罗伯特·卡洛访谈:约翰逊与摩西的执着、权力运作及边疆孤独 Dwarkesh Patel 2026-10-30

罗伯特·卡洛访谈:约翰逊与摩西的执着、权力运作及边疆孤独

14 节

约翰逊与摩西的特质

“如果你竭尽全力,你就会赢。”

英文原文

"If you do everything, you will win."

这就是林登·约翰逊一生奉行的格言。

英文原文

That is the maxim by which Lyndon Johnson lived his life.

我今天的嘉宾是罗伯特·卡洛。在撰写林登·约翰逊的50年里,他曾住在德克萨斯丘陵地区的边缘,去体会约翰逊年轻时的贫困与孤独。他查阅了全国参议院和总统图书馆里数以百万计的文件。他四处奔波进行访谈,对象从当年协助约翰逊窃取选举结果的前打手,到在他那场绝望的初次竞选中为他开车的司机,无所不包。

英文原文

My guest today is Robert Caro. Over the 50 years that he has spent writing about Lyndon Johnson, he has lived in the edges of the Texas Hill Country to understand the poverty and loneliness of Johnson’s youth. He has sifted through millions of documents in the Senate and presidential libraries of the entire nation. He has chased down for interviews everyone, from the former goon who helped Johnson steal an election to the chauffeur who drove him on his first desperate campaign.

换句话说,我今天的嘉宾是一位深谙约翰逊那句格言的人:“如果你竭尽全力,你就会赢。”卡洛先生,非常荣幸能请您来到节目中。

英文原文

In other words, my guest today is a man who understands Johnson’s aphorism: "If you do everything, you’ll win." Mr. Caro, it is such a huge honor to have you on the show.

很高兴来到这里。

英文原文

It’s great to be here.

我的第一个问题,正如我在引言中暗示的那样。你在多大程度上在约翰逊或摩西身上看到了自己的影子?你能把他们写得如此引人入胜,部分原因是否在于你与他们有某些共通的品质?

英文原文

My first question is what I hinted at in the introduction. How much do you see yourself represented in Johnson or in Moses? Is part of the reason you’re able to write so compellingly about them that you share some of their qualities?

首先我想说,我觉得,我也希望,这两个人身上的某些品质我是不具备的。其中之一就是他们太——我用这个词来说——无情了。你说他们为了赢不择手段。那是他们非凡之处的一部分。

英文原文

Let me say first, I think, I hope, there are qualities of both these guys that I don’t share. Among other things they’re so, I’ll use the word, ruthless. You say they’d do anything to win. That’s part of their greatness.

我记得当我开始了解罗伯特·摩西时,我去了存放拉瓜迪亚档案的船坞。那些档案由市政档案馆保存,真的就放在哈德逊河第79街船坞地下三层。靠墙有一排文件柜。我日复一日地坐在那里翻阅这些文件。偶尔我会看到罗伯特·摩西写的一张便条,我意识到我正在走他当年走过的路。这其实非常令人着迷。

英文原文

I remember when I started learning about Robert Moses, I went to the La Guardia papers, which were kept in the Boat Basin. They were stored by the Municipal Archives, literally in the 79th Street Boat Basin on the Hudson River, three levels down. There was this row of file cabinets against the wall. I’m sitting there day after day going through these documents. Occasionally I’d come across a note that Robert Moses wrote, and I realized I’m following the same path he was. It’s fascinating, actually.

显然不是所有的品质。但我在这里指的品质是,就像约翰逊或摩西一样,你绝不接受别人的拒绝。如果有人说“我不接受你的采访”,你不会就此作罢。你绝不放过任何线索。所以你和这些传主之间确实有一种共同的执着。

英文原文

Obviously, not all the qualities. But the quality I’m referring to here is that just like Johnson or just like Moses, you refuse to take no for an answer. If somebody says, "I won’t give you an interview," you don’t stop there. You refuse to leave a stone unturned. So there is a relentlessness that you share with these subjects.

我就把这当作夸奖了。是的。你会觉得有某些人是你必须采访的。如果他们不想接受采访,我觉得你不能轻易放弃。比如林登·约翰逊的第一任秘书,就是当年竞选时和他同坐一辆车的那个人。我说:“世界上没有其他人知道林登·约翰逊在驱车穿梭于德克萨斯的那些漫长时间里到底在做什么。我不知道我得怎么做,但我必须让他坦诚地告诉我这件事。”

英文原文

I’m going to take that as a compliment. Yes. You feel there are certain people that you have to interview. If they don’t want to give you an interview, you can’t, I feel, say no. Like Lyndon Johnson’s first secretary, the one who rode in the car with him on the campaigns. I said, "There’s no other human being on earth who knows what Lyndon Johnson is doing all these hours driving back and forth across Texas. I don’t know what I have to do, but I have to get him to tell me honestly about this thing."

获取真相与政治权力的运作

这就引出了我想问你的另一个问题。你采访了所有这些人,而在很多情况下,他们肯定知道告诉你你想知道的事情对自己并没有好处。但在许多情况下,他们还是告诉了你。你怎么让人们把那些他们自知不该说的事情告诉你?

英文原文

This raises another question that I wanted to ask you. You’re interviewing all these people, and in many cases, they must know that it’s not good for them to tell you what you want to know. In many cases, they tell you anyway. How do you get people to tell you things that they know they shouldn’t tell you?

你提的问题棒极了。有时你坐在那里,知道对方不想跟你谈你想从他们那里得到的内容,比如约翰·康纳利关于约翰逊如何利用金钱换取政治权力的事。我心里想:“但我已经查过那些记录了。康纳利负责收钱,并按照约翰逊的指示把钱分发出去,所以他是唯一能告诉我约翰逊是如何做到这一点的人,他是如何判断该把钱给谁的。”

英文原文

You ask terrific questions. Sometimes you’re sitting there and you know this person doesn’t want to talk to you about what you want to get out of them, like John Connally on how Johnson used money to get political power. I’m thinking, "But I’ve been through the notes. Connally collected the money and gave it out at Johnson’s instructions, so he’s the only guy who can tell me how Johnson did this, how he judged who to give money to."

