Minister, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor and a privilege for me to welcome you to Norisbank Climate Conference 2025, both those of you present here today and those of you who are following the conference online. And as the central bank and NBIM are co-hosting this event, it is a pleasure to share the stage with you Nikolai.

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Its consequences are far and wide, threatening biodiversity, damaging homes and infrastructure, and putting health and lives at risk. And the science is clear. Global warming is caused by human activity and global temperatures continue to rise. 2024 was the hottest year on record.

But in a time of global uncertainty, it is easy to lose focus on the climate crisis. And yet, addressing it remains an urgent task. This year marks 10 years since the Paris Agreement was signed, aiming to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels.

However, even if the world manages to limit global warming, the impacts of past greenhouse gas emissions on the climate will remain with us for years to come. And neither the central bank nor the NBIM can ignore this fact.

No, that's right. So let me start with a question. How many of you have been to Rome? That's pretty good. Well then you may have seen this sculpture. It's the capital line wolf and is one of the most famous sculptures in Rome. Now it depicts two twins Romelus and Remis who according to the myth later went on to found the city and they survived by circling on the shewolf and she became their mother earth so to say. So where am I taking this?

Well, second question. How many of you have been to the cosmopolitan city of Lilism? That's good. Here you may find this sculpture by contemporary artist Eric Palt, the capital wolf, too. Now, what happened to Romelus and Remos? Quite greedy, aren't they?

And I kind of think this is visualizing what's going on just now. If the way we live day-to-day is not sustainable in the long run, this is what's going to happen. Economics and finance are dependent on a sustainable world. Climate affects the economy and so therefore climate risk is a financial risk. And while being wellfed in the short term is a good thing in the long run it all needs to be sustainable and we are all in it for the long run.

Absolutely Nicolai. Now the responsibility for reducing emissions rests with political authorities who also have the most effective instruments. But climate change and the climate transition affect the economy and therefore it also affects the work of the central bank.

A decade ago, the then governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, gave a speech titled Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon: Climate Change and Financial Stability. With that speech, he ushered us into a new era. Central banks started taking the effects of climate change more seriously and the network for greening the financial system was launched in 2017 by central banks and financial supervisors with the idea that we can approve our analysis by working together and sharing experiences.

Now central banks are mandated to ensure price stability and financial stability. Climate change can affect both. More frequent and more severe weather events can lead to increased inflation volatility and make it harder to achieve price stability. For example, the rapid rise in food and beverage prices in Norway over the past year can in part be traced back to a sharp increase in the prices of cocoa and coffee and further back to drafts in Brazil and heat waves in West Africa.

Ensuring financial stability could also become more demanding. Banks and insurance companies may experience greater losses both from the restructuring of the business sector resulting from the energy transition but also from the fact that extreme weather can destroy both crops and buildings. So inspire strategy gaining a better understanding of the effects of climate change on the Norwegian economy has been a priority. We are learning more every day but still do not have any definite answers. So climate change is affecting the work of the central bank but it's also affecting the work you do Nikolai.

Absolutely. So our fund uh our goal is to generate returns in financial markets not for ourselves but for gen for Norwegians now and future generations. We invest for the long term. We're invested in 9,000 companies across 70 countries and we own roughly one and a half% of all the listed equities in the world. Now when you own the whole world, what happens in one part of the world impacts the rest of it. What happens with one company is captured by all the other companies. That is why climate change impacts us.

Climate risk is long-term, systematic and very uncertain. But mitigating and adapting to climate change also create economic opportunities. And our goal is to capture those opportunities. We worked on climate change for nearly 20 years to understand the effects on our portfolio.

Three years ago, we launched the 2025 climate action plan with a very bold ambition to be the world leading in this area. Because if you have really high ambitions, you achieve great things even if you fall sh slightly short. If you have low ambitions, you achieve nearly nothing even if you succeed.

This decade is crucial for achieving an orderly climate transition. It's complex and there will be winners and losers. Some high emitting companies will decline and perhaps disappear while others will transform and grow. And OA goal is to drive our companies towards net zero emissions by 2050. And this target guides all our work.

Now, are we succeeding? Well, this is a marathon and not a sprint. And even as large investors, we need the help from the rest of you. We engage with companies with standard setters because we believe that climate risk is a financial risk and managing it is good for business. Our current plan ends this year, but tomorrow we are launching the climate action plan 2030. But no spoilers now.

