TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer

TED与伊恩·布雷默共同解读世界

Recorded on Monday, June 2nd (Year not specified, context implies a recent year)

记录于6月2日星期一（年份未指明，根据上下文推断为近年）

Speakers / 讲述者:

Helen Moltters: Head of Media and Curation at TED.

**海伦·莫特斯：**TED媒体与策展负责人。

Ian Bremmer: Founder of Eurasia Group.

**伊恩·布雷默：**欧亚集团创始人。

Introduction / 引言

Helen Moltters:

Hello everyone. Thank you for joining. It is Monday, June the 2nd, the day after Ukraine unleashed an astonishing drone raid deep inside Russia and in doing so essentially rewrote the rules of war. I am Helen Moltters. I am the head of media and curation at TED and I am joined to make sense of it all by Eurasia Group founder Ian Bremmer. Ian, thank you so much for joining us.

海伦·莫特斯:

大家好。感谢各位的参与。今天是6月2日，星期一，就在前一天，乌克兰对俄罗斯境内深处发动了一次惊人的无人机袭击，此举基本上改写了战争规则。我是海伦·莫特斯，TED的媒体与策展负责人。今天，我邀请到了欧亚集团创始人伊恩·布雷默，与我们一同解读这一切。伊恩，非常感谢你的加入。

Ian Bremmer:

Helen, such a pleasure to be with you again.

伊恩·布雷默:

海伦，很高兴再次与你相会。

The "Spiderweb" Drone Operation / “蜘蛛网”无人机行动

Helen Moltters:

Here we are. Okay, so much is still emerging about what took place, but here's what I think we know. In an operation named Spiderweb, Ukraine launched a bunch of drones off trucks, which took out 41 of Russia's most strategic military planes. The Economist called it Ukraine's most audacious operation on Russian territory to date. So tell us, what do we really need to know about what happened here?

海伦·莫特斯:

我们开始吧。好的，关于所发生事件的许多细节仍在浮现，但我认为我们已知的情况如下：在一次名为“蜘蛛网”的行动中，乌克兰从卡车上发射了大量无人机，摧毁了俄罗斯41架最具战略意义的军用飞机。《经济学人》称这是乌克兰迄今为止在俄罗斯领土上最大胆的一次行动。那么，请告诉我们，关于这里发生的事情，我们真正需要了解的是什么？

Ian Bremmer:

Well, we don't know exactly how many planes were taken out. The Ukrainians claim 41. They, as antagonists in both sides of wars always tend to, you know, maximize the numeric exploits. So, we can confirm probably almost half of that number. It'll probably go up. We'll see. But the point remains the same. In three and a half years now of this brutal war, this is by far the most spectacular strike that has been seen by either side. This is David versus Goliath. And little Ukraine proves that they have the ability with drones that cost between $300 and $400 and only a couple hundred of them are able to take out individual strategic nuclear bombers that cost over $100 million for the Russians to build. And by the way, which they don't have the military capability to build today. So, we've never seen an asymmetric strike like this be pulled off against a major nuclear power. It's never happened. And there are, I think, big implications.

There are big implications for war fighting going forward. There's big implications for Putin and what he decides to do and how he responds. The future of the Russia Ukraine war. There's big implications for the United States and the role that President Trump is or is not going to play as a consequence. And it is essential, I think, to get deep under the hood around all of those things and not just rely on the "oh my god, look at what just happened" of the headlines.

伊恩·布雷默:

嗯，我们并不确切知道有多少架飞机被摧毁。乌克兰方面声称是41架。你知道，作为战争双方的对抗者，他们总是倾向于夸大战果数字。所以，我们大概可以确认接近这个数字的一半。这个数字可能会上升，我们拭目以待。但重点依然不变。在这场持续了三年半的残酷战争中，这是迄今为止双方所见过的最引人注目的打击。这是大卫对阵歌利亚的战斗。小小的乌克兰证明了他们有能力用成本仅为300到400美元的无人机，仅仅几百架，就能摧毁俄罗斯耗资超过1亿美元建造的单架战略核轰炸机。顺便说一句，俄罗斯如今已不具备建造这些轰炸机的军事能力。所以，我们从未见过针对一个主要核大国成功实施如此规模的非对称打击。这从未发生过。而且我认为，这其中蕴含着重大的影响。

这对未来的战争形态有重大影响。对普京及其决策和回应方式有重大影响。对俄乌战争的未来走向有重大影响。对美国以及特朗普总统因此可能扮演或不扮演的角色也有重大影响。我认为，深入探究所有这些事情的本质至关重要，而不仅仅是停留在新闻头条那种“天啊，看看发生了什么”的层面。

Asymmetric Warfare and Ukrainian Capabilities / 非对称战争与乌克兰的能力

Helen Moltters:

I think the phrase asymmetric warfare is really key for us to understand here as you say. So I was reading that this operation took about a year and a half to plan. It was obviously extremely daring. But as we do try to understand the implications of what happened here, how do you think Ukraine actually managed to pull this off? Playing as you say the David role in this David versus Goliath story.

海伦·莫特斯:

正如你所说，我认为“非对称战争”这个词是我们理解此事的关键。我读到这次行动计划了大约一年半的时间。这显然是一次极其大胆的行动。但是，当我们试图理解这里所发生事件的影响时，你认为乌克兰究竟是如何成功做到的？正如你所说，在这场大卫与歌利亚的较量中扮演了大卫的角色。

Ian Bremmer:

The Ukrainians have been working to develop their own homemade military capabilities. I mean, you see how much Europe is now saying we need to move to three to four to even 5% of GDP spend on defense. It's not existential for them. This is the only thing that matters for Ukrainians. It matters more than eating well. It matters more than educating your kids. It's whether or not your country and therefore you have a future after the Russians invaded. Um, and so they're putting everything they can into building military capabilities and they don't have as many people and they don't have as much money, but they are better educated and they also have access to a very capable global Ukrainian diaspora. And I've met many young Ukrainian, ethnically Ukrainian technologists from Silicon Valley, from Canada, from Europe, who have worked with the Ukrainian military virtually, and many who have traveled to Ukraine and resettled in Ukraine to help them there. And that in addition to some of the money that's been provided by Europe and the United States has helped the Ukrainians to build a world-class, perhaps Israel would be also you know probably one or two, one of the best drone capabilities, military drone capabilities in the world and that is exactly what just happened. They hid these drones um in the top of containers that were brought into Russia on trucks. Um those containers were then sent all over Russia, some of which were very deep inside Russia. And then all at once in one day or at least the ones that we've now seen. Maybe there are more that are still in hiding, they were ordered, directed um to be deployed against Russian military bases and other infrastructure. Um and I mean this is not just close to the Russian front lines with Ukraine. I mean there was a military base that is on the Mongolian border. We're talking thousands and thousands of miles away from the Ukrainian front and they were able to destroy advanced Russian strategic bombers um in that base. That is, it's unprecedented. It reminds me a bit of what we saw with Israel and Lebanon and Hezbollah because Hezbollah, we had for many years always been saying this is the most powerful non-state armed forces in the world, and that Israel had to be very careful not to get involved in a war with them because it would be incredibly dangerous for Israel's own national security. And then over a matter of days we find out that Israel has decapitated their leadership, um completely taken out their communications systems and destroyed their military infrastructure critically weakening Iran's geopolitical position in the Middle East as a consequence and leading to what is now um the most, the most progress that Trump has had in any diplomatic effort around the world, US Iran, which no one would have expected a few months ago but started with a change in asymmetric warfare that Israel was able to perpetrate against Hezbollah. This is now happening between Ukraine and Russia obviously on a much more significant scale and with global not just regional consequences.

