Joe Weisenthal: Hello and welcome to another episode of the OddLots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal

Tracy Alloway: and I'm Tracy Aloway. So Tracy, we recently published that episode about what it was like to have done business during the Maduro years in Venezuela. That was from a grain perspective. And I think one thing that's very obvious is that sure Venezuela may have plenty of natural resources, uh, oil obviously, but also other ones. and perhaps that the relationship between uh the US and the uh current government may be better than it was but there is going to be you know actually reviving the economy actually getting in a place of stability and thriving that's a that's a very long way off to say the least

Joe Weisenthal: right so if you have oil in the ground yes that's great but it's in the ground and you need to actually extract it in order to make money and also in order to encourage the type of people who would extract it you need to have some sort of reliability in place, right? There has to be some sense of stability of the future otherwise as we heard from our previous discussion people just aren't going to want to go there and do business

Tracy Alloway: right so one of the points that he brought up which I think is very germanine to the future and the questions about the country's future is that you know he talked about if there was a talented engineer who worked in some sort of processing plant in his case he was talking about cargill obviously if there was someone who is like talented in the sort of technical ical side of them. They hired them in Mexico, you know, they hired them elsewhere. So many people left. And when you think about the security situation on the ground even again, let's say somehow the foreign money wants to come back in this question of talent and the question of like where are they and do they want to come back and what it would take to get them to come back such that you can actually sort of produce natural resources among other things profitably. That's a huge difficult element and there's no switch that you can flip.

Joe Weisenthal: I'm also just interested in Venezuela's economy from a historical perspective. Uh, one because I feel like Central and South America have been a blind spot for us for various reasons. I've been to Venezuela once, but I think it was on a cruise when I was the only cruise I ever went on when I was like 9 years old. And all I remember is getting off the boat and like being there for a few hours and seeing a lot of stray dogs that I thought were really cute and I wanted to take home with me. That's all I remember.

Tracy Alloway: But other than that, it didn't

Joe Weisenthal: I wasn't thinking about the economy. But also, I find it really interesting because here we have an economy which seems to have coalesed around one specific resource.

Tracy Alloway: Yes.

Joe Weisenthal: But as we learned from that episode, they do make some other things. And so I'm curious about the tradeoffs between, you know, encouraging the oil industry versus other types of jobs and businesses. There's a lot to discuss.

Tracy Alloway: And one other element before we get into this that I think is very important is you hear a lot about how prior to Hugo Chavez coming to power that Venezuela was a fairly welloff country. But and again it speaks to maybe the current moment. We know just looking internationally that there is really not any sort of obvious connection between natural resource endowments and the wealth of the public. The resource curse the resource curse, right? And there are plenty of places that have a lot of oil or some other commodity where the general public is impoverished or does not live particularly well. I think this is where you get a lot of that element of the rule of law and skilled labor and all of these things that are certainly unevenly distributed throughout the world and are not correlated necessarily with the existence of commodities. Anyway, someone that we've had on the uh podcast before who has talked a lot about these things, some of the preconditions for sustainable growth. We've talked to him about all this multiple times. He happens to be the perfect guest because he was previously part of uh economic policym in Venezuela in the 90s. He was a minister of planning. He was also more a member of the board of the central bank. Truly the perfect guest. So I'm thrilled to welcome back on the podcast Ricardo Houseman who is currently professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, director of the Harvard Growth Lab. So Ricardo, thank you so much for uh coming back on OddLots. Truly the perfect guest in the perfect moment.

Ricardo Hausmann: Thank you. Thank you so much for having me.

Joe Weisenthal: Why don't you I'm trying to think where to start. Why don't you tell us about um you've been at Harvard for 26 years, but as I mentioned, you used to be in policym in uh Venezuela prior to the Chavez years. Why don't you tell us a little bit about your history there?

