--- author: 北美王路飞 date: '2026-05-08' guest: '' layout: post.njk source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSURQ51ZPIc speaker: 北美王路飞 tags: - us-iran-conflict - middle-east-geopolitics - economic-sanctions - diplomacy - regime-change title: 美伊冲突：战略僵局、制裁反噬与中东地缘政治重塑 summary: 采访**瓦利·纳斯尔教授**，深入探讨**美伊战争**的现状、战略僵局及其对中东地缘政治的深远影响。讨论了美国制裁政策对伊朗中产阶级的破坏性影响，以及伊朗国内民众对战争与政权的态度。**纳斯尔教授**指出，美国在中东的安全架构已然崩溃，导致地区力量平衡重塑，并分析了美伊冲突的可能结局及对全球去美元化的影响。 insight: '' draft: true series: '' category: geopolitics area: geopolitics project: [] people: - Vali Nasr - Donald Trump - Benjamin Netanyahu - Lyndon B. Johnson - Richard Nixon - Jimmy Carter - Henry Kissinger - Mao Zedong - Zhou Enlai - Deng Xiaoping - Vladimir Putin - Zbigniew Brzezinski - Hu Yaobang companies_orgs: - IRGC - OPEC - International Atomic Energy Agency - United Nations Security Council - NATO - GCC products_models: - JCPOA media_books: - The Dispensable Nation - Forces of Fortune status: evergreen --- ### 美伊冲突现状与战略僵局 **主持人**: 大家好，欢迎收听我的播客。今天我很荣幸邀请到**瓦利·纳斯尔教授**来我的播客。我们将讨论当前的**美国**和**伊朗**战争。教授，感谢您接受采访。
Original English **主持人**: Hi everyone. Welcome to my podcast. Today I have the honor to invite Professor **Vali Nasr** to my podcast. We're going to discuss the current **US** and **Iran** war. Professor, thank you for doing this.
**Vali Nasr**: 非常感谢，很高兴能和您在一起。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Thank you very much. It's very good to be with you.
**主持人**: 那么，您如何看待当前局势？**特朗普总统**已经宣布了大约60次**美伊战争**的胜利，但现在看来谈判陷入了僵局，目前没有任何进展。
Original English **主持人**: So, what do you think about the current situation? **President Trump** is announcing that we are having this victory over the **US-Iran war** for maybe 60 times, but now it seems like the negotiation is in a stalemate, with no progress right now.
**Vali Nasr**: 是的，我的意思是，战争本身，甚至军事方面，都陷入了僵局，外交方面也是如此。是的，总统声称取得了胜利，但他可能在轰炸**伊朗**大部分地区方面取得了一些战术胜利。但从战略上讲，**美国**的战争努力并未实现其目标。事实上，**伊朗**能够在美国和**以色列**的40天密集轰炸中幸存下来。让政权垮台、让政权在核问题上投降、在**伊朗**发生民众起义以改变政权——这些目标都没有实现。因此，**美国**在战争中并未实现战略目标。它在谈判桌上实现同样战略目标也面临困难。与此同时，**伊朗**通过关闭**霍尔木兹海峡**，并对国际能源市场和全球经济施加压力，从而创造了自己的战略优势。所以，我想说**美国**可能在某些地方赢得了一些战术性战斗，但它绝对没有赢得这场战争，并且仍然无法击垮**伊朗**的意志。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Right. The war itself, even the military side of it, is in a stalemate, and so is the diplomatic side. Yes, the President is claiming victory, but he might have had tactical victories by being able to bomb large parts of **Iran**. But strategically, the **US** war effort has not achieved its goals. **Iran** was able to survive 40 days of intense bombing by **Israel** and the **United States**. The objectives of making the regime collapse, making the regime surrender on the nuclear issue, having a popular rebellion in **Iran** to change the regime, none of these things have happened. So, **America** has not achieved the strategic goals in the war. It is having difficulty achieving the same strategic goals that it had at the negotiations table. In the meantime, **Iran** was able to create strategic advantages of its own by closing the **Strait of Hormuz** and putting pressure on the international energy markets and the global economy. So, I would say the **US** may have won a few tactical battles here and there, but it definitely has not won the war and is still unable to break **Iran**'s will.
**主持人**: 嗯。我不知道您是否关注**伊隆·马斯克**旗下的**X**（前身为Twitter）这个新闻媒体。有一些谣言说本周末**美国**和**以色列**可能会再次对**伊朗**发动军事行动。
Original English **主持人**: Mhm. I don't know if you follow **X**, formerly Twitter, owned by **Elon Musk**, which is a news outlet. There are some rumors going on that this weekend, they may be resuming military action, with both the **US** and **Israel** attacking **Iran** again.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，我不会感到惊讶，我认为**伊朗**人一直认为战争很可能发生，原因有二。首先，之前两次，他们在与**美国**谈判时，战争都爆发了，分别是在2025年6月和2026年2月。所以，他们不相信**美国**说要谈判就意味着不会有战争。其次，他们看到**美国**仍然有最高要求。它不愿意真正以达成解决方案为目的进行谈判。它要求得到所有它想要的东西。第三，我认为**伊朗**人也在关注海湾地区的军队调动。他们正在关注**美国**的兵力集结，所有这些都表明**美国**可能正在为恢复战斗做准备，**特朗普总统**可能认为新一轮的战斗最终会改变**伊朗**的立场。所以，是的，我想说这完全不令人意外，事实上，**伊朗**人正在预料到这一点。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, I wouldn't be surprised, and I think the Iranians have been operating on the assumption that war is very likely for two reasons. One is that twice before, they were negotiating with the **United States** when war started, both in June of 2025 and in February of 2026. So, they are not convinced by the idea that if the **US** says "we want to talk to you," it means there won't be war. Secondly, they see that the **US** still has maximal demands. It's not willing to truly negotiate with the aim of arriving at a solution; it's demanding everything it asks for. Thirdly, I think the Iranians are also looking at troop movements in the Gulf. They're looking at American troop buildup, and all of it points to the **US** perhaps getting ready for resuming the fighting. **President Trump** may be calculating that another round of fighting would end up changing **Iran**'s position. So, I would say that it is not at all surprising, and I think in fact, the Iranians are expecting it.
### 全面入侵伊朗的可能性与代价 **主持人**: 您认为这会像**伊拉克战争**一样，完全占领**伊朗**，然后进行真正的政权更迭，试图在**伊朗**内部建立一个民主政府吗？还是只是一种有限范围的地面行动，也许占领几个岛屿，然后控制**霍尔木兹海峡**？您认为哪种可能性更大？
Original English **主持人**: Do you think that's going to be similar to the **Iraq War**, which is going to completely occupy **Iran** and then do a real regime change to try to form a democratic government inside **Iran**? Or is it just going to be a kind of limited-scope ground operation, maybe occupy a couple of islands and then control the **Strait of Hormuz**? Which one do you think is more likely?
**Vali Nasr**: 我的意思是，我们可能在某个时候最终会陷入一场更大的战争，一场更大的地面战争，但**美国**还没有准备好在**伊朗**进行地面行动。换句话说，它至少需要一年的兵力集结。**伊朗**是一个幅员辽阔的国家，有山脉，其首都距离最近的港口大约有2000公里。所以，如果**美国**想要入侵**伊朗**，它实际上必须恢复征兵制，也就是强制兵役。然后，你知道，如果你与**伊朗**发动这样的战争，它将改变全球地缘战略格局。**美国**将重心放在亚洲、太平洋、南海以及所有这些事情上的努力都将受到损害。处理**乌克兰**战争的能力也会受到影响。所以，你知道，试图通过地面行动在**伊朗**强行改变政权是一个非常牵强的想法。然而，恢复轰炸并试图占领某些岛屿或领土很可能正在进行中。但这只会将战争升级到下一个层面。对**伊朗**发动空战可能会导致**伊朗**的报复。占领**伊朗**岛屿将再次导致**伊朗**在海湾地区，在**波斯湾**地区的升级，而且它还会让**美国**军队面临更直接的接触和伤亡的可能性。所以，这些对**特朗普总统**来说都不是简单的决定。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I mean, we may at some point in time end up in a larger war, a larger ground war, but the **United States** is not ready for a ground operation in **Iran**. In other words, it would need at least a year of troop buildup. **Iran** is such a large country with mountainous ranges, and its capital city is about 2,000 kilometers away from the closest port. So, the **United States** would literally have to bring back the draft. In other words, compulsory military service if it wants to invade **Iran**. And then, you know, if you start a war like that with **Iran**, it's going to change the global geostrategic position. The **United States**' effort to focus on Asia, to focus on the Pacific, on the South China Sea, on all of these things will be compromised. The ability to deal with the war in **Ukraine**. So, you know, going after trying to sort of forcibly change the regime from ground operation in **Iran** is a very far-fetched idea. However, resuming bombing and also trying to capture certain islands or territory may very well be in the works. But you know, that will only escalate the war to a next level. An air war against **Iran** will probably bring Iranian retaliation. Occupying Iranian islands would lead to again Iranian escalation in the Gulf, in the **Persian Gulf** region, and also it all sort of opens the **United States** troop to much more direct engagement and possibility of having casualties. So, these are not simple decisions for **President Trump**.
### 国内政治对战争决策的影响 **主持人**: 是的，我认为他的战争决定在国内政治中也不受欢迎。您看民意调查，他的支持率创历史新低，而且很多美国人，尤其是独立选民和民主党选民，绝大多数都反对这场战争。所以我认为他很难获得任何国内政治支持，除了共和党，他们支持这场战争，尽管**特朗普总统**并没有真正为此竞选。所以我的问题是，您认为这也会改变国内政策吗？因为您提到他们将强制征兵，这在独立选民和民主党选民中不会受欢迎。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah, I think also his war decision is not popular in the domestic politics. You see the poll, his polling number is hitting the all-time low, and also a lot of Americans, especially the independent and democratic voters, they're against this war in overwhelming number. So, I just think it will be very difficult for him to gain any domestic political support except for the Republican party, like there are for the war even though **President Trump** is not really campaigning on that. So, my question for you is, do you think that's going to also change the domestic policy because you mentioned like they're going to be in forced draft that's going to be not setting well among the independent voter and also Democratic voters.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，您说得对，这场战争目前不受欢迎。但它对美国人来说还不是一个首要问题。例如，能源价格，加油站的燃油价格还没有高到足以让它成为国会等方面的头号问题。但将战争升级到下一个层面很可能会做到这一点。但您知道，美国总统最终必须做出个人政治决定，关于他们是否愿意在军事冲突中妥协，或者他们是否寻求绝对胜利，以及他们是否愿意为这种绝对胜利付出代价。我的意思是，他非常清楚，目前正在发挥作用的问题之一是**特朗普总统**的自负。他发起了这场战争。他期待一场决定性的、快速的胜利，现在他仍然想要一场决定性的胜利，而且他似乎一直认为，如果他加大对**伊朗**的压力，他就能得到他想要的。这是一个非常危险的滑坡，会卷入越来越大的问题。这正是**约翰逊总统**时期**美国**在**越南**战争中升级的情况，很大程度上是因为他作为一个德克萨斯人，不会容忍**越南**人和**越共**告诉他该怎么做，认为**美国**会挺身而出，不会容忍反击。所以，你知道，我们不知道**特朗普总统**心里在想什么，但他显然被这种想法所驱动，即如果他现在妥协，就会被视为失败。无论是个人还是政治上。所以，他仍在努力寻找一种方法，在这里取得绝对的胜利。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, you're correct that the war is not popular right now. But it's not a top priority issue for Americans yet. For instance, the price of energy, the price of fuel at the fuel pump hasn't gone up high enough. That this becomes a number one issue for Congress. But taking the war to the next level may very well do that. But you know, it's also true that American presidents end of the day would have to make a personal political decision about whether they want to compromise in a military conflict or are they're looking for absolute victory and then are they willing to pay the price for that absolute victory. I mean, he's very clear that one of the issues that is at play right now is **President Trump**'s ego. He started this war. He was expecting a decisive and quick victory, and now he still wants a decisive victory, and it looks like he constantly thinks that if he were to escalate the pressure on **Iran**, he's going to get what he wants. And it's a very dangerous sort of a slippery slope of getting entangled into bigger and bigger issues. It is what happened in the **United States** under **President Johnson** when he began escalating in **Vietnam** and largely on the back of the fact that he would not as a Texan he would not tolerate being told by **Vietnamese** and the **Vietkong** what to do, that the **United States** was going to stand tall and it was not going to tolerate push back. So, you know, we don't know what's going on in **President Trump**'s mind, but he clearly is very driven by this notion that if he compromises now, it's going to be seen as defeat. Personally and as well as politically. And so, he's still trying to figure out a way that he could arrive at an absolute victory here.