伊恩·布雷默:

乌克兰人一直在努力发展自己的国产军事能力。我的意思是，你看欧洲现在多么强调我们需要将国防开支增加到GDP的3%、4%甚至5%。对他们来说，这并非生死存亡的问题。但对乌克兰人而言，这是唯一重要的事情。它比吃得好更重要，比教育孩子更重要。这关乎在俄罗斯入侵之后，你的国家以及你个人是否还有未来。嗯，所以他们正倾其所有来建设军事能力，他们的人口不多，资金也不充裕，但他们受教育程度更高，并且能够接触到非常有能力的全球乌克兰侨民。我见过许多来自硅谷、加拿大、欧洲的年轻乌克兰裔技术专家，他们通过虚拟方式与乌克兰军方合作，还有许多人前往乌克兰并在那里定居以提供帮助。再加上欧洲和美国提供的一些资金，这些都帮助乌克兰人建立起了世界一流的，或许以色列也能排进前一两名，世界上最好的无人机能力，军事无人机能力之一，而这正是刚刚发生的事情。他们将这些无人机藏在通过卡车运入俄罗斯的集装箱顶部。这些集装箱随后被运往俄罗斯各地，有些甚至深入俄罗斯腹地。然后，在某一天，或者至少是我们现在所看到的那些，突然同时行动起来。也许还有更多无人机仍处于隐藏状态。它们接到指令，被调遣去攻击俄罗斯的军事基地和其他基础设施。我的意思是，这不仅仅发生在靠近俄乌前线的地方。我是说，有一个军事基地位于蒙古边境。我们谈论的是距离乌克兰前线数千英里的地方，他们却能够摧毁该基地内先进的俄罗斯战略轰炸机。这是前所未有的。这让我想起我们看到的以色列、黎巴嫩和真主党之间的情况，因为多年来我们一直说真主党是世界上最强大的非国家武装力量，以色列必须非常小心，不要卷入与他们的战争，因为那对以色列自身的国家安全将是极其危险的。然后，在几天之内，我们发现以色列已经斩首了他们的领导层，完全摧毁了他们的通信系统，并摧毁了他们的军事基础设施，从而严重削弱了伊朗在中东的地缘政治地位，并导致了现在特朗普在世界任何外交努力中取得的最大进展——美伊关系，这是几个月前没有人预料到的，但这始于以色列能够对真主党实施的非对称战争的改变。现在，同样的事情正在乌克兰和俄罗斯之间发生，显然规模要大得多，并且具有全球性而非仅仅是地区性的后果。

Russia's Losses and Rebuilding Capabilities / 俄罗斯的损失与重建能力

Helen Moltters:

So at the top you said that we need to talk about three things in particular or dive into them and one of them of course is Putin and the Russian response to this. Now it seems and as you say reports are differing as to the number of planes that were actually lost but it seems like Russia has lost about a third of its strategic bombers in the raid so far. That's more than 7 billion in damage. I'm also curious. You said that they can't rebuild these planes. Really stupid question, but why not?

海伦·莫特斯:

所以，在开始时您提到我们需要特别讨论或深入探讨三件事，其中之一当然是普京以及俄罗斯对此的反应。现在看来，正如您所说，关于实际损失飞机数量的报道各不相同，但似乎俄罗斯在这次袭击中迄今已损失了约三分之一的战略轰炸机。这造成的损失超过70亿美元。我同样好奇。您说他们无法重建这些飞机。这可能是个很傻的问题，但为什么不能呢？

Ian Bremmer:

Um so the Russians rely on a triad, as the Americans do, to deliver a nuclear arsenal um in the event of the unthinkable, a nuclear war. Um you have ballistic missiles, ICBMs, um you have submarines that are nuclear capable and you have the bomber fleet. The bomber fleet is the oldest uh of the uh three legs of the stool. Um and it's really the least important. It's the, it's the last resort. It's what happens if there was a first strike by the Americans and NATO and you take out some of the most advanced capabilities and the bombers have been scrambled. They're in the air and they're meant to be, you know, something that you can deploy if you have to. Um if in in the worst case. So it's a second strike capability is the way they think about it. Now those bombers are Soviet era. Um the Russians are not making them anymore and they certainly can't do a lot of the replacement parts now because so much of their present military efforts are going towards fighting a very different kind of war. But these strategic bombers are important. They are a part of ongoing arms control agreements. Um they are um clearly part of the nuclear balance that the US has against uh the Russians and NATO has against the Russians. And if the Ukrainians can do this, and clearly Ukraine wanted to take out all of them, that the intention was to basically uh one leg of the nuclear triad and also one leg of Russia's ability to use conventional missiles against Ukraine. And and Ukraine is running low of Patriot missile battery um artillery. And so therefore they need to have successes there. Um that's why they don't have um so many of them and that's why they can't rebuild them. So just to give you like kind of some context on that.

伊恩·布雷默:

嗯，所以俄罗斯人像美国人一样，依赖“三位一体”核力量来投送核武库，以应对难以想象的核战争。你有弹道导弹，洲际弹道导弹（ICBMs），你有具备核能力的潜艇，还有轰炸机部队。轰炸机部队是这三条腿中最古老的一条。而且它实际上是最不重要的。它是最后的手段。如果美国和北约发动第一次打击，摧毁了一些最先进的能力，而轰炸机已经紧急起飞，它们在空中， предназначены для того, чтобы, знаете ли, быть чем-то, что вы можете развернуть, если придется. В худшем случае. Так что они рассматривают это как способность второго удара. 现在那些轰炸机是苏联时代的。俄罗斯人不再制造它们了，而且他们现在肯定也无法生产很多替换零件，因为他们目前的大部分军事努力都投入到一场截然不同的战争中。但这些战略轰炸机很重要。它们是正在进行的军备控制协议的一部分。它们显然是美国对俄罗斯以及北约对俄罗斯核平衡的一部分。如果乌克兰人能做到这一点，而且显然乌克兰想把它们全部摧毁，其意图基本上是摧毁核三位一体的一条腿，也是俄罗斯对乌克兰使用常规导弹能力的一条腿。而乌克兰的爱国者导弹连火炮快用完了。因此他们需要在那里取得成功。这就是为什么他们没有那么多，也是为什么他们无法重建它们。所以只是想给你一些这方面的背景信息。

Russia's Response and Putin's Calculations / 俄罗斯的反应与普京的盘算

Helen Moltters:

Thank you so much. So clearly whatever the final numbers, this has been extraordinarily damaging for Russia. And in response on Sunday, they launched, as I've heard it, 472 drones, three ballistic missiles, and four cruise missiles at Ukraine. What should we also expect from Russia going forward? And do you think that Ukraine is actually ready for it?

海伦·莫特斯:

非常感谢。所以，无论最终数字如何，这显然对俄罗斯造成了极大的损害。作为回应，据我所知，他们在周日向乌克兰发射了472架无人机、三枚弹道导弹和四枚巡航导弹。我们接下来还应该从俄罗斯那里预料到什么？您认为乌克兰真的为此做好准备了吗？

Ian Bremmer:

Um, Ukraine is ready for everything at this point. Uh the Russians have not shown restraint in a way that the Ukrainians have. Let's keep in mind Helen that the fact that Ukraine was able to do this meant that Ukraine could have deployed those drones against Russian civilians and civilian architecture. They could have uh killed hundreds if not thousands of Russian civilians in Moscow and in St. Petersburg and they didn't and they haven't. And the Russians are the ones that have historically for the last three and a half years launched their own missiles and drones and bombers and attacked everything they can find that moves in Ukraine. They're the ones targeting civilians. So, the Ukrainians are ready for this. Um, but we have to think about what Putin is going to do. And we need to put oursel in Putin's head here. Wh why is it that Putin um has believed that the longer this war goes on, the better for him? And what might Putin's vulnerabilities be in his head? Because he's the one that's making the decisions himself. And those are two separate questions. So, let me let me try to address both of them for you.

