赢家产品的底层逻辑:Zynga 创始人 Mark Pincus 的产品哲学与创业深渊 The Knowledge Project Podcast 2026-06-02

进攻心态与伟大产品的“魔力”特质

在创业和产品开发中,心理状态决定了成败。我们必须处于一种进攻状态(Playing Offense),而不是防守状态。你必须思考:“如果一切都顺利会怎样?”如果你从“如果一切都出问题了怎么办”开始,你就在打防守战,还没出门你就已经输了。

伟大产品(Great Products: 在消费端能产生深远影响并建立长期价值的产品)的首要原则是它们能在深层面上与我们对话。它们触及了某种一直存在却未被表达或满足的人类本能或需求。当你第一次体验到这种产品时,会有一种神奇的解锁感。通常,在我们最愤世嫉俗的地方,往往酝酿着最神奇的魔力。如果一个产品能打动我,并能留在 iPhone 的首屏,我认为它就具备了“十亿美金”级的粘性价值(Stick Value: 用户长期留存并产生高度依赖的价值)。或许现在这个标准应该更新为“万亿”或者至少“二十亿”。

能上 iPhone 首屏意味着用户每天都会被驱使去使用它,而如今能给人这种神奇体验的数字消费产品实在太少了。

Original English Source

We've got to be in a mental state where we're playing offense and not defense. You've got to be in this place that you're thinking, "What if everything goes right?" If we're starting with what if everything goes wrong, you're playing defense. You've lost before you're even out of the gates.

What are the first principles of great products?

I think great products in the consumer world speak to us on some deep level. They speak to some human instinct or need that we've been feeling and it's been unexpressed or unmet. When we first experience that, there's something magical to it that it could be an unlock. And lots of times it's where we're most cynical that we're ready for the most magic. But I found that if a product speaks to you, or at least this is my experience, if a product speaks to me and it makes it on the front of my iPhone, I think it has a billion dollar stick value. Or maybe I should update that. That's what I thought 15 years ago. Now maybe it's trillion. Two at least two billion. But if it's enough to be on the front of my iPhone, to me, that's saying a lot. Like that I'm going to use it more than once. A new app that's so seldom and and the front of my iPhone is I could go get and show it to you, but it's half empty. So, I still think that there's so few at least digital consumer products that give us that magical experience that we feel compelled to use every day.

寻找“热度”:识别真实信号的直觉

验证一个想法是否可行,关键在于寻找热度(Heat: 指产品或想法在早期表现出的强烈用户吸引力和自增长潜力)。这种热度是那种“一见钟情”的感觉——当你遇到对的人,你会知道;而当那个人不对时,你会感到不确定。

热度就是真实信号(True Signal: 剔除噪音后,反映产品核心竞争力和市场契合度的真实反馈)。当你拥有真实信号时,每个人都能感觉到,不需要别人告诉你。相反,当你没有真实信号时,你会需要大量的统计数据和各种借口来反复确认:“这是信号吗?”如果需要这样问,那它就不是。当你在另一个产品中,或者更棒的是,在自己的产品中看到“热度”时,感觉就像圣诞节早晨一样,一切都亮了起来。

Original English Source

You have a system for sort of proving ideas before you know that they're going to work. Really? Talk to me about that. How do you do that?

I'm looking for real heat around an idea.

What does heat mean?

Heat is something that you know it when you see it. It's kind of like being really in love with somebody. When you've found your person, I believe you know it. And then every other one that was not quite your person, you're not sure, right? And heat is the same thing. And it's like you want to see heat. So you're looking for signs of heat and you're like look at this click-through rate or look at this. But it's not heat. When you have heat around the product, everything says heat and you just know it. It's part of what I call true signal, right? It's this. When you have true signal, we all know it. You don't need anyone to tell you. And when you don't have true signal, you need lots and lots of stats and other things cuz you're like, is this the signal? Isn't it? It's not. But when you see heat in another product or and even better, when you see heat in your own, it's like Christmas morning. Like everything lights up.