I was asked to set the stage for today's events. And if climate change was indeed a stage play and not hardcore reality, the point we're at would be a very dramatic one. It would be one of the points in the play where we really rack up the tension, where the audience really feels that something is going on and the actors of the play haven't realized the seriousness yet.

We of course have been monitoring from the science side climate change for a long time and we still are. And this monitoring is revealing some dramatic facts that climate change itself currently seems to be changing. One of the changes is that the human impacts or so the impacts of human induced climate change are becoming clearer to us year-by-year. Not just because we're looking harder, but because we're feeling them more acutely.

For a long time, climate change has been real and dramatic, but still its changes have been on par with ve weather variations. This is no longer the case as is evident from all the natural disasters natural disasters that are fueled by climate change that we keep seeing year-by-year.

We can take examples the 2022 flood in Pakistan which was started by a heat wave made worse by climate change. Then came the monsoon season which was also more intense by climate change made more intense by climate change and the combination of these two led to about a tenth of the country falling underwater with long-term consequences. You do not clean up something like that overnight. 2023 we had the historically strong fires of Canada with local effects but also with long ranging effects across the Arctic. And this fire is only one of many examples of fires in the Arctic. The Arctic is burning.

2024 we had the unprecedented floods in Valencia with their catastrophic impacts. One of the reasons that the impacts of the Valencia flood became as bad as they were is that the local authorities did not really believe it could get that bad until it was too late. The same story unfortunately was repeated in 2025 in Texas. But I'll take another example which hasn't reached at least the Norwegian news as quite as much and that is a series of glacier collapses in Nepal and surrounding regions with ensuing floods and massive massive damages.

All these are but examples of na events with major consequences that we now know have been made worse, more intense and more frequent by by climate change. This is where science takes us. This is an example of an overview from the grouping, the UK grouping called World Weather Attribution, which routinely tracks all these major events, picks out the most damaging ones and checks what does science say about this particular event. And everywhere you see a red dot, there was a catastrophic damaging event in 2024 that was made worse by climate change. Everywhere you see a blue dot, there was an event that was made less likely by climate change. And those of you with sharp eyes will see that one of the few blue dots is here where we're standing. That was a cold winter. So those of you who remember the cold winter of early 24, remember that one because you will be seeing less of it.

But the real drama is not necessarily the extreme events themselves. We are learning about those. We are learning to adapt to them. The drama lies behind because what is driving these extreme events is of course global warming. The fact that the earth is getting warmer, the surface is getting warmer, the climate is getting more extreme, there is more precipitation. So the question becomes what is happening to global warming? Maybe the most important graph of this century is this one. This is global warming from 1850 until today. It's probably the one graph you've seen.

This constant evolution has been steady enough that when the IPCC made its one and a half degree report in 2028, their assessment of when we would hit 1.5 degrees was made just by drawing a straight line which was well justified. However, since 2018 and somewhat before, global warming has been speeding up. And if you're honest from the natural science side, we do not fully know why.

So one thing that has got a lot of attention was the fact that in 2020 um something really positive happened that the international maritime organization mandated that sulfur should no longer be a part of shipping fuels. That is excellent. But it also means that um the sulfur or the process that happens after you emit sulfur stopped. What is this process? Not something you usually think about. Well, it's chemistry in the atmosphere. You emit sulfur. It gets up in the atmosphere and it forms particles and these small particles reflect sunlight. So, the shipping fuel contributed to cooling the Earth somewhat, a little bit. This particular change has gotten a lot of attention. We now believe it is not the major contributor to the fact that the last few years have been very warm, but it still gets a lot of attention and we still need to focus on it.

Something else that has happened though over about the same time scale is that the same has actually happened in China. Air pollution is a major concern across the world and in all industrial regions. Many industrial regions have worked hard to remove air pollution and have gotten far uh in the uh Europe in Europe and in the US there isn't all that much air pollution left. However, in Asia, in particular in South and East Asia, there has for many decades been a strong growth in air pollution. That air pollution has also been cooling the earth. So, we've had quite strong cooling from our own pollution. Now, China about 10-15 years ago decided to do something about this. And when China decides to do something, they are efficient. So, they really succeeded. So about 80% of the sulfur from Chinese coal fire power plants and other factories and road traffic has disappeared over this time scale. So it shows that or we we we've been able to show we and other scientists that this has actually contributed to speeding up global warming over the last 10 to 15 years.

Now that's of course a little bit dramatic because you remove one negative effect and you get another. On the other hand, it also means that this was a temporary growth in the speed of global warming. That is potentially positive. However, there are other things happening now that we've warmed the earth, of course, or we are warming the earth. The earth is responding. One of these things I showed you already. It is the fires in the Arctic.