有时约翰逊会在要钱的请求上写字。如果那人要1,500美元,约翰逊会写:“好的,1,500。”有时他会写500,有时他会写不给,但有时他会写:“不行,绝不。”我问康纳利那是什​​么意思,他说:“这个人永远别想从林登·约翰逊那里拿到钱。”然后,当你问他为什么对这位特定的国会议员有这种看法时,真正引人入胜的故事就浮现出来了。

英文原文

Sometimes Johnson would write on a request for money. If the guy asked for $1,500, Johnson would write, "Okay, 1,500." Sometimes he’d write 500, sometimes he’d write no, but sometimes he’d write, "No, never." I asked Connally what that meant, and he said, "This guy was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson." Then when you ask why he felt this way about this particular congressman, that’s when the really fascinating stories emerge.

大型工程建设的困境与突破

在我们进一步深入探讨约翰逊之前,我想先从摩西谈起。在过去一二十年里,人们一直在抱怨现在搞建设变得太难、阻碍太多,尤其是政府搞建设。如果看看第二大道地铁,他们已经修了大约50年。开通了一英里半。花费了超过40亿美元。

英文原文

Before we get more into Johnson, I want to first start with Moses. In the last decade or two, people have been complaining that it’s become too hard and too difficult to build things, especially for the government to build things. If you look at the Second Avenue subway, they’ve been building it for around 50 years. They’ve opened up a mile and a half. It cost more than $4 billion.

人们一直在说:“《权力经纪人》出版了。这是一本影响巨大的书。我们曾经担心权力过度集中并下放给一个人去搞建设。我们想要防止这种情况,所以我们制定了环境审查、土地利用审查、社区委员会和诉讼程序。”人们说:“我们矫枉过正了。我们走向了另一个极端。”你怎么看?

英文原文

People have been saying, "The Power Broker came out. It was an immensely influential book. We were concerned about so much power being centralized and delegated to one person so they could build. We wanted to prevent that, and so we made environmental review and land use review and community boards and litigation." People say, "We’ve overcorrected. We’ve gone too far in the other direction." What do you think of that?

他们还说,由于所有这些保障机制,罗伯特·摩西在今天不可能以同样的方式行事。但事实是,当罗伯特·摩西刚起步时,同样存在各种防范机制。当时人们也同样在说:“你什么都建不成。”那是在20世纪20年代。人们当时说:“政府什么都建不成。障碍太多了。什么都建不起来。我们需要公路。这是汽车时代。人人都在买汽车,但我们只有陈旧的老路。没人能把路修起来,因为业主不希望公路穿过他们的土地。”罗伯特·摩西出现了,突然之间那些障碍都消失了,因为不管有怎样的保障机制和其他一切,他只管去建。在写《权力经纪人》时,看到他如何绕过一切阻碍,对我来说实在太令人着迷了。

英文原文

They also say that because of all these safeguards, Robert Moses could not operate in the same way today. But the fact is, when Robert Moses started, there were also safeguards. People were also saying, "You can’t build anything." This was in the 1920s. People were saying, "Government can’t build anything. There are too many blocks. Nothing’s getting built. We need highways. It’s the age of cars. Everyone’s getting automobiles, but we have the same old roads. Nobody can build them because the property owners don’t want the roads built through their land." Robert Moses comes along, and all of a sudden those things vanish because, despite all the safeguards and everything else, he just builds. Doing The Power Broker, it was just fascinating to me to see how he gets around everything.

不管遇到什么。他要在琼斯海滩建一个海滩。有一天他看到了那里。他说:“这是我见过的最棒的海滩。离纽约市只有27英里。如果我能修一条通往这里的路,我就能为纽约市民提供这个绝佳的海滩。”但是修那条路似乎不可能,因为业主们不希望路穿过他们的农场和地产。他基本上就是说:“我偏要建。”看他一步步去做,克服每一个障碍——障碍是如此之多——然后突然间它开放了,琼斯海滩建成了,纽约人可以前往了。这是一种政治天才的体现,也是意志力的体现:“我一定要做成。”了解这些非常引人入胜。

英文原文

It doesn’t matter what it is. He’s going to build a beach at Jones Beach. He sees it one day. He says, "This is the greatest beach I’ve ever seen. It’s only 27 miles from New York City. If I can build a road out here, I will give the people of New York City this great beach." But it seems impossible to build that road because the property owners don’t want the road going through their farms and property. He basically says, "I’m going to build it." To watch him do it, to overcome each obstacle, there are so many, and then all of a sudden it’s open and you have Jones Beach and you have it accessible to New York. It’s an act of political genius, and it’s also an act of will: "I’m going to do it." That’s fascinating to learn about.

所以你认为,如果今天有一个摩西式的人物,他们会找到办法绕过所有现存的制度框架吗?

英文原文

So you think today if there were a Moses-type figure, they would figure out a way to work around everything that’s been set up?

对此的回答是,当摩西当年搞建设时,他们也在说同样的话。“谁也建不成任何东西。我们需要给汽车修路,但这些路必须穿过几十个农场、大量地产。绝不会有人能做到的。”但他横空出世,并且做成了。所以今天也会有人出现并把它做成。

英文原文

The answer to that is, when Moses was building, they were saying the same thing. "Nobody’s ever going to build. We need roads for the automobiles, but they’d have to go through dozens of farms, scores of properties. No one’s ever going to be able to do it." But he comes along and does it. So today someone would come along and do it.

