---
author: Joseph Wang
date: '2026-04-11'
guest: ''
layout: post.njk
source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nwFrQKxTpdo
speaker: Joseph Wang
tags:
- middle-east-conflict
- oil-price-shocks
- inflation-dynamics
- us-monetary-policy
- geopolitical-risk
- global-recession
title: 地缘政治动荡下的全球经济与市场展望
summary: 本期《市场周刊》深入分析了中东冲突对全球经济数据、通胀、央行政策及国际政治格局的深远影响。探讨了和谈的可能性、各方博弈，以及地缘政治重塑下的全球经济风险与中国角色的演变。
insight: ''
draft: true
series: ''
category: macro-economy
area: geopolitics
project: []
people: []
companies_orgs:
- Fed
- Cleveland Fed
products_models: []
media_books: []
status: evergreen
---
### 地缘政治动荡与经济连锁反应
本周市场经历了一场全面的动荡，其中地缘政治事件扮演了关键角色。从中东冲突的升级，如美国总统威胁对伊朗采取行动，到副总统 JD Vance 在巴基斯坦主导的和平谈判，局势瞬息万变。这些地缘政治的紧张局势直接渗透到美国经济数据中，最显著的影响体现在 **石油价格** 的飙升。过去几周，油价多次突破每桶100美元大关，这直接推高了汽油、航空燃油和柴油等价格。
在此背景下，上个月的 **通货膨胀** 数据（CPI）显示出强劲势头，环比数据受高企的能源价格影响而大幅上涨。然而，剔除能源成本的核心 CPI 数据表现相对温和，年同比仅为2.6%。展望未来，工资增长的放缓以及疲软的租赁市场导致的住房通胀（disinflation）趋势，预示着核心 CPI 有望进一步温和回落。
关键在于，美国 **联邦储备委员会（Fed）** 关注的是 **个人消费支出（PCE）价格指数**，而非 CPI。PCE 数据呈现出不同的叙事：尽管历史上 CPI 通常高于 PCE，但近期 PCE 已反超 CPI。根据克利夫兰联储的预测，核心 PCE 指数预计将达到约3%。这一水平对美联储而言，要忽视其潜在的通胀压力是困难的，相比之下，若核心 PCE 维持在“两位数”（two-handle）区间，美联储可能更为从容。因此，尽管美联储的最新点阵图曾暗示年内可能降息一次，但当前市场并未消化任何降息预期。上周公布的美联储会议纪要显示了政策制定者内部的分歧：多数成员倾向于在能源价格飙升导致经济疲软和失业率上升的背景下降息，但仍有一部分人对通胀表示担忧，甚至主张加息。发言者认为，后者（主张加息者）主要是指那些在联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）中影响力有限的新任地区联储主席。
Original English
Hello
my
friends.
Today
is
April
11th
and
this
is
Markets
Weekly.
All right,
so
last
week
was
a
complete
whirlwind
in
markets.
On
one
day
you
had
the
president
of
the
United
States
threatening
civilizational
destruction
of
the
Iranian
people
and
today
you
have
Vice
President
JD
Vance
leading
peace
talk
negotiations
in
Pakistan
on
behalf
of
the
US.
So
a
lot
has
happened
today.
Let's
talk
about
two
things.
First
off,
let's
talk
about
how
the
war
in
the
Middle
East
is
filtering
into
US
economic
data.
And
secondly,
let's
talk
about
how
the
peace
locks
could
potentially
unfold.
All right,
starting
with
the
data.
So,
as
we
all
know,
when
there's
war
in
the
Middle
East,
it
most
concretely
impacts
the
US
through
higher
oil
prices.
Now,
over
the
past
few
weeks,
oil
has
often
been
trading
above
$100,
and
that's
led
to
higher
gasoline,
higher
um
jet
fuel,
higher
diesel
prices,
and
so
forth.
So
inflation
data,
CPI
data
last
month
was
hot.
On
a
month-over-month
basis,
CPI
data
surged
largely
due
to
high
energy
prices.