Another feedback that rarely crosses our minds is what's going on far out in the Pacific. I'm willing to bet that nobody here pays much attention to the goings on in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. However, we we scientists do and we're seeing changes in the cloud cover over the Pacific, most likely in response to the world warming.

But of course the main effect is the fact that we are still setting records in CO2 emissions every year. This is and will continue to be the main cause of warming. Let us not change this fact or or um get away from from this fact. And the more we warm the earth, the more questions appear because we do not know what will happen to the earth as it warms. We have never performed this experiment before. We are in unknown territory as I know we will hear more about later on today.

Of course, however, we are able to give projections and the most important projection now is that regardless of our emission changes today, we are still looking at several decades of rapid global warming. That is a depressing message, but it is an important message. is however not the only message. What happens after that is significantly impacted by our decisions today. So do not think that our decisions do not matter. It's just that they matter in the longer term.

So with climate change progressing rapidly, the most important message we have now except cut emissions as rapidly as we can is that whatever we plan, be it industrial, be it societal, be it for your own family, we must plan for a climate that is much warmer, much wetter, and much wilder than today. because that is what we will get regardless. If we do this, we can adapt.

The point is we need to cut emissions but at the same time we need to plan for a future with a wilder climate because climate change is getting stronger. It will become stronger and it is not going away. Thank you.

I want to talk to you about how we think about what the macroeconomic implications of these dramatic changes to the planet might mean. So here's a graph where on the top you see countries sort of positioned based on where their temperatures might be in the future and where their distribution of historical temperatures have been in the past. And so what you can do with this graph is you can make vertical comparisons and see for example that in the future we expect the temperature of Norway to look more analogous to what we see in Germany today. We also expect in the future Indonesia will look more like Sudan. And then quite importantly, we expect that Sudan will look like nothing we've ever seen before. So how do we understand what this shift, seemingly simple shift in the distribution might mean for the global economy?

So the thing I would love to do is the sort of science fair version of the experiment where I take two planets and I heat up one of them and I look after the fact to understand what the economies of the two look like. That's obviously a difficult experiment to run. So what we do instead is something that's like a natural experiment, a quasi experiment where we follow populations over time and as they experience different climates, we observe what their economy does in response.

So people before we had done this type of analysis had had different theories about how countries might respond to these types of extreme disasters. So here on the x-axis you see time and on the y- axis is sort of GDP. So the top line here is labeled sort of a creative destruction idea. It's a theory that maybe these events kind of jostle society. They change the economy.

Another theory is this build back be better notion. Maybe we don't replenish the capital in the economy at the efficient rate and so a storm comes through it clears out some old capital. We rebuild and that's new capital that's better.

The third idea here is this recovery to trend. Maybe really what matters is the frontier of global technology. And so as the global frontier moves forward, countries will just catch up to that frontier over time. And the fourth hypothesis is that there's no recovery. Getting hit by a disaster like this is essentially the same as moving backwards in time for an economy. You destroy capital and we simply just have to rebuild it again.

When you look at thousands of storms around the world, what we see is that this no recovery hypothesis is actually what we see what occurs to most countries. So over the course of 20 years after a hurricane, we see that the economy declines relative to trend somewhat slowly and never recovers.

When we match those types of calculations to our estimates, what we think is that in the course of 12 hours, Puerto Rico basically reversed a quarter century of economic development. And sort of these projections which came out early on seem to have been borne out on the ground. One point we also make with this graph is that the scale of these disasters is comparable to other type of financial crises that we in this room often talk about maybe with a bit more attention.

when you aggregate the data is that the productivity over the overall macroeconomy follows this type of curve. Okay? And so what you have here is on the x-axis the average temperature of a country and on the y-axis output in of GDP. What we see is that as temperatures increase, productivity tends to increase. Sometimes it's actually a little flatter in some newer studies. And then at around 15 to 13 degrees Celsius, it peaks and then begins to decline. And the slope of the decline here is about one to one and a half percent per degree Celsius.

This curve, if you don't remember anything else from this talk, this curve probably after 15 years of research, I've decided that this curve probably has more to do with the structure of the future global economy than anything else we've looked at.

you can ask, are we adapting? You know, the world is like we have a lot of technology. It's very sophisticated. Have things changed? Are we figuring out how to cope with temperature more effectively? The answer is no. We find no evidence that the global economy is changing and how responsive it is to average temperatures. You can look over time and what we see today is the same thing we saw in the 60s.

