韩国国防工业的崛起与从零起步的奇迹
这是 K9 自行榴弹炮，加上出售给波兰的 K2 坦克、出售给海湾阿拉伯国家的 KM-SAM 防空导弹系统、出售给菲律宾的现代护卫舰，以及交付给菲律宾、波兰和马来西亚的 FA 战斗机。这些先进系统是韩国国防工业正在走向世界的终极象征。在一个由法国、俄罗斯和美国等传统老牌国家主导的超先进产业中，韩国的崛起确实令人瞩目，特别是考虑到仅仅在 70 年前，韩国还是世界上最贫困的国家之一，没有任何成规模的工业基础。那么，韩国究竟是如何从零打造出一个世界级国防工业的？在当今更加危险的全球秩序下，其他国家能否复制韩国的战略，打入这个极其复杂且保密森严的国防产业？
英文原文
This is the K9 Howitzer and together with the K2 tanks sold to Poland, the KM SAM missile defense system sold [music] to the Gulf Arab states and modern frigots sold to the Philippines and the FA fighter jets delivered to the Philippines, Poland, and Malaysia. These advanced systems are the ultimate symbol of how Korean defense industry is taking over the world. And in a hyper advanced industry dominated by legacy players like France, Russia, and the US, Korea's rise is truly remarkable, especially given that just 70 years ago, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world with no significant industrial base. So, how did South Korea develop a worldclass defense industry from scratch? And in today's even more dangerous global order, can other countries copy the Korean strategy to break into the notoriously complicated and secretive defense industry?坦率地说，因为这个行业极其保密，由大企业和下定决心隐藏其运作方式的各国政府主导，按照我平时的研究流程——依赖专业报告、公开数据和学术研究——我根本无法解答这些问题。因此，当阿里郎电视台（Arirang TV）联系我，表示希望资助制作一期关于我自选的韩国产业视频，并提出帮我联络行业内部人士以及韩国政府本身，且非常关键的是，除了一次针对事实准确性的审核外，我仍拥有完全的编辑控制权时，我抓住了这个机会，登上飞往韩国的航班，去采访了来自韩国大企业、航天协会以及韩国最大国防杂志的专家，我甚至还获得了进入防卫事业厅（DAPA，韩国的采购机构，同时负责支持国防出口）的内部准入机会。确实多亏了他们就政府采购经验法则、所谓的补偿贸易（offset）战略运用以及朝鲜所扮演的出人意料角色提供的见解，我认为自己才得以拼凑出韩国如何从零建立尖端国防工业的全貌。
英文原文
Honestly, because the industry is so secretive, dominated by big corporations and governments determined to hide their methods. These questions were simply impossible for me to answer, at least using my normal research process, relying on professional reports, open data, and academic research. Therefore, when Arriang TV contacted me to say that they wanted to sponsor a video about a South Korean industry of my choice and that they would help me get in touch with industry insiders as well as the Korean government itself and very important that I would still have full editorial control apart from a single review for factual accuracy. I jumped on the opportunity and hopped on a plane to South Korea to interview experts from Korea's biggest companies, the Aerospace Association, Korea's biggest defense magazine, and I even got inside access to DAPA, Korea's procurement agency, which also supports defense exports. It was really only thanks to their insights on government purchasing rules of thumb, the strategic use of so-called offset and the surprising role of North Korea that I believe I got the full picture of how Korea built a state-of-the-art defense industry from scratch.安全威胁与自主防务的最初动力
这里是朝韩边界。当然，这在韩国国防工业的崛起中起到了巨大的推动作用。要知道，虽然在 1950 年代，美国全力支持韩国抵御北方入侵的威胁，但它当时的做法仅仅是直接向韩国军队提供其所需的所有武器和系统。然而，随着国家的发展，美国总统尼克松在 1969 年告知韩国，像韩国这样的盟友必须为自身防务承担多得多的责任。在随后的几年里，美军驻军减少，免费的武器赠送转变为付费军购，购买那些韩国为了生存而真正依赖的美国武器系统。正如今天面临生死存亡威胁的国家一样，美国的抽身给了韩国三大强烈的动力来开始建立自身的国防工业：
- 第一大动力：进口昂贵的武器系统会耗费宝贵的外汇，而各国更希望将这些外汇用于发展自身工业。
- 第二大动力：韩国在地理上被曾经在不同历史时期侵略过它的国家所环绕，因此一旦与其中任何一方发生冲突，外国武器进口很容易被切断。
- 第三大动力：虽然美国在历史上是一个非常慷慨的盟国，但它依然对其最尖端的防务技术实施严格限制。
因此，在朴正熙总统治下，韩国立志在很大程度上实现自力更生，通过提供免税、国家专项贷款、地方垄断牌照和补贴等手段，鼓励现代、韩华（当时称为韩国火药）、三星和大宇等本土企业建立防务生产部门。
英文原文
This is the border between North and South Korea. And of course, this plays a massive role in the rise of Korea's defense industry. You see, while in the 1950s the US had fully supported South Korea against the threat of a northern invasion, it had done so simply by giving the army all the weapons and systems that it needed. However, as the country developed, US President Nixon told South Korea in 1969 that allies like South Korea had to take far more responsibility for their own defense. And in the years that followed, US troops were reduced and free weapons gave way to paid sales of the US weapon systems that South Korea literally depended on for its very survival. So just like for nations that are under mortal threat today, this retreat of the US gave Korea three strong incentives to start building