### 谈判途径与信任缺失 **主持人**: 您仍然认为谈判有途径真正解决这场战争吗？我认为从**特朗普总统**的推文来看，他在1月份想要一个出路。他想要一个看起来像胜利的谈判协议，看起来比**JCPOA**更好，但**伊朗**政府似乎不想给他这个。
Original English **主持人**: Do you still think there could be a pathway for negotiation to really settle this war? I think from **President Trump**'s tweet, he in January want a way out. He want to have a negotiation deal looks like a victory. Looks like better than the **JCPOA**, but it seems like the Iranian government doesn't want to give him that.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，我认为**特朗普总统**现在正在寻求最大化的目标。我的意思是，如果双方都愿意妥协，协议总是可能的。而且他们还可以向对方表明，这份协议是可以信任的。换句话说，它实际上会被执行。我认为**特朗普总统**正在要求**伊朗**基本上接受投降。你知道，接受零浓缩，交出所有核材料，承诺在20年内不再进行任何核活动。然后甚至不清楚他承诺会给予什么作为交换。所以本质上，他并不是在说：“让我们找到一个我们双方都能接受的共同点。”他仍然要求**伊朗**基本上放弃一切。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, I think **President Trump** right now is asking for maximal goals. I mean a deal is always possible if both sides are willing to compromise. And also they can show the other side that the deal can be trusted. In other words, it will actually be implemented. And I think **President Trump** is asking **Iran** to basically accept surrender. You know, accept zero enrichment, hand over all of your nuclear material, promise not to do any more nuclear activity for a 20-year period. And then it's not even clear what is he promising in exchange. And so essentially, he's not saying, "Let's find a common ground we can both live with." He's still demanding that **Iran** basically gives everything.
**主持人**: 您认为**特朗普总统**是否描绘了**伊朗**方面的情况？他们内部存在争斗，不知道谁在做决定，而且强硬派和希望谈判的人之间显然存在分歧。您是否持有相同的观点？您认为**伊朗**方面实际上存在一些内部冲突，阻碍了这次谈判吗？
Original English **主持人**: Do you think **President Trump** was depicting the Iranian side? They have the internal fight like they don't know who is making decisions and there apparently divisions among the hardliners and the people who want to negotiate. Do you share the same viewpoint? Do you think Iranian side actually have some internal conflict that kind of inhibit this negotiation?
**Vali Nasr**: 不，我的意思是，在这个阶段，他们没有任何内部冲突需要谈判。毕竟，他们确实派了一个团队到**伊斯兰堡**与**彭斯副总统**会面。我的意思是，如果谈判桌上有一些实质性的东西，他们可以做出反应，分歧才会发生。所以，当**特朗普总统**的谈判桌上没有任何实质性的东西，并且他们都同意在**伊斯兰堡**讨论的内容是**伊朗**无法接受的时候，他们之间就没有分歧。我认为他们之间存在一些分歧，即考虑到**美国**在谈判桌上的态度，考虑到**特朗普总统**不断发布推文，声称各种事情，改变自己的立场，继续外交是否明智？他们正在争论这是否是一个陷阱，或者外交可能性是否真实？我的意思是，分歧就在这里。这并不是关于哲学问题：我们是否与**美国**对话？
Original English **Vali Nasr**: No, I mean at this stage they don't have any internal conflict to negotiate. After all, they did send a team to **Islamabad** to meet with **Vice President Vance**. I mean, divisions happen if there is something solid on the table they can react to. So, when there is nothing solid on the table from **President Trump** and they all agree that what was discussed in **Islamabad** is not acceptable to **Iran**, there is no division between them. And I think there is some division between them as to whether, given **America**'s attitude at the negotiating table, given that **President Trump** continues to put tweets out there where he claims all sorts of things, changes his position, is it wise to continue with the diplomacy or not? They are debating is this a trap or is the diplomatic possibility real? I mean that's where the differences are. It is not over the philosophical issue. Do we talk to the **United States**?
**主持人**: 谈论**美国**有什么意义？这也是我的一个问题，因为如果您看看过去两次谈判，就像您提到的，**美国**基本上两次都欺骗了**伊朗**进行谈判，他们杀害了**伊朗**的最高领导人。他们在谈判结束后立即轰炸了**伊朗**。所以在那两次事件之后，建立信任真的很难。您同意吗？
Original English **主持人**: What's the point of talking to the **United States**? That's a question I have as well because if you look at the past two negotiations as you mentioned like **US** basically tricked **Iran** into negotiation twice and they killed **Iran** supreme leaders. They bombed **Iran** immediately after the negotiation. So it's really difficult to build trust after those two incidents. Do you agree?
**Vali Nasr**: 是的。我的意思是，信任是最大的缺失。我们经常关注**伊朗**的高浓缩铀会发生什么，或者他们是否同意暂停浓缩10年、5年或15年，我们纠结于条款，但现实是，在这位总统领导下的**美国**放弃了它已经签署、**伊朗**也签署并执行的协议，然后又两次在与**伊朗**谈判时轰炸**伊朗**或对**伊朗**开战。当**伊朗**人对**特朗普总统**所说的话，以及他是否认真对待这些话，存在根本性的不信任时，即使他们达成了一项协议，即使他们达成了一项协议，明天他们也愿意签署，**特朗普总统**真的会执行这项协议吗？他会不会在一年后就放弃这项协议？所以，信任问题非常重要。在这个阶段，我认为外交需要建立信任，而信任的建立，比如说在**伊斯兰堡**会议之后，**伊朗**说你们需要在**黎巴嫩**实行停火，**特朗普总统**推动了**黎巴嫩**的停火。**伊朗**随后说，好吧，我们将解除对**霍尔木兹海峡**船只通行的限制。他们期待**特朗普总统**会说：“好吧，我将解除海军封锁。”而**特朗普总统**却说了完全相反的话，他说**伊朗**正在开放**霍尔木兹海峡**，但他将加倍海军封锁。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Yes. I mean the trust is the biggest thing lacking. We often get focused on what happens to **Iran**'s highly enriched uranium or do they agree to suspend enrichment for 10 years or 5 years or 15 years, we get bogged down on the terms, but the reality is after the **United States** under this president left the deal that it had signed, **Iran** had signed and **Iran** had implemented, and then twice more when he was negotiating with **Iran**, he bombed **Iran** or open war on **Iran**. When Iranians basically have a fundamental distrust in what **President Trump** says, whether he's serious about it, even if they arrived at a deal, even if they arrived at an agreement and tomorrow they were willing to sign it, would **President Trump** actually implement the deal? And would he not just leave the deal, let's say, a year later? And so this question of trust is pretty important. And at this stage, I think diplomacy needs trust building, and trust building would have come, let's say, after the **Islamabad** meeting, **Iran** said you need to impose ceasefire in **Lebanon**, and **President Trump** pushed for ceasefire in **Lebanon**. **Iran** then said, "Okay, we'll lift the restraints on traffic of ships on **Strait of Hormuz**." They were expecting that **President Trump** would say, "Okay, I'm going to lift the naval blockade." And **President Trump** said the exact opposite, that **Iran** is opening the **Strait of Hormuz**, but I'm doubling down on the naval blockade.
**主持人**: 是的。所以当时没有建立信任，就像现在关于双方能否解除各自海军封锁的争论，对于建立某种信任以让他们能够就核计划等更大问题达成一致，非常重要。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. So then there was no trust building like this argument about right now can the two sides lift their respective naval blockades is pretty important in creating some kind of a trust so that they can agree on the bigger issues of the nuclear program.
**Vali Nasr**: 是的。而且，如果您再算上**特朗普总统**撤销了所有**JCPOA**，我想说他们基本上欺骗了**伊朗**三次，对吧？他们已经签署了一项协议，然后又退出了协议。所以，您认为**JCPOA**与当前情况相比如何？您是否支持**JCPOA**？您对它有什么批评吗？因为很多人说：“哦，**JCPOA**是一个虚假的协议。**伊朗**人永远不会遵守。他们最终会制造核弹。”嗯，你知道，每一项协议，就像你买房子一样，你最终会达成条款，**美国**同意了条款，**伊朗**同意了条款。**伊朗**非常迅速地完全履行了协议中的义务。事实上，在2015年至2018年间，**国际原子能机构**11次表示**伊朗**履行了协议中的义务。现在，当你签署一项协议时，你不需要负责做你没有签署的事情。另一方面，**美国**实际上并没有执行协议中的这一部分。**美国**没有解除对**伊朗**的许多制裁。即使在**奥巴马总统**时期，制裁仍然存在。所以，在某种程度上，**伊朗**人也说这不是一个好协议。底线是，这是一项双方都签署的协议。这是一项国际协议。它成为了**联合国安理会**的一份文件。所以，你本可以回去，在**伊朗**核协议的基础上建立其他协议。我的意思是，那些批评**伊朗**核协议的人根本就不想要任何协议。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Yes. And also if you add up **President Trump** pull all of the **JCPOA**, I would say like they basically tricked the Iranian three times, right? Like they already signed a deal and then they pull out of the deal. So, I think what do you think about the **JCPOA** compared to the current situation? Like are you in favor of **JCPOA**? Do you have any criticism about it? Because a lot of people say, "Oh, the **JCPOA** is a fake deal. Iranian is never going to follow up on that. They're going to make a nuclear bomb in the end." Well, you know, every deal like when you buy a house, you know, you ultimately arrive at a terms and it's the **United States** agreed to terms. **Iran** agreed to terms. **Iran** fully implemented its part of the deal very quickly, and in fact 11 times between 2015 and 2018, the **International Atomic Energy Agency** said that **Iran** had fulfilled its part of the deal. Now when you sign a deal, you're not responsible for doing things that you didn't sign on to. On the other hand, the **United States** actually did not implement this part of the deal. The **United States** did not lift many sanctions on **Iran**. The sanctions remained in place even under **President Obama**. And so, in a way the Iranians also say that this was not a good deal. The bottom line was that it was a deal that both sides signed. It was an international deal. It became a document within the **United Nations Security Council**. And so you could have then gone back and built other deals on top of the **Iran nuclear deal**. I mean, people who criticized the **Iran nuclear deal** really did not want a deal at all.
