金融市场巨变:投资策略的范式转移与未来展望 Norges Bank Investment Management 2024-04-25

拥抱变革:投资新时代的呼唤

感谢大家。我们都从最近Adam U以及今天上午的演讲中受益匪浅,这些建议都非常精彩。我想以我自己的方式来探讨这个问题。我告诉我的团队:“不要防守,要保持好奇心,因为变化是永恒的。”我认为,我们作为投资者,作为金融服务从业者,一直低估了变化的影响。我们抵制变化,否认变化,墨守成规。所以,我想分享一些关于变化及其影响力的例子。

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Thank you, and what amazing advice we have all been the beneficiaries of, not just most recently from Adam U, but this morning. I thought I'd come at this my own way, and when I tell my organization, "Don't be defensive, be curious," change is a constant. We as investors, we in financial services, I think have consistently underestimated the impact of change. We've been resistant to change, we've denied change, we stick to the status quo, and I thought I'd just maybe share some examples of change and how impactful it is.

投资“顺风”的终结与策略重思

这已经是我从事这个行业以来的第40个年头了。我告诉我的团队,回顾这40年,在我刚开始的时候,还没有高收益债券(High-yield bonds: 信用评级较低但收益较高的债券)、杠杆贷款(Leverage loans: 银行向负债累累的公司提供的贷款)、交易所交易基金(ETFs: Exchange Traded Funds: 在交易所上市交易的指数基金),以及极少的证券化产品(Securitized product: 将非流动性资产打包成可交易证券的产品)。然而,现在这四类产品在我们的金融格局中占据了主导地位。我们为什么会认为它们在未来五到十年内还会存在呢?我们又为何要基于它们来构建投资策略?那些让它们得以扎根的环境,在今天是否依然存在?我不知道。

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So this is now my 40th year doing this, and I tell my team I look back over 40 years, and when I started, no high-yield bonds, no leverage loans, no ETFs, minimal securitized product. Now those four products are incredibly dominant in our financial landscape. Why do we think they're going to be here in five or 10 years? Why do we build investment strategies on them? Are the circumstances that allowed them to essentially take hold still the circumstances today? I don't know.

回顾这40年,我认为我的职业生涯一直处于顺风(Tailwinds: 有利因素)时期。我想我和你们大多数人一样,都非常幸运。我们曾享有四大顺风:利率从高位降至低位;我们印发了大量货币;通过财政借贷,我们几乎在全球各地预支了未来的需求;我们还受益于全球化。未来,这四项因素中是否还有任何一项会继续存在?我不知道。我认为,关于它们是否会变成逆风(Headwinds: 不利因素)存在着激烈的讨论,但我会说,我们正处于顺风消失的时期。

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I look back again over 40 years, and I think we've lived in a period of tailwinds for my career. I think I've been very fortunate. I think most of you have been very fortunate. We've had four tailwinds: rates have gone from high to low, we have printed an awful lot of money, we have borrowed forward future demand through fiscal borrowing almost everywhere in the world, and we've had the benefit of globalization. Are any of those four things true going forward? I don't know. I think there's a healthy debate as to whether they are headwinds, but I would argue I think we're in the absence of tailwinds.

我们为什么会认为过去40年有效的投资策略在未来还会奏效?过去十年间的业绩记录真的还有价值吗,或者我们是否应该完全抛弃它?我们所有投资者都习惯于回顾过去五年、十年,并从中获得巨大的安慰。但我们有多大可能在美国再次印发8万亿美元,然后一切都会持续上涨呢?为什么过去的业绩记录会是相关的呢?

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Why would we think the investment strategies that work for the past 40 years would work going forward? Is there actually any value to track record over the last 10 years, or should we just completely throw it away? We all as investors take great comfort in looking at the last five years, the last 10 years. What are the chances that we're going to print in the US another $8 trillion, and everything will go up and to the right? Why would track record be relevant?