its own [music] defense industry. The first incentive is that importing expensive weapon systems costs valuable foreign currency which countries would much rather use to develop their industries. The second incentive is that Korea is literally surrounded by countries that have at one point or another invaded the country. Therefore, foreign weapons imports could easily be cut off in case of conflict with any of them. And then finally, while the US has historically been a very generous ally, it still restricted its most state-of-the-art defense tech. Therefore, under President Park Chunghi, South Korea set out to become largely self-reliant by encouraging local companies like Hyundai, Hana, then known as Korea Explosives, Samsung, and De Woo, to set up defense production units by giving them tax exemptions, [music] state sponsored loans, local monopoly licenses, and subsidies.然而，任何研究历史的人都会告诉你，政府声称想要做某事与政府实际付诸行动是两码事。例如在 1960 和 70 年代，印度、埃及、巴西和阿根廷也投入了数十亿美元来补贴本土国防工业。然而，尽管投入了巨资，如今他们在波兰坦克合同等国际竞标中根本无法指望与韩国竞争。更重要的是，虽然韩国目前基本实现了自给自足，但印度和巴西近一半的国防系统依然依赖外国。或许更糟的是，尽管有着备受瞩目的巨额支出项目，埃及和阿根廷目前基本上已经放弃，其安全防务几乎完全依赖外国势力。那么，为什么这些投入数十亿美元的项目失败了，而韩国却取得了巨大的成功？换句话说，打造一个世界级的国防工业为什么会如此之难？
英文原文
However, as anyone studying history will tell you, a government saying that they want something and a government that's actually doing it are two very different things. For example, in the 1960s and '7s, India, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina also spent billions of dollars subsidizing a homegrown defense industry. Yet, despite these billions, today they could never hope to compete with South Korea in international tenders like the Polish tank contract. More importantly, while South Korea is now largely self-sufficient, India and Brazil still depend on foreign countries for almost half their defense systems. And perhaps even worse, despite high-profile spending programs, Egypt [music] and Argentina have now largely given up and almost completely depend on foreign powers for their security. So why did these billiondoll programs fail while South Korea's was a massive success? In other [music] words, why is it so hard to build a worldclass defense industry?要素一：干中学与务实的自研阶梯
作为一名经济学家，我受过的训练自然让我首先从强大的自由市场的理想化图景来思考这些问题。好的，如果人们愿意为某些产品（在这里是坦克、喷气机和舰船）支付巨额资金，那么理论上企业应该迅速涌现来提供供应。确实，造出一支好步枪需要花一些时间，但只要涉及足够多的资金，总会有聪明的创业者想办法把它做成。当然，国防市场有些特殊，因为对于大多数产品来说，唯一的客户当然是政府。但实际上，在这种情况下，这反而可能是一个优势。毕竟政府希望获得战略自主，因此它只需让本土公司供应坦克、飞机和舰艇，企业就会摸索出制造方法，对吧？遗憾的是并非如此，因为有三个因素在直接阻碍这一过程。
英文原文
As an economist, I've of course been trained to think about these problems first through the idealized picture of the mighty free [music] market. Okay. If people are willing to pay a lot of money for certain products, in this case, tanks, [music] jets, and ships, then companies should in theory quickly pop up to supply them. Sure, it takes a while to produce a good rifle, but if enough money is involved, there are always smart entrepreneurs who will find a way to make [music] it happen. Of course, the defense market is a bit special because for most products, the only customer is of course the government. But actually, in this case, that could be an advantage. After all, the government wants to become strategically independent. So, it can just ask local companies to supply tanks, jets, and ships, and they will figure out how to do it, right?首先是喷气机、导弹和潜艇这类技术太难制造，本土企业可能永远也摸索不明白。例如埃及在 1960 年代尝试这种方式时，开局看起来非常不错。由于投入资金巨大，埃及人直接聘请了经验丰富的德国工程师，他们很快就造出了令人瞩目的火箭，纳赛尔总统也在阅兵式上兴高采烈地展示了这些武器。然而，当埃及在与以色列的六日战争中真正需要这些火箭发挥作用时，它们实际上根本无法运转，最终被证明只是个无底洞。同样，印度从 1960 年代开始的战斗机项目也饱受延期和严重超支的困扰，尽管它们今天能够升空，但在发动机等关键外国零部件上依然高度依赖外部。
英文原文