First, why has Putin believed that the war, the longer it goes, the better for him? And look, I I think part of it is that Russia's military is bigger. Part of it is that he doesn't care as much about his own civilians. Putin runs a dictatorship. Um, you know, the Ukrainians have to worry much more about popular response. I mean, they've got their conscription age was 27. It was really hard just to bring it down to 25. Putin doesn't have to worry about that kind of thing. If you're Putin, you can keep raising thousands and hundreds of thousands of young men and the Russian people can't really do anything to you. They don't have an ability um to raise their voices in response. So, he thinks he can throw more people at it. He can have stronger um political stability. Uh he's got a bigger economy and a bigger war economy. He also thinks that the Europeans will lose interest. He has seen a number of European governments less willing to provide support. And most importantly, he's seen the Americans very inconsistent, much more internally divided over why it is that they're supporting Ukraine, even willing to suspend for a period of time intelligence and defense equipment at a time that they were not willing to threaten Russia credibly with bigger consequences and more sanctions. So if you're Putin, you've believed that the longer you stick with this war, the weaker the Ukrainians will get, the more the Europeans will be divided and the more likely the Americans are going to walk away. And even with Trump getting embarrassed by Putin stringing him along, there's nothing that Trump has shown Putin that has changed that view.

So the big question is whether Ukraine showing that they do have some cards to play, that they can actually damage Russia in ways that certainly Putin had never considered possible. And what else might they be able to do? How might they be able to weaken Russia critically on the global stage, its military capabilities? How might they make Putin look vulnerable with his own leaders, showing that he misjudged critically Ukraine's lack of capabilities? Might they even be able to assassinate Putin? Might they be able to come after him individually? So, those are all things that would make it more likely that Putin would negotiate um in in better faith that he might be willing to actually engage more with Ukraine and bring us to a ceasefire. Of course, there have been some meetings in the last 24 hours and we should come back and talk about that. But I want to get to the second point because that that's what might make Putin feel like he needs to engage more. That's the optimistic point. But there's a pessimistic point which is Putin has to also ask himself why is it that the Europeans have been willing to continue to provide more and more weapons and allow the Ukrainians to strike deep inside Russia. And you know, there's some debate over whether or not Trump knew was told in advance by Zelenskyy um that uh these strikes were going to occur. Um I I actually think Trump did know. I I think first of all the Ukrainians have shown that they really need that intelligence and also the Ukrainians have capitulated to Trump because they know they can't anger him that much. So, you know, you've seen that the Ukrainians accepted without any conditions a 30-day ceasefire because Trump demanded it. They accepted his critical minerals deal and pushed it through their own parliament, even though they were deeply uncomfortable because Trump demanded it. I have a hard time seeing Ukraine going ahead with these strikes and surprising Trump. I do. Especially because they came right after Trump was really angry and displayed that because Putin was engaging in all of these strikes against Kyiv, killing all of these civilians and Trump came out saying that. So if you're Putin, you see that the NATO seems to be very comfortable allowing not only giving Ukraine all of these weapons and these this intelligence that's facilitating Ukraine to take actions against Russia's strategic nuclear forces. So if you're Putin, what have you done wrong that has allowed NATO to persist in their belief that they can get away with that? And here the issue is something that we shouldn't be comfortable with, which is that Putin has to be thinking that he has not at all effectively deterred NATO. He has made them think that he is weak, that he won't respond adequately to them, that when he threatens um Fin uh Sweden and and Finland and says that if you join NATO, there will be hell to pay. And then they join NATO and he does nothing. He looks weak. And when he tells the Germans, if you provide tanks and if you allow these weapons to go long range into Russia, they'll be hell to pay. And he does nothing against them. Nothing credible. So I fear that there's also just as there is a part of Putin that now sees that he is in a position where he might need to negotiate for a ceasefire, there's also a part of Putin that feels like he's in an environment where he needs to show that he's much tougher, that he's much more willing to exact pain on NATO than he has been historically. that there will be real consequences, especially for President Trump, who he knows is very scared of World War III, is very scared of getting into a war himself. And of course, if the optimistic take is that Russia is now more likely to go into a ceasefire, the pessimistic take is that Russia is now much more likely to escalate severely. And what that means, I fear, is more likely to consider a use of a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine. That is, and that's why this is so important. It is so critical that we that we really think all of this through and we get it right. That is deeply unsettling.

伊恩·布雷默:

嗯，乌克兰此时此刻已经为任何事情做好了准备。俄罗斯人并没有表现出像乌克兰人那样的克制。海伦，我们必须记住，乌克兰能够做到这一点，意味着乌克兰本可以部署那些无人机来攻击俄罗斯平民和民用建筑。他们本可以在莫斯科和圣彼得堡杀死数百甚至数千名俄罗斯平民，但他们没有，也从未这样做过。而在过去三年半的时间里，一直是俄罗斯人发射自己的导弹、无人机和轰炸机，攻击他们在乌克兰能找到的一切活动目标。是他们在针对平民。所以，乌克兰人为此做好了准备。但是，我们必须思考普京会做什么。我们需要设身处地地从普京的角度思考。为什么普京会相信这场战争拖得越久，对他越有利？普京脑中可能存在的弱点是什么？因为是他自己在做决定。这是两个独立的问题。那么，让我尝试为你解答这两个问题。

首先，为什么普京相信战争拖得越久对他越有利？我认为部分原因在于俄罗斯的军事规模更大。部分原因在于他不太在乎自己的平民。普京统治的是一个独裁政权。你知道，乌克兰人更需要担心民众的反应。我的意思是，他们的征兵年龄是27岁，仅仅降到25岁就非常困难。普京不必担心这类事情。如果你是普京，你可以不断征召成千上万的年轻人，而俄罗斯人民对此无能为力。他们没有能力发出反对的声音。所以，他认为他可以投入更多的人力。他可以拥有更强的政治稳定。他拥有更大的经济体和更大的战争经济。他还认为欧洲人会失去兴趣。他看到一些欧洲国家政府提供支持的意愿降低。最重要的是，他看到美国人非常反复无常，在为何支持乌克兰的问题上内部分歧更大，甚至在他们不愿意以更严重的后果和更多制裁来可信地威胁俄罗斯的时候，一度暂停了情报和国防设备供应。所以，如果你是普京，你就会相信，你在这场战争中坚持得越久，乌克兰人就会越弱，欧洲人就会越分裂，美国人就越有可能袖手旁观。即使特朗普因为被普京牵着鼻子走而感到难堪，特朗普也没有向普京展示任何能够改变这种看法的东西。

