--- author: a16z date: '2026-09-10' guest: '' layout: post.njk source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsdJd2VeLvg speaker: a16z tags: - venture-capital - power-law - asset-allocation - artificial-intelligence - infrastructure-bottleneck title: A16Z 对话：AI 时代的极端幂律、资产配置与基础设施瓶颈 summary: A16Z 播客讨论指出，AI 时代风投呈现更极端的幂律与规模效应，资本投入算力可直接放大优势。随着 AI 渗透各行业，资产配置逻辑发生变化，未来机遇拓展至物理世界与机器人领域，而当前核心瓶颈主要在供给侧与电网基础设施。 insight: '' draft: true series: '' category: investment-assets area: finance-wealth project: [] people: - David George - Rohan Vora companies_orgs: - A16Z - SpaceX - OpenAI - Anthropic products_models: [] media_books: - A16Z podcast status: evergreen --- 我们分析了美国 3,000 家风险投资机构的数据。在过去二十年里，只有 20 家持续实现了 3 倍的净回报。
Original English We've looked at the data of 3,000 venture capital firms in the US. Only 20 have achieved consistent 3x net returns over the last two decades.
>> 眼下，幂律效应显然比过去 10 到 20 年的科技投资时期更为极端。你第一次发现，可以把资本直接砸向一家公司，而这会不断复合放大他们的优势。
Original English >> Right now, clearly the power law is more extreme than it has been in the last 10 to 20 years of technology investing. For the first time, you can take capital and throw it at a company and it compounds their advantage.
>> AI 正在冲击 GDP 的每一个环节：交通、劳动力、服务、资本、协同。此前还从未出现过一种技术范式，能够同时撼动 30 万亿美元的 GDP。埃隆在公开场合谈到过 Grockbot，而在山姆这边，他也谈到了 Astra 以及即将推出的一些长时间运行能力。
Original English >> AI is attacking every facet of the GDP, transportation, labor, services, capital, coordination. There hasn't been a technology paradigm that hits on 30 trillion in GDP at the same Elon has talked publicly about Grockbot on Sam's side. He's talked about Astra and some of the longrunning capabilities that are going to come out soon.
>> 你认为下一家市值达到 100 万亿美元的公司会是谁？
Original English >> What do you think is going to be the next hundred trillion dollar market cap company?
>> 有可能是
Original English >> It is possible that
欢迎回到 A16Z 播客。价值创造的逻辑发生了一些根本性的改变。幂律过去只是风险投资这种手工作坊式行业的特征，而现在它已经变成了普遍的系统性现象，尤其是三家前沿模型公司——SpaceX、OpenAI、Anthropic，代表了大约 3.5 万亿到 5 万亿美元的潜在企业价值。令人震惊的是，在 SpaceX 上市之前，我们的许多 LP 以及更广泛的机构配置机构群体并没有太多这方面的敞口。因此我们今天想聊聊，为什么资产组合构建和资产配置可能已经发生了改变，为什么幂律不再仅仅存在于风险投资行业，尤其是现如今价值究竟在哪里、以何种方式发生复利沉淀。David George、Rohan Vora，感谢你们的加入。
Original English Welcome back to the A16Z podcast. Something fundamental has changed in how value gets created. Power law used to be just a feature of a cottage industry in venture capital and now it's systemic throughout and particularly the three frontier model companies SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic represent somewhere between three and a half to 5 trillion dollars of potential enterprise value. And shockingly before SpaceX went public, a lot of our LPs and also the broader institutional allocator community didn't have a lot of exposure to it. And so we'll talk about today why uh potentially portfolio construction and asset allocation may have changed um why power law is not just only in the venture capital industry and then particularly where and how value actually compounds today. David George around Verdian thank you for joining me.
>> 很高兴来到这里。感谢邀请一起交流。
Original English >> Great to be here. Thanks for hanging out.
>> 谢谢你们邀请我们来。
Original English >> Thank you for having us here.
>> 太棒了，太棒了，太棒了。好的，DG。如果把你把过去六年里所有有风投背景的 IPO 加起来，全算在一块儿，未来的走向会是怎样？
Original English >> Awesome. Awesome. Awesome. Okay. So DG. So if you add up every venturebacked IPO for the last six years, all of them together, where does it go from here?
### AI 时代的极端幂律与规模效应 眼下，幂律效应显然比过去比如 10 到 20 年的科技投资更为极端，可能要追溯到网络效应驱动的消费级公司兴起的时候。之所以如此，原因有很多。规模收益递增一直是我们行业的一种动态。显然，大家都清楚网络效应型业务是如何实现规模收益递增的，但软件业务同样可以，对吧，它们可以采取不同的形式，比如品牌在市场上的声誉、资源的积累，这些都能提供竞争优势，这些现在依然成立。但眼下，特别是对于模型实验室，在我职业生涯中第一次出现这种情况：你可以拿资金直接砸向一家公司，而这会不断复合放大他们的优势。以往搞垮一家初创公司的方式往往是：给它砸太多钱，让他们招一千个人，接着就会产生各种协同问题、管理开销问题以及相互冲突的优先级，事情就搞砸了，因为你不可能招募足够多的人足够快地去把事情办好。而现在情况不同了，你可以把资金砸在算力上，而算力能够让产品和业务变得更好。所以在看来，幂律变得更加极端一点也不奇怪。当下，规模经济在 AI 市场中是非常真实的现象，而且我认为这种情况还将继续下去。
Original English Right now clearly the power law is more extreme than it has been in the last you know 10 to 20 years of technology investing probably going back to you know the emergence of the network effect driven consumer companies. Um there are many reasons why that's the case. Increasing returns to scale have always been a dynamic in our business. Obviously it's well covered how a network effect business can have increasing returns to scale but so can software businesses right and and they can take different forms but you know brand reputation in the market the accumulation of resources all provide competitive advantages that all still is the case but right now especially with the labs for the first time you know in my career you can take capital and throw it at a company and it compounds their advantage and this is a thing like how do you screw up a a startup, um well, you know, throw too much money at it and have them hire a thousand people and then, you know, you create all these coordination issues and overhead issues and and dueling priorities and and it sort of gets messed up because you can't hire enough people to do enough things fast enough. Um, now that's not the case. You can throw dollars at compute and compute can make products and the businesses better. And so to me, it's not terribly surprising that the power law is more extreme. Right now, economies of scale are a very real thing uh in the AI market. and I think will continue to be the case.
>> 罗恩，首先，你不仅是我们在 Accolade 的长期 LP 之一，而且巧合的是，距离你当年作为 A16Z 员工正好过去了整整 10 年。为了纪念你离开这里 10 周年，我把这个宝贝给带回来了。
Original English >> So, Ron, so first of all, uh you're not just one of our longtime LPs at accolade, uh but incidentally, it's been exactly 10 years since you were actually an employee of A16Z. And so, for your 10 year anniversary, since you were last year, I've brought this gem back.
>> 我的天啊。我的天。这太不可思议了。你怎么还留着这个？这太棒了。
Original English >> Oh my god. Oh my gosh. This is amazing. Why do you still have this? This is amazing.
>> 我们去地下库房里淘出来的，为了留作纪念，专门做了一个特大号的版本。我真不敢相信我从地下库房把它挖出来了。不过话说回来，在过去的 10 年里，世界发生了很多变化。如果你还记得的话，在那个时期，人们还在抱怨当时的基金规模太大了。
Original English >> So, we dug in the catacombs uh and we made this extra large version uh just for for posterity here. I can't believe that I got this from the from the catacombs. But incidentally, during the last 10 years, a lot has changed in the world. And and if you remember, at that point in time, people were belly aching about fund sizes being too large back then.
>> 你们当时有一支达到了 10 亿。我记得
Original English >> And you had one at a billion. I remember
>> 第一支达到 10 亿的。第一支风投基金。没错，一点没错。自那以后发生了许多事情。对于你的风投组合与私募股权投资组合之间的并列关系，你是怎么看的？另外在整体资产配置上又是如何考虑的？我们刚才进门的时候还在聊这个。如果让你凭借现在的认知重新从一张白纸开始，你会做出怎样不同的构建？
Original English >> the the first one out of billion. First venture fund. Exactly. Exactly. And so, you know, a lot has happened since then. How do you think about your venture portfolio juxtaposed against your private equity one? And then just also generally asset allocation. We were talking about this on the way in. If you were to start from a blank sheet of paper again knowing what you know now, how would you have constructed differently?
### AI 的需求渗透与全面渗透 >> 是的，拿当下的风险投资来说。AI 领域的收入已经达到了 1,000 亿美元。SaaS 达到同样的体量用了 15 年，而 AI 只用了 4 年就做到了，并且从需求渗透率来看，我们甚至还远未触及表面。DG 刚才所说的“你可以往里砸资本”，这是无限推理需求的体现，而且我们正处在这样一个节点：AI 正在冲击 GDP 的每一个环节——交通、劳动力、服务、资本、协同。此前还从未出现过一种技术范式，能够同时撼动 30 万亿美元的 GDP。所以你面对的是增长最快的技术，它正在冲击 GDP 的所有部分。因此作为资产配置者，很难不得出这样的结论：它不应该只是一个卫星仓位，它在某种形式上必须是核心资产甚至超核心资产。
Original English >> Yeah, let's take venture today. We've reached 100 billion in revenue in AI. It took SAS 15 years to get to the same point. AI did that in four years and we're not even close to anywhere in terms of the penetration of demand. The reason DG is saying you can throw capital at it the fun that's a function of unlimited demand for inference and we are at a point where AI is attacking every facet of the GDP transportation labor services capital coordination there hasn't been a technology paradigm that hits on 30 trillion in GDP at the same time and so you have the fastest growing technology it's hitting on all parts of the GDP so as an allocator it's hard not to make the case, you should it's not a satellite position. You should be core or a super core in some shape or form.
>> 我带有很强的偏见，但如果你仔细想想市场的形态以及自我的职业生涯开始以来它们发生了怎样的变化——大概是 18 年前我从事私募股权和成长股权投资时，这还是一个小众作坊式行业，而现在已经不是了。我经常谈到这一点，我们这个资产类别已经拥有 5 到 6 万亿美元的价值。而且企业更长时间保持私有状态的这种态势，是不会发生逆转的。
Original English >> I'm very biased, but if you just think about the the shape of the markets and how they've changed since I started my career, um you know, in private equity and growth equity, you know, that was I guess 18 years ago. This was a cottage industry and now it's not. And I talk about this all the time, but our asset class is 5 to6 trillion dollars of value. and the dynamics around companies staying private longer, they're not going to reverse.
>> 是的。你在 2019 年离开 General Atlantic 时就有了这种洞见：在后期阶段获得类似风投的结果，而这现在正在发生。比如
Original English >> Yeah. I mean, you had that insight in 2019 when you left G. It's venture- like outcomes in late stage, which is now happening. Like,
>> 所以它不再仅仅是早期阶段，也不再是当你拥有 1 亿美元营收时就去 IPO。
Original English >> so it's no longer just early stage and you IPO when you have 100 million in revenues.
>> 是的。顶级梯队的结果过去大概是 100 亿美元，而现在大概达到了 400 亿美元。
Original English >> Yeah. The top desk outcomes, I think, used to be 10 billion and now they're like 40 billion.
>> 是的。或者等到 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 出来的时候，可能很快就会变成 1,000 亿美元。是的。
Original English >> Yeah. Or soon to be probably 100 billion by the time anthropic and then open AI came come out. Yeah.
>> 是的，是的，确实。你看，这是合理的，对吧？就像上一轮周期创造了 25 万亿美元的新增市值，其中相当一部分流向了现有在位企业。
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And look, this makes sense, right? Like the last cycle created 25 trillion of market cap, new market cap and a bunch of that went to the incumbents.
