Arab** countries in the **Persian Gulf**. So the succession is working to the extent that the people who **Khamenei** wanted to be in place in the event of this attack are still the ones doing the job. They're pressing the button. They're firing the missiles. They're making sure the country is retaliating.
**Michael Barbero**: 他们想确保没有权力真空。目前，我们没有看到任何权力真空的证据。嗯，我的意思是，这之所以如此重要，当然是因为**特朗普总统**对他的目标——**政权更迭**——非常明确。他希望**伊朗**人民预见到权力真空，并填补它，推翻政权。嗯，大多数**伊朗**人民都表示他们希望这个政权被推翻，他们想要一个新**伊朗**。但现在，我认为许多**伊朗**人的首要任务是在炸弹下寻求安全，并确保他们的家人安全并存活下来，他们正在争先恐后地寻找食物、汽油和住所。我们还没有真正看到大规模的国内起义，但这只是第二天，我们不知道会发生什么。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: They wanted to make sure that there's no power vacuum. And at the moment, we're not seeing any evidence of a power vacuum. Hm. I mean, the reason that matters so much, of course, is because **President Trump** has been so explicit about his goal here, **regime change**. He wants the people of **Iran** to anticipate a power vacuum and to fill it and to topple the regime. Well, the majority of **Iranian** people have said that they want this regime toppled, that they want a new **Iran**. But right now, I think the priority for many **Iranians** is to find safety under bombs and to make sure that their families are safe and they survive and they're scrambling to find food and gasoline and shelter. We haven't really seen yet a massive domestic uprising, but it's only day two and we don't know what's possible,
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。想想第一天做了什么，对吧？
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: right? Think about what was done on day one, right?
**Michael Barbero**: 是的。他们在第一天就除掉了**哈梅内伊**先生，而且他们还在继续打击。我认为需要一些时间才能弄清楚**伊朗**会发生什么，以及这个政权是否会存活下来。好的，休息回来后，我们将讨论如果政权未能存活会是什么样子，以及需要什么才能让它被自己的人民推翻。我们马上回来。**Farnaz**，我想回到你在这段对话中早些时候提到的一个数字。**80%**。理论上，**80%**的**伊朗**人似乎反对这个政权，并且可能准备好帮助推翻它，如果在这场军事轰炸结束后，政权陷入混乱的话。所以，让我们来谈谈这种可能性。根据你所知，**伊朗**的反对派需要什么才能变得足够有组织和自信，去尝试做**特朗普总统**鼓励他们做的事情，以及他们许多人长期以来一直想做的事情，那就是推翻这个政权。对于**伊朗**国内的**伊朗**人民来说，要能够以一种在推翻政权中发挥核心作用的方式动员起来，就必须有**国内**和**国外反对派领导人**的战略、规划和某种程度的团结。而且还要有一种感觉，即政权及其压迫工具以及镇压和杀戮手段已经大大削弱或瓦解。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Yeah. They took out **Mr. Khamenei** on day one and they're still continuing to strike. I think it's going to take some time to figure out what's going to happen in **Iran** and whether or not this regime will survive. Well, after the break, we're going to talk about what it might look like if the regime does not survive and what it would take for it to be toppled by its own people. We'll be right back. **Farnaz**, I want to return to a number you mentioned much earlier in this conversation. **80%**. **80%** of **Iranians** in theory seem to oppose the regime and could be ready to help topple it if at the end of this military bombardment, the regime is in a shambles. So, let's talk about that possibility. Based on what you know, what would it take for the opposition in **Iran** to become organized and confident enough to try to do what **President Trump** is encouraging them to do and that many of them have long wanted to do, which is take down this regime. For the **Iranian** people inside **Iran** to be able to mobilize in a way that they would lay a central role in toppling the regime, there has to be strategy and planning and some sort of unity from opposition leaders inside the country and outside the country. and also a sense that the regime and its oppressive tools and its means of crackdown and killing have been significantly weakened or disassembled.
**Farnaz Faci**: 否则，如果人们像1月份那样再次走上街头，手无寸铁，他们就会再次面临致命镇压和死亡的风险。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Otherwise, if people just come to the streets again as they did in January and they're unarmed, they risk lethal crackdowns and death and killings again.
### 外部干预与政权更迭 **Michael Barbero**: 明白了。但是你有没有看到任何证据表明**美国**和**以色列**在他们选择和打击的目标上，正在试图协助反对派，并试图瓦解你刚才提到的压迫工具？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Understood. But do you see any evidence that the **US** and **Israel** in the targets that they've chosen and that they've struck are trying to assist the opposition and trying to disassemble the tools of oppression that you just mentioned?