However,
if
you
look
at
core
CPI,
which
excludes
energy
prices,
you
can
see
that
it
printed
at
a
pretty
tame
2.6%
year-over-year.
Now
looking
ahead,
we
have
wages
that
continue
to
decelerate
and
a
weak
rental
market
leading
to
shelter
inflation,
disinflation,
and
so
there's
a
lot
of
uh
tailwinds
that
suggest
a
more
moderate
uh
core
CPI
going
forward.
But
as
always,
why
do
we
care
about
this?
Well,
we
don't
really
care
about
this.
We
care
about
uh
PCE
because
that's
what
the
Fed
cares
about.
And
the
Fed,
of
course,
has
tremendous
impact
on
financial
markets.
Now
the
Fed
does
not
look
at
CPI.
It
looks
at
PCE
and
PCE
is
honestly
telling
a
different
story.
Now
historically
speaking
CPI
is
higher
than
PCE.
But
more
recently
you
have
a
very
interesting
relationship
where
actually
PCE
has
been
printing
higher
than
CPI.
Now
PCE
according
to
the
Cleveland
Fed
is
expected
to
be
about
3%
at
PC
core.
Now
3%
now
that
that's
really
high.
If
it
was
a
two-handle,
maybe
the
Fed
could
kind
of
shrug
their
shoulders.
But
a
3%
P
core
PC
is
difficult
to
ignore.
So
the
market
at
the
moment
is
not
pricing
in
any
rate
cuts
this
year.
Even
though
at
the
most
recent
Fed
meeting,
the
Fed's
dot
plot
did
guide
towards
one
cut.
Now,
we
got
the
Fed
minutes
last
week
and
it's
showing
something
that
we
kind
of
see
playing
out
in
real
time.
So
most
people
at
the
Fed
would
actually
be
cutting
rates
uh
in
in
the
face
of
an
energy
price
spike.
The
reason
being
that
as
gasoline
prices
spike,
consumers
will
spend
more
of
their
money
at
the
pump,
less
buying
other
things.
So
that's
economic
weakness
that
puts
upward
pressure
on
the
unemployment
rates.
The
modern
Fed
has
always
prioritized
employment
over
inflation.
That
being
said,
there
is
a
sizable
minority
of
people
at
the
Fed
who
are
concerned
about
inflation
and
would
even
be
hiking
rates.
Guys,
that's
not
going
to
happen.
And
we
all
know
who
these
people
are.
They
are
the
newer
Fed
presidents
who
are
not
influential
on
the
FOMC.
---
### 政治格局演变与全球秩序重塑
中东战争的阴影同样投射在 **消费者信心** 上，该指标已跌至数十年来的低点。消费者感到不安，可能源于对人工智能（AI）取代工作的担忧、持续的地区冲突，或是高昂的汽油价格。这种普遍的不安情绪预示着经济前景的疲软，可能导致消费减少，并在未来几个月内加剧经济放缓。
与此同时，这些挑战也影响了现任政府的 **政治前景**。市场指标显示，即将到来的中期选举中，**民主党** 有望实现“横扫”（sweep）。如果民主党同时掌控国会两院，预计将引发一场接连不断的调查，甚至可能导致部分官员面临牢狱之灾。值得注意的是，总统已承诺将赦免其幕僚。
虽然美国经济数据已显现出战争造成的损害，但其影响在海外将更为显著。在 **欧洲**，航空公司据称仅剩数周的航空燃油储备，一旦耗尽，可能被迫取消大量航班并大幅提高票价，对依赖旅游业的经济体造成毁灭性打击。在 **爱尔兰**，价格飙升已引发公众抗议，部分加油站甚至出现燃油短缺。这些经济冲击虽然来势渐缓，但无疑正在逼近，并可能令许多市场参与者感到意外，这也解释了为何局势如此迫切地需要冲突尽快结束。这种紧迫感自然引出了我们讨论的第二个核心议题。
Original English
Now,
the
war
in
the
Middle
East
is
also
feeding
into
consumer
sentiment.
Consumer
sentiment
has
dropped
to
multi-deade
lows.
The
consumer
is
not
feeling
good.
