Host: We've got 85 seconds to go. Not in real time. I'm talking about the Doomsday Clock. It was established by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1947, to illustrate how close we are to destroying the world. And as of this year's change, we've never been closer to midnight. The clock now takes into account factors like climate change and AI, but nuclear weapons remain a key concern, and for good reason. Here's John Woolston, a member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board, talking about nuclear proliferation.

John Woolston (implied): The decline has stopped, and we're now seeing the growth begin again. And the potential for a worldwide arms race is upon us.

Host: Just this month, new START, the last nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia expired. The US reportedly met with Russia and China in Geneva separately this week to discuss the potential for new arms limitation talks. Could that be a new path forward, or are we seeing the end of nuclear disarmament? We look at the new global state of play, where Canada stands, and whether we're worried enough about the threat of nuclear war. Then we trace the history of uranium mining in Ontario, which stretches back to the Manhattan Project and involves booms, busts and a whole lot of drama. Welcome to The Rundown. Since 1972, the United States and Russia have had their restrictions on their nuclear arsenals. That's not the case anymore. The new START treaty ended earlier this month. That comes amid ongoing talks about Iran's nuclear program and as major powers are testing new forms of weaponry and uneasy Western allies are considering developing their own nuclear options, are we hurdling toward a new global arms race? And what would that mean for Canada? George Perkovich is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nuclear policy program. Matt Korda is the associate director for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and Janice Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management at the University of Toronto and the founding director of U of T's Munk School of Global Affairs. Welcome all three of you to the rundown. Great to have you here. I want to start off with George. What did the new START treaty cover and why was it allowed to expire in February of this year?

George Perkovich: Well, the treaty, like its predecessors, covered what you could think of as long-range nuclear weapons. They're called strategic nuclear weapons. But basically, these are the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia have, which can hit each other's homeland. All right. And it limited the number of the launchers of those weapons. So how many missiles, how many bomber planes could carry those weapons? And then by the counting rules, it limited them to 1550 each. It expired two weeks ago, in part because both sides ran out of gas on arms control and also the Ukraine war, so they weren't able to, during the Ukraine war to agree to extend it. The United States has been insisting with some reason that because China is rapidly building up its nuclear forces, China should be brought into any future strategic arms control agreement. And also, last thing I'd say is that the new START treaty, like its predecessors, did not cover what are called tactical or short-range battlefield nuclear weapons. And since Russia has perhaps 2000 of those in Europe, the administration and others were saying those weapons should now be included in the future. That's very hard to do. And so there was no agreement. So everything just lapsed.

Janice Stein: Janice, how safe are the remaining nuclear-related treaties? You know, namely, we've got the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Could these fall to the wayside?

George Perkovich: Well, as George was just saying, there is a lot of concern about China's nuclear program, and we call that the three-body problem. It's easy, easier to model with the minimum you need to survive a first strike and have enough to retaliate. That's been the underpinning of whatever nuclear stability we have. It's easier to do that modeling with two than it is with three. And if you just think about that, that's because you get into the dynamics of, well, what happens if these two apply against that one? And that creates all kinds of dilemmas, frankly. So the test ban treaty, there are leaks. I would say, George, I don't know how else to describe it from the current government that China conducted an underground nuclear test without notifying and that it was testing an advanced technology. If there is an all-out nuclear arms race, a nuclear test ban will be very, very difficult to maintain over time. There's no question. There's no question the Non-Proliferation Treaty is at risk, not because of what China and Russia and the United States are doing to each other, but because of what each of them is doing in their neighborhoods. Right.

Host: All right. With that being said, let's have a look at the weapons inventories of the world's nuclear-armed nations, according to the Federation of American Scientists. So this is a bar graph here. You will see in blue reserve and in orange ochre colour deployed strategic. Now these are the total estimates Russia with 4309. The US with 3600, China with 600, France with 290. The UK 225, India 180, Pakistan 170, Israel with 90 and North Korea with 50. Matt. Which of these nations are interested in nuclear non-proliferation and which are most likely to say, increase their arsenal and develop perhaps new technologies?

