秘密通胀目标与信任危机:2026年7月美联储决议深度剖析 Joseph Wang 2026-07-29

政策惯性与政治敏感:7月议息会议的鹰派底色

大家好,我的朋友们。今天是7月29日,这是我针对7月联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC:Federal Open Market Committee,联邦公开市场委员会)会议的简报。我刚刚看完了凯文(Kevin,即美联储主席 Kevin Waller)的第二场表现,坦白说,这真的很糟糕。不过在深入讨论之前,让我们先退一步,回顾一下之前发生的事情。实际上,在上一次会议和这一次会议之间,发生了很多事情。显而易见,上一次会议非常鹰派,自那以后,FOMC 成员们也倾向于表现得更加鹰派。他们担心通胀确实没有朝着正确的方向发展。以至于沃勒理事(Governor Waller)之前非常公开地表示,如果我们继续看到糟糕的 CPI(Consumer Price Index:消费者物价指数)数据,他将不得不很快加息。但是,实际公布的通胀数据却相当温和。CPI,尤其是核心 CPI(Core CPI:扣除食品和能源价格后的消费者物价指数)非常疲软,甚至创下了月度环比零增长的历史最温和记录之一。

然而,美联储认为通胀是由三件事驱动的:一是关税,二是 AI 建设,三是能源价格。现在,尽管我们上个月的通胀数据很温和,但看看能源价格,战争似乎正在升温,情况正在恶化。如果再看 AI 建设,这似乎是一件持续进行甚至可能加速的事情。因此,通胀对美联储来说仍然是一个问题。在进入本次会议之前,市场预期今年将加息两次,大约从9月的某个时候开始。我个人认为今天有很大的加息可能性。当时市场定价显示7月加息的概率为30%。现在的这届美联储已经不同了,他们会公开告诉你,他们愿意给市场带来“意外”。所以,我认为现在是一个加息的好时机,因为如果你现在不加息,等到后面再加,就会撞上中期选举,而你绝对不会想在这个时间点加息,因为这会带来各种政治影响。

当然,会议如期举行。会议刚开始时,市场感到一阵惊喜,因为美联储并没有加息。然而,这显然是一场极其鹰派的新闻发布会,因为有三位投票委员投下了反对票(dissents),这三位美联储投票委员希望在本次会议上加息。在新闻发布会上,凯文走上讲台,发表了大量鹰派言论。政策声明本身也非常鹰派,强调了物价稳定(Price Stability:商品和服务价格保持相对稳定,不发生剧烈通胀或通缩),并且对劳动力市场整体持相当乐观的态度。不过我注意到,其中有一些细节似乎在暗示这将是一场生产力繁荣,同时也是一个负向供给冲击(Negative Supply Shock:由于生产成本上升或原材料短缺导致商品和服务总供给突然减少的经济现象),在经济学话术中,这暗示着你应该忽略(look through)这种冲击。但总体而言,他们高度强调物价稳定,从字面来看,这显然是一场更加鹰派的发布会。

Original English

Hello, my friends. Today is July 29th, and this is my July FOMC debrief. All right. So, I just finished watching Kevin's second performance, and honestly, it was awful. But, before we get into it, let's take a step back and review what happened. So, between the last meeting and now, a lot of things have happened, actually. So, the last meeting was pretty obviously hawkish, and since then, uh FOMC members have tended to be more hawkish. They were worried that um inflation really wasn't heading in the right direction. So much so that Governor Waller was actually very openly saying that if we continue to have these bad CPI prints, you know, he's going to have to hike and, you know, very soon. Um but, the inflation data actually was pretty soft. CPI, uh core CPI was actually super soft, one of the softest readings we've ever had on a month-over-month basis, zero. However, though, the Fed perceives inflation to be driven by three things. One is tariffs, two is the AI buildout, and three is energy prices. Now, even though we had a soft print last month on inflation, we're looking at, say, energy prices. Well, it looks like the war is heating up, and that's worsening. If you look at the AI buildout, it looks like that is uh something that's ongoing and might accelerate as well. So, inflation is still a problem for the Fed. The market priced in two hikes this year heading in, um starting sometime in September. I personally thought that there was a good chance we could hike today. Uh so, the market was pricing in a 30% chance of a July hike. Now, this is a different Fed now. This is a Fed that openly tells you they are willing to surprise the market. So, I thought it would be a good time to hike, since if you don't hike now, later on when you hike, you're going to be hiking right by the midterms, and you really don't want to be doing that. It's going to have all sorts of political implications. Now, heading into the meeting, of course, the meeting happened, and right off the bat, the market was pleasantly surprised because there was no hike. However, it was very obviously a hawkish press conference because we had three dissents, three Fed voters would have liked to hike rates this time. Um the press conference, Kevin, of course, just kind of got on stage and he said a lot of hawkish stuff. The sitting bit itself is also pretty hawkish, emphasizing price stability, and generally pretty upbeat about the um labor market. I I will note though that there are shades of that that seem to suggest that this is, you know, going to be productivity boom, and um this is a negative supply shock, which in economic speak suggests that you should look through it. But overall, there's a high emphasis on price stability, which you would take on face to be more hawkish con- uh conference.

