内特·银谈民调走势与直觉判断:2026年中期选举前瞻 The Ezra Klein Show 2026-10-27

内特·银谈民调走势与直觉判断:2026年中期选举前瞻

13 节

中期选举前的民调意外与参议院选情

距离中期选举还有一周时间,一年前看起来几乎不可能发生的事情已经发生了。民主党不仅有赢得众议院的路径,还有赢得参议院的路径。简要回顾一下民主党获得参议院多数席位的情况:他们需要守住目前持有的竞争性参议院席位,然后需要在目前由共和党持有的州至少翻转四个席位。其中有几个州看起来一直有可能,但接着是那些艰难的州——特朗普曾以两位数优势获胜的州。人们之前并没有真正谈论堪萨斯州,但现在【音乐】堪萨斯也成了讨论焦点。而这个选举周期引人瞩目的地方在于,民主党在所有这些州的民调中都极具竞争力。在其中的少数几场竞选中,他们实际上遥遥领先。

所以,我认为问题在于,我们能相信这些民调吗?

在投票前仅仅一周,我们对选举目前的局势到底能说些什么?为了探讨所有这些,我想请内特·银(Nate Silver)来到节目中。内特当然是大家都知道的国际知名选举数据分析专家。

英文原文 >> We are a week out from the midterm elections and something that looked almost impossible a year ago has happened. There is a path for Democrats to win not just the House but the Senate. So a Senate majority for Democrats to to sort of recap this. They need to defend the competitive Senate seats they currently hold. And then they need to flip at least four seats in states currently held by Republicans. A couple of those states had always looked possible, but then came the hard ones states where Trump had won by double digits. People weren't really talking about Kansas, but now [music] Kansas. And the remarkable thing about this cycle is that Democrats are polling competitively in all of them. In a handful of those races, they're actually far ahead.

And so, I think the question is, can we trust these polls?

What can we really say about where the election stands just a week before the vote? To talk about all this, I want to have Nate Silver on the show. Nate, of course, is, you know, internationally famous elections nerd.

民调权威内特·银,

英文原文 >> The polling guru Nate Silver,

他在上次总统选举中预测对了【音乐】每一个州。

英文原文 >> he predicted [music] every state in the last presidential election.

欲戴王冠,必承其重。银。

英文原文 >> Heavy is the head that wears the crown. Silver.

确实如此。

如今他在Substack上主编《银色简报》(Silver Bulletin),发布大量精彩的分析、民调和选举预测。他共同主持播客节目《仍在计票》(Still Counting)。特朗普的支持率目前比他在1月6日之后还要低,当时他……

英文原文 >> Absolutely.

These days he edits a silver bulletin on Substack which puts out a ton of great analysis, polling, and election forecasts. He co the podcast still counting. Trump's approval rating is now lower than it was uh after January 6th when he was

我之前没意识到这一点。

英文原文 >> I didn't realize that.

不,你懂的,这已经达到了历史最低水平。

英文原文 >> No, it's it's you know it's as low as it's ever been.

而且他最近撰写了《边缘:冒一切风险的艺术》(On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything)。内特现在加入了我。

英文原文 >> And he's the author of most recently on [music] the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything. Nate joins me now.

【音乐】

英文原文 >> [music]

内特·银,欢迎回到节目中。

英文原文 >> Nate Silver, welcome back to the show.

嘿,埃兹拉。你好吗,朋友?

英文原文 >> Hey, Ezra. How are you, man?

特朗普时代的拐点与历史周期律

我挺好。我刚才想问,你刚才跟我私下说的时候我没追问,因为我想留到节目里说。【笑声】你眼神有点飘向远方地对我说,这场选举让你觉得意义重大。我认识你很久了。你通常不会说这种话。那么,为什么觉得意义重大?

英文原文 >> I'm good. I I wanted to ask I didn't follow up when you said this to me a second ago cuz I want to do it on air. [laughter] You said to me, looking a little far away in your eyes, that this election feels momentous to you. I've known you a long time. You don't usually say things like that. So, what feels momentous?

如果选举的大致结果与民调显示的相符,那么我认为在某种程度上,它将标志着特朗普时代的终结。【笑声】嗯,他还会有两年的总统任期。嗯,但只要计票结束(可能因为阿拉斯加和加利福尼亚等州而需要一段时间),2028年的总统竞选活动就会开始。如果特朗普如民调显示的那样遭遇惨败,那他就会变成一个超级“跛脚鸭”,对吧?你或许可以将其比作2006年之后的小布什。

嗯,人们在面对民调时,理所当然地有些难以置信。这看起来有点像一个不同的统治格局,对吧?堪萨斯州变得具有竞争力,得克萨斯州变得具有竞争力,民主党有可能深入共和党领地取得斩获。但或许我们正处于某些不同变化的边缘:一代人的更替;特朗普完成了他宪法规定的两个任期的四分之三;而且人工智能的阴影也在逼近。目前我还不完全清楚AI在这次选举中是多大的一个议题。我认为可能比人们假设的要大,但是嗯,它可能会成为2028年最大的议题。我认为你可以预见它会和经济一起成为2028年最大的议题。

英文原文 >> If the election goes roughly as the polls say it will go, then in some ways it would mark the end of the Trump era, I think. [laughter] Um, he'll still be president for two more years. Um, but the minute the election, the votes are counted might take a while because of Alaska and California and states like that, the 2028 election campaign begins and if Trump has a bad night, as polls show, then he's a super lame duck, right? You might draw an analogy to um to Bush after 2006.

Um and like part of what people understandably are having trouble believing in the polls. It kind of looks like a different regime, right? Where Kansas is competitive, Texas is competitive, potentially gains for Democrats deep into Republican territory. But maybe we're on the verge of something different between generational turnover, between Trump being threequarters of the way through his two constitutionally provided for terms and um and with AI looming too. It's not quite clear to me how big an issue AI is in this election. I think maybe more than people assume, but um but it could be the biggest issue of 2028. I think I think you might expect it to be along with the economy the biggest issues of 2028.

听你讲这些时,我在想一年前关于这场选举的那些讨论。

英文原文 >> I was thinking as you said some of that about the conversations I had about the election a year ago.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

一年前的说法是,民主党可能会赢得众议院,但参议院……我是说绝无可能。

英文原文 >> And a year ago the conversation was Democrats will probably win the House and the Senate. I mean never say never.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

绝无可能。原因在于,要赢回参议院,民主党需要在特朗普曾赢了超过10个百分点的许多地方获胜。鉴于我们对现代美国党派政治的一切了解,那是不会发生的。所以你看,我们现在交谈的时间大概在选举前两周左右,等到播出时会更短,在你的模型中,民主党赢得参议院的概率超过70%。不仅是赢得参议院,而且可能赢下的席位超出所需。

为什么?发生了什么?

英文原文 >> But no. And the the the reason was that to win back the Senate, Democrats were going to need to win in a number of places where Trump had won by more than 10 points. And given everything we know about partisanship in modern America, that wasn't going to happen. So, you know, when we're talking, it's about 2 weeks before the election right now, it'll be less by the time this airs, Democrats are at a 70 plus% chance of winning the Senate in your model. And not just winning the Senate, but possibly winning like beyond that despair.

Why? What happened?

所以,我认为发生了几件事,其中一些与预期可能未校准好有关。嗯,你看,2024年之后,有人谈论我认为是永久性的保守派氛围转变。嗯,谈论民主党节节败退,拜登失败了,还有觉醒主义(wokeness)。

英文原文 >> So, I think a couple of things happened and some of them have to do with expectations maybe being miscalibrated. Um, you know, after 2024, there was talk of a I guess permanent conservative vibe shift. Um, that Democrats were on their back heels and Biden had failed and wokeness.

认为那是永久性的想法很蠢。

英文原文 >> That was dumb. The idea they'd be permanent.

是的。【笑声】但如果你看看美国选举的历史,美国选举中最规律的趋势——少数能延续数十年的规律之一——就是总统所在的政党在中期选举中会遭到反弹。如果总统处于第二个类似跛脚鸭的任期,这种反弹可能会稍大一些,但你知道,例外情况一只手就能数得过来:1998年莫妮卡·莱温斯基事件之后,2002年9·11事件之后,大概就这些了。2022年,与基于其支持率所预期的相比,拜登在中期选举中受到的打击相对较轻。

嗯,所以你看,在普通的中期选举中,环境相比前一个大选年会向不利于总统政党的方向移动7.5个百分点。嗯,今年看起来更像是11个百分点。但为什么11个百分点很重要?嗯,正如你所说,有所有这些特朗普曾以10、11、12、13个百分点获胜的州,对吧?俄亥俄州我想他赢了11个百分点。嗯,所以如果有11个百分点的摇摆,而且分布相当均匀,突然之间俄亥俄州就变成了五五开的摇摆州。

嗯,我认为之前不太明朗的是,民主党在大多数重要选战中实际上提名的候选人相当不错,并且/或者足够幸运地面对了较弱的共和党候选人,对吧?嗯,我不确定詹姆斯·塔拉里科(James Talarico)是否符合每个人的口味,但你看,嗯,你知道,他能够利用肯·帕克斯顿(Ken Paxton)的诸多劣迹等等,对吧?嗯,在北卡罗来纳州,罗伊·库珀(Roy Cooper)是舒默及其团队招揽的一名强力人选。嗯,你知道,民主党现在采取了一种策略,试图在像内布拉斯加州这样的地方提名名义上的独立人士。比如在爱荷华州,我认为共和党和民主党两边的候选人都很强。

嗯,但是,你知道,我会说候选人的无形特质大概……嗯,你知道,它们最多可能会推动局面改变5个百分点,但你算一下这笔账,你会觉得,好吧,得克萨斯州是一个特朗普领先13个百分点的州,党派气候向民主党倾斜了11个百分点,所以现在是共和党领先2个百分点,然后肯·帕克斯顿是否低于平均水平到足以将共和党领先2个百分点转变为民主党领先2个百分点?嗯,这就是数学计算,对吧,这算是一个足够合乎逻辑的推断。

英文原文 >> Yeah. [laughter] And but if you look at the history of American elections, then the most regular trend in American elections, one of the few things that survives for decades is there is a backlash against the president's party at the midterm. Maybe a little bit bigger if a president is in his second kind of lame duck term, but you know, we can recite the exceptions on one hand. 1998 um after Monica Lewinsky, 2002 after September 11th, that's about it. 2022, Biden had a relatively gentle thumping in the midterm compared to what you might expect based on his approval rating.

Um so you know look in the average midterm the environment shifts by seven and a half points against the president's party versus the previous presidential year. Um this year it looks more like 11 points. But why is 11 points important? Well um there are all these states like you said that Trump won by 10 11 12 13 points right? Ohio I think he won by 11 points. Um, so if you have an 11-point swing and it's fairly uniform, all of a sudden Ohio becomes a tossup.

Um, what I think wasn't so clear is that Democrats have actually nominated in most important races pretty good candidates and or lucky enough to face weaker Republican candidates, right? Um, I'm not sure if James Talico is everybody's cup of tea, but like um, you know, he is able to take advantage of Ken Paxton's many sins so forth, right? Um, in North Carolina, Roy Cooper was a strong recruit from Schumer and Company. Um, you know, Democrats have the strategy now of trying to nominate independents and kind of name only in states like Nebraska. I think both the candidates, Republican and the Democrat, are strong in Iowa, for example.