>> 是的
Original English >> Y
>> 但也有很大一部分流向了初创公司和新的初创企业，你知道随后的每一次浪潮都会比前一次更大。所以
Original English >> but a lot of it went to to startups and the new startups and you know each one of these subsequent waves gets bigger than the prior one. And so
>> 你知道我们的预期是，拿走那 25 万亿美元，未来的数字还会更大。
Original English >> you know our expectation is you know that take the 25 trillion and like it's going to be a larger number.
>> 没错。
Original English >> Yep.
### AI 的潜在市场空间（TAM）与劳动力替代 >> 是的。对于 AI 的潜在市场空间（TAM），我一直感到困惑。很想听听你们对这个问题的看法。比如拿医疗健康行业来说，医疗行业每年在医疗 IT 上的支出大概是 600 亿到 1,000 亿美元。但 AI 正在切入医疗领域实际发生的劳动力以及任务本身的价值。那涵盖了理赔、账单、行政管理，这是一个万亿美元规模的产业。因此 AI 的潜在市场空间可以比传统的 SaaS 或医疗 IT 大出 10 倍以上。而这个价值究竟是多少？所执行任务的经济价值究竟有多大，那才是你所面对的 TAM。随后 AI 公司会从中抽取一定的捕获率。但我们根本无法确切知道这个 TAM 究竟能变得有多大。正如你所说的，纵观每一次浪潮，原有在位企业的体量随着时间推移都会小上 10 倍。因此很难去估算它，但我自己可以明确这一点：在这些回报规模到底能达到多大这件事上，我一直以来都低估了。
Original English >> Yeah. And I'm constantly confused about the TAM of AI. We'll love your thoughts on this. Um like take healthcare. Healthcare spends like 60 to 100 billion on healthcare it per year. But AI is hitting on actual labor and the value of tasks that are being performed in healthcare. That's claims, billing, administration. That's a trillion dollar industry. So the TAM of AI can be 10x plus bigger than traditional SAS or healthcare IT. And what is that value? Well, what's the economic value of a task that's being performed like that's the TAM you're looking at. And then there's some capture rate that the AI company will take. But we have no idea what how big the TAM can get. to your point, it's you look at every wave, the incumbents are 10x smaller uh over time. So, it's hard to estimate it, but I can tell this for myself. I've been chronically wrong about how big these outcomes can get.
>> 是的，我也是。是的，劳动力。我的意思是，你看，如果单看美国经济中花在劳动力上的资金与花在软件上的资金相比，劳动力大概是软件的 40 倍左右。需要强调的是，这并不意味着劳动力就会消失。我认为劳动力只是会被重塑，我们最终会以某种方式重新构想人类所承担的任务。但我认为这恰恰是 AI 的核心所在——你切入的是一个完全不同的维度。因此，如果把它等同于软件，说“哦，它就是软件的下一次演进”，那就未免太狭隘了。
Original English >> Yeah, same here. Yeah, labor. I mean, look, if you just look at like how much of, you know, dollars are spent in the US economy on labor versus software, it's like something like 40 times more. Now, that doesn't mean importantly that um labor is going to go away. Like I think labor is just going to get reinvented and so we'll we'll end up with um you know sort of reimagination of the task that humans do. Um but I think that's actually the the the whole point of AI is like you're going after this different thing. And so to equate it to software and say oh it's the next evolution of software is far too limiting.
>> 我们的法律顾问经常对我们讲，大意是：我太喜欢 Harvey 了。现在我所有的客户都觉得自己是律师了，他们甚至可以直接来探讨
Original English >> Our legal council uh says to us often it's like I love Harvey. All my clients think they're lawyers now and they could actually spar with
在我身上，针对那些换作以前他们大概会说“我不是很懂这个，就全听你的吧”的话题。所以随着 AI 使用的到来，我的计费工时反而增加了。因此，所有那些用例都极其、极其……可能被大大低估了，而我们目前甚至都还不知道……
Original English me on topics where they would have probably been like I don't really understand this. I'm just going to defer to you. So my billable hours have only gone up with the advent of the usage of AI. And so all those use cases are are massively massively um probably underappreciated and we don't still even know
>> 它们是扩张性的。对。这才是核心所在。对。
Original English >> they're expansionary. Yeah. Is the whole point. Yeah.
>> 然后之前还有这么一种整套论调：前沿实验室（Frontier Labs）将会蚕食应用层，究竟哪一层会赢？结果事实证明，好像大家都在增长。
Original English >> And then there was there was this whole thesis where well Frontier Labs are going to cannibise the apps which layer is going to win. Turns out like everyone is sort of growing.
>> 对，对，对。我们刚刚……你知道，我的一位朋友做了一期播客，他在里面描述的大概是“一切都会行得通”这种感觉。嗯。
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We just um you know a friend of mine did a podcast where he described like everything is going to work kind of thing. Mhm.
>> 嗯，而且，你知道，我的表述略有不同，但就像是，你知道，我们一直收到 LP 提出的问题，他们问我们比如：
Original English >> Um, and um, you know, I I describe it slightly differently, but it's like, you know, we get questions all the time from LPs when they ask us like,
>> 你知道，技术栈里的哪一层……
Original English >> you know, layer in the stack,
>> 技术栈里的哪一层会行得通。而我有点觉得，我不知道，市场规模将会极其庞大。我认为可能一切都行得通。当然，会有很多公司行不通，也可能会有某些特定的特殊类别行不通。嗯，但我认为总的来说，如果认为“开源做得好，对前沿实验室就是坏事”，反之亦然，这种想法就太受限了。额，所以我们尽量让自己摆脱这种零和思维。
Original English >> which layer in the stack is going to work. And I'm kind of like, I don't know, the the market is going to be so big. Like, I think everything might work. Now, there's going to be a lot of companies that don't work and there may be idiosyncratic categories that don't work. Um, but I think by and large, it's far too limiting to think like, oh, if open source does a good job, it's bad for the labs and, you know, vice versa. Uh so we try and like remove ourselves from thinking in a zero sum way like that.
>> 对。
Original English >> Yeah.
### 风险投资的幂律与赛道扩张 >> 展开讲讲，因为为什么大家会认为这是赢家通吃？而且你知道，即便我们可以做假设，但你知道上一代技术在很多门类里可能确实是赢家通吃，但这感觉在本质上是不同的，因为我们正在重新审视和评估许多基本逻辑。所以或许可以展开聊聊。
Original English >> Extract it out because why why do people think it's going to be a winner or take all and and you know if we can hypothesize but you know the last era of technology it was probably winner take all in a lot of categories but this feels categorically different because we're reunderwiting a lot of the fundamentals. So maybe extract it out.
是啊，你看，“赢家通吃”用来描述这点很有意思，因为如果单看所有头部科技公司的市值增长，其实有很多、很多、很多都取得了成功，并不是真正的赢家通吃。不过这里有一个重要的区别：我们非常笃信特定类别内的幂律法则，也就是说，赢家会夺取绝大部分的市场份额和市值，而第二名就像是在捡残羹剩炙，你知道，额……
Original English Yeah, look, winner take all is an interesting way to describe it because like if you just look at the market cap growth of all the leading technology companies like there are many many many that were successful like there wasn't winner take all right now there's an important distinction like we very much are believers in the power law within a given category so like the winners will capture the vast majority of the market share um and market cap and second place is like playing for scraps you know um
>> 额，但我认为我们将会看到类别数量迎来极其巨大的扩张，对吧？所以，你知道，如果你回到 20 年前，CRM 还根本不算一个门类，我是说它很小，就只有 Siebel Systems 这类系统等等。嗯，但你知道，现在它是一个巨大的门类了。所以我认为同样的事情也会发生。我们在我们所投资的每一个技术市场中都见证了这一点。再次说明，我们的方式是……你知道，在我们的行业里，我们可以承受亏损，对吧？而且，如果在某个特定基金里，我们在一定数量的投资上没有亏损，那说明我们承担的风险还不够，对吧？所以，你知道，如果你纵观我们历来表现最好的风险投资基金，我认为亏损率大概在 60%。对。
Original English >> uh but I think there will see a massive expansion of the amount of categories that we have, right? And so, you know, if you go back 20 years like CRM was not really a category I mean it was small. It was like seable systems and and things like that. Um but you know now it's a massive category. And so I think the same thing will happen. We've seen it in every technology market that we invest in. Again, our approach is um you know in our business we can tolerate loss, right? And like if we're not losing money in a given fund on a given amount of investments, we're not taking enough risk, right? And so, you know, if you look at our best performing venture funds over time, I think the loss rate is 60%. Yeah.
>> 差不多。
Original English >> Or so
>> 在早期阶段。对。
Original English >> on early stage. Yeah.
>> 在早期阶段。嗯，现在到了成长阶段，亏损率会更低一些，但大概也会在 10% 到 20% 的区间。这是合理的，因为伴随而来的，会有我们做出的带来 10 倍或更高回报的投资。所以，嗯，你知道，如果我们做得很出色，我们就是在每一个立得住脚的门类中支持头部公司。如果这个门类发展得很好，那我们就会取得绝佳的成绩；而如果这个门类发展不佳，也没关系。这差不多就是我们所承受的风险。
Original English >> On early stage. Um, now at the growth stage, like the loss rate will be lower, but it's probably going to be in the 10 to 20% range. And that's appropriate because with that, you will get investments that we make that, you know, 10x or more in returns. And so, um, you know, if we're doing a good job, we're backing the leading company in every category that is a credible category. And if the category works out well, then we do a great job. And if the category doesn't work out well, that's okay. That's kind of like the risk that we live with.
>> 是的。没错。没错。而且其中还暗含着某种时机选择的问题，因为我知道你我常对此感慨：我认为很多人经常在当下的那个节点觉得市场过热了，然而事后回过头看，其实当时的一切都非常便宜；但市场上也会出现另一些反常现象，在那些时候过热可能确实是真的。所以我知道你们经常向很多 LP 强调在风险投资中保持一致性的重要性，其重要程度可能超过其他任何资产类别，因为你永远不知道这些技术会在什么时候爆发出来。或许可以给我们梳理一下这点，因为外面有很多机构资金分配者（allocators）实际上根本无法触达很多前沿的——尤其是现在的这些模型。他们正在试图迎头赶上，并且在某些情况下，可能正在产生一些有点过于反映出市场稍微有些浮躁的负面行为。所以或许可以为我们拆解一下。
Original English >> Yeah. Yep. Yep. And and embedded in that is also kind of timing because I I know around you and I lament on this in that I think a lot of folks often times think that things are overheated in that moment in time and then you look back in retrospect and it turns out everything was actually quite cheap but then there's these aberrations in the market where it's probably actually true and so I know you advise a lot of your LPs on on the cons importance of consistency in venture capital probably even more than any other asset class because you just never know when these technologies can come out. maybe walk through that because there's a lot of institutional allocators out there who actually don't have access to a lot of the frontier certainly models now. They're trying to play catch-up and and in some instances probably maybe introducing some adverse behavior that is a little bit too reflective of things being a little bit too frothy. So maybe unpack that for us.
### 风险投资的回报分化与一致性 >> 是的，我是说 DG 谈到的幂律的极端性。作为资金分配者，如果你在过去的 5 到 10 年里无法触达排名前 5 到 10 的公司，你在回报方面就会大幅落后。让我们退一步来看。比如我们研究过全美 3000 家风险投资机构的数据，在过去的二十年里，只有 20 家持续实现了 3 倍的净回报。
Original English >> Yeah, I mean the extreness of the power law that DG talked about. If you as an allocator have not had access to the top 5 to 10 companies over the last 5 to 10 years, you're significantly behind in terms of returns. And let's take a step back. Like we've looked at the data of 3,000 venture capital firms in the US. Only 20 have achieved consistent 3x net returns over the last two decades.
>> 抱歉，请再说一遍。20% 还是 20……
Original English >> Sorry, say that one more. 20% have 20
>> 不到 1%。
Original English >> less than 1%.