Maybe
they're
looking
at
AI
replacing
their
jobs,
making
they're
looking
at
the
war
of
the
Middle
East,
maybe
looking
at
high
gasoline
prices.
In
any
case,
the
consumer
is
not
feeling
good.
that
suggests
weaker
uh
confidence
in
the
economy,
maybe
less
consumption
and
suggest
uh
potentially
economic
weakness
in
the
months
ahead.
This
is
always
this
is
also
of
course
impacting
the
political
prospects
of
the
Trump
administration.
Poly
market
is
now
suggesting
there's
a
better
than
even
chance
that
we
could
have
a
democratic
sweep
at
the
midterm
elections.
That
would
be
very
bad
for
the
president
because
if
the
Democrats
control
both
houses
of
Congress,
you're
going
to
have
non-stop
neg
non-stop
investigations
and
maybe
some
people
will
go
to
prison.
Uh
the
president
has
already
promised
his
staff
that
he's
going
to
pardon
all
of
them.
So
we'll
see
see
what
happens
then.
Now
the
economic
damage
is
visible
in
the
in
the
US
economic
data,
but
of
course
it's
going
to
be
much
more
pronounced
abroad.
The
US
of
course
is
ultimately
also
a
large
producer
of
oil.
So,
what
we
see
abroad
is
that
in
Europe,
uh,
the
airlines
are
just
weeks
away
from
running
out
of
jet
fuel,
and
if
that
were
to
happen,
they're
going
to
have
to
cancel
flights,
monstrously
raise
prices.
It's
going
to
have
a
very
bad
impact
on
some
of
the
more
tourist
driven
economies.
In
Ireland,
you
already
have
protests
where
many
people
are
very
unhappy
about
the
surges
in
prices
and
it
seems
like
some
stations
are
even
dry.
So
this
um
the
economic
impacts
of
the
straight
off
closing
it
is
coming.
It's
slow
but
it
is
it
is
definitely
coming
and
I
think
when
it
comes
it's
going
to
surprise
a
lot
of
people
in
the
market
which
is
part
of
the
reason
why
there's
such
urgency
for
this
conflict
to
end
which
leads
us
to
our
second
topic.
---
### 和谈进展与历史博弈
关于和平谈判的进展，有报道指出，中东冲突的爆发令 **特朗普政府** 感到意外，他们原以为会像对待委内瑞拉那样，迅速通过军事行动解决问题。然而，他们严重误判了 **伊朗** 的反应及其关闭 **霍尔木兹海峡（Strait of Hormuz）** 的能力，导致美国陷入了一场“泥潭”。发言者认为，这并非“3D国际象棋”，而是“重要人物在犯蠢”，并指出此次谈判很大程度上是出于美国急于摆脱困境的考量，甚至可能是在 **巴基斯坦** 总理的协助下，由美国幕后协调的。
尽管如此，鉴于各方缺乏 **善意（good faith）**，这些谈判注定异常艰难。回顾历史，**伊朗** 与 **奥巴马政府** 曾达成 **JCPOA**（伊朗核协议），伊朗承诺接受严格的核查，以换取部分制裁的缓解。然而，**特朗普政府** 单方面撕毁了协议。此后，去年6月，在伊朗与美国进行谈判之际，伊朗遭到了 **以色列** 的袭击（获得美国支持）。今年2月，当另一艘航空母舰到位后，美国再次对伊朗发动了攻击。因此，发言者认为，伊朗与美国及以色列之间的谈判一直“虚假”，其目的只是为美以两国争取重新武装的时间。时至今日，尽管谈判在巴基斯坦进行，但仍有报道称更多军事资产正被调往中东，包括一艘正在途中加入的第三艘航空母舰。
从 **美国的角度** 来看，这场战争并不受欢迎，消耗了总统巨大的政治资本，甚至导致其部分昔日支持者（如MAGA阵营的评论员）开始疏远。美国渴望脱身，但又不愿看到伊朗在控制霍尔木兹海峡方面“获胜”，因为这将是美国战略上的一个明确失败。对于 **以色列** 而言，战争在国内颇受欢迎，这契合了总理 **本杰明·内塔尼亚胡（Benjamin Netanyahu）** 摧毁伊朗的长期政治目标，尤其是在今年以色列面临大选的背景下，这将是一个重大的政治胜利。而 **伊朗** 则通过其“10点谈判计划”明确了诉求：首先，要求停止美国和以色列的袭击，并寻求安全保障——尽管美国总统特朗普或许能做出承诺，但其能否约束以色列仍是未知数。其次，伊朗希望保留对霍尔木兹海峡的控制权，该海峡现已赋予其全球20%石油供应的控制权，他们希望维持这一新获得的强大影响力。若局势维持现状，伊朗将能收取高额过路费，甚至可能在数月内成功进行核试验，成为拥有霍尔木兹海峡控制权的地区核强国。尽管伊朗在领导层和工业能力上遭受损失，但美国和以色列似乎没有简单有效的军事途径来重新夺回霍尔木兹海峡的控制权。关于核攻击的讨论中，存在关于其可行性和潜在后果（如核泄漏）的专家辩论。
Original English
Now,
by
all
accounts,
a
lot
of
reporting
on
this,
uh,
this
conflict
in
the
Middle
East
surprised
the
Trump
administration.