民主制度下的建设与两难

我认为这对民主政体来说是一个深刻的问题:我们如何才能既不走向五六十年代摩西那种极端,又不落入我们现在的处境?在我居住的加州,我们在过去十年里花费了——我不知道——150亿美元。而这150亿美元的建设投入,却没有给我们换来一条新线路或一英里新的铁路。而在另一种不同的体制下……你可以说今天的中国就像四五十年代的纽约市。他们有一种非常类似摩西的态度,在过去10到20年里修建了数万英里的铁路。当然,代价是类似规模的人口搬迁和鲁莽行事。那么,我们怎样才能在两个极端之间找到一个好的平衡点呢?

英文原文

This, I think, is a profound question for democracies: how do we end up in a place which is not the extremes of ’50s or ’60s Moses, but also not where we are now? Where I live in California, we’ve spent, I don’t know, $15 billion over the last decade. We haven’t gotten a single new line or single new mile of railway that those $15 billion have been spent to build. Whereas in a different system… You could say China today is like New York City in the ’40s and ’50s. They have a very Moses-type attitude and they put up tens of thousands of miles of railways over the last 10-20 years. But of course, at the cost of similar amounts of displacement of people and recklessness. So how do we land in a good spot between either extreme?

我不确定是否存在这样一个好的平衡点。你刚才说的就是现实情况。要进行任何大规模建设,你都会面临几十个、大量甚至成百上千个不希望把项目建在那里的业主。所以问题是,任何工程到底该怎么建起来?然后就会有某个人出现,并且能够把它做成。

英文原文

I’m not sure there is a good spot. What you just said is the situation. To build anything on a large scale, you’re confronted with dozens or scores or perhaps hundreds of property owners who don’t want it built there. So the question is, how does anything get built? Then someone comes along and can do it.

当罗伯特·摩西起步时,向长岛修路似乎是不可能的,确实是不可能的,因为道路必须穿过大量地产,而大多数业主不希望道路穿过去。他们当时有权力阻止,因为摩西当时没有土地征用权。但摩西基本上就是说:“我一定要建。”他总能找到办法克服每一个困难。我想表达的是什么呢?我想说的是,每隔一段时间,就会出现一个在为公众建造重大工程方面堪称天才(如果这个词恰当的话)的人物。可能过去几十年都没有这样一个人。你会说:“一切都停滞了。再也不会有任何重大工程建成了。”然后突然有人出现,顷刻之间工程就建成了。这就是政治天才的本质。我碰巧在写的两个人,林登·约翰逊和罗伯特·摩西,约翰逊面对的是民权,摩西面对的是公共工程,当时人们都说“这不可能做到”。但他们做到了。

英文原文

When Robert Moses started, it seemed impossible, actually impossible, to build roads out into Long Island because the road would have to cross scores of properties, most of whose owners didn’t want the roads coming through. They had the power to stop them then because he didn’t have the power of eminent domain. But Moses said basically, "I’m going to build it." He would find a way to overcome each difficulty. What am I trying to say by that? I’m trying to say that every once in a while someone comes along who’s a genius, if that’s the right word, at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass when there’s no one like that. You say, "Everything’s stalled. Nothing big is ever going to be built again." Then someone suddenly comes along and all of a sudden things get built. That’s the nature of political genius. I happen to be writing about two guys, Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses, Johnson with civil rights and Moses with public works, where people were saying, "You can’t do this." But they did it.

如果我说得不对请纠正我,但如果容我对你说的话尝试做一种解读,听起来你似乎认为我们今天需要一点摩西。

英文原文

Correct me if I’m putting words in your mouth, but if I may attempt an interpretation of what you said, it sounds like you think we need a little Moses today.

很有见地。我有时也会琢磨你刚才说的那句话。回答是,我当然不希望有像罗伯特·摩西那样无情且无视公众舆论的人。但与此同时,你需要有人能找到办法把工程建起来。尽管有那么多人不想让它建,他还是必须找到办法。

英文原文

A great insight. I sometimes wonder about just what you said. The answer is, I certainly don’t want someone who’s as ruthless and disregarding public opinion as a Robert Moses. But at the same time, you need someone who’s going to find a way to get things built. He’s going to have to find a way despite the fact that so many people don’t want it built.

理想主义者的转变与代价

很多没读过这本书的人有这样一种印象,觉得你认为摩西所做的一切都是糟糕的,我们必须确保再也不出现摩西这样的人。所以听到你说我们今天又需要一点摩西,挺有意思的。

英文原文

A lot of people who haven’t read the book have this impression that you think everything Moses did was bad, and that we need to make sure that we can never have a Moses again. So it’s interesting to hear you say that we need a little Moses again.

当人们对我说他所做的一切都很糟糕时,我的回答是:“你没读过这本书。”因为毫无疑问,书的前半部分,好几百页,写的都是一个年轻的理想主义者,他看到城市居民对休闲娱乐、对长岛海滩的巨大需求,并且想方设法让城市居民能够去到那里。他做事的方式展现出了非凡的天才与意志力,那是非常了不起的。

英文原文

When people say to me everything was bad that he did, what I say is, "You didn’t read the book." Because certainly the first parts of the book, hundreds of pages, are about a young idealist who sees this great need for recreation, for beaches on Long Island for the city people, and is going to find a way to make them accessible to people in the city. It’s an act of genius and willpower the way he does it, and that’s great.

那么,这是否演变成了摩西谁的话都不听、唯一重要的就是他自己想建什么的状态?确实演变成了那样。他确实变了。但早期的摩西,那个理想主义者,在搞建设之前,是文官体制细节方面的专家。他把所有的精力都投入到试图改革文官体制上,以便让人们凭借功绩而非政治关系获得晋升。他在这方面付出了巨大努力。你能看到一种真正的理想主义。在早期的工程中你能看到一种真正的理想主义,当时他说:“我想让纽约人能够去到这些海滩。”

英文原文

Now, does it evolve into where Moses listens to nobody, and the only thing that matters is what he wants to get built? It does evolve into that. He does change. But the young Moses, the idealist, before he’s building, is an expert in the technicalities of civil service. He devotes all his energies to trying to reform the civil service so that people get promoted on merit instead of political pull. He works so hard at that. You see a real idealism. You see a real idealism in his early works, when he says, "I want to make these beaches accessible to New York."