No, sadly not. Because there are three factors that are actively preventing this. And the first is that technologies like jets, missiles, and submarines are so difficult to make that local companies may never actually figure it out. For example, when Egypt tried this approach in the 1960s, it started really promising. Thanks to how much money was involved, the Egyptians could simply hire experienced German engineers who in no time came up with impressive rockets [music] that President Nasser gleefully showed off at military parades. However, when Egypt actually needed the rockets to work during the Six-Day War with Israel, these rockets were not actually functional, proving to be simply a money pit. Similarly, Indian fighter jet programs from the 1960s onwards were plagued by delays and massive cost overruns. And sure, while they are airborne today, they still rely heavily on crucial foreign parts such as [music] engines.那么，韩国是如何避免这种命运的？这正是价值连城的核心问题——制造出被多国认为足够可靠、愿意斥资数十亿美元采购的导弹和战斗机。答案可以在韩国战争纪念馆的这份信息图中找到。当埃及和印度在 1960 和 70 年代将目光瞄准尖端国防技术时，韩国起步时主要制造的是轻型火炮、海岸警卫队巡逻艇、轻武器和螺旋桨教练机。只有在掌握了这些技术之后，韩国人才尝试制造自己的坦克。即便如此，他们也是从在韩国本土升级和维护美制巴顿坦克开始的。正是凭借在这些坦克上积累了经验的工程师，韩国才得以在 1980 年代研制出 K1。我身后的这辆就是韩国的 K1 主战坦克，这是他们第一款自制的主战坦克，但关键在于它当时仍基于美国技术。此后，他们又花了 27 年时间，直到 2014 年才研制出自己的坦克——也就是最近成功出口到波兰的 K2。这就是经济学上所说的干中学（learning by doing）：从简单入手，边造边学，然后沿着价值链逐步向上攀升。
英文原文
So, how did Korea avoid this fate? That is the million-doll question. Producing both missiles and fighter jets that have been deemed reliable enough for countries to spend billions on them. The answer can be seen in this infographic from the museum at the War Memorial [music] of Korea. While Egypt and India set their sights on advanced defense tech in the 1960s and '7s, Korea mostly started by making light artillery, coastg guard boats, small arms, [music] and propeller-driven trainer aircraft. Only after mastering these technologies did the Koreans attempt to build their own tank. [music] And even there they started with upgrading and maintaining American patent tanks in Korea. Only then with experienced engineers that had worked on these tanks was South Korea able to develop the K1 in the 1980s. This here behind me is Korea's K1 battle tank. Their first self-made battle tank, but crucially it was still based on US technology. After that, it still took them 27 years until 2014 to build their own tank, the K2 that was recently exported successfully [music] to Poland. And this is what economists call learning by [music] doing. You start simple, you learn by making, and then you slowly work your way up the value chain.干中学是解释为何极少有国家能从零建立国防工业的第一个因素。要知道，一个繁荣的产业需要大量具备无法在学校学到的知识的工程师。如果你希望机构能够制造超先进的军事装备，你不能光给他们许诺金钱；他们会声称自己能做到，但结果只会交付昂贵、低劣且充斥着超支的产品。那么，政府何时该要求本国产业摸索自研，何时又应该直接进口呢？这个问题当然没有唯一的标准答案。但在我访问韩国防卫事业厅（简称 DAPA）时，他们告诉我，他们实际上遵循一条非常简单的经验法则：如果本土产业落后外国竞争对手大约 2 年或更短，他们就会从国内产业采购；但如果韩国产业落后得更多——比如面对像美国 F-35 这样的第五代战斗机——那么韩国政府就会选择进口。
英文原文
Learning by doing is the first factor that helps explain why so few countries were able to build a defense industry from scratch. You see, a thriving industry needs lots of engineers with knowledge that cannot be learned in school. If you want organizations that can build ultra advanced military machines, you cannot just promise them money. They will tell you they can do it, yes, but only they will deliver expensive, [music] inferior products plagued by cost overruns. So when should governments ask their own industry to learn how to make something versus when is it better to just import instead? Of course, there is no single right answer to that question. But when I visited South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration, [music] DAPA for short, they told me that they actually follow a very simple rule of thumb. If local industry is approximately 2 years or less behind foreign competition, they procure a product from domestic industry. But if Korean industry is further behind, they are still with, for example, a fifth generation fighter jet like the US F-35, then Korea's government will import instead.补偿贸易的妙用与军购杠杆
好吧，干中学能够解释整件事，对吧？走出那次采访时，我以为自己已经搞清了全貌。但第二天当我与来自韩国航空宇宙产业协会的徐先生（Mr. Suh）交谈时，我意识到自己实际上还遗漏了一个关键点，而那个关键点就是补偿贸易（offset）的概念。也就是说，无论何时谈判一笔重大防务进口订单，你追求的绝不仅仅是用最低的价格买到最好的产品，你还会争取最高比例的补偿贸易。补偿贸易是一个专业术语，用来描述卖方国家为你所做的事情，以冲抵你向他们支付的款项。补偿贸易通常是你进口订单金额的一定百分比。例如，加拿大最近采购新潜艇时：
加拿大政府要求 100% 的补偿贸易。
但这意味着什么呢？补偿贸易通常是什么样的？基本上包括三类：
- 补偿性采购
- 补偿性投资
- 补偿性技术转让
例如在加拿大潜艇一案中，德国蒂森克虏伯海洋系统（TKMS）在 2026 年 7 月被指定为首选供应商，据报道这包含了两个方面：首先，德国将培训加拿大造船厂并为其配备维护潜艇的设备；其次，德国人承诺在关键矿产和人工智能等战略领域进行巨额投资。
英文原文