Um, but, you know, I would say that probably the candidate intangibles. um you know they might move things by five points at most but you kind of do the math and you're like okay well Texas is a Trump plus 13 state the parson climate moves 11 points toward Democrats so now it's R plus two and then is Ken Paxton below average enough to turn R plus2 into D plus2 well that's the math right and that's kind of that's a logical enough story

候选人素质与各州竞选对决

所以这给我引出了一个问题。

舒默和他的团队,【哼笑】民主党参议院竞选委员会(DSCC)。目前由克斯汀·吉利布兰德(Kirsten Gillibrand)领导。几个月前他们看起来相当糟糕,他们看起来相当糟糕主要是因为焦点都在他们在缅因州发起但输掉的那场争斗上——他们想让珍妮特·米尔斯(Janet Mills)成为被提名人,但结果原本要变成格雷厄姆·普拉特纳(Graham Platner)。格雷厄姆·普拉特纳崩盘了。

英文原文 >> so one question that raises for me is

Schumer and his team, [snorts] the Democratic Senatoral Campaign Committee. It's under Christian Gillibrand right now. They looked pretty bad a couple months ago and they looked pretty bad primarily because a focus was on the fight that they waged and lost in Maine to make Janet Mills the nominee and instead it was going to be Graham Planner. Graham Platner imploded.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

特洛伊·杰克逊(Troy Jackson)现在是民主党被提名人,你看,稍稍领先于苏珊·柯林斯(Susan Collins)。我想人们对那场竞选很紧张,因为柯林斯的表现往往优于她的民调,而且差距,你看,并没有那么宽。但如果你审视这一系列的州,他们看起来都还不错吗?我是说,爱荷华州的特克(Turk),你看,阿拉斯加的佩尔托拉(Peltola),罗伊·库珀,对吧?看起来似乎……

英文原文 >> Uh Troy Jackson, who's the Democratic nominee now, you know, is ahead of Susan Collins by a bit. I think people are nervous about that race because Collins tends to outperform her polling and it's not that, you know, wide of a gap. But if you're looking over the the range of states, do they look pretty good? I mean, Turk in Iowa, you know, Pollah and in Alaska, Roy Cooper, right? It seems like

佩尔托拉是一个重头戏。我不确定普通民主党人能在那打成平手。她在那场竞选中,你看,实际上是一个微弱的热门人选。嗯,

你看,是的,在缅因州和密歇根州有这些重大争斗。我我多少也理解民主党对缅因州的担忧。我的意思是,这完全是基于上一届选举中苏珊·柯林斯战胜民调整整大约9个百分点这一事实。关于民调误差的持续性存在一整套争论。我们往往假设它不会持续,但嗯那是民调可能收窄了一到两个百分点的一场竞选。缅因州的民调并不多。

嗯,密歇根州。看,我是那种认为在其他条件相同的情况下,温和派候选人比进步派更能打的人之一,至少在像密歇根州这样的摇摆州是这样,对吧?嗯,如果你对比那里的州长竞选,乔斯林·本森(Jocelyn Benson)领先8个百分点,而埃尔-萨耶德(El-Sayed)领先3个或3.5个百分点左右,对吧?再次说明,你看,存在4到4.5个百分点的候选人质量差距。这再次处于我们认为候选人在像这样的环境中能产生多大影响的范围之内,对吧?

嗯,但嗯如果你有足够的顺风支持,那么你就可以克服其中的一些问题。顺便说一句,在其他方面,埃尔-萨耶德是一名好候选人,对吧?在某些方面他非常有密歇根特色,对吧?他以某种类似佐兰的方式,嗯,并没有表现出……我的意思是他有点像个哥们儿形象,对吧?与弗朗切斯卡·洪(Francesca Hong)或其他人相比,这是一个有趣的对比,而且这种对比可能也包含性别层面的因素。嗯,他也筹集到了很多钱,钱是有帮助的。嗯,所以但是是的,我是说密歇根和缅因,如果民主党输掉其中一个,他们仍然有机会;如果两个都输掉,那么民主党翻转参议院的大戏可能就彻底玩完了。

英文原文 >> Pela is a big one. I'm not sure that an average Democrat would be in a toss up. She's, you know, a slight favorite in that race, actually. Um,

look, yeah, you have these big fights in Maine and Michigan. I I would share Democrats concern about Maine a little bit. I mean, that's based on nothing but just the fact that Susan Collins beat her polls by like literally like nine points in the last election. There's a whole argument about how persistent polling error is. We tend to assume that it's not, but um that's one race where the polls have gotten maybe closer by a point or two. There hasn't been a lot of polling in Maine. Um, Michigan. Look, I'm one of those people who says that other things held equal that a moderate can't able do better than a progressive, at least in a purple state like like Michigan, right? Um, and if you compare the governor's race there where Jocelyn Benson is ahead by eight points, Eliad's ahead by three or three and a half or something, right? Again, that, you know, there is a four or four and a half point candidate quality gap. that is again within that range of what we think candidates how much they can matter in an environment like this one right um but um if you have enough wind at your back then you can overcome some of those problems and by the way in in other ways Elsa is a is a good candidate right he's very Michigan in certain ways right he in kind of a zoranesque way um doesn't present I mean he kind of is a bro right it's an interesting contrast to like Franchesco Hong or somebody and there are gendered parts of that comparison too potentially. Um he's also raised a lot of money and money is money is helpful. Um so but yeah I mean Michigan and Maine if Democrats were to lose one of them they'd still have a chance. If they were to lose both then probably game over for a Democratic Senate flip.

红州超预期表现与“后进先出”现象

看着民调,让我觉得有趣的一件事——人们对此也有过评论,这不是我独创的观察——是民主党人似乎在越偏红的州表现越超预期?

英文原文 >> One of the things that has been interesting to me looking at at the polls and and people have comment on this. This is not my original observation. Is it that Democrats seem to be overperforming more in redder states?

是的。

英文原文 >> Yes.

所以他们在得克萨斯、堪萨斯、爱荷华看起来比你想象的要好,而在密歇根、明尼苏达可能就没那么显眼,你看,在蓝州差不多也是这种模式,对吧?这里面有什么门道吗?如果有,你怎么看?

英文原文 >> So they look better than you would think in a Texas, a Kansas, an Iowa, maybe like a little bit less good in like a Michigan, a Minnesota, you know, it kind of goes on like in the blue states, right? Is there something to this? And and if so, what do you make of it?

嗯,我认为这就是让民主党人感到紧张的地方,因为正是红州——特别是在中心地带的红州——嗯,在最近的一些选举中,民调超常发挥的现象都集中在那里。与此同时,这个说法在几个层面上确实讲得通,对吧?

嗯,第一点是汽油和柴油价格。嗯,如果你看看柴油燃料在哪里被消耗,通常不是乘用车,而是农业、卡车运输、石油、家庭取暖油,对吧,这全都是中西部偏冷的那些州,而今年碰巧很多战场州都集中在那里。

嗯,如果你相信某种“后进先出”的论点,比如如果我们正在某种程度上摆脱特朗普时代呢?事实上在2024年,嗯,在很长一段时间里第一次出现了非常温和的去两极分化。相对于2020年,民主党表现最差的一些州是像纽约和加利福尼亚这样的地方。嗯,你看,例如年轻的有色人种选民和更广泛的年轻男性在某种程度上转向了反民主党。

嗯,而在相对层面上,如果你真正深入细节,比如在堪萨斯州,哈里斯的政党投票指数(PVI)——我们称之为该州与全国分歧之间的差距——在堪萨斯州缩小了一点。嗯,所以也许你正在看到某种“后进先出”,即加入特朗普联盟的人群,比如拉美裔、工薪阶层白人,也许只是稍微往回走了一点,或者也许干脆不投票,对吧?你看,特朗普在2024年民调中走强的一个原因是在年轻男性中的超常表现。但在中期选举中,你最不想依赖其投票率的一个群体通常就是年轻男性。

英文原文 >> Well, that's what I think makes Democrats nervous because it's the red states, especially in the heartland where um the polling over performance has been concentrated in in some of these recent elections. At the same time, the story does make sense on a couple of levels, right? Um number one, gas and diesel prices. Um, if you look at where diesel fuels are consumed, not usually by passenger vehicles, but by agriculture, trucking, petroleum, home heating oils, right, it's all kind of the colder Midwestern states where a lot of the battlegrounds are concentrated as it happens this year.

Um, if you believe in kind of a last in first out argument, like what if we are reverting somewhat out of the Trump era? Actually, in 2024, um, for the first time in a while, you had very mild depolarization. Some of the worst states that Democrats had relative to 2020 were like New York and and California. Um, you know, younger voters of color, for example, and younger men in general kind of moved against Democrats. Um whereas you know like relatively speaking if you're really looking in the weeds like Kansas is a state where Harris I think the PVI we call it the gap between that and the national spread declined in Kansas a little bit.

Um, so maybe you're having some last in first out where the people that join the Trump coalition like Hispanics, working-class whites, maybe just moving a little bit back in the other direction or maybe just not voting, right? You know, one reason why Trump polls in 24 was overperformance among like young men. The one group you do not want to rely on to turn out in a midterm is usually young men.

【哼笑】

英文原文 >> [snorts]

温和派策略与反建制反在任情绪

所以我觉得还有另一种解释可以说,我很想知道你怎么看,那就是这实际上可能与双方的候选人素质有关。在更偏红的州,我认为民主党人更严格地遵循了“需要更温和候选人”的观点。你会想到堪萨斯州的亚当·汉密尔顿(Adam Hamilton)。嗯,谢罗德·布朗(Sherrod Brown)就像是一个长期的民粹主义者,而且你知道……很有名,还有北卡罗来纳州的罗伊·库珀。嗯,乔恩·奥索夫(Jon Ossoff)就像……我是说我不再认为佐治亚是一个红州了,但奥索夫是一个极其自律的人物。内布拉斯加州的奥斯本(Osborn)实际上是以独立人士身份参选的。我不会说是民主党挑选了他,但显而易见我认为民主党与他保持一致,并对他的参选感到兴奋,没有派民主党人去跟他竞争。

嗯,而当你进一步进入更传统的摇摆州或更蓝的州时,你看,缅因州,他们提名了一个更偏左的候选人,你知道,杰克逊取代了普拉特纳,而普拉特纳也是一个更偏左的候选人。显然在密歇根州是阿卜杜勒·埃尔-萨耶德,更偏左的候选人赢了;在明尼苏达州,民主党也是更偏左的候选人赢了,而且看起来她会赢,但表现比人们感到安心的程度要稍差一点。

所以,我觉得看待这个问题的一个角度可以说,在偏红的州,民主党一直在非常刻意地挑选看起来更独立的候选人,对吧?【哼笑】你看,而当你走到民主党感到更舒适、可以承担更多风险的地方时,他们就在承担更多风险,并牺牲掉了一些可能的斩获。这就好比是我们在看到的情形中的“温和派致胜”论点。

英文原文 >> So I I feel like there's another story you could tell and I'd be curious how this rates for you which is that it actually has to do potentially with candid quality on both sides. So in redder states Democrats have been I would say more rigorously following a view that they need more moderate candidates. So you think of like Adam Hamilton in in in Kansas. Um shared brown is like a longtime populist and you know very well but Roy Cooper in North Carolina. Um John Ov is this like I mean I wouldn't say George is a red state anymore but John Ov is this like relentlessly disciplined figure. Nebraska with Osborne who's actually running as an independent. I wouldn't say Democrats chose him but obviously Democrats are uh aligned I think and excited about his candidacy and didn't run a Democrat um against him.

Um, and as you get more into the more traditionally purple or bluer states, uh, you know, Maine, they have nominated like a more left candidate, you know, Jackson replacing Platner, who is also a more left candidate. Obviously, Abdul sayed in Michigan, the more left candidate won in Minnesota, the more kind of left candidate, one for the Democrats, and it seems like she's going to win, but is performing a little bit worse than people are comfortable with.

So, I feel like one way you could squint at this is to say in redder states, Democrats have been, you know, very purposefully choosing candidates who just seem more independent, right? [snorts] You know, and that as you go down to where Democrats felt more comfortable and could take more risk, they're taking more risk and trading away some of the possible gains. Like that would be the moderation wins thesis of like what we're seeing.

佛罗里达州就是一个例子,那里有一个民主社会主义者(DSA)候选人,根本不在任何人的预测地图上,因为你看,嗯,她现在落后6、7或8个百分点,这对佛罗里达来说还不算太糟,但你看,在那里你看到了未能选出……在当前节点上,你可能需要一个相当保守的民主党人才能在佛罗里达获胜。

不,我认为这很大程度上是事实。我认为很大程度上也是如果你看看像明尼苏达这样的州,佩吉·弗拉纳根(Peggy Flanagan)处于领先地位,但只领先3.5或4个百分点,

英文原文 >> Well, in and Florida is a state where you had a DSA candidate that isn't on anyone's map because, you know, um she's now trailing by six or seven or eight points, which isn't that bad for Florida, but like but there you see the failure to select a uh a you know, you need a pretty conservative Democrat probably to win in Florida at this point.