成功假象与组织文化变革

我认为,保持健康的怀疑态度至关重要。假设你在2019年是世界上最优秀的投资者,你离开了挪威,搬到德克萨斯州奥斯汀,在那里你只购买了多户住宅,并且都选在了绝佳地段。你的房产现在100%入住,租金每年增长10%,你以3.5%的利率获得了60%的抵押贷款,你感觉非常棒,你是世界上最棒的投资者。

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I think a healthy skepticism. You were in 2019 the best investor in the world. You left Norway and you moved to Austin, Texas, and all you bought in Austin, Texas, was multifamily, and you bought multifamily in all the right locations, and your buildings are now 100% occupied, your rents have been growing 10% a year, you took out your 60% mortgage at 3 and a half percent. You were feeling great, you were the best investor in the world.

那么,今天你的股权价值几何?这是一个数学问题:租金上涨,但资本化率也上涨,你的股权价值只剩下50%。你是一个好的投资者吗?嗯,在2019年你确实是个非常好的投资者,2020年也是,2021年人们开始怀疑,2022年你跌到了谷底,到了2023年,人们几乎确信你只是运气好,而非聪明。也许我们应该用“企业软件”来代替“奥斯汀,德克萨斯州”这个例子,也许我们一直生活在顺风中,现在必须学会接受变化。

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What's your equity worth today? It's a math problem: rents up, cap rates up, your equity is worth 50 cents on the dollar. Were you a good investor? Well, in '19 you were a really good investor, in '20 you were a good investor, in '21 people were not so sure, in '22 you went to the bottom of the barrel, and in '23 people are pretty convinced you were lucky, not smart. Maybe we should use the words "enterprise software" instead of "Austin, Texas." Maybe we've been living in tailwinds, and we have to learn to accept change.

我知道在我的组织中,我们实践了Adam刚才提到的许多事情,我们积极鼓励思想上的不服从(intellectual insubordination: 鼓励员工提出不同意见和挑战现有观念的文化),这与公然违抗(outright insubordination: 公开反抗命令或权威)不同,因为后者会阻碍业务运营。但对于一个好想法,没有层级之分,也没有感到不适的余地——这是我们积极倡导的。每隔几年,我就会召集我的合伙人讨论未来。我于2008年加入了Apollo。2008年,Apollo的管理资产规模(AUM: Assets Under Management: 资产管理规模)是400亿美元,到2023年达到了6500亿美元。我们增长了14倍,超过了苹果和微软,我想除了英伟达,我们超过了所有其他公司,而且这都是有机增长。

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I know in my organization a lot of the things that Adam just said we do. There's active encouragement of intellectual insubordination, which I distinguish from outright insubordination, because that makes it difficult to run the business, but there is no hierarchy for a good idea, there is no ability to feel uncomfortable. This is something we actively promote. I gathered my partners in January. Every couple of years we get together and we talk about the future, and I started with Apollo in 2008. Apollo in 2008 was $40 billion of AUM. Apollo in 2023 was $650 billion of AUM. We outgrew 14 times. We outgrew Apple, we outgrew Microsoft. I think we outgrew everyone other than Nvidia, by the way, all organic.

下一个问题是:我们是幸运还是聪明?你们都知道,我们是幸运的。你不可能期望一家金融服务公司能增长14倍。我们之所以聪明,仅仅是因为我们处于正确的位置,为变革做好了准备,而变革确实发生了。想想那些推动我们从400亿美元管理资产规模增长到6500亿美元的趋势:2008年的金融危机削弱了大多数金融机构,它们都在采取防御策略;利率降至零,这迫使那些对退休人员做出承诺的投资者去寻找替代投资(Alternatives: 指除传统股票、债券外的投资类别)。这些就是推动我们增长的因素。

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Next question: were we lucky or smart? Come on, you guys know this, we were lucky. You can't possibly expect to grow a financial services business at 14 times. We were smart only in that we were in the right place to prepare for change, and change happened. Think about the trends that drove us from $40 billion of AUM to $650 billion of AUM: financial crisis in 2008 weakened most financial institutions, they were playing defense; rates going to zero pushed investors who had made promises to retirees to look for alternatives. Those are the factors that drove our growth.