Okay, learning by doing that can explain the entire thing, right? So, walking out of that interview, I thought I had figured it all out. But [music] the next day when I talked to Mr. Suang from the Korea Aerospace [music] Industries Association, I realized that I was actually still missing something crucial and that something [music] turned out to be the concept of offset. That is whenever you negotiate a major defense import order, you do not just try to get the best product for the lowest price. [music] You also try to get the highest offset. where offset is a technical term that is used to describe something that a country does in return for you to offset your payment to them. Offset is typically a percentage of the dollar value of your import order. So for example, when Canada recently requested new submarines, >> the Canadian government they ask for 100% offset. >> But okay, what does that mean? What is offset [music] typically? Okay, three things. It can either be offsetting purchases, offsetting investments, or offsetting technology transfers. So, for example, in the case of Canadian submarines, where Germany's TKMS was named preferred supplier in July 2026, it reportedly meant [music] two things. First, Germany would train and equip Canadian shipyards to maintain the submarines. And second, the Germans promised to invest heavily in strategic sectors [music] such as critical minerals and AI.另一方面，韩国通常选择的是技术转让类的补偿贸易。也就是说，每当他们从美国进口装备时，往往会要求向本土公司转让大量技术作为补偿。例如，韩国在 1990 年代购买美国 KF-16 战斗机时，协议包括由三星航天（今日韩国航空宇宙产业公司的前身）在韩国本土进行授权生产，这让工程师积累了飞机制造技术，日后该企业正是利用这些技术造出了自己的战机。因此讽刺的是，首先进行大量进口反而可能有利于本国产业，因为这能让你通过补偿贸易更快获取外国技术，在本质上为“干中学”提供了强劲助力。
英文原文
On the other hand, Korea typically chose a technology transfer offset instead. That is, whenever they imported hardware from the US, they often asked for a substantial offset in technology transfers to local companies. For example, when Korea bought US FC16 [music] fighters in the 1990s, the deal included licensed production in Korea by Samsung Aerospace, a predecessor of today's Korea Aerospace Industries, which built aircraft knowhow with these engineers that the company later used to make its own jets. So, ironically, it may be an advantage to your own industry if you first import a lot because it can allow you to obtain foreign technologies much faster through offset, essentially turbocharging, learning by doing.要素二：范围经济与民用工业基础
但如果这就是全部逻辑，那么对于当今大量进口且希望变得更加独立的中东国家而言无疑是个好消息。他们能否直接复制韩国这种通过补偿技术转让强化的稳扎稳打路径？当我询问韩国专家时，他们告诉我：
中东国家，特别是沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋等国，在其本土国防工业上投入了巨资，尤其是阿联酋，但问题在于……
他们无法建立起能够支撑国防工业的其他工业部门。
作为一名经济学家，我立刻意识到这些论点实际上是在指出：从零建立国防工业需要范围经济（economies of scope）。因此，除了干中学之外，促成韩国路径如此成功的第二个因素是发展范围经济。要知道，虽然你当然可以尝试通过数百年跨度的干中学来建立国防工业，但韩国 60 年的发展轨迹在很大程度上得益于其作为一个整体制造业大国的快速、广泛崛起。其原因很简单：国防公司如果自身生产相关民用产品，或者与其它重工业紧密相连，就能够更高效地生产诸如坦克或飞机等复杂的防务技术。
英文原文
But if that was the whole story, then that would be good news for countries in the Middle East today who import a lot and also want to get more independent. Could they just copy Korea's slow and steady approach? supercharged with offset technology transfers. When I asked the experts in South Korea, they told me that Middle Eastern countries especially Saudi Arabia and UAE Arab Arab those countries were heavily invested upon their indigenous defense industries especially the Arab UAE but the problem is >> they couldn't build other industry industry sector which supports defense industry. As an economist, I immediately recognized these arguments as basically saying that to build a defense industry from scratch, you need economies [music] of scope. So besides learning by doing, the second factor that made Korea's path so successful is developing economies of scope. You see, while of course you could [music] try to build a defense industry through learning by doing over hundreds of years, Korea's 60-year trajectory was aided a lot by their rapid broad-based rise as a global manufacturing power in general. And the reason is simply that defense companies can produce complicated defense tech like tanks or jets much more efficiently if they either make related products themselves or are close to other heavy industry.例如，K2 主战坦克的制造商现代乐铁（Hyundai Rotem），他们可不仅仅制造坦克。在最开始，现代乐铁实际上是：