>> 哇。
Original English >> Wow.
>> 持续实现 3 倍净回报。
Original English >> Consistent 3x net returns.
>> 这太不可思议了。而且实际上你并不需要在……并不需要在那 20 年里拥有七八支基金。标准是你在 20 年的周期里，是否有三到四支实现 3 倍净 TVPI 的基金。我们发现只有 20……
Original English >> That's incredible. And it's actually you don't have you don't need seven eight funds in those 20 years. Are it was do you have three to four 3x net TVPI funds over a 20-year period. We found only 20
>> 家机构做到过这一点。
Original English >> firms that have done that.
>> 哇。
Original English >> Wow.
>> 在风险投资中保持一致性真的、真的非常难。
Original English >> Consistency in venture is really really hard.
>> 但有趣的是，那些保持一致性的机构……
Original English >> But what's interesting is the consistent ones
>> 在每一个年份期（vintage）都持续拥有触达那些定义行业类别的公司的机会。
Original English >> consistently had access to the category defining companies every vintage.
>> 对。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 嗯，当然也存在例外，顺便说一句，仅仅拿到投资份额/品牌（logo）也是不够的。如果你是做早期阶段并且拥有规模庞大的基金，你必须持有它足够多的股份份额。
Original English >> Um now there are exceptions and by the way just having the logo is not sufficient enough. If you're early stage and you have a large fund, you need to own enough of it.
>> 如果你是在后期阶段，DJ，我很好奇你是否同意，规模体量（sizing）是非常关键的。
Original English >> If you're late stage, DJ, I'm curious if you agree, sizing is really critical.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 额，所以在后期阶段类似风投的回报是可能的，但你表现最好的公司应该占到你基金的 5% 到 10% 以上。这样你才能真正在单家公司上收回整支基金的本金。以前后期阶段是不存在单家公司收回基金本金的算术逻辑的，现在有了。
Original English >> Uh so venture- like returns are possible in late stage, but your best company should be 5 10% plus of your fund. That way you can actually return the fund on a single company. Fund returning math in late stage didn't exist before. It now does.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 嗯，所以我们找到了合适的投资组合规模配比，而那些能够持续获得投资机会的机构，就在那 3000 家中的前 20 名之内。所以如果你没有投进他们，回报的分化是巨大的。而如果你没有投到那些机构，你拿到的就是风险投资的平均回报。如果你看剑桥汇丰（Cambridge Associates）的数据，过去 10 年风险投资的平均回报只有 1 到 2 倍。
Original English >> Um so we have found the right portfolio sizing and the ones that consistently have gotten access are in that top 20 out of 3,000. So if you don't have them, there's a huge dispersion of returns. And if you don't have those, you're getting the average venture return. If you look at Cambridge data, the average venture return over the last 10 years is 1 to 2x.
>> 你还不如去投私募股权（PE）。你在公开市场上肯定也能做得更好。你根本没必要把钱锁上 10 年。
Original English >> You'll do better in private equity. You'll definitely do better in the public markets. You don't need to lock up your money for 10 years.
>> 是的，确实如此。对。我刚刚调出了我们朋友 Eddie 的一条推文，他实际上是今天早上发的。他说：“对大型 VC 基金的兴趣是由创始人驱动的，而不是 LP。创始人往往想要的是具有扩展能力、能够进行全生命周期投资、并能帮助招揽客户和招聘人才的品牌。LP 们一直在缓慢跟进，但大多数人仍然在拖拖拉拉，因为这实际上违背了传统认知。”
Original English >> Yeah, for sure. Yeah. I I just pulled up a tweet uh from our friend Eddie who posted actually this this morning. He said, "Internest in big VC funds has been driven by founders, not LPs. Founders more often than not want the brand that can scale, be a life cycle investor, and help land customers/hires. LPs have slowly followed along, but most are still dragging their heels because it actually it's counter to conventional wisdom.
### “中间层的消亡” >> 是的。而且退出成果更大，所以基金规模也可以更大。在那 20 家机构里也有一些例外。有一些小型机构专注于细分的垂直市场……
Original English >> Yeah. And the outcomes are larger, so funds can be larger. There are some exceptions in those 20. There are some small firms that are focused on niche vertical markets
>> 或者他们切入的阶段比大机构要早得多，以至于与大机构之间没有太多的竞争。不过这种策略的问题在于，你必须在基金规模及其策略上保持一致性。如果随着时间的推移你开始把规模做大，那你就会撞上大机构，而且我认为那样一来要保持一致性就会变得非常、非常困难。
Original English >> or they're playing at a stage that's so much earlier than the bigger firms where like there is not a lot of competition with the bigger firms. Now the problem with that strategy is you have to stay consistent in terms of fund size and their strategy. If you start getting bigger over time then you bump into the big firms and I think it it becomes really really hard to stay consistent.
>> 是的。没错。中间层的消亡（Death of the middle）。
Original English >> Yeah. Yep. Death of the middle.
>> 中间层的消亡。
Original English >> Death of the middle of the middle.
>> 我们说过每次提到“中间层的消亡”我们都要喝一杯的。所以……
Original English >> We said we were going to drink every time we said death of the middle. So
>> 我对我们风投生态圈里的许多同行都非常赞赏。嗯，你知道，但这个所谓的中间层消亡……
Original English >> I'm very complimentary of of many of our peers in the in the venture ecosystem. Um you know like but this this death of the middle thing
>> 你怎么定义它？
Original English >> how do you define it?
>> 比如到底什么是中间层？额，所以我认为就像你刚才描述的那样，比如高度专业化的基金，你知道，有些很早就进入 AI 领域、拥有极其深厚的领域专家的基金……
Original English >> Like what's the middle? Uh so I think like sort of what you described like the highly specialized funds you know some of the ones that were very early to AI with like deep deep deep domain experts
>> 嗯，做得相当不错，对吧？他们做得很好，而且你知道，有时他们能迅速行动进入项目，或者分食我们想要参与的交易份额，你知道，那确实是现实。嗯，然后我认为还有比如你知道无论我们是……你……
Original English >> um have done a pretty good job right like they've done a good job and and you know sometimes they can move fast get into things or take shares of deals that we want to do and you know that that is that is a reality um then I think there's like the you know whatever we're you
### 全阶段平台与飞轮效应 在某种意义上，大规模风险投资的特点就在于我们拥有众多产品线，能够一路陪跑，从种子轮一直跟进到企业上市。我想我们的一些同行也采用了类似的策略，对吧？虽然我很想认为我们做得最好，但确实还有另外几家也是这么做的。除此之外，介于两者之间的其他所有机构，我认为在竞争中都会有些吃力，原因正如埃迪所言，对吧？ 创始人真正在意的是什么？创始人真正在意的，是接受一位他们认为能够为自己降低结果风险的合伙人的资金——如果要极简概括的话，这就是描述创始人真正在意之物的最简单方式。当然，他们也在意合伙人本身，对吧？比如负责治理的人。所以你必须是一个好伙伴，诸如此类。但我们投入巨大资源建立起现在的规模是有原因的，对吧？这就是为什么我们拥有700名员工。这也是为什么我们把从基金中赚取的管理费再投资于运营资源，因为我们认为这第一能改善最终结果的走向，第二有助于我们赢得项目。 因此，当创始人挑选合伙人时，往往如果是热门项目，他们会有很多备选方案。这就是显性偏好。而且，正如埃迪所说，我们在这方面做得还算不错。接着我也认同他的看法，我们的LP来投资我们，就是这一过程的副产品，对吧？ 所以，我们的业务是一个飞轮。这个飞轮始于：我们是否是深度的行业领域专家？我们是否能提出正确的观点？我们能否向创始人证明，我们就是适合他或她的合作伙伴？如果能，我们就赢得了项目。如果我们能帮助改善结果，那就太棒了。而如果我们确实让结果变得更好，就会发生两件事：第一，我们业务的回报具有持续性，部分原因在于新一代创始人希望与赢家为伍，对吧？他们很在意这一点，因为这有着重要的品牌效应，并能为他们带来连锁反应。第二，通过跻身赢家之列并为他们提供一些微小帮助，我们建立了极具说服力的背书，这些创始人随后就会告诉其他创始人：“嘿，你应该和这些人合作。”这就是我们业务中飞轮运转的方式。
Original English know large you know large scale venture right in theense is that we have many product lines and we can scale all the way from, you know, a seed all the way through to when you go public. Um, and I think we have some peers who employ a similar strategy, right? And, you know, there's I'd like to think that we're the best, but there's there's a few other folks who do that. Everything else in between that, I think, struggles to compete a little bit for the reasons that Eddie said, right? The what does the founder care about? the founder cares about um you know sort of taking capital from a partner that they think can derisk the outcome for themselves like that if you were just to simplify it that is the simplest way to describe what the founder really cares about. Now they care about the partner, right? Like the government person. So you have to you have to be a good actor and all those things. But there's a reason why we build up a tremendous amount of resources, right? Like that's why we have 700 employees. Uh that's why we take, you know, the management fees that we make on our funds and we invest them in operating resources because we think that it will one bend the curve on the outcome and two help us to win deals. Um, and so, you know, when founders select their partners often, you know, if it's a hot deal, like they'll have many alternatives. Like, that's the revealed preference. And, and you know, as Eddie said, we're doing an okay job with that. What I agree with him about then is our LPs coming to invest in us is a byproduct of that, right? Um, and so, you know, our business, our business is a flywheel. Um, the flywheel starts with um, you know, are we are we deep domain experts? uh are we going to have a point of view uh that is the right point of view? Um can we demonstrate to the founder that we you know are the right partner for for her or him? Um if so, we win the deal. If we can help to make the outcome better, that's great. Um and then if we do make the outcome better, there's two things that happen. One, um our business has persistence of returns partially because um you know the the new founder wants to be around the winners, right? they want they care about because there's important brand and that has knock on effects for them. Um and then secondly, you know, by being a part of the winners and helping them, you know, in small ways, uh we we create sort of killer references and the founders then tell the other founders, hey, you should work with these folks. And so that's the way the flywheel works in our business.
>> 有个理论，很想听听你们两位的看法：
Original English >> One theory curious to get your both of your takes is
>> 比如Pre-seed轮和种子轮，也就是估值在2000万、3000万、4000万美元以下，基金规模在1亿美元以下。它们可以与大机构共存，因为在创立阶段，假设有七家AI公司都在做大致相同的事情。我想像Andreessen这样的大机构可能会想等上一两轮，直到出现更多的相对确定性。因为有一件事是你绝对不想做的，那就是投到第二名或第三名；正如你所说，你必须投中赛道赢家。所以你们宁愿等那一轮，然后再加大投入去领投A轮或B轮。嗯。
Original English >> take preed seats. So sub 20, 30, $40 million valuation, sub$und00 million funds, they can coexist with the big firms because at inception stage, say there's seven AI companies kind of doing the same thing. I would think a large firm like Andre would want to wait for a round or two until there's more relative certainty because one thing you don't want to do is be in the number two or number three like you said, you have to be in the category winner. So you rather wait for that round and actually double down and lead the A or the B. Mhm.
>> 所以这些小机构可以在比大机构早一两步的阶段为自己开辟出一个利基市场，并且真正拥有获胜权。它们可以做得非常好，并且与大机构形成互补。
Original English >> So the small firms, they can carve out a niche for themselves a clip or two earlier than the big firms and actually have a right to win. They can do really well and be complimentary to the big firms.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 你认同这一点吗，还是说……？
Original English >> Do you agree with that or like
>> 对，对，对，对。你看，我们在整个生态系统中与种子基金保持着非常良好的关系。我们自己也做种子轮，对吧？但Pre-seed轮确实往往比我们通常进入的阶段更早。
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And look, we have like very healthy relationships with with seed funds across the ecosystem. Um we also do do seed ourselves, right? But preede for sure, you know, sort of earlier than we typically.