Ricardo Hausmann: Well, if you want to understand Venezuela, you have to really understand the fact that it's a very mature oil country. Oil became important starting in 1917 with Royal Dutch Shell. Then in the 1920s, Standard Oil of New Jersey came in, now Exxon. And by 1929, Venezuela was the largest oil exporter in the world

Ricardo Hausmann: and remained the largest oil exporter in the world until 1965 when it was taken over by Saudi Arabia. And in that period going to say 1978 1980 between say 1917 and 1978 say you know 60 years Venezuela was probably the fastest growing country in the world and it was uh the country with the lowest inflation rate in the world and it um it had a fixed exchange rate with the dollar. It had you know a very developed financial market. It was a country of very very large immigration. So that say in the census of 1960 7% of Venezuelans were born in Europe in mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal but also it was a source of attraction of Colombians, Dominicans, Ecuadorians etc. So it was a very prosperous country. and then got in the 1970s the oil boom and the oil boom made us think very very big. Then came the second oil shock of the Iran Iraq war and that brought in even more money and then suddenly the in the 1980s the price of oil collapsed. oil revenues collapsed and the US jacked up interest rates like crazy in the early 80s and that led to a debt crisis by 1983 and from 1983 to [snorts] around 1989. It's what in Latin America was called the lost decade of the 80s and we were all in a big you know balance of payments crisis

Joe Weisenthal: that was very painful happened.

Ricardo Hausmann: Venezuela is the country in the world that went from AAA to default more quickly. It did. So it was AAA like in 1981 and it defaulted in 1983.

Joe Weisenthal: Wow.

Tracy Alloway: Wow.

Ricardo Hausmann: So So it was um and then the 80s were quite complicated. Then in the early 90s was President Carlos Andres Perez and his minister Miguel Rodriguez and others Moses Naim and and other ministers I participated on that government. A very major structural adjustment was done and debt restructuring opening the economy and the '9s were a period of a difficult recovery. Oil was very volatile going up and down. But by 1998, you had the the Russian crisis and the price of oil collapsed dramatically. Interest rates went through the roof. Financial markets dried up. And it is in that year 1998 that we had elections and the public said, "What the hell? you told us that all these reforms are going to pay off. You know, where's the money, etc. There was no money because the price of oil had gone down to something like $8 a barrel. But the truth is that they voted for Chavis. Massively voted for Chavis. [snorts] And Chavis started, you know, very moderately at the beginning, but as time went on and as the price of oil recovered and we had a spectacular boom between 2004 and 2014 in the price of oil. Well, Chavez felt that he was empowered. He had the money. The oil money was coming in. He thought given all the oil money that he was that was coming in, he could borrow against it. He put all these policies to restrict the private sector. He nationalized everything that moved. He created these socialist enterprises left and right. They all went broke eventually. But he imposed exchange controls, import controls, price controls. If it moved, you controlled it. And by 2012, he was very sick with cancer. But he ran for the election. He died probably immediately after the election. We don't know exactly the day when he died because um he didn't didn't appear publicly after early December, but they announced his death in in March of 2013. The year 2012, they the government spent as if the price of oil was at $200 a barrel when it was only at $100 a barrel. So they borrowed as if it was going out of fashion. And then suddenly in 2013 2014 the price of oil collapsed to something like in the 30s. So it's not that they had to go from 100 to 30 or no it's that they were spending at 200 and borrowing and when the price of oil collapsed nobody wanted to lend to Venezuela. So suddenly they had no dollars, no dollars to import raw materials, spare parts, seeds, fertilizers, whatever. And production came tumbling down and it was the biggest economic collapse that ever happened in human history outside of wars

Joe Weisenthal: and bigger than the collapse that happened in most wars.

Ricardo Hausmann: So without money coming in, they still had to pay for a huge public sector that they had created. So it just printed money. Maduro took out five zeros out of the currency and barely three and a half years later he took six more zeros out of the currency. This is a hyperinflation never seen before maybe I don't know in Germany in the 1920s and for a brief period in Germany after the second world war. It's it's something that has never happened. The financial system went from being like $80 billion in assets to like $1 billion in assets.

Joe Weisenthal: Jeez.