You can also look around the world at different types of data sets. Whether you look at a very wealthy country like the United States, whether you look at China, rapidly developing, whether you look at India, Brazil, hundreds of household surveys done by the World Bank, we see essentially the same shape over and over again.

So we estimate that over the last several decades, we've already foregone several trillion dollars in income because of warming that has already occurred to date.

And if you were to impose climate change on these countries, what you see is a depression of growth rates. And the depression is larger for hotter countries because they're on that downward sloping side of that curve. uh if you were to roll that forward and ask what does that mean for what the structure of the global economy looks like in the future you over and over see maps that have this basic structure where throughout the tropics and the subtropics you have large economic impacts and then at higher latitudes you might have smaller impacts in some cases positive impacts.

So, first of all, when you add up global output and ask what are the implications for world GDP, we see a decline. And that there's a great deal of uncertainty, but it's to the tune of 20 to 40% of GDP depending on the different types of models people use.

The third point is that because the tropical regions and that subtropical regions that have the greatest impact on their macroeconomy are today also the poorer regions of the world. We generate graphs that look like this where the poorer two-thirds of the world are experiencing climate change with much more intensity, much greater macroeconomic impact. So that you have this divergence in the future that emerges as a result of warming.

And what we see is that for a substantial fraction of countries in Africa, the risk of persistent economic decline increases by roughly 25% due to sort of business as-usual scenarios. We think that this is a major risk and a lot of our new work is trying to focus on this type of question.

So to wrap up, I want to leave you with a few sort of straightforward take-home messages. The first is that the evidence is very clear that high temperatures and in tropical cyclones that I've shown you slow GDP growth. The effective temperature is highly nonlinear and this is very important for the structure of the global income distribution in the future. Historically we see no evidence of adaptation. And recent warming over the last several decades has already substantially slowed growth to the tune of tens of trillions of dollars worldwide.

By 2100, we project that every one degree of warming will lead to a reduction of global GDP by roughly 10%. That's sort of like a benchmark number you can hold in your mind. And we have real concerns now that sort of the coupling of macroeconomic decline and political instability could be really disastrous for certain economies in the world that are at particularly high risk.

Finally, the last point which I haven't talked too much about is that there's this idea of the social cost of carbon which is if we try to compute a single number that represents the overall economic harm to the global economy as a result of the emission of one ton of CO2, what would that number be? And based on these various new macroeconomic calculations and other work in the room here, uh, new estimates are suggesting that just through the channel of the effects on GDP, these costs amount to roughly 1,000 to 2,000 US per ton of CO2 with some substantial uncertainty.

So when I tell people that I'm working on a paper that is estimating the impacts of natural disasters on the Norwegian economy, the reaction that I often get is, "Oh, are there natural disasters in Norway? Uh especially from my friends from southern uh Europe, I get this reaction." So there seems to be this perception that Norway is pretty much shielded from the worst effects of climate change. Um, of course we know this is not true as shown by this image which was taken after extreme weather hands hit Norway.

So this is what we found. So these are uh in US dollars and deflated amounts. So we see that the payouts have increased enormously over the time. And if we think about the number of Norwegian municipalities that have been hit by especially strong uh events like this that has also increased over time. So we define strong events as those that cause that for which payouts insurance payouts are at least 5% of the local income. So that is uh that is a lot.

Now precisely because the insurance in Norway is universal people are going to be paid back for the direct damages of the extreme weather events. So what we are estimating and what I will show you the results are basically the indirect impacts of these extreme weather events um due to broader repercussions of the extreme weather on the Norwegian economy.

Now of course after the disaster we found that there was a sharp decrease in the income. So cumulatively the decrease was about $720 US. Um then we zoomed in a little bit closer on these data and we found that this result which is for income after taxes was basically driven by income uh from labor labor income.

Now the picture is similarly negative for wealth. So we we found that after the disaster, Norwegians that were affected by the by by the events, extreme events, saw a loss in their wealth in the two years after the disaster of about 13,000 US. We also found that this result comes from a decrease in the housing wealth of the Norwegians, which is most likely due to a drop in the housing prices in the local area.

And we see that the fall in consumption is um also notable and it's about twice as large as the fall in income. So 100461,460 US over the three years after the disaster. Okay. And this is probably an over an underestimate of the true impact of on consumption because at least one part of this consumption was used to repair and replace the assets that that were damaged and that were then reimbursed by the insurance company.