规则重构与早年的叛逆挫败

我从小生长在一个对社交游戏(如猜词、拼字游戏、大富翁)非常狂热且具竞争力的家庭。我父亲非常爱玩,如果我们觉得游戏规则设计得不对,他会带头修改规则。例如在 Scrabble(拼字游戏)中,他觉得抽字母的运气成分太重,于是增加了一个维度:你可以从自己的托盘里拿一个字母,去替换棋盘上的一个字母,只要替换后依然能组成单词即可。这种修改增加了游戏的维度和策略深度。

这种对既有规则的挑战也体现在我的早年经历中。我曾和父亲发生过一次重大的决裂,那是我人生的转折点。他希望我按照他的“剧本”生活——加入兄弟会,在密歇根大学成为他那样的男人。但我并不适应,紧张局势在一次加勒比海帆船旅行中爆发了。我父亲是个极其糟糕的船长,我们的船在海港里打转并冲向岩石区,我跳进小艇启动引擎,拉住缆绳把船拽进了泊位。我救了全家人,但我父亲却勃然大怒,认为“船长只能有一个”,并威胁要让我从大学退学以便“重新教育”我。我当时回了一句“去你的”,立刻租了一架水上飞机离开,随后转学到了沃顿商学院。

我的职业生涯初期也充满了挫败,因为我有作为雇员的“致命缺陷”:我面试表现很差,因为我过度追求诚实而非讨好面试官。我曾是班里唯一一个毕业时没拿到 Offer 的学生。

Original English Source

Were you always playful? Yeah, I grew up in a family that was very competitive around these kind of family social games like charades and Scrabble and Trivial Pursuit. Competitive like tipping the board over if you lose... almost like my dad was very playful and into games and so much so that he first did this and then we all did. We'd start to change the rules if we thought the games weren't made right. The best one was in Scrabble. It kind of sucks that there's this luck of the draw on your letters. And my dad made this rule that you could take a letter from your your little tray. And change it out with a letter on the board as long as it still made a word, right? So you could put an O for an A. And then you had to reuse that letter in the same turn. And so my dad sometimes would take a half an hour for a turn and all these intricate things, but it made it more you had more dimensionality to games and it added a whole dimension.

You had a falling out with your dad and that seemed to be one of the pivotal early moments in your life. What happened? My dad, we all kind of played a role in his movie and he loved being in a fraternity in college and it was like defining for him and he wanted me to do that. I wasn't into the fraternity and they weren't into me either. It was like mutual and and I initially went to this Big 10 school, University of Michigan and I was just not in the right place in any way and I just was not on lots of fronts becoming the kind of man that my dad wanted me to be. He wanted me to be just like him. This got more and more tense and our family was on a sailboat in the Caribbean in the Virgin Islands and we was bear boating so it was just us crewing and my we had grown up sailing and my dad was the worst sailboat captain ever. I mean just famously like epically bad captain like we would get stuck on a sandbar because he didn't read the tides right you know we were in this harbor in Virgin Gorda and the keel got stuck and we always had something go wrong and the boat was going in circles and headed eventually for this like rock barrier and I got in the dinghy and I turned on the engine and grabbed the rope and I pulled the boat into the slip and save the day. And my dad was furious and he said, "You could have killed us all and there could only be one captain." And you know, I think he was also a little humiliated. And that escalated to this bigger fight. And he said, "I was going to wait until after this trip, but I've decided to take you out of college to finish raising you." And I said, "Fuck you. Bye." And I left right there. I went and rented a C plane and flew away and and I also had transferred been accepted to transfer to Wharton University of Pennsylvania from Michigan. And so then I just packed up my car and left and drove to Penn.