Matt Korda: Yeah. You know, what's important to recognize is that the United States and Russia have about 90% of all nuclear weapons in the world, but that percentage is shrinking. And it's not because those stockpiles are getting any smaller, but it's actually because of the opposite. Right. Other countries are building up their stockpiles, and so they're constituting a larger portion of that sort of overall nuclear pie. And so you mentioned countries like China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan, many of these countries are increasing the numbers of nuclear weapons that they have in their stockpiles. Others are increasing sort of the technological capabilities of those weapon systems and others are doing both. There is really no nuclear-armed country that is in the process or anywhere close really, to the process of disarmament. Really what we're looking at is that all these countries are embarking on these incredibly expensive and extensive modernization campaigns that are designed to really keep nuclear weapons in their arsenals for the next, you know, 50, 60, 70 years, really probably for the remainder of our lifetimes.

Host: George, I'm hoping you can add on to that. What can you tell us a bit about some of the new technologies?

Matt Korda: Well, Matt said it well. So Russia, for example, has five new delivery systems of weapons to be able to hit as far as the United States. And it's doing that to be able to bypass any possible missile defenses that the US might put up to intercept those weapons. So there's a giant torpedo that could go underwater all the way to the coast of the United States and blow up a massive nuclear warhead. There is a nuclear-powered cruise missile, cruise missiles. You can guide and maneuver, so you can make it much harder to intercept them. Russia is building one powered by a small nuclear reactor so that it could stay in the air almost indefinitely. There are several others, all designed to bypass missile defense. Because the US withdrew from the most important treaty, arguably, which was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In 2002, the US withdrew from that, and Russia then said, all right, we'll find a way to work around whatever you do on missile defense. China is adding the number significantly of its long-range weapons and also the technical sophistication of those. And it's also believed they don't explain and they should explain, but it's believed that two is to be able to ensure it could beat any US missile defense and also survive any kind of offensive attack, offensive first strike by the US against this smaller Chinese force. And so that's those two. And North Korea is doing something similar, trying to have missiles that could reliably hit the United States to deter the United States from hitting North Korea first.

Host: Matt, very quickly, I want to follow up. How would the US's Golden Dome missile proposal be met by potential nuclear rivals?

Matt Korda: Yeah. So, you know, as George mentioned, we sort of have a blueprint for how a country is going to respond to a really complex missile defense architecture that gets instituted by a nuclear-armed state. So in 2002, the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And at the time, there was a lot of concern from several countries, including Russia and China, where they kind of responded and they said, you know, if, if, if missile defense and nuclear deterrence, right? If these two things are sort of at the core of what we consider to be nuclear stability, right? Not having defenses and having this sort of mutual vulnerability. And if you take away that aspect of missile defense, then we're going to have to respond. Right? And so if countries start building up their defenses, other countries are going to have to build systems that are designed specifically to circumvent those defenses. And so, you know, it takes a long time to build up a weapon system. But if you fast forward, you know, ten, 15 years later, this is why we're seeing Russia and China and other countries to start to build up these systems that are specifically designed to offset any perceived advantage that they can see another country getting by deploying advanced missile defenses. Right. That's not the only reason why those countries are building those things. There's a whole host of other factors domestic reasons, you know, monetary reasons, things like that. But the development of advanced missile defenses is certainly a big one.

Janice Stein: Canada has spent decades advocating for the peaceful use of nuclear weapons and technology. Canada was one of the first signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 50 years ago. I am curious, would Canada's participation in the Golden Dome proposal undermine all that work in its legacy?