作为一家坦克工厂成立的。但政府始终认为，单靠制造坦克是无法维持企业运营的，因为与民用经济相比，坦克的市场体量仍然非常小。
同样，K9 榴弹炮由韩华航天制造，该公司也生产发动机；KSS-III 潜艇由像韩华海洋这样的造船厂建造，该厂同时也建造天然气运输船等专业民用船只；最后，T-50 教练机和 FA-50 战斗机由韩国航空宇宙产业公司（KAI）生产，这是一家庞大的综合企业，同样制造直升机、卫星，并为波音和空中客车生产飞机零部件。这当然绝非巧合。生产民用产品不仅可以保护大型军工综合企业免受市场低迷周期的冲击，还能教会企业如何高效进行大规模生产，并且民用和军用产品往往可以共用许多零部件的生产线。因此事后来看，朴正熙总统在大致相同的时间节点上，既启动了国防干中学计划，又推行了更广泛的产业政策，这也完全不是巧合。
英文原文
For example, the K2 battle tank producer Hyundai ROM. Well, they are not just making tanks. In the beginning, Hyundai ROM was actually founded >> as a tank factory. But governments always thought, yeah, they cannot well they cannot maintain as a company only by making tanks because tanks are still very small compared to civilian economy. Similarly, the K9 Hower is made by Hanoa Aerospace, which also makes engines, while the KSS3 [music] submarines are built by ship builders like Hanwa Ocean, which also build specialized civilian ships like [music] gas tankers. And finally, the T-50 trainer jet and FA50 fighters are produced by Karina Aerospace [music] Industries, a giant conglomerate that also makes helicopters, satellites, and produces plane parts for Boeing and Airbus. This is of course no coincidence. Not only does building civilian products protect major military conglomerates from downturns, [music] it also teaches companies how to do mass production efficiently and [music] they can often share production lines for many parts that are used in both civilian and military products. So in hindsight, it was also no coincidence that President Park kickstarted both his defense learning by doing program and his broader industrial policy around the same time.要素三：规模经济与冷战后的持续需求
然而，我认为波兰和德国的例子表明，要掌握全貌我们还需要第三个因素。仅凭干中学和范围经济本身是不够的。波兰虽然能够吸引大量制造业，但未能建立起任何接近韩国军工制造能力的基础，因此当俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时，波兰自身无法制造坦克；至关重要的是，其邻国德国历史上虽是坦克制造强国，但德国的坦克工厂实际上萎缩得非常厉害，以至于无法足够快地交付如此庞大的订单。那么究竟发生了什么？这与解释韩国国防工业崛起的第三个因素又有什么关系？
在我身后可以看到朝鲜，一个扬言一旦爆发战争就要征服整个韩国的国家。事实证明，朝鲜的威胁实际上有助于解释韩国成为国防巨头所需的第三个因素：不是范围经济，而是规模经济（economies of scale）。由于朝鲜的威胁，韩国一直将其国内生产总值（GDP）的约 2.5% 用于国防。因此：
我们在韩国市场上一直有着非常稳定的需求。众所周知，我们与朝鲜的关系始终非常紧张，因此由于来自朝鲜的潜在威胁，我们始终有着装备现代化的需求。
英文原文
Yet, I'd argue that the cases of Poland and Germany show us that we need yet another third factor to get the full picture. By themselves, learning by doing and economies of scope are not enough. You see, while Poland was able to attract a significant manufacturing industry, it was not able to build anything close to the military manufacturing capabilities of Korea. So when Russia invaded Ukraine, Poland could not build the tanks themselves. And crucially, while their neighbor Germany is historically a tank manufacturing powerhouse, Germany's tank factories had actually shrunk so much that they could not deliver such big orders quickly enough. So what happened? And what does this have to do with our third factor that can explain the rise of Korea's defense industry? Behind me, you can see North Korea, a country that has pledged to conquer all of South Korea if a war breaks out. Well, as it turns out, the North Korean threat can actually help explain the third factor that Korea needed to become a defense giant is not economies of scope, but rather economies of scale. Okay, as you can see here, due to the threat of North Korea, South Korea has consistently spent around 2.5% of GDP on defense. And therefore >> we've always had a very stable demand in Korean market. So as you know we always have a very tense relationship with North Korea and thus we always have the demand for modernization because of the potential threat always coming from North Korea.而且由于韩国经济增长十分迅速，这意味着其重工业能够指望获得针对坦克、榴弹炮、飞机、舰艇等持续增长的订单。相比之下，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰前夕，波兰政府的支出只有韩国的一半；与此同此，虽然英国和德国在绝对数额上的支出超过韩国，但他们并未将资金花在作为韩国当前成功基石的重型武器（如坦克和榴弹炮）上，因为他们觉得冷战已经结束。但由于边界上驻扎着规模庞大的朝鲜军队：
韩国认定，对我们而言冷战并未结束。所以他们持续制造坦克，持续制造自行榴弹炮等装备，这对于韩国产业的竞争力至关重要，原因就在于第三个因素——规模经济。