**主持人**: 是的，我认为这很普遍。是的，**以色列**的立场是……
Original English **主持人**: Yeah, I think that's in general. Yeah, **Israel**'s position is...
**Vali Nasr**: 它的立场，它的盟友，**华盛顿**的许多新保守派，他们实际上反对并且仍然反对达成协议。他们基本上希望**伊朗**，也就是**伊斯兰共和国**消失，认为应该通过军事解决方案来解决，他们不希望**美国**真正处理这个问题。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Its position, its allies, many of the new conservatives in **Washington**, they actually objected and still object to deal making. They basically want **Iran** to essentially the **Islamic Republic** to disappear, that there would be a military solution to it, and they don't want the **United States** to actually deal with it.
### 制裁的反噬效应与伊朗国内民意 **主持人**: 是的。您提到了制裁，这实际上提出了一个有趣的问题，因为我的观众非常关注“极限施压”行动的实际效果。在您的著作**《财富的力量》**中，您认为中东真正的变革来自于日益融入全球经济的中产阶级的崛起。讽刺的是，多年来的**美国**制裁似乎摧毁了**伊朗**的中产阶级，同时却壮大了像**IRGC**（**伊斯兰革命卫队**）这样的强硬派，他们真正控制着地下经济。您认为**美国**的制裁政策是否通过摧毁那些能够从内部改变**伊朗**的人群而适得其反了？
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. You mentioned about the sanction actually that kind of raises interesting question because my viewer of really focus on the actual effectiveness of the maximum pressure campaign. In your book **Forces of Fortune**, you argue that the true change in the Middle East come from rising globally integrated middle class. Ironically the years of this American sanctions seem to have decimated **Iran**'s middle class while empowering the hardline fractions like the **IRGC** who really control the underground economy. Do you think has the **US** sanction policy fundamentally backfired by destroying the very demographic that can actually change Iranian from within?
**Vali Nasr**: 是的，我认为，你知道，在任何地方，**美国**所希望的，即亲西方、民主或其他形式的、融入全球经济的政府，总是与中产阶级规模的增长相关联。中产阶级需要私营部门发展。私营部门需要贸易发展。所以，如果**美国**真的想改变**伊朗**，那么2015年出现的机会是，它将利用国际贸易、**伊朗**商业和私营部门的扩张、来自国外的直接外国投资，逐步强制**伊朗**进行根本性的结构性变革。**伊朗**的中产阶级越大，随着时间的推移，它就越融入国际经济，它将逐渐从内部产生一种压力，使其朝着全球化的方向转变。但当你将一个国家排除在世界贸易之外时，它就不再是全球化的一部分。当它不是全球化的一部分，并且不像其他国家那样进行贸易时，开放经济对不同国家施加的那种力量就不存在了。它的经济，就像**伊朗**一样，变得更加贫穷。例如，在**特朗普总统**对**伊朗**实施“极限施压”制裁后的头两年，**伊朗**20%的中产阶级跌破了贫困线。或者说，**伊朗**的经济以及大多数受制裁的经济体，比如**委内瑞拉**、**俄罗斯**等，逐渐变成了“黑暗经济”。换句话说，它们转入地下。它们变成了非法经济。然后，这使得权力集中在寡头和经济网络手中，这些寡头和经济网络不再受国家管辖，也不参与法治。它们绕过法治。所以，你知道，所有这些问题都发生在**伊朗**，并且使情况恶化了。**伊朗**有更多的贫困。顶层财富更加集中。有更多的黑色经济活动。政府对经济的控制更多。我的意思是，就**伊朗**变得像全球南方许多其他融入全球经济的国家一样，所有指标都表明**伊朗**开始走向一个非常不同的方向。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Yes, I think, you know, everywhere what the **United States** wants, which is pro-Western governments, democratic or otherwise, who are integrated into the global economy, have always been associated with the growth in the size of the middle class. And the middle class needs private sector to grow. Private sector needs trade to grow. So if the **United States** really wanted to change **Iran**, the opportunity that came about 2015 was that it would use international trade, expansion of business and private sector in **Iran**, direct foreign investment from abroad to gradually force fundamental structural change in **Iran**. And the larger **Iran**'s middle class became, the more integrated over time it would become with the international economy, it would gradually create a pressure from within for shifting in the direction of globalization. But when you cut a country out of world trade, then it's not part of globalization. When it's not part of globalization and it's not trading like other countries, the kind of forces that an open economy imposes on different countries don't exist there. Its economy, as in **Iran**, becomes poorer. Like in the first two years after **President Trump** put maximum pressure sanctions on **Iran**, 20% of **Iran**'s middle class fell below the poverty rate. Or that **Iran**'s economy and most sanctioned economies like in **Venezuela**, **Russia**, gradually become dark economies. In other words, they go underground. They become illegal economies. And then that concentrates power in hands of oligarchs and economic networks that are then no longer subordinate to the state and don't participate in rule of law. They go around rule of law. And so, all of those problems have arisen in **Iran**, and it has worsened the situation. There's more poverty in **Iran**. There is more concentration of wealth at the top. There is more black economy activity. There is more government control of the economy. I mean all the indices in terms of **Iran** becoming like, let's say, like many other countries of the global south who are integrated into the global economy, **Iran** began to go in a very different direction.
**主持人**: 我认为**特朗普总统**和新保守派的策略是，他们对**伊朗**施加巨大的压力和制裁，然后学生和公民就会上街抗议，这在今年1月确实发生了，但它并没有真正推翻政权，而且你看到了对示威者的**大规模镇压**。现在，在**美国**和**以色列**直接战争的威胁下，您认为**伊朗**公众是支持现政权，还是实际上鼓励**美国**和**以色列**占领**伊朗**，然后推翻**IRGC**政权？
Original English **主持人**: I think **President Trump** and also the neocons's playbook is, they apply this massive pressure and the sanction on **Iran**, and then the student and citizens will become protesting on the street which happened this January, but it didn't really topple the regime and you have this massive crackdown on the protesters. Now you see under the threat of the direct war with the **US** and **Israel**, do you think the Iranian public support is for current regime or is for actually they're encouraging the **US** and **Israel** to occupy the **Iran** and then basically topple the **IRGC** regime.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，我认为他们两者都没有能力占领**伊朗**。所以，**以色列**对**伊朗**的策略一直是，你知道，鼓励制裁和经济压力。民众感到愤怒，并且越来越愤怒，然后你找到方法将民众武器化。在**伦敦**有一些电视台不断向**伊朗**广播。我想说它们对**伊朗**公众的影响，就像**福克斯新闻**在2016年对共和党人的影响一样，当时人们突然对那种占据主导地位的观点感到惊讶，然后最终帮助**唐纳德·特朗普**当选。有大规模的社交媒体宣传活动，针对**伊朗**，旨在将民众武器化，你知道，尤其是在现在，我们在**美国**看到了，在**欧洲**也看到了，人们只看到和阅读算法推送给他们的东西。是的，并逐渐陷入这种泡沫中，他们开始只从特定的角度看待现实，民众开始越来越受到这种宣传的驱动。当然，民众是不满的，对**伊斯兰共和国**感到愤怒，厌倦了它的政策，同时也在经济上受苦。但所有这些都被这种将民众武器化的运动所加剧，然后也许**以色列**尤其在当地也有人。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, I think neither one of them has the capability of occupying **Iran**. So, **Israel**'s strategy with **Iran** was always that, you know, encourage sanctions and economic pressure. The population is angry and getting angrier, and then you find ways to weaponize the population. There are television stations in **London** that continuously broadcast into **Iran**. I would say their effect on the Iranian public is like the effect of **Fox News** TV was on Republicans in 2016, for instance, when people were all of a sudden surprised by the kind of views that took over and then eventually helped **Donald Trump** to be elected. There are widescale social media campaigns that are directed at **Iran** on weaponizing the population, and you know, particularly nowadays, and we saw it in the **US**, we see it in **Europe** where people only see and read what the algorithms push to them. Yes, and gradually basically are in this kind of a bubble where they begin to see reality only from a particular point of view, that the population began to become more and more driven by this propaganda that was being driven on it. Of course, the population was unhappy, was angry at the **Islamic Republic**, is tired of its policies, is at the same time suffering economically. But all of this was sort of sharpened by this weaponization of the population campaign, and then perhaps **Israel** in particular had also people on the ground.
**主持人**: 是的，阿萨德，对吗？是的。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. Assad, right? Yeah.
**Vali Nasr**: 是的。他们的工作是，你知道，将经济抗议引向更政治化、反政权甚至有时是暴力的方向。现在**伊朗**的抗议和公众对**伊斯兰共和国**的愤怒是真实的。但我认为**以色列**将其视为派遣军队进入该国的替代方案，对吗？你可以让一个国家，基本上让一个政府与自己的人民开战，而人民基本上会充当外国军队的地面部队。所以当**特朗普总统**和**内塔尼亚胡总理**会说：“我们将摧毁**伊朗**所有的压迫工具，**革命卫队**、**巴斯基民兵**等，为民众起义打开大门。”这几乎就像他们认为这是替代他们在**伊拉克**发动战争的方式。你不能派地面部队，但你可以从空中轰炸，然后你可以施加经济压力，然后你可以基本上对民众发动信息战。所有这些都会造成政府垮台的局面，然后你基本上可以在没有实际入侵的情况下实现政权更迭。所以基本上从您的描述来看，他们想要的是**叙利亚**或**利比亚**那样的局面，对吗？有很多代理人战争正在进行。**伊朗**只是变成了一个真正功能失调的国家，中央政府基本上瘫痪了，而且网络中正在发生内战。我认为这可能更符合**以色列**的喜好，而不是**美国**的喜好，因为对**美国**来说，一开始总有一种感觉，即**伊朗**成为一个失败国家将对该地区，特别是对**海湾国家**造成灾难性的影响。而对于**以色列**来说，**伊朗**不与其接壤。这是别人的问题。如果**伊朗**是一个失败国家，那不是他们的问题。而且我也认为**以色列**从未受到**叙利亚**成为失败国家的威胁。当**叙利亚**是一个真正的国家时，它受到的威胁比当**叙利亚**是一个失败国家时更大。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Right. Whose job was to, you know, direct economic protest in the direction of being much more political, anti-regime and even sometimes violent. Now the protest in **Iran** and the anger of the public towards the **Islamic Republic** is real. But I think **Israel** saw in this as an alternative to sending troops into the country, right? That you could make a country basically go to war, a government go to war with its own population, and the population basically would serve as the boots on the ground for the foreign forces. So when **President Trump** and **Prime Minister Netanyahu** would say, "We're going to destroy all the instruments of oppression in **Iran**, **Revolutionary Guards**, the **Basij force**, to open the door for a popular uprising." It's almost like they think that this is a substitute to the way they wage the war in **Iraq**, that you can't put troops on the ground, but you can bomb from the air and then you can put economic pressure and then you could basically wage information warfare on the population. All of which then creates a situation where the government collapses and then you basically achieve regime change without an actual invasion. So basically from your description what they want is really a **Syria** or **Libya** situation, right? You have a lot of proxy war going on. **Iran** just become a really nonfunctional state and the central government is basically paralyzed and you have all the civil war happening in cyber. I think that probably is more to **Israel**'s liking than it was to the **United States** because for the **United States** there was always a sense at the beginning that a failed state in **Iran** would be catastrophic for the region and particularly for the **Gulf countries**. Whereas for **Israel**, **Iran** doesn't border on it. It's somebody else's problem. It's not their problem if **Iran** is a failed state. And I also think that **Israel** was never threatened by **Syria** being a failed state. It was more threatened when **Syria** was an actual state than when **Syria** was a failed state.