所以最大的问题是，乌克兰是否展示出他们确实有一些牌可打，他们实际上能够以普京肯定从未想过的方式损害俄罗斯。他们还能做些什么呢？他们如何能够在全球舞台上，在军事能力方面严重削弱俄罗斯？他们如何能让普京在他自己的领导层面前显得脆弱，表明他严重低估了乌克兰的能力？他们甚至能暗杀普京吗？他们能单独针对他吗？所以，这些都是可能使普京更倾向于以更真诚的态度进行谈判，更愿意与乌克兰进行更多接触，并促成停火的事情。当然，过去24小时内举行了一些会议，我们应该回过头来谈谈这个。但我想谈谈第二点，因为那可能会让普京觉得他需要更多地参与进来。这是乐观的一面。但也有悲观的一面，那就是普京还必须问自己，为什么欧洲人愿意继续提供越来越多的武器，并允许乌克兰深入俄罗斯境内进行打击。你知道，关于特朗普是否事先被泽连斯基告知这些袭击将会发生，存在一些争论。我实际上认为特朗普是知道的。我认为首先，乌克兰人已经表明他们确实需要那些情报，而且乌克兰人也已经向特朗普屈服，因为他们知道不能太激怒他。所以，你知道，乌克兰人无条件接受了为期30天的停火，因为特朗普要求这样做。他们接受了他的关键矿产协议，并在自己的议会中强行通过，尽管他们对此深感不安，因为这是特朗普要求的。我很难想象乌克兰会在没有让特朗普知情的情况下发动这些袭击。我确实这么认为。特别是因为这些袭击发生在特朗普非常愤怒并表现出来之后，因为普京正在对基辅发动所有这些袭击，杀害所有这些平民，而特朗普公开指责了这一点。所以，如果你是普京，你看到北约似乎非常乐于不仅向乌克兰提供所有这些武器和情报，以便利乌克兰对俄罗斯的战略核力量采取行动。那么，如果你是普京，你做错了什么，让北约能够坚持他们可以侥幸成功的信念？而这里的问题是我们不应该感到安心的，那就是普京肯定在想，他根本没有有效地威慑住北约。他让他们认为他软弱，他不会对他们做出充分的回应，当他威胁瑞典和芬兰，说如果你们加入北约，就会付出惨痛代价时，然后他们加入了北约，他却什么也没做。他看起来很软弱。当他告诉德国人，如果你们提供坦克，如果你们允许这些武器远程进入俄罗斯，他们就会付出惨痛代价时，他却对他们什么也没做。没有任何可信的行动。所以我担心，正如普京的一部分现在认为他处于可能需要谈判停火的境地一样，普京的另一部分也觉得他处于一个需要表现得更强硬，比以往更愿意给北约施加痛苦的环境中。这将产生真正的后果，特别是对特朗普总统而言，他知道特朗普非常害怕第三次世界大战，非常害怕自己卷入战争。当然，如果乐观的看法是俄罗斯现在更有可能实现停火，那么悲观的看法是俄罗斯现在更有可能严重升级。而我担心，这意味着更有可能考虑对乌克兰使用战术核武器。这就是，这就是为什么这如此重要。我们必须认真思考这一切并做出正确的判断，这至关重要。这令人深感不安。

The Likelihood of Escalation and Nuclear Threat / 升级的可能性与核威胁

Helen Moltters:

Obviously, the realistic the Bremmer take on all of that. If you're not playing optimist and you're not playing pessimist, where do you think we really are and who is in the position therefore of trying to prevent nuclear disaster or this spilling into a bigger war? Is that Trump?

海伦·莫特斯:

显然，这是布雷默对这一切的现实主义看法。如果您既不扮演乐观主义者，也不扮演悲观主义者，您认为我们真正处于什么位置？那么，谁有能力试图阻止核灾难或这场冲突演变成更大规模的战争？是特朗普吗？

Ian Bremmer:

Uh the realistic take is that uh this is an escalation, but it's not a game-changing escalation yet. that um Putin will be careful um more careful about his forces uh than he has been. He will be more respectful of Ukraine's capabilities than he has been. Um and that he will up the attacks on Kyiv and exact more civilian damage to Ukrainians around the country. He'll try to assassinate some senior leaders, some, you know, major defense leaders, that kind of thing. Maybe he'll try to pull off something spectacular against Ukrainians officials when they visit other countries, that kind of thing. Um, but but he doesn't seriously consider a nuke because he knows that that would not just radically alienate and unify the Europeans. and he doesn't know what it will do with Trump even though he he's probably his sense that it will make Trump more distant and hands off and try to end the war than fight against Russia. But he also knows that it will seriously antagonize his most important ally and that is China. The Chinese really don't want the Russians to make this worse and they would be very very opposed to him using a nuclear weapon and they've told him that historically. So I think he's loathed to use it but I I understand that you know if that was a 1% likelihood maybe it's not 30 or 40 right now but it's not one it's five it's 10 it's 20 and these are numbers that should be unthinkable and they're not. Now I want to say one more thing. The real what realist Ian is thinking right now. Realist Ian remembers Mr. Prigozhin who you and I have spoken about in the past when the head of the Wagner group, one of the most important advisors to Putin, decided to go on a suicide run and took his senior most trusted troops and led a column of tanks from the Ukrainian front up to Moscow against Putin.

And I mean, we all knew it was a suicide run. We we all knew there was no way he could end up alive after that, but what had happened was Prigozhin was put into a corner into a no-win situation where anything he did meant that he was going to end up in jail or dead. And what we have to understand is that when we're fighting a war between Russia and Ukraine and a proxy war between Russia and NATO and the stakes are getting higher and Ukraine's own asymmetric capabilities are getting greater and and Ukraine is absolutely willing if they had a shot at Putin they would take it in a second. If they had the ability to critically destroy Russia's warfighting capabilities, they would do it in a second. And NATO is helping them. We have to understand that if Putin ever got into a position in his headspace like Prigozhin was either because of external threat to him or internal threat to him he's not going to pull a Gorbachev where he you know sort of steps down without a fight. No, Putin would go down with guns blazing. And and absolutely that means that nuclear use has gotten much closer today than it has been when I was growing up in the arms control age in the day after age of the cold war in the 70s and 80s. This is a much more dangerous environment than that. And and and the Russia Ukraine war is the tip of the spear for what a major global war might eventually turn into.

伊恩·布雷默:

嗯，现实的看法是，这是一次升级，但还不是改变游戏规则的升级。普京在对待他的军队方面会比以往更加小心。他会比以往更加尊重乌克兰的能力。而且他会加大对基辅的攻击，并在全国范围内对乌克兰平民造成更大的伤害。他会试图暗杀一些高级领导人，一些主要的国防领导人，诸如此类。也许他会试图在乌克兰官员访问其他国家时，对他们采取一些引人注目的行动。但是，他并不会认真考虑使用核武器，因为他知道那不仅会彻底疏远并团结欧洲人，而且他也不知道这会对特朗普产生什么影响，尽管他可能感觉到这会使特朗普更加疏远和放手，并试图结束战争而不是对抗俄罗斯。但他也知道，这会严重激怒他最重要的盟友——中国。中国人真的不希望俄罗斯人让事情变得更糟，他们会非常非常反对他使用核武器，而且他们历史上也曾这样告诉过他。所以我认为他不愿意使用核武器，但我理解，你知道，如果说可能性是1%，也许现在不是30%或40%，但也不是1%，而是5%，10%，20%，这些数字本应是不可想象的，但它们并非如此。现在我想再说一件事。现实主义者伊恩现在真正在想什么。现实主义者伊恩记得普里戈任先生，我们过去谈论过他，当瓦格纳集团的负责人，普京最重要的顾问之一，决定进行一次自杀式行动，带领他最信任的高级部队，率领一列坦克从乌克兰前线向莫斯科进发，对抗普京。

我的意思是，我们都知道那是一次自杀式行动。我们都知道他不可能在那之后活下来，但发生的事情是，普里戈任被逼到了一个没有出路的绝境，无论他做什么都意味着他最终会坐牢或死亡。我们必须明白，当我们在俄罗斯和乌克兰之间打一场战争，在俄罗斯和北约之间打一场代理人战争，赌注越来越高，乌克兰自身的非对称能力越来越强，而且乌克兰绝对愿意，如果他们有机会对付普京，他们会毫不犹豫地抓住机会。如果他们有能力严重摧毁俄罗斯的作战能力，他们会毫不犹豫地去做。而北约正在帮助他们。我们必须明白，如果普京在他的思想空间里，像普里戈任那样，无论是由于外部威胁还是内部威胁，陷入了困境，他不会像戈尔巴乔夫那样不战而退。不，普京会战斗到底。这绝对意味着，今天使用核武器的可能性比我成长于七八十年代冷战后军备控制时代时要近得多。这比那时的环境危险得多。俄乌战争可能最终演变成一场大规模全球战争的先兆。

The Russia-China Relationship / 俄中关系

Helen Moltters:

So I'm curious about the connection between Russia and China and wonder if you can give us a little bit of context on how that relationship actually works. You say China does not want Russia to launch a nuke on Ukraine. How does that actually work? Just as a kind of a geopolitical kind of relationship. How do they make their intentions known? Why do they care what Russia does in Ukraine? Tell us more about that relationship and the kind of leverage that China has over Russia.