>> 我想你们会投的种子轮，是那种体量更大、更扎实的种子轮吧？比如针对连环创业者的那种。
Original English >> The seed you would do I think is like chunkier bigger seed, right? Like a serial entrepreneur.
>> 过去曾经是——对。
Original English >> They used to be a Yeah.
>> 对，那确实曾经是我们的……话虽如此，我们也有自己的Speedrun项目，实际上我们今天上午早些时候刚从那边过来，我不知道，我觉得……
Original English >> Yeah. that that definitely is our that said, you know, we have our speedrun program which we just came from actually earlier this uh this morning and I don't know I think
### 早期布局与全周期联动的必要性 >> 我认为市场正在发生变化，正如DG刚才所说，由于创始人对大品牌有着极强的偏好依附，我们能够接触到所有的项目，有时候对我们来说去投Pre-seed和种子轮确实是有意义的。所以，你其实需要这种能力的灵活性；而且对创始人而言，正如你所指出的，他们其实并不在乎你的重心在哪里，他们只是想进入这个轨道，而你总能找到相匹配的基金来对接。因此我认为在这个世界里我们可以共存，但我同时也认为非常重要的一点是，我们的业务本质上是一门早期投资业务，我们必须最先赶到现场。我们可能实际上并不会出手投资，但我们至少必须了解全局图景和市场，以便后续真正做出明智的决策。因此……
Original English >> I think the market is evolving where we're where um because founders have such a preferential attachment as as DG was saying to the brands we get to look at everything and sometimes it does make sense for us to do the preede and seed and so you know you kind of want that flex of capability and for the founder to your point they kind of don't really care where your focus is they just want to be in that orbit and like you'll find the funds to kind of match to it and so I think we can coexist in this world but I I think it's also very um important like our business is principally an early stage business we have to be first to the poll and we may not actually do the investment but we have to at least understand the landscape and market to be able to actually make the informed decisions later on and so
>> 我今天在Speedrun和几位创始人聊过，他们非常希望留在这一轨道中。
Original English >> I spoke to a few founders at speedrun today and they very much are hoping to stay in the orbit
>> 是的，长期留在里面，对吧。所以这在十年前算是一种新现象，而如今随着更多早期机构开始涉足后期，并进一步延伸其流程体系，这种形态真正开始确立，但当时还并不完全像今天这样。DG，我不知道你是否认同这一点：如果没有早期投资，随后也没有后期投资跟进，实际上几乎不可能有效地维持这种中期的业务。
Original English >> yeah long term right and so this is you know a new phenomena that were 10 years ago again this is starting to really take shape as more of the early stage folks started doing later stage and then extending process stack but not quite in the way that it is today and DJ I don't know if you you would agree with that like it's just virtually impossible to have this sort of mid-stage business effectively without having the early stage and then also the late stage and come behind it as well.
>> 是的，我的意思是，看，我个人肯定是有倾向性的，但我认为我们作为成长型基金之所以能取得成功，正是因为我们的早期业务。我一直都在说，我们的业务始于早期，也终于早期。所以，这在成长阶段为我们带来了巨大的优势，无论是在获取信息、知识、人脉资源等方面。而且我认为，我们的早期合伙人大概也会说，成长型业务同样给他们带来了益处，因为这让我们可以随着时间推移扩大并深化与创始人的合作关系，而这反过来又有助于在早期阶段赢得项目。
Original English >> Yeah, I mean look I'm very biased uh but I think the reason that we've been successful as a growth fund is because of our early stage business. I said that all the time like our business starts and ends with early stage and so um you know that provides us a tremendous amount of advantages at the growth stage um in terms of access information, knowledge um relationships etc. Um and I would think that you know our early stage partners would probably say that the growth business provides them benefits too because it allows you know us to scale up and deepen partnerships with founders over time and that helps to win deals at the at the early stage.
>> 是的，完全赞同，完全赞同。而且这是不可偏废的，你不能只做早期，也不能一味只等到后期。所以呼应你之前提到的观点，行业似乎正日益向少数几家头部聚集。这很可能是事实，因为同样存在这种幂次法则的动态，但与此同时，几乎绝大多数的代表性企业，我们都必须在早期就介入，因为那是我们保持主动权并参与按比例跟投等权益的唯一途径。所以这显然就是……
Original English >> Yeah. Totally. Totally. And you can't there's both sides. You can't only do the early, you can't also only wait till the late too. And so your point earlier around it looks like increasingly that firms are converging to a handful of names. Like that's probably true because you know again this power law dynamic but also at the same time almost majority of those logos so to speak we have to get at the early because that's the only way we maintain the ball control and also participate in the prata and then some. And so that's obviously the the business that
>> 我们坚信，最强大的后期投资特许业务背后，都依托着庞大的早期投资特许业务。当拥有早期投资特许业务时，你的制胜能力是成倍放大的。是的，就像……
Original English >> we're big believers that the strongest latestage franchises have a huge early stage franchise attached to them. Like the ability to win is multiplied when you have an early stage franchise. Yeah. Like it's
>> 我们谈到过后期投资的规模配置：无论你的后期基金规模有多大，如果你能在一定规模下，将基金的5%到10%投入到某家定义赛道的领军企业中。你之所以能做到这一点，是因为你拥有早期投资业务，并在早期就与创业者及管理团队建立了这种联系。如果是作为一家新成立的后期机构直接入局，想开出一张5亿美元的支票是非常困难的。
Original English >> um and we talked about sizing in late stage where you can whatever the size of your late stage fund is, if you can at scale put 5 to 10% of your fund in one of the category defining companies. The way you could do that is because you had an early stage franchise that developed that relation with the entrepreneur and the management team early on. It's really hard to come in as a denovo late stage firm and write a $500 million check.
>> 对，对，对。不，这确实非常难。是的，我亲历过那个领域。
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, it's very hard. Yeah. Uh Ive I've I've lived that world.
### LP视角的风投资产配置 >> 从LP的角度来看，你如何看待风险投资从根本上、或许在结构上变成了与你职业生涯刚开始时不同的一项工作？此外，在考虑构建投资组合时，鉴于风险投资内部其实存在各个子类别，你又是如何考虑风险投资内部的资产配置的？
Original English >> How do you think about from the LPC how venture is fundamentally perhaps a structurally different job than maybe when you started your career also as well? And you know how do you think about also asset allocation within venture because there's actually subasses within venture as you think about portfolio construction as well.
是的，我的意思是，如果以一种非常简化的方式来看，在我们脑海中，从事风险投资有四种方式：Pre-seed和种子轮，也就是基金规模在1.5亿以下的基金，如今仅在美国就有近2000家；
Original English Yeah, I mean there's I mean in a very simplistic way there's in our mind there's four ways to do venture preceded seed so think sub 150 funds there's thousand thousand close to 2,000 today in the US alone
>> 接着是我们谈到过的尴尬的中间层，顺便说一句，那里有很多机构，有数百家机构；然后是大机构；
Original English >> messy middle we talked about and then there's a lot of firms there by the way thousands of not thousands hundreds of firms and then the big firms
>> 接下来是专注于后期的机构。所以一共有四种参与方式。
Original English >> and then dedicated late stage so there's four ways to play it
>> 我们投资大机构已经有几十年了；我们投资了种子轮机构；在尴尬的中间层我们有选择性地投了几家；
Original English >> um we have done the larger firms for decades now we've done the seed firms we've select effectively done a few in the messy middle
>> 而对于专注后期的机构，我们还没有投资过，原因……
Original English >> and we haven't done dedicated late stage for the
我们谈过的那些原因。
Original English reasons we talked about.
>> 嗯，情况正在发生怎样的变化？AI 实际上让我们的工作变得比以往任何时候都更加困难。
Original English >> Um how is it changing? AI is actually making our jobs harder than ever before.
>> 嗯，它让工作变难，是因为融资轮次通常更大了。
Original English >> Um it's making it harder because rounds are larger
>> 速度也更快了。行业里目前出现的势头令人困惑。以下是它令人困惑的原因。你可以看到一家公司——我其实非常想听听你对这点的看法，因为我们经常听到这种事——一家公司从“随便选一个孵化器”出来，一个月内 ARR 从零做到五百万。
Original English >> in general. They're faster. The traction that's happening in the industry is confusing. And here's why it's confusing. You can have a company I'm actually really curious to hear this from you because we hear this a lot. company comes out of Pick Your Accelerator. I went from zero to five million ARR in a month.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 那家公司还没有经历任何续约周期。
Original English >> There's no renewal cycle yet on that company.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 他们正以极高的估值倍数依据这种势头进行融资。很多时候，他们可能只是在同一个孵化器同期学员之间相互售卖。而且这甚至都不是 ARR，但他们却直接乘以 12。所以，但是每九家这样的公司里，就会有一家真正特别的，它拥有两三百万的真正 ARR，估值极高，并且将会继续成长为下一个 Cursor。
Original English >> And they're raising off of that traction at huge multiples. And a lot of times they're selling to each other in a cohort potentially. And it's not even ARR, but they're multiplying by 12. So, but for every C for nine companies like that, there's one really special one that's doing a couple of million in ARR actual ARR that has a huge valuation that will go on to be the next cursor.
>> 是的。所以现如今要辨别出什么是真正的势头、什么不是，确实非常非常困难。估值非常高。这也是大机构表现优异的原因。我其实认为他们可以等待，或者他们在下一轮拥有足够的相对确定性，然后再去领投那一轮。但即便在那时，也没有多少确定性可言。你们当初投 Cursor 的时候，我认为并没有很多确定性。而且有多少个月，人们都在说 Cursor 已经死了？
Original English >> Yeah. So it is really really tough actually today to parse out like what's real attraction what's not. Valuations are really high. This is why the big firms do well. I actually think they can wait or they have enough relative certainty in the next round then lead that round. But even then there isn't a lot of certainty. When you guys did cursor I don't think there was a lot of certainty. And how many for how many months were people saying cursor is dead?
>> 哦，甚至在宣布收购的当天早上，人们仍然在说 Cursor 已经死了。我当时想，他们刚宣布要被 SpaceX 以 60……
Original English >> Oh even the morning of the acquisition announcement people were still saying that cursor is dead. I'm like, they just announced that they were going to be acquired by SpaceX for 60.
>> 如果我说错了请纠正我。300 万 ARR，4 亿美元的一轮，或者大概在那个水平。
Original English >> Tell me if I'm wrong. 3 million AR, $400 million round or somewhere maybe around there.
>> 是的。差不多那样。对。
Original English >> Yeah. Something like that. Yeah.
>> 很多人会说，那太疯狂了。他们为什么要做那笔交易？
Original English >> Like a lot of people would say like that's crazy. Why did they do that deal?
>> 是啊，是啊。好吧，你看。创始人判断力是一件非常重要的事情，对吧？所以，随着时间的推移去了解创始人，花大量时间与他们相处，观察他们的思考方式——我倾向于认为，尤其是我的早期阶段合伙人，在这方面是相当擅长的。其次，要分辨出真实的势头与那种误导性的势头确实很难。所谓误导性，是指你无法从中获取市场信号，并不是说有人在故意误导。
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, look. Okay. So, like founder judgment is a very important thing, right? And so, you know, getting to know founders over time, spending a lot of time with them, seeing how they think, like I'd like to think that, you know, especially my early stage partners are pretty good at that. Um, secondly, like it is hard to parse out real verse, you know, kind of misleading attraction. And misleading in the sense that like you can't take market signal from it. Not that anybody's doing any misleading. Um,
>> 大概也有一些那种成分。
Original English >> there's probably some of that too.