理论盲区:双重使命的非理性调和与传导机制缺失

现在,进入新闻发布会环节。这个家伙说了很多话,而真正让我震惊的是两件事。首先,凯文坚信美联储的双重使命(Dual Mandate:美联储促进最大就业和物价稳定的法定职责)之间并没有冲突。但在历史上,我们通常认为充分就业与物价稳定这两个使命是存在冲突的。因为当通胀过高时,你会提高利率以试图抑制需求,这通常会对劳动力市场产生负面影响;同样地,当失业率过高时,你可以降低利率来刺激经济,但这可能会对通胀产生上升压力。因此,这两个使命存在冲突,这是非常传统的观点。说实话,我并不认为这有什么争议。

但凯文竟然公开告诉你,他不相信这一点。当被问及:“好吧,如果你不认为这两个使命之间存在冲突,那你认为货币政策发挥作用的传导机制是什么?”以下是他的回答:

“在货币政策的传导机制方面,我认为不同的工具通过不同的传导机制起作用。利率通过信贷渠道和借贷渠道起作用,可能还有信心渠道和外汇。资产负债表可能通过其他一些渠道起作用,比如信号传递和投资组合平衡。我们在制定政策时会充分了解所有这些工具。但如果有人暗示我们正在微调总需求以使其追赶供给,那并不是我的思想模型。我认为我们并不擅长微调业务。我们试图让供给和需求大致保持平衡,但实际上,我们今天坐在这里参加新闻发布会,我认为我们对这个经济体中的总需求状况有合理的认识。我们在推断总供给。我们在对生产率做出判断。在某种意义上,这是供给和需求之间的一场竞赛。而围绕 AI 的企业资本支出(CapEx)激增,使得这一计算变得有点难以判断,但在未来的这段时间里,我们将努力去判断这一点。”

听完这些,我坦白说没有听到任何具体的传导机制。这听起来就像是一堆冗长的“文字沙拉”(word salad),这也让我重新想起了对凯文成为美联储主席的担忧。凯文已经在公众视线中出现了一段时间,所以我们已经知道他的想法和他的所作所为。他曾任美联储理事,而在担任理事期间他的表现非常糟糕。他总是过于鹰派,甚至在雷曼兄弟破产(即大衰退/金融危机(Great Financial Crisis:2007-2008年席卷全球的严重金融危机))的前夕,他也相当鹰派。在金融危机之后,他仍然保持着鹰派立场。因此,他再次站在了政策辩论的错误一边,这表明他是一个判断力很差的人。

他之所以如此鹰派,原因之一是他的框架基本上被称为货币主义(Monetarism:强调货币供应量是经济活动和通胀主要决定因素的经济学流派),他认为货币数量对经济活动有非常大的影响。所以,当他看到美联储扩大资产负债表,也就是通过量化宽松(QE)印钱买债时,他认为这会带来严重的通胀。这在当时是完全合理的,许多人也都有这种感觉。但事实证明这并非事实,那是对世界运行方式的错误理解,因为在金融危机之后的十年里,我们基本上处于极低的通胀状态。然而,即使有了长达十年的反面证据来反驳他的框架,凯文也并没有真正改变,他现在仍然在说同样的话。这让我很担心,因为这告诉我他是一个无法学习的人。基本上,他是一个意识形态化的人,一个通过“魔幻思维”来对待世界的人——也就是说,你的信念不会根据证据进行调整,而是直接由意识形态强加给你。当然,他以前在一家智库工作。而这也是魔幻思维的另一个典型例子,他会直接做出一个宏大的声明,坚称就业与物价稳定之间没有权衡取舍,但却解释不清楚原因。这根本说不通。在某些特定背景下,可能确实不存在权衡取舍,例如在巨大的技术繁荣中,可能在不摧毁太多工作岗位的情况下实现这一点。但总的来说,我认为认为这两个使命之间存在冲突并不是什么有争议的观点。

Original English

Now, going into the presser, now, you know, this guy he says a lot of things, and what really struck out to me were two things, actually. So, first off, now, Kevin has this belief that um the Fed's two mandates are not in conflict. So, historically, we think that the full employment and price stability mandates are in conflict because, say, when uh inflation is too high, you hike rates to try to lower demand, and that usually has a negative impact on the labor market. Similarly, when you say that unemployment is too high, you can cut rates, and that's to stimulate the economy, and that could have an upward impact on inflation. So, these two conflicts these two mandates are in conflict. That's, you know, pretty traditional. Honestly, I I actually don't think it's that controversial. Um but Kevin actually openly told you that he doesn't believe that, and when asked about, "Okay, so if you don't believe there's a conflict between your two mandates, how do you think what's the mechanism through which monetary policy works?" And And is what he said.