在顶级机构挑战权威:从 Malone 到 Bain

毕业后,我有幸在 John Malone 的 TCI 公司(当时美国最大的有线电视公司)工作。在一次决定性的面试中,总裁问:“我们为什么要招第二个 MBA?”我回答:“因为我读了 George Gilder 的《微观世界》(Microcosm),我认为你们公司正处于‘信息高速公路’的前沿,除了有线电视,你们可以做很多交易。”这直接命中了核心。但在 Malone 面前,我由于过于骄傲而导致了多次“职业生涯限制性”会面。例如,TCI 当时要花 4 亿美金收购 Prodigy 的三分之一股份,我反问道:“为什么不直接买下 AOL?他们才价值 1.1 亿美金,而且产品更好。”Malone 对此非常反感,说他不需要一个“乳臭未干的 MBA”来教他什么是好交易。

后来在 Bain(贝恩咨询)的暑期工作中,我也表现出了类似的性格。我推翻了米特·罗姆尼(Mitt Romney)亲自建立的一个关联图表——该图表声称相对市场份额越高,利润率越高。我通过分析零食行业的数据证明这个图表是错的。在向所有合伙人展示时,我甚至还做了 PowerPoint 动画,用一个闪烁的 X 来嘲讽那个图表。这就像是“在教堂里宣布上帝不存在”一样,到演示结束时,大部分人都离场了。我成了贝恩历史上唯二被明确告知“不要再回来”的实习生之一。这些经历都在不断积累证据:我不适合当一名雇员。

Original English Source

So after school you had some formative experiences at sort of Bane and you worked with John Malone. I'd love to spend a few beats on those.

Sure. I had all these great experiences in my 20s. Um, really amazing, but they were all kind of despite myself because I had these kind of fatal flaws as an employee. One is I'm terrible at interviewing because of this like overindexing desire to be honest more than to please the interviewer even though I wanted to get these high-paying jobs. So getting out of college, I was the only kid in my section to graduate without a job. And then I was lucky enough to get a 15-minute interview with TCI, John Malone's company... Brendan Clus, who was the president, said, "Why do we need a second MBA here?"... And I said, "Because I read this book by George Gilder called Microcosm... your company is positioned for this coming information superhighway."... He said, "Well, it's funny you say that. We're having dinner with George Gilder tonight."... But then I had a few career-limiting meetings with Malone... TCI was going to buy a third of Prodigy... I said, "Why don't we just buy this company AOL? They're way better. It was 110 million and nobody liked that."... Malone said, "I don't need some wet behind the ears MBA telling me what's a good deal."... Then, yeah, Bane... they had this graph in the company that Mitt Romney had first made... says if your relative market share is high enough, your return on sales, your margin will be high... I proved that in the snack industry it breaks. I presented... I showed their graph with a flashing X in it. I said, "Look, the graph is wrong. This doesn't work." It's like going to church and being like, I don't believe in God... I was one of two summer associates in the history of the firm that they asked not to come back. So, a lot of evidence was building up that I was not employable.

二十八岁的觉醒:从戒烟到《生命之书》

28 岁时,我意识到自己没有得到想要的结果,人生陷入了僵局。我走进一家犹太教堂,虽然我不认识任何人,也不懂教义,但那里是个安静思考的好地方。我开始在笔记本上写下为什么我的生活如此糟糕。最后我锁定了一件事:抽烟。我并不凶,每天抽一两支,但如果周末在酒吧,一晚上能抽一包。我讨厌烟味,讨厌那种生活失去控制的感觉。我想,如果我能做一件事来证明我能给生活带来积极改变,那就是戒烟。1994 年 10 月 19 日,我决定终身戒烟。此后的一年里,每天没抽烟都让我感到自豪,这种掌控感让我重新找回了自信。

这种反思演变成了我每年都会进行的**《生命之书》(Book of Life: 一种个人战略回顾与责任追踪实践)练习。其核心在于对生活进行战略化思考**。思考一下:你未来的自己会感谢你今年做的哪件事?通过这种方式,我们能对自己负责,逼自己去做那些困难但正确的决定。

正是在这段时间,我开始和 Sunil Paul(AOL 当时唯一的互联网产品经理)一起脑暴。我们产生了一个“花生酱加果冻”式的想法:他想做硬件,我想做软件,目标都是让互联网变得更简单。我们创立了 Freeloader,两人各投入 3 万美金。最终,我们以 3800 万美金的价格卖掉了公司。在那次创业中,凡是能顺利进行的事全都顺利了。

Original English Source

At 28, you realize you're not getting the results you want. Things aren't working out. You find yourself in a synagogue again. Walk me through what was going on.