**Farnaz Faci**: 我们看到了。我认为当前这场战争与**6月**与**以色列**的战争不同之处在于，目标已经扩大到不仅仅是军事导弹和核设施，还包括政府用来压迫和镇压的结构、建筑和机构。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: We do. I think the difference in this current war in comparison with the June war with **Israel** is that the targets have expanded to not just military missiles and nuclear sites to structures and buildings and institutions that the government used to oppress and repress.
**Michael Barbero**: 比如什么？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Uh like what
**Farnaz Faci**: 比如今天**革命法庭**遭到袭击，这是一个臭名昭著的法庭，审判和起诉政治案件和异议者。他们袭击了**国家广播电台**，这是一个宣传工具。他们还袭击了属于**革命卫队**的两个军事基地，以及他们的下属**巴斯基民兵**，我们看到他们射击、杀害和殴打抗议者，他们摧毁了这两个基地。所以至少有一些证据表明目标正在扩大，而且**美国**和**以色列**的目标似乎确实是在实地促成**政权更迭**。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: like the **revolution court** today was attacked and this is a court that's highly notorious that tried and prosecuted political cases and dissident. They attacked the **state broadcasting** which is a tool of propaganda and they also went after two military bases belonging to the **Revolutionary Guards** and their underlings besieged the volunteer plane closed militia that we see shooting and killing and beating protesters and they decimated those two bases. So there there is some evidence at least that the target is widening and it certainly seems that the goal of the **United States** and **Israel** is to facilitate **regime change** on the ground
**Michael Barbero**: 这当然可能发生，也可能永远不会发生。如果这里不会发生任何形式的革命，那么政权内部是否有**美国**和**以色列**可能认为宽容、有能力、理论上可以满足政权剩余部分及其忠诚者，并且可能被反对派接受，而且**美国**和**以色列**及其领导人认为可以与之打交道的领导人呢？基本上，就像**美国**在逮捕**尼古拉斯·马杜罗**后在**委内瑞拉**找到的那种人。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: which may or may not ever come to pass of course and if there won't be any kind of a revolution here is there for a leader within the regime that the **US** that **Israel** might find tolerant able who they see as somebody who could in theory satisfy what remains of their regime, its loyalists, potentially be acceptable to the opposition and that the **US** and **Israel** and its leaders feel they can do business with. Basically, the kind of person that the **US** found in **Venezuela** after it arrested **Nicholas Maduro**.
**Farnaz Faci**: 你提到**委内瑞拉**很有趣，因为**伊朗**消息人士告诉我，他们私下讨论继任和规划的一个问题是，谁将成为**伊朗**的**德利**，指的是**委内瑞拉**的副总统。提到的一些名字是技术官僚和**革命卫队**前将军，他们被视为中间派、务实派，可能愿意改变路线。其中一个名字是**国家安全委员会**主席**阿里·拉里贾尼**，他现在实际上正在管理国家。**穆罕默德·巴盖尔·加利巴夫**将军，前**革命卫队**指挥官，现任议会议长，在指挥战争中发挥作用。他也是我听说过的名字之一。我还听说过前总统**哈桑·鲁哈尼**的名字，他是一位温和派神职人员，但他已经被**哈梅内伊**先生的亲密圈子排斥在外。所以这些是我听说过的一些名字。但我想在这里提到的是，对于那**80%**想要彻底改变的人以及反对派和异议者来说，任何与**伊斯兰共和国**政权相关的人物都是不可接受的，因为这些人中的每一个人都是这个体系的一部分，并在这个政府47年来一直存在的压迫、杀戮和镇压中扮演了角色。但问题是，**美国**和**特朗普总统**最终是否会决定他不想冒**伊朗**不稳定的风险。他不想冒**内战**的风险，宁愿与那个体系中愿意做出让步的人打交道。对吧？我们今天听到**特朗普总统**说，他愿意与**伊朗**新领导人对话，而且他听说有一些继任选择。所以我认为他是在向**伊朗**政权发出信号，如果你有一个愿意给我我想要的东西，并在核、军事、导弹和政策上做出我想要的让步的人物，那么我就会支持那个领导人。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: It's interesting you bring up **Venezuela** because **Iranian** sources were telling me that one of the conversations they're having in private about succession and about planning amongst themselves is the question of who will be the **Delcy** of **Iran** referring to **Venezuela**'s vice president and some of the names that have come up are technocrats and former generals of the **Revolutionary Guards** who are sort of seen as centrists pragmatic s people who maybe would be open to a change of course. One of the names is **Ali Larijani**, the head of the **National Security Council** who's effectively running the country right now. **General Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf**, a former **Revolutionary Guards** commander who's the speaker of the parliament and has a role in commanding the war. Now he's also one of the names that I have heard. I've also heard the name of former president **Hassan Rouhani** who's a kind of a moderate cleric but he's sort of been outcast from the close circle of **Mr. Khamenei**. So these are some of the names I've heard. But I want to mention here that for that **80%** who want wholesome change and for the opposition and dissident no figure that is associated with the **Islamic Republic**'s regime is going to be acceptable because every single one of these people was part of a system and had a role in those oppressions and killings and repressions that have been part and parcel of this government for 47 years. But the question is whether the **US** and **President Trump** will ultimately decide that he doesn't want to risk instability in **Iran**. He doesn't want to risk civil war and would rather engage with someone from that system that would be willing to make concessions or not. Right? And we heard **President Trump** say today that he's open to speaking to **Iran**'s new leaders and that he's heard that there are some options for succession. So I think he's kind of signaling to the **Iranian** regime that if you do have a character who is willing to give me what I want and make the kind of concessions that I want on nuclear and military and missiles and policies, then I will back that leader.