海伦·莫特斯:

所以我对俄罗斯和中国之间的联系感到好奇，想知道您是否能给我们提供一些关于这种关系实际如何运作的背景信息。您说中国不希望俄罗斯对乌克兰使用核武器。这实际上是如何运作的？仅仅作为一种地缘政治关系。他们如何让对方知晓自己的意图？他们为什么在乎俄罗斯在乌克兰做什么？请告诉我们更多关于这种关系以及中国对俄罗斯拥有的那种影响力。

Ian Bremmer:

Look, it's a longstanding relationship between these two men, these two dictators, these two leaders that are both leaders for life. You know, Russia nominally has elections, but not really. China nominally has a selection process, but Xi Jinping has ended that when it comes to himself. They've known each other um now for, you know, uh decades. Um and they meet continually on the global stage. I mean, Xi Jinping visits Putin on his birthday. It's a big deal. And and they trust each other in ways that go well beyond relations between traditional American presidents and European leaders. I mean, pre-Trump. Um, and and that's because they understand that they have to have each other's back because nobody else will. Now, there are limits to the relationship. It's an asymmetrical relationship. China's much more powerful economically. China's much more powerful technologically.

Um, China wants stability on the global stage. Russia, like North Korea, is more of a chaos actor. So when Russia invaded Ukraine and told Xi Jinping it was going to be over very quickly, the fact that it wasn't and that it undermined China's own relations with the East European countries that they were doing the best economic relations with, but suddenly became the most anti-Russian because of the war. And China's relationship with Russia undermined their own old 16 plus one relationship with all the East and Southern Europeans. That was a problem. So, the Chinese aren't happy uh with the fact that the North Koreans have provided over 10,000 troops to the front lines to Russia to fight and and the Chinese found out about that um you know when it happened. It wasn't like Putin gave China a heads up. So there are some of these issues uh where uh the Russians are acting as a as a chaos actor on the global stage causing more instability and the Chinese are very uncomfortable with that. China provides a lot of important uh technology to Russia, a lot of important, some of that's dual use, a lot of important money uh to Russia and they buy a lot of oil from Russia. Um but they don't provide direct warfighting capabilities the way the Iranians do and the North Koreans do and they also don't recognize uh Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine. They don't recognize the annexation of um four Ukrainian uh districts that the Russians have now put into their constitution and as a basis of their negotiating platform. They don't recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Um they say that it is the territorial integrity of Ukraine that has sway and they've said that at the United Nations General Assembly on many occasions because it's consistent with their policy of Taiwan which the Chinese see as an an indelible part of of the Chinese nation and the Chinese state. So um all of that is to say the Putin China relationship is very strong. Trump's idea that he was going to pull a reverse Nixon and get the Russians to align with him over Xi Jinping was insanity and never going to happen. And his own advisor, most of them knew it but were unprepared to tell Trump the truth about it because he doesn't like it when people disagree with him. Um and uh and as a consequence um that relationship is not going anywhere. But but again um when it comes to things that the the Russians could really do to undermine Ukraine, China's position globally um back in the beginning of the war in the first year when it was looking more likely that Russia would use a tactical nuke in southeast Ukraine because they were losing lots of territory. The Americans warned the Russians under Biden that if that were to happen, the United States would directly engage in military strikes against Russian military targets. They said that directly through intelligence channels and they also told the Chinese and the Indians and China and India both at the head of state level told Putin, you have to absolutely not use a nuke. And the American position I think has changed dramatically from Biden to Trump on this. I fear has changed dramatically. Um because the deterrent is weaker. Um but that I I'm not at all convinced that India and China are less worried about it as a consequence.

伊恩·布雷默:

看，这是这两个人，这两个独裁者，这两个终身领导人之间长期的关系。你知道，俄罗斯名义上有选举，但实际上没有。中国名义上有选拔程序，但习近平在涉及他自己时已经结束了这一点。他们认识彼此嗯，现在已经有几十年了。他们在全球舞台上持续会面。我的意思是，习近平在普京生日时拜访他。这是件大事。他们之间的信任程度远远超出了传统美国总统和欧洲领导人之间的关系。我是说，在特朗普之前。嗯，这是因为他们明白他们必须互相支持，因为没有其他人会支持他们。现在，这种关系是有限度的。这是一种不对称的关系。中国在经济上强大得多。中国在技术上强大得多。

嗯，中国希望在全球舞台上保持稳定。俄罗斯，像朝鲜一样，更像是一个混乱制造者。所以当俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并告诉习近平战争会很快结束时，事实并非如此，而且这损害了中国自身与东欧国家的关系，而中国与这些国家曾有着最好的经济关系，但由于战争，这些国家突然变得最反俄。中国与俄罗斯的关系也损害了他们自己与所有东欧和南欧国家的旧有“16+1”合作关系。那是个问题。所以，中国人对朝鲜向俄罗斯前线提供了超过10000名士兵参战这件事并不高兴，而且中国人是在事情发生后才知道的。并非普京事先通知了中国。所以存在一些这样的问题，俄罗斯在全球舞台上扮演混乱制造者的角色，造成更多不稳定，而中国人对此非常不舒服。中国向俄罗斯提供了大量重要的技术，大量重要的，其中一些是军民两用的，大量重要的资金，并且从俄罗斯购买大量石油。但是他们不像伊朗人和朝鲜人那样提供直接的作战能力，他们也不承认乌克兰，不承认俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵。他们不承认俄罗斯吞并了四个乌克兰地区，而俄罗斯现在已将这些地区写入宪法，并作为其谈判平台的基础。他们不承认俄罗斯2014年吞并克里米亚。他们说，乌克兰的领土完整具有决定性意义，他们多次在联合国大会上这样说过，因为这与他们的台湾政策一致，中国人认为台湾是中国民族和中国国家不可分割的一部分。所以，所有这些都表明普京与中国的关系非常牢固。特朗普认为他可以复制尼克松的反向操作，让俄罗斯人与他结盟对抗习近平，这简直是疯了，而且永远不会发生。他自己的顾问，大多数人都知道这一点，但却不准备告诉特朗普真相，因为他不喜欢别人反对他。因此，这种关系不会有任何改变。但是，再说一次，当涉及到俄罗斯可能真正采取的、会损害乌克兰以及中国全球地位的行动时……在战争初期，第一年，当俄罗斯看起来更有可能在乌克兰东南部使用战术核武器，因为他们正在失去大量领土时，拜登领导下的美国警告俄罗斯，如果发生这种情况，美国将直接对俄罗斯军事目标进行军事打击。他们通过情报渠道直接这样说，他们也告诉了中国人和印度人，中国和印度都在国家元首层面告诉普京，你绝对不能使用核武器。我认为美国在拜登和特朗普之间在这个问题上的立场发生了巨大变化。我担心发生了巨大变化。因为威慑力减弱了。但我一点也不相信印度和中国因此会减少担忧。

Peace Talks and Diplomatic Front / 和平谈判与外交前线

Helen Moltters:

So you mentioned the peace talks which strangely I don't know how much you think this was all timed. Obviously, the operation was was a year and a half in the making. The peace talks ended a couple of hours ago today. They ended pretty inconclusively, it seems. Do you think peace talks, new peace talks will happen as a result of this, or what kind of negotiations do you think we should look for in the coming weeks?