因此,在2024年初,我展望未来,自问:变革将从何而来?我们如何首先接受我们过去的成功是基于一系列不再存在的事物?我们如何让组织为接受变革做好准备?如果我们错了怎么办?我认为我至少有40%的时间是错的,这在棒球术语中,会让我成为有史以来效率最高的球员。那么,让我们创造一种接受失败并能快速纠正错误的组织文化。我们不应该因为做出糟糕的决定而解雇员工,而应该因为不做决定而解雇他们。我想这就是我们所做的。

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And so, sitting in the beginning of 2024, I'm looking out and I'm saying to myself, "Where's change coming from? How do we first accept that the success that we've had is based on a series of things that no longer exist? How do we prepare the organization to accept change? What happens if we're wrong?" I think I'm wrong at least 40% of the time, which would make me, in baseball terms, the most productive player ever. Well, let's create an organizational culture that accepts that you can fail and fix your mistakes quickly. Let's not fire people for making bad decisions; let's fire them for making no decision. And that's, I think, what we've done.

所以,我坐下来思考今天上午团队所说的,以及你们从Wellington、Helman and Freeman和Oak Tree那里听到的。我认为所有这些都是真实的,我会在其基础上再添上我自己的看法。我认为我们作为投资者,对正在发生的巨大变化不够警觉。我认为有些变化是可以预测的,所以我会告诉你们我们是如何基于观察到的变化来构建业务的。

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So I sit out and I think about what the team said this morning, what you heard from Wellington, what you heard from Helman and Freeman, what you heard from Oak Tree, and I think all of it is true, and I'm going to add my gloss on top of it. I think we as investors are not mindful enough of the massive change taking place, and I think some of the change is predictable, so I'll give you how we are building our business based on change on things that we observe.

市场流动性与“去银行化”趋势

2008年,我们几乎摧毁了全球金融体系。我们实施了大量的改革,但包括我在内的所有人,都还没有真正体验到这些变化的影响,因为在我们修改规则后,我们又印发了8万亿美元,然后一切都向上发展。现在,我们已经经历了大约18个月的变革生活。

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2008, we nearly destroyed the worldwide financial system. We implemented massive amounts of change. None of us, me included, have yet to experience any of that change, because right after we changed the rules, we printed $8 trillion, and everything went up and to the right. We've now had about 18 months of living with change.

那么,我们能观察到什么呢?一个显而易见的问题是:公共市场是否具有流动性?我认为并非如此。也许在股票市场是这样,但在固定收益市场则不然。2008年对固定收益领域的做市资本(Market making capital: 促进市场交易的资本)施加了极大的惩罚。如今,做市资本仅为2008年的10%,而市场规模却是2008年的三倍。是的,我们正生活在流动性仅为原来的三十分之一的市场中。现在,出售前20名以外的投资级公司债券需要5天时间。

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So what could we observe? Easy one: are public markets liquid? I don't think so. Maybe on the equity side that's true, on the fixed income side, no. 2008 put an extreme penalty on market making capital in fixed income in particular. Market making capital is 10% of what it was today of what it was in 2008. Markets are three times their size. Yes, we are living with a 30th of the liquidity. It now takes five days to sell an investment grade corporate bond outside the top 20.

我们实际上已经目睹了全面的市场失灵,比如英国发生的那个被称为LDI(Liability Driven Investment: 负债驱动投资: 一种旨在匹配养老金负债的投资策略)的“小插曲”。这并非英国机构在做一些疯狂的事情,而是一种错误的信念,他们认为可以以接近或等于市场价格出售AAA和AA级债券。他们错了,他们开始抛售,价格随之暴跌,最终英格兰银行不得不介入。我们是否应该认为,未来这种“流动性只在上涨时存在,下跌时则消失”的情况会成为常态?