这意味着随着生产数量的增加，你的单位成本实际上会下降。例如，据报道韩国 K2 坦克的生产成本明显低于德国同类产品，部分原因在于韩国稳定的订单使现代乐铁的生产线得以持续运转，而制造豹式坦克的欧洲人在冷战后缩减了产能。因此，现代乐铁能够将营销、财务以及研发等固定成本分摊到比 KNDS 等德国公司更大、更稳定的坦克出货量上。所以当韩国参与挪威的主战坦克竞标时，据报道测试发现 K2 的性能与传奇的德国豹式坦克旗鼓相当，但得益于规模经济，K2 要便宜得多。
英文原文
>> And because Korea's economy was growing so rapidly this meant that its heavy industry could count on consistently rising orders for tanks, howitzers, jets, ships and the like. By contrast, the Polish government was only spending half of what Korea was spending just before Russia invaded Ukraine. And meanwhile, although the UK and Germany spent more than Korea in absolute terms, they were not spending on the types of heavy weapons that are the backbone of Korea's current success, like tanks and howitzers, because they felt like the Cold War was over. But thanks to the massive North Korean army at their border, >> South Korea decided well for us cold war is not over. So they kept on making tanks, kept on making self-profit how such a things and this was very important for the competitiveness of Korean industries because of factor number three economies of scale. Meaning that as you produce more, your cost per units actually drop. For example, Korean K2 tanks are reportedly significantly cheaper to produce than their German counterparts in part because steady Korean orders kept Hyundai ROM's production lines running while Europeans who make leopards scaled back their productions after the Cold War. And therefore, Hyundai ROM can spread its fixed costs such as marketing, finance, and research and development over a bigger, steadier stream of tanks than German companies like K&DS can. And therefore, when Korea participated in a Norwegian tender to buy battle tanks, trials reportedly found that the K2 was as capable as the legendary German Leopard tank, but thanks to economies of scale, the K2 was significantly cheaper.在整个韩国调研之旅中，我的初步结论是：要从零建立一个世界级国防工业，仅靠拥有雄心壮志和利用政府权力促使企业做好本土防务生产是不够的。相反，他们通过进口先进技术，同时一步一步向本土企业订购较简单的装备，促成了缓慢的干中学，而这又通过补偿贸易的技术转让得到了强力助推。但这一模式之所以奏效，是因为他们同时扶持了整体制造业，创造了范围经济；而且还因为他们在军费上持续投入，同样创造了规模经济。
事实上，这正是另一个主要的新兴防务出口国——土耳其所遵循的模式。土耳其工业起步于组装 F-16、与其他国家联合生产装甲车以及制造基础战术电台。从那里开始，他们向价值链上游移动，涉足本土改装和子系统研发，并最终开始制造自己的尖端武器系统。土耳其还拥有相对发达的制造业，为其国防工业提供了范围经济；同时它在军事上的支出也保持在相当高的水平（尽管略低于韩国），为其产业同样赋予了第三项要素——规模经济。
英文原文
So my initial conclusions from my entire Korean research trip was that to develop a world-class defense industry from scratch. It was not just enough that Korea had big ambitions and used government power to get companies to get good at making defense locally. No, instead they enabled slow learning by doing by importing advanced technologies while step-by-step ordering simpler technologies from local companies. And this was all supercharged by technology transfers from Offset. But this only worked because they were also supporting their manufacturing industry as a whole, creating economies of scale. And it only worked because they continuously spent money on their military, creating economies of scale as well. Indeed, this is exactly the template that the other major rising defense exporter followed as well, Turkey. Turkey's industry started assembling F-16s, producing armored vehicles together with other nations, and building basic tactical radios. And from there they moved up the value chain into domestic modifications and subsystems and eventually they started building their own state-of-the-art [music] weapon systems. Turkey also has a relatively advanced manufacturing industry, providing its defense industries with economies of scope. And it also kept spending quite significantly, although slightly less than Korea, on its military, providing its industries also with the third ingredient, [music] economies of scale, as well.出口壁垒与国防外交的现实
作为一个总在思考有效市场的单纯经济学家，我最初的本能是认为这三大要素不仅能解释韩国为何基本实现自给自足，还能解释韩国如何成为国防出口强国——只要造出好产品，出口便是顺理成章的下一步。然而我大错特错。这就引出了最后一块拼图。因为尽管韩国工业凭借要素一、二、三崛起到了今天的地位，但在过去几年中，韩国防务界学到了惨痛的一课：即使你拥有世界顶级的产业和极具竞争力的产品，你仍可能在最具价值的国际竞标中败北。
例如在 2022 年阿联酋的大型教练机交易中，韩国的 T-50 输给了中国的 L-15；韩国传奇的造船厂尽管拥有极具竞争力的产品，却错失了澳大利亚和加拿大的大型招标；当然，正如我提到的现代乐铁及其在挪威极具竞争力的坦克，他们最终实际上输掉了竞标。但这是为什么呢？我认为，这是因为国防市场中独特的“政府买家”属性反过来困扰了韩国。如果你想引导自身产业向特定方向发展（比如变得更加独立），拥有强大的政府权力确实非常管用；但在国际市场上，这意味着一旦你想出口，你所有的客户都是其他国家的政府。可以预见，这意味着竞标不仅关乎提供一款性价比高的优秀经济产品。
