--- author: TED date: '2026-03-01' guest: '' layout: post.njk source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcz_GJyD-3E speaker: TED tags: - unilateral-military-action - regime-change - asymmetric-warfare - geopolitical-instability - foreign-policy title: 伊朗袭击：为何选在此时？ summary: 本次访谈深入探讨了美国和以色列对伊朗发动袭击的背景与动机，特别是伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊遇刺后的局势。专家分析了特朗普政府此次行动的原因，包括其在委内瑞拉的成功经验以及对伊朗军事能力的评估。对话还讨论了伊朗政权更迭的可能性、其对海湾国家平民目标的报复性袭击，以及国际社会对此事件的反应。此外，访谈还触及了特朗普在国内政治上面临的挑战，以及霍尔木兹海峡可能出现的非对称战争风险。 insight: '' draft: true series: '' category: geopolitics area: geopolitics project: [] people: - Donald Trump - Ali Khamenei - Reza Pahlavi companies_orgs: - IRGC - Hezbollah - Houthis - Hamas - International Atomic Energy Agency products_models: [] media_books: [] status: evergreen --- ### 伊朗袭击：背景与特朗普的动机 **主持人**: 大家好。2026年2月28日，星期六。今天早上，在数周威胁不断升级之后，美国和以色列轰炸了伊朗的几个地区，包括最高领袖**阿里·哈梅内伊**在德黑兰的官邸。伊朗也进行了报复，向以色列和四个设有美国军事基地的海湾阿拉伯国家发射了导弹，这些国家包括巴林、科威特、卡塔尔和阿联酋。现在局势瞬息万变，感觉异常紧张。所以我们立即请来了**欧亚集团**创始人**伊恩·布雷默**，帮助我们理解现在正在发生什么以及未来会发生什么。伊恩，你好。
Original English **主持人**: Hello everyone. Happy Saturday, February the 28th, 2026. This morning, after weeks of escalating threats, the United States and Israel bombed several parts of Iran, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's compound in Tehran. Iran responded in kind with missiles launched towards Israel and four Gulf Arab countries which host US military bases Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Now this is a fast-moving situation which feels extraordinarily tenuous. So we obviously turned immediately to Eurasia Group's founder Ian Bremmer to help us make sense of what is happening now and what is to come. Ian, hi.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 海伦，很高兴见到你，一如既往。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Helen, good to see you as always.
**主持人**: 伊恩，正如我所说，威胁已经持续数周。所以这次升级并不完全出人意料，但请告诉我们**特朗普**为何现在这样做？
Original English **主持人**: So Ian, as I mentioned, the threats have been stacking up for weeks now. So this escalation isn't exactly a surprise, but tell us why Trump is doing this now.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 嗯，有几个原因。首先，**特朗普**有一种自信，这既源于他在**委内瑞拉**的成功——他解除了**尼古拉斯·马杜罗**的职务，没有暗杀他，而是将他绳之以法，尽管在那次行动中许多委内瑞拉人和古巴人丧生，但没有美国人死亡。这进展顺利，美国人觉得很受欢迎，大多数拉丁美洲国家也觉得很受欢迎，他觉得“我也可以在其他地方这样做”。所以部分原因是这个。另一部分原因是，他以前在伊朗有过军事经验。在他第一个任期内退出**伊朗核协议 (JCPOA)**后，他曾多次向伊朗发出警告。当他对伊朗进行军事打击时，伊朗人未能或不愿反击。所以他觉得这里没有威慑能力。因此，他没有冒特别大的风险。最后，他确实进行了谈判，但他的要求远超伊朗人的接受范围，坦率地说，这几个月来一直很清楚。但他确实想确保该地区有足够的军事能力，这既包括美国将要进行的打击（我们现在看到的只是开始），也包括美国帮助保卫以色列及其在该地区自身基地和盟友的能力。这些最终的组成部分几天前才到位，然后这就是美国和以色列有机会对最高领袖和最高军事领导层进行“干净利落的打击”的第一个窗口，然后他们下达了命令。所以这就是所有这一切的起因。当然，还有一个更广泛的问题，那就是我们如何看待美国在世界各地行使**单边军事力量**？实行**政权更迭**政策，暗杀政治领导人。这对美国未来意味着什么？对世界其他国家又意味着什么？但是，就导致这一系列打击的原因而言，这当然没有让我们感到惊讶。我认为市场也没有感到太大惊讶。军事打击的规模超出了普遍预期，但没有人，没有一个可信的观察者认为谈判会取得突破。他们也不认为这是**特朗普**会“退缩”的“taco时刻”。他们确实觉得，我们也确实觉得，他会兑现他的威胁，以色列人也是如此，他们几个月来一直就此事进行非常密切的协调。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Well, there are a couple reasons. First, there is a level of confidence that **Trump** has both on the back of his success in **Venezuela**, having removed **Nicholas Maduro**, not assassinated him, actually bringing him to justice, though a lot of Venezuelans and Cubans were killed in the operation. No Americans were. It's gone over well. The Americans find it popular. Most of the Latin American countries find it popular. And he's like, "Well, I can do this in other places too." So part of it is that. Part of it is that he's had experience with Iran before, military experience. After withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal, the **JCPOA** in his first term, he's put the Iranians on notice on a couple of occasions. And when he has engaged in military strikes against Iran, the Iranians have not been able or willing to hit him back. And so he doesn't feel like there's a deterrent capability here. So he's not taking a particularly big risk. Finally, he did engage in negotiations, but his demands were much greater than the Iranians were willing to engage, and that's been clear for months now, frankly. But he did want to ensure that there was adequate military capabilities in the region, both in terms of the strikes that the Americans were going to engage in that we're now seeing the beginning of, but also in terms of America's ability to help defend Israel and its own bases and its allies across the region. The final components of that only got into place days ago, and then this was the first window of opportunity after that when the Americans and Israelis had a clean shot at the supreme leader and the top military leadership, and they gave the order. So that's what precipitated all of this. There's a broader question about how do we feel about the United States exercising unilateral military power all over the world? Engaging in a policy of regime change, assassinating political leaders. What does that mean going forward for the US? What does it mean for other countries around the world? But in terms of what led to this series of strikes, this did not certainly did not surprise us. I don't think it was a big surprise to the markets. The scale of the military strikes were greater than were generally anticipated, but nobody credible following this believed that the negotiations were heading for breakthrough. Nor did they believe that this was a taco moment that Trump was going to chicken out. They did feel, and we did feel, that he was going to make good as it were on his threats, as were the Israelis, and they've been coordinating on this very closely for a couple of months now.