No, I think that's a lot of it. I think a lot of it also if you look at a state like Minnesota where Peggy Flanigan is ahead, but by three and a half or four points,

而不是领先9或10个百分点,

英文原文 >> not by nine or 10, which

是的。嗯,你看,在那些拥有民主党全面执政(trifectas)且存在对民主党治理批评的州,是你往往会看到更多潜在问题的地方。在俄勒冈州,你看到了很多对自由主义治理的批评,对吧?嗯,蒂娜·科特克(Tina Kotek),现任州长,我想在民调中仅领先一到两个百分点。嗯,你看,凯西·霍楚尔(Kathy Hochul)看起来当然会赢得连任,但可能优势相对微弱。在马萨诸塞州你没怎么看到这种情况,那是一个典型的治理良好的州,经常会有像查理·贝克(Charlie Baker)这样的共和党州长,对吧?

嗯,但是你看,我认为人们存在一种反现任的情绪。【笑声】我认为人们在暗中算计究竟是谁在对我的生活施加控制,对吧?

英文原文 >> Yeah. um you know the states where you have these democratic trifectas and you have critiques of democratic governance is where you tend to see more more problems potentially in Oregon where you've had a lot of critiques of liberal governance right um Tina Cotch the incumbent I think is only ahead by like one or two points in the polls um you know Kathy Hokll certainly looks like she'll win re-election but maybe by a relatively tepid margin you haven't seen that as much in like Massachusetts which is a classically well-governed state that's often had a Republican governor in the form of Charlie Baker Right.

Um, but you know, I think people are there's an anti-inccumbent mood. [laughter] People, I think, are making this implicit calculation about who has kind of power over my life, right?

但并非针对所有在任者,对吧?比如奥斯索夫作为佐治亚州的在任者将会大胜。我是说,从我们在民调中看到的情况来看,他的挑战者……嗯,罗伊·库珀是北卡罗来纳州的现任州长。是的。嗯,或者你知道,显然曾经是,他就像是要轻松获胜一样。所以你看,这里有表现得很好的民主党现任者。我认为明尼苏达是这方面最明显的例子,因为蒂姆·沃尔兹(Tim Walz)的净支持率是负17个百分点左右,以至于他原本打算竞选连任后来放弃了。所以那里有点像是震中。

英文原文 >> But not against all incumbents, right? Like Austin is incumbent in Georgia is going to stomp. I mean, from what we can tell in the polls, his challenger, um, Roy Cooper is the incumbent governor in North Carolina. Yeah. Um, or, you know, obviously was like he's going to like win in a walk. So, like there are Democratic incumbents who are doing just fine here. I think Minnesota is the clearest example of this because Tim Walls's approval rating is 17 points underwater or something to the point where he was going to run for another term and and didn't. So, it's kind of like ground zero.

他在政坛上的起落真是大起大落。

英文原文 >> He's had a real fast fall in rise and fall in politics.

败选副总统候选人的轨迹,你知道,比如约翰·爱德华兹(John Edwards)的声誉下跌就很惨淡。嗯,

英文原文 >> The trajectory of losing vice presidential nominees, you know, John Edwards had a rough fall from Grace, for example. Um,

你看,保罗·瑞安(Paul Ryan)嗯已经不在国会了,对吧?这挺,你看,挺残酷的。你说得很对。

英文原文 >> you know, Paul Ryan uh no longer in Congress, right? It's pretty, you know, pretty rough. That's a fair point.

数据中心与曝光度对决选的影响

关于中西部和中心地带的这些假设,还有一件事。嗯,《经济学人》有一些数据显示,特朗普选民住得离数据中心越近,在这次选举中倒戈投票给民主党的可能性就越大。嗯,通常在西部有大量的数据中心,对吧?因为你需要一些空间,但又不想离电网太远或太偏僻。所以这可能也是一个隐藏因素。

当我在梳理并试图判断哪些候选人看起来表现最超预期时,我还在思考一件事:关注度与表现之间如今是多么缺乏相关性。这就像如果我浏览那些刷屏我信息流、登上大型播客的候选人——我是说显然这也取决于他们对竞选方式的选择——但就像是阿卜杜勒·埃尔-萨耶德无处不在,对吧?詹姆斯·塔拉里科无处不在;乔恩·奥索夫目前没有上很多全国性播客,但他的切片视频绝对到处都是。你没怎么看到谢罗德·布朗,对吧?你没怎么看到玛丽·佩尔托拉,对吧?她不做很多全国性媒体采访;你没怎么看到罗伊·库珀。

但真的就像你看过去,社交媒体和我信息流里到处都是的候选人,与实际在民调中表现优异或糟糕的候选人之间,几乎没有任何关联。

英文原文 >> One one more thing for these hypotheses about the heartland and the Midwest. Um the economists had some data showing that like the closer that Trump voters live to data centers, the more likely are to flip and vote Democratic in this election. Um and in the West in general, you have a a lot of data centers, right? Because you want some space, but you don't want to be too far off the grid and too rural. And so and so that could be a hidden factor, too.

There's something I was thinking about while I was like going through and trying to decide which of the candidates seem to me to be overperforming the most. I was thinking about how uncorrelated attention and performance is right now. So it's like if I go through the candidates who are all over my feeds and who are on big podcasts and and I mean obviously some of this is also their choice of of of how to run but it's like uh like Abdul said like omnipresent right James Taro omnipresent John Of he's not going on many national podcasts at the moment but his clips are absolutely everywhere you're not seeing sher brown right you're not seeing um you know very much of Mary Pollola right she does not do a lot of national press you're not seeing a lot of Roy Cooper but It's really like you look at it and there is almost no connection between who are the candidates who are everywhere, you know, on social media and my feeds and who are the candidates who are doing practically well or poorly um at least in polls.

是的,看,有些候选人有不同的激励驱动。如果你想在2028年竞选总统,那你可能潜在地希望保持一个稍高一些的知名度。我认为在像塔拉里科或埃尔-萨耶德这样的情况下,他们难免觉得无论如何自己都会获得最大的关注度。但你看,保持低调也有其好处。你看,也许俄亥俄州就是一个很好的例子。也许爱荷华州有一点。

我是说,看,在中期选举中,基本上有三个大问题,对吧?你的选民会出来投票吗?对方的选民会出来投票吗?然后在占选民约15%的可能摇摆选民中,发生了多大程度的游说劝导?嗯,你知道,如果民主党在爱荷华或堪萨斯等几场竞选中失利,他们可能会说,知道吗,这场竞选只是引起了太多人的关注,共和党成功地将一些选民拉过了终点线。我的意思是,游说劝导的部分已经结束了。如果民主党投票率按中期选举标准来衡量不够高,我会感到震惊。我们不知道共和党人是否会出来投票,而这将在共和党保住参议院并把民主党在众议院的席位限制在10席,与全面的1994年式的灾难之间划出分界线。

英文原文 >> Yeah, look, some candidates have different incentives. If you want to run for president in 2028, then you probably want a somewhat somewhat higher profile potentially. I think in a case like Taler Rico um or Elsa, they kind of inescapably feel that um they're going to get the maximum amount of attention anyway. But look, there's something to be said for kind of keeping a a a lower profile, too. You know, maybe Ohio is a good example of that. Maybe Iowa a bit.

I mean, look, in midterms, um there are basically three big questions, right? Will your voters turn out? Will the other side's voters turn out? And then how much persuasion is taking place among, you know, the 15% of the elector that's possibly swing voters. Um, and you know, if Democrats were to come up short in a couple of races like Iowa or Kansas, they might say, you know what, this race just got like a little bit too much on everybody's on everybody's radar and Republicans managed to drag some voters off the finish line. I mean, the persuasion part of this is done. I'd be shocked if Democratic turnout wasn't high by midterm standards. We don't know if Republicans are going to turn out and and that will determine the range between Republicans hold the Senate and keep Democrats to 10 seats in the House and complete 1994 style disaster.

民调误差的对称性与历史修正

【音乐】

所以现在我们讨论时的语气有点像民主党希望发生的事情就一定会发生一样。

英文原文 >> [music]

So the right now I mean we're talking a little bit as if the thing Democrats are hoping will happen will happen.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

但我们在中期选举中经常看到民调误差,在大选中可能也会看到民调误差。那么,民主党的希望对民调误差有多大的抵御能力?你是如何考虑民调误差可能出现在哪里的?比如当你在模型中构建考量,并思考你试图修正什么时——你看,你多次看到特朗普被低估,多次看到苏珊·柯林斯被低估。另一方面,民调机构也知道发生了这种情况,对吧?你如何看待这其中的民调误差维度?

英文原文 >> But we often see polling error in midterms and maybe we see polling error in general elections too. So, how resilient are Democratic hopes to polling error and and how are you thinking about where the polling error might be? Like when you're building things into the model and thinking about like what you're trying to correct for, you know, you've seen Trump underestimated many a time, seen Susan Collins underestimated many a time. On the other hand, the pollsters know that has happened, right? How do you think about the polling error dimension of this?

看,我总是告诉大家的第一件事是,每当你在看一场或多场参议院竞选的一系列民调时,都要问问自己:如果每场竞选的民调都朝同一个方向偏差了三到四个百分点会怎样?嗯,你看,民主党在像俄亥俄和得克萨斯这样的竞选中大致都有三点左右的领先优势,对吧?嗯,如果出现三个百分点的民调误差,你将经历一个非常漫长的不眠之夜,我们甚至可能要等待阿拉斯加的排序复选制投票结果。但这……你看,众议院是不一样的。如果民主党没能赢得众议院,那么人们将对民调发生了什么产生深刻的疑问,在某种程度上对这个国家发生了什么也会产生深刻疑问。

我我认为民主党有一种情绪上的感受,觉得每当出现民调误差时,都是对他们不利的,对吧?因为希拉里·克林顿和乔·拜登,而且总的来说,民调实际上屡次低估了唐纳德·特朗普。但这是真的吗?这在中期选举中尤其如此吗?民调误差一直都是不利于民主党的吗?

英文原文 >> Look, the first thing I always tell people is that whenever you're looking at a series of polls in a Senate race or in Senate races plural, right, always ask yourself, what if they're off by three or four points in the same direction in every race? Um, you know, Democrats have a lot of threepoint leads in races like Ohio and Texas, more or less, right? Um, if you had a three-point polling error, you would have a a very long night where we might be waiting for rank choice voting in Alaska. But it's, you know, the House is different. If Democrats were not to win the House, then there would be profound questions about what's going on with the polling and in some ways what's going on with the with the country, too.

I I think Democrats have the emotional feeling that when there's a polling error, it is, you know, against them, right? Because it, you know, Hillary Clinton and and and and Joe Biden and just in general, polls actually have repeatedly underestimated Donald Trump. But but is that true? And is it particularly true in in midterms? Have polling errors been consistently against Democrats?

在特朗普时代的两次中期选举中并非如此。我想2018年是在特朗普任内,那些民调是有史以来最准确的年份之一。2022年也类似。事实上,在几场备受瞩目的选战中,比如宾夕法尼亚州的费特曼竞选,民调显示奥兹在费特曼中风后缩小了差距,对吧?然后费特曼以相当坚实的——我认为是4到5个百分点左右的优势获胜,对吧?但总体而言民调相当准确。

还有一些在奇数年举行的选举、决选之类。去年在新泽西和弗吉尼亚,民调低估了民主党5到10个百分点,这是我们在民意调查充分的大选中见过的最大民调误差之一。

嗯,所以是的,我对某些人的批评是,他们会说,民调在这些样本中对共和党的抽样不足,而民主党人热情高得多,更有可能回答问卷,对民调机构更信任。行业内的每一个人都意识到了这一点。看,我认为每个民调专家都知道民调在2016年、2020年和2024年都低估了唐纳德·特朗普。嗯,你知道,这三个大选年算给民调的“黄金标准”敲响了丧钟,过去的黄金标准就是“我们直接去调查人群,根据熟知的普查人口统计数据进行加权,然后全盘信任数据”。

爱荷华州的安·塞尔泽(Ann Selzer)民调,【笑声】她简直是评级最高的民调专家。她和《纽约时报》当时我想并列第一还是什么的,对吧?嗯但现在……

英文原文 >> It has not been true in the two midterms under in the Trump era. I guess 2018 was under Trump and their polls were, you know, one of the most accurate years for polling ever. 2022 similar. In fact, there were a couple of races that were high-profile like the Federman race in Pennsylvania where polls showed Oz closing the gap after Federman's stroke, right? And then Federman won by a pretty solid I think four or five points or something like that, right? But overall polls were quite accurate. There are also elections that are held in oddnumbered years, runoffs, things like that. In New Jersey and Virginia last year, the polls were five to 10 points low on on Democrats, which is a one of the biggest polling errors we've seen in a well-pled, you know, general election.