英文原文
So, as a naive economist always thinking about efficient markets, my initial instinct was that not only could these three factors explain why Korea became largely self-sufficient, they could also explain how Korea became a defense export powerhouse. They just created good products and then exports were the next logical conclusion. Boy, was I wrong. This brings me to the final piece of the puzzle. Because while Korea's industry rose to where it is today [music] thanks to factors 1, two, and three, Korea's defense community has learned a painful lesson in these last few years. That [music] is, even if you have a world-class industry and a super competitive product, you may still actually miss out on the most valuable international tenders. For example, in 2022, South Korea's T50 lost out to China's L-15 [music] in a big United Arab Emirates trainer jet deal. And Korea's legendary ship builders have missed out on big tenders in Australia and Canada despite having a highly competitive product. [music] And of course, as I mentioned, Hyundai ROM and its super competitive tank in Norway, well, they actually lost the tender. But why? Well, I'd argue it's because this is where the unique government buyer aspect of the defense market came [music] back to haunt South Korea. Sure, having a lot of government power is really useful if you want to steer your own industry in a certain direction, like becoming more independent, but on the international market, this means that now all of your clients, if you want to export, are other governments. And predictably this means that is not just about offering an economic [music] product, a good product for a good price.当空军、海军或陆军发布国际征求建议书（RFP）时，采购评估矩阵通常涉及技术规格、全寿命周期成本和作战效用等指标。然而在现实中，拥有一款有竞争力的产品仅仅能帮你拿到入场门票。在性能大体相当的产品之间，真正决定赢得竞标的因素在于：
- 你能为进口国提供什么样的补偿贸易；
- 如果对方从你这里采购，你能为其提供什么样的其他地缘政治优势；
- 你或你的盟友（这一点后续至关重要）有多大可能性会阻断其刚刚采购的产品的零部件替换或后续升级。
这三个外交因素能够解释韩国错失的那些竞标。挪威之所以选择德国豹式坦克而非据报道便宜得多的 K2，是因为德国政府让挪威相信，面对俄罗斯的威胁，与德国建立更紧密的防务关系将带来优势。类似地，澳大利亚据称选择了日本舰艇，加拿大选择了德国潜艇，是因为他们认为这些国家是更有用的军事盟友。另一方面，阿联酋最终选择中国飞机是出于推动供应来源多元化的考量；与此同时，曾协助韩国研发 T-50 战机的美国拥有针对该技术的出口审批权，而阿联酋并不希望受到这种限制。
英文原文
Sure, when an air force, navy or army issues an international request for proposals, the procurement matrix typically talks about things like technical specifications, life cycle costs, and operational utility. However, in reality, having a competitive product merely helps you to get your food in the door. [music] What matters for actually then winning the tender between [music] somewhat comparable products is number one what offset you can offer the importing country. What other geopolitical advantages you offer them if they buy from you and how likely it is that you or one of your allies which will become important later will block replacement parts or upgrades to the product that they just bought. These three diplomatic factors can explain Korea's missed tenders. Norway chose the German Leopard over the reportedly much cheaper K2 because the German government convinced [music] it that it would gain an advantage by closer defense ties with Germany in the face of a Russian threat. Similarly, Australia supposedly picked up the Japanese ships and [music] the Canada the German submarines because they viewed these countries as the more useful military ally. On the other hand, the UAE ultimately chose Chinese airplanes as part of a push to diversify its suppliers. While the US, which had helped Korea develop the T-50 jet, held export approval rights over its technology to the UAE, which the UAE did not want.重要的是，韩国人从这些巨大挫折中吸取的教训，并不是他们无法在高度政治化的国际防务领域竞争，而是他们未能有效传达本国关于“北约互操作性、可靠产能和优厚补偿贸易”的整体国家叙事。因此，能够解释韩国 2022 年后亮眼出口表现的，不仅在于它培养了一个世界级的产业，还在于运气——它本质上是在正确的时间出现在了正确的地点。也就是说，当俄罗斯用坦克和大炮入侵乌克兰时，波兰和波罗的海国家突然意识到，他们急需尽快获得重型武器。得益于朝鲜的威胁，韩国正是少数保留了重型军工工厂的国家之一，因而能够交付这些坦克和榴弹炮。
那么，既然传统西方供应国（尤其是德国）正在重新开动工厂，且拥有所有外交优势，这是否意味着韩国的国防出口繁荣现在已经结束了？不，我不这么认为。因为当我与韩国相关人士交谈时，可以清楚地看到他们已经汲取了教训。他们告诉我，在经历多次竞标失利后，他们现在建立了一个庞大的外交人员网络，专门推广“K-防务”叙事——即一个可靠的民主伙伴，不对盟友施加过多限制，并且最重要的是能够可靠地生产重型武器。此外，对于希望复制韩国成功故事的国家，韩国现在提供以技术转让形式呈现的优厚补偿贸易，帮助对方在需要时在本土生产战机、坦克、榴弹炮乃至舰船。