Ricardo Hausmann: So it was a total collapse of the economy. 8 million people left the country. Now you have to ask yourself the question, what the hell? This is not the only oil country in the world. I mean what happened to Saudi Arabia? What happened to Kuwait? What happened to United Arab Emirates or Kazakhstan or Aerbatan? We never heard of a collapse of this magnitude just because the price of oil went down. So what really happened is that the price of oil went down in a system that presumed that people had no rights and all the money was in the government. And when now the government doesn't have the money, people are left with no rights and nothing moves. And that's the underlying reason for the Venezuelan collapse.

Joe Weisenthal: That was a fantastic summary of Venezuelan economic history. I like speaking to uh professors because I don't even have to ask questions. You just listen.

Tracy Alloway: Yeah, because those were all the questions I was going to ask.

Joe Weisenthal: Yeah, that was great. Okay. Well, actually a serious question though. Were there any real efforts throughout, I guess, the 1900s, the last century, to diversify Venezuela's economy away from oil?

Ricardo Hausmann: Yes, that was the mantra in Venezuela. It's harder to do than to say, right? The the the mantra was that we were going to sew the oil.

Ricardo Hausmann: We're going to sow the oil. And so, we developed our hydro potential in the south of the country. We have the best hydroelectric river in the world, the Caron River. It should be producing like 32 gigawatts of power. And by the way, 247 if you want, 365 days a year, it's it's fantastic from it's a it's a hydraological marvel. It's not producing 8 megawws, 8 gigawatt. So, so it's they they messed that up too. We were going to use that to produce aluminum, steel. We have enormous agricultural potential especially with the agricultural revolution that has happened in mostly in Brazil in the last 20 years. It didn't reach Venezuela during Chavismo. So, we could be producing over 12 million hectares and we are producing on less than a million. So, so the potential for diversification is huge, but the story of Venezuela has been the story of this incredible uncertainty over what the future brings because we have not managed the o the volatility in oil incomes in a way that protects the domestic economy. So more than you know just the old Dutch disease of being you know you're earning so many dollars that you're so appreciated that other things are not competitive. It's really that since the 1980s, it's been up and down, up and down in oil incomes that has made the economy quite unpredictable. And the only way to deal with that is to protect the economy from oil price volatilities through stabilization funds. And those I wrote the law for the stabilization fund, but the moment Chavez got in, that's the first thing he killed.

Tracy Alloway: I was just going to ask since you were on the board of the central bank, you know, we know that in a lot of resourcerich countries the approach of the central bank, they might just peg to the dollar, you know, something very simple. What was the sort of general philosophy of the central bank when you were on it? How did it think about sterilizing foreign currencies, preventing inflation? What was what was the framework that the central bank used?

Ricardo Hausmann: That's a that's a very good question because Venezuela until 1983 had pegged the exchange rate to the dollar except in one small crisis we had in the early 60s and then when the US devalued the currency in 197172 when it abandoned the Breton Woods agreement we the US devalued we revalued visav the US but we had fixed exchange rates so it was very simple fixed exchange rate. The market believed the exchange rate was fixed and pegged and it worked quite well until the 1983 crisis. And then in the 1983 crisis, first they tried exchange controls, multiple exchange rates. And when I was at the central bank, it we decided to unify the exchange rate to float and to adopt something more like inflation targeting.

Joe Weisenthal: Got it.

Ricardo Hausmann: But it it was it was not easy to do because uh you know inflation targeting is easier to achieve when when inflation is under control and things are more stable. So we had a pretty bumpy road.

Tracy Alloway: You know you mentioned that stability fund as a policy maker. What was it like to witness, I guess, the the transition to the Chavez administration and I guess see some of your your work your earlier work dismantled.

Ricardo Hausmann: Well, it was initially quite gradual. Chavez left the the finance minister from the previous administration. She gave some confidence to markets and he first thing he did is he changed the constitution and the constitution concentrated power in the presidency. It went from two chambers of congress to a single chamber of congress and then and then the checks and balances were eroded. Uh and but what really changed his mind was uh the moment the price of oil went up he felt he no longer needed society

Ricardo Hausmann: that the private sector needed him. He didn't need the private sector. So he started, he had the money to buy everybody off, but he expropriated, didn't pay for most of it, and created an environment in which people thought that they really had no rights. You had your property could be taken away, you could not set prices, you could not buy foreign exchange without permission. And if to buy to get that permission, you had to behave. And so it created an environment, a quite oppressive environment. By the way, we had a free press and and now there's no free press whatsoever. So, it's it's this erosion of rights, property rights, information rights, voting rights, just political rights. So, it was the complete erosion of all rights and the transformation of a long-standing democracy into a dictatorship was quite horrible to watch.