### 伊朗的生存能力与去美元化趋势 **主持人**: 是的。所以现在**美国**正在对**霍尔木兹海峡**进行封锁，您认为在当前的封锁情况下，**伊朗**是如何设法生存下来的？我还看到一些说法称，由于封锁，**伊朗**不得不停止石油开采。储存区域已经用尽，他们的国库账户正在枯竭，可能在两个月内他们就没有外汇储备了。您认为在当前的封锁情况下，**IRGC**如何生存下来？因为您已经面临恶性通货膨胀了。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. So right now, **US** is doing this blockade of the **Strait of Hormuz**, and how do you think is **Iran** managed to survive given this current blockade situation? And also, I saw there's some saying that the Iranian has to stop pumping oil because of the blockade. The storage area is already used up, and their treasury account is kind of depleting, maybe in two months they don't have any foreign currency reserves. How do you think the **IRGC** can survive this given the current blockade situation because you already have the hyperinflation going on?
**Vali Nasr**: 是的，我的意思是，**伊朗**确实面临巨大的经济压力，但关于“临界点”在哪里以及“临界点”如何到来，这些计算都高度主观。我的意思是，首先，没有确切的信息表明**伊朗**有多少储存空间，你知道，它能关闭多少油井并在以后重新开放。但同时，人口的“临界点”在哪里？我的意思是，你可以从经济上估计各种短缺、可用性、供需等，但你无法计算一个民族的忍受意愿。在它采取政治行动之前。这不是经济理论可以预测的。换句话说，我们可以预测**美国**的汽油价格可以达到每桶6美元。我们无法预测的是这是否会真正影响中期选举。是的，我们可以假设，但我们无法确定。其次，我想说，**伊朗**在新冠疫情期间实际上也面临着非常相似的情况。我的意思是，**伊朗**今天的出口率与新冠疫情下的一年相似，而**伊朗**在那一年几乎没有贸易的情况下幸存了下来。**伊朗**的进出口率与那个时期非常相似。所以，我想说**伊朗**可能能够吸收这种经济冲击几个月，而不是几周。然后，与此同时，这正在成为**美国**的一场耐力考验，一场意志考验。在这种情况下，这不是关于枪支的问题，所以全球经济是否更容易受到海湾地区关闭所造成的经济压力的影响，还是**伊朗**？是的，你知道，这对亚洲、非洲、欧洲的影响相当显著。现在的问题是，它们中哪一个更愿意忍受这种状况？所以，**伊朗**的计算是他们可以比**美国**坚持更久。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Yeah, I mean there is definitely enormous economic pressure on **Iran**, but the calculations of where the break point is and how the break point comes is highly subjective. I mean first of all there is no firm information about how much storage space **Iran** has, you know, how much of its wells can it shut down and reopen later. But also, where is the break point for the population? I mean you could economically estimate various shortages, availability, supply, demand, but you cannot calculate what is a population's willingness to suffer? Before it does something politically. That is not something that economic theory can predict. But in other words, we could predict that oil in the gas prices in the **United States** can go to $6 a barrel. What we cannot predict is whether that would actually impact the midterm elections. Yeah, we can assume, but we cannot tell. Secondly, I would say that **Iran** actually faced a very similar situation during COVID. I mean rate of **Iran**'s exports today is similar to that one year under COVID, and **Iran** survived that one year of almost no trade. The rate of exports and imports in **Iran** are very similar to that time period. So, I would say **Iran**'s probably capable of absorbing this kind of economic shock for a matter of months, not weeks. Then at the same time, this is becoming with the **United States** a test of endurance, a test of wills. It's not about guns in this case. So, is the global economy more susceptible to the kind of economic pressure that the closure of the Gulf is creating or is **Iran**? Right. You know, the impact of this on Asia, on Africa, on Europe is quite significant. Now the question is which one of them is willing to put up with this more? So, it's **Iran**'s calculation is they can outlast the **United States**.
**主持人**: 所以我实际上看到了当前的情况，我在思考您认为这场战争对普通**伊朗**人民的支持有何影响？因为我听到不同的播客主持人采访了不同视角的**伊朗**人。他们中的一些人认为，早些时候，比如1月份的抗议活动，那些血腥镇压已经使现政府失去合法性，对吗？它失去了民众的合法性。但另一些人认为，这场战争实际上产生了“**国旗效应**”，使民族主义成为首要任务。很多**伊朗**人民会支持现政府与**美国**和**以色列**作战。您认为哪种情况更有可能发生？
Original English **主持人**: So I actually look at the current situation and I'm thinking about what do you think about this war impact on the support from the normal Iranian people because I heard a different podcaster like interviewing Iranian from different perspectives. Some of them think that the earlier year like January protest, those bloody crackdown already make the current government illegitimate, right? Like it lose the legitimacy among the population. But others think this war actually have a really around the flag effect like making the nationalism become the top priority. A lot of Iranian people will support the current government to really fight **US** and **Israel**. Which do you think is more likely to happen?
**Vali Nasr**: 我认为两者都是真的，但我认为，尽管**伊朗**人对1月份的事件感到愤怒，但我认为他们今天面临的现实是对他们国家的战争，而且这场战争越来越不是针对政权，而是针对国家。所以，当轰炸目标是大学、医院、基础设施时，你知道，民众不再认为这是关于**伊斯兰共和国**的。他们认为这是针对国家的战争。所以，我认为**伊朗**公众对政权、对战争、对局势的看法现在要复杂得多。它不是非黑即白的。它不是非此即彼。它可能是，是的，政权在1月份失去了合法性，但你知道，它是保卫这个国家的力量，而那些对1月份事件负责的**革命卫队**，正是那些为**伊朗**而战、保卫**伊朗**而献出生命的人。所以，就像任何民族一样，这变得复杂得多，没那么简单。其次，你必须考虑到这是一场足够大的战争，正在塑造**伊朗**公众，并正在塑造**伊朗**政府的未来。所以，我认为我们必须看看这场战争如何结束，我不认为过去是预测未来的一个很好的指标。有一点是肯定的，那就是**伊朗**公众没有起来反抗。没有公开示威。我们公开看到的**伊朗**人最重要的示威是他们每晚走上街头抗议战争。现在，这些抗议活动通常是由政府组织的，但很多**伊朗**人无论如何都会去。没有工作的妇女，声称自己反政权的人，但他们说他们想与其他抗议战争的**伊朗**人站在一起。**伊朗**人进行公开抗议的另一种方式是，当**特朗普总统**威胁要摧毁**伊朗**所有发电厂时。**伊朗**人民自己，他们带着他们的孩子、妻子、父亲、母亲，他们组成了人链来保护这些设施。所以，你知道，你看到的是**伊朗**没有反政府示威。你看到的是**伊朗**的反战示威。现在，这并不意味着未来反政府示威不会卷土重来，但在这个时候，你知道，1月份的事件并没有定义**伊朗**当前的政治。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I think both are true, but I think as angry as the Iranians are about January, I think the reality they are facing today is a war on their country, and the war has become increasingly not a war on the regime but a war on the country. So, when you know the bombings target universities, hospitals, infrastructure, you know, the population no longer thinks this is about the **Islamic Republic**. They believe it's the war on the country. And so, I think the Iranians public opinion about the regime, about the war, about the situation is now much more complicated. It's not black and white. It's not either or. It could be like yes, the regime lost its legitimacy in January, but then, you know, it is the force that's defending this country, and the same **Revolutionary Guards** who are responsible for what happened in January are the ones who have actually put their lives on the line fighting for **Iran** and defending it. And so, like any population, this becomes much more complicated, it's not that simple. Secondly, you have to think that this is a large enough a war that is shaping the Iranian public and is shaping the Iranian government going forward. And so, I think we have to see how this war ends, and I don't think the past is a very good predictor of the future. One thing is for sure, and that is that the Iranian public have not risen up. There is no public demonstration. The most important demonstrations we see publicly by Iranians are when every night they go in the streets to protest the war. Now, these protests are often organized by the government, but a lot of Iranians go anyways. Women without a job, people who claim they are anti-regime, but they say they want to stand with the other Iranians protesting the war. The other way in which the Iranians did public protest is when **President Trump** threatened that he was going to destroy all of **Iran**'s power plants. Iranian people themselves, they took their children, wives, fathers, mothers, they created human chains to protect these facilities. So, you know, you look and say you don't see anti-government demonstrations in **Iran**. What you see is anti-war demonstrations in **Iran**. Now, that doesn't mean that in the future anti-government demonstrations will not come back, but at this point in time, you know, January is not defining Iranian politics at this moment.
**主持人**: **伊朗**政治。
Original English **主持人**: Iranian politics.
### 美国战略收缩的代价与中东力量平衡 **Vali Nasr**: 没错。所以在您的著作**《不可或缺的国家》**中，您实际上警告了**美国**从中东战略撤退的沉重代价。你知道，一些分析人士，比如**兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基**，历史上曾警告过**中国**、**俄罗斯**、**伊朗**联盟。回顾过去，**美国**的战略收缩是否真的为这种完美的敌对联盟铺平了道路？您认为**美国**目前是否真的在为其过去的撤退付出代价？
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Exactly. So in your book, **The Dispensable Nation**, you actually warned about the heavy prize of American strategic retreat from the Middle East. You know, some analysts like **Zbigniew Brzezinski** historically warned a **China**, **Russia**, **Iran** alliance. Looking back, did American strategic contraction actually pave the way for this perfect adversarial coalition? And do you think is American currently really paying a price for its past retreat?