They
thought
they
would
just
bomb
Iran
and
then
it
would
be
over.
Similar
to
like
Venezuela,
they
were
caught
off
guard,
gravely,
gravely
miscalculated
that
Iran
would
close
straight
off
Hamoose
and
accidentally
got
stuck
in
this
quagmire.
Guys,
there
is
no
3D
chess
here.
It's
just
the
same
old
thing.
Important
people
doing
stupid
things.
Happens
all
the
time.
So
these
negotiations
seem
by
much
reporting
suggests
are
largely
on
the
behest
of
the
US
which
is
eager
to
get
out
of
this
quagmire.
Now
there's
a
very
this
very
interesting
post
uh
from
the
prime
minister
of
Pakistan
on
X
that
reporter
Ryan
Grimcott.
You
can
see
that
this
is
a
post
where
the
prime
minister
of
Pakistan
is
talking
about
peace
negotiations.
But
the
first
post
that
he
gave
actually
had
draft
at
the
top
and
then
uh
post
from
prime
minister
of
Pakistan.
Very
clearly
this
was
given
to
him
probably
by
the
US.
So
the
US
is
behind
the
scenes
choreographing
with
Pakistan
prime
minister
telling
him
what
to
say
so
that
we
can
get
these
uh
peace
talk
negotiations
going.
Now
be
clear
to
let's
be
clear
these
are
going
to
be
very
difficult
negotiations
because
there's
not
a
lot
of
good
faith
among
the
parties.
Now,
Iran
had
an
had
an
agreement
with
the
Obama
administration
called
the
JCPOA
where
Iran
would
agree
to
rigorous
monitoring
of
its
uranium
program
in
exchange
receive
some
degree
of
relief
in
sanctions.
Now,
by
all
accounts,
Iran
faithfully
carried
out
its
duties
under
the
JCPOA,
but
the
Trump
administration
unilaterally
tore
that
agreement
apart.
Then
last
June
when
Iran
was
in
negotiations
with
the
US,
they
were
attacked
by
Israel
with
the
support
of
the
US.
Now
in
February,
Iran
continued
to
have
negotiations
and
as
soon
as
that
second
aircraft
carrier
got
into
position,
the
US
attacked
Iran.
So
the
history
is
that
these
negotiations
that
Iran
has
held
with
the
US
and
Israel
have
always
been
fake.
They've
always
been
it's
just
basically
been
a
ruse
to
give
Iran
to
give
the
US
and
Israel
time
to
rearm.
And
even
as
these
negotiations
take
place
today
in
Pakistan,
we
have
reports
that
there
are
more
military
assets
being
moved
into
the
Middle
East.
There's
a
third
aircraft
carrier
on
the
way.
So,
it's
possible
that
these
negotiations
could
really
just
be
to
buy
time
so
that
the
US
can
get
another
aircraft
carrier
in
position
and
continue
uh
continue
its
attacks.