英文原文
Importantly, the lesson that the Koreans took away from these massive disappointments was not that they could not compete in the highly political world of international defense, but rather that they had failed to communicate their countrywide story of NATO [music] interoperability, reliable production, and generous offset. Therefore, what could explain Korea's initial export performance after 2022 is not just that it fostered a world-class industry, but also luck. It was essentially in the right place at the right time. That is, when Russia invaded Ukraine with tanks and artillery, Poland and the Baltics suddenly thought, we really need heavy weapons as fast as possible. And thanks to the threat of North Korea, South Korea was essentially one of the few countries that had maintained its heavy defense factories and were then able to deliver these tanks [music] and howitzers. So does that mean that Korea's defense export boom is actually now over now that traditional Western suppliers, especially Germany, are gearing up their factories again and they have all the diplomatic advantages? No, I don't think so. Because when I talked to the Koreans about it, it became clear that they had learned their lesson. They told me that after having witnessed so many missed tenders, they have now set up a big network of diplomatic personnel specialized in selling the K defense story of a reliable democratic partner that doesn't put many restrictions on its allies and can produce very importantly heavy weapons reliably. On top of that, Korea now offers countries that want to replicate the Korean success story generous offset in the form of technology transfers helping produce jets, tanks, howitzers, and even ships to make them locally if desired.防务建设的三种模式
总结来说，韩国是少数几个能够建立行业领先国防工业的国家之一，因为他们没有期望立即实现完全自给，而是采用聪明的采购方式和补偿贸易，帮助本国产业循序渐进地掌握国防技术树。而这之所以成为可能，是因为他们同时建立了其他工业，并保持了高位且稳定的本土需求，从而让韩国产业从范围经济和规模经济中获益。然而，仅靠这三个因素本身还不足以真正进行国际竞争。正如他们所发现的那样，国际防务出口博弈的核心在于让各国政府确信，你所能提供的远不止是一款优秀的产品。企业本身显然无法独自做到这一点，因此韩国政府也必须精通国防外交。从目前来看，这种策略似乎正在奏效：在阿联酋教练机交易中败给中国后，韩国随后成功说服了沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋和伊拉克这三个中东主要国家，使其选择采购韩国的防空导弹系统，而非传统的西方或中国供应商。
英文原文
So in conclusion, Korea is one of the few countries that was able to develop a classleading defense industry because rather than expecting to become independent right away, they use a smart buying approach and offset to help their industries slowly but surely master the defense technology tree. And this was only possible because they simultaneously built other industries and kept local demand high and stable, allowing Korean industries to benefit from economies of scope and economies of scale. However, on their own, these three factors were not enough to truly compete internationally as they discovered the international defense export game is about convincing governments that you can offer them more than just a good product. companies cannot be expected to do this on their own of course and therefore the Korean government had to get good at defense diplomacy as well and so far it seems to be working after losing the UAE trainer jet deal to China Korea then successfully convinced three major Middle Eastern states Saudi Arabia UAE and Iraq to buy its missile defense system over traditional western or Chinese suppliers.至此，我们解答了韩国如何从零打造出世界级国防工业的问题。鉴于另一个主要的普遍成功案例土耳其也遵循了类似的模式，我认为在这个安全威胁加剧的新时代，这确实为其他国家提供了一个极具吸引力的可借鉴模式。不过，我必须强调这并不是唯一的选择。另一个主要的国际防务成功案例——以色列，起初也遵循了韩国和土耳其这种“干中学并包揽一切”的模式。但在代价昂贵的“狮”（Lavi）式战斗机计划使以色列预算承压后，该项目于 1987 年被取消。此后，以色列人决定转向一种专业化模式，主要研发高科技系统，而非提供完整的防务产品链。这意味着对于当今任何希望提升自身安全水平的国家来说，基本上存在三种模式，取决于具体国情和真实诉求，每种模式都可能是正确的选择：
- 模式一：直接依赖外国系统。这或许不那么受欢迎，但正如我们在埃及和印度看到的，有时如果他们直接选择进口，结果反而会更好。如果你处于拉丁美洲大部分地区那样相对和平的周边环境中，或者你拥有极其强大的盟友（如欧洲小国），这很可能就是最适合的模式。
- 模式二：在某些与自身工业优势相契合的防务产品上做到精益求精，就像以色列或瑞典的做法。
- 模式三：韩国-土耳其模式。如果你真的像韩国那样被强敌环绕，我认为这种模式最讲得通。但正如我们所见，模式三极难做成：你必须拥有极其惊人的耐心，并且懂得如何统筹发展整体工业——这是经济学中最难掌握的手段之一。
那么你对此怎么看？是否还有其他国家拥有足够的耐心来推进长达数十年的干中学、具备足够的稳定性赋予其产业规模经济，并有能力发展普遍的重工业以实现范围经济？如果有，这些国家又是谁？欢迎在下方评论区告诉我。需要说明的是，本视频以及我的韩国调研之旅由阿里郎电视台资助，其宗旨是向全球受众展示韩国；但除了针对事实准确性的一次审核外，他们对本视频没有任何编辑控制权。