So the first one is that already today extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more costly even in Norway. The second main result is that well despite the fact that Norwegians are fortunate enough to be uh insured against the worst impacts of climate change about the direct impacts of of such extreme weather events. Affected households are seeing a strong and also persistent uh decline in their income, their wealth and their consumption. And finally, given the richness of the administrative data that we uh can access in Norway, we also could shed some light on the mechanisms that drive these decreases in the income and wealth and consumption of the affected households. And we saw that when firms so the local economy is particularly hit that is going to hit the individual's income and through possibly through uh housing prices consumption of Norwegians is going to fall.

Climate change is probably the defining problem of our time leading to devastating risks to our lives like livelihoods and also the global economy. As economists, we know how to solve the problem in principle, right? We have to put a price on carbon. In this way, we make emitters internalize the costs that are associated with producing emissions.

So based on our experience with like 20 plus years of EUS we have learned the following. So our national carbon pricing policies effective at reducing emissions. Yes we have seen that these current prices led to a substantial reduction in emissions. But when we look at the macroeconomic effects, we also saw that these come with uh non-negligible macroeconomic costs and these costs turn out to be unequally distributed across society with poorer households with younger households uh shouldering a larger a much larger share of the burden.

Um so I think this really shows that it's important to address the economic and distributional effects of these carbon pricing policies and we can do so. So in fact I I have some work that shows if you use targeted transfers so you target the households that are more affected by most affected by the policy you can mitigate both the aggregate effects of the policy and the economy and also the distributional impacts.

I want to start out with a traditional way of thinking about um climate policies. Uh namely that we typically we think about it as a free rider problem or economists would call it a prisoner dilemma game. Unless you think about ways to change the game to make it possible that we have an agreement among countries where emissions are cut. That is why this is a unique equilibrium of this game.

Another perspective is that we should think about it as a is a as a coordination game where we will have investments in green capital, renewably energy, abatement technologies if those investors anticipate that there will be a very ambitious environmental policy in the future making those investments profitable and more profitable than investing in alternative traditional sectors.

The problem is that we start here with a relatively much capital that is sunk in traditional sectors which are relatively much bullying on fossil fuel energy and because of that it's difficult for policy makers to introduce environmental policies and ambitious policies. So um so we might then be in what we call a green uh catch 22 that the world has not been able and that is part of the reason why the world has not been able to address climate change is because we are stuck in this brown trap.

more natural gas can replace coal and coal has a larger maybe approximately twice the carbon content of natural gas. And this effect seems to be most important in the short term because in the short term it's difficult to change the amount and the capacity to produce renewable energy. but when gas when more gas is anticipated when investors today think that in 20 30 years from now there will be more natural gas then investments in re renewables can fall and so in the long term gas can replace renewables instead of coal.

So so so that is why we call it the gas trap. The higher so so remember what we did we fixing everything else. If you look at a small change in one isolated thing namely the effect of climate change that will motivate if you cannot tie your hands if you are temp if you cannot commit that will motivate you to produce more fossil fuel that will because that will squeeze out coal but the anticipation of this is that renewables will fall and you can end up with more emissions.

the solutions is to pay attention to how you your important decisions will affect expectations because expectations are self-fulfilling in such a coordination game. If investors and other countries expect that the Paris agreement will fail, it will fail. If expectations change, investments will change.

So talking about uh challenges with regard to the energy transition for Norway, I could give you two narratives. One could be like compared to other oil producing countries, we are extremely well equipped. But I could also give you another narrative. A narrative which is a little bit more challenging. A narrative which is related to the fact that we are going to face a double challenge over petroleum resources are going to go down. At the same time as we as everybody else has to adapt to the climate change and on top of that I'm going to also talk about the fact that compared not to the oil producing countries but to other OCD countries we have put ourselves in a situation where we are world champion in using of resources public resources internally and I will take that second route in talking about the challenges this narrative because I think that's important.

despite the fact that we have saved a lot we have also used a lot and then we discussed that in Norway the typical argument is that yes we have used a lot but we were supposed to use a lot because we were facing in a lot over the But because the oil fund has grown so much, taking 3% out of the fund in spending has been a lot over the time.

and the minister of finance in their budget last week pointed out that in a few years we're going to see costs exceed revenues uh in the government sector and that means that maybe going forward the 3% from the fund will not be sufficient to finance that. So we have put ourselves in a situation where compared to other OCD countries we have already used a lot of the resources the we are already depending a lot on the income from the fund.