Joe Weisenthal: I think one of the most surprising aspects and now that I think about it from our recent conversation was just how long have some of these businesses stuck it out under a deteriorating situation. You think okay you get this hyperinflation and you hear these stories about okay are there some warehouses full of sugar somewhere that we could sell abroad so that we could get the hard currency in in order to buy you know buy spare parts etc. this idea that like you know it was it was not a it was a sort of slow boil so to speak and the big international companies they didn't leave right away they actually they kept trying to make it work for as long as they possibly could.

Ricardo Hausmann: Absolutely. And and it was uh I mean Cargill is a good example in your in your previous show. Cargill you know the government nationalized international trade. So, uh, you had to buy you had to sell everything through a stateowned company that would buy on behalf of your customers. And they were the ones kind of siphoning the differential between the official exchange rate and the and the and the market exchange rate or the black market exchange rate which was at some stages, you know, 10 to one, 100 to one. So the best business was to sell a dollar at the parallel rate and convert that into dollars at the official rate. That would have been a rate of return of 10,000% in a day. So so it was it was that that craziness in in that led to uh to the economic collapse that I mentioned before.

Joe Weisenthal: Since we're talking about dollars, talk to us a little bit about the impact of sanctions. So, you know, you were no longer a policy maker when those sanctions came into effect, but I I think part of the difficulty when it comes to assessing Venezuela right now is we're trying to figure out how much of the economic issues there are the result of sort of homegrown structural issues versus external factors like the sanctions that have been in place for two decades now.

Ricardo Hausmann: No, the sanctions haven't been in place for two decades. The sanctions the sanctions were actually imposed starting around second half of 2017 and the economy imploded. The the worst implosion was in the year 2016. In the year 2016, the government cut back on imports by something like 85%. Imports of food, imports of medicine. They they just collapsed imports. I wrote an article in those days suggesting that Venezuela should go to the IMF and restructure its debt because since it had borrowed so much money and the price of oil had declined so much and it had no savings, it could not keep on servicing the debt and it it would need to restructure its debt ideally with some support from the IMF. So I asked the question in in the title of that article was um should Venezuela default and um and that got me banned from the country.

Ricardo Hausmann: So fortunately I published it abroad but it gives you an idea of how this

Joe Weisenthal: was the year 2016.

Tracy Alloway: Okay before sanctions okay

Ricardo Hausmann: 2015 2016 before sanctions. So it was the writing was on the wall. the the the oil production had collapsed because in 2003 Chavez fired the the oil company had gone on strike because Chavez was messing with their meritocracy with their hierarchical rules of you know what you needed to do to reach a certain level in the in the structure of the company which was a culture that we inherited from Exon Mobile and from from shell that were sort of like the two large producers in Venezuela before we they were nationalized in the 70s. But so there was a deep culture in that in in that company. They went on strike. Chavez fired 20,000 out of 32,000 starting from the top. So he eliminated all the human capital of that company and immediately production started to decline. We had the capacity to refine 1.3 million barrels of oil a day. Today we can't refine a 100,000. We import gasoline. So, so they this destruction way precedes any sanctions. Now the sanctions were imposed because Maduro started to get farther and farther away from democratic norms and uh it was a way of trying to force him to to to move back to democratic norms and uh and instead he radi he became more radicalized in his uh in his thing. But just to tell you the importance of human capital in all you might say oil is not that important. You know human cap it's kind of like a basic industry. When they kicked out the Venezuelan oil engineers they went to Colombia. There was a field in Colombia called Rialises. It was producing 30,000 barrels of oil a day. The Venezuelan oil engineers came in and in no time they it was producing 250,000 barrels a day. So it's it's just you you need to know what it is that you're doing. Well, that human capital they kicked out, that's the real collapse of the Venezuelan oil production. And then obviously he could have negotiated around sanctions, but he would rather be poor and in power than, you know, provide some more rights and norms and and and and maybe risk losing an election.