Um, so yeah, the critique I have of some of the people say, they'll say, well, you know, you're under sampling Republicans in these polls and Democrats are much more enthusiastic and much more likely to respond and trust the pollsters more. Every single person in the industry is is aware of that. Look, I think every pollster is aware that polls missed uh low on Donald Trump in 2016, 2020, and 2024. Um, you know, the three presidential years was kind of the death nail for the gold standard of polling, which is like we're just going to go and survey people and and we'll wait to well-known census demographics and we'll just we'll just trust the data.

The an Seltzer poll in Iowa, [laughter] which and bless I mean, she was literally the highest rated pollster. She and then your times were like I think tied for number one or something, right? Um but now

现在我们独占鳌头了。

英文原文 >> now we stand alone.

是的。【笑声】

英文原文 >> Yeah. [laughter]

讲讲塞尔泽那边发生了什么,因为也许有些人留下了心理创伤,而有些人根本不知道我们在说什么。

英文原文 >> So say what happened with Nelzer because maybe some people are emotionally scarred and some people have no idea what we're talking about.

是的。那是大选前的周末,对吧,我周六本来安排了晚宴,然后收到朋友的短信说:你听说那个爱荷华民调了吗?有传言说安·塞尔泽——爱荷华民调的女掌门人,对吧?她曾预测了巴拉克·奥巴马在2008年爱荷华党团会议的巨大胜利——将发布一份民调,显示卡玛拉·哈里斯在爱荷华州领先,我想是领先三个百分点。所有其他爱荷华民调都是特朗普领先九个百分点左右,对吧?

嗯,我们的模型当时非常怀疑。通常你不会想押注跟安·塞尔泽作对,但这在某种程度上打开了整个潘多拉魔盒:万一每个人都只是在对过去的选举过度补偿呢?虽然这没有太大逻辑,但她之前全凭一句“我只相信我的数据,我不会过度润色它,不会对它做太多假设”走到了很高的地位。结果那个民调偏差了多少来着,大概13、14或15个百分点。

英文原文 >> Yeah. What was it was the weekend before the election right and I had like some dinner plans on Saturday and then I got like a text from a friend saying have you heard about this Iowa poll? There's a rumor that like Anseltzer, the um kind of, you know, Dame or Don of Iowa polling, right? Um who had predicted Barack Obama's big win, the Iowa caucus in in 2008, would have a poll coming out showing Kla Harris winning, I think, by three points in Iowa. Every other poll of Iowa had been Trump plus nine or something like that, right?

Um and our model was pretty skeptical. you don't usually want to bet against an Seltzer, but like it kind of opened up this whole world like what if everyone's just kind of way overcompensating for past elections and and it didn't make a lot of sense, but she had gotten very far before just saying I'm just going to trust my data. I'm not going to overly massage it, not make too many assumptions about it. And the poll was off by what was it like 13 or 14 or 15 points.

特朗普不可理喻地起诉了那家报纸,就好像发布一份他落后的民调构成了诽谤一样。

英文原文 >> Trump insanely sued the paper as if like publishing a poll where he um was losing was defamation.

是啊。是啊,一直搞不清其中的动机机制到底是什么。

英文原文 >> Yeah. Yeah, it's never clear what the incentives are supposed to be.

民调方法论的重塑与迭代机制

我能在民调这件事上暂停一下吗?让我们深入探讨一下方法论,因为我发现每当我们开始讨论,或者我开始思考民调中通过调整人口统计数据来解决人们不接电话、采用在线抽样以及不知道谁会出来投票等所有这些问题时,我感到非常困惑。你会怎么做?民调机构到底在做什么?

英文原文 >> Can I stop on this polling thing for a minute though to let's let's get in the weeds methodologically for a minute because I find whenever we start discussing or I start thinking about how what is happening in polls to massage demographics to kind of answer all these problems of people don't pick up the phone or you know we're using online sampling and we don't know who will turn out. I I feel very disoriented. What do you do? Like what what are the pollsters doing?

我得说明我不是民调专家。我是一个预测专家,对吧?但这种界限在某些方面变得越来越模糊了,对吧?

英文原文 >> And I should say I am I'm not a pollster. I'm a forecaster, right? But I that distinction in some ways is becoming blurriier, right?

是的,这就是我的意思。他们感觉自己像是在做预测。【笑声】

英文原文 >> Yeah, that's what I mean. They feel like they're forecasting. [laughter]

我认为塞尔泽事件的结论是,每个人都知道民调几乎就像是一个带有民调风味输入的小型模型。

我不确定最贴切的比喻是什么。但人们总想把它描绘成一辆破旧老车上的坏油表:当指针显示还剩25%的油时,你实际上必须加油,因为油表坏了,对吧?然而,这更像是一个迭代过程,对吧?你开了一家餐馆,顾客抱怨菜太辣。你稍微调低一点辣度。现在有些顾客又说不,我想要菜里恢复原来的辣味,对吧?所以这是一个更具迭代性的过程。

而且我认为民调机构现在意识到,他们至少会根据最后几周的结果接受评判。尽管他们可能会说“这只是公众舆论的一个快照”,但无论准确还是错误,背后都有巨大的声誉利益在承受风险。

英文原文 >> I think the upshot of the ancelter thing is that um everyone knows that a poll is kind of almost like a a mini model with polling flavored inputs.

And I'm not sure what the right metaphor is. But people wanted to make it like it's some broken gauge that like you're um that you know on your beat up old car that when it says 25% of fuel left actually have to refill because the gauge is broken. Right? Instead this is a more of an iterative process. Right? You open a restaurant, the customers complain the food is too spicy. You tamp it down a little bit. Now some of your customers say no I wanted the spice back in my food. Right? And so but it's more of an innovative process. And I think um pollsters are now aware they'll be judged on their results in the final few weeks at least. And as much as they might say, well, it's just a snapshot of public opinion, there are huge reputational stakes on the line for for being right. So I mean the pers and for being wrong.

所以民调机构有相当好的动力去修正这些潜在问题。

英文原文 >> So the pollsters have pretty good incentives to correct for these problems potentially.

嗯,但你知道,有时当……我知道这听起来有点同义反复,对吧?当发生这些重大的浪潮变革选举,或者某种出乎意料的选举时,有时民调机构会低估它们。例如在1994年,对克林顿来说原本看似相对糟糕的一年,结果变成了极其可怕的一年,对吧?你也可以把2014年看作一个平行参照——如果我是共和党人,我会感到担忧——因为那一年的民调对奥巴马来说从来都不乐观,但出现了非常非常大的投票率差异,民主党人就是没有那么大的热情。当时奥巴马更依赖于多元族裔的年轻群体联盟,而这部分人在中期选举中的投票率传统上并不高。这最终演变成参议院损失9席,民主党在参议院彻底溃败。

英文原文 >> Um but you know, but sometimes when it I know it sounds kind of toological, right? when there are these big wave change elections or elections that are kind of unexpected and sometimes pollsters lowball them. In 1994, for example, it looked like a relatively bad year for Clinton that turned into a terrible year, right? You can also look at a year like 2014 is a parallel that I'd be worried about if I were Republicans because that's a year when the polls were never great for Obama, but you had a really, really big differential turnout where Democrats just weren't that enthusiastic. At the time, Obama was relying on more of a multi-thnic younger coalition that traditionally does not turn out at the same rates in midterms. And that turned into a 9 seat loss, a total route for Democrats in in the Senate.

是的。我是说,我想我问你的正是这个:我们知道中期选举的选民结构会与大选不同,有些人会比其他人有更强的投票动力。我的意思是,他们难道只是调查人们并问:“你觉得自己会去投票吗?”这就是筛选的核心吗?对于非专业人士来说——我之前读过《The Upshot》的相关分析,内特·科恩(Nate Cohn)做过一个很酷的展示,让你看到对相同的底层民调数据进行不同的处理,会得出截然不同的结果。但在构建2026年与2022年完全不同的中期选民构成时,他们是否存在某种通用的做法?

英文原文 >> Yeah. I mean, this is, I think, what I'm asking you, that we know the midterm electorate is going to be different than the presidential electorate, that some people are going to be more motivated to vote than others. I mean, are they just pulling people and saying, "Do you think you're going to vote?" And and and that's like the big screen just for somebody who does not like I have read analysis of these the upshot a while back and and Nick Cohen did a cool thing where they let you see like how different ways of moving the data around would give you a very different result on the same like underlying poll data. But is there like a a kind of conventional thing they're doing to compose a midterm electorate that is going to be really different in 2026 than it was in 2022?

是的。所以有一个不同之处在于,如果你问人们“你打算去投票吗?你对投票有多大的热情?”,这会产生一个非常偏向民主党的样本。嗯,其他民调机构试图根据其他类型的数据来预测人们是否会去投票,对吧?嗯那些技术往往会为民主党带来更温和的结果。

在早期投票数据中你可以观察到一件事(通常我建议大家不要看),就是谁在低投票倾向选民中获胜,对吧?也就是在过去三次选举(包括中期选举)中最多只投过一次票的人。嗯,到目前为止,那些低投票倾向选民似乎相当偏向民主党。这【清嗓子】在某种程度上可能会改变,共和党无论如何会在选举日当天投出选票并追赶上来,对吧?但如果不是这样,如果民主党的低投票倾向选民出来了,而共和党的没有出来,那么你可能会看到低估民主党的民调误差。

英文原文 >> Yeah. So, one difference if you ask people, are you going to vote? How enthusiastic are you about voting? That produces a very democratic sample. Um, other pollsters try to predict whether people will vote based on other types of data, right? um and and those techniques tend to produce more modest results for Democrats. One thing you can watch in the early voting data, which generally I advise people not to do, but who was winning among like lower propensity voters, right? People of who have voted in no more than one out of the past three elections counting counting midterms. Um those low propensity voters appear to be quite Democratic so far. It [clears throat] maybe probably will to some extent. Republicans will cast their vote by election day anyway and they'll and they'll catch up, right? But but if not, if Democrats low propensity voters turn out and the GOP doesn't, then that's where you might see a polling error that underestimates Democrats.

选举叙事与新生代政治人物

那么,如果共和党最终度过了一个好于预期的夜晚,你认为最终的解释会是什么?

英文原文 >> So if Republicans end up having a better thanex pected night, what do you think will have ended up being the explanation for it?

我是说,看,我认为这有两种版本。一种就只是民主党输掉了所有的摇摆选局,对吧?塔拉里科输了一个百分点,杰克逊输了一个百分点,也许埃尔-萨耶德通过重新计票才险胜,谢罗德·布朗赢了,但特克输了三个百分点。这在概率分布的核心区域是非常可行的。然后,我认为大家会对民调提出一些质疑,但那也符合规律。我们会说,好吧,党派归属感依然很强。也许民调机构和民主党之前抱有的希望有点过高,以为能在这些偏共和党12个点的州获胜;如果是偏共和党8个点那还行,但我们只是在攀登那座红色大山时耗尽了氧气,对吧?

如果出现……比方说众议院选情咬得很紧,对吧?而民主党在参议院只拿下了北卡罗来纳州,对吧?我是说,那几乎让人难以想象,并不是说基于民调在理论上不可能——你看,我们在模型中设置了那些厚尾,表示有时候民调可能会偏差5、6或7个百分点甚至更离谱,对吧?——但这几乎颠覆了我们自认为了解的中期选举运行机制。

我认为有几场选战对我来说具有极大的叙事重要性。塔拉里科给我的感觉对大家来说承载了很大的叙事意义。你看,民主党在得克萨斯州具备竞争力的可能性,某种宗教左翼的回归。阿卜杜勒·埃尔-萨耶德将被视为一个非常重要的检验:他其实不是民主社会主义者,而是一个更偏左的民粹主义、言辞犀利的候选人。比如我之前看了一个视频,他在选民见面会上彻底驳倒了一个跑来质问“你是否会谴责穆斯林兄弟会”的人。埃尔-萨耶德是一个非常非常聪明的人,他把那个人驳得体无完肤。

英文原文 >> I mean, look, I think there are two versions of this. Like one is just Democrats lose all the toss-ups, right? Talerico loses by a point. Jackson loses by a point. Maybe Elsa wins by a recount. Shared Brown wins, but Turk loses by three points. Like that's very feasible in the kind of thick part of the probability distribution. And then and then I think you know with some questions about the polls, but that's kind of that's kind of in line. We'll say, okay, partisanship is still really strong. Maybe pollsters and Democrats had their hopes up a little bit too high to think you could win on these, you know, R +12 states, it would have been R plus 8, then yeah, but we just kind of reached the point where we ran out of like oxygen climbing up that that big red hill, right?