So what I'm going to uh show you here is uh two challenges which I think they're there and which uh I think are important to address going forward in particular if we are to uh adapt and uh reduce our dependence on oil to build other industry. The first is that despite having high productivity levels and higher growth rates in the 80s, 90s, early 20s than many countries, growth rates of productivity now are declining in Norway relative to other top OCD countries. Norway has a high labor supply, but we also have a high share um or so we have a high labor supply, but it has been stagnating and we also have we also work fewer hours than many OCD countries and most importantly we have an increase in share outside the labor force.

uh but I think that I want to end on an optimistic note. So I think that ended end of the transition is not just a matter of cost to Norwegian economy. It's a lot of opportunity as well. New industries, new patents, new um new firms, new growth rates, new partners, new new discussions, etc. But um we need as um Nicl Tang said this morning, we need u to have ambitions to achieve those goals. So brushing our challenges under the carpet is not something I do. Instead, put them up and discuss what to do about them.

In this new environment, many countries face an increasingly difficult tradeoff between three energy goals that I will call my energy trilmna. My team argues that I should not really use trilmna because in a trilmna you can't really escape and I'm going to try to show you that we can escape the trilmna. So what are the three angles of the trilmna? We need energy that is secure because the geopolitical reality has changed dramatically. We need energy that is sustainable because the climate reality has not changed or some would argue that it has changed for the worse. And we need energy that is affordable because households and corporates need it.

Ultimately only clean energy has the potential to deliver on all three goals of my trilmna. As Norway actually demonstrates the share of renewable in energy consumption here in this country ranks amongst the highest in the world. While household energy prices, I know highly debated on the subject of controversy during the political campaign, but remember they are still around 23 of the EU average.

The only viable path for Europe to achieve these objectives is to rely more on locally clean energy. This path could help meet the three goals of the trilmna. First, renewables alongside other clean technologies for producing electricity are central to any credible plan to reduce the impact of climate change. Second, renewables offer level of energy independence that given our lack of natural resources, Europe would never reach with imported fossil fuel. And third, as a marginal as the marginal cost of renewable electricity is close to zero, a system based largely on renewables should ultimately bring down energy prices.

And there are three reasons why I'm optimistic that Europe can overcome these challenges. First, while we cannot eliminate the cost associated with intermittency, we cannot control the weather. We can substantially reduce them if we push through with the investment in generation capacity, grids and storage. Second, infrastructure investment could be particularly effective in Europe owing to what? To our geographic diversity. Third element, the technology is moving in our favor.

So what is missing as usual? Money. How can we unlock the investment? But I think that we policy makers and I'm talking here about both fiscal authorities and monetary authorities. We must provide two things. First, the right environment for financing. So the missing link in our view is a proper functioning capital market. Deepening and integrating EU capital markets is critical to support the large-scale investments that we need.

Second policy makers need to create a predictable environment for investment. Investment will not step forward if the green transition is clouded by uncertainty. So we must reduce uncertainty where it is possible. So creating the right environment begins with well three elements again credibility, speed and confidence.

Well, there's no doubt that we're at a a critical moment in the global sustainability transition and it's always faced significant headwinds. But as uh uh President Lagarde has very eloquently said, those headwinds have become stronger and everybody knows it.

And the fossil fuel industry is significantly more efficient at capturing politicians than capturing emissions. Uh and as a result, they have used the accumulated political power to push back and to blunt the progress that the world needs very seriously. We are continuing to put 175 million tons of man-made global warming pollution into the troposphere every day.

One of the most hopeful and optimistic trends of the last few years, last year for example, if you look at all of the new electricity generation installed worldwide everywhere in the world, many are surprised to hear that the percentage represented by renewable energy was 93%. And the International Energy Agency has projected that in the years ahead, it's going to exceed 95% renewable energy.

However, there is an unequal malistribution of access to capital. There is what the economists call a home bias. And there is also a reluctance on the part of investors and lenders to commit to capital in uh infusions into developing countries where there is a noticeable risk of currency valuation on a sudden basis which might cause them to lose their money.

Take Africa for example. Africa has 60% of the prime solar energy potential of the entire world. But Africa has fewer solar panels installed than the single US state of Florida. That is a disgraceful commentary on the current system for the allocation of capital around the world.