I just felt like I'd made a lot of bad career decisions and I was washed up early... I just sat there in this temple... It was just a good place to sit and think. And I just started writing in a notebook about why my life sucked so badly. And I just ended on like this one thing that I smoked cigarettes... I didn't want to do it, but I kept doing it. So it was this sense of like my life was a little out of control... if I could do one thing to like know that I'm making some positive change in my life, I'm going to quit smoking. So on October 19th 1994, I did a lifetime quit on cigarettes. And then every day for that year after that that I didn't smoke, it was something I could feel good about... evaluating your life effectively with honesty and it wasn't coming up good... prove to yourself every day that you're sort of in control of your circumstances.

And then you do it again. You call this your book of life.

Yeah. I think that a practice like the book of life... is just be strategic about your life. Like be thoughtful about like I like say what would your future self thank you for doing this year. We can be strategic, hold ourselves accountable and and force ourselves to make some tougher decisions now because you know you'll thank yourself later. And right around the time I was brainstorming on the side with this guy Sil Paul. Sunil was the only internet product manager at AOL... we came up with this kind of peanut butter and jelly idea that like he wanted to build hardware, I wanted to build software, but we both want to make the internet easier for people... Sunil and I got the company going. We each put in 30,000. 60 total. It was called freeloader. And you guys sold that company for 38 million, was it? Yeah. And then everything possibly everything that could have gone right went right.

Tribe.net 的挫败:创始人的直觉与偏见

Freeloader 之后,我创立了 Tribe.net(早期的社交网络项目)。在这里,我深刻体会到了创始人的一个悖论:我们的直觉(Instincts)几乎总是正确的,但我们的主意(Ideas: 具体的实施方案或商业模式)往往是错误的。

我当时有一个名为“鸡尾酒会”的直觉,这源于我投资 Napster 的经历——这标志着点对点社交网络的开始。我和 Reid Hoffman 曾在互联网泡沫破灭后的“核冬天”里讨论 Web 2.0,认为数据应该被释放。我们当时都看好 Friendster,并投入了第一笔钱。但我没去像素级复制 Friendster,因为当时的创业文化认为抄袭是不道德的。我的主意是做“Craigslist 遇见 Friendster”。

我彻底搞错了信任机制(Trust Mechanism: 社交网络中用户互动的安全感与边界设定)。我的产品吸引了外向的人、玩“火人节”的人,但对主流人群来说,它是错的。扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)曾在公司初创一年后带着 Sean Parker 来看我,我当时看到了他们做对了,但我因为自负和所谓的道德感,拒绝调整方向去采用那些已经被 Facebook 验证的信任模式。结果,Tribe 就像一艘漏水的快艇,虽然用户增长惊人,但留存极差。我当时不应该试图开得更快,而应该去补那个底部的漏洞。

Original English Source

Skip a few beats after Freeloader and come to tribe.net. So, you have the right instinct for a social network and then you meet Zach and he's got the right idea for a social network. Talk to me about that tension.