Janice Stein: Would it undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty? No, because we would not be a proliferator. Right. The the issue really is as as Matt and George have said, that to the extent that you improve defense against missiles, incoming missiles, you actually incentivize powers to develop more and more powerful missiles. It is also true, though, that ballistic missile defense, as not just said, is not only aimed at other nuclear powers, it is aimed at states that are increasingly the owners of very sophisticated ballistic missile technology and hypersonic missile technology, which non-nuclear. So, technically speaking, and we don't know enough about the Golden Dome yet. Frankly, the specs are not there in a really serious way. And I see your smiling there. But as it is currently described, we would not be a violator from that perspective. Whether it's wise, that's a wholly different discussion, but we would not formally be a violent.

Host: All right, George.

George Perkovich: Well, I think Janice is right. I mean, I think from the Non-Proliferation Treaty point of view, the missile defense is isn't such a vital issue. Except, as she said, if it drives people to build up rather than to reduce their nuclear forces, I think the the bigger question would be if if Canada or other US allies started developing options to make nuclear weapons so different from missile defense, but nuclear weapons, that would be a big challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And there's some discussion in South Korea once in a while in Poland, perhaps in Canada, that because the US has become unreliable in this regard, people may need to hedge their bets. And so that that is a concern about the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Matt Korda: Yeah.

Host: Really.

Matt Korda: Really is striking. Just just to follow on George's comment, it really is striking to listen to the discussion in Europe about an independent nuclear deterrent. And it's coming not only from the two nuclear powers, but from a country like Germany. So this is a this is a discussion of an entirely different order than we've heard out of Europe, really, in the last 75 years.

Host: Well, let's pick up upon that idea of New Order here. Matt, has the world forgotten how to negotiate regarding nuclear weapons, or is it simply not interested in it? Seeing how things have changed a bit?

Matt Korda: Yeah. You know, the fact that we're even having this discussion about the idea of countries potentially building their own nuclear weapons is really emblematic of how much the world has changed, right? And how much damage that for, you know, in particular, the Trump administration has done in such a short time to the global cause of non-proliferation and arms control. But it's not just the Trump administration, right? There are other nuclear-armed states that are really, you know, sort of exercising increasingly imperial ambitions against their neighbors. Right? Russia in particular. But the, you know, I also lump the UN, the, the US in that as well, right? With regards to Canada and Greenland and things like that. And so we're seeing that, you know, increasingly this era of, of arms control negotiations and countries really sort of making an effort to sit around the table from each other, finding value in talking through differences and resolving differences in arms control. That era is is increasingly over. And what we're seeing is that countries are much more interested in sort of naming and shaming their prospective arms control partners than actually trying to inject a sense of predictability into an otherwise quite, quite unpredictable relationship.

Host: Janice, I want to get your take on that. But, you know, Matt talks about sitting around that table. Part of that is having some trust. And I want to help understand how much is that concept important in sort of understanding and negotiating some of these deals?

Janice Stein: Okay. Well, you just as a glue that makes almost everything possible. But, you know, beginning really after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States, Soviet Union came to the table with not a very high degree of trust. And you negotiate with your adversaries. You don't only negotiate with your friends, and you actually build that trust through the negotiation process. I don't think it's right to make it a requisite. We will miss a lot of opportunities that way. Unfortunately, I would say we have dug into the stockpile of trust over the last several years and depleted it very badly. You know, in Russia broke a norm in Europe, which is you don't invade your neighbor. Europeans thought that was way behind them in their past. It was very rude shock. And the Trump administration, I could tell you as a Canadian, the Trump administration has been a rude shock to very close allies. So we have diminished trust. And when you're on the downward slope of trust, it's harder to get a negotiation process going than when you're on the upside, I think, and that's why we're seeing what we're seeing.

Host: George, what would it take to get major powers, China included, back to the negotiating table?