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，是的。我的意思是，过去的撤退有不同的代价和不同的影响。但是当前的战争实际上非常不同，因为这是一个看起来**美国**正在重返中东的时刻。但是**美国**也处理了一个它未能解决的问题，对吗？它决心摧毁一个它认为弱小的国家。它认为这将是一场几周的战争，但现在已经证明它无法轻易击败**伊朗**。它摧毁了**海湾国家**的经济。它证明它无法在军事上保卫它们。**美国**在该地区的所有基地都受到了严重破坏。所以，在全球范围内，**美国**基本上降低了自身的国际地位。所以，**美国**，我的意思是，总统已经取消了一次**中国**之行。他是否会在5月21日前往，这是一个悬而未决的问题。如果他去了，会在什么情况下？但毫无疑问，世界在**伊朗**战争之前对**美国**和**中国**之间力量平衡的看法，现在已经非常非常不同了。**美国**现在是一个受伤的巨人，而且它不是被另一个超级大国所伤，而是被一个中等强国所伤。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, yes. I mean, the past retreat had a different kind of a price to it and different implications. But the current war is actually very different because this is a moment where it looks like **America**'s coming back to the Middle East. But **America** also tackled an issue where it has come up short, right? It sets itself to destroy a country that it thought was weak. He thought it would be a few weeks war, and now it has proven that it is not capable of defeating **Iran**. Not easily. It has destroyed the economies of the **Gulf countries**. It proved that it cannot defend them militarily. All of **America**'s bases in the region have been heavily damaged. And so globally, the **United States** has basically reduced its own international stature. So as the **United States**, I mean, the president has already cancelled his trip to **China** once. It's open to question whether he will go on May 21st. And if he does, under what circumstances? But definitely the way in which the world thought the balance of power between **United States** and **China** was shaping up before the **Iran** war is now very, very different. **America** is now a wounded giant, and it's not wounded by another superpower. It's wounded by a middle-level power.
**主持人**: 您认为，就像您提到的，**美国**在中东的许多基地，特别是那些**海湾国家**的基地，受到了严重破坏。我看到《**纽约时报**》发表了一篇新文章，而且**美国**在危急情况下也没有表现出真正保卫这些基地的意愿。**美国**实际上将所有资源都用于保卫**以色列**。您认为这是否实质性地表明**美国**已经失去了在中东的主导地位，所有传统的**美国**盟友，比如**沙特阿拉伯**和其他**海湾国家**，都在积极寻找新的保护者？
Original English **主持人**: Do you think like given like you mentioned a lot of **US** bases in the Middle East particularly those **Gulf countries** got really severely damaged. I saw there's a new article come out from the **New York Times** and also **US** hasn't show any willingness to really defend it when it's in a dire situation **US** actually pull all it resource to defend **Israel** and do you think this actually substantially show **US** has lost the dominance in the Middle East and all the traditional **US** allies like **Saudi Arabia** and other **Gulf countries** are actively seeking new protectors.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，是的。我的意思是，这里有两件事。第一是，**美国**，你知道，四十多年来一直存在这样一种假设，即**美国**为**海湾国家**提供安全保护伞，就像它在**北约**下对欧洲人所做的那样，或者它现在想在亚洲通过**四方安全对话**等方式实现。尽管有时它并没有真正实现，比如2020年**伊朗**袭击**沙特**油田时，**美国**没有出面，但现在非常清楚，这个长达四十年的**美国**战略保护伞已经崩溃了，因为**美国**建立所有这些基地是为了保卫**海湾国家**对抗**伊朗**，而所有这些基地都受到了严重破坏，它未能保护它们免受**伊朗**的攻击。现在，不仅是石油设施等遭到打击，这些是可以修复的，但对海湾经济根本性的损害是无法轻易逆转的。换句话说，所有那些公司、数据中心、科技公司、银行、那些搬到海湾地区，认为海湾地区绝对没有风险且安全的人，现在已经意识到它并非没有风险且安全。所以他们想把钱撤走。他们不希望他们的人在那里。如果他们认为战争正在重演，他们就不想投资。所以，海湾地区围绕服务业、科技产业、旅游业、贸易、欧洲人、亚洲人、老年人搬到这些国家，建立后石油经济的整个图景都消失了。所以，**美国**发起了战争，却无法迅速赢得战争，也无法保护该地区免受战争后果的影响。所以，实际上是**美国**听从**以色列**的建议，成为了中东地区更大的威胁，而不是**伊朗**的威胁。现在，是的，目前这种言论还没有跟上这个现实。我的意思是，阿拉伯政府对**伊朗**非常愤怒。他们很生气。但当尘埃落定后，**伊朗**对他们来说一直是一个敌人。这一点没有改变，好吧，现在它更危险了。问题是他们有一个关于如何用**美国**来保卫自己的理论，而这个理论已经崩溃了。我认为，尽管所有人都说我们将加倍与**美国**的关系，我们将重建基地等等，但实际上，在更深层次上，对旧的遏制战略的价值存在很大的疑问。我认为**美国**基地现在变成了一个累赘，因为**美国**可以再次攻击**伊朗**，然后这些基地将成为明显的目标。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, yes. I mean, there are two things here. One is that the **United States**, you know, for over four decades there has been this assumption that the **United States** is providing a security umbrella to the **Gulf countries** much like it does to Europeans under **NATO**, for instance, or it now wants to do in Asia under the **Quad** and all of that. And even though there are times when it didn't really come through like when in 2020 **Iran** attacked **Saudi** oil fields, the **United States** didn't come through, but now it is very clear that this four-decade-long American strategic umbrella has collapsed because the **United States** created all of these bases to defend the **Gulf countries** against **Iran**, and all of those bases are heavily damaged, and he was not able to protect them against **Iran**. Now not only say oil facilities being hit, which you can repair, but the damage to the fundamental Gulf economy is not easily reversible. In other words, all those companies, data centers, technology companies, banks, people who were moving to the Gulf believing that the Gulf is absolutely risk-free and secure now have realized that it is not risk-free and secure. So, they want to take their money out. They don't want their people there. They don't want to invest if they think war is returning. So, the entire picture for the Gulf of creating a post-oil economy around services industry and technology industry and tourism, trade, Europeans, Asians, the old people moving to those countries, that's all gone. And so, the **United States** started the war and was not able to either win the war quickly or to protect the region from the consequences of the war. So, it's actually **United States** following **Israel**'s advice became the bigger threat to the Middle East than the Iranian threat was. Now, so yeah, the currently the rhetoric has not caught up with this reality. I mean the Arab governments are furious at **Iran**. They're angry. But when the dust settles, **Iran** was always an enemy to them. That hasn't changed, and okay, it's now more dangerous. The problem is that they had a theory about how they would defend themselves with the **United States**, and that theory has collapsed. And I think despite all the talk that we will double down on our relations with the **US**, we will rebuild the bases. In reality, at a deeper level, there is a great deal of doubt about the value of the same old containment strategy. I think the **US** base become a liability now because **US** could attack **Iran** again and then those base will become obvious target.
**Vali Nasr**: 没错。所以，在某种程度上，我们不知道未来会走向哪个方向，但我们有很多关于我们将回到海湾地区以前状态的讨论，但我不敢肯定会是这样。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Exactly. And so, in a way we don't know which direction the future would go, but so we have a lot of talk about we're just going to go back to where we were in the Gulf, but I'm not sure that's going to be the case.
**主持人**: 是的。如果当前的战争和对**伊朗**的严厉制裁持续下去，您是否预见到这会加速能源贸易中长期全球**去美元化**的趋势？因为**伊朗**已经在使用一些**人民币**或加密货币进行石油交易。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. If the current wars and heavy sanctions against **Iran** persist, do you foresee this accelerating a long-term global trend of **ddollarization** in the energy trade because **Iran** is already using some Chinese **RMB** or crypto to trade oils.
**Vali Nasr**: 我的意思是，在一段时间内，一直存在**去美元化**的动机。我的意思是，即使像**中国**、**俄罗斯**、其他全球南方国家看到**伊朗**、**委内瑞拉**等国，看到**美国**如何利用美元作为通过制裁推动各国，并对它们施加非常严格的压力以迫使它们做事的工具。你会说它们有寻找替代方案的动机。我认为这种动机已经增强，但目前还没有真正可用的替代方案。你知道，没有其他货币可以取代美元，因为没有其他货币像美元那样可用、流动性强且易于交易。是的。**伊朗**可以购买或出售石油以**人民币**计价，但超过某个点，它仍然需要美元。而且，如果每个国家都想做**伊朗**同样的事情，**人民币**也并非那么容易获得。换句话说，**伊朗**不容易把**人民币**给**刚果**，然后**刚果**把**人民币**给**巴西**，然后**巴西**把**人民币**给**哥伦比亚**。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I mean for some period in time there's been incentive to **ddollarize**. I mean even if countries like **China**, **Russia**, other global south countries looked at **Iran**, **Venezuela**, and saw how the **United States** uses the dollar as a way of pushing countries through sanctions and putting them under very strict pressure to get them to do things. You would say they would have had an incentive to find an alternative. I think that incentive has grown, but there is not as yet a real availability of an alternative. You know, there's no other currency that can take over because there's no other currency that is as available and as liquid and as readily transactionable. Right. Yes. **Iran** can buy sell its oil for **Renminbi**, but beyond the point it still needs dollars. Yes. And also the **Renminbi** is not as available for if every country wanted to do the same thing as **Iran**. Right. Yes. In other words, it's not easy for **Iran** to give **Renminbi** to **Congo** and then **Congo** give **Renminbi** to **Brazil** and then **Brazil** give the **Renminbi** to **Colombia**.
**主持人**: 是的。基础设施还没有准备好。是的。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. The infrastructure is not ready yet. Yeah.
**Vali Nasr**: 没错。基础设施和可用性等都不存在。所以，是的，每个人都渴望替代方案，但没有真正的替代方案。而加密货币提供了一些单一交易选项，但不是一个系统性选项。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Right. The infrastructure and the availability is not there. And so yes, everybody is desirous of an alternative, but there is no real alternative. And cryptocurrency provides some single transaction options but not a systemic option.
### 中东地缘政治的重塑 **主持人**: 那么，您认为这场**伊朗**和**美国**的战争将如何重塑中东的地缘政治？因为您看到**阿联酋**刚刚退出了**欧佩克**，他们需要**美国**的互换额度。很多**海湾国家**过去非常富有，拥有大量的盈余，但现在由于当前的封锁，他们似乎陷入了经济危机。
Original English **主持人**: So how do you think this **Iran** and **US** war will reshape the geopolitics in the Middle East because you see **UAE** just left the **OPEC** and they need a swap line from **US**. A lot of those **Gulf country** they used to be really rich with all the surplus but now this seems are running into the economic crisis because of this current blockade.