I think we all know founders like this that are just they're so attached to this idea that they're going to go down with the ship... it is like a bad relationship... I like to say that with tribe, I had three winning instincts and one losing idea. We learn over time hopefully as founders that our instincts are almost always right and our ideas are usually wrong. And so that is a really powerful philosophy and tool if we can hang on to that and really use that. And so I had this instinct I called a cocktail party and it started with Napster... I was the first check into Napster... it was this cocktail party where we could connect with each other with nobody in between. And to me, that was the beginning of this social web... Reid Hoffman and I were during this nuclear winter... re-coining the term web 2.0... anything on the internet that can be free will be free starting with data... Fster was the first thing I saw work and didn't copy it... I thought, Tribe, it's Craigslist meets Fster. I got trust completely wrong. I mean, like so wrong, it's unbelievable... Zuck came through my office about a year after I started Tribe... I had amazing virality and amazing user growth and I had terrible retention... It was like a sinking speedboat... and the real answer to sinking speedboat is to fix the hole in the bottom, you know, not go faster. Zuck and Sean Parker came through and I saw they got it right and I think it was my ego and the kind of morality... that you don't copy people. Um, and so I wasn't going to go do the exact thing that they had done... stuck with the same losing strategy.

PBN 方法论:在已知之上创新

基于 Tribe 的失败,我在 Zynga 建立了一套名为 PBN(Proven-Better-New)的产品框架。这个框架的初衷是为了防止团队在错误的地方浪费时间。

  • Proven(已验证:目标受众、功能和平台已被市场证明的部分):这一部分你应该合法地复制。不要去改动那些已经被证明有效的东西,甚至你可能都不完全理解它为什么有效。例如 Zynga Poker,我们完全复制了真实货币博彩游戏的规则、桌面布局、卡牌和声音。
  • Better(更优:通过优化现有体验让 10/10 的用户都觉得更好):在 Zynga Poker 中,Better 就是“无需下载”。由于我们不是真实货币博彩,没有安全限制,所以可以做到网页即开即玩。数据证明,每多点击一次会流失 50% 的用户,要求下载则会流失 80% 到 90% 的用户。
  • New(创新:极小单位的原子级创新):这是最危险的部分。我的哲学是**“所有创新都会失败,直到它最终成功”**(All new fails until it finally doesn't)。所以不要只尝试一个新点子,而是要尝试该点子的无数变体,在极小的原子单位里寻找突破。Zynga Poker 的 New 就在于在牌桌周围显示真实用户的照片(通常是你的朋友)。

很多创始人失败是因为他们试图重新发明产品的每一个部分。

Original English Source

From this concept and the failure of tribe, I ended up getting to this framework at Zingga that I called proven better new. Um and it's based on my philosophy that you have winning instincts and losing ideas. And the problem is that I see with so many products and founders is that they're losing for the wrong reason. So they're losing because they didn't just stick to their one isolate their one area of innovation. They tried to reinvent every single part of their product...

Slack is a great example of proven, better, new... proven means these things are proven and what's proven you should legally copy... Better is is there something about that product that 10 out of 10 users would say you could do better... For Zinga Poker, our proven was poker games. We didn't mess with the rules of poker... Better for Zinga Poker was no download... New in Zinga poker was pictures of real people often your friends... my philosophy is all new fails until it finally doesn't... if you assume all new fails you probably won't be let down. It means you take a different approach to new which is you can't try one new idea... You have to try many many variants of each new idea and look in much smaller atomic units of innovation for new.

产品解构:先做“博士”,再谈改进

在获得改进或创新一个产品的权利之前,你必须先成为该领域“已验证”部分的博士(PhD: 对现有成功模式、细节和原理的极度精通)。

我记得在 Zynga 与德州扑克团队开会时,一名新任产品经理自豪地向我展示他准备发布的全新用户个人主页(Profile)。我问他:“向我展示你的‘个人主页博士学位’。告诉我移动端有史以来最好的游戏主页是哪些?为什么?”他答不上来。我告诉他,如果你不是这个领域的全球顶尖专家,如果你不关心每一个像素背后的逻辑,你就没有权利改动它。

解构(Deconstructing: 将成功产品拆解到最小逻辑单元并分析其成因的过程)既是艺术也是科学。如果你想成为一名伟大的产品制造者,你必须致力于一辈子的解构工作。每当一个新产品出现时,要像研究学生一样观察自己的体验:是什么让你感觉很棒?是什么让你不爽?我们对用户的责任是神圣的,你越是带着尊重和关怀去对待产品,用户就越能感受到其中的意图。