So,
So
that's
the
context
for
these
discussions.
So
in
order
to
think
about
how
these
discussions
could
play
out,
I
think
it's
useful
to
think
about
it
from
each
from
the
perspective
of
each
of
the
people
at
the
table.
Remember,
there
are
three
people
at
the
table.
From
the
US's
perspective,
you
know,
again,
no
one
knows
what
the
US
is
doing
there.
It's
a
very
unpopular
war
and
it's
costing
the
president
significant
political
capital
not
just
in
the
economic
we've
just
shown
you
but
a
lot
of
people
in
MAGA
from
Tucker
from
um
you
know
Alex
Jones
from
uh
uh
Megan
Kelly
these
are
people
that
were
staunch
supporters
of
the
president
and
are
now
splitting
with
uh
just
not
against
moving
away
from
him.
So,
it's
costing
the
president
political
support
and
it's
really
not
clear
how
it's
been
helping
the
president.
So,
I'm
guessing
that
the
US
would
like
to
get
out
hopefully
let
oil
prices
come
back
down.
But
also,
they
are
reluctant
to
leave
Iran
with
a
win.
That
is
to
say,
retaining
control
of
the
Sri
Moose
because
that
would
be
a
very
clear
defeat
uh
from
from
a
US
strategic
viewpoint.
From
Israel's
viewpoint,
again,
this
war
is
very
popular
in
Israel
and
it's
been
Prime
Minister
Benjamin
Yahoo's
dream,
his
entire
dream
for
for
his
entire
political
career
to
destroy
Iran.
And
one
thing
to
note,
there
are
elections
in
Israel
this
year.
And
so,
it
seems
like
it's
in
President
B,
Prime
Minister
Benjamin's
interest
to
continue
this
war
and
maybe
even
destroy
Iran.
That
would
be,
I
think,
a
huge,
huge
political
victory
for
him.
From
Iran's
perspective,
well,
they've
already
told
us
through
their
10-point
negotiation
uh
plan
what
they
want.
First
and
foremost,
they
don't
want
to
be
attacked
by
the
US
and
Israel
anymore.
So,
they're
looking
for
security
guarantees.
That's
very
very
difficult
to
for
them
to
get
because,
you
know,
maybe
maybe
the
President
Trump
could
commit
to
this,
but
then
they
don't
really
uh
are
not
able
to
restrain
Israel.
So,
it's
not
really
clear
how
that
could
happen.
They
Iran
would
also
of
course
like
to
retain
control
over
straight
of
Hamuz
which
um
you
know
they
have
which
is
now
given
them
control
over
20%
of
the
world's
oil.
That's
some
newfound
power
that
they
would
like
to
keep.
Now
if
things
were
to
remain
as
they
are
today
then
Iran
would
basically
be
charging
let's
say
a
$2
million
toll
making
money
and
maybe
in
a
few
months
they
could
have
a
successful
nuclear
test.
they
could
become
a
nuclear
power
with
control
of
straight
of
Hamuz
that
would
cement
their
status
as
a
regional
hedgeimon.
So
they
do
come
into
this
uh
into
this
negotiation
with
a
lot
of
leverage.
Now
they've
lost
a
lot
of
leadership.
Their
industrial
capacity
has
been
severely
dis
degraded
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
there's
really
no
military
solution
for
the
US
and
Israel
to
retake
the
street
of
Hammoose.
It's
possible
they
could
just
nuke
the
entire
country.
It's
possible
that
they
could
send
half
a
million
troops
uh
to
retake
to
conquer
Iran,
but
those
are
I
think
unlikely
scenarios.
As
a
side
note,
I've
been
talking
about
and
worrying
about
a
potential
nuclear
attack
on
Iran.
Now,
Professor
Pap
of
the
escalation
blog
addressed
this
point
in
one
of
his
recent
talks
and
he
thinks
that
it's
he's
not
really
worried
about
a
nuclear
escalation.