### 哈梅内伊之死及其影响 **主持人**: 正如你所知，**特朗普**几分钟前在**Truth Social**上宣布，**哈梅内伊**死了。接下来会发生什么？这感觉影响巨大。
Original English **主持人**: So as you know **Trump** just announced a few minutes ago on **Truth Social** that Khamenei is dead. What happens now? That feels huge.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 我认为这是一件大事。有几点要说。首先，我们必须记住，这是一个极其残暴的政权，而**哈梅内伊**不仅对政权的残暴负有个人责任，而且在过去几个月里，在拒绝与美国进行有效谈判方面，他一直是一个**强硬派**。我指的是，去年1月，当数千名伊朗平民（据信有数万人）在示威时，在**哈梅内伊**的命令下被杀害，其中大多数人手无寸铁，并未对他们面对的部队构成直接安全威胁。坦率地说，我们从未在该地区任何地方见过这种短期的残暴。你必须回顾**苏丹**，回顾**卢旺达**，才能看到那种杀戮。你谈论的是在几周内发生的死亡人数，这相当于**加沙**一年战斗中的死亡人数。所以这确实是一种极端的残暴。因此，不会有很多人为**哈梅内伊**的死流泪。话虽如此，他并非政权本身。他已经86岁了。他们长期以来一直在为过渡做准备。他被杀的事实肯定会让他被伊朗国内支持政权的人视为**烈士**，这些人很多，至少有15%到20%的人口是坚定的政权支持者，这次刺杀只会让他们更加坚定。伊朗军事领导层在去年的12天战争中遭受了重大打击，但他们很快就重组了。这并没有影响他们内部镇压的能力和意愿。看来其他一些军事领导人可能也已经死亡。总统可能没有，但其他人有。坦率地说，总统在伊朗人民眼中或在权力驱动方面并不是一个非常重要的人物，但**伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC)**的负责人很可能已经死亡。以色列人已经宣布他以及最高领袖的其他高级军事顾问已被杀。但从这一点推断到政权终结，还有很长的路要走。因为请记住，当**特朗普**和以色列人发动这些袭击时，他说：“我们正在攻击所有军事设施。”他们确实做到了。他们正在攻击所有他们能找到的**弹道导弹设施**。他们确实在这样做。但他还说，这次行动旨在实现**政权更迭**。他说：“既然我们正在清除领导层，这是你们伊朗人民千载难逢的机会，来掌控你们的政府。”但掌控政府需要推翻**伊斯兰革命卫队**成员、军队、基地、准军事团体、街头警察以及其他那些非常愿意并有能力对伊朗平民使用**致命武力**的人。没有理由相信这种情况会改变。它可能会改变。我们可以希望它会改变，但目前还没有理由。没有证据让我们相信这一点。而且肯定没有美国**地面部队**。也没有以色列地面部队。没有像**委内瑞拉**那样有领导层的**有组织的反对派**。所以，一方面，在**委内瑞拉**，**特朗普**在移除了**马杜罗**之后，完全准备好继续与同一个政权合作，这至少在短期内被证明是一个相当有效的策略。但在伊朗，**特朗普**不准备与现有政权合作，这在很多方面是可以理解的。但我们如何才能从这一点走向人民的政府，这对于伊朗、对于整个地区乃至全世界都将是一件非同寻常的事情，目前尚不清楚。但必须有人真正实现这一点。而就目前而言，今天，要说伊朗人民有能力做到这一点，将是相当牵强的。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: I think it is a big deal. And I mean there are a few things to say about it. The first is that let us remember that this is an incredibly brutal regime and that **Khamenei** has not only been personally responsible for the brutality of the regime but also has been a hardliner in terms of refusing effective negotiations with the Americans over the past months. I mean certainly many thousands of Iranian civilians and believed tens of thousands of Iranian civilians were killed under the order of **Khamenei** in January when they were demonstrating and most of these were unarmed and not posing a direct security threat to the troops that they were facing off against and that is frankly we haven't seen that kind of short-term brutality in the region anywhere. You'd have to look to **Sudan**, you'd have to look to **Rwanda** before you saw that kind of killing. You're talking about the sort of deaths over the course of a couple weeks that you saw in **Gaza** over an entire year of fighting. So that's really an extraordinary brutality and as a consequence, there aren't a lot of people that are going to shed a tear over the death of **Khamenei**. Having said that, he is not the regime. He's 86 years old. They've been planning for transition for a long time. The fact that he has been killed will make him seem to be more of a martyr in the eyes certainly of those that support the regime inside Iran, of whom there are many, a minimum of probably 15 and 20% of the population that are hardened regime supporters and will become more so on the back of this assassination. The Iranian military leadership has taken substantial strikes over the 12-day war last year and they reconstituted themselves quite quickly. It didn't affect their ability and willingness to repress internally. It does appear that a number of other military leaders may well be dead. Probably not the president, but others. The president's not a very important figure, frankly, in the eyes of the Iranian people or in driving power, but the head of the **IRGC** may well be dead. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Israelis have announced that he has been killed as well as other top advisers to the Supreme Leader on the military side. But it's very far to go from that to it's the end of the regime. Because remember when **Trump** launched these strikes with the Israelis, he said, "We're attacking all of the military installations." And they've certainly done that. They're attacking all the ballistic missile installations that they can find that they can get to. They're certainly doing that. But he also said this is meant to be an operation of regime change. He said, "Now that we're taking out the leadership, it is your once in a generation opportunity, the Iranian people, to take your government." But taking the government requires overthrowing those members of the **IRGC**, the military, the bases, the paramilitary groups, the police officers on the streets, and others that have been very willing and capable of using lethal force against the Iranian civilians. And there's no reason to believe that that's about to change. It might. We can hope that it's about to change, but there's no reason yet. There's no evidence that makes us believe that. And there's certainly no American boots on the ground. There are no Israeli boots on the ground. There's no coordinated opposition with leadership the way there has been in **Venezuela**, for example. So, on the one hand, in **Venezuela**, **Trump** was fully prepared to continue to work with the same regime, having removed **Maduro**, and that has so far proven to be a pretty effective short-term strategy at least. But in Iran, **Trump** isn't prepared to work with the existing regime, understandably in many ways. But it's not clear how we get from that to the government of the people, which would be an extraordinary thing for Iran and for the entire region and for the world. But someone's got to actually make that happen. And for now, as of today, it would be quite a stretch to say that the Iranian people have the capacity to do that.
### 流亡者的回归 **主持人**: 那么，**礼萨·巴列维**，当然是沙阿的儿子，他说他愿意从流亡中回来。你认为这有多现实？
Original English **主持人**: So **Reza Pahlavi** who is of course the son of the Shah has said that he's willing to come back from exile. How realistic do you think that is?
**伊恩·布雷默**: 我是说，如果有足够的支持，以及对他周围的警卫，他或许有可能在那里安营扎寨。我认为这是有可能的。不是今天，但或许有可能。但这需要一定程度的干预，对吧？我是说，你现在不可能空降“友军”，然后在**德黑兰国际机场**受到欢迎。那是不可能的。而且，我是说，**特朗普**一直非常谨慎。每个人都在谈论**特朗普**如何是**鹰派**，**特朗普**如何是**强硬派**，他愿意使用军事力量。显然，在过去一年里，许多国家都曾遭受美国炸弹和导弹的袭击，就像在**拜登政府**和之前的政府时期一样。但**特朗普**不希望美国军队伤亡。他不想打**永久战争**。请记住，他结束了长达20年的**阿富汗**战争。**拜登**最终完成了撤军，但**特朗普**与**塔利班**达成了一项在许多方面都是单方面的协议，因为他只是想让美国军队撤出。所以**特朗普**将继续极不情愿地派遣任何美国地面部队。如果没有地面部队，至少就目前而言，我们离可以说“我预测这个政权已经结束，沙阿可以回来，伊朗人可以举行民主选举，他们可以真正建立一个代表他们的政权”的境地还很遥远。我们离那一步还很远。现在，仍将会有很多军事袭击，美国人预计这可能会持续几天到一周多一点的时间，以摧毁伊朗所有的海军能力，以及他们的**无人机 (UAV)**和导弹能力。他们很可能已经发射了大部分剩余的武器。但如果他们还没有，那么在一周内，这种能力就会被摧毁。所以，我认为伊朗在很短的时间内将不再有直接威胁该地区其他政权的能力，这是有可能的。他们可能通过**代理人**拥有**非对称能力**。他们当然可以资助恐怖活动，诸如此类。他们可以从事**间谍活动**，但就**常规军事活动**而言，伊朗投射力量的能力即将耗尽。这是一件大事。但这与说伊朗将没有能力镇压其国内人民，海伦，是非常非常不同的。那不是美国人目前有军事计划的事情。目前，没有理由相信，也没有证据表明，如果没有这样的行动，伊朗政权将无法继续镇压。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: I mean with sufficient support, policing around him, it is perhaps plausible that he could be there and he could set up camp someplace. I think it's plausible. It's not today, but it's perhaps plausible. But that requires some level of intervention, right? I mean, it's not as if you're able to right now fly in friendlies and you're going to be welcomed at the **Tehran International Airport**. That's not a thing. And again, I mean, **Trump** has been very careful. Everyone is talking about how **Trump** is a hawk and **Trump** is a hardliner and he's willing to use military force. And clearly there are lots of countries that have been on the wrong side of American bombs and missiles over the last year just as they have in the **Biden administration** as they have in previous administrations. But **Trump** does not want American troops getting killed. He doesn't want forever wars. Remember he brought the war in **Afghanistan** after some 20 years to an end. **Biden** concluded it. But it was **Trump** that took a deal with the **Taliban** that in many ways was one-sided because he just wanted the American troops out. And so **Trump** is going to continue to be extremely reluctant to commit any American forces on the ground. And absent that, we are pretty far, at least again, as of today, from a place that you would say, I predict that this regime is over and the Shah can come back and the Iranians can have democratic elections and they can actually put in place a regime that would represent them. We're very far from that. Now, there's still going to be a lot of military attacks, and the Americans expect this to go on probably for a matter of several days to a little over a week in terms of destroying all of Iran's naval capabilities, extinguishing their **UAV**, the unarmed aerial vehicles, and their missile capabilities. It is possible that they've already fired off a lot of what they still have. But if they haven't, within a week that capacity will be done. And so I think it is plausible that in very short order Iran will no longer have direct capacity to threaten other regimes in the region. They may have asymmetric capabilities through proxies. They could certainly fund terrorist activities, that sort of thing. They could engage in espionage, but conventional military activities, we are nearing the end of Iran's capacity to project power. And that's a big deal. But that's very very different, Helen, from saying that Iran won't have the capacity to repress their people on the ground. That is not something that the Americans right now have a military plan for. And it is right now there's no reason to believe there's no evidence that would show that the Iranian regime is going to be incapable of continuing to repress absent such a play.