**Vali Nasr**: 我认为中东的一切都改变了。换句话说，中东以前是在这样一种假设下运作的，即大部分地区都处于某种**美国**安全架构之下。这种安全架构已经崩溃了，所以不同的国家将对此做出不同的反应。有些国家将试图扩大其影响力范围。**伊朗**是一个，**以色列**是一个，**土耳其**是一个。还有一些国家认为，随着**美国**存在的减少和**美国**无法维护其战略意志，它们将失去阵地，大多数**海湾国家**都是如此。所以，各国将寻找替代方案。替代方案还不是很明确。我们可能会有更多的冲突。我的意思是，**阿联酋**退出**欧佩克**，现在对**沙特阿拉伯**构成威胁，最终可能导致这两个国家之间的冲突。没错。我的意思是，然后，你知道，这实际上可能会给**沙特阿拉伯**和**伊朗**一个合作的理由。在许多方面，你可以说**海湾合作委员会**（**GCC**）已经结束了。一群石油资源丰富、都在**波斯湾**地区、对**伊朗**有共同利益的国家，这种局面已经不复存在了。**海湾合作委员会**现在更像是一个地址，就像说东南亚一样。但它在战略上并没有真正意义。我的意思是，**阿曼**和**阿联酋**的立场截然不同。**阿联酋**与**沙特**的冲突现在正在加剧，也许对**沙特阿拉伯**来说，它可能会超越**伊朗**的威胁，因为**伊朗**对**沙特阿拉伯**的威胁是真实的，但**阿联酋**实际上正在针对**沙特阿拉伯**的根本命脉，也就是石油收入。或者说，**阿联酋**可能会更大程度地邀请**以色列**进入海湾地区，这不会受到**伊朗**甚至其他一些**海湾合作委员会**国家的欢迎。所以，局势变得越来越复杂，将会有新的冲突需要解决。有一些旧的冲突将不得不以不同的方式解决。该地区内部本身就有可能发生更多战争，所以我们将在找到替代这场战争之前存在的秩序之前，经历一段困难时期。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I think everything about the Middle East has changed. In other words, the Middle East operated under the assumption that most of it was under some kind of an American security architecture. That security architecture has collapsed, and so different countries are going to react to that differently. There are countries that are going to try to expand their zone of influence. **Iran** is one, **Israel** is one, **Turkey** is one. There are those that feel that with lesser American presence and **America**'s inability to assert its strategic will, that they are going to lose ground, and it's true of most of the **Gulf countries**. So countries are going to be looking for an alternative. The alternative is not very clear. We may have more conflicts. I mean the **UAE** leaving **OPEC** and now becoming a threat to **Saudi Arabia** may eventually lead a conflict between those two countries. Correct. I mean and then, you know, it actually may give **Saudi Arabia** and **Iran** a reason to collaborate and cooperate. In many ways you could say the **GCC** is over. The fact that there's a group of countries all oil rich, all in the **Persian Gulf**, who have a common interest against **Iran** is no longer there. **GCC** is now more like an address like saying Southeast Asia. But it doesn't really strategically mean anything. I mean the positions of **Oman** and **UAE** are diametrically apart. The **UAE-Saudi** conflict is now intensifying, and maybe for **Saudi Arabia** it may overshadow the Iranian threat because the level of Iranian threat to **Saudi Arabia** is real, but **UAE** is actually going after **Saudi Arabia**'s fundamental bread and butter, which is oil revenue. Or that **UAE** may invite **Israel** to a greater extent into the Gulf, which will not be welcomed by **Iran** or by even some other **GCC** countries. And so the picture is becoming more and more complicated, and there will be new conflicts that need to be settled. There are old conflicts that will have to be settled in a different way. There is possibility of more wars within the region itself, and so we're going to go through a period of difficulty before a substitute can be found to the order that existed before this war.
### 战略窗口与美国决策过程 **主持人**: 嗯。所以**美国**流传着一种说法，你知道，如果**美国**和**以色列**现在不打击**伊朗**，他们将永远没有机会了。您认为这种“**关闭的窗口**”论点具有任何战略逻辑，还是仅仅是**以色列**政府的纯粹宣传？
Original English **主持人**: Mhm. So there's a narrative circulating in **US**, you know, this is a best chance if **US** and **Israel** don't strike **Iran** now they will never have a chance again. Do you think this closing window argument hold any strategic logic or just pure propaganda from the **Israel** government?
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，他们做了两次。我认为他们相信这一点。他们做了两次，但都失败了。在6月，他们认为如果他们杀死大约30名**革命卫队**指挥官，试图杀死其领导人，鼓励民众起义，他们就可以推翻**伊斯兰共和国**。他们只需要**美国**在2025年6月轰炸**伊朗**的核设施，因为**美国**拥有最强大的炸弹，可以穿透坚固的掩体。但**伊朗**没有倒下。然后在2月，**以色列**决定它实际上从一开始就需要**美国**。而他们两者共同，如果你愿意，中东最强大的两支空军和进攻性武器以及进攻能力，与**伊朗**开战，他们又失败了。所以，这个窗口也许从未存在过。这个窗口也许是虚构的，这种认为**伊朗**如此虚弱以至于即将崩溃，而所需要做的就是开战的想法。你可以讽刺地说，**以色列**一直都知道这一点，但利用这个论点来让**美国**支持战争。或者你可能会说，**以色列**也犯了和美国人一样的错误，过度解读了**伊朗**的弱点。但我认为那个窗口已经关闭了。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, they did it twice. I think they believed in it. They did it twice and they failed. In June, they thought that they could bring down the **Islamic Republic** if they killed some 30 **Revolutionary Guard** commanders, tried to kill its leaders, encourage the population to rise up. They only needed the **United States** in June 2025 to bomb **Iran**'s nuclear facilities because the **US** has the most powerful bombs that can penetrate hard bunkers. But **Iran** didn't fall. And then in February, **Israel** decided that it actually needs the **United States** from the very beginning. And the two of them jointly, the two most powerful, if you want, air forces and offensive weapons in the offensive capabilities in the Middle East went to war with **Iran** and they failed again. And so the window perhaps was never there. The window was perhaps imaginary that this notion that **Iran** was so weak that it was about to fall and all he needed to do is to go to war. You could say cynically that **Israel** always knew this but used this argument to get the **United States** to support war. Or you might say that **Israel** also made the mistake just like the Americans of overreading into **Iran**'s weakness. But I think that window is already closed.
**主持人**: 也许那个窗口从未存在过，就像您的描述一样。
Original English **主持人**: Maybe that window never maybe that window never exist like just from your description.
**Vali Nasr**: 没错。没错。那个窗口从未存在过。现在，**美国**拥有完全摧毁许多国家的军事能力，但它是有代价的。它要付出战后重建或派兵驻扎等代价。所以，**美国**和**以色列**所签订的战争协议是，你可以从空中推翻**伊斯兰共和国**。但这并没有发生。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: That's right. That's right. That window never existed. Now, **United States** has the military capability to destroy many countries completely, but it comes at a cost. It comes at a cost of owning the day after or having to put troops on the ground. So, the war that the **United States** and **Israel** signed up to was that you could topple the **Islamic Republic** from the air. And it hasn't happened.
**主持人**: 我的许多观众对**美国**的决策过程感到困惑，因为你知道，**美国**拥有像您这样杰出的外交人才，以及其他真正经验丰富的外交官和战略思想家，然而政府中的许多决策，比如谈判期间的暗杀，或者看起来非常反复无常，考虑不周。您曾在最高层任职。您如何看待理性分析在提交给总统之前被国内政治扭曲的情况？或者您认为**以色列游说团**对本届政府的影响如此之大，以至于所有传统的战略思想家都被边缘化了？他们的声音实际上没有被总统听到。
Original English **主持人**: So many of my viewer actually puzzled by the **US** decision making process right because you know **US** has a brilliant diplomat minds like yourself and other like really experienced diplomat and strategic thinkers yet many decisions in this government like assassination during negotiation or appears very erratic and not well thought through. So you have served at the highest level. How do you see the rational analysis getting distorted by the domestic politics before it's reaching the president? Or do you think the **Israel lobby** just has such a impact on the current administration that all the conventional strategic mind they got kicked sidelines? They they actually their voice not really get heard by the president.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，我认为我们正在处理一个非常特殊的**美国**政府，从某种意义上说，**特朗普总统**并不真正依赖**美国**政府的机构和能力来分析情报和提供建议，而且决策过程也并未真正让各种机构和这些机构中的专家参与进来，比如国务院、五角大楼、中情局等。这是一个高度集中在他本人和围绕在他身边的一群人身上的决策过程，这些人也脱离了**美国**机构。像**史蒂文·维特科夫**、**贾里德·库什纳**这样的人，你知道，他身边有很多亿万富翁。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, I think also we're dealing with a very peculiar American administration, in the sense that **President Trump** does not really rely on the institutions and the capabilities of the **US** government to analyze intelligence and provide advice, and that the decision making also really does not engage the various institutions and the experts in those institutions, State Department, Pentagon, CIA. It's a decision process that is highly centralized in him as himself and the group of people around him who are also detached and divorced from American institutions. People like **Steven Witkov**, **Jared Kushner**, you know, a lot of the billionaires that are around him.
**主持人**: 我不认为那些人有资格做这份工作。
Original English **主持人**: I don't really think those people are qualified to do the job.
**Vali Nasr**: 他们没有资格，但他们也不寻求专家的意见。所以，即使是那些担任内阁职位的部长们，他们也更专注于整天待在白宫总统身边，而不是待在自己的机构里。我的意思是，我们有一位国务卿，他几乎从不在自己的部门。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: They're not qualified, but also they don't try to reach out to experts. So even those people who are secretaries like they run cabinet positions in the **US** administration are more focused on being next to the president at the White House all day than being in their own agencies. I mean we have a secretary of state that is never at his ministry roughly.
**主持人**: 是的。是的，国家安全顾问。所以，在某种程度上，你知道，你有一个高度个性化的决策，非常集中于总统从任何来源获得的信息，这些信息通常不是来自政府内部自下而上的，而是来自他的朝臣和那些能够接触到他的人。所以它不像其他政府。
Original English **主持人**: Yes. Yes, national security advisor or so in a way, you know, you have a highly personalized decision making that is very centered on whatever information the president gets from whatever source which is usually not coming from bottom up within the administration, is coming from his courtiers and the kinds of people who have access to him, and so it is not like other administrations.
**主持人**: 我不知道您是否读过《**纽约时报**》描述决策过程的文章。他们非常详细地描述了**特朗普总统**和**以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡**以及所有其他高级内阁成员开会时发生的事情。我认为从我的角度来看，中情局局长和**马可·卢比奥**都完全了解当前的决定，以及它可能导致什么，它可能导致当前的混乱，但他们没有冒着政治资本的风险去阻止总统。
Original English **主持人**: I don't know if you read the article coming out of the **New York Times** like describing the decision process. They have very detailed description about what happened during the meeting **President Trump** and the **Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu** and all the other top cabinet members. I think from my perspective the CIA head and also **Marco Rubio** they are fully aware of about the current decisions like what it could lead to it could lead to current mess but they didn't put their political capital on the line to try to stop the president.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，这也说明了本届政府的特殊性。高度个性化。就像你在和一个皇帝打交道。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well that also goes to the peculiarity of this administration, highly personalized. It's like you're dealing with an emperor.
**主持人**: 您认为为什么本届国会没有采取任何行动来阻止这场战争？因为我看到已经有两次投票，两次都失败了。即使我认为民主党也没有利用这个机会真正对总统施加一些限制。
Original English **主持人**: Why do you think the current Congress didn't do anything to try to stop this war? Because I saw there are already two vote and both vote failed. Even I think the Democrat didn't use this opportunity to really put some restriction on the president.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，民主党人根本做不到。我的意思是，他们中的一些人可能也受到支持战争的相同政治影响的驱动，他们过去也支持**伊拉克战争**或其他战争。但总的来说，共和党现在在参议院和众议院都占主导地位，他们被**特朗普总统**吓倒和控制，以至于在任何国内或外交政策问题上，他们都不会真正挑战**特朗普总统**。而这归结于**特朗普总统**能够决定哪个国会议员能够当选，共和党国会议员能否当选。所以只要他拥有这种对选民的控制权，那么，你知道，想要继续当国会议员的人就不会违抗他，而想要违抗他的人就不会再次当选。所以他对国会拥有非常独特的控制权。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, the Democrats could not fundamentally. I mean some of them may be driven also by the same political influence that supports the war and they have in the past supported the **Iraq War** or other wars as well. But by and large the Republican party which is right now dominant in both Senate and the House is so intimidated and dominated by **President Trump** that on no issue domestic or foreign policy, it actually challenges **President Trump**. And so and that goes to the fact that **President Trump** is able to decide which congressman can get elected, the Republican congressman can get elected or not. And so long as he has that kind of a control over the voters then, you know, congressmen who want to stay congressmen are not going to cross him and congressmen who want to cross him are not going to get elected again. And so he's having a kind of domination over Congress that is very unique.