>> 是的，可能也有一些那种情况，但我还是回到……
Original English >> Yeah, there's probably some of that too, but like I go back to
>> 我喜欢人们时不时帮忙重新定义 ARR 到底是什么意思。我觉得这对大家来说是一个非常有用的公益提示……
Original English >> I love every now and then people are like helping to redefine what AR actually means. I'm like this is a very helpful PSA for the
>> 这总是有帮助的。是的。但我不知道，还是回到这个问题：市场是否需要更多你的产品？这始终是核心问题。那张便利贴就贴在我的电脑屏幕上。
Original English >> This is always helpful. Yes. Uh, yeah. But like I don't know, come back to, you know, is the market demanding more of your product? Like that is always the question. That's post a note on my on my computer screen. Like
>> 当一家公司才运营或销售了几个月时，你怎么知道这一点？
Original English >> how do you know that when the company's been only operating or selling for a couple of months?
>> 你无法通过财务分析来做到这一点。你必须通过真正理解客户、与客户交谈来做到这一点。然后，这就像随着时间推移我对 Harvey 的评价一样，作为一个例子，对吧？他们在早期商业化方面做得非常好，因为他们很聪明。他们是研究人员加律师的组合。他们获得了一些势头，并在早期签下了一些知名律所。但是使用量并不是很好，对吧？所以，如果你看它的实际部署情况，相比其他一些软件公司，它看起来就很平庸，还有 AI……
Original English >> You're not going to be able to do it with financial analysis. You'll have to do it by really understanding the customers, talking to the customers. And then, you know, it's like one of the things that I said about Harvey overtime as an example, right? Um they did a really good job commercially early days like cuz they were they were smart. They were re there was like a research plus lawyer combo. um you know they got some momentum and some and some you know high-profile law firms to sign up early days um but you know the usage was not very good right and so like if you looked at the actual deployment of it just it looked like mediocre compared to some other software firms um you know and AI
>> 从留存的角度来看？
Original English >> from a retention standpoint
>> 不是留存，不，是它的使用量。
Original English >> not retention no usage of it um
>> 现在快进到推理模型之后，情况完全颠倒过来了。
Original English >> now fast forward post reasoning models like that totally flipped
>> 你可以看到采用率的绝对腾飞，对吧？于是，一系列不同的事情同时发生了。律师从该产品中获得了多得多的价值。你可以从使用量和参与度中看出来。而且，正因为它是高实用性的使用和参与，情况几乎发生逆转，从之前的“哦，我们害怕幻觉之类的东西”，变成了“不，不，不，每个客户其实都在要求律所使用该产品”。因此，我认为我们寻找的就是这样的市场。我们努力尽早抓住它们，努力比我们在 Harvey 时的阶段更早抓住它们。但是，这就是我们寻找的信号。你必须深入一线。每个人都可以做同客群分析，每个人都可以看续约数据。但是理解市场的底色，以及客户实际想要什么、需要什么，以及他们的替代方案，我认为这就是你做出决策的方式。这就是为什么拥有早期阶段业务如此重要的原因。因为他们在技术和产品方面扎得最深。而且，他们显然在 Cursor 身上看到了这一点，他们在很多其他事情上也看到了。
Original English >> and uh you could see you absolute takeoff of adoption, right? And so a bunch of different things happened at the same time. Lawyers got way more value out of the product. You could see it in usage and engagement. Um, and then it became because it was like high utility usage and engagement. It almost became a flip from what was previously like, oh, we're scared of things like hallucinations to, no, no, no, every client is actually demanding the law firms use the product. Um, and so, you know, I think we look for markets like that. We try to catch them early, like we try to catch them earlier than when than we did at Harvey. Um, but, you know, that's the kind of signal that we look for. You got to go you got to go lay it down. Like, everyone can do cohort analysis. Everyone can look at renewal data. Um, but like understanding the texture of the market and what the customers actually want and need in their alternatives. I think, you know, that's how you make the decision. That's why it's so important to have the early stage business. Um, because they're the deepest in the in the technology, in the products. Um, and they, you know, they obviously saw it in cursor and they've seen it in many other things.
### LP 对 AI 与风险投资现状的反馈 >> Jen，最大的阻力是什么？我是说，你是我认识的最能募集资金的人。那么，你从……那里得到的阻力是什么？
Original English >> Jen, what's the biggest push back? I mean, you're the most prolific fundraiser I know. So, what's the push back you get from
>> 你完全可以在这家机构谋得一份待遇优厚的工作。
Original English >> You could be very gainfully employed at this firm.
>> 我同意你是一位多产的募资者。
Original English >> I I agree that you are a prolific fundraiser.
>> 嗯，在 AI 的现状、风险投资的现状方面，你从 LP 那里得到的最大阻力是什么？
Original English >> Um, what's the biggest push back you're getting from LPs on like the state of AI, the state of venture?
>> 其中很多是围绕……比如，我们是否正在这里接飞刀？就像市场的时机，我们所处的阶段，东西是否过热了等等。所以我们在开头谈了很多关于这方面的内容，关于估值以及市场的潜力是什么。但我确实从 LP 那里感受到了很多情绪，即他们的工作也即将发生根本性的改变。你之前提到过其中的一个方面，即 AI 使得评估机会和基金变得更具挑战性；但另一个方面是，从历史来看，LP 在某些方面其实并没有动力去积极拥抱改变，对吧？这是一份在某种程度上最终目标与 GP 的风险承受能力截然相反的工作。这只是行业的运行机制，但我经常说，GP 可能会因为错失下一个 Facebook、下一个 Uber 而被解雇，对吧？那是疏忽之错，那种错误是会被开除的。
Original English >> So, a lot of it is is worries around um, you know, are we catching a falling knife here? Just like the timing of the market, where we are, like are things overheated, etc. And so we talked a lot about this at the the outset, you know, around valuations and what the potential of the market is, but I do get a lot of sentiment from the LPs that their job is also about to fundamentally change as well. And and you mentioned earlier one aspect of it around AI making it more challenging to evaluate opportunities and funds, but the other aspect of it as well is the the LP historically has not been incentivized to actually embrace change in some respects, right? you know, this is very much a job where um the end goal is actually somewhat diametrically opposed with the risk tolerance of the GP and and this is just the the mechanics of the industry, but I often times say, you know, a GP can get fired for missing out, you know, the next, you know, Facebook, the next Uber, right? Like that is the error of omission and like that is fireable.
>> 但反过来，LP 只有在投资了 Amanda 时才会被解雇。所以在某些方面，激励结果实际上与……完全相反。
Original English >> But LPs on the flip side only get fired if you invest into Amanda. So in some respects like the incentive outcomes are actually completely opposite of the
>> 如果你是 LP，你不会因为投资 IBM 而被解雇。
Original English >> you don't get fired for investing in IBM if you're an LP.
>> 确实如此。对。事实上，你甚至可能根本不会因为不投资而被解雇。
Original English >> Exactly. Yeah. And in fact like you don't potentially even get fired for not investing at all.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 所以……
Original English >> And so
>> 回到你的第一个问题，作为 LP，如果你错过了前沿模型，但你大致跟随着基准。对。
Original English >> if you miss if you miss the frontier models back to your first question as an LP but you kind of are along the benchmark. Right.
>> 也许稍微低于基准，你也能保住工作。
Original English >> Maybe slightly below the benchmark you're keeping your job.
>> 对。对。这太耐人寻味了。
Original English >> Right. Right. And that's fascinating.
>> 而且对大多数人来说——我会把母基金排除在外，因为那是另外一回事——但对很多人来说，上行空间对他们来说实际上并没有那么大的吸引力。所以，那种“嘿，你可能会错过下一代潜在……”的说辞就存在激励机制不匹配。
Original English >> And and also for most folks and I'll leave fund of funds out of the the equation because it's a different different piece, but but you know for a lot of folks the upside actually is not that interesting for them. So the pitch of like hey you're going to miss out on the next potential generation incentive misalignment.
>> 这实际上相当直接。那么，从 LP 的角色来看，我们接下来该走向何方？我认为我们也拥有重要的角色和职能。在我们作为风险投资行业领导者的工作背景下，我们经常谈到，我们必须帮助人们理解未来的发展方向。这其中的一部分，是理解不仅要渗透进他们的风险投资配置之中，而且要渗透到他们的整个投资组合之中。我认为这远比仅仅说“嘿，你可能会错过这下一代回报”，或者错过前沿模型的优化，或者错过一两家幂律分布的公司等等，要有趣得多。
Original English >> It's it's actually quite um direct. So so where do we go from there in terms of the LP kind of role and see like it I think we also have an important role and function. And we oftent times talk about in the context of our job as a leader of the venture capital industry is we have to help folks understand where the future is going. And part of that is understanding how to infiltrate not just within their venture capital allocation but across their entire portfolio. And that I think is way more interesting than just saying hey like you might miss out on this next generation returns or the optimization of like the next frontier model or you know one or two power law companies etc.
>> 获取份额、挑选项目、确定规模，这是 LP 所做的事情。所以获取份额……
Original English >> Access selection sizing is what LPs do. So access
>> 你可以说你有数据来弄清历史上谁做得好。
Original English >> you could argue you have the data to figure out who has done well historically
>> 在三千家机构中的那二十家机构里，你不会看到持续一致性，对吧，也许其中一半具有持续一致性。
Original English >> out of those 20 firms out of 3,000 like you are not going to see consistency right maybe half of them are consistent
>> 但 LP 的工作也是去寻找下一代机构，并继续获取那些份额，所以其一是你获取……
Original English >> but the LP's job is also to find the nextg firms as well as continue accessing that so one is you access
### 投资组合构建与资产配置 第二是甄选，第三是投资组合构建、规模控制，而且从 LP 的角度来看这至关重要。
Original English two is selection three is portfolio construction sizing and it's critical from an LP standpoint
>> 因为如果你面对的是一个在 3000 家机构中只有 20 家表现优秀的资产类别，你就应该相当持续地集中在这 15 到 20 家机构上。所以当我看到一个包含 50、60、70 家风险投资机构的投资组合时，我很难想象整体组合能跑赢平均水平。
Original English >> because if you have an asset class where 20 firms out of 3,000 do well you should concentrate in those 15 20 firms pretty consistently. So when I see a portfolio with 50 60 70 venture capital firms, it's very hard for me to imagine that the overall portfolio can generate better than the average.
>> 我又要说回风投的平均水平了。那根本就不是人们……
Original English >> And again, I'm going back to the average in venture. That's just not what one
>> 相对于流动性而言不够吸引人……
Original English >> not compelling enough for the liquidity
>> 相对于任何其他资产类别，比如公开市场、私募股权。我是说，私募股权可能能给你带来 1.5 到 2 倍的净回报，既没有锁定期，也没有你所承担的风险。你谈到了 60% 的亏损率，PE 没有那个，
Original English >> relative to any of the other asset classes, public markets, private equity. I mean, private equity can probably get you like one and a half to 2x net without the lock up, without the risk you're taking in. You talked about 60% loss ratio. P doesn't have that,
>> 对吧？呃，PE 还有其他问题，我们今天谈到 AI 软件时可以聊聊，但是，嗯，所以对 LP 来说，投资组合构建和规模控制至关重要。比如我见过太多次……
Original English >> right? Uh P has other problems we can talk about today when it comes to AI software, but um so portfolio construction sizing for an LP is critical. Like I've seen too many times
>> 一个 LP 或资产配置者找到了一支有趣的基金，实际上也选对了，
Original English >> an LP or an allocator find an interesting fund, actually get it right
>> 然后把自己基金的 1% 投了进去。
Original English >> and put 1% of their fund into it.
>> 太棒了，你赚了 10 倍。它贡献了你基金 10% 的回报，根本无法带来实质性改变。
Original English >> Great. You 10xed it. It returns 10% of your fund. It does not move the needle at all.