### 伊朗的未来领导与特朗普的计划 **主持人**: 我有很多后续问题，但我想问一个问题是，鉴于伊朗目前正在发生的混乱，你认为谁会成为领导人，还是现在说还为时过早？另一个问题是，明天有什么计划？或者说，在袭击停止后，对伊朗人民有什么计划？**特朗普**关心这些吗？或者说，这一切似乎都在发生，但实际上对当地人民没有任何计划。
Original English **主持人**: I have so many follow-up questions to that, but one I guess is who do you see emerging then as a leader or is it just too early to say given the chaos that is happening on the ground in Iran? And I guess the other question is what's the plan for tomorrow or what's the plan for after the strikes stop for the Iranian people? Does Trump care about that or it just seems like this is all happening and there is actually no plan for the people on the ground?
**伊恩·布雷默**: 这是两个不同的问题。就目前而言，你预计**伊斯兰革命卫队**仍将掌权。他们的一些高级领导人将被杀，会有新的领导人来取代他们。我们看到**真主党**在过去一年中被以色列彻底**斩首行动**，包括**寻呼机袭击**等，但他们已经补充了兵力，对吧？他们现在远不如以前有能力。他们今天对以色列不构成重大威胁。但他们仍然有能力在**黎巴嫩南部**进行地面治理。黎巴嫩政府和军队一直无力或不愿解除他们的武装，这就是**停火**难以维持的原因。所以，这就是你现在会看到的情况。现在，这承认了他们短期内很难相互沟通。他们可能很难以集中方式下达命令，然后全国各地都能执行，但就目前而言，这就是我们正在关注的，也是该国过去几年来的运作方式。所以，这个政权对于如何有效**在国内镇压其人民**并不陌生。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: So two different questions. As of right now your expectation would be that the **IRGC** will still be in charge. A number of their top leaders will be killed. There will be new leaders that will come and replace them. We have seen that with **Hezbollah** with complete decapitation by Israel over the last year, the pager attacks and all of that and they have refilled their ranks, right? And they are nowhere near as capable as they used to be. They don't pose a significant threat to Israel today. But they still have a lot of capacity to govern on the ground in southern Lebanon. And the Lebanese government and army has been incapable slash unwilling to disarm them, which is why the ceasefire has been hard to maintain. So that's what you would expect to see right now. Now that recognizes that it's going to be very hard for them to communicate with each other for the near term. It might be hard for them to actually have orders that are given in a centralized way that are then followed out across the country, but still for now that's what we're looking at and that's kind of the way the country has been run for the past years. So this is not this is not a regime that is new to figuring out how to effectively repress its people domestically. And so...
**主持人**: 你认为**伊斯兰革命卫队**不会瓦解吗？你认为他们会维持他们的权力吗？显然，这个国家现在一片混乱，但**伊斯兰革命卫队**会作为一个整体团结在一起并继续管理国家吗？现在想象伊朗国内会出现某种**民主领导人**是否还为时过早？我知道许多领导人已经被投入监狱。你认为他们会被释放吗？你觉得这一切都太早了吗？我希望我错了。
Original English **主持人**: Do you see, and sorry to interrupt you, but do you see, given that state, so you don't see the **IRGC** actually kind of falling apart? You think that they'll maintain their power? They're not organized, obviously there's a total disarray happening in the country, but the **IRGC** will actually stick together as a unit and will continue to run the country? Is it too early to imagine that you might see kind of democratic leaders emerging from within the organization on the ground in Iran? I know that many leaders have been put into prison. Do you think they would get out? What do you think, is all of this too soon? I hope I am wrong.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 现在说**伊斯兰革命卫队**将在三个月内掌管这个国家还为时过早。现在说还为时过早。我只是在回答你的问题，说现在谁掌权？就是现在。这距离袭击开始还不到24小时。仍然是**伊斯兰革命卫队**。随着时间的推移，很多事情都可能改变。而且，地面上的信息非常少。但这里的关键是，与**委内瑞拉**不同，美国人在那里与高级领导人进行了积极持续的接触，并准备在**马杜罗**下台后与他们合作。但在伊朗，他们没有这样的条件。他们尝试过。他们得到了一些**伊斯兰革命卫队**成员的支持，这些成员向他们提供了关于最高领袖和伊朗其他高级领导人下落的信息和情报，这有助于他们在这次袭击中取得成功。所以，他们并非没有进行情报收集，但他们没有的是一个政府内部的团体，他们准备与之合作。而且，目前的反对派非常分散。尽管大多数人反对这个政权，但它在地面上根本没有以有组织的方式存在。那么，你的另一个问题是，**特朗普**会怎么做？这又意味着什么？嗯，**特朗普**有一系列目标，想想他是如何呈现这些目标的，因为他希望这是一次巨大的胜利。一个目标是摧毁伊朗的核能力。去年他在这方面做了不少工作。他说它们被摧毁了。有些确实被摧毁了，但不是全部。而且他们在没有**国际原子能机构**检查员监督的情况下，尽快重建了。所以有这方面。伊朗人拒绝就**弹道导弹**进行谈判，其中很多现在已经被炸毁，那些没有被炸毁的，很多都已发射，针对以色列，也针对**海湾国家**。是的，这些国家确实设有美国军事基地，但我们目前看到的大部分袭击实际上是针对这些国家的**平民目标**，比如**迪拜**，比如**利雅得**，这些地方本身并没有任何美国基地。这些基地远在城外。所以，**弹道导弹**不再是以前的威胁。因此，**特朗普**在他决定对伊朗开战时宣布的三个目标中，已经实现了两个，他可以说：“我已经实现了，到这些军事行动结束时，我将已经实现了这些目标。”现在，第三个目标，即**政权更迭**，他给自己留了后路。他说：“好吧，我已经进行了所有这些打击，现在太危险了，因为我仍然会打击，以色列也仍然会打击所有这些军事和领导目标，但一旦我们完成，伊朗人民就接管它。”如果他们不这样做，他就会说：“嗯，我尽力了。我给了他们机会。他们没有做。”他想说这话吗？他不想说，但他不会自己承担责任，因为他无意亲自进行直接的**政权更迭**。他已经在这些行动的最初几个小时内表示，参与改变政权的行动者将是伊朗人民。他对伊朗人民没有控制权。他对伊朗人民没有影响力。许多伊朗人民并不特别信任他。他说他会拯救伊朗人民，但在他说要拯救他们之后，数万伊朗人死亡，而且是在一个多月后他才采取军事行动。所以，我是说，我认为如果你今天是一个伊朗公民，你会感到**压力重重**。你在任何情况下都不一定会觉得面前有很好的机会，而且你决定怎么做都会非常危险。我的希望是，这个政权能以最小的暴力崩溃。我认为这是每个人的希望。无论你是否支持美国的袭击，每个人都希望伊朗人民能够拥有一个真正尊重并反映他们价值观、权利、希望和抱负的政府。但我们离那一步还很远。美国可能在一定程度上促成了这一点，但他们肯定不是造成这一切的原因。而且，我们离实现这个目标还很远。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: It is too early for me to be saying the **IRGC** is going to be in charge of this country in three months time. It is too early to say that. I am responding to your question saying right now, who do I expect is in charge? That's right now. That is less than 24 hours after these strikes have begun. It is still the **IRGC**. There are many things that could change over time. And there's very little information on the ground. But the key point here is that unlike in **Venezuela** where the Americans had active ongoing engagement with senior leaders that they were prepared to work with after taking **Maduro** out. They do not have that in Iran. They have tried. They have gotten some support from some **IRGC** members who have given them information and intelligence on the whereabouts of the supreme leader and other senior leaders in Iran that has been helpful in getting them the success that they have just seen in these strikes. So, it's not like they haven't engaged in intelligence collection, but what they don't have is a group inside the government that they're prepared to work with. And the opposition at this point is very fragmented. Doesn't really exist on the ground in an organized way at all, even though most people oppose the regime. So, then your other question, what does **Trump** do? What does this mean? Well, **Trump** has a series of goals and think about the way he's presented them because he wants this to be a big win. One goal is the destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities. He did a fair amount of that last year. He said they were obliterated. Some of them were, but not all of them. And they rebuilt as quickly as they could without oversight from the **International Atomic Energy Agency** inspectors. So there's that. The ballistic missiles