海伦·莫特斯:

所以您提到了和平谈判，奇怪的是，我不知道您认为这一切在多大程度上是经过精心安排的。显然，这次行动策划了一年半。和平谈判在今天几个小时前结束了。看起来结果相当不确定。您认为因此会举行和平谈判，新的和平谈判吗？或者在未来几周内，我们应该期待什么样的谈判？

Ian Bremmer:

So, according to Putin, this is still not a war, it's a special military operation. According to Putin, these acts are acts of terrorism. They're not direct acts of military war which means that he is not compelled to take military responses including on his nuclear threat level internally that he would if it were a direct war helpful in that regard again he's dictator so he can change the rules uh at a whim but he likes to have Potemkin law uh in Russia that you know at least implies that he's going through a process whether it's a show trial or whether it's you know sort of a vote in parliament you name it um to approve an annexation all of this stuff. So, I think it's helpful that that process goes through. Now, um it's very clear to me that Ukraine was very well aware that they were the decision of when to launch this attack was informed by the reality of negotiations happening the next day. Now these are not Zelenskyy Putin negotiations which at this point Zelenskyy says he welcomes. Trump says he wants. Putin refuses. Putin's cabinet says no. But they were meaningful working level diplomatic discussions. And despite Ukraine's extraordinary success, the Russians still showed up. And they didn't just show up. They they actively negotiated um on the prospects of another round of uh prisoner exchanges, soldiers fighting that are uh seriously wounded. This has happened before, but it's meaningful that it happened just now. And the Russians have also uh provided in Russian, but I took a quick look at it um uh some documents uh around what would uh be required for a ceasefire. It appears that there are two different options. One is that the Ukrainians would have to cede all the territory that the Russians have annexed, which includes territory that Russia right now does not actually occupy, a non-starter. The second would be present lines of conflict. Ukraine doesn't cede more territory uh but they are not allowed to have any further intelligence or weapon systems of any sort um from the west and no weapons no soldiers on the ground from the west going forward. Also a non-starter. So I mean interestingly there's still no common ground. But Helen, I would tell you that today Russia and Ukraine on the diplomatic front are a small step closer than they were before the Ukrainian attacks. I would tell you on the military front they are a slightly larger step towards significant escalation than they were um a couple of days ago. And that's the tension here. That's the tension.

伊恩·布雷默:

所以，按照普京的说法，这仍然不是一场战争，而是一次特殊的军事行动。按照普京的说法，这些行为是恐怖主义行为。它们不是直接的军事战争行为，这意味着他没有被强制采取军事回应，包括在他内部的核威胁级别上，如果这是一场直接战争，他会那样做，这在这方面是有帮助的。再说一次，他是独裁者，所以他可以随心所欲地改变规则，但他喜欢在俄罗斯搞“波将金法律”，你知道，至少暗示他正在经历一个过程，无论是作秀审判，还是议会投票，你随便说，以批准吞并所有这些东西。所以我认为这个过程的进行是有帮助的。现在，我很清楚，乌克兰非常清楚他们决定何时发动这次袭击是基于第二天谈判的现实情况。现在这些不是泽连斯基和普京的谈判，目前泽连斯基表示他欢迎这种谈判。特朗普说他想要。普京拒绝。普京的内阁说不。但这些是有意义的工作层面外交讨论。尽管乌克兰取得了非凡的成功，俄罗斯人仍然出席了。他们不仅仅是出席了。他们积极地就下一轮战俘交换、重伤士兵等问题进行了谈判。这种情况以前也发生过，但现在发生是很有意义的。俄罗斯人还提供了一些俄文文件，我快速看了一下，是关于停火需要满足什么条件的文件。似乎有两个不同的选项。一个是乌克兰人必须割让俄罗斯已吞并的所有领土，其中包括俄罗斯目前并未实际占领的领土，这根本行不通。第二个是维持目前的冲突线。乌克兰不割让更多领土，但他们不允许从西方获得任何进一步的情报或任何类型的武器系统，未来也不允许西方在地面上部署任何武器或士兵。这也行不通。所以我的意思是，有趣的是，仍然没有共同点。但是海伦，我会告诉你，今天俄罗斯和乌克兰在外交战线上比乌克兰袭击前更近了一小步。我会告诉你，在军事战线上，他们比几天前向着重大升级迈出了稍大的一步。这就是这里的紧张之处。这就是紧张之处。

The Broader Impact of Drone Technology / 无人机技术的广泛影响

Helen Moltters:

That is indeed a tension. So at TED 2025 back in April, we heard from Palmer Luckey, who's the founder of Anduril. And US defense firm. And he actually shared a story in which there was a drone operated operation. He was talking about China and Taiwan as the antagonist in that story. But he was basically laying out the vision that unless militaries take drone capabilities and AI seriously, they are essentially being irresponsible to their nations because this technology is available. We should use it for deterrence and we should we should be serious about it and we should use it now. I wonder if you're to take a step away from Russia and Ukraine and think about militaries more generally. Do you see any militaries that are really taking that seriously or that actually are kind of setting stock into that type of thinking? Because it's just so astonishing to me that these $300 like super cheap drones are able to cause such massive damage on the kind of the old system.

海伦·莫特斯:

这确实是一种紧张关系。在四月份的TED 2025大会上，我们听取了帕尔默·拉奇的发言，他是安杜里尔（Anduril）公司的创始人，这是一家美国国防公司。他实际上分享了一个关于无人机行动的故事。他当时谈论的是中国和台湾作为故事中的对抗方。但他基本上阐述了一个愿景，即除非军队认真对待无人机能力和人工智能，否则他们基本上是对自己的国家不负责任，因为这种技术是可用的。我们应该用它来进行威慑，我们应该认真对待它，并且现在就应该使用它。我想知道，如果您暂时抛开俄罗斯和乌克兰，更广泛地思考军队问题。您是否看到有哪些军队真正认真对待这个问题，或者实际上正在采纳这种思维方式？因为这些价值300美元的超廉价无人机能够对那种旧系统造成如此巨大的破坏，这对我来说实在太令人震惊了。

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. It it's the countries that are using the drones effectively that are taking it most seriously. So, it's Israel, it's Ukraine, it's India, it's the Gulf States. It's countries that have seen these things directly in operation. Um, and it's changing their lives. The United States is thankfully not in or near a war zone. Canada, Mexico, two big bodies of water. So, if you're going to have major drone threats, they're going to be internal lone wolves. They're not going to be coordinated militaries with those capabilities. Now, you know, as you start moving and Palmer Luckey and and they've put out videos and it's very compelling as you move from these $300, $400 individual drones um to um you know, sort of uh large much larger numbers of micro drone swarms that could that are going to be incredibly cheap and can be controlled from afar. um that could be easily put um in uh you know a much smaller um you know sort of uh in a FedEx box you know in something that can be shipped. It's going to be very very much much harder to detect you know sort of how these things are being smuggled across borders. Again keep in mind this Ukrainian attack it's not like Israel against Hezbollah where all those strikes came from Israel. This was, you know, attacks that came from inside Russia. The Ukrainians were able to smuggle these really inexpensive drones inside containers where the Russians didn't think there were any drones in them. And so, what does that tell you? It means that the Russians can't have containers coming in. And if they do, they've got to spend a lot more money and be a lot more careful about the what they're doing on their security and their borders. Well, I mean, I promise you that the stealth capabilities and the the miniaturization capabilities of the drones is moving a lot faster than government's defense capabilities of their borders. So again, what is really changing is that much weaker actors, whether states or whether um you know, non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, are going to become a lot more powerful. Now the danger here uh is that we are now living in a world uh that is radicalizing a lot of people right I mean you know this is a a winner take all world it's a law of the jungle world and it's a world where the United States and a lot of other people don't care about you if you don't have power don't care the Ukrainians are going to fight a lot for the Ukrainians but the US might just cut it And the Palestinians, who cares about the Palestinians? Not even the Gulf States really care about the Palestinians? Not in a way they're going to really do anything about it or the Egyptians or the Jordanians. And who cares about Haiti, right? I mean, how far is Haiti from the United States? You know, it's right in our backyard. Who cares about it? Who cares about South Sudan? Who cares about the DRC? And so, you know, when when relatively small numbers of people with access to advanced technology, but not all that much money can start causing the sorts of damage that we're now seeing the Israelis and the Ukrainians engage in inside Gaza and inside Russia. Um, then suddenly this becomes a national security issue for everyone including the United States of America. It's a very very real issue.