那么,这是否演变成了“不管别人怎么说,也不管挡在路上的人有几千个,我认为这里该修一条公路,我就要修”——比如跨布朗克斯高速公路——“我要把他们赶走”?确实如此。他变了。在我看来,那是《权力经纪人》故事中很大的一部分:这个起初年轻、怀揣理想、想要通过建设让人们生活得更好、让他们能享受海洋和海滩的人,是如何变成一个仅仅因为自己认为该建就非建不可、完全不顾他人言论的人。不管要驱逐几百还是几千人,也不管这个主意有多糟糕——比如跨布朗克斯高速公路——他都要做。在这条路修建之前,人们就劝他不要建。这条路通车的那一刻,就成了世界上最长的交通拥堵路段。不是几千人,而是数以万计的人被他驱逐,赶出家园,而且没有任何安置条款。

英文原文

Now, does that evolve into "I think there ought to be a highway here no matter what anybody says, and no matter how many thousands of people are in the way," like the Cross Bronx Expressway, "I’ll evict them"? It does. He changes. That to me is a big part of the story of The Power Broker: how this guy who’s in the beginning a young, idealistic guy who wants to build to make lives better for people, to give them access to the ocean and beaches, changes into someone who just wants to build because he thinks something should be built no matter what anyone else says. He’s going to do it no matter how many hundreds, thousands of people he has to evict, no matter how bad an idea it is, like the Cross Bronx Expressway. People are telling him not to do that before he does it. The minute this road opens, it’s the world’s longest traffic jam. Not thousands, but tens of thousands of people were evicted, thrown out of their homes by him without any relocation provisions.

所以从某种意义上说,这是一个关于你如何在赋予某人权力的同时,在某种程度上——我不想用“腐蚀”他这个词——却让他在面对任何反对他的人、面对任何反对意见时变得冷酷硬化的故事。

英文原文 So in a way it’s a story of how you give somebody power without the power, in a way — I don’t want to use the word "corrupting" him — but hardening him to anyone who opposes him, to any opposition.

代码智能体在获得快速、详细的反馈时表现最佳。

英文原文 Coding agents work best when they get fast, detailed feedback.

我的赞助商 Antithesis 通过在数千次对抗性模拟中运行智能体所做的每一项更改,为你的智能体提供最丰富的反馈。

英文原文 My sponsor, Antithesis, gives your agents some of the richest feedback there is by running every change they make through thousands of hostile simulations.

这通常是行不通的。模拟测试很难。它通常需要围绕伪造的网络和时钟等东西来重构你的软件。

英文原文 This usually isn't feasible. Simulation testing is hard. It normally requires rebuilding your software around a fake network and clock, among other things.

所以大多数团队根本不会去费这个劲。即使他们去做了,获得足够的覆盖率通常也需要花费数小时。因此他们会在夜间运行这些模拟,而到了那个时候,当天所有的更改都已经混杂在一起,智能体就更难分辨出究竟是哪个 PR 搞垮了系统。

英文原文 So most teams don't bother. Even if they do, getting enough coverage typically takes hours. So they run these simulations overnight, by which point all the day's changes are jumbled together, and it's harder for the agents to tell which PR broke something.

Antithesis 解决了这两个问题。它在完全确定性的模拟计算机内部运行你的软件,因此你无需自己重构任何东西。而且它的探索速度足够快,你可以对每个 PR 都进行测试。

英文原文 Antithesis solves both problems. It runs your software inside a fully deterministic simulated computer, so you don't have to rebuild anything yourself. And it explores fast enough that you can test every PR.

在最近的一个项目中,它将 15 小时的模拟测试压缩到了每次 15 分钟的运行中。这种速度既来自并行化,也来自分支。

英文原文 On a recent project, it packed 15 hours of simulation testing into each 15-minute run. That speed comes from both parallelism and branching.

因为它是确定性的,所以每当 Antithesis 发现一个有趣的状态时,它都可以保存那一确切时刻,并分支衍生出数百种不同的未来走向。它从不把时间浪费在重新回放事件、期望碰巧再次遇到那个状态上。

英文原文 Because it's deterministic, whenever Antithesis finds an interesting state, it can save that exact moment and branch off hundreds of different futures. It never wastes time replaying events, hoping to stumble across that state again.

而且它不仅仅是随机探索。Antithesis 会系统性地注入故障,并以最有可能破坏你系统的方式来调整它。所以 Antithesis 里的每一分钟,都是你的软件所经历过的最倒霉的数小时之一。欲了解更多信息,请访问 antithesis.com/dwarkesh。

英文原文 And it doesn't just explore randomly. Antithesis systematically injects faults and tweaks your system in the ways most likely to break it. So every minute in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours your software will ever experience. Learn more at antithesis.com/dwarkesh.

见证摩西失去权力

你在 1966、1967 年开始写这本书。你写这本书的时候摩西正在失去权力。他的生涯还没有结束。所以故事在你写它的过程中发生着变化。我不知道你是否谈论过这点,但想必结局会发生改变,因为你在动笔时并不知道他是否会失去那项权力。

英文原文 You start writing the book in ’66, ’67. You’re writing it while Moses is losing power. His career is not over yet. So the story changes while you’re writing it. I don’t know if you’ve talked about that, but presumably the conclusion changes because you don’t know whether he’s going to lose that power or not when you start.

问得很好。我看着那一切发生,而我很年轻。不管我当时多大年纪,我当时其实不知道自己在做什么。我看着他失去权力,我对他的了解也足以明白这将是多么令人难过。

英文原文 That’s a great question. I watch that happen, and I’m young. Whatever my age was, I didn’t really know what I was doing. I watched him lose power, and I learned enough about him to know how sad this was going to be.