the Iranians were refused to even negotiate on, a lot of those have now been blown up and those that haven't, a lot of them have been launched against Israel but also against **Gulf States**. And yes, they do host American military bases, but most of the strikes that we've seen so far have actually been against civilian targets in those countries like in **Dubai**, like in **Riyadh**, which does not actually host any American bases itself. Those bases are far outside. And so the ballistic missiles are no longer the threat that they used to be. So, you already have two of the three goals that **Trump** announced in his decision to go ahead with a war against Iran that **Trump** can say, "I've already achieved and I will have achieved by the time these military operations have concluded, I will have achieved those goals." Now, the third goal, which is regime change, he's given himself an out. He said, "Okay, I've done all of these strikes and right now it's too dangerous because I'm still going to hit and Israel is still going to hit all these military and leadership targets, but once we're done, Iranian people take it over. And if they don't, then he'll say, "Well, I did everything I could. I gave them the opportunity. They didn't do it." Does he want to say that? He doesn't want to say that but he's not going to take responsibility for this himself because he is not intending to engage in the direct regime change himself. He has already said in the initial hours of these operations that the actors that will engage in changing the regime will be the Iranian people. He has no control over the Iranian people. He has no influence over the Iranian people. A lot of the Iranian people don't particularly trust him. He said he was going to rescue the Iranian people and tens of thousands of Iranians died after he said that he was going to rescue them and it was over a month later before he took military action. So, I mean, I think that if you're an Iranian citizen today, you're feeling pretty squeezed. You're not necessarily feeling like there are great opportunities in front of you in any circumstance, and it's going to be very dangerous what you decide to do. Again, my hope is that this regime collapses with a minimum of violence. I think that's everyone's hope. It's everyone's hope. Whether you supported the US attacks or you didn't, everyone hopes that the Iranian people can have a government that actually respects and reflects their values, their rights, their hopes and aspirations. But we are very far from that. And the United States may have facilitated that to a degree, but they certainly are not causing it. And again, we're very far from here to there.
### 伊朗袭击平民目标的动机 **主持人**: 对吧？还有很长的路要走。我很好奇，这可能是一个非常愚蠢的问题，但你随意。为什么伊朗要轰炸**迪拜**、**利雅得**？为什么他们要轰炸其他阿拉伯国家，特别是那些没有美国基地的国家？我理解有美国基地的地方，但我听说**迪拜机场**被击中了。他们为什么要这样做？
Original English **主持人**: Right? There is a very long way to go. I am curious, and this is probably a really stupid question, so you're welcome. But why did Iran why have they bombed **Dubai**, **Riyadh**? Why are they bombing other Arab states especially without the kind of the US base? Like I get that, but I'm hearing about the **Dubai airport** being hit. Why would they?
**伊恩·布雷默**: **迪拜机场**看起来被击中了？我是说，显然，我并不惊讶他们向**海湾国家**发射了导弹和**无人机**，但我原本预计，就像我们在12天战争之后看到的那样，袭击会针对那里的美国基地，就像我们在**卡塔尔**看到的那样。而且，你知道，也许他们失败了，也许他们被击落了，也许在被击落的过程中，那些伊朗武器或防空系统、导弹防御系统最终击中了其他目标。这当然可能发生，但我们看到的不是这样。我们已经看到**无人机**直接瞄准**迪拜**、**科威特**、**沙特阿拉伯**的**平民区域**。我必须告诉你，我们以前从未见过伊朗这样做。那么他们为什么要这样做？嗯，一方面，伊朗将这些国家视为**交战方**。它们原则上是中立的。它们没有加入美国和以色列的战斗，但它们也没有阻止。在过去几周里，它们从反对逐渐转变为悄悄表示将支持美国和以色列，帮助促成袭击。所以，我认为伊朗现在准确地认为它们对伊朗的生存构成敌意。我认为伊朗的领导人，如果你今天身在伊朗，你会意识到你可能不属于这个世界了。现在正在积极尝试暗杀伊朗所有仍然活着的决策者、高级决策者，这真是令人震惊。所以，他们可能不会那么理性地行事。他们可能不会那么长远地思考，而且他们也无法很好地沟通。所以这对我来说感觉像是绝望。如果你知道你对坚固设施（比如基地或关键能源基础设施）所做的任何事情都可能被击落，而你又想表明你能做些什么，你不会只是坐以待毙，会有代价和后果。这可能就是导致你对目前**非交战方**国家的**平民目标**进行打击的逻辑。这是我能想到的唯一逻辑。我不相信这些是伊朗导弹和**无人机**操作员的**流氓行为**，他们没有收到任何命令。我不相信这一点。我认为仍然有足够的**集中控制**。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Just now the **Dubai airport** looks like it was hit? And I mean clearly and some of the I'm not surprised that they sent missiles and drones into the **Gulf States**, but I would have expected as we saw after the 12-day war that the attacks would have been against American bases there as we saw in **Qatar**. And you know, maybe they fail, maybe they get knocked down, maybe in the process of getting knocked down, those Iranian weapons or the air defense, the missile defense ends up hitting other targets. That can certainly happen, but that's not what we're seeing. We're already seeing drones that are directly targeting civilian areas in **Dubai**, in **Kuwait**, in **Saudi Arabia**. That I have to tell you that we've not seen that before from Iran. So why would they do that? Well, on the one hand, these countries are seen by Iran as belligerent. They are in principle neutral. They've not joined the fight with the United States and Israel, but they didn't prevent it. Over the past couple weeks, they increasingly went from opposing it to quietly saying that they would provide support for the United States and Israel in helping facilitate strikes. So, I mean, Iran now, I think, accurately sees them as hostile to Iran's survival. I think Iran, if you are a leader in Iran today, you recognize that you may not belong for this world. There is an active attempt to assassinate every decision maker, active top level decision maker that is still alive in Iran today, which is a staggering thing to say. And so they may not be acting quite as rationally. They may not be thinking quite as long term and they also can't communicate very well. So this to me feels like desperation. If you know that anything you do against hardened facilities like bases or like critical energy infrastructure is likely to be shot down. And you want to show that you can do something, that you're not going to just sit and take it, that there will be costs and consequences. That is, perhaps the logic that leads you to engage in those strikes against civilian targets among countries that are presently non-combatants. That's the only logic I can come up with. I don't believe these are rogue actions by missile and operators and drone operators in Iran that are not getting orders from anyone. I don't believe that. I think there's still sufficient centralized control.