>> 是的。是的。是的。是的。大家认为我们今天处于 Jen 所说的那种演变中的什么位置？关于你该如何……我知道你有偏向，但在风险投资和成长型投资上分配的总体资本，与私募股权、公开市场、实物资产、信贷或任何其他资产相比，合适的百分比应该是多少……
Original English >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Where do you all think we are today in that evolution that Jen was talking about of how you would I know you're biased, but the appropriate percentage of overall capital allocated to venture and growth compared to private equity or public markets or real assets, credit, whatever it
>> 对，这……这对我来说很难回答，因为我只做风投成长型投资。所以，我的偏向会让我说应该大幅超配。嗯……
Original English >> Yeah, this is the this is hard for me to answer because all I do is venture growth. So, I would be biased to say it's should be superersized. Um,
>> 不过我们喜欢这个答案。
Original English >> we like that answer though.
### AI 对各资产类别的影响与退出格局 看看如今的公开市场。我们像是 vibe code 出了某种东西，为我们评估上市公司的 AI 韧性提供了一种极好的方式，现在我们正在一级市场上这样做，这在我们成长型股权投资组合中给了我们巨大的帮助。但在 SaaS 公开市场中，最多只有大约 15 到 20 家公司的交易估值超过 10 倍市销率，这是一个极其疯狂的数字，因为几年前那曾经是几十上百家。而且这些公司中的绝大多数，基本上都显示出受 AI 驱动的增长加速。你要么是做监控的，要么是做安全的，要么是做智能体部署的，等等。所以，这又回到了同样的原则：如果你以某种形式与 AI 挂钩——这是 GDP 所有要素中增长最快的部分——那么你就应该在投资组合中大幅超配它。这在公开市场上也会产生影响。即使是如今的私募股权，当他们进行新投资时，他们也在寻找具备 AI 原生特性的标的。他们不会想去买一家增长 10%、基于席位收费的工作流软件公司。比如，那种事根本就不会发生。他们寻找的是能够展现出在 AI 原生管理团队带领下实现加速的记录系统。
Original English Look, look at the public markets today. We vibe coded like something that created a great way for us to assess AI resiliency of public companies and now we're doing that on the private side and it's helping us hugely in in our growth equity portfolio. But the in the SAS public markets there only like 15 to 20 companies max trading above 10 times revenues which is by an insane number because it used to be dozens and dozens a few years ago. And every one of those companies for the most part is showing acceleration of growth from AI. you're either in monitoring, security, deployment of agents, etc. So, it goes back to the same principle where if you are in some shape or form tied to AI, which is the fastest growing facet of all the elements of the GDP, then you should superersized it in your portfolio. That will have impacts in the public markets. Even private equity today, when they're doing a new investment, they're looking for something that's AI native. They're not looking to buy a workflow software company growing 10% that's seedbased. Like, that's just not happening. They're looking for the system of record. that can show acceleration with an AI native management team.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 所以 AI 的这种纽带如今实际上横跨了每一个资产类别。
Original English >> So that connective tissue of AI is actually across every asset class today.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 而参与其中最强有力的方式之一，我是说，可能就是通过风投。
Original English >> And the one of the strongest way to play it is I mean it's it's probably through venture.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 但那正是甄选、获取份额和投资组合构建极其关键的地方。
Original English >> But that's where selection access and portfolio construction is really critical.
>> 是的。不过即便是在退出方面，我们之前在聊……你知道，比如像 Silver Lake 可能买下 Workday 这样的事，比如在私募股权领域做一些更大胆的尝试，当你具备相应能力去潜在地注入并把它们带入未来作为其中的一部分。另外一种情况是，现在风投领域的退出规模也远远超过了私募股权。比如我……你知道，就像我昨晚查的一样。今年私募股权方面，最大的退出是……嗯，对 EA 的收购，大概在 500 亿左右，以及 Medline，也是 500 亿左右。Cursor……我们先不……先排除 IPO。像 Cursor 出售给 SpaceX 的并购交易，规模远比那个大得多。所以问题在于，就像……
Original English >> Yeah. Well, even the exits though we were talking about um you know Silverl potentially you know buying workday for example just like doing more provocative things for example in private equity land when you have the capabilities to potentially infuse and and bring them into into the future as a part of that. The other version of it is also exits in venture now way exceed private equity. Like I you know like I was looking this up last night. Private equity this year. The biggest exits are um the buyout of EA which was like around 50 billion and Medline which is around 50 billion. Curser let's not let's exclude the IPOs. Like cursor was the M&A sale to SpaceX was way bigger than that. And so the pro the problem with that is like
### 传统 SaaS 面临的估值与转型挑战 >> 你看 ChatGPT 之前的年份，在私募股权领域……
Original English >> you look at the pre-hat GPT vintages and private equity
>> 你以前会为一个最多增长 10% 到 20% 的软件资产支付，我不知道，15 到 20 倍的 EBITDA，
Original English >> you would have paid I don't know 15 to 20 times EBIDA for an software asset that's growing 10 20% max
>> 对。
Original English >> y
>> 如果你看今天的公开市场，那个资产的交易价格是两倍市销率，
Original English >> if you look at the public markets today that asset is trading at two times revenue
>> 对。
Original English >> y
>> 问题不仅在于估值，那家公司可能根本找不到买家，因为……
Original English >> and the problem is not that just the valuation there might not be a buyer for that company because
>> 如果你今天在看一家软件公司，你首先想到的就是终局价值是多少，它对 AI 是否具备韧性。展现这一点的最好方式是内生增长的加速。我们的数据显示，在公开市场中，1 个百分点的增长相当于 3 个百分点的 EBITDA。
Original English >> if you're looking at a software company today the first thing you think about what is the terminal value is it resilient from AI. The best way to show that is organic growth acceleration. Our data shows 1 percentage of growth in the public markets is equivalent to three percentages of IBIDA.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yep.
>> 所以，顺便说一句，挺有意思的，因为在疫情期间，每个人都在说我们需要实现盈利。那时是反过来的，而现在又完全相反了。
Original English >> So, by the way, it's funny because in co everyone was like we need to be profitable. It was the inverse and now it's the opposite.
>> 不，不。21 年是反过来的。之后基本上……完全是呃，与风险保持一致，对吧？与公开市场的风险挂钩。
Original English >> No, no. 21 it was the inverse. Post it's basically like fully uh aligned with risk, right? Correlated with like risk in the public.
>> 没错。嗯，所以不幸的是，很多私募股权交易，它们增长不够快。它们没有表现出那种加速，而且它们可能没有管理团队来彻底重组业务，比如 Intercom 的做法就是一个很好的例子。把创始人请回……请回来，重组整个业务，打造一款 AI 原生产品，做大规模，然后再去销售。这几乎就像是在让你现有的业务自杀一样，而在私募股权里这是非常难做到的。
Original English >> Exactly. Um so, unfortunately, a lot of those private equity deals, they're not growing fast enough. they're not showing that acceleration and they may not have the management teams to revamp the business like what intercom did is a great example. Bring the founder bank uh back, revamp the whole business, create an AI native product, scale it, and then sell. Like it's almost like you're suiciding your existing business, which in private equity is really hard to do.
>> 这确实非常难做。我刚跟那位创始人呆了一小会儿，呃，我……我在一场活动上走到他面前，我就像……我直接给了他一个大大的击掌，我说：“你做到了，老兄。
Original English >> It's really hard to do. I just spent a little time with the founder uh and uh I I went up to him at an event and I was like I just gave him a big high five and I'm like, "You did it, man.
>> 你做到了。这……这就是那种非常、非常难做到的事情。你知道，目前这还是孤例。
Original English >> You did. This is the this is the thing that like is really really hard to do. You know, it's an end of one right now.
>> 嗯，但你知道，有一批非常优秀的创始人，他们有能力掌舵那些公司，公开市场的、一级市场的，
Original English >> Um but you know, there's a bunch of really good founders who are capable with those businesses, public markets, private markets,
>> 呃，我认为他们会去尝试一下。嗯，所以我们拭目以待。
Original English >> uh who I think are are going to take a crack at it. Um so we'll see.
>> 是的。不过顺着那个思路，DJ，因为我们……我们有时也会遇到阻力，比如对于那些一直从事风投并向风投配置资金的人来说，他们也可能会有类似的问题，即他们手里同样有传统的 SaaS 业务。比如，关于你如何看待历史包袱，这其中的平衡是什么？
Original English >> Yeah. May maybe on that thread though, DJ, because we we also sometimes get the push back as well like for folks who have been in venture and allocated to venture, they might also have a similar problem where they do have the legacy SAS businesses also as well. like what's the balance between how you think about the historical stuff?
>> 让我来问你这个问题。所以，我要顺着 Jim 向你提的问题继续问。你挑一家 2016 年到 2021 年 ChatGPT 之前年份的软件公司，它表现还可以，但不再拥有那些 AI 原生特性。它没有在加速。它的增长大概在 30% 左右。在风投账面上，它大概是 10 到 20 倍市销率。它不再能够上市了。就像，没人愿意带它去上市。
Original English >> Let me ask you that question. So, I'm going to piggyback off of Jim's question to you. You got a pick a 2016 through 2021 pre-Cat GPT vintage software company that was fine but doesn't have that AI native features anymore. It's not accelerating. It's growing like 30%. On the venture books, it's at like 10 20 times revenue. It's not can go public anymore. Like no one cares to take that public.
>> 是的。Silver Lake 对那家公司不再感兴趣了。一年前他们可能会有，现在他们没有了。
Original English >> Yeah. Silver Lake has no interest in that company anymore. They would have a year ago. They don't.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 那家公司会怎样？
Original English >> What happens to that company?
>> 嗯，你看，这就像……
Original English >> Um, you know, look, it's like
>> 我们在这类公司上也有很多敞口。所以，
Original English >> we have a lot of exposure to those companies, too. So,
>> 我会说这非常……还非常待定，对吧？比如我，你知道，我这个周末和……嗯，我们的一位 CEO 创始人在一起，你知道，他就说，
Original English >> I would say it's like it's it's very TVD, right? Like I, you know, I was with um one of our CEO founders this weekend and, you know, he was like,
>> “你知道，跟我说实话。比如，你究竟觉得现在正在发生什么？”而且，嗯，你知道，别给……他其实对我说，别给我播客式的公关回答。嗯，这挺讽刺的。嗯，你知道，我认为两件事可以同时成立：一是 AI 是我们见过的最大的时代性变革，它将重塑各个行业；同时，那些能够适应的软件公司也会保留一些持久的价值，对吧？嗯，我们正在监测的一件事——这让我们对 AI 极其看好——就是它向实体经济的实际扩散，对吧？所以在编程方面，我认为如果……如果要为常规软件和更缓慢的变化节奏描绘一种乐观前景，你会说，嗯，你知道，编程受到了冲击，但那算是一种虚晃一枪，对吧？因为编程……编程有完美的文档记录，对吧？所以它有类似完美的数据，呃，它是可验证的，而且是可模拟的，对吧？因此，嗯，就像大多数商业任务并不具备这三个属性，所以，你知道，向编程之外的其他知识工作的扩散，可能会耗费长得多的时间。这会是替那些软件公司辩护的理由。嗯，然后它们当中的一部分会演进，并且会拥有 AI，你知道的，解决方案，它们会改变它们的商业模式。嗯，我认为这是必须的。嗯，但那会是解释为什么可能……你知道，这是一个……
Original English >> you know, give me the straight scoop. Like, what do you actually think is happening? And, um, you know, not don't give me a he actually said to me, don't give me a podcast answer. Um, which is ironic. Um and you know I think both things can be true that AI is like the biggest generational change that we've ever seen and it's going to transform industries and also there will be some enduring value of software companies that are able to adapt right um part of the thing that we're monitoring which makes us extremely bullish about AI is just actual diffusion into the real economy right so coding I think if if you were to paint the the bullish scenario for regular software and for slower pace of change, you would say um you know coding hit but that's kind of a head fake, right? Like coding coding is perfectly documented, right? So it has like perfect data uh it's verifiable and it's simulatable, right? And so um like most tasks in business do not share those three attributes and so you know maybe the diffusion into other knowledge work beyond you know coding will take a lot longer. That would be the case to make for the software companies. Um, and then some of them will evolve and and have AI, you know, solutions and they'll change their business models. Um, and I think that's a must. Um, but that would be the case for why maybe, you know, it's a
……有点被夸大了。我认为如果你看看过去几个月许多上市 SaaS 公司的反应，我想人们对此已经有了一点越来越清醒的认识。不过，这一切都让我对人工智能超级、超级、超级看好，对吧？所以，如果你看一下我们的投资组合，你知道我们确实持有其中一些公司，但我们大约 95% 的净资产价值（NAV）并不在这些公司里，对吧，就在那里，它是在那些增长非常快、正在加速等等的公司中。嗯，你知道，中位数——我想是美国的中位数公司在每位员工身上每月花费 12 美元用于人工智能。而在我们所见的数据集中，排名前 1% 的公司每个月在每位员工身上花费 7,000 美元……
Original English little bit overblown. I think if you look at the way that a lot of the public SAS companies have reacted over the last few months, like that's I think there's a little bit of a growing realization in that. Um, all that makes me super super super bullish on AI though, right? So like if you look at our portfolio um you know we have some of those companies but about 95% of our NAV is not in those companies right like right there it's it's in the it's in the companies that are you know growing very fast accelerating etc. Um you know the average I think it was the median company in the US is spending $12 per employee on AI per month. The top 1% of the data set that we've seen is spending $7,000
>> 哇。
Original English >> Wow.