容我想一下,有那么一个时刻发生过这种事……是的……他的办公室当时仍然在三区大桥管理局那边。当他掌权时,我在那个办公室里采访过他好几次。你能感受到他的威权。你能感觉到外面坐着一圈又一圈的人,在等待他的决断。

英文原文 If I could think a moment, there's a moment that this happened… Yeah… His office was still up at the Triborough Bridge Authority. When he was in power, I interviewed him in that office several times. You felt his power. You felt outside there were all these people sitting around waiting for his decisions.

我一采访完,秘书就会拿着一份电话清单走进来,上面全是我和他谈话期间打来找他有所求的人。我记得我和他有过一次长时间的采访。可能是我最后一次采访他。等我采访结束时,我意识到没有任何电话打来。秘书没有任何事情要向他通报。所以无论你对摩西怎么看,你都会感受到一个人失去权力的凄凉。

英文原文 As soon as I finished, the secretary would come in with a list of telephone calls from people who had called wanting something from him while I was talking to him. I remember I had one long interview with him. Maybe it was my last one. By the time I finished, I realized there had been no calls. The secretary had nothing to tell him. So whatever you thought of Moses, you felt the poignance of someone losing power.

那太引人入胜了。这正是我一直想知道的。你忍不住为他感到难过,哪怕你知道他干过些什么。你忍不住会觉得:“噢,从某种意义上说,再也没有人打电话找他求人情了,这很悲凉。”

英文原文 That’s fascinating. That’s what I was wondering about. You couldn’t help feeling sad for him, even though you knew what he had done. You couldn’t help feeling, "Oh, this is, in a way, tragic that no one’s calling and asking him for a favor anymore."

他意识到这一点正在发生吗?

英文原文 Did he realize that was happening?

我觉得他并没有真正意识到。从某种程度上说,我相信他肯定是意识到了。但到了那时,他已经被隔绝得太厉害了。不管他当时多大年纪,他都已经 80 多岁了。他耳聋了。他在兰德尔岛的三区大桥总部里仍然拥有所有这些对他忠心耿耿的“摩西人马”,他们对待他依然一如既往地毕恭毕敬。他知道自己的项目无法完成了。但我知道他觉得只要像过去那样继续硬推下去,他就还会再次获胜。对你问题的回答是:不,我认为他从未真正意识到这一点。

英文原文 I don’t think he really did. In a way, I’m sure he did. But by that time he was so insulated. Whatever his age was, he was up in his 80s. He was deaf. He still had at the Triborough headquarters on Randall’s Island all these Moses men who were loyal to him and treated him with the same deference they always had. He knew he wasn’t getting his projects done. But I know he felt he was just going to keep pushing like he always did, and he was going to win again. The answer to your question is no, I don’t think he did ever realize that.

能否解雇罗伯特·摩西

我想是在 1962 年,正如你所说,他试图对纳尔逊·洛克菲勒使出以前对无数任前市长和州长使过的那一招,那就是如果不能如他所愿就威胁辞职。洛克菲勒说:“我遗憾地接受”,然后什么事也没发生。这让我在读的时候感到疑惑:以往那些受到威胁的前任州长和市长们,难道就不能做同样的事吗?

英文原文 In, I think, ’62, as you say, he tries to pull a trick on Nelson Rockefeller that he had pulled on countless previous mayors and governors, which is to threaten to resign if he didn’t get his way. Rockefeller says, "I regretfully accept," and nothing happens. That made me wonder as I was reading it. Could all those previous governors and mayors who were getting threatened have done the same thing?

好问题。是的,答案是可以。嗯,你说“他们能不能做同样的事?”在某种程度上,答案是可以。他们有权解雇他。他不是民选官员。但实际上根本没有这种可能性。追根究底这个问题的答案是:不,他们做不到,因为他实在太受拥戴了。你根本不可能解雇罗伯特·摩西。那就像解雇某个纽约的偶像级人物一样。

英文原文 Great question. Yeah, the answer is yes. Well, you say, "could they have done the same thing?" In part, the answer is yes. They had the power to fire him. He wasn’t an elected official. But there wasn’t really a possibility. The answer to the question at the bottom is no, they couldn’t, because he was simply too popular. You couldn’t fire Robert Moses. That’s like firing some person who was the idol of New York.

但此外,凭借他的绝顶聪明,他在所有这些不同的职务中——州电力局局长、三区大桥管理局局长、公园专员、长岛公园专员、琼斯海滩专员——编织了这样一张错综交织的网络,以至于你无法将他从所有职位上解雇,因为这些任期结束的方式各不相同,而且其中一些职务你并没有权力解雇他。他真真切切地让这变得不可能。嗯,几乎不可能,因为在最后,如果你真想去做,洛克菲勒就做到了。但到了那时,铠甲上已经出现了裂痕。我认为几十年来,对你这个问题的答案都是你做不到。但随着他年纪渐长,铠甲上出现了裂纹。如果你愿意顶住各大报纸上的批评、公众的指责以及其他一切压力,你大概原本是能做到的。

英文原文 But in addition, with his genius, he had created, in all his different posts — chairman of the State Power Authority, chairman of Triborough Bridge Authority, Parks Commissioner, Long Island Parks Commissioner, Jones Beach Commissioner — such an interlocking web that you couldn’t fire him from everything, because the terms ended in different ways, and some you didn’t have the power to fire him from. He had really made it impossible. Well, almost impossible, because at the end, if you wanted to do it, Rockefeller did it. But by that time, cracks had appeared in the armor. I think for decades, the answer to your question is you couldn’t do it. But then as he got older, cracks appeared in the armor. If you wanted to brave criticism in all the newspapers and public criticism and everything else, you probably could have done it.