George Perkovich: Yeah, I just picking up upon what Janice said, which I think was was right on that you that you don't start negotiations with trust. You build trust if you have successful or at least promising negotiations. And I would just add to that to answer your question, it has to start with the top leaders. And in the past when it worked, it was the head of state of the United States or the Soviet Union or Russia, either directly and secretly, usually communicating with each other, saying, look, I don't like where things are headed. We should change it. Or appointing a special emissary that their go to person that the other side knew, okay, talk to them. They speak for the president or they speak for the general secretary. And that, I think, is the only way out of the current predicament. Is it at some point does President Putin and does President Xi, does President Trump communicate with each other? All right. We got to get this on track. And I'm designating this person to talk to your counterpart. And this would probably need to be in secret, which I happen to think is a good thing can be controversial, but I don't see it happening, especially with the United States now through any kind of open dialogue, because it just gets too spun out and, and, and unmanageable.

Host: Matt, I want to get you in here. Janice had mentioned the Cuban Missile Crisis. For a lot of people, it said that's the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war. And I am curious how far or close to the brink of nuclear war are we today?

Matt Korda: You know, I think what's really important to note, and Janice mentioned this up top, is that, you know, when we think about crises during the Cold War, right? The US and the Soviet Union, these two major nuclear superpowers with missiles pointed at each other. Right. That was an incredibly dangerous situation. But what's different about today is that you don't just have these two countries, right? You have nine nuclear-armed states. They all have interlocking deterrence relationships with one another. And so, you know, a crisis that involves just two countries is almost certainly, you know, likely to spin out of control and involve additional countries beyond just those two. And so, for example, the United States may want to build a new weapon system to respond to something that Russia is doing. Right. But then how is China supposed to react to that, given tensions between the US and China? Right. And then if China responds, right, China and India have sort of a simmering border conflict. They engaged in a shooting war as recently as 2021, right. How is Pakistan supposed to respond to what India does given, you know, historic tensions between India and Pakistan? And so this sort of goes in a in a domino effect. And you can really easily imagine how a crisis that starts with potentially just two countries rapidly escalates to maybe three, maybe four.

Janice Stein: You know, I just want with an optimistic note here, Matt. Okay. You just described what I was talking about earlier, the three-body effect where the calculations get so tight. But that leads to accumulation of weapons. It's really fascinating that even though their homelands have been attacked, nuclear powers have not responded with nuclear weapons. Right. And I've just finished a piece at that. Nuclear weapons are actually a bad bet. There's not very much return on investment. Iran fired a, you know, a barrage of missiles at Israel. It did not threaten or contemplate or think about using nuclear weapons. Ukraine responded to a vicious attack by Russia, and the Russians talked about using tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese and the Indians, at the request of President Biden, spoke out against it. That was it. And the war has been going on for more than four years, longer than World War II, and they have not used nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since. Each of them have a second strike capability. Neither side has threatened to use nuclear weapons. So there is still a line here that is very, very, very difficult to cross. Despite all these interlocking effects, I think we want to distinguish between building them up and using them. Those are two separate universes.

Host: All right. With that.

George Perkovich: I'm optimistic.

Host: George, I'm going to get you in there. As we noted, you know, the US has a has attacked Iraq, NATO attacked Libya. Iran is now being threatened with US military action. How significant are events like this in swaying non-nuclear nations in considering exploring these options? And perhaps, as Janet said, building building it up?

George Perkovich: Well, I think it goes both ways. I think there's an impulse or to imagine if we had had nuclear weapons, this wouldn't have happened if we were Iraq, Libya, etc. And so for bystanders to look and say, Jesus, they should have gotten nuclear weapons, maybe we should do that. Turns out it's very hard to get nuclear weapons. So each of those countries that we talk about did have some level of ambition to get nuclear weapons, and they were stopped. So Israel has a standard policy. It's done it with Syria. It's done it with Iraq. It's done it with Iran. It's done assassinations with people elsewhere. It doesn't let an adversary get nuclear weapons. The US has kind of said the same thing. So while it's tempting, you have to answer, okay, how long will it take us to get nuclear weapons? And what happens to us while we're trying to get them? So Poland has mentioned this possibility for very good reason, given what Russia has done to Ukraine. Well, you can readily imagine now Poland's engineers and scientists being assassinated in the streets in in Poland, sabotage operations from Russia. If Russia thought Poland was trying to acquire nuclear weapons, how many do you need? If you're going to go against Russia, which has however many thousands you want to count? So it turns out whether or not it's a seductive idea, in practice, it raises many more problems than than people can readily kind of manage. I would say.