So, despite the political difficulties of the moment, we cannot let the ambition for a better world wither away on our watch. So, let me close by citing Norway's celebrated playwright Henrik Ipsson. In The Master Builder and the quote castles in the air. They are so easy to take refuge in and so easy to build, too. But I'd like to remind us of another passage which to me demonstrates our collective task from Mandon. He wrote, "A thousand words can't make the mark. A single deed will leave."

The only thing some people think we have in short supply is political will. But please always remember that political will is itself a renewable resource. Thank you.

Yeah. So, let's start with the bad news. the tipping points, some of the tipping points in the climate system. And tipping one thing unfortunately tends to make tipping another more likely in the climate system.

So just last week we launched our global tipping points report 2025 and we're saying to the world for the first time we've crossed a climate tipping point. This is the one for widespread dieback of coral reefs in the tropics in warm warm waters. Why should I care? You might be thinking. Apart from this is a beautiful biodiverse ecosystem but it does support the livelihoods of an estimated more than 500 million people, many rich fisheries and of course coral reefs provide really important coastal protection in a world of rising sea levels and storm surges to all of the real estate behind the reefs around many coastlines of the tropics.

we can't rule out that both are actually close to or possibly past a a tipping point. making a commitment to a very large magnitude of long-term sea level rise. We also know now that the Amazon rainforest could be at risk both from the combined effects of global warming and of people continuing to deforest it at a lower level of warming than we thought before.

I just want to talk briefly about a couple of coupled tipping points in the Atlantic Ocean circulation which is kind of the Atlantic bit of this. Right. We know that this thing can be tipped off. It's switched on and off 25 times during the last ice age and the end of the last ice age. What happens if we tip the collapse of the Atlantic overturning circulation? Well, it happens in some of the state-of-the-art climate models at 2° C of global warming. It would make Northwest Europe less habitable. and could cause global food insecurity.

Which is why I spent a couple of years trying to convince myself and write a book here on positive tipping points about the evidence that in some sectors and in some markets we have seen a spectacular positive tipping points to clean technology and also some changes in behavior that we need.

Norway can be rightly proud of having led the world in a very abrupt transition in the market from one to the other. However, we need to be thinking about the global picture here and we got to remind ourselves again of amplifying feedbacks because whilst it took the policy support to tip the Norwegian market in a global sense, the more electric vehicles that uh get adopted and there they are, that's the total fleet worldwide growing exponentially with a doubling time of a year and a half. um the better and the cheaper they get.

Tim Lenton： 我们的建模表明，我们现在正处于一个不可避免的或正在引爆的时期，太阳能将成为本世纪中叶的主要电力来源。我们都可以同意，我们仍然需要加快速度。

Tim Lenton： 总结一下，现在满足《巴黎协定》以限制全球变暖的唯一途径，无论你如何定义“远低于2°C”，就是激活一些积极的引爆点，以加速我们需要的变革。但我试图向你们展示，在一些关键市场和行业，这已经发生了，而且我们对能够最有效地推动这些引爆点前提的政策和行动有所了解。

Laura Starks：气候信息在投资决策中的作用

Laura Starks： 在讨论这个问题之前，我认为我们必须思考动机，因为投资者采纳气候信息的动机各不相同，实际上可能差异很大。动机取决于投资者的视角。它可以是价值观视角，也可以是价值视角。价值观视角与非金钱、非财务因素有关，它关乎人们的价值观。而价值视角是我们思考投资者时的方式，他们做决策的依据是审视财务信息，思考利用气候信息所带来的风险和回报机会。

Laura Starks： 我们对全球439家大型机构投资者进行了调查，询问他们为何将气候风险信息纳入投资决策。我们发现他们的选择多种多样。我们可以将这些动机分为价值观视角和价值视角。价值视角包括：投资回报有益、降低整体投资组合风险、降低尾部风险。另一方面，价值观动机则关注：资产所有者的偏好是什么？这是否是一种道德伦理义务？

Laura Starks： 长期机构投资者应该是对他们所投资公司的环境、社会和治理（ESG）政策最感兴趣的群体。这张图显示，持有期最长的投资者确实持有ESG评分高的公司，而持有期短的投资者则不然，这种关系非常单调。

Laura Starks： 《巴黎协定》签署后发生了什么？监管风险预计会上升。我们研究了那些受碳排放影响最大的公司的债券价格变化和信用评级分析师的评级变化。我们发现，在《巴黎协定》之后，这些公司的信用评级大幅下降。

Laura Starks： 为了获取公司所需的气候信息，需要有充分的披露。我们询问投资者，他们认为气候风险披露与常规财务报告相比有多重要。79%的受访者认为它至少与财务报告同等重要。