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We've actually witnessed wholesale market failure, this cute little thing called LDI in the UK. This was not some crazy thing UK institutions were doing. This was a mistaken belief that they could sell AAA and AA obligations at or near the market price. They were wrong. They started selling, the price collapsed. Bank of England ultimately had to step in. Should we actually think on a go forward basis that this is the norm, that liquidity only exists on the way up, it does not exist on the way down?

我们为什么要选择公共市场?我们为什么要区分公共市场和私人市场?公共市场和私人市场之间到底有什么区别?对我来说,除了股权,它们之间是否存在流动性差异并不清楚。

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Why do we want to be public? Why do we actually distinguish between public and private? What is actually the difference between public and private? It's not clear to me that there's any liquidity difference. Equity is aside.

第二个重大的根本性变化是,自2008年以来,世界各地的大多数监管措施,不仅是当时,而是持续至今,都在削弱银行在经济中的作用。世界各地都在以不同的速度经历去银行化(de-banking: 减少银行在经济中作用的趋势)。在美国,银行目前提供的债务资本不到30%,其余部分由投资者提供。世界各地的每个监管机构、每个政府 everywhere in the world 都有两种选择:资本可以来自银行,或者资本可以来自投资者,没有第三种选择。一旦选择了投资者,你还有另外两种选择:它们可以来自日常流动性的公共市场,或者来自机构私人市场。

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Second big fundamental change: 2008, most of the regulation around the world, not just then, but continuing to today, has to reduce the role of banks in the economy. Everywhere in the world is going through de-banking at different rates. In the US, banks today are less than 30% of debt capital. Investors are the other percentage. Every regulator, every government everywhere in the world has two choices: capital can come from banks, or capital can come from investors. There's no third choice. Once you choose investors, you have two more choices: they can come from the daily liquid public markets, or they can come from institutional private markets.

想想欧洲的优先事项,特别是能源转型、气候变化、基础设施——我刚才提到的所有这些都是长期项目。我们为什么要让这些项目通过日常流动性市场获得资金?难道我们不希望它们通过机构市场获得资金以匹配流动性吗?系统性风险在哪里?想想为什么银行业不受青睐。银行业不受青睐,部分原因是银行“借短贷长”。我们真的希望通过使用更多的公共市场来增加“借短贷长”的风险,还是希望使用私人市场?

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Think about the priorities, particularly in Europe: energy transition, climate change, infrastructure. Everything I just mentioned is long-term. Why would we want that funded on a daily liquid basis? Wouldn't we want that funded in institutional markets to match liquidity? Where is systemic risk? Think about why banking is being disfavored. Banking is being disfavored in part because banks borrow short and lend long. Do we really want more borrow short, lend long by using more public markets, or do we want private markets?

这种对银行角色和投资者角色的全面重新思考是一场巨大的变革。我们作为投资者,将会在金融,不,应该说是固定收益领域,体验到前所未有的产品。过去40年里被金融机构资产负债表锁定的风险回报、产品和收益,现在正作为投资产品走向我们。

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This whole rethink of the role of a bank, the role of an investor, is a massive change. We as investors are going to experience products in the financial, excuse me, the fixed income space that we've never seen before. Risk rewards, products, returns that have been locked on the balance sheets of financial institutions for the last 40 years are on their way to you as investment products.

指数化、集中化与公募/私募之辩

我们都将不得不克服对公共和私人市场的固有偏见。另一个巨大的变化是指数化(indexation: 投资组合复制市场指数表现的策略)和相关性(correlation: 不同资产价格变动方向和程度的关系)。美国市场是否存在价格发现(price discovery: 市场参与者通过交易行为确定资产真实价值的过程)?我不知道。美国市场83%的份额是标准普尔500指数(S&P 500: Standard & Poor's 500 Index: 一个包含美国500家大型上市公司股票的市值加权指数),其中10只股票占了标普500指数的35%。这些股票今天的市盈率(PE: Price-to-Earnings Ratio: 衡量公司股价与其每股收益之间关系的指标)高达45倍。我们中有多少人每天都在试图购买45倍市盈率的股票?可能一个也没有。

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We're all going to have to overcome biases that we have about public and private. Other big change: indexation and correlation. Do we have price discovery in US markets? I don't know. 83% of the US market is S&P 500. 10 stocks are 35% of the S&P. Those 10 stocks trade at a 45 PE today. How many of us come in every day trying to buy 45 PE stocks? Probably none.