Tracy Alloway: That's truly a remarkable statistic about that uh that Colombian oil field.

Joe Weisenthal: I want to get to the present tense soon and talk about the challenges. now, but maybe to help us understand, you know, through these years of deterioration, whether we're talking about the latter years of uh Chavez or the earlier years of Maduro, what was the constituency that allowed them to stay in power despite these disruptions? Because even the most absolute dictator anywhere to some extent has to have some credibility with some pocket that's powerful something that preserves I would I would think etc. Talk to us about where was the constituency for this new trajectory of the country that sort that started under Chavis.

Ricardo Hausmann: So initially the constituency was very large but as the economy started to deteriorate and as people thought that there was less and less opportunities within that regime Maluda had to get nastier. So Chavez was very you know liked if you want he was popular in in he could actually win elections. Maduro couldn't really win elections and so he had to get nastier and nastier. So today what you have is essentially extreme repression. Extreme repression not only on civil society but extreme repression on the military. They distrust the military to death. They have a secret police for civilians called Seavine and then there's a secret police for the military called theim. And the deim has hundreds of officers in jail. They are the worst treated political prisoners in Venezuela. They are starved. They are tortured. They have deeply penetrated all the communications of anybody in the army. The Cubans are deeply into it. They're using Russian technology. So that they're trying to prevent the army from organizing against the government. So the army is not really there to defend the country. That's why the attack on January 3rd was such a cakewalk. it's that uh you know the army was there to to be kind of controlled so that it it wouldn't um break from the government. So that's the it's it's really a that's why in the election of July 28th, 2024, in spite of the fact that they didn't let 8 million Venezuelans abroad vote, in spite of the fact that they did not let 3 million young Venezuelans register for the first time in the electoral roles, in spite of the fact that they did not let the candidate that won the primaries to run, Maria Corina Machado, she appointed somebody who nobody knew. She raised his hand and he won 7030. He would have won 8515 if if other people had been allowed to vote. Now that's a margin. Even 7030, that's a margin that you haven't seen Trump win. You know, chain bound nobody wins by those margins. So there is a huge political majority in Venezuela for change that has that is behind one clear political leadership. So Venezuela is not Iraq. Venezuela is not a polarized country. Venezuela is a unified country. In those elections, the opposition won in all 24 states. They won in 90% of the 335 municipalities. That means it's a national there's a political majority in Venezuela that wants to go in a different direction, but there's a small click that's trying to prevent it. And so that is the current situation. And that's my concern that the Trump administration has announced that they want to rule by indirectly by controlling that click when when there is a big political majority that wants to go in a different direction.

Joe Weisenthal: This was actually going to be my next question. So, we're now up to January 2026. Majuro is gone. The US says it wants more private investment in Venezuela. So, maybe, you know, some of the sanctions issues go away. But on the other hand, the acting president is straight out of the Maduro regime and it doesn't seem that you're having any significant political or structural change. Is that right?