Laura Starks： 强制性气候风险披露有两个目标。第一个目标通常被称为“单一重要性”，即获取信息以了解气候风险如何影响公司及其风险。第二个目标可称为“双重重要性”，即不仅要了解它如何影响公司及其风险，还要了解公司的行为如何影响社会和环境。

Laura Starks： 投资者利用气候信息与公司进行沟通，试图让公司在气候变化方面更加负责。我们发现，在我们调查的投资者中，84%的人通过各种方式与公司沟通，试图获取更多气候信息并促使他们更加负责。

Harrison Hong：气候投资的风险与回报

Harrison Hong： 我将从投资组合多元化的视角来探讨这个问题，并提出一个更广泛的问题。对于可再生能源、基于自然的解决方案和适应性资本这些不同类型的资产，我们认为它们的风险特征是什么？基本思想是，社会希望实现某种程度的投资组合多元化，风险越高的资产，你越不倾向于投资，或者反过来说，政府需要做更多的工作来财政支持，以激励社会采纳这些资产。

Harrison Hong： 我认为，克里斯蒂娜·拉加德的演讲恰到好处地指出了这一点。她花了很多时间谈论二阶效应，即风险。我认为这正是我们需要正视的核心问题，即可再生能源的二阶效应，这一点在很大程度上被忽视了。例如，德国曾出现历史性的风力不足，导致其大量可再生能源公司濒临破产。

Harrison Hong： 同样，对于基于自然的解决方案，比如森林，其资产的波动性历来要高得多。森林非常容易受到火灾的影响。你可能试图用一片森林来进行碳封存，但如果发生火灾，整个项目就付之一炬。所以，投资于大自然本身也带有其固有的风险。

Harrison Hong： 即使绿色资本与化石燃料具有相同的生产率，并且绿色资本本身带来的气候灾害较少，但仅仅因为多元化的需要，要实现100%的绿色经济仍可能面临重大障碍或阻力。让投资者走完最后一英里是非常昂贵的。如果一个投资者已经在其投资组合中持有30%的绿色资产，要让他增加到50%或60%是非常昂贵的。

Harrison Hong： 我们的因果证据表明，波动性渠道对投资者非常重要。当公司被迫使用20%到30%的可再生能源发电时，你会发现电价的波动性上升了。这些绿色资产产生的现金流更加不稳定。当这些公司试图为这些绿色资产投资筹集债务时，它们基本上要面临更高的资本成本。投资者认为可再生能源的波动性大约是化石燃料的1.5倍。

Harrison Hong： 讨论得还远远不够的是适应性资本。鉴于基础设施的年波动率仅为7%到9%，我们不仅应该讨论可再生能源与棕色能源，还应该将适应性资本作为第三种资本配置来源。换句话说，我们的投资组合中应该拥有多少适应性资本？

Harrison Hong： 思考适应性资本的方式是，它实际上是一种保险。我把房子建在高跷上，不是因为我喜欢高跷，而是为了对冲自然界的坏运气。这些是经济中的对冲资产。从长期来看，如果气候科学是正确的，适应性资本的回报可能会相当高。

闭幕总结：挑战、机遇与前行之路

Carina Smith： 我最近当了祖母。当我的孙女25岁时，那将是2050年，也就是我们力争实现净零排放的年份。她将继承一个怎样的世界？气候变化将如何影响全球经济和她的未来？正如我们今天上午从行长那里听到的，气候变化影响着挪威银行的所有核心任务。

Carina Smith： 那么，我从今天的演讲者那里得到了哪些关键启示呢？第一，科学是明确的。第二，经济状况令人担忧。第三，前方的道路是复杂的。第四，变化可能比我们想象的要快。第五，市场已经在做出反应。

Carina Smith： 我们目前的《气候行动计划》将于今年结束，它为我们的投资组合公司设定了最晚到2050年实现净零排放的宏伟目标。很高兴看到这些公司已经取得了进展。但正如今天所展示的，没有任何一个机构能够单独应对这一挑战。气候变化超越了科学、经济、政策和金融之间的界限，我们的应对也必须如此。我们需要协调一致的行动。

Carina Smith： 作为长期投资者，我们将尽自己的一份力。我们将继续支持向净零排放的转型。明天，又是一个重要的日子，我们将发布新的《2030年气候行动计划》。该计划反映了20年的学习成果以及我们今天听到的研究和见解。我们正在将科学、经济分析和投资证据转化为管理世界最大投资组合之一的行动。