这就引出了我想问你的下一个问题。你采访过他七次。第七次的时候,你提到了你知道有一笔捐款给到了他的委员会,捐款人是一位百万富翁,因为他的公园道采用了新路线,那位富翁的高尔夫球场得以幸免于难。自那之后,他再也没有跟你说过话。如果你能获得第八次采访罗伯特·摩西的机会,你最想问他的一个问题是什么?

英文原文 Which leads into the next question I want to ask you. You interviewed him seven times. The seventh time, you mentioned your awareness of a donation that was made to his commission by a millionaire whose golf course was spared by the new route for his parkway. After that, he didn’t talk to you again. If you had gotten an eighth interview with Robert Moses, what is the one question you would most want to ask him?

天哪,问得太好了。不假思索地讲,如果我只有这一个问题可以问他,我会问他:“你意识到自己正在变吗?”这是脱口而出的……你提了一个绝妙的问题。但这就是我目前会给出的回答。这是我一直想问他的事情。

英文原文 Oh, God, what a great question. Off the top of my head, if I only had one question to ask him, I’d ask him, "Did you realize you were changing?" That’s off the top... That’s a great question you asked. But that’s the answer I’ll give for now. That’s something I always would like to have asked him.

你认为他意识到自己正在发生变化了吗?

英文原文 Do you think he realized that he was changing?

不择手段与大萧条的机遇

不。我认为他从一开始就觉得自己拥有在某处修路、在某处建公园的宏图。那是最好的事情。它是必须要完成的,也是理应去完成的。无论他必须给人们施加多少艰难困苦,无论他必须驱逐成千上万的多少人,无论他必须做什么,他都要把路建起来。你会看到他这种与日俱增的无情,彻头彻尾的冷酷无情。如果有人挡了他的道,他就会想方设法拔掉那个人这个绊脚石。

英文原文 No. I think he felt from the beginning that he had this vision to build roads here and parks there. That was the best thing to do. It was going to get done, and it should get done. No matter how many hardships he had to inflict on people, no matter how many thousands he had to evict, no matter what he had to do, he was going to get the roads built. You see this increasing ruthlessness, this utter ruthlessness of him. If someone stood in his way, he was going to find a way to remove that person as an obstacle.

如果你愿意听,我可以给你举个例子。布朗克斯有一位政客名叫亨利·爱泼斯坦。亨利·爱泼斯坦反对修建跨布朗克斯高速公路。他对罗伯特·摩西说:“你把它直接修穿了一个街区,这得让你驱逐成千上万的人。你只要把它往南移两个街区,就只需要驱逐几百人。”摩西着手去毁掉爱泼斯坦,而且基本上做到了,手段就是把他搞婚外情的事公之于众。

英文原文 I’ll give you an example of that if you want. There’s a politician in the Bronx named Henry Epstein. Henry Epstein is opposing the Cross Bronx Expressway. He’s saying to Robert Moses, "You’re putting it right through a neighborhood where you have to evict tens of thousands of people. You can just move it two blocks to the south, and you only have to evict a couple of hundred people." Moses sets out to destroy Epstein, and basically does, by making it known he’s having an affair.

如果他能在某人身上找到弱点——比如对方有情妇、收受金钱之类的——他就会加以利用。只要能成事,他什么招数都使得出来。依我之见,这是他在非常年轻时未能办成事情而学到的。他有想做成的事,但没能做成。这种领悟降临到了他身上。我们在书里,或者在了解他的过程中都能看出来。我试图展现他是如何认识到自己必须找出人们身上的弱点的。如果对方有弱点,他就会去利用。他要把事情做成。有一种冷酷硬化,一种愈演愈烈的冷酷无情,到了最后唯一重要的就是把事情办成。任何挡他道的人都会领教他不惜一切代价的手段。如果摩西必须毁掉他,他就会毁掉他。

英文原文 If he can find a weakness in somebody, that he has a mistress, that he’s taking money or something, he’ll use it. He’ll use whatever he has to to get things done. He learns that, in my opinion, by failing to get things done when he’s very young. He has things that he wants to get done, and they don’t get done. The awareness comes on him. We can see it in the book, or in my learning about him. I try to show how he learns that he has to find weaknesses in people. If he has a weakness, he’s going to use it. He’s going to get things done. There’s a hardening, an increased ruthlessness, where the only thing that matters is to get the thing done. Anyone who stands in his way is going to get whatever it takes. If Moses has to destroy him, he’ll destroy him.

正如你所说,你写的不单是一个人的历史,而是一个美国时代的记录。《权力掮客》中最引人入胜的一点在于,尤其是在他能够如此快速地取得如此多成就的时期,当时正在发生的——你也谈到了这点——是大萧条。他以极其廉价的报酬雇用了成千上万名建筑师和数以万计的线务工,为这座城市建设大型公共工程。所以我很好奇,摩西早期的成就中,有多大一部分仅仅是因为大萧条导致政府能够在顶尖人才方面与私营部门竞争,并且能够获得大量劳动力在整个冬季 24/7 全天候劳作、高速推进?

英文原文 As you say, you’re writing not the history of one man, but of an era in America. One of the most interesting things about The Power Broker is, especially in the period in which he’s able to accomplish so much so quickly, what’s happening, and you talk about this, is the Great Depression. He’s hiring thousands of architects, tens of thousands of linemen, for pennies on the dollar to do big public works for the city. So I wonder how big a part of Moses’ early achievements is just that the government, because of the Great Depression, could compete with the private sector for the top talent and for lots and lots of labor working 24/7 through the winter, moving fast.