If there's a if there's like a like let's say the House is kind of close, right? And Democrats only pick up North Carolina in the Senate, right? I mean then that's kind of hard to contemplate almost right not just not because it's not theoretically possible based on the polls right like you know we have these in our model these like fat tails that say sometimes polls can by five or six or seven points or something crazy right um but that would kind of like defy everything that we think we know about how how midterms work

there are I think a couple of races that feel to me like they have like a a lot of outsized narrative importance. Telerico feels to me like it's got a lot of narrative importance to people. You know, the possibility of Democrats being competitive in Texas, a sort of return of a religious left. Abdul sayed is going to be seen as a very important test of, you know, he's actually not a DSA guy, but sort of a more left populist, you know, unsparing candidate. Like I was watching this video where he just like absolutely annihilates this guy who comes to one of his town halls and is like will you denounce to the Muslim Brotherhood and I mean Elsiad who's a very very very smart guy leaves this guy like a smoking like crater on the floor.

所以感觉会有很多人关注他的具体表现。

英文原文 >> So it feels like there's going to be a lot of attention on how he specifically does

嗯。

英文原文 >> um

你知道,你最近非常关注民主党内部的派系划分。我想你把民主党人分成了大写L的左翼(Capital-L Left)、丰裕自由派(abundance libs,我猜我属于这派),

英文原文 >> you know you've been very attentive to like the factional divisions of the Democratic party recently. I think you've you've cut Democrats into what is it the capital L left the abundance libs which I guess is me

还有“理查森主义”(Richardsonism),你是以希瑟·考克斯·理查森(Heather Cox Richardson)命名的,她是一位Substack博主,代表了那种抵抗派自由主义者、“不要君王”之类的路线。但我很好奇,你认为选举的不同结果最终会如何被解读,并塑造民主党及其战略?

除了谁胜谁负之外,11月3日的两条大副线叙事是:第一,进步派相对于温和派表现如何?第二,各州的结果中是否有受到AI反弹影响的证据?如果人们事后进行这些生态学分析,发现“在建有数据中心的州,共和党的得票率低了3个百分点”,这可能也很重要。是的。

如果埃尔-萨耶德输了,无论参议院输赢,对进步派来说都是非常糟糕的叙事。我不知道如果……比方说本森赢了9个百分点,而埃尔-萨耶德只赢了4个百分点会发生什么?也许像我这样的数据狂会说,“他的胜场替代值低于平均水平,这证明了我的论点”,但我认为这在民主党内部辩论中不会占上风。

我认为对任何选战来说,一个重要的门槛问题是:这场竞选是在选举之夜宣告结果的吗?这很大程度上决定了叙事走向。非数据狂的人往往不太关注胜出优势,只要结果看起来清晰明确就行。

看,人们之前总想讲一个过饱和的叙事,说进步派在初选中全线获胜,但那并不完全符合事实。你看,弗朗切斯卡·洪最终在威斯康星州落选了。我不知道贾斯敏·克罗克特(Jasmine Crockett)是否真的比塔拉里科更激进;她更像是一个党派的引战型人物,她输掉了那场选战。

英文原文 >> and then Richardsonism which you've named for Heather Cox Richardson who's you know the substacker and that's sort of the big like resistance libs no kings kind of thing but I I'm curious how you think different forms of the election might end up being interpreted and shaping the the Democratic party and its strategies.

So the two big apart from who wins, right? The two big sub story lines of November 3rd are one, how do progressives do relative to moderates? But then is there evidence of like an AI backlash um from the state-by-state results, right? If people do these ecological analyses afterward, they find, hey, yeah, in states where there was a data center construction and Republicans underperformed by by three points, I mean, that might be important as well.

Yeah. If if [snorts] I I'll say I were to lose, then win or lose the Senate, and that's a very bad narrative for progressives. I don't know what happens if like um you know, let's say that um Benson wins by nine points and Elsa wins by four, right? Maybe nerds like me are like, well, he had a below average wins of a replacement. That proves my thesis, but like I think that wouldn't really carry the day in the Democratic debate as much.

Um, I I think for any race, an important threshold question is, was the race called on election night? Right? That shapes narratives quite a bit. People who aren't nerds tend not to pay much attention to the margin as long as it seems unambiguous and clear.

Um, I mean, look, people wanted to tell this oversupplied narrative of like the progressives like winning everywhere in the primary, and that wasn't entirely true. You know, Franchesca Hong was ultimately rejected in Wisconsin. Um, I don't know that Jasmine Crockett actually is more progressive than Taller Rico. She's more of a partisan bombthrower and and she lost that that race. Um, yeah,

她不是民主社会主义者。那不是她在政治上的定位。

英文原文 >> she wasn't a DSA person. That was not her her profile in politics.

但我认为民主党选民展现出了相当程度的理性判断,对吧?并没有任何规定说选民必须或者应该完全基于胜选能力去最大化选择,对吧?你可以计算某种期望值得分:“这位候选人获胜的概率是多少,乘以他们能为我所关心的议题带来多少好处”,对吧?

不过我可以告诉你一件事。在缅因、密歇根……

英文原文 >> But like I think I think Democratic voters have exercised a fair amount of kind of rational discretion, right? I mean, there's nothing that says that voters have to or necessarily should maximize everything based on electability, right? You're allowed to say, well, I'm trying to calculate some like expected value score of what is the chance that this candidate wins times how much good will they do for the issues that I that I care about, right? Although, I will tell you one thing. Um the amount of Democratic infighting really dropped off after these races in Maine, Michigan,

威斯康星。

英文原文 >> Wisconsin.

初选确实会制造很多纷争,而在2028年初选到来时,这种纷争还会再次升温。

英文原文 >> Primaries just create a lot of I mean and it's going to go up again when the 2028 primary

到那时这将是大家在长达一年半时间里唯一谈论的事情。

退一步看,我认为有一个叙事会成为现实,特别是如果有这批代表人物胜出的话,那就是民主党正在步入一个千禧一代年长政治人才的时代。我对民主党内的X世代官员朋友感到抱歉。我认为晚期婴儿潮一代和民主党内的X世代群体,最终在政治时代和传播时代之间感到相当脱节。

但现在当我审视民主党的人才梯队时,在左翼,像扎赫兰·马姆达尼(Zohran Mamdani)、阿卜杜勒·埃尔-萨耶德和AOC(亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯)等人极具才华;我认为如果埃尔-萨耶德赢了,他将成为一颗超级明星般的联邦参议员。嗯,然后你看像罗布·桑德(Rob Sand)这样的人,看起来他在爱荷华州长竞选中将轻松获胜;再想想塔拉里科,他真的是个政治明星;还有乔恩·奥索夫,他已经变成了一位超级巨星。

我觉得你正在目睹新一代民主党人登场,他们更加天然地契合这个时代。他们在奥巴马时代入场,受特朗普时代的塑造,深谙如今的传播之道。对我来说,某种变化正在跨越不同派系发生,他们现在都拥有了闪亮的政治明星,而几年前我还不敢这么说。

我认为这有点像奥巴马带来的“斯蒂芬·库里效应”——他开始在没人投过的地方投三分球,现在的孩子们在高中练习这个,然后进入大学并进入NBA。

英文原文 >> it's going to be the only thing everyone's talking about for a year and a half or something. I would say and and this is like a step back I have. One narrative that I think is going to be true particularly if you have you know a bunch of these players win is the Democrats are coming into an an era of like elder millennial talent that I apologize to my Democratic office holder Gen X friends. I think like the like the late boomer and then um like the Gen X class and Democratic party ended up like pretty caught between political eras and communication eras.

But when I look at the Democratic talent right now and I think about you know on the left people like Zan Mani and Abdul Seed and AOC who are hugely talented like I think El say'll be like a pretty superstar US senator if he wins. Um, you know, and then I look at, you know, people like Rob Sand who's, you know, looks like he's going to win the Iowa governor's race in a walk, but you think about Telerico who like is like really a star. John Of who has become an absolute superstar.

Like I think you're just sort of seeing like the arrival of like a Democratic class that is just more native to this era. Like came in during Obama, then was shaped by Trump, understands communication now. just something to me seems to be changing that is actually across a different faction like they all now have stars in a way that I wouldn't have said was true a few years ago.

I think some kind of like a Steph Curry effect with Obama as an analog where like he starts shooting three-pointers from where no one has before and now kids are practicing that in in high school and they graduate and grow to college in the NBA.

在这个类比中谁是斯蒂芬·库里?

英文原文 >> And who is Steph Curry in this analogy?

奥巴马。

英文原文 >> Obama.

是的,在某种程度上。

英文原文 >> Yeah. like in some ways

比如埃尔-萨耶德和奥索夫都以不同的方式深受奥巴马的影响。皮特市长也有点……

英文原文 >> I mean yeah Elsiad and Assa for instance are very both influenced by Obama in different ways you know Mayor Pete's got a little

皮特市长,是的,皮特·布蒂吉格(Pete Buttigieg)是我想补充到这里的另一位年长千禧一代人才。

英文原文 >> Mayor Pete yeah Pete Buddha Judge is another kind of elder millennial talent I would add to this

嗯,但我觉得在某种程度上,2012年之后民主党发生的事情有点诡异,对吧?希拉里输给了奥巴马,而比尔·克林顿是在1992年当选总统的,出于某种原因大家觉得“好吧,现在轮到希拉里了”,对吧?她在与伯尼·桑德斯的激烈初选中胜出,但在某种程度上,这感觉像是回归到了一个与奥巴马试图打造的政党截然不同的民主党,对吧?然后是拜登,他当初被奥巴马挑选正是因为他年纪大,且本身竞选总统不被视为威胁,在寻求避险的心态中胜出。但我觉得民主党的某种发展轨迹被打断了,也许现在它正在稍微恢复。

英文原文 >> um but like I think like in some ways what happened to Democrats after 2012 was kind of weird right where Hillary lost to Obama and Bill Clinton became president in 1992 right and for some reason it's like well it's it's Hillary's turn now, right? And she had a very competitive primary against Bernie Bernie Sanders and prevail, but like that in some ways felt like um a return to a different Democratic party than the party that Obama was trying to craft, right? And then and then Biden who was kind of expressly chosen by Obama because he was old and not seen as a threat to run for president himself kind of won amid this like flight to safety and then but like um I don't know obviously some of these were competitive nomination processes right but it feels like some trajectory [music] got interrupted in the Democratic party and and maybe now it's being restored I suppose a little

众议院选区重划与佛罗里达政治版图变迁

【音乐】

我们一直在大谈特谈参议院,而参议院就像是中期选举中极具号召力的大型动物,因为你只需要关注几个竞选,脑子里能记住每个人的角色形象。

英文原文 >> [music]

So, we've been talking a lot about the Senate, and the Senate is like the charismatic megapon of midterms because there are only a couple races you have to pay attention to, and you can keep the characters of them in mind.

显然众议院不是一个二元结果。民主党最终是拿到228名、235名、240名还是250名众议员,这真的很重要。那么告诉我,建模和民调似乎表明民主党可能会落在什么位置,以及双向的敏感度如何?

英文原文 >> Obviously, the House is not a binary outcome. it really matters if Democrats end up with 228 members of the House, 235, 240, 250. So tell me about what the modeling and the polling seems to suggest about where Democrats might end up and you know like the kind of sensitivity of that in both directions.