……在每位员工身上每月花费 7,000 美元用于人工智能。所以，不仅在编程之外的应用扩散十分有限，而且如果你只看扩散情况，看看到底是谁在消耗 token、目前真正从人工智能中获得实际价值，我们其实还处于极早期，对吧？比如银行，你知道，最尖端的银行在人工智能工具上的支出可能只占人力成本的 1%。因此，这让我非常看好的原因在于，这些是我们见过的有史以来增长最快的公司。再说一次，它们每月增加的收入比那些巨型科技股公司还要多。然而，这可能仅仅建立在大概 1,000 万用户、也许 2,000 万、最多 3,000 万用户的采用基础上。而且你知道，在美国有 15 亿美元工人。我认为这将会改变我们进行大量工作的方式。
Original English per employee on AI per month. So um not only have we had like limited diffusion beyond coding, but if you just look at diffusion of, you know, the shape of who is consuming tokens and actually getting real value out of AI today, we're super early, right? Like banks, you know, the most cutting edge banks are probably doing 1% of headcount cost on on AI tools. Um and so the reason this makes me very bullish is these are the fastest growing companies we've ever seen, like of all time. Again, they're adding more revenue per month than the than the mega cap tech companies. Um, and yet it's probably on the back of adoption of like 10 million users, maybe 20, maybe 30 max. And you know, there's one and a half billion dollar workers in the US. And I think it's going to transform the way we do a lot of work.
>> 是的，加州公务员退休基金（CalPERS）出名的是因未投资于他们支持的领域而错失了数十亿美元的收益。他们现在正在弥补失去的时间。他们已经将投资组合从 91% 转换至 58%，风投和成长期投资从 9% 增至 43%。在这两类资产之间可能存在某种平衡。但你知道，他们正在大力投入……不过在这些传统公司中仍将产生大量价值。我刚才开玩笑说 bending，那对 Airtable 来说可能是一个很好的结果。你知道，除了他们实际上……
Original English >> Yeah, Kalpers's famously uh lost out on billions of gains by not investing in their back. They're making up for loss time now. they they've uh converted their portfolio from 91% to 58 and venture and growth from 9 to 43. There's probably some balance in between those things. Uh but you know, they're they're leaning hard into um but there's going to be a lot of value still that's going to be accreted in some of these historical companies. And you I was sort of joking around about bending. That was probably a great outcome for Air Table. You know, outside of the fact that, you know, they're going to actually
>> ……分拆该业务的超代理（hyper agent）部分，实际上我认为会用它做出非常有趣的事情。但在整体局势中，我认为很多东西都会有其归宿。而这种零和思维，我认为可能正是我们会建议避免踩入的陷阱。
Original English >> spin off the hyper agent piece of the business and actually um I think do really interesting things with that. But in the scheme of things, I think there's going to be a lot of homes for a lot of things. And this zero sum thinking I think is is probably the pitfall of which we would would advise against.
### 私募信贷与软件业的估值调整 >> 所以我们讨论了风险投资和成长期投资，讨论了私募股权，讨论了公开市场。顺便提一下，过去 10 年里所有这些领域的构成都发生了巨大变化。我们在私募市场中也迎来了全新类别的出现，比如私募信贷。对于这些领域相对而言的前景，你有什么看法吗……
Original English >> So we talked about um we've talked about you know venture growth, we've talked about private equity, you know we've talked about um public markets. Um and by the way the composition of all of those have like radically changed over the last 10 years. Um we also have had the emergence of entirely new categories that are available in the private markets like private credit. Um do you have a view on sort of outlook of those on a relative basis
>> 特别是在软件领域？
Original English >> in software in particular?
>> 是的，我想说在科技领域……
Original English >> Yeah, I'd say in technology
>> ……我们的视角是审视存在于许多私募股权软件投资组合中的私募信贷，其规模达数千亿美元。
Original English >> uh the vantage point we have is looking at private credit which resides in a lot of private equity software portfolios which is hundreds of billions.
>> 嗯。
Original English >> Mhm.
>> 我给你一个统计数据。看看 2021 到 2022 年，大约发生了 2,000 亿到 3,000 亿美元的杠杆收购（LBO）软件交易，伴随着超过 2,000 亿美元的负债。那些软件交易的平均估值超过 EBITDA 的 25 到 32 倍。那些公司如今的价值可能只有当时的一半。你在信贷市场、私募信贷中看到赎回的原因正是如此。他们看着公开市场。你遭遇了 CS 大崩盘。这是软件领域的一次大规模回调，而且你可以看到估值的收缩，这意味着杠杆率急剧上升。所以，如果你是一家在某种程度上对人工智能缺乏抵御能力的软件公司，我认为你在股权地位和信贷方面都面临挑战。
Original English >> I'll give you one statistic. So you look at 2122 about 2 to 300 billion in LBO software transactions happened with over 200 billion in debt taken out. The average valuation for those software deals over 25 to 32 times IBIDA. Those companies today are worth probably half that. The reason you're seeing redemptions in the credit markets in private credit is exactly that. They're looking at the public markets. You've had CS apocalypse. It's been a massive correction in software and the val and you can see a contraction in valuations which means the leverage ratios have gone up dramatically. So if you are a software company that is in somewhat not resilient to AI I think you're challenged both in terms of your equity position also credit as well.
>> 顺便说一句，即使是私募股权的人工智能版本也并非完全高枕无忧。我们经常谈论，你知道，仅仅把西尔斯百货放到网站上并不能让它变成亚马逊，对吧？你必须具备从底层框架和物流体系全面打造亚马逊的优势，才能使之成为亚马逊。这不仅仅是一个网站的问题。而在许多情况下，那些现在正注入人工智能的私募股权支持的公司，实际上在我们自己的一些公司中也见识过类似情况：同业竞争对手会说，噢，我首先要做的当然是雇佣人工智能客服代理，因为这是唾手可得的低垂果实。事实证明，如果你没有把工作流真正构建进去，如果客户习惯了与真人交流，客户流失就会非常迅速；而且 NPS 的每一次下降，都与收入下降直接相关，然后你就会开始陷入恶性螺旋，特别是当你头顶上还背负着沉重债务时。因此，我们有时会听人说，好吧，我就做人工智能版本的私募股权。这并不是产生回报的灵丹妙药，尤其是从技术角度来看，要真正在整个公司内部全面融入人工智能，在本质上是截然不同的。
Original English >> By the way even the um AI version of private equity is not completely insulated. We oftentimes talk about like you know just because you put Sears on a website didn't make it Amazon right you have to have the benefit of building Amazon from the studs logistically to make it Amazon. It's not just the website and in a lot of instances with the private equity backed companies that are now just infusing AI. We've seen it actually in some of our companies as well where the peer competitor is like oh the first thing I'll do is of course hire AI customer service agents because that's like an easy lowhanging fruit. Like turns out if you don't actually build in the workflow, you start to turn customers very quickly if they're used to talking to a human and for every dollar uh every drop in NPS is like a direct correlation with drop in revenue and then you start to spiral especially if you have debt ladened on top of it. So oftentimes uh sometimes we hear from folks like well I'll just do the AI you know kind of version of private equity. It's not a pan panacea for for generating returns especially when it's just so categorically different from a technological perspective to actually infuse that throughout the company as well.
>> 是的，你不能只是给公司派一个运营合伙人，然后说“让我们给它加上人工智能”。这根本行不通。
Original English >> Yeah, you can't just throw an operating partner at the company and say let's put AI on it. It just doesn't work.
>> 你需要彻底——顺便说一下，如果你的管理团队确实具备创始人精神，这是有可能的，但董事会必须保持步调一致，所有投资者也必须步调一致……
Original English >> You need to completely and if you have by the way if you do have a founder mentality at the management team like it is possible but the board has to be aligned the all the investors have to be aligned
>> 而且你确实必须做出一些非常艰难的决定，就像 Intercom 所做的那样。
Original English >> and you do have to make some really hard decisions the way intercom did.
>> 是的。没错。
Original English >> Yeah. Yep.
### 风投的流动性周期与复利回报 >> 是的。显而易见，这是一个非常支持风险投资和成长期投资这一类别的群体。我们来谈谈对其合理的反对意见，以及为什么说你在风投和成长期投资中承担的风险或其他任何代价可能是站不住脚的理由。
Original English >> Yeah. So obviously this is a group that is very pro you know venture and growth this category. Um let's talk about the legitimate opposition to it and what is the case you know for why maybe the you know the risk that you're taking or whatever it may be with venture and growth you know doesn't justify it.
>> 呃，我是说，我们经常遇到的反对意见是实现流动性的时间周期。普通的独角兽通常要保持私有状态 10 年以上，然后你会看到所有这些后续轮融资接二连三地快速发生。你可能会在五六家不同的机构看到同一个公司标志……
Original English >> Uh I mean the push back we get a lot is timeline to liquidity. So it takes the average unicorn is private for 10 plus years typically and then you got all these follow on rounds that are happening pretty quickly one after the other. You see maybe the same logo in five six different firms
>> 问题是你如何从中退出……
Original English >> and the question is how do you get out of it
>> 嗯，因此……
Original English >> um and so
>> 而且 IPO 实际上并不是分配。
Original English >> and an IPO isn't actually a distribution.
>> 在你真正通过 IPO 获得流动性之前，可能需要耗费 12 到 24 个月以上的时间。尤其是如果你在 IPO 时持有 10% 到 15% 的股份，如果你身处一家划时代的公司，这需要很长时间。所以关于流动性的时间周期，我们经常收到这样的反对意见。
Original English >> It takes it could take 12 24 plus months before you actually get liquidity out of an IPO. like especially if you own 10 15% at IPO like it's going to take a long time if you're in the generational company. So we get that push back a lot in terms of timeline to liquidity.
>> 嗯。那么，针对这种反对意见的反驳是什么呢？
Original English >> Mhm. And then um what is the what is the sort of counter to that push back?
>> 针对这种反对意见的反驳，还是要回到 3,000 家机构中只有 20 家能持续表现优异这个事实上。如果你处于这前 1% 的机构中，并且拥有一个品类赢家，你实际上希望确保它能持续复利增长。
Original English >> Well counter to that push back is going back to 3,000 firms 20 do well consistently. If you're in the top 1% of those firms and you have a category winner you want to make sure that compounds actually.