又是一个好问题。答案是它起到了很大的作用。他需要建筑师来做某件事。我不记得具体是什么了。这在《权力掮客》里有写。他们在第五大道上排起长队,成千上万失业的建筑师,他可以用极低的工资雇用他们。但比工资更重要的是,他们是招之即来的,因为他们无事可做。他能够雇用这么多人,并且以一种无情的方式招人和解雇人,逼着工人们拼命苦干。他可以随时解雇他们。那是大萧条时期。他们没有别的工作可去。他利用了这一点。是的。

英文原文 Another great question. The answer is that it played a big role. He needed architects for something. I don’t remember what it is. It’s in The Power Broker. They lined up on Fifth Avenue, thousands of out-of-work architects that he could hire for very low wages. But more than the wages, they were available, because they didn’t have anything to do. He was able to hire so many people, and hire and fire them in a ruthless way, making the workmen work hard. He could just fire them. It was the Depression. They didn’t have other jobs to go to. He used that. Yes.

作为一个如此深入研究城市发展的人,有一件事我很纳闷。你看上世纪初或者上世纪初之前建造的那些东西——中央车站以及纽约所有那些美丽的建筑——对比上世纪后半叶建造的东西。它们看起来远没有那么美了。那些更早、更美丽的建筑是由一个贫穷得多的国家建造出来的。什么改变了?为什么以前能够建造出更美丽的东西?

英文原文 As somebody who has studied urban development so deeply, here is one thing I’m curious about. You look at the things that were built at the beginning of the last century, or before the beginning of the last century — Grand Central Station and all the beautiful architecture in New York — versus the things that were built in the second half of the century. They look a lot less beautiful. The earlier, more beautiful things were built by a much poorer country. What changed? Why were you able to build more beautiful things before?

改变的一点是,你曾经拥有所有这些失业的工匠,他们可以——我们就说是在建筑物上雕刻石工装饰。我的公寓在一栋公寓楼的 15 层。街对面是一座 15 到 16 层高的建筑。你会说:“看看那栋建筑屋顶上石雕里所做的所有美丽的雕刻。”我说:“唯一能看到它的人就是我公寓里的人,以及隔壁公寓里的人。”有人愿意花这笔钱,是因为建造那栋楼的建筑商能够以如此廉价的工资雇用熟练人员,以至于他们可以让这些人在没人看得到的顶层楼层做装饰来让大楼变得漂亮,因为人力很便宜。

英文原文 One thing that changed is you had all these out-of-work artisans who could, we’ll just say, carve stonework on buildings. My apartment is on the 15th floor of an apartment house. Across the street is a building that’s 15-16 stories high. You say, "Look at all the beautiful carving that’s done in the stonework of that building up on the roof." I said, "The only people who can see it are the people in my apartment and the people in the apartment next to it." Someone was willing to spend that money because the builders who built that could hire skilled people at such low wages that they could make them do the decorations to make a building beautiful up on floors that nobody’s going to see, because people came cheap.

如果你想让你的智能体承担实际工作,它们需要能够使用支撑你公司运转的工具。比如电子邮件、Slack 或 Stripe。但是赋予它们不受限制的访问权限是有风险的,因为它们可能会向客户发送机密信息,或者退还一批不该退的款项。当然,你可以直接手动审核每一个请求,但这通常难以持久。这就是为什么我的赞助商 WorkOS 构建了 Airlock。

英文原文 If you want your agents to do real work, they need to be able to use the tools that your company runs on. Things like email or Slack or Stripe. But giving them unfettered access is risky, because they could send confidential information to a customer or refund a bunch of payments that they shouldn't have. Of course, you could just review every request manually, but that doesn't typically last. That's why my sponsor, WorkOS, built Airlock.

它是位于你的智能体与你的工具之间的一层判定层。每当智能体想要执行某项操作时,它都会向 Airlock 发出请求,后者根据你公司的策略对其进行评估,并决定是允许、阻止还是上报给人工处理。每当请求获准,Airlock 就会替智能体采取相应操作,调用必要的端点并传递响应。这样一来,你的智能体就永远看不到你的 API 密钥,因而无法泄漏它们

英文原文 It's a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your tools. Any time that an agent wants to do something, it makes a request to Airlock, which evaluates it against your company's policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. Whenever a request is allowed, Airlock takes the relevant action for the agent, hitting the necessary endpoints and passing along the response. That way, your agents never see your API keys, and so they can't leak them

或者将其用于未经授权的目的。

英文原文 or use them for unauthorized purposes.

由于 Airlock 掌管着你所有工具的钥匙,它必须坚如磐石。

英文原文 Since Airlock holds the keys to all your tools, it has to be rock solid.

幸运的是,在过去近十年的大部分时间里,WorkOS 一直在构建身份验证和权限产品,并且经过了实战检验。有超过 3,000 家公司信赖 WorkOS,包括 OpenAI 和 Anthropic。Airlock 目前正处于抢先体验阶段。如果你感兴趣,请访问 workos.com/airlock。

英文原文 Fortunately, WorkOS has spent the better part of the last decade building auth and permissions products, and they're battle-tested. More than 3,000 companies rely on WorkOS, including OpenAI and Anthropic. Airlock is in early access. If you're interested, go to workos.com/airlock.

约翰逊的权力:说服力还是筹码

我现在想问问关于约翰逊的事。在《参议院霸主》中,你提出了两点关于约翰逊为何如此卓有成效的看法,至少我是这么理解的。其一是他跟你交谈时极具说服力。其二是他将自己置于一个握有筹码的位置,拥有可以向你承诺或威胁你的东西。这并不是说他让你信服了什么,而是你知道如果想取得成功,就必须得到他的关照。在这两者之中,我很好奇究竟哪一个才是他真正的权力来源:他的筹码,还是他的说服力?

英文原文 I want to ask you about Johnson now. In Master of the Senate, you make two points about how Johnson is effective, at least this is the way I read it. One is that he’s very persuasive if you’re talking to him. The other is he’s put himself in a position of leverage such that he has things to promise you or things to threaten you with. It’s not that he’s convinced you of anything, but you know that you need his favor if you want to be successful. Of the two, I’m curious which was really the source of his power: his leverage or his persuasion?