**Michael Barbero**: 如果不是支持他，至少我会接触并考虑那个领导人的可能性。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: If not back him, at least I'll engage and entertain the possibility of that leader.
**Farnaz Faci**: 这将损害**伊朗**人民对民主和自由的渴望。但政治就是这样。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: that will be detrimental to the as aspirations of democracy and freedom for the **Iranian** people. But politics are
**Michael Barbero**: 从非常现实的意义上说，那将与**政权更迭**背道而驰。所以**特朗普总统**将不得不决定对他来说什么才是最重要的。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: in a very real sense that would be at odds with **regime change**. And so **President Trump** is going to have to decide what really matters most to him,
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: right?
**Michael Barbero**: 改变政权还是创建一个稳定的**伊朗**。这两者可能存在冲突。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Changing the regime or creating a stable **Iran**. Those may be in conflict,
**Farnaz Faci**: 没错。而且，你知道，我认为这会让**伊朗**内外许多人感到非常失望，因为**特朗普总统**，出于我们讨论过的所有原因，关于那**80%**庆祝**伊朗**事件和战争的人，他被视为一个帮助他们实现变革愿望的人物。但我想这可能会很快改变，如果**美国**与**哈梅内伊**先生的继任者达成协议，他们可能会感到被背叛。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: right? And you know, I think it would be hugely disappointing to many people in **Iran**, both inside and outside, because you know, **President Trump**, for all the reasons we talked about about sort of the **80%** that are celebrating the events in **Iran** and the war, he's seen as a figure who has helped their aspirations for change right now. But I think that that could quickly change and they may feel betrayed if the **US** strikes a deal with the successors of **Mr. Khamenei**.
### 伊朗的未来展望 **Michael Barbero**: 好的，无论接下来谁领导**伊朗**，我想知道过去几天发生的事件是否或多或少地保证了其政府将永远不再一样，即使是由政权内部人士执政。我的意思是，很难想象**伊朗**会回到**霍梅尼**掌权的35年里那种由代理人、国家支持的恐怖主义所定义的体系，原因很简单，随着时间的推移，这导致了他自己的死亡。它让**美国**和**以色列**相信，解决问题的唯一方法就是除掉领导人。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Well, no matter who leads **Iran** next, I wonder if the events of the past few days more or less guarantees that its government is really never the same, even if it's an insider from the regime running it. And by that I really mean it's hard to fathom **Iran** returning to the system of proxies and state sponsored terror that really defined **Khomeini**'s 35 years in power for the simple reason that over time it resulted in his own death. It made the **US** and it made **Israel** believe that the only way to solve the problem was to take out the leader.
**Farnaz Faci**: 我认为我们所知的**伊斯兰共和国**已经结束了。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: I think the **Islamic Republic** as we knew it is over.