是的。所有这些选区重划以及选民自我分流的一个重大后果是,摇摆选区远少于以往,对吧?此外,民主党在2024年的众议院选举中表现相对不错。我的意思是,在2024年大选之夜,尽管哈里斯输了,但民主党是否真的会赢得众议院仍然存在悬念。

所以你看,即使在我们的模型中他们赢得众议院的概率超过90%,这平均下来也只对应大约22个席位的净增。嗯,而且……

英文原文 >> Yeah. So, one of the big consequences of all this redistricting as well as voter self- sorting is that you have far fewer swing districts than than you once did, right? Also, Democrats had a relatively good 2024 in the House. I mean, there was still some doubt on election night whether Democrats might actually win the House in 24 despite Harris having lost. Um, so, you know, even the models, even our model that has them with a 90% plus chance of winning the House, that only translates quote unquote into I think 22 seats or something on average. Um and

而我们见过席位变动达40或50席的浪潮选举,

英文原文 >> which like we've seen, you know, wave elections that are like 40 50 seats,

对吧?比如2010年是不是变动了63席?

英文原文 >> right? I mean, was it 63 in in 2010, for example,

那是一场规模非常大的,

英文原文 >> which was like the big the very big one

或者是2018年的41席左右?

共和党确实通过选区重划增加了一些席位,主要是在那些他们直接削减了少数族裔占多数的选区,对吧?比如路易斯安那、阿拉巴马、田纳西等州,阿拉巴马的选区在民调中实际上还挺接近的。但这净削减了民主党的三个席位,对吧?

在得克萨斯和佛罗里达,你没有看到共和党取得太多增益,因为在得克萨斯的理论是:我们现在可以承担更多风险,因为我们在低收入拉美裔选民中拥有了稳固得多的支持。但如果你相信民调,那些群体正是最激烈地倒戈回民主党的群体。而在佛罗里达,德桑蒂斯画了一张风险更高的地图,更多针对大选年进行了优化,在像现在这样的环境下会产生很多五五开到偏共和党的选区。

现在在佛罗里达,共和党拥有……我们之前谈过如果民主党在堪萨斯或得克萨斯获胜会怎样,在现阶段,如果民主党人在全州范围的竞选中获胜,感觉几乎同样惊人。

英文原文 >> or 41 or something in 2018? Um you know, Republicans did gain a few seats from the redistricting process, mostly in the mostly one where they just cut out a majority minority district, right? So, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and some of those states, the Alabama district is actually kind of close in the polling. Um, but that's like a clean three seats wiped out from Democrats, right?

Um, in Texas and Florida, you were not seeing many Republican gains because in Texas, the theory was that like, oh, we can now we can now take more risks because we now have a much firmer hold with lower income Hispanic voters. Well, if you believe the polls, those are the groups that are shifting most aggressively back toward Democrats. And in Florida, Dantis kind of drew a riskier map that was optimized more for presidential years and would have a lot of toss up to lean our districts in an environment like this one.

Now, in Florida, Republicans have, you know, I we talked before about like, well, what if Democrats win in Kansas or Texas? At this point, it would almost feel as remarkable if a Democrat won a statewide race. And

我从未读到过任何对我而言完全令人满意的关于佛罗里达为何变得如此之红的解释。但正如你所说,佛罗里达已经从一个经典的摇摆州,

英文原文 >> you have I Florida I have never read what was to me a fully satisfying explanation of how Florida became so red. But Florida has gone, as you say, from being a canonical swing state

变成了比得克萨斯更稳固的共和党堡垒。罗恩·德桑蒂斯第一次竞选州长时几乎只是险胜。佛罗里达怎么会变得这么红?

英文原文 >> to more of a Republican readout than Texas. I mean, Ronda Sanders barely won um his first race for governor. How did Florida become so red?

我认为75%是人口迁移,25%是民主党陷入了某种可能是自我强化的死亡螺旋。关于人口迁移,佛罗里达是一个独特的地方,它提供蓝州的便利设施,但没有那么多自由派,你懂我的意思吗?【笑声】这吸引了……一直以来都在吸引老年人。

但我认为在大多数州都有很多政治上的自我选择。如果你看看选民登记数据,人们开始再次更多地登记为民主党人而非共和党人,这种情况已经有连续四五年没出现过了。今年你在中西部尤其是宾夕法尼亚看到了民主党的这种回升,但在佛罗里达没有。佛罗里达在登记层面上一直在变得更红。

英文原文 >> I think it's 75% migration and 25% kind of a death spiral for the Democratic party that might be self-reinforcing. I mean, with the migration, um, Florida is a unique place in offering blue state amenities, but without [laughter] without as many libs, you know what I mean? Um, and that attracts, you know, a has always attracted older people. Um but yeah, I think you have a lot of like political self- selection in most states.

If you look at like voter registration data, um people have begun to again register more as Democrats than Republicans, which which was not true for like four or five years in a row. Um this year you seeing those comebacks for Democrats in the Midwest in particular in Pennsylvania, but not in Florida. Florida just keeps getting redder at the registration level.

特朗普执政危机与地缘政治风险

好的。所以那是众议院民调的中心情况,但我们谈到过两到三或四个百分点的民调误差——考虑到众议院的在任者优势和选区重划——这并不罕见。

英文原文 >> Okay. So, so that's like the center of house polling, but but we've talked about a two to three or four point polling error like not being unusual given incumbency advantages in the House, given redistricting.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

如果出现三个百分点的误差,结果证明民主党比预期好三个百分点,会不会导致很多选区重划的防线瓦解,民主党迎来一场巨大的浪潮选举,实际上在众议院赢得40个席位,并在议长哈基姆·杰弗里斯的领导下拥有庞大席位优势?

英文原文 >> Is this the kind of thing where if you get a three-point error and it turns out Democrats did better than expected by three points? Yeah. Where all of a sudden a bunch of the redistricting falls apart and Democrats like have this huge wave election and actually they are winning, you know, 40 seats in the house and they have this like huge majority under speaker Hakee Jeff.

是的,这确实具有某种不对称性,对吧?人们喜欢用洪水和海洋的比喻,但如果浪潮变得非常大,发生的一件事就是它会淹没那些可能根本没有为这种灾难做好准备的候选人。我认为最好的例子实际上是参议院的罗杰·马歇尔(Roger Marshall),

英文原文 >> Yeah. No, it is a little bit asymmetric, right? And people love the flood and maritime metaphors, but but um if the wave gets really big, then one thing that happens is it inundates candidates who have not been prepared for that type of disaster potentially. I mean, I think the best example is like actually in in the Senate with Roger Marshall where I have um

在堪萨斯。

英文原文 >> in Kansas

在堪萨斯,对吧?我的家人住在堪萨斯州的奥弗兰帕克,在堪萨斯和密苏里政治界很有影响力。天哪,罗杰·马歇尔真是一个糟糕的候选人,对吧?我当时想,这是堪萨斯,无所谓,没关系的。但如果你被卷入这场浪潮中……堪萨斯曾选出过沙里斯·戴维斯(Sharice Davids)进入国会。

英文原文 >> in Kansas, right? I have a family that lives in Overland Park, Kansas, big in Kansas and Missouri politics and like boy, Roger Marshall's a really bad candidate, right? I'm like, you know, it's Kansas. It's I'm sorry. Doesn't matter. Doesn't matter. Um but um but if you're caught up in this tide and like Kansas, you know, it's elected Theres Davis to Congress.

抱歉打断,你看到特朗普跑去为罗杰·马歇尔辩护的事了吗?

英文原文 >> Sorry. You saw the thing where Trump then went to defend Roger Marshall.

噢,天哪,看到了。

英文原文 >> Oh, no. Yeah.

他说他不得不以那种方式向他的病人讨要医疗费的原因……人们试图抹黑他,特朗普还用了一个反犹太主义侮辱性词汇。

英文原文 >> And was like, Yeah. I mean, the reason he had to go after his candidates, his his patience for payment in that way, people trying to paint him. He used like an anti-semitic slur.

罗杰遭遇了不公待遇。我认识他,他是个硬汉,但他也是高素质、优秀的人。他受到了不公的指责,因为法律规定他必须强力追讨病人欠款,法律不允许你不去追讨。你依法必须追讨这些人,而他们却把他描绘成某种夏洛克式的人物。

英文原文 >> Roger was given a real I know the guy. He's one of the He's a tough guy and all, but he's also high quality and he's a fine person. And he was given a bum wrap because he was mandated by law to request strongly money owed from patients. You're not allowed not to do it. You have to by law go after those people and they made it like, oh, he was some kind of a shillock type guy.

有时候我怀疑特朗普是否真的在乎共和党能否守住参议院,对吧?他在国会其实没推动什么实质立法,主要靠的是行政权力,对吧?

英文原文 >> There are times when I wonder whether Trump really cares whether GOP holds the center or not, right? I mean, he hasn't done a whole lot through Congress. It's mostly been through executive power, right?

我认为科宁(Cornyn)原本能在得克萨斯赢。特朗普本可以轻易结束那场初选让科宁获胜,那完全在特朗普权力范围内,这样共和党在得克萨斯会处于更强地位,更不可能丢掉参议院。

特朗普在边际上是不想输掉中期选举的。他搞了这个奇怪的中期党代会,但他关于共和党为何可能在中期选举中失败的整套理论,似乎建立在他本人不在选票上这一前提之上;他觉得只要大家都表现得好像他在选票上一样,共和党就没问题。然后他的另一个策略是承诺如果共和党获胜就给每个美国人发一张5000美元的支票,相当于贿赂大家。如果能以一种对他个人充满赞誉的方式获胜,他愿意赢下中期选举;但如果赢下中期选举意味着要让共和党人同他保持距离并支持他不怎么喜欢的人,

英文原文 >> And I think Cornin would win Texas. Trump easily could have just ended that primary and made Cornin the the winner, right? That that was completely within Trump's power and Republicans would be in a stronger position in Texas and less likely to lose the Senate if that had happened.

You know, Trump has on the margin not wanted to lose the midterm election. He did this weird midterm convention, but his whole theory of why Republicans might lose a midterm convention appears to be that he himself is not on the ballot and that if only people would act like he is on the ballot, Republicans would be fine. Then his other theory was to promise every American a $5,000 check if Republicans win. So like to bribe people. It's like he's willing to win the midterm if he can win it in a way that is personally congratulatory of him. But if winning the midterm means giving Republicans space from him and you know backing people he doesn't really like

那就算了。

英文原文 >> then no.

你看,在特朗普本身是核心人物但他本人并不在选票上的选举中,共和党人往往陷入进退维谷的境地,对吧?整整一系列的选举都是如此:2018年;如果你把2022年也算上的话,当时某些因素阻止了在支持率仅40%时本该发生的拜登惨败;通常所有的决选(包括佐治亚州的两场)、所有的特别选举、最高法院竞选、公投提案等等,对共和党来说结果都非常糟糕。

因为特朗普唯一的魔法就是在自己出现在选票上时,让某种通常不问政治的选民甘愿“爬过碎玻璃”去为他投票。而且,正是这些选民不会回答民调,或者被错误地归类为不太可能投票的选民。我认为那些人可不会为了罗杰·马歇尔或肯·帕克斯顿去“爬碎玻璃”。

但我不想脱离这里的宏观大局,对吧?如果特朗普没有决定与伊朗开战并导致油价飙升至每加仑4.5美元以上(在加州等地更高,在其他地方稍低),我不认为我们会在这里讨论民主党在参议院占据优势。

英文原文 >> Look, Republicans are kind of caught between a rock and a hard place in elections where Trump himself is the dominant figure but not himself on the ballot. Right? that entire trench of elections. So 2018, if you kind of want to count 2022 as well, where something prevented Biden from having the wipeout you might get with a 40% approval rating, typically all the runoffs, including the two in Georgia, all the special elections, Supreme Court races, ballot initiatives, all that kind of stuff. It's all gone really badly for for Republicans.

Um because the one magic trick that Trump has is to get a certain type of usually disengaged voter to kind of like crawl on glass to vote for him when he himself is on on the ballot. And furthermore, these are the exact voters that aren't answering polls or that are incorrectly deemed to be unlikely voters or anything like that, right? Um, those people are not gonna crawl over glass to vote for Roger Marshall or Ken Paxton, I don't think.

But I I don't want to lose the side of the big picture here, right? The I don't think we'd be talking about Democrats being favored in the Senate if Trump hadn't decided to go to war with Iran and spike gas prices into the mid4 per gallon. More here in California and places like that, less in some other places.

你显然一直在密切关注特朗普的支持率。

英文原文 >> You know, you obviously keep a close track of Trump's approval rating.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

其支持率下滑的来龙去脉是什么?自从他二度就职以来,支持率下降了不少。这种下降是平稳的,还是围绕某些事件呈现断断续续的台阶式下跌?