伊恩·布雷默:

是的。那些有效使用无人机的国家最认真地对待这个问题。所以，是以色列、乌克兰、印度、海湾国家。这些国家都亲眼目睹了这些东西在实战中的运用。这正在改变他们的生活。谢天谢地，美国不在战区或战区附近。加拿大、墨西哥，两大水域相隔。所以，如果出现重大的无人机威胁，那将是内部的独狼式袭击。不会是有组织的、具备这些能力的军队。现在，你知道，随着你开始行动，帕尔默·拉奇他们也发布了视频，非常有说服力，当你从这些价值300、400美元的单个无人机，转向数量庞大得多的微型无人机蜂群，这些蜂群将非常便宜，并且可以远程控制。它们可以很容易地放在一个小得多的联邦快递盒子里，可以运输的东西里。要检测这些东西是如何被偷运过境的，将会变得非常非常困难。再次记住，这次乌克兰的袭击不像以色列对真主党的袭击那样，所有袭击都来自以色列。这次是来自俄罗斯内部的袭击。乌克兰人能够将这些非常便宜的无人机藏在集装箱内偷运进去，而俄罗斯人根本没想到里面会有无人机。那么，这说明了什么？这意味着俄罗斯人不能再让集装箱进来了。如果他们要这样做，就必须花费更多的钱，并且在边境安全方面更加小心。我的意思是，我向你保证，无人机的隐形能力和小型化能力的发展速度比政府的边境防御能力快得多。所以，真正改变的是，无论是国家还是非国家行为者，包括恐怖组织在内的弱小行为者，都将变得更加强大。现在的危险在于，我们生活在一个正在使许多人激进化的世界。我的意思是，你知道，这是一个赢家通吃的世界，一个丛林法则的世界，一个美国和许多其他人如果你没有权力就不会在乎你的世界，不在乎乌克兰人会为乌克兰人付出很多，但美国可能就此罢手。巴勒斯坦人呢？谁在乎巴勒斯坦人？甚至海湾国家也不真正关心巴勒斯坦人？不是以他们会真正为此做任何事情的方式，埃及人或约旦人也不会。谁在乎海地，对吧？我的意思是，海地离美国有多远？你知道，它就在我们的后院。谁在乎它？谁在乎南苏丹？谁在乎刚果民主共和国？所以，你知道，当相对少数拥有先进技术但资金不多的人开始造成我们现在看到的以色列人和乌克兰人在加沙和俄罗斯境内造成的那种破坏时，那么突然之间，这就成了包括美利坚合众国在内的每个人的国家安全问题。这是一个非常非常现实的问题。

The US Response and Trump's Potential Actions / 美国的反应与特朗普的潜在行动

Helen Moltters:

And how does let's take the US. How does the US respond to that?

海伦·莫特斯:

那么，让我们以美国为例。美国如何应对这种情况呢？

Ian Bremmer:

Look, first of all, we haven't talked about Trump's response to this yet. Um and and that's the other piece of the equation that really matters, which is does this make Trump more likely to engage because he's worried about World War III, because he sees um that the Russians uh need to be brought to bear. Ukraine is accepting a ceasefire, but Russia is not. Does this make Trump feel like he has more cards that the Russians are weak and he needs to push them? He has displayed some willingness to criticize Putin over the past few weeks, but in his private meetings with heads of state, and I've gotten downloads on some of those directly, he said, "Well, I can threaten sanctions, but I really don't want to have to implement them." That's a problem, right? So, uh, if if Trump is ultimately not prepared to have a fist in his glove with Putin, then Putin knows that he can get away with a lot more because ultimately the United States is the most important military power in the world and the most important underpinner of NATO as a as an alliance and supporter of Ukraine militarily as opposed to economically where the Europeans all are doing more. Um I I I suspect that Trump is going to give up on this that Trump is going to see it's too hard. He's already said, "Well, maybe the Pope can do something. Maybe Erdogan can do something." He's spending more time on Iran, which is in a much weaker position, engaging more in trying to get a deal there with some success, by the way. And I think he's losing interest. Trump is not a patient person. Uh he you know he doesn't like long briefs. He likes headlines. He likes watching TV and reading the news quickly. Um and so you know this has been going on for a long time. Trump said it was going to take a day. Then he said, "Well, I you know I was exaggerating when I said a day, but I mean he doesn't mean years." And he's like, "Now it's two weeks. I give him two weeks and that's it." He said that three separate times now. He's not going to say it 10 separate times. So ultimately, if Putin's not going to really, you know, engage, then I think Trump's going to move on. And he's likely to move on and say, um, I I've washed my hands. I tried, and the Ukrainians and the Russians both aren't willing to to make this happen. I don't think he'll cut off Ukrainian support. I think he will provide intelligence. He'll allow the Ukrainians to buy military weaponry from the US. He'll see that the Europeans are spending most of the money. The NATO summit will be successful. He's not going to pull out of NATO. Um, which so it's not the worst case scenario for Ukraine. It's not the worst case scenario for NATO where Trump does a deal with Putin and ignores the Europeans and the Ukrainians. Um, but ultimately it's someone else has to do this. Now, you mentioned Palmer Luckey. Uh I I do think that uh there are a lot of people with a lot of power that are involved in the military-industrial technological complex that are trying to make sure that new spend by the US defense department is on these issues is on AI and is on defense capabilities with drones and all of those things. I think a lot is being spent there. But I also know that the DoD is a very slow-moving entity. Um, and it's, you know, it's got a lot of mouths to feed, a lot of constituents in Congress with jobs that are committed to legacy programs that are not relevant to US national security in another 5 years time, whether it's submarines or last generation bomber jets. And and the US is just not going to pivot fast enough. No way. You would need leadership that is much more willing to move fast and break things. And you know, uh there are people like that that are giving a lot of money to the Trump campaign and whose companies are getting big contracts. That's happening. But Pete Hegseth is not that. And um most of the existing generals and admirals are not that. Uh and and Congress that is ultimately uh securing funds for defense is not that. So I I I suspect that the answer to this is going to be wait till there's a crisis and then we respond.