**Michael Barbero**: 哇。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Wow.
**Farnaz Faci**: 我认为**哈梅内伊**先生统治下的**伊朗**，那个对**美国**、对**阿拉伯邻国**、对**以色列**怀有敌意，并以**好战**、**恐怖**、**劫持人质**和**镇压本国公民**为特征的国家，是不可持续的。在中东的新现实中，它不可持续，也无法生存。在**10月7日**之后，我们看到**以色列**将自身安全和生存置于一切之上。我不认为这样一个**伊朗**会被其不安分的民众所容忍，他们不会改变。鉴于我们在该地区和针对**阿拉伯国家**看到的所有袭击，我不认为**伊朗**的邻国会容忍那种国家，以及那种他们面临被袭击风险的感觉，以及一个没有人知道它会做什么、会如何反应的不可预测的邻国政府。而且我认为**美国**也不会必然容忍它。所以我认为所有不利因素都堆积在**伊斯兰共和国**身上，使其无法像过去47年那样继续下去。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: I think the state that **Mr. Khamenei**'s **Iran** which was hostile to the **US**, hostile to its **Arab** neighbors, hostile to **Israel** and defined militancy and terror and hostage taking and repression of its own citizens is not sustainable. It's not sustainable and cannot survive in the new realities of the **Middle East** where we've seen **Israel** sort of prioritize its safety and survival above all else post **October 7**. I don't think it is an **Iran** that will be tolerated by its restive population that won't change. And given the all the attacks we've seen in the region and against **Arab** states, I don't think **Iran**'s neighbors will tolerate that kind of a state and this feeling that they're at risk of being attacked and sort of an unpredictable government next door that nobody knows, you know, what it will do and how it will react. And I don't think the **United States** will necessarily tolerate it either. So I think all the odds are stacked against the **Islamic Republic** continuing as it has been for the past 47 years.
**Michael Barbero**: 好的，最后，**Farnaz**，我想问一下，就这一点而言，**伊朗**反对派和海外侨民，甚至你自己，在这个充满非凡变数和恐惧，但也充满可能性的时刻，你允许自己对**伊朗**抱有什么希望和梦想？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Well, just to end, **Farnaz**, I wonder to that point what members of the **Iranian** opposition and the expat world diaspora, you even what you're allowing yourself to hope for and to dream of for **Iran** in this moment of such extraordinary flux and fear, but also possibility.
**Farnaz Faci**: 嗯，我是**伊朗**人，周五我以为永远不可能访问**伊朗**，不可能去我父亲的墓地，也不可能见到我年迈的亲戚，那是一个遥远的梦想。今天，我有了希望。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Um, I'm **Iranian** and on Friday I thought that the possibility of ever visiting **Iran**, of visiting my father's graveside or seeing my elderly relatives was a distant dream. Today I have hope.
**Michael Barbero**: 希望能回去。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: of returning.
**Farnaz Faci**: 希望能回去。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: of returning.
**Michael Barbero**: 一个相当朴素的目标。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: A pretty modest goal.
**Farnaz Faci**: 你知道，许多被流放、无法回国的**伊朗**人都是这么说的。他们说，想见亲戚、回故乡，这只是最低限度的要求。这是许多人被剥夺的权利。而且我认为全世界许多**伊朗**人都有了一线希望。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: You know, that's what a lot of **Iranians** who've been exiled and who can't go back say. They say that it's pretty bare minimum to want to see your relatives and visit your home country. And it's a right that has been robbed from many people. And I I think many **Iranians** the world over have a glimmer of hope.
**Michael Barbero**: 好的，让我问一个可能不那么朴素的可能性。我正在想那些周六在喝酒庆祝的人。我的意思是，除了回**伊朗**探亲，他们还敢想些什么？
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Well, let me ask about a perhaps less modest set of possibilities. I'm I'm thinking about the people who were taking shots **Mhm**. on Saturday. I mean, what do they dare to think about beyond just visiting relatives back in **Iran**?
**Farnaz Faci**: 他们敢于梦想一个自由的**伊朗**，政治犯获得自由，年轻人走上街头要求更好的生活不会被枪杀，人们不会因为这是一个资源丰富的国家而挣扎求生，父母不会为他们的孩子哀悼。看着人们走上街头，高喊“自由！自由！”以回应**哈梅内伊**先生的死，这对于**美国**或西方观众来说，可能听起来像是一个朴素的愿望，但我认为对于长期以来一直渴望并努力建立一个自由、民主、世俗国家的**伊朗**人民来说，这是一个巨大的梦想。作为一名报道**伊朗**三十年的记者，我从未想过我会写这样的新闻，或者，你知道，报道这个。所以我今天看着**《纽约时报》**的头版，标题是“哇。这是我一生中从未想过会写的故事的标题。”
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: They dare to dream of a free **Iran** where political prisoners are free, where young people who take to the streets to demand for a better living are not shot and killed and people are not struggling to make ends meet because it's a resource-rich country where parents are not mourning their children. Watching the videos of people taking to the streets and chanting freedom, freedom in reaction to **Mr. Khamenei**'s killing it. It may sound to an **American** or Western audience that this is a modest aspiration, but I think for the **Iranian** people who have sort of long aspired and worked toward having a free, democratic, secular country, this is a big dream. And as a reporter who's covered **Iran** for three decades, I never thought that I would be writing this news or, you know, reporting this. So I looked at the front page of the **New York Times** today with the headline and thought, "Uh, wow. This is this is a headline on a story I never thought I would write in my lifetime."