英文原文 >> What is the story of its decline? It's dropped quite a bit since he took office a second time. Has that dropped been steady or has it been like discontinuous around certain events?

如果你想在统计上对其进行建模,它与油价高度相关。坦率地说,这里面也有一个时间趋势,对吧?总的来说,你会看到它随着汽油价格和某种经济焦虑而小幅上下波动。“解放日”(Liberation Day)期间下降了很多——那是2025年4月对关税的担忧吗?嗯,

英文原文 >> If you want to like model it statistically, then you know it's quite correlated with gas prices. Frankly, there's al also a time trend, right? In general, you see it jut up and down a little bit based on gas prices and kind of economic anxiety. It dropped a lot during Liberation Day. Was that April 2025 concern about tariffs? Um,

但这是一个相当稳定的下滑,我认为人们在某种程度上从特朗普的第一任期中吸取了错误的教训,对吧?当选民觉得经济良好——客观上在他前三年确实相当不错——这就像是一个光环,允许你面对“民主党整天抱怨民主这样那样、种族、排外情绪等等”时反驳说:“但你工资单上的钱变多了,你有份好工作,股市在涨,你的房子在升值,对吧?”而现在人们对所有这些都产生了怀疑,这让那些文化战争的事情显得有些绝望和愚蠢。

此外还有审美疲劳。特朗普喜欢说这是他的第三个任期,但感觉确实如此。自2015年年中以来,他一直是美国政治的核心人物。这真是很长的一段时间。他也已经80岁了,埃兹拉,你和我都很早就指出拜登太老了。我不知道你是否不得不收敛那一立场。但拜登也是在任期的这个大致时间点开始出现更多问题的。

我们已经提到了这两件也许不难解释的事情:但为什么要对伊朗开战?为什么特朗普在数据中心问题上采取了这种非常不受欢迎的立场?这本该是一个民粹主义者顺理成章进行适度煽动的好议题,对吧?现在针对数据中心大约是一个80比20的反对比例。当你问人们希望AI加速还是放缓时,大约只有3%支持加速,大约60%支持放缓,还有30%不确定。

英文原文 >> but it's been a pretty steady decline and I think people kind of learned some incorrect lessons from the first Trump term, right? um when voters felt like the economy was good and objectively it was pretty good in the first three years of Trump. That just kind of serves as like a a halo that allows you to say, "Oh, Democrats are complaining about democracy this and democracy that and and race and xenophobia and whatever else, right? But you got more money in your paycheck. You have a good job. The stock market's up. Your house is appreciating in value, right?" And now that people question all those things, it makes the culture war stuff seem kind of desperate and silly.

also just kind of fatigue. Um, you know, Trump likes to say it's his third term, but it kind of feels that way. He's been the dominant figure in American politics since whatever mid 2015. That's a that's a really long time. He's also um 80 years old, you know, like you, Ezra, you and I were both kind of early on that Biden is too old. I don't know if you have to censor that bandwagon. Um, but Biden began to develop more problems at roughly this point in his presidency, you know, and it's like, okay, you we've already mentioned the two things that are maybe not hard to explain, but like why the war with Iran and then why is Trump taking this very unpopular stance on data centers, which feels like kind of the perfect issue for a populist to do some mild demagoguing in the other direction, right? like data centers are like a a 8020 issue against data centers now roughly. And when you ask people do you want to have LA AI accelerate or slow down. It's like 3% for accelerate and like 60% for slow down and 30% are not sure or whatever.

我能给出两个原因,一个实质性的和一个不那么实质性的。实质性的原因是,我认为他确实被说服了,相信我们在与中国进行一场军事、地缘政治和经济竞赛。正如他喜欢说的,“谁赢得AI,谁就赢得一切”。另一个原因是,如果AI热潮有什么风吹草动改变了市场情绪,那么特朗普手中唯一看起来向好的经济指标——也就是股市,

英文原文 >> Well, I I could give two, you know, I give a substantive and a less substantive reason for Trump. I mean, one is that I think he actually is persuaded we're in a military and geopolitical and economic race with China. I mean, as he likes to say, whoever wins AI wins. And the other is that if the AI boom, if something shifts sentiment, then the one economic indicator Trump has that is looking good for him, which is uh the stock market.

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

就会崩盘。

到那时他就一无所有了,对吧?接着你将面对高利率、糟糕的债务、疲软的增长、疲软的股市,而所有资金蜂拥投入的那个领域可能不再起效了。

此外——我认为在这里不是小事——一帮AI高管给唐纳德·特朗普捐赠了大量资金,埃隆·马斯克个人(我也想谈谈这个)目前正在以一己之力资助共和党的中期竞选活动,对吧?他投进去了多少?数亿美元,

英文原文 >> Collapses.

And then he's got nothing, right? Then you've got high interest rates, you've got terrible debt, you've got, you know, anemic growth, you've got a weak stock market. And like the thing where all the investment was going is no longer maybe working out.

And also, and I think it's not nothing here, a bunch of AI execs have donated a ton of money to Donald Trump and Elon Musk personally, and I want to talk about this too, is like individually financing at this point the Republican midterm campaign, right? Like I mean, what's he put in? It's hundreds of millions of dollars

大概4亿多美元。

英文原文 >> for like 400 some million.

是的。我们甚至很难知道我们是否摸清了全部投入的底细。因此,他可能也不想疏远他的科技界选民群体。

英文原文 >> Yeah. And it's hard even to know if we know everything that's gone in. And so, you know, he may also not want to like alienate his tech, right? Um, you know, even tech center constituency.

我认为这占很大比重。我不是懂特朗普心思的人,但唯一能持续激励他的似乎就是他不喜欢看到股票行情显示屏上的红色箭头。而且你看到投资者对AI泡沫的焦虑在增加,那种论调变得越来越复杂,就像“我们如何在没有测试过的仪表指引下,把这架飞机降落在这条狭窄的跑道上?”在过去一两周里,中东的石油价格再次大幅上涨。如果最后一刻出现什么意外,【笑声】最显而易见的意外就是某种市场崩盘,那将可能进一步打击特朗普。情况可能还会恶化得多。

英文原文 >> I think that's a lot of it. I think I think, you know, I'm not a I'm not a Trump whisperer, right? It does seem like the one thing that consistently motivates him is that he doesn't like seeing red arrows on the stock market ticker. Um, and you know, you've seen increasing amounts of investor anxiety about about maybe not I think the AI bubble argument is getting more sophisticated, right? It's like [sighs] how can we land this plane without instrumentation we've tested before and this kind of narrow strip of runway, right?

You know, you've also had just in the past week or two, you've had oil prices increase sharply again in the Middle East. I don't know. I mean, if there were to be a last week surprise, [laughter] the most obvious surprise would be some kind of market downturn that would kind of further hurt Trump potentially. Things can break a lot more.

你几分钟前引用了2006年小布什的类比。你谈到了布什作为超级跛脚鸭,但在你说这话时,我想到了布什任期的最后两年发生了极其重大的动荡,最终以全球金融崩溃收尾。看着特朗普、看着经济、看着地缘政治局势,我看到的是处处充斥的风险。如果你告诉我未来几年我们会遭遇严重衰退、股市回调或连锁金融危机,我会觉得这完全合理。

如果你告诉我俄乌、美伊、以伊或波斯湾国家的某些事态组合会比现在更加失控,我觉得完全合乎情理。某种失控的AI行为攻击了……美国AI机群攻击了中国,或者中国AI机群攻击了美国。世界对我来说充满了风险。我们见识过那样的跛脚鸭总统,事情在他们面前炸开,而他们几乎没有权力和公众信誉去处理。

英文原文 >> I mean, this is you were using the Bush 06 analogy a few minutes ago. You know, you talked about sort of Bush as a super lame duck and one and I was thinking as you said that though that the final two years of Bush's term were tremendously eventful um leading up to a global financial meltdown at the end of it. And yeah, I look at Trump and I look at the economy and I look at the geopolitical situation and what I see is risk everywhere. Right? If you told me we were going to have like a massive recession or stock market correction or correlated financial crisis, you know, next few years, I'd say, "Yeah, that totally tracks to me."

If you were to tell me some like Russia Ukraine or Iran America or Israel, Iran or some combination of things like Gulf State like that it like flies even more out of control than it already is. Like that would seem totally plausible to me. some kind of rogue AI behavior. Yeah. That attacks like, you know, an American AI swarm attacks China or a Chinese AI swarm attacks America. Like the world feels full of risk to me. And like we've seen, you know, lame duck presidents like that. Like really things begin to like blow up in their face and they have very little power or public credibility to then handle it.

而且在任期结束时他也将年满82岁。在某种程度上,特朗普在第一个白宫任期的前三年非常幸运,字面或象征意义上都没有发生灾难。不像拜登那样,乌克兰战事是在拜登任内爆发的,加沙冲突是在拜登任内发生的。

如果共和党丢掉参议院,首先应该被归咎的人之一可能就是皮特·赫格塞斯(Pete Hegseth)。我想没有多少担任国防部长的人会认为,带着如此模糊的作战计划和目标与伊朗开战是一个明智的主意。

英文原文 >> And he'll be 82 years old by by the end of the term, too. Um, look, in some ways, Trump was pretty lucky in the first three years of his first term in the White House that kind of not nothing kind of literally or figuratively blew up, right? It wasn't like Biden where Ukraine happened under Biden's watch and Gaza happened under Biden's watch, right?

You know, if Republicans lose the Senate, probably one of the first people that should be blamed is Pete Pegsith, I think. Right. Um, I don't think there are very many people who would serve a secretary of defense that would have thought that going to war with Iran with this very ambiguous war plan and very ambiguous goals was a was a smart idea.

但因果关系是相反的。我不是说你表达了相反的意思,但唐纳德·特朗普和本雅明·内塔尼亚胡想在伊朗开战,而特朗普任命了《福克斯与朋友们》的撰稿人皮特·赫格塞斯担任国防部长,就是因为他想要一个在任何情况下都绝不会对他说“不”的人坐在那个位置上。我认为赫格塞斯在中期选举后或某个时间点极有可能很快被撤换。但他绝不可能被一个有个人威望敢对特朗普说“不”的深思熟虑的将领所取代。他们不会召回吉姆·马蒂斯(Jim Mattis)。你在关税问题上也看到了这一点,高盛总裁、特朗普第一任期的国家经济委员会(NEC)主任加里·科恩(Gary Cohn)是绝不会主持这一套关税体制的,他根本不会这么做。特朗普和他的团队上台就是要确保身边全都是唯唯诺诺的人。

如果股市因为AI尚未准备好、或者因为太危险而崩盘,或者如果我们最终与中国陷入对抗,这一切会变成什么样?可能出错的事情不仅在于地缘政治,更在于会以灾难性的方式传导至经济领域,加剧疯狂的市场崩溃。更不用说,如果特朗普在最后两年真正被逼入绝境,可能会采取你在扑克术语中所说的“上头”(high tilt)策略,加上年纪变老且身边全都是皮特·赫格塞斯之流。

英文原文 >> But but it's the other way around. I'm not saying you're saying anything different here, but Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to go to war in Iran. And Donald Trump had named Pete Hegsth a Fox and Friends correspondent to be defense secretary because he wanted somebody in that position who would never under any circumstance say no to him. Like I think it's very likely he pretty quickly gets the axe after the midterms or at some point. But he's very unlikely to be replaced by a like a thoughtful commanding general who has the personal stature to say no to Donald Trump. Right? It's not going to be they're not going to bring back Jim Mattis and that has I mean you've seen this on tariffs right Gary Conn the um Goldman Sachs head who is the NEC director national economics council in Trump's first term would not have presided over this tariffs regime he just would not have Trump and his team wanted to come in and make sure Trump would be surrounded by people who always said yes.

um what does this all look like if the stock market goes into freef fall because it turns out AI isn't not ready for prime time because it's actually too dangerous or you know what if we do end up in confrontation with China like the number of things that could go wrong and not just go wrong geopolitically but in a way that would then correlate into the economy in like a catastrophic fashion potentiating some crazy meltdown to say nothing of like the way Trump might act if he's really cornered in the last two years and begin like going into like high tilt strategies to use one of your poker turns and Trump older and surrounded by Pete Hegaths.