### 国际社会的回应 **主持人**: 好的，我们来谈谈世界各地的反应。请告诉我们你与欧洲人在这方面的交涉。我看到你有一些非常有趣的互动。欧洲人正在谈论周一召开会议。今天是周六。这感觉像是一件可能会引起你高度关注的事情，但欧洲人正在做什么？
Original English **主持人**: All right, let's talk about the response from around the world. So tell us about your dealings with the Europeans on this. I saw some pretty funny interactions that you had had. The Europeans are talking about convening on Monday. Today is Saturday. This does feel like something that maybe would bring, you know, come to the top of your attention, but what are the Europeans doing?
**伊恩·布雷默**: 他们基本上只是表现出担忧。你知道，就像他们会写一封措辞强硬的信。他们在这里并不真正相关。这并不意味着他们在所有事情上都不相关。我是说，我们看到当**特朗普**在**格陵兰**问题上威胁他们时，他们说他们会用**对等关税**反击，他们会用**反胁迫工具**反击，然后**特朗普**就退缩了。他什么也没得到就退缩了。所以，欧洲人并非在所有事情上都毫无影响力。但在这个问题上，**特朗普**已经做出了决定，他没有听取欧洲人的任何建议。他没有要求他们加入。他们在功能上与美国的军事决策无关，这让欧洲人处于一个不舒服的境地。所以，如果你是**乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩**，你说你将在周一召集一个理事会来讨论这个问题，那么你周一产生的影响可能和周六一样大。现在，我本会表现出更多的紧迫性。英国人在这方面做了一些，说“我们有飞机在空中，我们想确保我们是该地区盟友**集体防御**的一部分”。所以他们本可以那样做，那将是一件重要的事情。其次，有很多欧洲公民在当地，所以他们显然想确保他们得到照顾，他们都安全，他们正在尽最大可能撤离。所有这些事情，但他们对伊朗并没有一个**集体立场**。他们没有任何功能性的事情可以做来改变这场冲突的轨迹。而且，与**伊拉克**和**阿富汗**不同，他们实际上没有发挥作用。这里没有“**志愿联盟**”。所以欧洲人与这个结果无关。更广泛地说，中国也与这个结果无关。俄罗斯，伊朗在外部没有朋友。我们看到，自10月7日以来，以色列和美国已经能够打击**也门胡塞武装**，或者**真主党**，或者去年的伊朗，或者现在，或者**加沙哈马斯**。在所有这些情况下，以色列人和美国人偶尔会进行军事打击，但伊朗及其**代理人**，所谓的“**抵抗轴心**”，或者他们在世界各地的朋友和支持者，无论是真正反对美国的**全球南方国家**，还是与伊朗密切合作以获得更多无人机支持以帮助他们对抗**乌克兰**战争的俄罗斯人（俄罗斯人在四年前发动了这场战争），或者从伊朗购买大量石油的中国，都没有做出任何有效的回应。我是说，他们都表达了批评。现在，我们正在进行一个**安理会紧急会议**，我和你正在谈话。我非常确定中国和俄罗斯正在表达他们对美国和以色列下达的命令的异议，但他们不准备做任何事情。事实上，我甚至不相信中国会因为这些袭击而推迟**特朗普**总统四月访问北京的即将举行的峰会。实际上，没有人因为美国和以色列在伊朗和该地区建立**军事主导地位**而采取任何行动。这与**特朗普**第二任期第一年大相径庭，当时他主要关注**关税和经济工具**，世界上许多国家都非常有能力反击，而不仅仅是屈服和积极谈判，而且还使用自己的**胁迫工具和机制**，达到他们认为比最初被要求更好的境地。但在军事上，无论是**委内瑞拉**，还是伊朗，或者我怀疑未来的**古巴**，情况都不是这样。那么**特朗普**总统还可能决定在哪里采取他真正喜欢的**单边军事行动**，而没有人愿意或有能力反击呢？
Original English **Ian Bremer**: They're basically acting concerned. You know, it's kind of like they'll write a strong letter. They're not really relevant here. And that doesn't mean they're not relevant on anything. I mean, we saw that when **Trump** threatened them on **Greenland**, they said that they were going to hit back with reciprocal tariffs and they were going to hit back with the anti-coercion instrument and **Trump** backed down. He backed down without getting anything. So, it's not as if the Europeans are uniquely factless on everything. But on this issue, **Trump** made his decision and he wasn't taking any advice from the Europeans. He was not asking them to join. They are functionally irrelevant to American military decision-making. And that is an uncomfortable position for the Europeans to be in. And so if you're **Ursula von der Leyen** and you say you're going to convene a council to discuss it on Monday, you're going to have probably just about as much effect on Monday as you did on Saturday. Now I would have displayed more urgency. The **Brits** did a bit of that and saying that we got planes in the air and we want to make sure that we're part of a collective defense of our allies in the region. So there could have been that, they could have done that. That would have been an important thing to do. Secondarily, there are lots of European citizens on the ground and so they obviously want to make sure that they are taking care, they're all secure, that they're evacuating as best as they possibly can. All of these sorts of things, but they don't really have a collective position on Iran. They don't have anything that they can functionally do to change the trajectory of this conflict. And unlike in **Iraq**, unlike in **Afghanistan**, they're not actually playing a role. There is no coalition of the willing here. So the Europeans are irrelevant to this outcome. And more broadly there is the reality that the Chinese are irrelevant to this outcome. The Russians, Iran has no friends externally. We've seen since October 7th that Israel and the United States have been able to target whether it's the **Houthis in Yemen** or whether it's **Hezbollah** or whether it's Iran last year or just now or whether it's **Hamas in Gaza**. In all of these cases, the Israelis and the Americans on occasion have engaged in military strikes, and there's been really no effective response whatsoever, either by Iran and its proxies, the so-called **axis of resistance**, or their friends and supporters around the world, whether it's **global south countries** that really oppose the United States or it's the Russians who have been working with Iran closely to get more support for drones to help them fight against **Ukraine** and the war that they started four years ago, the Russians, or whether it's China that buys a lot of oil from Iran. I mean, they've all expressed criticism. It is, we've got right now we've got a **Security Council emergency session** that is going on and I am quite certain that the Chinese and Russians are expressing their disagreement with what has been ordered by the US and by Israel but they're not prepared to do anything. In fact, I don't even believe that the Chinese will postpone the upcoming summit meeting of President **Trump** to visit Beijing in April on the back of these strikes. There's really virtually nothing that anyone is doing as a consequence of the Americans and the Israelis establishing military dominance against Iran and in the region. And that's wildly different than the first year of **Trump**'s second administration when he focused primarily on tariffs and economic tools and where many countries around the world were very capable of hitting back and not just capitulating and actively negotiating but also using their own coercive tools and mechanisms and getting to a place that they felt was better than what they were initially being demanded. That is not the case militarily either in **Venezuela** or in Iran or I suspect in **Cuba** going forward. And where else might President **Trump** decide that he really likes taking unilateral military action that no one is willing or capable to respond against?