>> 是的。三四年前你会愿意卖掉 Stripe、Databricks 或任何其他此类公司吗？答案是一致的：不愿意。现在，其中某些公司能否比通常情况更早上市？当然。Anthropic 实际上是在 2021 年才首次获得融资，它将在 5 年后上市。
Original English >> Yeah. Um would you have wanted to sell stripe data bricks or any of those other companies three four years ago? Like the answer is unanimously no. Uh now could some of these companies go public earlier than not? Sure. Entropic was really first funded in 2021. It's about to go public 5 years later.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> Cursor 从首次收购——从首次融资到收购的时间很短。比如……
Original English >> Cursor from first acquisition from first financing to acquisition is short. Like
>> 因此，最好的风险投资机构实际上能够相当快地获得足以返还基金本金的流动性，甚至可能比私募股权还要快。但那一小部分机构是极少数的。
Original English >> so the best venture firms actually have fund returning liquidity pretty quickly maybe even quicker than private equity. But that subset of firms is tiny.
>> 是的。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 是的。没错。实际上，非常有名的是，大约一年半前，我们去找了一期基金的 LP（有限合伙人）。当时那一期基金已经成立 16 年了，我们持有在种子轮阶段投资的 Stripe 仓位。我们问所有的 LP：“嘿，你们想从这里套现退出吗？”我们意识到，你知道，经过 16 年，我们当初要做的工作现在已经完成了。“你们想在这个项目上收回流动性吗？”而每一个 LP 都说：“不，我们宁愿让它继续复利增长。”最终在一年后，你知道，我们决定退出，因为已经到了第 17 年，我们必须收回这些流动性，必须清盘该基金等等。但是，你知道，这么多 LP，我认为具体取决于特定类别，对吧？大学捐赠基金更愿意让它继续跑下去。而家族办公室坦率地说根本不想要把钱拿回去，因为他们不想为之交税……
Original English >> Yeah. Yep. Actually, very famously uh a year and a half ago or so, we went to our fund one LPs. At that point in time, the fund one was 16 years old and we had this position in Stripe that we invested at the seed stage and we asked all of our LPs like, "Hey, do you want liquidity out on this?" We recognized, you know, the job that we came to do is now done 16 years in. Like, do you want liquidity back on this? And every single one of those LPs said, "No, we'd rather let this continue to compound." And then ultimately a year later, you know, we decided to to make that exit because it's 17 years in. We've got to get this this liquidity out. We got to wrap up the fund, etc. But, you know, so many LPS, I think, is very specific to certain categories, right? Endowments would prefer to let it run. Family offices, quite frankly, don't want the money back because they don't want to pay taxes on
它。他们宁愿让它继续复利。因此，每个 LP 群体都有具体的细微差别，很难一概而论地说所有人要的都是同一件事。但我也认为，正如你所指出的——
Original English it. They'd rather have it continue to compound. And so there is specific nuance with each LP group where it's very hard to paint a broad brush stroke stroke on like across the board on everyone wanting the same thing. But I also think to your point
>> 最顶尖的 LP，不好意思，是最顶尖的 GP，一路上都在创造流动性，特别是在 2021 年很多团队没有落袋为安的时候。我认为那是一个很好的首要指标，而现在在这个新的周期中，问题变成了你是否真的能通过并购尽早变现部分流动性，然后随着时间的推移，在充分复利的情况下让赢家走向 IPO。
Original English >> the very best LPS, excuse me, the very best GPS have manufactured along the way liquidity and particularly in 2021 when a lot of folks didn't take money off the table. You know, I think that was a good sign of the first indicator and now in this next cycle, it's can you actually get some early liquidity out through M&A and then let you know, potentially the winners IPO over time with the fullness of of compounding as well.
>> 对，没错。
Original English >> Yeah, exactly.
### 下一个万亿美元级机会 >> 我想以此收尾，因为我觉得你和 Gavin 之前来回讨论 DG 时的那个问题挺有意思的。嗯，他当时不想回答关于下一家 10 万亿美元市值的公司会是谁的问题，但他很笃定下一家 20 万亿美元市值的公司会是什么。所以，我想问问你们两位，你们认为下一家市值达到百万亿美元（100 trillion dollar）的公司会是什么？
Original English >> I'm going to end on this note because I I thought this is an interesting question that you and Gavin were were uh tossing back and forth DG on. Um he he uh didn't want to answer the question on what will be the next $10 trillion company, but he had certainty around what will be the next 20 trillion market cap company. So, I'm going to ask both of you, uh, what do you think is going to be the next, uh, hundred trillion dollar market cap?
>> 天哪，又来这套了。我都无法去思考那种量级的事情。
Original English >> Oh my gosh, here we go. I can't even think in those things.
>> 是啊，我们……那大概还需要经过两个技术周期，而不只是一个。完全有可能诞生全新的公司。而且我认为，大家讨论的能推动实现 10 万亿美元或更高成果的大量市值创造，都存在于那些尚未被涉足的新产品领域，对吧？所以——
Original English >> Yeah, we're, uh, that's probably two two tech cycles away, not just one. Uh, it is possible that we have entirely new companies that get created. And I think a lot of the market cap creation that you would talk about that would drive a 10 trillion outcome or more um, is in new product areas that haven't yet been touched, right? So
>> 对。
Original English >> yeah,
>> 就像我谈到的技术向企业的扩散，我们现在根本还没起步，对吧？
Original English >> like what I talked about the sort of diffusion of the technology into the enterprise like we're nowhere, right?
>> 嗯。
Original English >> Um,
>> 一年前大家总是在谈论消费端。现在甚至都没人谈论消费端 AI 了。但这将……针对消费者的最终用例不会是一个聊天机器人界面。那是拟物化的版本。我们将迎来原生的版本。它将是主动式的，会代表我们去处理工作，会为消费者创造巨大的价值。而在这方面我们几乎还没起步。我的意思是，确实，现在有 10 亿聊天用户，但这只是触及了皮毛。我们在机器人领域也还没什么进展，但我认为机器人技术将会比语言领域规模更大，而且我认为这将在未来 10 年内发生。
Original English >> you know, a year ago everyone talked about consumer all the time. No one even talks about consumer AI anymore. But that is going to like the end use case for consumers is not going to be a chatbot interface. Like that's the skumorphic version. We're going to have a native version. It's going to be proactive. It's going to do work on our behalf. It's going to it's going to create a ton of value for for consumers. And we're kind of nowhere on that. I mean, yeah, there's, you know, a billion chat users, but, you know, like we're that's like scratching the surface. Um, we are, um, nowhere on robotics, but I think robotics is going to be bigger than the language stuff. Um, and I think it's going to happen in the next 10 years.
>> 我们在自动驾驶方面也几乎没有进展，对吧？全美实际运行的 Waymo 车辆不到 10,000 辆，无人驾驶出租车更是少得多。然后，这一领域也为其他人的构建留下了巨大的开放空间。医疗健康占 GDP 的 18%。对。
Original English >> Um, we are almost nowhere on autonomy, right? Like there's fewer than 10,000 Whimos uh, live in the US, way fewer robo taxis. Um, and then, you know, a lot of open space for others to build in that area, too. Um, we, you know, healthcare is 18% of GDP. Yeah.
>> 我们无论是在护理交付还是在药物研发上，都还没开始触及表面。我的意思是，有一些公司正在做这方面的研发，展现出了一些早期进展的迹象，但我认为未来 10 年我们在那里取得的进展将会是巨大的。此外，我们正处于一个重新构想物理世界万物的有趣时代，从国防到制造业，再到数据中心。所以我审视所有这些趋势的汇聚，心想：是啊，现在可能让人觉得我们在 AI 上已经做了很多，但 10 年后再回头看，我们会感慨，那些其他重大领域创造了巨大的价值。
Original English >> Like we, we've, we've done nothing to scratch the surface either on care delivery or on drug discovery yet. I mean, there's some companies that are working on it, showing some early signs of progress, but I think the progress that we make there in the next 10 years is going to be massive. Um, and then, you know, we're in this interesting era of reimagining, um, all things physical world from defense to manufacturing to data centers. Um, and so I look at the confluence of all these trends and I'm like, yeah, it may feel like we've, you know, we've we've done a lot with AI already. Um, but 10 years from now, we're going to look back and say, oh my gosh, like those other major areas created a ton of value.
>> 因此我很兴奋，我认为下一个类似 SpaceX、AI 或 OpenAI 这样的机构可能即将诞生。而且它们很可能会出现在那些领域中。
Original English >> Um, and so I'm excited that I think the next SpaceX AI or OpenAI are probably going to get created. Um, and they'll probably be in those kinds of domains.
>> 对。
Original English >> Yeah.
### 供应链瓶颈与基础设施投资 >> 对。我想再补充一个类别，对我而言它既是隐忧，也是巨大的机遇。顺便为你设立的那只新的机会基金做个宣传。我用非常简化的方式来思考当今 AI 的瓶颈：它不在于需求端，而是在供给端。从能源、电网、数据中心，再到芯片，接着是前沿模型和应用程序。美国在这个链条的右侧非常出色，也就是芯片及之后的环节。VC 生态系统对那部分支持得很好。我认为你的新基金在左侧也会起到很大帮助，因为美国并不是在能源发电上有问题，问题出在通电速度上。
Original English >> Yeah. I'll add one category that to me is both a concern but a huge opportunity. It's a plug for your new fund on the on the opportunities fund that you did. I think very simplistically about like the bottleneck in AI today. It's not demand, it's on the supply side. So you got energy, the grid data center, then you got chips, then you got frontier models and apps. The US is amazing at the right side of that. So like chips and onwards. The VC ecosystem supports that well. Um I think the new fund you have is really going to help on the left side as well because the US doesn't have a problem with energy generation. It has a problem with speed to power.
>> 对。
Original English >> Yeah.
>> 那涉及审批许可和输电。那是监管层面的问题。其他国家每年投产的可再生能源装机容量是我们的 10 倍。
Original English >> That's permissioning transmission. That's regulatory. Other countries are putting out 10x more renewable capacity a year.
>> 所以那是一个切实的瓶颈，这也意味着需要对数据中心进行重构。你谈到了密度提高 10 倍以上。你不可能只是把一个旧的数据中心改造为新的 AI 设施。因此，你的新基金能够在这里创造的不仅是 100 亿、500 亿，而是 1000 亿以上的机会，从而切实解决瓶颈问题。我认为这确实是一个令人担忧的问题，因为需求并不是问题所在。我听过很多 LP 说这就像互联网泡沫或者说像 CO。事实并非如此，因为牵引力是真实的，这并不是那种转瞬即逝的收入，就像——
Original English >> So that is a real bottleneck and that means reimagining the data center. You talked about the density being 10x plus. Well, you can't just repurpose an old data center for the for new AI facility. So this is where the new fund you have can create not 10 50 but 100 billion plus opportunities as well that can really solve the bottleneck and I think that is a real concern because demand is not the concern. Um, a lot of I've heard LP say this is like the dotcom or this is co. It's not because the traction is real and it's not ephemeral revenue like
>> CO
Original English >> co
>> 瓶颈可能在供给端，但如果你拥有合适的投入要素，比如你的基金现在支持的那些公司——下一代芯片公司、存储芯片等，那将是一个巨大的机会。
Original English >> the bottleneck could be supply but if you have the right inputs like the fund that's you're now backing those companies next generation chip companies memory etc. That's a huge opportunity.
>> 机器时代到了。把机器带来吧。
Original English >> It's time for machine age. Let's bring the machines.
>> 太喜欢这个说法了。
Original English >> I love it.
>> 好吧，我们就以此结束。非常感谢两位。过程非常愉快。感谢你们邀请我们。太棒了。再见。
Original English >> All right let's close on that. Thank you both so much. It was super fun. Thank you for having us. Awesome. See you.