金钱政治、直觉预期与终极预测

是的。说实话这让我感到焦虑。单是AI这件事就让我焦虑(这是另一期播客的内容了)。未来的3到5年后可能会完全不同。中年人总想着“我可以继续做现在的事情,再干个20或30年然后退休”,而现在变成了“天知道会发生什么”。但当面临几十年来最重要的技术进步时,一个82岁的唐纳德·特朗普坐在掌舵的位置上,绝不是最理想的总统人选。

马斯克的大笔砸钱起作用吗?在竞选后期金钱到底重不重要?

英文原文 >> Yeah. Um it makes me anxious to to be honest, right? I mean I the AI thing alone, this is a different episode, right? Probably makes me anxious. We're just like, okay, the future could look very different um 5 years from now, 3 years from now, right? Um, if you're in middle age, right, you want to kind of think, oh, I can keep doing what I'm doing, do it for another 20 or 30 years, and then whatever, retire. And now it's like, oh, who the knows what's gonna, you know? But like, but Trump is not the ideal president to have [laughter] at the helm when you're on the verge of I don't think we're necessarily on the verge of a singularity, right? But like with perhaps the most important technological advancement in in decades, to put it modestly, right? I'm not sure that's the person that you'd want to have in charge as an 82-y old Donald Trump.

Does the Musk money dump matter? Does money in general matter this late in the election?

我认为在政治中金钱的作用通常被高估了。但我需要做个限定:在任何引人瞩目的竞选中——参议员、州长,当然还有总统——边际收益是递减的;但如果你观察众议院地图边缘那些知名度和曝光度是硬伤的选区,或者州议会竞选,金钱就非常重要,尤其是现在州议员和州长关系到每两年一次的选区重划。

另一件事是,当你用选民捐赠的小额资金购买广告时费率更优惠,而且提前筹到钱在竞争没那么激烈时锁定广告位费率也会更好。你听说了共和党的资金优势,因为那主要是企业资金和政党资金,转换成选民实际看到的广告曝光量,可能更接近50比50。

英文原文 >> I think money is generally overrated in politics. I qualify that by saying for any high-profile race, so Senate, governor, um certainly president, where you encounter diminishing returns, if you were to look at the frontier of like the House map where maybe name recognition, and visibility is an issue. If you were to look at like state legislatores, those are really important, especially now that state legislators and governors play into the now apparently every two years redistricting that we have.

The other thing too is that like when you are um buying ads with voter donated money, you get better rates and also you get better rates if you have that money raised earlier and and lock that in when it's less competitive, right? So you hear about the Republican financial advantage. Um because that's primarily corporate money and party money. Um it's probably translating to more like 50/50 in terms of actual ad impressions that voters are seeing.

就在2024年大选前夕,你发表了一篇文章,如果我记错了细节你可以纠正我,你大意是说:“我的模型显示卡玛拉·哈里斯会赢,”

英文原文 >> Right before the 2024 election, you published a piece, you can correct me if I'm wrong about some part of this where you basically said, "My model says Kla Harris is going to win."

是的。

英文原文 >> Yeah.

“而我的直觉告诉我唐纳德·特朗普会赢。”

英文原文 >> And my gut says Donald Trump is going to win.

没错。我认为你是在选前公开记录了这个判断。今年你的直觉和你的模型有任何分歧吗?

英文原文 >> Right. I think you did this pre-election. Yeah. This a pre-registered take. Yeah. Do you is your gut in any way different than your model this year?

我在那篇文章中谈到的是,如果共和党人再次在中西部战胜民调,对于民调机构、预测人员、评论员等整个行业来说将是更加尴尬的。因此在情感上我感到有必要对此进行对冲。是的,我对堪萨斯、爱荷华以及那一梯队的州持有一点怀疑态度。

但不同之处在于,在2024年,我列出了大约21个政治环境有利于唐纳德·特朗普的原因;为了保持公平我也想列出有利于哈里斯的原因,但我只能勉强想出四五个。而今年情况完全反过来了。基本面条件对共和党来说感觉非常糟糕:一个80岁的第二任期总统,在他更年轻、更受欢迎、2018年经济被认为更好的时候就经历过惨淡的中期选举;而现在面临着伊朗问题、4.5美元的油价、杰弗里·爱泼斯坦丑闻、白宫的腐败指控,以及民主党强大的候选人阵容。在某些方面,你会想象今年对共和党来说是比2018年更糟糕的一年。如果真是这样,那就意味着民主党将在众议院普选票上大赢10到11个百分点左右。所以我的直觉非常矛盾:相比于全国选情被错误校准,我更担心各州的民调出现错误。

英文原文 >> Well, what I talked about in that piece is that like it would be more embarrassing for the industry, meaning pollsters, forecasters, pundits, whatever, etc., if once again, Republicans beat their polls in the Midwest, right? So, like emotionally, I feel some need to hedge against that. And yeah, I'm a little skeptical of of Kansas maybe and Iowa and that tier of states.

What's different though is that like so in 24 um I had an exercise where I'm like here are I think it became like a list of like 21 reasons why the political environment favored Donald Trump. And I'm like I'm going to do one to be fair for why it favors Harris. But I could like only come up with like four or five things. Right? This here that's the reverse. The fundamental conditions feel terrible for Republicans, right? You have the secondterm 80-year-old president who had a bad midterm when he was younger and more popular and the economy was perceived as better in 2018. Um, and now you have Iran, you have 450 gas, you have Jeffrey Epstein, right? Um, you have corruption in in the White House, you have the strong batch of Democratic candidates.

You know, in some ways it's um you'd imagine that it would be a worse year for Republicans in 2018, right? And if that's true, that means like Democrats win the popular vote by the House by for by for by by like 10 or 11 points or something. And so my my my guts really contradictory, right? I worry more about the state polls being wrong than the national race being being miscalibrated.

嘉宾赠书推荐

我觉得这是个很好的结尾之处。照例是最后一个问题:你向听众推荐哪三本书?

英文原文 >> I think that's a good place to end. Always a final question. What are three books you recommend to the audience?

好的。埃兹拉,这挺难的,因为我是节目的忠实听众,我推荐的一些书已经被其他人……

英文原文 >> Okay. Esther, this is tough because I'm a frequent listener of the show and some of my recommendations have been taken by other

不,那挺好的。我觉得有重复推荐时听众会更加重视。

英文原文 >> No, that's good. I feel like the audience takes it more seriously when there are uh repeat recommendations.

那么我挑了三本稍微冷门的。

第一本是经济史学家罗伯特·戈登(Robert Gordon)在2016年写的《美国增长的起落》(The Rise and Fall of American Growth)。我记得我读这本书是在巴黎参加扑克锦标赛的时候,像往常一样。巴黎是如此永恒,而与此同时,那周恰逢美国与伊朗开战,美国国防部和Anthropic公司爆发了激烈争吵,一切都让人感到躁动。

英文原文 >> Well, I picked three slightly weird ones. So, um the first one is um The Rise and Fall of American Growth by the economic historian Robert Gordon. It was written in 2016. Um I remember kind of reading this book when I was um in Paris at a poker tournament in Paris as one does, right? Um, and like Paris is so timeless. And meanwhile, this was like the week when the US went to war with Iran. It was the week when the Department of Defense and Anthropic got in a big fight. Things just felt like they were excited.

这本书是你最近读的。

英文原文 >> You read this book recently.

是我最近读的。巴黎的永恒感与AI等技术的加速发展之间的对照,让我开始思考经济史。戈登的书谈到了几件事:第一,如书名所示的核心论点是,美国的巨大增长收益实际上大致发生在1870年至1970年之间;第二,这也是一个提醒——因为AI乐观主义的论调往往是“工业革命最终结果很好,让人们活得更长、更富有”——但在很多年里,工业革命给人们造成了极其可怕的生活条件,那是狄更斯笔下的世界、充斥着童工。我印象最深的画面是他讲述美国街道上曾经有成堆的马粪,而且没有室内下水道。

所以这是一本非常详尽、引人入胜的书,不是那种沙滩消遣读物,但极具说服力地讲述了所有这些无法用GDP充分衡量的巨大变迁。我把这与我的法国之行联系起来:欧洲可以说选择了较低的GDP增长,但拥有更高的生活质量。虽然本周谈论法国可能不是最好的时机,但依然如此。

第二本书是凯特·霍尔(Cate Hall)写的《你可以直接放手去做》(You Can Just Do Things)。凯特曾是一名扑克玩家,算是一个同行同路人。她曾一度是世界上排名最高的女性扑克玩家。后来她染上了毒瘾,从公众视野中消失了几年,但现在她回到了湾区工作圈子。这是一本写给特定类型极客的自助类书籍,强调了自主能动性(agency)的重要性;其中很大一部分实际上是关于如何更好地处理人际关系,以及人们有时因为觉得尴尬而在沟通基本目标、需求和渴望方面表现得多么糟糕。她的观点是:坦诚地与人交流,获取诚实的反馈,这将在人生中发挥巨大的作用。所以我也推荐这本书。

最后一本也是一本老而弥坚的佳作。我平时读很多扑克策略书,但大概不适合在埃兹拉·克莱恩的节目里推荐。有史以来最好的扑克相关书籍大概是阿尔·阿尔瓦雷斯(Al Alvarez)在1983年撰写的《城中最大的赌局》(The Biggest Game in Town)。这是一本篇幅不长、紧凑好读的书。作者是一位英国文学评论家兼诗人,在世界扑克大赛(WSOP)刚刚兴起时深入拉斯维加斯的沙漠,探访了所有那些老派的得克萨斯公路赌场赌徒。文笔非常好,带有一种轻微的、杂志特稿般的华丽风格,但这部分领域对我意义重大。它是少数没有落入俗套、且极好地捕捉到了令我着迷的这个世界的赌博题材书籍。

英文原文 >> I read it recently. Yeah. Yeah. Um, and the kind of justosition between like the timelessness of Paris and um this acceleration to AI and other things got me kind of like thinking a little bit about like economic history and like and but anyway, Gordon's book talks about a couple of things. one the thesis which is implied by the title is that actually the huge gains that the United States made came between like roughly 1870 and 1970 it's also a reminder that like the um the industrial revolution because this is kind of what the AI optimistic case is right well the industrial revolution worked out okay and wound up making people live longer and wealthier right for many years the industrial revolution produced terrible living conditions for for people right where you had like you know dickens and you had like child labor. You know, the most vivid image I have is he talks about like how much like horse manure there was on American streets, right? And you didn't have like indoor plumbing.

And so, um, so it's a fascinating book. It's very detailed. It's not like a beach read. Um, but, um, but very compelling about all these massive changes that aren't well measured by GDP. And then I tie that to my France thing because it's like Europe has kind of opted for lower GDP growth, but arguably um, higher quality of life. Maybe in the best time talking about France this week, but still.

Um, book number two is called You Can Just Do Things by Kate Hall. Kate is a former poker player and kind of a fellow traveler. Um, she was at one point the highest ranked um, uh, women poker player, female player in the world. She developed um, a a drug addiction and kind of dropped off the map for a couple of years. um but is now back to working in in the Bay Area scene. And it's kind of a self-help book for a certain type of of nerd that emphasizes the importance of of agency, but a lot of it really is about like how to handle personal relationships better and how poor people are at at communicating sometimes basic goals and needs and wants and relationships because they think it might feel weird or whatever else. But like she's like, "Look, just have honest conversations with people, get honest feedback, and that will that will go a long way in life." So, I recommend that book, too.

Um, last one is another oldie but goodie. Um, there is not. So, I read a lot of like poker strategy books, like probably not appropriate for the Esper Klein show for recommendations. Probably the best poker related book of all time is called The Biggest Game in Town. It was written by a guy named Al Alvarez in 1983. It's a it's a short, compact read. So he was like a British literary critic and poet who did this thing where he kind of like went into the desert in Las Vegas when the World Series of Poker is coming into being and talks to like all these oldtime like Texas Roadhouse gamblers. It's very well written, a very maybe slightly overwritten, like kind of magaziney way, but like this part of the world's important to me, right? And it's one of the few books about gambling that doesn't fall into cliches and captures this part of the world that I'm fascinated by very well.

那本书听起来棒极了。内特·银,非常感谢你。

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嘿,嘿,嘿。

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英文原文 >> That that book sounds great. Uh Nate Silver, thank you very Thank you.

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Hey, hey, hey.

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