### 特朗普的国内政治考量 **主持人**: 那么，这与**MAGA**（“让美国再次伟大”）支持者如何互动呢？这与那些不希望美国卷入战争的人如何互动呢？他能够进行这种短促、尖锐的入侵，而且没有地面部队，这是不是**特朗普**规避这种问题的方式？因为感觉在上次总统竞选时，他实际上是竞选不发动战争的，但实际情况并非如此。当然，如果没有实际的士兵和部队在地面上，战争的定义会有些不同，对吧？
Original English **主持人**: How does that play though with **MAGA**? How does that play with people who really didn't want America to get involved? Is the fact that he manages to make this kind of short sharp kind of invasions and there's no boots on the ground. Is that kind of the way that **Trump** skirts round that? Because it feels like in the last presidential campaign he actually campaigned on not starting wars and instead that really has not been the case. Although of course the definition of war is a little different if there aren't actually soldiers and troops on the ground, right?
**伊恩·布雷默**: 对吧？我是说，如果没有美国士兵被杀，那么他更容易向他的**MAGA**支持者解释。而且在**委内瑞拉**，谢天谢地，没有美国军人伤亡。有一些人受伤，但没有人死亡。到目前为止，再说一遍，在最初的几个小时里，没有美国人被杀。但是，你知道，**特朗普**当然已经做好了美国人被杀的准备。这次行动中，战斗人员和很可能非战斗人员都会伤亡，而且由于在伊朗选择性发动的战争导致大量美国人死亡，这在**特朗普**的**MAGA**基本盘中会非常不受欢迎。在**MAGA**内部，在以色列问题上也有分歧。有一些坚定的**MAGA**支持者，你尤其在**塔克·卡尔森**身上看到了这一点，但也有其他人公开表示绝对反对。为什么我们要为以色列承担这么多？为什么我们要向他们提供数十亿美元的军事支持？为什么我们要采取军事行动来支持他们在自家后院想要的东西？我是说，在**乌克兰**问题上，美国已经停止提供军事援助。为什么？因为那里很远，我们认为欧洲人应该做。那么，我们为什么要支持以色列呢？很多**MAGA**支持者不喜欢这样。但也有很多**MAGA**支持者喜欢。而且有很多**MAGA**捐助者也喜欢。我是说，特别是**米里亚姆·阿德尔森**，但还有很多其他人，他们经常去**海湖庄园**，就像迈阿密流亡社区中那些支持**委内瑞拉**和**古巴**军事行动的人一样。但这并不是普遍受欢迎的。这里有一个更广泛的问题，我们应该讨论一下，因为你问我，**特朗普**如何处理他做出的承诺，他以此进行竞选，而且有很多支持**MAGA**的人说，**卡马拉·哈里斯**会是战争候选人，但**特朗普**不会。**特朗普**不是**鹰派**。**查理·柯克**，我是说，他在此之前被暗杀。他极力反对攻击伊朗的想法，并有记录在案。我确信**特朗普**的许多反对者，包括一些**MAGA**内部的人，会利用这一点。现在，**特朗普**已经兑现了他的一些承诺。他承诺会使用**关税**，并努力将制造业带回美国，迫使其他国家在美国花钱。他与日本人、韩国人、英国人、欧洲人、沙特人以及其他国家达成了很多协议，承诺在美国投入更多资金。所以，无论你喜欢这个政策与否，无论你认为**关税**是个好主意与否，当然，这背后存在**负担能力问题**，但他已经兑现了这一点。他承诺会**关闭边境**，并且在关闭边境方面做了很多工作。他承诺会打击**芬太尼**，并且在打击芬太尼方面做了很多工作。墨西哥人在这方面一直是美国非常重要的合作伙伴。但他还承诺“**美国优先**”，结束这些战争。虽然没有地面部队，但现在很清楚，美国正在利用**单边军事力量**来实现他想要的结果，而很多**MAGA**支持者显然对此感到不舒服，尤其是在中东。同样清楚的是，**爱泼斯坦档案**问题，**特朗普**曾说：“我要清理这个地方，我们要公布这些文件，因为存在**双重司法体系**。”然而，**比尔·克林顿**和**希拉里·克林顿**会被传唤作证，但**霍华德·卢特尼克**不会。所以，他正在保护自己人。每个人都看到了这一点。他还说他要“**抽干沼泽**”。他现在不再谈论这个了。事实上，结果发现，美国不仅在之前的政府时期存在大量**腐败**，而且在**特朗普**执政下甚至更加**腐败**。这是一种**盗贼统治**，直接惠及他本人和他的家人，以及政府内部的许多人和他们的家人。所以我确实认为，**特朗普**在许多问题上完全没有兑现对**MAGA**至关重要的承诺，这就是他**支持率严重流失**的原因，也是他极有可能在11月以相当大的劣势**失去众议院**的原因。他时间不多了。他每天都越来越难扭转局面。我不认为与以色列一起对伊朗进行的**单边袭击**会改变这一点。我不认为最高法院对AIPA的裁决会改变这一点。我不认为明尼阿波利斯ICE的努力会改变这一点。我认为在过去几个月里，他遇到了更多麻烦。他的发展轨迹一直对他不利，因此他很可能会变得更具**风险承受能力**，这很可能体现在其他国际军事事件中。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Right? I mean, if no American soldiers are getting killed, then it's a much easier proposition for him to square with his **MAGA** supporters. And in **Venezuela**, knock on wood, no American servicemen and women have been killed. There were a few injuries but no one was killed. And so far, again, early hours, no Americans have been killed. But, you know, certainly **Trump** is prepared for Americans to be killed. Combatants and quite plausibly non-combatants on the back of this and large numbers of Americans killed because of a war of choice in Iran will be unpopular with significant numbers of **Trump**'s **MAGA** base. There's also there is a break in **MAGA** on Israel. There are a number of strong **MAGA** supporters and you've seen this with **Tucker Carlson** in particular, but there have been others that have been out there publicly saying absolutely not. Why are we carrying so much water for Israel? Why are we providing them billions and billions of dollars in military support? Why are we engaging in military actions that are supporting what they want in their backyard? I mean, on **Ukraine**, the United States has stopped providing military aid. Why? Because it's far away and we think the Europeans should do it. So, why are we supporting Israel and there's a lot of **MAGA** supporters that don't like that? There are a lot of **MAGA** supporters that do. And there are a lot of **MAGA** donors that do. I mean, **Miriam Adelson** in particular, but there are many and that many that go to **Mar-a-Lago** all the time, just as there are those that support military operations in **Venezuela** and **Cuba** among the Miami exile community. But it is not uniquely popular. And here there's a broader we should address the broader issue which is because you asked me, how is **Trump** dealing with the fact that he made these promises, he campaigned on this stuff and there were so many people pro **MAGA** that were saying that, **Kamala Harris** was going to be the war candidate, but **Trump** wouldn't. **Trump**'s not a hawk. And **Charlie Kirk**, I mean, he was assassinated before that. He was extremely opposed to the idea of attacking Iran and is on record in doing so. And I'm sure that there are many opponents to **Trump**, including some in **MAGA**, that are going to be using that. Now, **Trump** has made good on a number of his promises. He promised that he was going to use tariffs and he was going to work to bring manufacturing back to the US and force other countries to spend money in the US. And he's cut a bunch of deals with promises from the **Japanese** and the **South Koreans** and the **UK** and the **Europeans** and the **Saudis** and others to start spending a lot more money in the US. So he's whether you like the policy or not, whether you think tariffs are a good idea or not and certainly there's an affordability problem on the back of it, he's made good on that. He promised he was going to close the border and he has done a lot of work in closing the border. He promised he was going to fight **fentanyl**. He's done a lot of work in fighting **fentanyl**. The **Mexicans** have been very very significant partners of the US on that. But he also promised that he was going to **America first** to end these wars. And while there are no troops on the ground, it is now clear that unilateral American military power is being used to project outcomes that he wants that a lot of **MAGA** is clearly uncomfortable with, especially in the Middle East. It's also clear that the **Epstein files** where **Trump** said, "I'm going to clean this place up and we're going to release those files because there's a **two-tier justice system**." And yet, **Bill and Hillary Clinton** will be brought in to testify, but not **Howard Lutnik**. And so, he's protecting his own. And everyone sees that. And he said he was going to drain the swamp. He doesn't talk about that anymore. And in fact, he turns out not only was there a lot of corruption in the US under previous administrations, but it's even more corrupt now under **Trump**. It's kleptocratic, benefiting him and his family directly and many insiders in the administration and their families. So I do think that the fact that **Trump** now on a number of issues has absolutely not followed through on promises that matter deeply to **MAGA** are why he is hemorrhaging support and why he is very likely overwhelmingly likely to lose the house probably by a substantial margin in November. And that's he's running out of time. It's getting harder for him to turn that around every day. And I don't think that unilateral strikes on Iran with Israel are going to change that. I don't think the Supreme Court's ruling on AIPA is going to change that. I don't think that the Minneapolis ICE efforts are going to change that. I think that he's in more trouble over the last couple months. The trajectory has been negative for him and he's likely to become much more risk acceptant as a consequence of that which may well play out in other military episodes internationally.