Original English Source

Before you have the right to do better or new, you need to be a PhD in what's already proven. So, I remember at Zingga having a roadmap meeting with the poker team and a newly minted product manager proudly showed me the new poker profile that he was going to launch. And I said, "Okay, show me your PhD in profiles. Show me what are the best game profiles on mobile ever done and tell me why." He's like, "I don't know." And I'm like, well, you haven't earned the right to change the profile if you're not an expert. You can't you need to be the world's leading expert in profiles... I want to see a war room full of profiles. You need to care at the pixel level before you have the right. And that's what I mean by proven and deconstructing. And deconstructing is an art form and a science... anytime a new product comes out like be a student of yourself in that experience and like what is it that feels great or doesn't? And we have a responsibility to our users like it's sacred.

创业深渊:在两次成功之间的虚无

我将创业失败后或退出后的那段时期称为深渊(The Abyss: 创业者在失去公司和身份认同后经历的结构缺失期)。那是一个没有结构、 amorphous 的地方。对于创始人来说,公司就是我们的身份。我父亲管这叫“两次成功之间”,但这非常痛苦。

深渊起初感觉像自由,你可以补觉,做想做的事。但一两周甚至一个月后,你会意识到自己可能永远找不到想要的工作了——你不可能去为别人打工,所以你实际上是处于“不可雇佣”的状态。你可能会在深渊里待上数年。虽然你也在做项目,但你找不到那种能让你投入全部激情和信念的“那件事”。

躲避深渊可能很难,我们能做的只有拥抱它,并建立更多的流程(Process)。《生命之书》在这方面很有帮助。你可以通过做大量的小事来寻找解锁激情的钥匙。当我创立 Zynga 时,我正处于深渊中,当时只是在涉猎一些小项目,其中一个就是德州扑克游戏。我当时的工作伦理很差,处于一种“要么全力以赴,要么只是玩票”的状态。直到有一天,我被那种“就是它了”的感觉击中。

Original English Source

I want to talk about the abyss a little bit. So after tribe and before Zingga, you went into this hole. Can you describe how you felt?

Yeah, at some point I started calling this place the abyss. The way I think of the abyss is it's this place that we go to as founders and entrepreneurs after our thing, after it dies or it's bought or it's over for whatever reason. It's this amorphous place that we are in our life that has no structure... My dad used to call this in between successes... This abyss is this usually dark place because at first it feels great. Maybe freedom... And about a week or two later, maybe a month later, it starts to dawn on you that I may never find gainful employment again. I mean, gainful meaning something I want to do. I'm not gonna ever go work for anyone else, so I'm not employable anyway. So, I don't know if I'll ever come out of this abyss. I've been in this abyss sometimes for multiple years... I find finding lots of small things to work on that are on maybe going to unlock the passion thing. I got to Zingga. I was in the abyss and I had just side projects that one of which was a poker game. I was dabbling... You're either all in or kind of like dabbling.

Zynga 的诞生:发现游戏中的“鸡尾酒会”

41 岁创立 Zynga 时,我被看作是一个疯狂的人。VC 们不相信我已经财务自由了还会像 25 岁的人那样拼命。但在那段深渊期,我深刻理解了我的底层驱动力(The Why: 个人存在的核心使命):我能为世界提供的是构建能触动人的产品,只有这样做我才最快乐。

Zynga 的大机会在于,人们认为游戏市场已经成熟且无趣(2007 年全球视频游戏产值仅 230 亿美金),但我看到了潜在需求(Latent Demand)。只要游戏变得足够便捷,我也愿意玩。我认为游戏可以成为数字生活栈的核心。

我们对社交游戏(Social Gaming: 以社交互动为核心,降低准入门槛并创造社交价值的游戏模式)的定位是:面向大众市场而非核心玩家。我们要求用户付出的时间很少,但给予他们社交价值。这依然是那种“鸡尾酒会”的直觉——如果我们的游戏能为你提供一个改善现实关系的新维度,哪怕每周或每月只有一次,它就是有价值的。此外,我们引入了虚拟物品/用户付费(Virtual Goods / User Pay: 通过售卖虚拟道具而非依靠广告变现的商业模式)。我们在应用商店还没上线应用内购买时,就开始尝试这种模式。它能变现用户的参与度,而不是通过广告把用户赶走。

Original English Source

When I was all in with Zingga, I was a maniac... my why I got to is like what I can offer the world is building products that move people...