Janice Stein: I completely agree with George that embarking on the path to get a nuclear weapon is a very dangerous process. Iran is where it is today because of that. And, you know, just to underline what George was saying right now, one of the really striking things to me was when Ukraine smuggled drones on flatbed trucks across Russia's border. I went way deep into, you know, the central, the Asian part of Russia and used those drones against strategic bombers, which some of which were part of the strategic fleet to launch nuclear weapons. Russia did not respond. There are, I think, the most powerful anti-proliferation arguments. And I'm looking at George's we say this we have to make is they're just lousy investments. They're bad bets. They're don't do it, they don't pay off.

Host: And we are going to have to leave it there. Matt. George, Janice, really, really thank you for your insights on this one. I really appreciate your time.

George Perkovich: Thank you.

Janice Stein: Pleasure to be with you all.

Host: Bye bye.

Host (segment outro): During the Second World War, the Americans were on the lookout for a reliable source of uranium. TVO Today's John Michael McGrath tells us the story of what happened next and what it all meant for Ontario. People mostly use uranium for two purposes to make steam and power plants, or to make bombs. Basically, uranium is good for making water hot or for making the air really, really, really hot. And Ontario has a history of uranium mining going back to the 1930s, one filled with secrecy, subterfuge and intrigue. During World War II, the Americans were desperate for friendly sources of uranium to supply a little thing called the Manhattan Project that sleep away camp for engineers and physicists would eventually build the first atomic bombs. But just getting the necessary uranium looked like it could be a problem. The Canadian government nationalized the mining company El Dorado as part of the war effort, and gave it a monopoly on all uranium mining in the country as it happened. Port Hope was home to one of North America's only military grade uranium refining centres. Secrecy was the name of the game. Workers at the refinery were kept in the dark. They had no idea that the material they were working with was being shipped to the US to help create the first nuclear weapons. In the late 1940s, the US was again in search of friendly sources of uranium in case the Cold War heated up. A few prospectors became convinced of rich deposits near Elliot Lake in northern Ontario. Not wanting to tip off competitors, their campaign played out like a slow motion thriller. Panel loads of engineers, geologists and prospectors surreptitiously fanned over 56,000 acre area in the province's north to stake roughly 1400 mining claims. The area became a boomtown. Elliot Lake was founded as a planned community to support the mining industry. The region's population of 4000 people ballooned to roughly 25,000 by the late 1950s. It wasn't alone. Bancroft two became a hotbed for mining activity. But booms are followed by busts. Suddenly, the Americans no longer wanted big stockpiles of uranium. Demand collapsed and Elliot Lake's population fell by roughly half in the following five years. It picked back up in the 1970s as Western countries turned to nuclear power in response to the oil shocks, but fell again. The last uranium mine in Elliot Lake stopped production in the mid 1990s. But Ontario's history of uranium mining has left the province with a pair of legacies. On the one hand, we've inherited a supply chain that's contributing to the new generation of nuclear power projects, both in Ontario and globally. On the other hand, mining and refining uranium has come with environmental costs, including in Elliot Lake and Port Hope, where cleanup costs continue today and are estimated at more than $1 billion.

Host: I'm Jayn. Thanks for watching The Rundown. What do you like or not like about what we're doing so far? Send us your feedback at TVO.org/rundownfeedback or leave us a comment on YouTube. Until then, see you next week.