**Michael Barbero**: 是的。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Yeah.
**Michael Barbero**: 好的，**Farnaz**，非常感谢你。我们真的很感激。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: Well, **Farnaz**, thank you very much. We really appreciate it.
**Farnaz Faci**: 谢谢你邀请我，**Michael**。
Original English **Farnaz Faci**: Thank you for having me, **Michael**.
**Michael Barbero**: 在周日晚上接受**《泰晤士报》**采访时，**特朗普总统**表示，**美国**对**伊朗**的军事袭击可能持续**四到五周**。当被追问他关于谁应该领导**伊朗**政府的计划时，总统提出了几个看似不一致的愿景。他说，其中一个设想是**美国**从政权内部物色一个合作的领导人。他说，另一个设想是**伊朗**的精锐军事力量会简单地放下武器，向**伊朗**人民投降。我们马上回来。这是你今天还需要知道的其他事情。宪法不能通过法令修改。宪法规定未经国会批准不得宣战。总统称这是对**伊朗**的战争。周日，国会民主党人质疑**特朗普总统**对**伊朗**军事打击的合法性，称这是一个需要国会批准但总统未能寻求批准的明确案例。其中一位民主党人，**弗吉尼亚州**参议员**蒂姆·凯恩**，提出了一项旨在结束**美国**在**伊朗**使用军事力量的决议。总统不仅没有来国会寻求辩论或投票，他甚至没有通知我们绝大多数人就采取了行动。这是一场非法战争。我是**Michael Barbero**。周日晚上市场开盘时，油价上涨了**10%**。这凸显了**伊朗**冲突的经济风险。**美国**和**以色列**对**伊朗**的袭击可能会严重限制全球石油和天然气供应。即使中断是短暂的，也几乎肯定会使全球能源价格上涨。本期节目由**Jessica Chung**、**Mary Wilson**和**Claire Tennis**制作。由**Liz O. Balen**和**Paige Cowit**编辑。包含**Alicia**和**Dan Powell**的音乐。我们的主题音乐由**Jim Brunberg**和**Wonderly**的**Ben Lansk**创作。本期节目由**Chris Wood**进行工程制作。**《The Daily》**到此结束。我是**Michael Barbero**。明天见。
Original English **Michael Barbero**: In an interview on Sunday night with the **Times**, **President Trump** said that the **American** military assault against **Iran** could last up to **four to 5 weeks**. When pressed on his plan for who should lead **Iran**'s government, the president offered several seemingly inconsistent visions. One scenario, he said, was that the **United States** identified a cooperative leader from inside the regime. Another scenario, he said, was that **Iran**'s elite military forces would simply lay down their weapons and surrender to the people of **Iran**. We'll be right back. Here's what else you need to know today. The Constitution can't be changed by statute. The Constitution says no declaration of war without Congress. The president has called this war against **Iran**. On Sunday, congressional Democrats questioned the legality of **President Trump**'s military strikes against **Iran**, saying that it was a clear-cut case where he needed Congress's approval, but failed to seek it. One of those Democrats, **Senator Tim Kaine** of **Virginia**, has introduced a resolution seeking to end the use of **American** military forces in **Iran**. The president not only did not come to Congress to seek a debate or vote, he acted without even notification to the vast majority of us. This is an illegal war. I am. And as markets opened on Sunday night, oil prices rose **10%**. Highlighting the economic risks of the conflict in **Iran**. The **US-Israeli** attacks on **Iran** could severely restrict oil and gas supplies around the world. Even if the disruption is brief, it will almost certainly make energy more expensive around the world. Today's episode was produced by **Jessica Chung**, **Mary Wilson**, and **Claire Tennis**. It was edited by **Liz O. Balen**, and **Paige Cowit**. Contains music by **Alicia** and **Dan Powell**. Our theme music is by **Jim Brunberg** and **Ben Lansk** of **Wonderly**. The episode was engineered by **Chris Wood**. That's it for **The Daily**. I'm **Michael Barbero**. See you tomorrow.