Well, I love these markets and they're all around us where we think they're mature and over and they haven't even started yet... Google was the 56th search engine... games was the same thing... In 2007, the whole video game industry worldwide was like $23 billion. It was mature, not interesting. And yet there was, I believe, this latent demand... what we got right with social gaming was make it for the mass market, not for gamers, and give you enough value in it that an adult would give themselves permission to play... but actually you're here for this cocktail party to do social networking. What if in our game we give you a new dimension to your social networking that can improve a relationship in your life?... And then the second thing that came into play for social gaming with us was virtual goods, user pay... We were one of the first companies in the western world to do this inapp purchase thing... monetize your engagement instead of trying to show you an ad and getting you to leave the game.

拒绝妥协:构建“互联网瑰宝”的代价

John Doerr 曾告诉我:“你能做的最伟大的事就是建立一个互联网瑰宝(Internet Treasure: 指那些用户无法想象没有它的生活的世界级服务)。”我将这视为愿景,但在融资过程中,我故意让自己过得很艰难。因为我之前的多次融资体验很糟糕,这次我要确保所有人都在这条“公路旅行”上达成共识。

我常对创始人说:“明确你的目标,否则你将死于一千次妥协”(Know your goal or suffer a death by a thousand compromises)。很多创始人在早期为了招到那个工程师、CTO 或投资人,不断 contort(扭曲)自己。你为了品牌和估值在董事会里塞进一个混蛋,结果有一天你醒来发现这是一家你根本不想呆的公司。你是公司最核心的资产,如果这里不适合你,那就是失败。

在融资 Zynga 时,我陷入了 Peter Thiel 和 Sequoia(红杉资本)之间的争斗,最后他们都没投,导致我们成了“受损商品”。我不得不去见各种二线 VC,最后虽然 Fred Wilson 给出的估值和条款非常严苛,但我爱 Fred。最讽刺的是,Zynga 后来赚的每一分钱都是自给自足的,我融资来的钱一分都没动过。

Original English Source

I knew I could make what I call an internet treasure... a service you can't remember life before or imagine life without... I made this way harder for myself when it should have been easy at this point to raise money for Zinga... know your goal or suffer a death by a thousand compromises... if it's not the right place for you, you've failed... The first round I raised was impossibly hard... I got caught in between a fight in between Peter Teal and Sequoia... eventually Fred Wilson... he negotiated a hard deal cuz he could but and the funniest thing is I never used the dollar I raised the whole time.

失败机器:从 MVP 陷阱到“构建错误”

我通过漫长且痛苦的失败总结出了一套失败机器(Failure Machines: 一种通过大规模快速点击测试,而非构建完整最小可行产品来验证想法的系统)。

当我就任 Zynga CEO 进行转型时,我重点关注核心资产如《Words with Friends》。当时该游戏的收入预测正在大幅下滑,团队想放弃它。我每周和团队开会,问他们:“玩家会因为什么而感谢我们?”最初团队觉得这是个不公平的问题。我们读用户的评价,发现评分从 4 分多降到了 3 分。

团队里的一群 20 多岁的小伙子想做“快节奏”模式,增加肾上腺素。但这完全搞错了目标受众——中年女性玩家玩这个是为了禅意的时刻,为了逃离。团队花了 6 个月时间研发,却没做漏斗顶部的点击测试。我问点击率是多少,他们说 1%。这意味着 99% 的核心玩家对这个主意说“滚蛋”。