**主持人**: 但为什么，我是说，如果情况不妙，你的支持率下降，你为什么会，我是说，我理解你变得更具**风险承受能力**，但实际上却倾向于做更鲁莽的事情，这感觉可能是错误的方向。
Original English **主持人**: But why, I mean why would why if things are going badly and your numbers are down do you I mean I understand why you become more risk acceptant but actually leaning into doing even more reckless things feels like maybe the wrong direction to head in.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 这是他能做的事情。这是他拥有的权力。如果他听从他的高级顾问，他的行为会非常不同。我认为**委内瑞拉**问题，他会处理得非常相似。但我是说，你知道，AIPA**关税**，他的**财政部长**和**美国贸易代表**告诉他，不要使用这个。它站不住脚。但他显然比他们更懂，因为他是总统。他是赢家。所以他继续做了。然后一年后，不到一年后，最高法院，包括他自己提名的法官，都投票反对他。现在对他来说会更困难。现在他会受到更多限制。所以我是说，我认为问题在于**特朗普**非常短视。他非常，你知道，喜欢追逐最新的**新鲜事物**。他总是想制造头条新闻，而且他**缺乏纪律**。所以他没有那种气质去进行**战略性政治变革**，从而让他能够更有效地建立一个凌驾于**制衡机制**之上的总统职位。我认为我们发现的是，他越来越多地在许多问题上失败，因此你开始看到无论是**法官**，还是军方成员，还是**共和党领导人**，都开始公开采取反对他的行动，这在三、六个月前并没有发生，但现在发生了。我们已经多次看到这种情况，我认为未来我们会看到更多。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: It is something he can do. It's power that he has. If he were listening to his top advisers, he would be acting very differently. I think the **Venezuela** issue, he would have handled very similarly. But I mean, you know, the AIPA tariffs, he was told by his secretary of treasury and by his US trade rep, don't use this. It won't stand up. And he obviously knows better than they do because he's the president. He's the one that won. And so he went ahead and he did it. And then a year later, less than a year later, the Supreme Court, including his own nominees, vote against him. And now it's going to be harder for him. Now he's going to be more constrained. So I mean, I think the problem is that **Trump** is very short-term. He's very attached to the latest shiny object. He constantly wants to make headlines and he's incredibly undisciplined. So he does not have the temperament to engage in the strategic political revolution that would allow him to more effectively build a presidency that is sits above checks and balances. I think what we're finding is increasingly he's failing on a bunch of issues and as a consequence you start to see whether it's justices or whether it's members of the military or whether it's Republican leaders start to take public steps against him and that wasn't happening 3 months ago, 6 months ago, but now it is. We've seen it on a number of occasions and I think we're going to see more of it going forward.
**主持人**: 但我认为，那些给他建议的人，特别是关于这场战争的军事顾问，有些实际上被解雇了，对吧？
Original English **主持人**: But I think it's also true, isn't it, that some of the people who've been giving him advice, particularly on this war, some of his military advisers actually then got cast out. You know,
**伊恩·布雷默**: 被解雇了。没错。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Got cast out. That's right.
**主持人**: 对。所以他真的相信他可以这样做，因为他是总统，他可以自己一个人做这一切。
Original English **主持人**: Right. So, does he really he really believes that he can kind of do this because he's the president, he can just do this all by himself.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 嗯，这些人大多是相对初级的人员。因为请记住，**特朗普**这次雇佣的一些顾问，在我看来非常有能力，比如**马可·卢比奥**和**詹姆森·格里尔**；但也有一些在我看来非常无能，比如**皮特·赫格塞斯**或**小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪**。但他们都极其忠诚。所以不像**特朗普**第一个任期的第一年，当时人事变动频繁，很多人后来都在谈论、泄密，并且极力反对**特朗普**。这次我们几乎没有看到这种情况，而且管理得相对**严格**，因为他们都明白，他们要么完全按照**特朗普**的要求去做，要么就走人。我是说，本届政府一年多以来，我们看到的唯一一次重大爆发是**埃隆·马斯克**，他以惊人的方式出现，爆料了**爱泼斯坦档案**，并说他要创建第三党，等等，基本上是触碰了**第三轨**，但后来又退缩了。**J.D.万斯**促成了**和解**，现在他又与**特朗普**合作了。所以我是说，真的，在最高层，**特朗普**的核心圈子里一直保持着一致性，并且愿意顺从**特朗普**所说的一切，即使事情失败也愿意促成。所以，我是说，我们已经看到了多少次**特朗普**对六名民主党人提起诉讼，他们制作了反对他的视频。我是说，那场诉讼失败了，他失败了，因为他没有听取顾问的意见。同样，对**詹姆斯·科米**和**莱蒂西亚·詹姆斯**的诉讼也失败了，他也没有听取顾问的意见。但他们愿意在所有这些情况下做他说的任何事，无论是关于军事打击还是经济**关税**，还是关于采取措施确保下一次选举不会“被操纵”，比如**FBI调查**和在**佐治亚州富尔顿县**查封投票箱。所有这些都是**前所未有的行动**，但这些都是**特朗普**总统下令的，他的**核心圈子**、他的直接下属和他的内阁百分之百支持。**特朗普**和这些人之间没有一丝一毫的距离。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Well, these are relatively junior people. Most of them. Because keep in mind that what **Trump** has hired for this time around, some of his advisers are very capable in my estimation, like **Marco Rubio** and **Jameson Greer**, some of them are incredibly incompetent in my estimation, like **Pete Hegsath** for example, or **RFK**. But they all are incredibly loyal. So unlike **Trump**'s first year in his first term of office where it was a revolving door with a lot of people that then were talking were leaking were extremely opposed to **Trump**. This time around we've seen virtually none of that and it's been a relatively tight ship because they all recognize that they're going to do exactly what **Trump** wants or else. I mean, the only major blow up we've seen in the first year now of the administration year plus was **Elon Musk** who came out in spectacular fashion and dished on the **Epstein files** and said he was going to create a third party and all of that basically grabbed on to the third rail but backed away from it. **JD Vance** facilitated a rapprochement and now he's working with **Trump** again. So I mean really there's been at the top level there's been continued alignment and willingness to go along with whatever **Trump** is saying among that inner circle and that that willingness to facilitate even things that fail. So, I mean, again, we've seen how many instances now where **Trump** has gone after launch lawsuits on the six Democrats that did this video that opposed him. And you know that lawsuit blew up and he failed and because he wasn't listening to advisers and same thing with the lawsuit against **James Comey** and **Leticia James** and he failed and wasn't listening to advisers but they are willing to do whatever he says in all of these instances whether it's about military strikes or economic tariffs or about taking efforts to ensure that the next election is not quote unquote rigged like the **FBI investigation** and the seizing of the ballot boxes in **Fulton County in Georgia**. All of these are unprecedented acts, but they're unprecedented acts that President **Trump** is ordering and that his inner circle, his direct reports and his cabinet are 100% supporting. Not even not an inch of space between **Trump** and those people.