Ricardo Hausmann: Well, it's very hard to read exactly what the Trump plan is for Venezuela. Marco Rubio had talked has talked about three phases. First stabilization, then recovery, and then eventually a political transition. I think and I have argued that it's the wrong phasing because there's going to be very little recovery unless you know what is the those rules of the game. What is what is the what are the rights that people have right now? People in Venezuela are afraid to speak, are afraid to to do anything because they're still being deeply harassed and put in jail for just, you know, tweeting something or for having an opinion or for, you know, they have put in jail young girls in order to pressure military officers that have say broke rank and they want them to to uh to turn themselves in. So it's a very oppressive regime and and the idea is that yes, we are going to give this regime orders of what to do even though at the heart they are the ones that brought the economy to where it is. And the idea is we're now going to eliminate sanctions, but it's not sanctions that destroyed the Venezuelan oil industry. It was the the expropriations that were done in 2007 and 2009. It was the firing of all the oil workers in 2003. It was the rules that they created for the oil industry. In the oil industry, according to the law, production can only happen through the national oil company or in joint ventures with the national where the national oil company has 51% of its shares. The national oil company is broke. It's in default with all its creditors. So if if it were to receive some dollars in some bank account in the US, you know, there are judgments in US courts that would freeze those assets to pay creditors. So nobody wants that as a partner. So it is in this context that you know Trump says, "Oh, I want US companies to go back." Well, the law doesn't allow for those companies to go back. And if you want to change the law, who's going to change the law? Well, we had stolen elections last year for the National Assembly that the US does not recognize, Latin America does not recognize, Europe does not recognize. There is no legitimate power to change the hydrocarbons law. Right now, you have a dollar the official rate of 300 and something and the black market rate is at 400, 500, 600, it reached a,000. So, if you are going to invest, at what exchange rate do you come in? At what exchange rate do you convert your profits back out? It's it's the what the president of Exxon said that Venezuela is uninvestable. It's just a description of reality. It's it's the in the the system was not designed for private investment independent of sanctions. And that's that's what needs to change. But it needs to change through a government that has legitimacy to change things that you know is perceived as being you know the the reflection of the will of the people that you know they are the ones who decided that you know what course of action to take. I don't think any serious investor is going to go in into such a messy situation.

Joe Weisenthal: I certainly take your point and it certainly sounds very logical what you say that you're never going to get real investment of capital. You're certainly not going to get the sort of uh perhaps remigration of talent that left and so forth until there's some sort of political stability, until there's some sort of confidence this is the new thing. But how do you do that functionally? I mean, clearly sanctions didn't work, right? Sanctions didn't have any effect on removing uh the Maduro regime. there's not an impulse to put boots on the ground, American troops and so forth. It doesn't seem like there's any appetite. So, is there some mechanism in which the Trump administration even if it wanted to take your advice and put political stability before economic revival? Does does the tool exist practically to establish that sequence?

Ricardo Hausmann: I think it does and I think you might see them moving in this direction in the coming days and weeks and I think that it's important they that they listen to the fact that you know they this is not they you know they are obsessed about not committing the mistake that the US made in Iraq

Joe Weisenthal: right

Ricardo Hausmann: but Iraq has nothing to do with Venezuela Iraq is you know a country that goes back to Mesopotamia was 5,000 years old in those 5,000 years until Saddam Hussein, there had never been an election. There had never been political parties. In Venezuela was democracy. We have political parties. We ran an election not a 100red years ago. In 2024, we were able to secure the results of those elections because we had 600,000 people across the whole country supervising and protecting the votes for for the opposition. You have a political organization, a majority political organization there. So what you need to do right now is to say is to tell the army, we're not going to fire you the way they fired all the army in Iraq. You tell the bureaucracy, we're not going to fire the way you fired all the the bureaucracy in Iraq. Everybody's going to have their their their salaries. Everybody's going to have their pensions, right? But they are going to be be under civilian control. And if you know you you tell them you know you you they they have already seen what happened to Maluro they are very clear that it's much cheaper a treatment alas moneyi right you don't have to put the special forces on the ground to extract somebody you know alasle money you just send some missiles and no boots on the ground so there pressure you can put to say listen guys let's define uh uh a timetable for elections. Let's define a credible electoral council to supervise those elections with international supervision. Let's have a date for those elections. Let's open up the roles so that young people can register and diaspora can register and we [snorts] have an election on a certain date. And by the way, you have to free all the political prisoners. You have to allow the diaspora to go back and you have to allow a free press. Otherwise, you get the sullemani treatment. And I tell you that if you do those things, what is society going to do? They're going to want to participate in those elections, to organize for those elections, to start thinking about the future, and to have the credibility that the future is going to be possible because there will be a democratic government committed to a market economy, not a not a socialist government under threat of American attack and with a cash flow control by the American power. So that is a much better situation in which to recover the economy, to achieve social peace and to have uh Venezuela become prosperous again.

Tracy Alloway: Could you have some sort of hybrid structure here where Venezuela maintains some aspects of socialism but also tries to reintroduce those market signals that you've been talking about?