伊恩·布雷默:

看，首先，我们还没有谈论特朗普对此的反应。这是等式中另一个真正重要的部分，那就是这是否会使特朗普更倾向于介入，因为他担心第三次世界大战，因为他看到俄罗斯人需要被制约。乌克兰正在接受停火，但俄罗斯没有。这是否让特朗普觉得他有更多筹码，俄罗斯人软弱，他需要推动他们？过去几周，他表现出一些批评普京的意愿，但在他与国家元首的私下会晤中——我直接得到了一些这些会晤的简报——他说：“嗯，我可以威胁制裁，但我真的不想实施它们。”这是个问题，对吧？所以，如果特朗普最终不准备对普京采取强硬手段，那么普京就知道他可以逍遥法外，因为归根结底，美国是世界上最重要的军事大国，也是北约作为联盟最重要的支持者，以及乌克兰军事上的支持者，而不是经济上，欧洲国家在经济上做得更多。我怀疑特朗普会放弃这件事，特朗普会认为这太难了。他已经说过：“嗯，也许教皇能做点什么。也许埃尔多安能做点什么。”他正在花更多时间在伊朗问题上，伊朗处于弱势地位，他更积极地试图在那里达成协议，顺便说一句，取得了一些成功。我认为他正在失去兴趣。特朗普不是一个有耐心的人。他不喜欢冗长的简报。他喜欢头条新闻。他喜欢看电视和快速阅读新闻。所以你知道，这件事已经持续了很长时间。特朗普说这只需要一天。然后他说：“嗯，你知道我说一天是夸张了，但我的意思不是几年。”然后他又说：“现在是两周。我给他们两周时间，就这样。”他现在已经说了三次了。他不会说十次。所以最终，如果普京不真的，你知道，参与进来，那么我认为特朗普会继续前进。他很可能会继续前进，然后说，嗯，我已经洗手不干了。我试过了，乌克兰人和俄罗斯人都不愿意让这件事发生。我不认为他会切断对乌克兰的支持。我认为他会提供情报。他会允许乌克兰人从美国购买军事武器。他会看到欧洲人正在花费大部分资金。北约峰会将会成功。他不会退出北约。所以这对乌克兰来说不是最坏的情况。对北约来说也不是最坏的情况，即特朗普与普京达成协议，忽视欧洲人和乌克兰人。但最终，这件事得由别人来做。现在，你提到了帕尔默·拉奇。我确实认为，有很多有权有势的人参与了军工技术复合体，他们正试图确保美国国防部的新开支用于这些问题，用于人工智能，用于无人机防御能力等等。我认为在这方面花了很多钱。但我也知道国防部是一个行动非常缓慢的实体。而且，你知道，它有很多需要养活的人，国会中有很多选民的工作都依赖于那些在未来5年内与美国国家安全无关的传统项目，无论是潜艇还是上一代轰炸机。美国根本不可能足够快地转型。绝不可能。你需要一个更愿意快速行动、打破常规的领导层。你知道，有一些这样的人正在给特朗普竞选团队大量资金，他们的公司也获得了大合同。这种情况正在发生。但皮特·赫格赛斯不是那样的人。大多数现有的将军和海军上将也不是那样的人。最终负责国防资金的国会也不是那样。所以我怀疑，这个问题的答案将是等到危机发生，然后我们再做出反应。

What to Watch For / 未来关注点

Helen Moltters:

So what are you watching as we wrap this up? What are you watching that we should also be watching for? Like what signs are the most important as we head into the next era of this conflict?

海伦·莫特斯:

那么，在我们结束这次讨论之际，您在关注什么？您关注的哪些方面也是我们应该关注的？比如，当我们进入这场冲突的下一个时代时，哪些迹象最为重要？

Ian Bremmer:

Number one, Trump has not yet, as of this moment, uh, responded to what Ukraine has done. There'll be a press conference. He'll be asked that question. So, we need to know whether this was a surprise to Trump and he's angry at the Ukrainians, or whether the Americans actually knew about it, um, had the intelligence and may not have approved it, but certainly didn't try to stop it. That is an important piece of information in determining how Trump is or is not going to deal with Zelenskyy going forward. Um secondly, uh we need to see what kind of direct response Putin is going to have militarily against Ukraine. Is he going to try to downplay this domestically? I mean, there are a lot of military and bloggers in Russia that have made a big deal out over this. I mean, it's not like a it's not like it's catastrophic, but uh if you're if you're reading the news in Russia, you know what's happened over the last couple days. Uh and so is Putin going to change that? Will he censor them? Will he even arrest a couple um and and suddenly, you know, make it seem like no big deal and I'm in charge and don't worry about it? or is this something that people are going to be fired for uh in the chain of command and Trump Putin is going to go after the Ukrainians in a much more dramatic way. And also, you know, what else do we see from the Ukrainians? Because they they know that they cannot continue to fight a conventional trench warfare fight successfully against Putin for the next two years. They have been losing territory, albeit at a slow rate, over the past months. And the Russians in the territory of Sumy have recently begun a major offensive where they're gaining territory more quickly. They're also raising a lot more conscripts than the Ukrainians are. So, the Ukrainians are going to have to show more capabilities like this going forward. I suspect they have such plans and we're going to watch them very carefully. Those are the things I think that are most important right now.

伊恩·布雷默:

第一，截至目前，特朗普尚未对乌克兰的所作所为做出回应。将会有新闻发布会，他会被问到这个问题。所以，我们需要知道这是否让特朗普感到意外，他是否对乌克兰人生气，或者美国人是否真的知道这件事，掌握了情报，可能没有批准，但肯定没有试图阻止。这是决定特朗普未来将如何与泽连斯基打交道的重要信息。其次，我们需要看看普京将对乌克兰采取什么样的直接军事回应。他会试图在国内淡化这件事吗？我的意思是，俄罗斯有很多军方人士和博主对此大做文章。我的意思是，这不像是一场灾难，但是如果你在俄罗斯看新闻，你就知道过去几天发生了什么。那么普京会改变这种情况吗？他会审查他们吗？他甚至会逮捕几个人，然后突然之间，你知道，让这件事看起来没什么大不了的，“我掌控一切，别担心”？或者这是会导致指挥系统中的人被解雇的事情，而普京将会以更激烈的方式对付乌克兰人。还有，你知道，我们还能从乌克兰人那里看到什么？因为他们知道，在未来两年内，他们无法继续成功地与普京进行常规的堑壕战。在过去的几个月里，他们一直在缓慢地失去领土。而俄罗斯人最近在苏梅地区发动了一场大规模攻势，他们正在更快地夺取领土。他们征召的士兵也比乌克兰人多得多。所以，乌克兰人未来将不得不展示更多这样的能力。我怀疑他们有这样的计划，我们将非常密切地关注他们。我认为这些是目前最重要的事情。

Conclusion and Ukrainian Resilience / 结论与乌克兰的韧性

Helen Moltters:

We also had a talk from this architect Slava Balbek who is a Ukrainian architect. He had a he had a a small operation in Kyiv that was designing cafes and and you know commercial buildings and things like that. And he shared a talk he now also works going to the front line every one week in every month. And he shared this talk about this kind of dual reality that he lives in. And he shared the phrase "war, work, life, balance," which is just this kind of chilling phrase that has become a reality for so many Ukrainians of having to mix reality or work and life and family and joy and fun and the things that you kind of want from being a human on earth with the reality of, you know, living under aggression from Russia. And it was it was a great talk that I recommend you watch. Ian, it is always a pleasure, an eye-opening pleasure to talk to you. Thank you so much for sharing your wisdom with us and I am glad that we will be able to be back here again soon where you can do the same again. Thank you so so much.

海伦·莫特斯:

我们还听取了乌克兰建筑师斯拉瓦·巴尔贝克的演讲。他在基辅有一个小型工作室，设计咖啡馆、商业建筑之类的。他分享了一次演讲，他现在每个月都有一周时间去前线工作。他分享了关于他所生活的这种双重现实的演讲。他还分享了“战争、工作、生活、平衡”这个短语，这真是一个令人不寒而栗的短语，对许多乌克兰人来说已经成为现实，他们不得不将现实或工作、生活、家庭、欢乐、乐趣以及作为地球上的人所渴望的事物，与生活在俄罗斯侵略下的现实混合在一起。那是一次很棒的演讲，我推荐大家观看。伊恩，与您交谈总是一件愉快的事，一次令人大开眼界的愉快经历。非常感谢您与我们分享您的智慧，我很高兴我们很快就能再次回到这里，您可以再次这样做。非常非常感谢。

Ian Bremmer:

Thank you.

伊恩·布雷默:

谢谢。