另一方面,想想当今世界上最大的资本池:12万亿美元的资金存放在401(k)计划(401K: 美国的一种退休金储蓄计划)中,这些是中等市场投资者,真正需要回报的人。这些人投资了什么?日常流动性的指数基金,而且是50年期的。为什么?为什么我们要让人们投资于50年期的日常流动性指数基金?我认为变革真正到来之处就在于此。

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On the other hand, think of the largest pool of capital in the world today: $12 trillion sitting in 401K for us mid-market investors, people who really need returns. What are these people invested in? Daily liquid index funds for 50 years. Why? Why do we have people invested in daily liquid index funds for 50 years? And it'll go to where I think change is really coming.

我们正在对公共市场与私人市场进行全面的重新评估。在我40年的职业生涯中,我一直认为公共市场是安全的,私人市场是高风险的,而且在我大部分职业生涯中,情况确实如此。私人市场只有三种产品:风险投资(Venture Capital: 投资于初创期或成长期的非上市公司)、对冲基金(hedge funds: 采用多种策略以期获得绝对回报的投资工具)和私募股权(private Equity: 投资于非上市公司股权的基金)。这三者都具有高风险。公共市场是安全的,至少在美国,有8000家上市公司,股票和债券组合多样化。

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We are going through an entire evaluation of public versus private. In my 40 years, I certainly grew up thinking public is safe, private is risky, and for most of my career that's been true. Private was three products: venture capital, hedge funds, and private equity. All three are risky. Public was safe. In the US, at least 8,000 public companies, diversified portfolios of stocks and bonds.

但如果情况不再是这样了呢?如果私人市场既安全又高风险,而公共市场也既安全又高风险呢?我们应该如何思考投资?我们应该如何构建投资组合?我们大多数机构都设有一个“私人投资”或“另类投资”的类别。为什么不设一个“公共投资”类别,而不是“私人投资”类别?美国上市公司数量已从8000家降至4000家,我敢打赌这个数字还会继续下降,而不是上升。难道我们不应该将一半的资金投入私人市场吗?

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What if that's not the case anymore? What if private is both safe and risky, and public is safe and risky? How should we think about investing? How should we think about portfolios? Most of us, most institutions, operate with a private bucket or an alternatives bucket. Why don't you have a public bucket rather than a private bucket? Market: we went from 8,000 public companies in the US to 4,000 public companies, and I would bet that's going to go down, not up. Shouldn't we have half our money in private?

我认为我们过去之所以关注私人市场以寻求回报率,是因为我们一直认为它风险更高,因此需要更高的回报。但我认为,未来我们将转向私人市场以寻求多元化,以摆脱指数化和集中化。我认为我们将重新思考整个风险和回报的概念。我们过去认为公共市场是安全的,私人市场是高风险的,银行是某种债务融资,日常流动性是理所当然的——顺便说一句,我们为什么要有日常流动性基金?我不知道。一个拥有20年或40年投资期限的机构,为什么要关注流动性?我不知道。这些都是我们正在打破的禁忌。

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I think we've looked to private markets for rate of return because we've always perceived it as more risky, therefore more return is desired. I think we're going to look to private markets for diversification. I think to escape indexation and concentration. I think we're going to look to private markets. I think we're going to rethink the whole notion of risk and reward, the things that we've taken for granted: that public is safe and that private is risky, that banks are a sort of debt financing, that daily liquid. By the way, why do we have daily liquid funds? I don't know. Why does an institution with a 20 or 40-year time horizon concern itself with liquidity? I don't know. These are we are breaking taboo.