我主张不要陷入 MVP 陷阱(MVP Trap: 指为了构建一个“可行”的产品而浪费过多时间,而没有在想法阶段就进行验证)。我们需要在想法阶段就通过大规模点击测试来寻找“玩家会拥抱我们”的东西。在有时间构建正确的东西之前,先把它构建错(Build it wrong before we don't have time to build it right)。不要追求“可行”(Viable),因为主意大概率是错的。我们要构建错误的东西,看它是否证明了正确的方向。

Original English Source

I got to failure machines through a lot of failure, painful, slow failure... I started and ended every meeting with, "What will our players thank us for?"... the problem was that this team was a bunch of mostly 20some dudes making a game for middle-aged women... They'd spent six months on this, hundreds of engineering days, and they never really tested the top of the funnel... 99% of Words of Friends players say no way when you show them this game... and the team... they did start click testing every day hundreds of ideas starting with what will our core audience thank us for... and that was the beginning of the whole turnaround.

I see too many founders get stuck in what I call the MVP trap... too many teams waste time getting to a minimum viable product that they can put out in the market. And we don't have time anymore for that... build it wrong before we don't have time to build it right. Don't build it right. Build it wrong and build it fast. And don't make it viable. Viable is the bad word... Let's build wrong and see if it proves right. Then let's build right.

创始人模式与道德契约:管理的黑科技

创始人模式(Founder Mode: 指创始人保留对核心业务的直接干预和极强个人风格,拒绝被平庸化管理的模式)就是我们最初成为创始人的原因。我们都是专家,以前在公司里总是离答案最近,却离决策最远。作为创始人,你有权按自己的方式行事,哪怕是错误的。

我运行公司的方式是民主独裁(Democratic Dictatorship):我想听到每个人的声音,但最后只有一票。好的 CEO 寻找智力诚实,寻找各处的真相,但不会根据民意调查做决定。

关于管理,我有几个“黑科技”:

  1. 道德契约(Moral Contract: 领导者对建设者做出的承诺,确保他们的努力不会因为错误的决策而白费):工程师总是被坑,他们辛苦攻下的山头往往被 CEO 的一句话抹杀。我承诺我会像他们攻山头一样努力去释放他们工作的价值。
  2. 全员 CEO(Everyone is a CEO: 明确每个人负责的核心成果,并让所有人知晓):给人们比他们认为自己应得的更多的责任,他们会感到挑战和兴奋。
  3. 不进行 1对1 面谈(No One-on-ones: 避免私下抱怨带来的办公室政治):如果有人向我抱怨别人,我会立刻叫来那个人,当面把话说清楚。
  4. 技术助理制度(Tech Assistant: 选拔有潜力的年轻人作为“影子”,通过吸收领导者的决策逻辑来快速成长):这是一种不可扩展的规模化方式,通过传递“吸血鬼之血”来培养未来的领导者。
Original English Source

Founder mode is why we became founders in the first place... You owe it to yourself to bet on your instinct. You owe it to yourself to lose because of yourself. It's your right to be wrong... The way I run the company was what I called a democratic dictatorship. And I said, I want everyone everyone's voice to be heard and then I'll be the single vote.

I don't really believe in management... Early on... I wrote everyone's names and I said, "By the end of the week, write down what you're CEO of."... Everyone here needs to own something that matters... In the same way we have a responsibility to our users we have a responsibility to our engineers... there should be a moral contract if you're going to take that hill I'm going to show you that I am going to work just as hard to unlock value out of the work you did...

I don't do one-on-ones... Jeff Bezos wouldn't ever do one-on-ones because it created politics and it was a huge waste of his time... If anyone did finally get my ear and complain about someone else, you stop, you call the other person, and you say, "Hey, Shane's complaining about you. I think you should come up and talk to him." And you walk away.

Tech Assistant... it's through like passing your vampire blood... you pick someone from the organization who's promising... They're your shadow. They go to every meeting you go to... training up a mini me.

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关键字: product-management growth-strategy entrepreneurial-mindset social-gaming decision-making