His
thinking
is
that
uh
if
there
is
a
nuclear
attack
on
Iran,
the
fallout
would
be
very
difficult
to
control
in
the
sense
that
the
nuclear
fallout
could
drift
where
the
weather
blows
it
and
you
could
easily
have
a
scenario
where
the
follow
is
blown
to
say
Gulf
allies
or
maybe
even
blown
uh
towards
Israel.
So
you
could
have
a
so
it
it's
kind
of
not
in
anyone's
interest
to
have
this
nuclear
war
because
it's
going
to
hurt
everyone.
However,
I
will
also
note
that
there
are
other
nuclear
experts
like
Gerald
Chevrier
who
who
thinks
that
if
you
detonate
a
nuke
not
on
the
ground
but
in
air
the
nuclear
fallout
is
limited
and
so
that
could
be
a
way
to
uh
for
these
countries
to
deploy
nukes
without
having
to
worry
about
fallout
being
blown
back
towards
towards
their
own
countries.
So
anyway,
not
sure
how
that
will
play
out.
So
in
any
case,
there's
Bloomberg
laying
down
uh
in
this
graph
the
10
points
that
Iran
would
like
and
you
can
see
that
even
though
the
US
is
willing
to,
you
know,
maybe
negotiate
around
some
of
them,
uh
it
they're
in
stark
contrast
with
Israel,
which
is
which
is
not
willing
to
negotiate
on
very
many
of
them.
So
it's
it's
not
clear
how
these
negotiations
would
ultimately
take
place.
It's
it's
going to
be
a
very
difficult
negotiation
and
the
markets
are
already
cheering
this
as
if
it
were
a
done
deal.
We
can
see
that
the
moment
that
the
se
the
negotiations
or
the
ceasefire
were
announced
the
markets
basically
went
vertical.
It's
almost
as
if
they
were
replaying
liberation
day.
I'm
not
sure
if
that's
the
right
move
because
at
the
end
of
the
day
the
street
of
hormos
is
still
closed
and
as
we
discussed
earlier
the
damage
is
still
filtering
through
the
economic
system
slowly
but
surely.
Now,
whatever
happens
though,
this
is
definitely
going
to
remake
the
global
map.
One
thing
that
we've
learned
is
that
the
Gulf
allies,
the
Gulf
states
like
Saudi
Arabia
and
so
forth,
they
learned
that
the
US
cannot
guarantee
their
security.
And
so,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
they're
going
to
have
to
be
nicer
to
Iran
because
Iran
can
still
strike
their
production
capacity
whenever
they
want.
Um,
I
know
that
there's
some
people
who
continue
to
think
that
this
is
some
kind
of
3D
chess
game
with
China,
but
honestly,
China
looks
like
it's
going
to
be
one
of
the
winners
in
this
scenario.
China
played
a
role
in
getting
Iran
to
the
table.
And
if
you
look
at
the
US's
national
security
strategy,
it's
very
clear
that
the
US
no
longer
is
treating
China
as
like
their
great
global
rival.
Right?
So
there's
reporting
in
the
Wall
Street
Journal
that
suggests
that,
you
know,
that
the
Trump
administration
is
kind
of
getting
rid
of
lot
a
lot
of
the
hawks,
a
lot
of
China
hawks
in
the
administration
and
moving
towards
more
of
a
consiliary
tone
with
China.
Now,
if
you
know
anything
about
the
military
supply
chains
in
the
US,
you'll
notice
that
they're
heavily
dependent
upon
Chinese
components.
So
there
there
really
is
no
point
in
having
this
great
global
rivalry
with
China
when,
you
know,
you
can't
even
make
missiles
without
Chinese
help.
So,
it's
looking
like
really
the
same
strategy
that's
laid
out
in
the
national
security
document
we
talked
about
last
year
where
we're
going
to
have
a
multi-polar
world
where,
you
know,
the
US
has
their
sphere
of
influence
in
the
China
has
theirs
and
we
can
trade
with
each
other.
We
can
compete,
but
uh
it's
not
some
kind
of
great
rivalry
here.
So,
in
any
case,
it's
going
to
be
an
exciting
week.
I
have
no
idea
how
this
turns
out.