### 非对称战争与霍尔木兹海峡 **主持人**: 好的，我们回到中东。你之前提到了**非对称战争**的概念。如果伊朗已经用尽了它的导弹武库，但现实是，没有人能真正决定**非对称战争**会发生什么。你认为**胡塞武装**或**霍尔木兹海峡**会发生什么？它会被关闭吗？你认为会发生什么？我想，这在该地区会产生什么**连锁反应**？
Original English **主持人**: All right, let's head back to the Middle East. And you mentioned earlier the idea of asymmetric warfare. So if Iran has used up its missile armory but the reality is that no one can actually dictate what happens with asymmetric warfare. What do you think happening for instance with the **Houthis** or with the **Straits of Hormuz**? Is that going to get closed? What do you think is going to happen? What are the ripple effects of this I guess in the region?
**伊恩·布雷默**: 是的，这是最重要的市场影响，也可能是美国军人最重大的脆弱点，那就是对船只的威胁，包括直接的油轮运输和军舰通过**霍尔木兹海峡**、**红海**以及更广阔的区域。**胡塞武装**已经表明他们有能力对这些船只进行打击，包括在**非洲之角**和**印度洋**更广阔的区域。所以我是说，我确实认为**霍尔木兹海峡**在至少一段时间内将无法通行，这种可能性相当高。这意味着**油价**，在这些袭击发生后和预期中已经飙升，而目前市场上有大量石油，且**石油需求**相对较低，但这些价格正在上涨。**天然气**也是一样。你将很难把天然气运到欧洲。这意味着这些价格也在上涨。你知道，美国拥有大量的军事能力，**扫雷舰**等等。所以，我是说，我不认为海峡会长期无法通行。如果超过几天到几周的时间，我会感到惊讶。如果超过这个时间，我会感到惊讶。但对**油轮**的威胁将持续存在，这意味着很多油轮可能最终不得不绕远路，因此会花费更多钱。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Yeah, that's the most significant market impact and it might be the most significant vulnerability that American servicemen and women have is to the ships, both tanker traffic directly and military ships going through the **Straits of Hormuz** in the **Red Sea** and more broadly. And the **Houthis** have shown that they have a capacity to make strikes against these boats including off the **Horn of Africa** in the **Indian Ocean** even more broadly. So I mean I do think that there is a pretty high likelihood that for at least a period of time that the **Straits of Hormuz** will be impassible. And that means that oil prices which have already spiked on these strikes and in anticipation of these strikes with lots of oil on the market right now and with relatively low demand for oil those prices are going up. Natural gas, same thing. You're going to have difficulty in getting that gas to Europe. And that means that those prices are going up. You know, huge amount of American military capability, mine sweepers, the rest. So, I mean, I don't believe that the straits will be impassible for long. I'd be surprised if it was more than a matter of, you know, inside a few days, outside a couple weeks. I'd be surprised if it went longer than that. But there'll be continuing threat to tankers and that means that a lot of those tankers may end up having to go the long way and costing an awful lot more money as a consequence.
### 未来关注点 **主持人**: 好的。那么，总结一下，我很好奇你在接下来的几天和几周里最关注什么？
Original English **主持人**: All right. So to wrap this up, I'm curious what you're watching most closely in the next few days and over the next few weeks.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 我最密切关注的是**伊朗国内**。我想看看我们会看到什么样的**示威活动**，什么样的**不稳定**，以及有多少信息会通过**Telegram**和其他来源传播出来，因为那里没有开放的媒体可以实际报道。我们会看到一些远离**德黑兰**的城镇吗？例如，那些有**少数民族**的地区，比如**库尔德人**聚居地，伊朗中央政府很难完全控制。我们之前在**绿色革命**中看到，**德黑兰**以外有更大规模的示威和大量暴力。那将是值得关注的。例如，我们还想看看伊朗领导层正在发表什么样的声明，以及是谁在发表这些声明。到目前为止，我是说，在最初的几个小时里，我们看到的很少。我们看到了**战争迷雾**，以及**外交部长**发表了一些声明，但仅此而已。所以，我是说，真的，现在还处于早期阶段。你想看看伊朗政权还剩下什么，以及你在内部看到了什么样的反对派。更广泛地说，我们想看看该地区会有什么样的反应。我们会看到**也门胡塞武装**采取有效的行动吗？我们会看到导致对平民更大规模袭击的**恐怖活动**吗？我们会看到**真主党黎巴嫩阵线**完全开放，以色列决定这是一个清理一切的绝佳机会吗？在过去几个月里，以色列只进行了有限的打击。在这种环境下，这当然非常有可能。所以有很多事情需要关注。但再说一遍，在一个很难想象会发生重大升级的环境中，这不会成为一场**地区战争**。这肯定不会成为**第三次世界大战**。更多的是关于伊朗国内实际发生的事情。这是我们最关注的。在这方面，这与**马杜罗**被捕后非常相似，当时我们关注的是**加拉加斯**和整个**委内瑞拉**的地面情况。伊朗的不确定性比**委内瑞拉**大得多，但基本问题实际上非常相似。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Most closely I'm watching internally Iran. I want to see what kind of demonstrations we see, what kind of instability and how much of that gets out vis-a-vis **Telegram** and other sources because it's not like there's an open media that can actually report on it. Do we see some towns that are farther away from **Tehran**, where you have ethnic minorities, for example, where it's harder where there are **Kurds**, where there are others that it's much harder for the Iranian central government to actually have complete control. We've seen with the **Green Revolution** before, there were much bigger demonstrations and a lot of violence outside of **Tehran**. That would be interesting to watch. As well as we want to see what kind of statements are being made by the Iranian leadership and who's making them. So far, I mean, early hours we've seen very little. We've seen **fog of war** and the foreign minister make some statements, but that's about it. So, I mean, really it is early early days. You want to see what's left of the Iranian regime and what kind of opposition you see internally. More broadly than that, we want to see what kind of reaction we get across the region. Do we see effective activity by the **Houthis in Yemen**? Do we see terrorist activity that leads to bigger strikes against civilians? Do we see a front the **Hezbollah Lebanon front** open up completely with Israel deciding that this is a great opportunity to just mop that up after only limited strikes over the past months. That's certainly very plausible in this environment. So lots lots of things to watch. But again in an environment where it's hard to imagine major escalation, this is not going to become a regional war. This is certainly not going to become **World War III**. It's much more about what happens on the ground, frankly, in Iran. That is the biggest thing we're looking at. And in that regard, very similar to right after **Maduro** was captured, what we were watching was what was happening on the ground in **Caracas** and across **Venezuela**. There's a lot more uncertainty for Iran than there is for **Venezuela**, but the basic sorts of questions are actually very similar.
**主持人**: 伊恩，非常感谢你，不像欧洲人，你在周六抽出时间来谈论这件事。我们非常感谢你的智慧，谢谢你追踪这一切。我相信我们很快会再见。
Original English **主持人**: Ian, thank you so much for, unlike the Europeans, taking time on your Saturday to come and talk about this. We are so grateful to have your wisdom and thank you for tracking all of this. We will, I'm sure, see you again soon.
**伊恩·布雷默**: 很高兴和你交谈。
Original English **Ian Bremer**: Always great to talk to you.