Ricardo Hausmann: First of all, I don't understand exactly the logic of a hybrid. You you mean like when Trump won the election, did you say why don't you have a hybrid you know why why do a you know one-off trick you know why do we need a hybrid there there is a majority political opinion in Venezuela in favor of one direction if it has to be done gradually for X or Y reason let them figure it out it's not there is something that has failed and has failed catastrophically there is no other catast catastrophic failure that you can compare to the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. People want change. There's a state that is not working. By the way, Venezuela is going to have a free education, free healthcare, free many things because that's kind of like in the DNA. Don't It's always been the consensus is by US standards relatively liberal.

Joe Weisenthal: By US standards that sounds very socialist.

Ricardo Hausmann: Yeah.

Ricardo Hausmann: Yeah. Exactly. So the problem is not socialism, not socialism. The problem is individual rights, freedom, property rights, free press. Those are the basic things because those things convert individuals into agents of their own destiny. And that's how you get investment. That's how you get the economy going. If if if the Venezuelans abroad don't feel that it's a it's a place where they can live in freedom safely, the human capital of the country has left. It won't want to come back. But if you tell them, look, recovery is coming in a free place with a government that that wants a restitution of rights. Venezuelans have has always been a country of immigration, not out migration. It's a country that that has been a a source of attraction of people everywhere. So that transition I tell you that transition can be done quickly and without conflict if enough pressure is put on the click that has sequester the government. That's why they can't get votes. That's why they look even in the voting centers in military bases the government lost 70 to30 is in spite of it its repression. So let let the majority of Venezuela something that did not exist in Iraq it did not exist elsewhere. It's a society that has undergone a catastrophe and has [clears throat] learned from that catastrophe. it has figured out what doesn't work and what course of action it wants to continue.

Joe Weisenthal: So I want to say I take your point absolutely that there that as you put it very well Venezuela in your view is not a polarized society. There is a consensus. There is a view both domestically and Venezuelans abroad that there needs to be major political change. And I certainly take your point uh highly intuitive that you're not going to get the influx of capital or talent until that political change takes place. On the other hand, you [snorts] know, when you when the US just kidnapped the head of state, which is a shocking turn of events, I think we're all shocked the day that we woke up on January 3rd. And you're talking about, you know, you say the Sulammani treatment, so that is assassination that you're saying should be would be the threat against the click. Do you see possibility that you essentially engender a sort of I don't know about a necessarily defense of the existing regime but a defense of sovereignty that what is this other country doing kidnapping our head of state? What is this other country doing threatening to assassinate the people who run our government? This is our government etc. Do you not see or am I is it completely off the mark to talk about risk of backlash there and the impulse to rally around the flag and sovereignty when another country is being this aggressive about controlling a government?

Ricardo Hausmann: I think that's why narratives matter.

Joe Weisenthal: Okay.

Ricardo Hausmann: And I don't particularly like the narrative that sometimes Trump uses. The narrative about the US getting into Europe in the Second World War was we came to liberate not to conquer. Okay, that's the idea. We came to liberate not to conquer. Today in Venezuela, Trump is very popular. Getting rid of Maduro is super popular. Why? Because the perception is that we had been taken over by Cubans. You saw that in the attack on January 3rd, Cuba announced that 32 of its members were killed because that was the security apparatus around Maduro. Maduro didn't rely on Venezuelans for his security. He relied on Cubans for his security because he doesn't trust Venezuelans. So the perception was that we were a colony of Cuba if you want. We were a colony of foreign interests and now we want to get back to our freedom. So the the narrative I would want the US to stick to [snorts] is we came to liberate not to conquer. We came to reestablish your freedom. And if freedom gets reestablished, Venezuelans will naturally be good partners of the US as they had historically been. The fact that Trump is popular in Venezuela is an ind is is a condemnation of Chavismo. It's how disastrous these guys have been, how aligned with foreign powers that have nothing to do with with us. You know, they're aligned with Cuba, they're aligned with Russia, they're aligned with [music] Iran, they're aligned with Bellarus. So, it's it's that kind of government that has taken over with no domestic political base that is being threatened to be kicked out. And that's why I think it it makes the transition so much easier.