If
we
don't
have
some
kind
of
resumption
in
oil
flow
though,
I
do
believe
we
will
have
a
global
deep
global
recession,
maybe
a
depression
in
some
parts
of
the
world
and
uh
eventually
that
will
be
reflected
in
financial
markets.
All right,
so
that's
all
I
prepared
for
today.
Talk
to
you
guys
next
week.
---
### 全球秩序重塑与经济衰退风险
地缘政治冲突的持续发酵，促使 **海湾国家**（如沙特阿拉伯）认识到 **美国** 无法完全保障其安全。因此，它们将不得不采取更谨慎和灵活的外交策略，并与 **伊朗** 保持更为缓和的关系，因为伊朗仍有能力随时打击其石油生产能力。
与此同时，**中国** 在此番地缘政治格局重塑中，似乎正成为潜在的赢家之一。中国在促成伊朗与西方国家（包括美国）的谈判中发挥了作用。观察美国国家安全战略的变化，可以发现其对华姿态已从过去的“全球性竞争对手”转变为更为缓和的“伙伴”关系。这种转变部分原因在于美国军事供应链对 **中国零部件** 的严重依赖，使得在战略层面与中国展开全面对抗变得不切实际。由此，全球格局正朝着一个 **多极化世界** 的方向演进，各个大国将拥有各自的势力范围，并在竞争与合作中寻求平衡，而非陷入全面的“伟大竞争”。
展望未来，无论此次谈判结果如何，如果石油供应未能恢复正常， **全球经济** 极有可能面临一场深刻的衰退，甚至在某些地区演变为经济萧条。这种严峻的经济前景最终也将不可避免地反映在金融市场上。
Original English
Now,
whatever
happens
though,
this
is
definitely
going
to
remake
the
global
map.
One
thing
that
we've
learned
is
that
the
Gulf
allies,
the
Gulf
states
like
Saudi
Arabia
and
so
forth,
they
learned
that
the
US
cannot
guarantee
their
security.
And
so,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
they're
going
to
have
to
be
nicer
to
Iran
because
Iran
can
still
strike
their
production
capacity
whenever
they
want.
Um,
I
know
that
there's
some
people
who
continue
to
think
that
this
is
some
kind
of
3D
chess
game
with
China,
but
honestly,
China
looks
like
it's
going
to
be
one
of
the
winners
in
this
scenario.
China
played
a
role
in
getting
Iran
to
the
table.
And
if
you
look
at
the
US's
national
security
strategy,
it's
very
clear
that
the
US
no
longer
is
treating
China
as
like
their
great
global
rival.
Right?
So
there's
reporting
in
the
Wall
Street
Journal
that
suggests
that,
you
know,
that
the
Trump
administration
is
kind
of
getting
rid
of
lot
a
lot
of
the
hawks,
a
lot
of
China
hawks
in
the
administration
and
moving
towards
more
of
a
consiliary
tone
with
China.
Now,
if
you
know
anything
about
the
military
supply
chains
in
the
US,
you'll
notice
that
they're
heavily
dependent
upon
Chinese
components.
So
there
there
really
is
no
point
in
having
this
great
global
rivalry
with
China
when,
you
know,
you
can't
even
make
missiles
without
Chinese
help.
So,
it's
looking
like
really
the
same
strategy
that's
laid
out
in
the
national
security
document
we
talked
about
last
year
where
we're
going
to
have
a
multi-polar
world
where,
you
know,
the
US
has
their
sphere
of
influence
in
the
China
has
theirs
and
we
can
trade
with
each
other.
We
can
compete,
but
uh
it's
not
some
kind
of
great
rivalry
here.
So,
in
any
case,
it's
going
to
be
an
exciting
week.
I
have
no
idea
how
this
turns
out.
If
we
don't
have
some
kind
of
resumption
in
oil
flow
though,
I
do
believe
we
will
have
a
global
deep
global
recession,
maybe
a
depression
in
some
parts
of
the
world
and
uh
eventually
that
will
be
reflected
in
financial
markets.
All right,
so
that's
all
I
prepared
for
today.
Talk
to
you
guys
next
week.