**主持人**: 我认为即将到来的中期选举将真正考验这种影响力。嗯，如果**托马斯·马西**能够击败**特朗普总统**支持的候选人，那将是对所有其他国会议员的一个非常重要的信号。
Original English **主持人**: I think this upcoming midterm will be a really test of that influence. If **Thomas Massie** can win against the candidate **President Trump** endorsed, that would be a really big signal to all the other Congressmen or Congresswoman.
**Vali Nasr**: 不，我同意您的看法。但你知道，那个决定还有几个月，11月。所以，很少有国会议员现在想让总统承担责任，直到我们达到那个点。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: No, I agree with you. But you know that that decision is months away, November. And so, there are very few Congressmen right now want to hold the president accountable until we get to that point.
### 伊朗核武器前景与冲突结局 **主持人**: 您认为**伊朗**鉴于当前的**IRGC**以及基本上安全需求，他们会在近期寻求核弹吗？
Original English **主持人**: Do you think **Iran** given the current **IRGC** and basically the security need they're going to pursue a nuclear bomb in the near term?
**Vali Nasr**: **伊朗**有一些声音说**伊朗**过去20年的核学说是一个错误。**伊朗**要么不应该走这条路，要么就应该直接去制造核弹，因为他们所做的只是拥有一个对检查开放但世界不信任的计划。所有这些都给**伊朗**带来了战争和制裁。但我认为，如果他们有一个论点，你知道，如果**伊朗**不想每六个月就被攻击一次，它就需要核威慑。但问题是，**伊朗**要获得足够数量的核弹头，以提供威慑，并不容易。这可能需要三、四年、五年，但那五年对**伊朗**来说可能非常危险。换句话说，如果发现它在做任何事情，它可能会再次陷入一场更大的、代价高昂的战争。所以这不是一个我们应该这样做的一目了然的决定。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: There are voices in **Iran** who say that **Iran**'s nuclear doctrine of the past 20 years was a mistake. **Iran** either should not have pursued this path or should have just gone for the bomb because all they did of this having a program that is open to inspection but the world doesn't trust it. All it did is to bring **Iran** war and sanctions. But I think if they there is an argument that, you know, **Iran** needs a nuclear deterrence if it doesn't want to be attacked every six months. But the problem with that is that it's not easy for **Iran** to get to enough number of nuclear warheads that actually can provide a deterrent. So that might be three, four years, five years away, but those five years can be very dangerous to **Iran**. In other words, it is found out that it's doing anything, it could end up in a bigger war again, very costly war. And so it is not a straightforward decision that we should do this.
**主持人**: 是的。而且它还赋予**美国**入侵**伊朗**，真正清除那些核弹的合法性，对吗？就像现在这场战争没有任何国内支持一样。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. And also it give **US** legitimacy to really invading **Iran** to really get rid of those nuclear bombs. Right. Like right now the war doesn't have any domestic support.
**Vali Nasr**: 没错。因为没有可信的情报表明**伊朗**政府正在寻求核弹。但如果真的发生，就像**伊拉克**大规模杀伤性武器的情况一样，向**美国**公众推销就会容易得多。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Exactly. Because there's no credible intelligence showing that Iranian government is pursuing a nuclear bomb. But if that really happens, it will be much easier to sell to the **US** public, just like the **Iraq** WMD situation.
**主持人**: 非常正确。非常正确。
Original English **主持人**: Very true. Very true.
**Vali Nasr**: 是的，没错。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Yeah, exactly.
**主持人**: 那么，您认为这场**美国**和**伊朗**冲突的务实结局会是什么？
Original English **主持人**: So, what do you think could be the pragmatic endgame for this **US** and **Iran** conflict?
**Vali Nasr**: 我的意思是，最务实的结局是达成一项结束战争的协议。那将是停止敌对行动。那也将包括一个核元素，这将消除**美国**不得不担心**伊朗**的理由，并会给**伊朗**足够的经济激励，使其也想保护一项协议。它会比**特朗普总统**所希望的要少，但试图，你知道，得到他想要的实际上对**美国**和世界来说代价更高，也更危险。所以，我的意思是，我仍然认为最好的情况是以外交方式结束战争。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I mean, the most pragmatic endgame is a deal to end the war. That would be a cessation of hostilities. That would also include a nuclear element that would remove the reason for the **United States** to have to worry about **Iran** and would give **Iran** enough economic incentives to want to protect a deal as well. It will be less than what **President Trump** was hoping for, but trying to, you know, get what he wants is actually far more costly and dangerous to the **United States** and to the world. And so, I mean, I still think that the best scenario is a diplomatic end to the war.
**主持人**: 您认为在当前情况下，这能实现吗？双方，你知道，强硬派都掌控着局面。
Original English **主持人**: Do you think that's achievable given the current situation? Two side like you know hardliners are all in control.
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，我的意思是，我认为即使我们回到冲突，双方仍然需要考虑通过谈判解决。一场无休止的战争可能会升级到对双方都更严重、更丑陋、更具破坏性的阶段。而且，无论何时你处于战争中，战斗的替代方案就是对话。没有第三条路。除非**美国**在战斗中途基本上说：“你知道，我要回家了。我不再打了。”这不是一个很好的结果。但我认为，即使双方现在还没有准备好，即使他们重新开始战斗，到那时，出路仍然必须通过谈判。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, I mean, I think even if we go back to the conflict, the two sides still will have to think about a negotiated settlement. An unending war can escalate into bigger, uglier, more damaging phases for both sides. And anytime you're in a war, the alternative to fighting is talking. There's no third way. Unless the **United States** basically just says in the middle of the fight says, "You know, I'm going home. I'm not fighting anymore," which is not a very good outcome. But I think at even if the two sides are not ready right now, even if they went back to fighting, at that point in time, again, the exit would have to be through negotiations.
**主持人**: 嗯。那么，您认为如果**特朗普总统**只是说：“嘿，我们不会恢复轰炸**伊朗**基础设施，而且我们不会，你知道，入侵**伊朗**，但封锁仍将存在，我们只是离开。我们只是永远留下封锁。”
Original English **主持人**: Mhm. So, do you think what if **President Trump** just say, "Hey, we're not going to resume the bombing **Iran** infrastructure and we're not going back to, you know, invade **Iran**, but the blockade will still be in place and we just leave. We just leave a blockade there forever."
**Vali Nasr**: **伊朗**人不会同意的。我的意思是，他们会挑战封锁，然后**美国**要么解除封锁，要么开战。我的意思是，你知道，在这种事情中，你不是唯一有投票权的人。对方也有投票权。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: The Iranians will not agree to that. I mean, they will challenge the blockade and essentially then the **US** either has to lift the blockade or go to war. I mean, you know, in these kinds of things, you don't have the you're not the only one with a vote. The other side also has a vote.
**主持人**: 如果一位总统只是说：“嘿，我们正在解除封锁。我们宣布胜利，然后我们就离开了。我们完全撤出**美国**在中东的军队，让**以色列**去打这场战争，对吗？”
Original English **主持人**: What if a president just say, "Hey, we're lifting the blockade. We declare victory and we just left. We pull American completely out of this Middle East and let **Israel** fight this war, right?"
**Vali Nasr**: 那么你就会有一个非常不同的局面，基本上该地区的国家必须想办法重新建立秩序。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Then you then you're going to have a very different then basically the countries of the region have to figure out how they put an order back together.
**主持人**: 是的。你基本上失去了所有的**海湾合作委员会**盟友。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. You basically lost all the **GCC** allies.
**Vali Nasr**: 有些国家可能想与**以色列**结盟。其他一些国家可能会说我们必须与**伊朗**坐下来谈判。其他参与者，如**俄罗斯**或**中国**，将扮演更大的角色，因为归根结底，**海湾合作委员会**国家和**伊朗**人同时信任的唯一国家是**中国**，以及比如说**中国**几年前在**伊朗**和**沙特阿拉伯**之间的和解中所扮演的角色。所以，你知道，**美国**一旦退出，就像你创造了一个巨大的真空，一旦你创造了一个真空，你知道，空气就会涌入，最终，我们不知道秩序会是什么样子，但中东总是会有一个后**美国**秩序。它不会只是这个秩序。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Countries may some of them may want to ally with **Israel**. Some of the other ones may say we have to sit down with **Iran** and negotiate. There will be a bigger role for other actors like **Russia** or **China** because end of the day the only countries that both the **GCC** countries and the Iranians trust at the same time is **China** and the role that let's say **China** played in the rapprochement between **Iran** and **Saudi Arabia** a few years ago. So, you know, with the **United States** out of the way it's like you create a giant vacuum and once you create a vacuum, you know, air rushes into it and ultimately we don't know what the shape of the order would be but there's always going to be a post-American order in the Middle East. It's not going to be just this order.
### 以色列战略的失败与伊朗的崛起 **主持人**: 您认为，你知道，**以色列**与**美国**相比，显然有非常不同的战略结局，对吗？所以我认为**本雅明·内塔尼亚胡**希望**伊朗**成为一个失败国家，他们可以像对待**加沙**那样，每隔几个月轰炸**伊朗**，他们称之为“割草”。您认为当前**以色列**对**美国**政治的影响力能持续多久？就像你知道，**美国**左右翼民粹主义都在反对**以色列**的影响力，比如反对**美国-以色列公共事务委员会**（**AIPAC**）。
Original English **主持人**: Do you think, you know, **Israel** clearly have very different strategic endgame compared to **US**? Right. So I think **Benjamin Netanyahu** want **Iran** to become a failed state and they can do what they did to **Gaza** which is like bombing **Iran** every few months and they they call it mowing the grass. What do you think the current **Israel**'s influence on the **US** politics can sustain? Like you know there's already rising populism among the left and the right in **US** against the **Israel** influence like against the **AIPAC**.