投资者现在感到困惑,他们困惑是因为他们回顾历史,认为过去的方法有效。但他们尚未准备好质疑基本面:系统是否完全不同了?情况是否已经改变?我们是否处于顺风消失的时期?我是否愿意重新审视潜在的假设?

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Investors right now are confused, and they're confused because they're looking back at history and they're saying, "This worked," but what they're not yet willing to do is to question the fundamentals. Is the system totally different? Have things changed? Are we in the absence of tailwinds? Am I willing to revisit underlying assumptions?

投资的未来:阿尔法、贝塔与私人市场

想想以下几点,回到价格发现的概念。股票的积极管理是一项非常困难的业务,很少有人能做得非常好,拥有纪律,拥有60个团队。如果我告诉你有一个市场,在20年里,93%的参与者未能跑赢指数,你会感到担忧吗?这些人变笨了吗?我不认为如此。那么,市场结构改变了吗?我认为市场结构已经改变了。我认为日常流动性这个概念也将改变。我们正在为此下注,我们建立了一个今天价值6500亿美元的业务,五年内将翻倍,其基础就是投资者将重新审视他们的思维方式,而这已经正在发生。

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Think about the following, like coming back to the notion of price discovery. Active management of equity is a really difficult business. Very few people do it really well, have the discipline, have 60 teams. If I told you there was a market where for 20 years 93% of the participants failed to beat the index, you would be concerned. Did these people get stupider? I don't think so. Well, has the structure of the market changed? I think the structure of the market has changed. I think the whole notion of daily liquidity is going to change. We are betting on that. We've built a business that is $650 billion today, which will be twice its size in five years, based on a bet that investors are going to revisit how they think. It is already happening.

如果你考察一个典型的投资者,我会简化你的投资组合:一个典型的机构投资者,投资于我们的,大约50%投资于日常流动性的公共股权,30%投资于日常流动性的固定收益,20%投资于其他所有东西。为什么?没有人知道。这就是我们一直在做的事情,这就是历史上有效的方法。我们正在实时观察这种变化,而这种变化首先发生在固定收益领域。

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So if you take the typical investor, and I'll take your portfolio, but then I'll simplify it. A typical institutional investor that invests with us is 50-ish percent invested in public equity, daily liquid, 30% invested in fixed income, daily liquid, and 20% in everything else. Why? No one knows. That's what we've done, that's what's worked historically, and we're actually watching this change in real time. And the place it's changing first is in fixed income.

一个单一的A级私人证券,它是另类投资还是固定收益?我经常问首席投资官(CIOs: Chief Investment Officers: 负责管理投资组合的最高级别投资专业人士)这个问题,这能让他们思考一个小时,因为我们都从小认为这种东西不存在。我们正在看到机构投资者审视他们的固定收益投资组合,他们正在将固定收益投资组合从公共和私人市场转向阿尔法(Alpha: 超额收益,指投资组合在承担同等风险的情况下,超越基准指数的回报)和贝塔(Beta: 市场风险,衡量投资组合相对于市场整体波动的敏感度)。

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A single A-rated private security, is that an alternative or is that fixed income? I ask CIOs this question all the time. It can stump them for an hour because we've all grown up thinking this thing doesn't exist. We are watching institutional investors look at their fixed income portfolio, and they are moving their fixed income portfolio not into public and private, but into alpha and beta.

我们将看到机构投资者的固定收益投资组合转向私人市场,原因在于有一个仲裁者,有一个评级机构。有人可以说这是A级,那也是A级,通过转换你可以获得200个基点(basis points: 衡量利率或收益率变动的单位,1个基点等于0.01%)的收益率。因此,既然我们不需要流动性,我们就应该转换。

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We are going to watch a turnover of the fixed income portfolio of institutional investors move into private markets. And the reason that's happening is there's an arbiter, there's a rating agency. Someone can say, "This was A-rated, this was A-rated." You can pick up 200 basis points of yield for moving. Therefore, we should move since we don't need the liquidity.