Joe Weisenthal: Professor Houseman, thank you so much for coming back on OddLots. Fascinating perspective. Truly the perfect guest. Um, really appreciate you taking your time to chat with us.

Ricardo Hausmann: Thank you. Thank you for having me.

Tracy Alloway: Thank you, Ricardo.

Joe Weisenthal: Tracy, that was a fascinating conversation from someone who I guess I would say has an unmatched perspective right there. That is a uh an excellent view to get from someone who has both served in government but also has made it his career as an economist to talk essentially about some of these human capital problems that will certainly beset Venezuela for a very long time regardless of how the political situation unfolds. You know, I can't think of Ricardo without thinking about monkeys swinging from trees um and his description of how countries actually develop new industries and how one area can lead into a new more technologically advanced area. But anyway, one thing stuck out from that conversation for me, which is, you know, the emphasis on institutional and structural decline versus the external factors like the sanctions.

Tracy Alloway: Yeah. And it seems to me that that makes it more difficult in in the current environment, right? Because again, US involvement in Venezuela, I don't even know how to describe it nowadays, would suggest that maybe dollar shortages aren't going to be as much of a thing as they were in the past, maybe sanctions go away, stuff like that. But if the major problem is that institutional decay and the uh acting president is still in still from the Maduro regime, that seems a much harder problem to solve. By the way, your last question about whether or not US involvement maybe like coaleses Venezuelans um around a sort of nationalist regime. Uh there's a headline out right now saying that

Joe Weisenthal: Venezuela's acting president says she's had enough of US orders. So, you know, you get kind of like a a glimmer of it.

Tracy Alloway: It seems very tough. And to talk about the Sulammani treatment, there's a euphemism for assassination of

Joe Weisenthal: I'm not even sure it's a euphemism.

Tracy Alloway: It's not even It's not even a euphemism at all. Look, I certainly take the point though that this idea of let's get the economic stabilization done first and then the political stabilization that might simply be impossible. And I thought Professor Houseman did a great job of laying out the sort of the reality of human capital and the idea that, you know, this is not just some vague thing, oh, we want talented people back and that stat about the Colombian oil field, very remarkable, but then also some of the legal aspects of why the system is not designed as it currently is for multinational oil companies to come back into the country. But on the other hand, I mean, again, sanctions didn't work for years to get Maduro out. We've had sanctions against Cuba for how long? They don't work. Like getting the government you want, even if you're much more powerful than the other country, is far from a trivial exercise in almost every example that we can think of.

Joe Weisenthal: Absolutely.

Tracy Alloway: Well, I'm also thinking back to again that episode that we did um with the Cargill employee and this idea that well maybe maybe if you have enough private investors, multinationals that come together and say, you know, we are interested in Venezuela, but we need to see the following changes. Maybe that acts as some sort of catalyst to strengthen up the rule of law, but it's a sort of chicken and egg situation, right? because those companies need to be incentivized. They need to want to come in to Venezuela. In order to advocate for like the conditions that would make it possible for them to enter Venezuela.

Joe Weisenthal: Yeah.

Tracy Alloway: I wonder how much vacancy there is at the uh apartment complex where Assad is living in Moscow. Like the question is like how many people need to be promised a very cushy retirement in a nice gated Moscow high-rise for them to say, "Okay, we're just we'll just do this the easy way." I'm curious like what the what the number would be and how much uh capacity there is for that movement. That would be the sounds like it could be a solution, but I don't know if that's really on the table.

Joe Weisenthal: That would be an interesting statistic. I don't think you're going to get it anytime soon, but anyway, shall we leave it there?

Tracy Alloway: Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Aloway. You can follow me at Tracy Aloway.

Joe Weisenthal: And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at the stalwart. Follow our guest Ricardo Houseman. He's at Ricardo Houseman. Follow our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Dashel Bennett atbot and Kalebrooks at Kalebrooks. For more OddLots content, go to bloomberg.com/odlots. We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. And you can chat about all these topics 247 in our Discord, discord.gg/od. gg/odlotss.

Tracy Alloway: And if you enjoy OddLotss, if you [music] like these ongoing Venezuela discussions, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast [music] platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely adree. All you need to do is find the [music] Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcast and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.