Uh Chairman Waller, I want to follow up on Colby's question about policy transmission. You've said there's no cruel choice between stable prices and full employment. Um, rates bring inflation down by cooling demand. It's generally thought that can show up in the labor market. If that's not the channel you're relying on, what is? In terms of transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, I think different tools work through different transmission mechanisms. The interest rates work through lending channels and credit channels, maybe confidence channels and foreign exchange. The balance sheet probably works through some other channels like signaling and portfolio balance. We're keeping fully abreast of all these tools in making policy. But if the suggestion is somehow we're going to be fine-tuning aggregate demand so it catches supply, that's not my mental model. I don't think we're great in the fine-tuning business. We're trying to get supply and demand in broad order, but really what we're doing as we sit here today at this press conference is I think we've got a reasonable sense of what aggregate demand looks like in this economy. We're inferring aggregate supply. We're making a judgment about what productivity is. And in some sense, there's a race between supply and demand. And the surge in business CapEx in and around AI is making that calculation a little harder to judge, but in the period ahead, we're going to be trying to judge just that. So, listening to that, I honestly didn't hear a mechanism. It sounded like this long-word salad, and it brings me back to my concern about Kevin becoming Fed chair. Now, Kevin has been in the public spotlight for some time, so we already know what he what he thinks, what he's done. He was also a former Fed governor. Now, he did a very bad job when he was Fed governor. He was always too hawkish, even on the eve of the Lehman disaster, the great financial crisis, he was also pretty hawkish. Now, after the great financial crisis, he was still hawkish. So, again, he's been on the wrong side of the policy debate and shows someone who was has poor judgment. Now, one of the reasons why he has been so hawkish is that he has a framework where he basically it's called monetarism, where he thinks that the quantity of money has a very big impact on economic activity. And so, he saw the Fed's expanding of the Fed's balance sheet, you know, QE, printing money to buy bonds to be very inflationary. It was totally reasonable. Many people felt that way. Um but that was just not true. Um that was an incorrect understanding of how the world worked and for the decade after the great financial crisis, we basically had very low inflation. Now, even after a decade of evidence against his framework, Kevin really hasn't changed and so, he's still saying the same thing. So, that was a concern to me because that tells me that he's someone who cannot learn. Basically, someone who is a an ideological person, someone who approaches the world through magical thinking, right? Your beliefs are not adjusted according to evidence, they are just given to you by ideology or whatever. And of course, he used to work at a think tank. So, this is another good example of magical thinking where he would just make this big claim, there is no trade-off between employment and price stability. And then fail to tell you why. So, doesn't make any sense. There could be some context where there there is no trade-off, for example, honestly, a huge technological boom, for example, may possibly do that when that actually doesn't destroy too many jobs. But again, these are broadly speaking though, I think it's not controversial to think that there is a conflict between the two mandates.

秘密通胀指标:长期国债暴跌与市场信任危机

接下来他谈到的事情,我认为真正引起了市场的恐慌。如果你看看金融市场,会发现短期到中期利率走低了,这是因为美联储最终选择按兵不动。国债收益率在很大程度上反映了预期的政策利率路径。但是,当我们越过中短期国债,去看30年期长期国债时,它的收益率变动受政策路径影响要小得多,更多取决于长期的供求关系与通胀预期。你可以清晰地看到,在新闻发布会期间,30年期国债的收益率呈爆炸式飙升。这就是市场对美联储维持物价稳定的承诺感到严重担忧的直接表现。

为什么市场在凯文竭尽全力扮演鹰派角色、满口都是物价稳定之后,还会有这种不信任感?我想这与以下这段对话有关。我们来听一下:

“当你谈到2%的通胀目标时,你依赖的是什么衡量标准?” “是的,我会给出两个答案。首先,让我给出标准的官方答案。美联储每年一月都会概述一份宗旨与策略声明。在那份策略文件中(我相信日期是今年的一月),它将个人消费支出(PCE)通胀率描述为那里的目标函数。所以那是我们的数字,我们会坚持下去。谁知道明年一月之后我们在策略上会怎么说呢。我怀疑工作组可能会有一些补充。但我会说,某种版本的卢卡斯批判(Lucas Critique:指出当决策者的政策规则改变时,经济行为体的预期和历史行为模式也会随之改变,因此基于历史数据预测新政策效果可能失效的理论),以及经济学中的某种版本的古德哈特定律(Goodhart's Law:指出当一个经济指标被选为政策调控的指标时,它就会失去作为反映经济真实状况指标的作用的经验法则)应该提醒我们,当我们谈论通胀衡量标准或其他东西,并将这些标准描述为与我们的目标一致时,我们可能会把它们变成不再是非常好的衡量标准或非常好的目标。概括来说,如果你站在我面前对我说,我完全遵守策略文件,我们将实现2%的通胀,绝不超出半点。但为了实现这一目标,我正在关注比 PCE 更广泛的通胀数据集。所以,在不完全亮出底牌的情况下,我正在像我的同事一样,试图理解经济体中正在发生的潜在的、广义的物价变化。”

所以,基本上凯文被问到了他是如何衡量通胀的。通胀衡量的定义和通胀目标本身一样重要。他虽然口头上强调希望将通胀目标精确控制在2%,但在被问及如何衡量它时,他的回答却暴露出严重问题。如果你用不同的方式来衡量它,结果会截然不同。而他基本上相当漫不轻心地说:“是的,我应该告诉你是 PCE,但实际上那并不是我真正的思考方式。而且我也不打算告诉你我是怎么想的。”

换句话说,坐在台上的美联储主席关注着一个并不是由 PCE 衡量的、且对公众完全保密的“秘密通胀目标”。作为债券投资者,面对这种表态该如何自处?这意味着投资者持有的长期国债面临着一个无法预测的主观判定风险,这显然无法令人感到宽慰。因此,我认为这实质上增加了持有长期国债的风险溢价,而且这也将逐步冲击更广泛的风险资产。总而言之,我认为这次新闻发布会是一次非常糟糕的表现。说实话,凯文如果能听从自己的建议,直接停止向媒体发表讲话,对他自己和市场都会更好,因为这简直是一场灾难。好了,这就是我今天准备的全部内容。周六再见,我会和大家继续聊。

Original English

Now, the next thing though that he talked about, and this is the one that I think really concerned the markets. If you look at the markets, you can see that the front end to belly rates went lower and that is because the Fed is not hiking. So again, Treasury yields largely reflect the expected path of policy. But we go beyond that to the 30-year long bond, that's much less about the path of policy, more about supply and demand. And you saw that yield basically explode higher during the press conference. And that's the market becoming concerned about the Fed's commitment to to price stability. Now, why would the market feel that way after Kevin, you know, kind of did his best uh Hollywood impression of a hawkish person and just kind of said price stability all the time? Well, I think it has to do with this exchange. Let's listen now.

When you talk about the 2% inflation target, what measure are you relying on? Yeah, so I'll give two answers. First, let me give the proper standard answer. The The Federal Reserve every January outlines a statement of purposes and strategy. And in that strategy document, which I believe was dated January of this year, it describes a measure of PC inflation as the as the objective function there. Um I have enough of my own So that that's our number, we're sticking with it. Who knows come after next January what we might say about strategy. I suspect the task forces might might have something to add. But I'll say this, some version of the Lucas critique, some version of Goodhart's law in economics should remind us that when we talk about uh measures of inflation or something else, and we describe those measures as being consistent with our objectives, we might make them such that they're not very good measures or very good objectives. Broadly, if you said to me standing in front of you, I abide fully by the strategy document. We're going to deliver 2% inflation and not a whisper more. But to achieve that, I'm looking at a broader set of inflation data than PCE. So without sort of fully revealing my cards, um I'm trying to understand like my colleagues what's the underlying generalized change in prices that are happening in the economy. So basically Kevin is asked about how he measures inflation. Now that's just as important as inflation target, right? He's going to tell you that he wants to target 2% inflation exact, but then he how do you measure that, right? That if you measure it differently, you could have very different outcome. And he basically just kind of I thought fairly nonchalant nonchalantly said that, you know, yeah, I'm supposed to tell you that it's PCE, but actually that's not really how I think about it. And I'm not going to tell you how I think about it. So basically you have a Fed chair that's going on stage and he has an inflation target that's not really measured by PCE and it's a secret. So if you're a bond investor, what are you supposed to do with this? You have a Fed chair with a secret inflation target. Well, obviously that's not very comforting, right? So I think that materially increases the risk for someone who's holding the long bond. So I think that was bad and that's going to impact broader risk assets as well. So all in all this press conference was I think very poor performance and honestly Kevin would honestly it would serve him better if he actually took his own advice and just stopped talking to the press cuz this was a disaster and he needs to stop doing this. All right. So that's what I prepared for today. Come back. I'll talk to you guys again on Saturday.

📌 文中提及的人物和组织

人物: Kevin Waller

公司/组织: Federal Reserve