如果同样的情况发生在股权市场呢?如果人们将他们50%的股权投资组合拿出来,真正思考多元化,思考上市公司的数量,而不是只考虑私募股权(private Equity: 投资于非上市公司股权的基金)——因为私募股权,我知道这场辩论正在这个国家实时进行,私募股权是杠杆股权(levered equity: 通过借贷增加投资回报的股权),它是一种基金结构,会产生一些二元结果。如果我们讨论的是私人股权,而不是私募股权,那对人们来说将是一个更难的转变,因为目前还没有评级机构愿意让人们在公共和私人市场之间以同等风险进行讨论。但这就是我们今天所处的世界,未来会有更多的公司是私有的。那些没有投资私人股权的人,正在错过一半的市场。他们正在集中他们的投资组合。

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What about if the same were true in equity? What if people took their 50% equity bucket and they actually thought about diversification? They thought about the number of public companies, and rather than think about private equity, because private equity, and I know the debate is taking place in this country in real time, private equity is levered equity. It's in a fund structure. It produces some binary outcomes. What if we talked about equity that's private, rather than private equity? That's going to be a harder move for people because there's no rating agency yet that is willing to allow people to talk across the spectrum of public and private and equal risk. But that's the world we live in today. More companies are going to be private. People who are not invested in equity that is private are missing out on half of the marketplace. They are concentrating their portfolios.

他们的公共投资组合过去表现良好,这并不让我感到惊讶。我们被指数化和相关性所驱动,我们被资金流所驱动。美国已经印发了8万亿美元,去年100%的回报基本上来自10只股票。每个人都醒悟过来,发现他们拥有英伟达、苹果、亚马逊和微软,并且以同样的方式加了杠杆。对我来说,这是否可持续并不清楚。

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The notion that their public portfolios have performed well in the past does not surprise me. We are indexed and correlated. We have been driven by money flows. We've printed $8 trillion in the US. 100% of last year's return was essentially 10 stocks. Everyone has woken up and discovered that they own Nvidia, Apple, and Amazon, and Microsoft, and it's levered the same way. It's not clear to me that that's sustainable.

作为一名企业领导者,我认为Adam提出的“谦逊自信”的概念确实非常好。我们都面临着变化,都面临着不确定性。但当我们做一些小事情来应对变化和不确定性,我们反思不同的意见,我们允许思想上的不服从时,我们中有多少人真正迫使组织从根本上重新思考我们认为真实的事情是否真的真实?我想挑战这一点,我想让你们所有人思考这一点。

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And for me, as a leader of a business, I think Adam's notion of humble confidence is actually a really good one. We all are confronted with change. We're all confronted with uncertainty. But while we do the little things to deal with change and uncertainty, and we reflect contrary opinion, and we allow for intellectual insubordination, how many of us actually force the organization to fundamentally rethink whether the things we think are true are true? I want to challenge that. I want all of you to think about that.

我认为我们从小所处的环境已经不复存在了。我认为金融体系不再像我们想象的那样运作。我认为流动性不同了,债务来源不同了,指数化和相关性也不同了。公共和私人市场的整个概念都不同了。而且,我认为我们过去40年所采用的策略在未来将不再有效。这对我们来说是一个非常不舒服的现实,因为我们都习惯于进行尽职调查,查看业绩记录,查看历史相关性。对我来说,这些是否还有任何价值并不清楚。谢谢大家,这次演讲非常精彩。

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I don't think what we've grown up in exists anymore. I don't think the financial system works the way we think it does. I think liquidity is different, the sources of debt are different, indexation and correlation are different, the whole notions of public and private are different, and I don't think the strategies that we've employed over the past 40 years are going to work going forward. That's a really uncomfortable thing for us to deal with, because we're all used to doing due diligence and looking at track record, looking at historical correlations. It's not clear to me that that is any value. Thank you, this has been great.

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关键字: economic financial-market-change market market-liquidity