**Vali Nasr**: 所以我不知道，我的意思是，我们必须在下一次选举中看看这会如何发展，以及它对选民来说到底有多重要。但现实是，我们现在所处的位置，**以色列**在中东的地缘战略游戏计划已经失败了。**以色列**已经达到了它能对**伊朗**做的事情的极限，至少在公开军事冲突方面。所以一旦尘埃落定，**以色列**也必须回到原点，重新审视，你知道，它将如何管理**伊朗**？它将如何管理这个地区？**以色列**在10月7日袭击和今天之间所持的假设，即它在军事上如此强大，可以军事解决一切，已经不再奏效了。所以，是的，它可以继续影响**美国**等等。但这张利用**美国**与**伊朗**开战的牌已经打过了，而且没有奏效。你不能打两次同样的牌，对吗？所以他们必须有一个不同的结局。我不知道那会是什么，但这并不意味着他们与**伊朗**的问题会消失。这只是意味着他们最近遵循的假设和战略必须重新评估，因为它们没有奏效。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: So I don't know, I mean we have to see in the next elections how this plays out and how important it is actually for the voters. But the reality of it is that where we're standing right now, **Israel**'s geo, you know, strategic game plan for the Middle East has failed. And **Israel** has sort of reached the limits of what it can do with **Iran**, at least with open military conflict. And so once the dust settles, **Israel** also will have to go back to the drawing board and re-examine, you know, how is he going to manage **Iran**? How is he going to manage the neighborhood? The assumptions that **Israel** had between the October 7 attack and today that is militarily so powerful that it can settle everything militarily is no longer working. So yes, it can keep influencing the **US**. But this card of using **America** to go to war with **Iran** was already played and it didn't work. You're not going to be able to play the same card twice, right? So they would have to have a different end game. And I don't know what it would be, but it doesn't mean that their issues with **Iran** are going to go away. It just that means that the assumptions and strategy that they have followed in the recent past would have to be evaluated because they didn't work.
**主持人**: 嗯。您认为，我的意思是，我看到**罗伯特·P教授**说**伊朗**将从这场冲突中崛起，成为全球舞台上的强国。您同意这个判断吗？您认为这...
Original English **主持人**: Mhm. Do you think, I mean I saw Professor **Robert P** say **Iran** is going to coming out of this conflict as the force power in the global stage. Do you agree with that judgment? Do you think that's...
**Vali Nasr**: 我认为这有点夸大其词，这种说法具有冲击力。我的意思是，我会把它说得轻一点。我会说，是的，**伊朗**从这场战争中走出来，伤痕累累，受到破坏，但也在某些重要的战略胜利中获胜。现在，**伊朗**要成为任何形式的强国，关键问题是它能否将这些战略胜利转化为实质性的东西。换句话说，这仍然没有确定。所以**伊朗**人在这场战争中表现出色。他们让**美国**感到惊讶。他们挫败了**美国**。但我认为他们并没有成为全球强国。这说得太过了。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: I think that's overstating it, that has kind of a statement that has shock value. I mean I would put it lesser. I would say yes. **Iran** has come out of this war battered, damaged but also having won certain important strategic victories. Now the key question for **Iran** to become any power of any sort is can it translate those strategic victories into something solid. In other words, that's still not determined. And so Iranians have performed well in this war. They have surprised the **US**. They have frustrated the **US**. But I don't think they have emerged as a global power. That's putting it too strongly.
### 伊朗革命卫队的性质与中国模式的启示 **主持人**: 是的。我还看了您几个月前的演讲。您基本上说，很多人对**伊朗**的看法，认为它是官僚政府，是不准确的。**伊朗革命卫队**实际上是一个军事控制的政府，它非常关注自己的主权和安全。
Original English **主持人**: Yeah. I also watched your presentation a months ago. You basically say that a lot of people's view on **Iran** as you know those bureaucratic government is not accurate. The Iranian **IRGC** is actually a militant control government that's really have a deep concern about its own sovereignty and security.
**Vali Nasr**: 如果我们从历史上看**IRGC**，它的起源更接近于**解放军**。你知道，它是一支从革命中走出来的军事力量，它的起源支持那场革命的意识形态。但当它成熟后，它实际上已经成为一支专业的军事力量。它在**伊朗**的政治可能是民族主义的。他们可能仍然谈论宗教，但归根结底，这些人是军人。他们的日常工作是军事。我们可以看到，在这场战争中，导弹、心理战、信息战、他们的战术等方面的决策，基本上都建立在军事专业主义之上，最终他们统治**伊朗**的方式，或者他们将统治**伊朗**的方式，与今天**俄罗斯**的统治方式并没有什么不同。**俄罗斯**仍然由**苏联**时期存在的相同安全部队统治。我的意思是，**普京**曾是老**克格勃**。同样的**克格勃**以**联邦安全局**（**FSP**）和**格鲁乌**（**GRU**）的形式存在。你不能看着这些人说他们是共产主义者，对吗？他们不是，在某种程度上，你可以说他们的政治是民族主义的，是右翼的，是不民主的。你可以说所有这些，但你实际上必须认为他们不是受意识形态驱动的人。是的。他们受民族主义驱动，在他们的行为模式中，他们是合法理性的。他们是技术官僚，是官僚主义的，对吗？所以这场战争表明，将**伊朗**仅仅视为一个阅读宗教文本的宗教阿亚图拉，是一个错误。你正在与一台复杂的军事机器打交道，它能够达到这个水平，正是因为它是在某些合法理性机制的基础上运作的。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: If we thought about **IRGC**, let's say historically, its origins is closer to, let's say, **PLA**. You know, it's a military force that came out of a revolution and its origins it supported the ideology of that revolution. But when it's matured, it has actually become a professional military force. Its politics in **Iran** may be nationalistic. They may still talk about religion, but end of the day, these are military men. Their day job is military. And what we can see is that the decision making in this war with missiles, with psychological operations, with information warfare, their tactics, basically built on military professionalism, and ultimately the way they're ruling over **Iran** or they would rule over **Iran** is not that different, let's say, with the way in which **Russia** is ruled today. And **Russia** is still ruled by the same security forces that existed under the **Soviet Union**. I mean **Putin** was old **KGB**. The same **KGB** exist in the form of **FSP** and **GRU**. And you cannot look at these people and say they're communists, right? They're not. In a way, you could say their politics is nationalistic, it's right-wing, it's undemocratic. You could say all of those things, but you actually have to think that they're these are not people who are driven by ideology. Yeah. They're driven by nationalism and in their mode of behavior they are legal rational. They're technocratic, bureaucratic, right? And so this war has shown that it is a mistake to think of **Iran** as just a religious ayatollahs reading religious texts and that you're dealing with a sophisticated military machine that is able to perform at this level exactly because it is run on the basis of certain legal rational mechanisms.
**主持人**: 嗯。所以，根据您的描述，考虑到像**中国**那样的改革开放机会，您认为**伊朗革命卫队**也能做到同样的事情吗？
Original English **主持人**: Mhm. So, so given your description, given the opportunity like what **China** had open and reform, do you think Iranians **IRGC** can do the same?
**Vali Nasr**: 嗯，你知道，长期以来，走**中国**道路一直是**伊朗**的一个大辩论，甚至在西方研究**伊朗**的观察家之间也有辩论，认为也许有一个时刻，比如说，当**胡耀邦**领导下的**中国**也曾有过类似的时期，你曾有**四人帮**，但你也逐渐有了**邓小平**，**中国**最终做出了决定，即**共产党**将朝着它所走的方向发展。是的。没错。但不同之处在于，没有两个案例是完全相同的。我的意思是，**中国**和**伊朗**之间在历史上等等有很多相似之处。但最终它们是两个非常不同的国家，两次非常不同的革命。**伊朗**和**中国**的不同之处在于，当**中国**考虑这种转型时，它并没有卷入**伊朗**与**以色列**和**美国**之间那种安全问题。换句话说，**中国**的转型发生在和平时期。事实上，它发生在**中国**和**美国**至少举行了首次会晤之后，当时**尼克松**访问**中国**，主要是为了至少与**美国**建立一个特定的方向，尽管完全正常化还需要很多年，直到**卡特总统**任期才实现。但无论如何，那发生了。然后**中国**在思考它的未来。**四人帮**和**邓小平**之间的辩论不是在枪口下，不是在炸弹从天而降的情况下发生的。是的。而是在一个开放的环境中。两国之间的第二个区别是，在**尼克松**访问**中国**的时候，早在1977年，**中国**就开始将**苏联**视为对**中国**的致命军事威胁。没错。这使得**美国**的威胁相对较小，因此存在一个战略上的共同点，使得**基辛格**能够访问**中国**，会见**周恩来**和**毛泽东**，并进行战略对话，即无论我们有什么分歧，我们曾在**朝鲜战争**中作战，我们之间有很多不和，但现在这些都被我们共同面临共同敌人的事实所取代。那种情况在**伊朗**并不存在。**伊朗**没有那种**中国**在1971年从**苏联**那里感受到的陆地威胁，那种威胁会迫使**伊朗**领导人重新思考他们对**美国**的敌意。事实上，情况恰恰相反，**美国**本身已经成为**伊朗**最大的威胁。是的。以前，这只是一种意识形态威胁。这是一种在**伊朗**革命领导人想象中的威胁。现在它已经成为一个实际的威胁。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Well, you know, following the **China** path for a very long time has been a big debate in **Iran** and even debate among **Iran** watchers in the West that perhaps there is a moment where, let's say, when you would have had the same kind of a period in **China** under **Hu Yaobang**, that you had the **Gang of Four**, but you also gradually had **Deng Xiaoping**, and **China** ultimately made the decision that the **Communist Party** would evolve in the direction that it did. Yeah. Right. But the difference and no two cases are the same. I mean there's a lot of similarities historically between **China** and **Iran**. But ultimately they're two very different countries, two very different revolutions. Where it's different between **Iran** and **China** is that when **China** was thinking about this transformation, it was not entangled in the kind of security issue that **Iran** has with **Israel** and the **US**. In other words, the transition in **China** came at a time of peace. Yeah. In fact, it came after **China** and the **United States** at least had an initial meeting when **Nixon** went to **China** to essentially at least create a certain direction with the **US** although it would take many for normalization. It wouldn't come until the **Carter** presidency. But nevertheless, that happened. And then **China** was thinking about its future. Debating between **Gang of Four** and **Deng Xiaoping** was happening not under the gun, not under bombs falling from the sky. Yeah. But in an open environment. The second difference between the two countries is that at the time when **Nixon** went to **China**, that's as early as 1977, **China** had begun to look at the **Soviet Union** as a mortal military threat to **China**. Exactly. Which made the **United States** a lesser threat, and therefore there was a strategic common ground that allowed **Kissinger** to go to **China** and meet with **Zhou Enlai** and meet with **Mao** and to have a strategic conversation that whatever differences we have, the fact that we fought in the **Korea War**, the fact that we have a lot of bad blood between us is now superseded by the fact that we both are facing the common enemy. That kind of situation doesn't exist with **Iran**. **Iran** does not have a kind of land threat that **China** perceived in the **Soviet Union** in 1971 that would force the Iranian leaders to rethink their hostility towards **America**. In fact, the other way around, **America** has become itself the biggest threat to **Iran**. Yeah. Previously, this was only an ideological threat. It was a threat in the imagination of **Iran**'s revolutionary leaders. Now it has become an actual threat.
**主持人**: 嗯，非常好。非常感谢您给我这次与您交谈的机会。
Original English **主持人**: Well, very good. Thank you so much for this opportunity to speak with you.
**Vali Nasr**: 非常感谢。我非常感谢您在这里的时间。
Original English **Vali Nasr**: Thank you so much. I really appreciate your time here.
**主持人**: 不客气。希望我们能再做一次。
Original English **主持人**: Not at all. Hopefully, we'll do it again.