在他的说服力背后是权力。当你和他交谈时,如果他对你有所要求,你知道他背后有权力给予或拒绝你想要的东西。比如说,他要求一位参议员在某个特定议题上投赞成票。那位参议员可能不同意他的观点,可能不想把票投给他,但他会清楚:他想要一个委员会职位,约翰逊有权给他或不给;或者他会清楚自己想要一项具体的法案,约翰逊有权力让这项法案通过或不通过。

英文原文 Behind his persuasion was the power. When you were talking to him, if he asked something of you, you knew he had the power behind him to give you or deny you things that you wanted. Say he was asking a senator for a vote on a specific issue. The senator might not agree with him, might not want to give him the vote, but he would know. He wants a committee assignment. Johnson has the power to give him that or not. Or he would know he wants a specific law. Johnson has the power to get that law passed or not.

在一切背后——当约翰逊跟你说话,他搂着你的肩膀,身体靠向你时——他施加给你的不仅是他的人格力量。在那个人格力量背后,你知道他有能力对你做不利或有利的事,你最好明白这一点。

英文原文 Behind everything — when Johnson is talking to you, and he puts his arm around you, and he leans into you — it’s not just the force of his personality that he’s bringing to bear on you. Behind that personality, you know he has the power to do things to you or for you that you better be aware of.

《提升的手段》,那本关于与科克·史蒂文森竞选的书,也就是 1948 年的参议院选举。那大概是我有史以来最喜欢的书。你把德克萨斯州州长科克·史蒂文森这个人描绘得如此扣人心弦,人们称他为“德克萨斯先生”。当你为他写人物小传、撰写这本书时,你心中是否曾有一丝希望他能赢得那场参议院选举?

英文原文 Means of Ascent, the book about the election with Coke Stevenson, the 1948 Senate election. That is my favorite book perhaps ever. You paint such a compelling portrait of this person, Coke Stevenson, governor of Texas. They called him Mr. Texas. As you were writing his profile and writing this book, did part of you wish that he had won the Senate election?

你忍不住会觉得……我直接回答你吧。答案是肯定的。我认为科克·史蒂文森虽然是个理想主义者,但他懂得如何把事情办成。当他担任德克萨斯州州长时,他确实做出了成就。我认为如果他进了参议院,他会成为一名出色的参议员并有所建树。所以你希望他赢。你会为他的失败感到悲剧,因为他是以那样的方式落败的。科克·史蒂文森的问题在于,他确实没有意识到有人会在选举中对他使出林登·约翰逊所使出的全部手段。他无法直面并应对这一点。

英文原文 You couldn’t help feeling… I’ll answer you directly. The answer is yes. I think Coke Stevenson, although he was an idealist, he knew how to get things done. When he was governor of Texas, he really accomplished things. I think if he had gone to the Senate, he would have been a great senator and accomplished things. So you wish that he had won. You feel the tragedy that he lost because of the way he lost. The thing about Coke Stevenson, he really didn’t realize someone could do all the things to him in the election that Lyndon Johnson did. He didn’t come to grips with that.

肯尼迪、约翰逊与改变美国的决心

假设肯尼迪在 1960 年获胜,但约翰逊拒绝担任副总统,因此依然是多数党领袖。你认为肯尼迪在约翰逊担任多数党领袖期间能通过的法案,与约翰逊后来作为总统能够通过的法律相比,会有多大不同?也就是说,在 1963 年、1964 年和 1965 年发生的事情,会不会只是更早发生而已?

英文原文 Suppose that Kennedy wins in ’60, but Johnson refuses the vice presidency, so he’s still majority leader. How different do you think the bills that Kennedy would pass under Johnson as majority leader would be from the laws that Johnson as president was eventually able to pass? That is to say, the things that happened in ’63 and ’64 and ’65, would they have just happened earlier?

不会,因为肯尼迪没有那种想要改变美国的首要渴望。约翰·肯尼迪极其迷人。他是一位优秀的总统。他在外交政策方面很出色,而约翰逊在外交上显然不行。但他所欠缺的,是林登·约翰逊拥有的这种愿景、这种改变美国的渴望。

英文原文 No, because Kennedy did not have the overriding desire to change America. John Kennedy was utterly charming. He was a good president. He was good in foreign policy, where Johnson certainly was not. But what he did not have was this vision, this desire to change America that Lyndon Johnson had.

林登·约翰逊在科图拉教贫困孩子一年后回来,下定决心要改变教育体系以更多地帮助穷人,做所有这些别的事情来帮助贫困人群。那种决心确实是独一无二的。这正是使他在内政上成为一位如此伟大的总统的原因,让我们拥有了所有这些民权法案、这些反贫困法案,要是没有林登·约翰逊,我们是不会拥有这些的。

英文原文 Lyndon Johnson comes back from his year teaching the poor kids in Cotulla determined to change the education system to help poor people more, to do all these other things to help poor people. That determination is something that’s really unique. It’s what made him domestically such a great president, that we have all these civil rights laws, these anti-poverty laws that we wouldn’t have had without Lyndon Johnson.

由于外交政策,由于越南,他的总统任期以悲剧告终。但他这种想要把事情办成以帮助美国人民的渴望几乎是独一无二的。你会说:“天哪,他决心要做成这件事。”他会找到实现它的方法。你看着他去做。然后你会说:“他确实在做。”当他的注意力转向越南时,一切都分崩离析,他的总统生涯毁于一旦。他最初想在内政方面做的事情,未能按他原本会采取的方式去完成。但他在大选后凭借教育法案、凭借反贫困法案着手改变这个国家。他正走在实现它的道路上。那就是约翰逊和越南的巨大悲剧。

英文原文 His presidency ends in tragedy because of foreign policy, because of Vietnam. But he has this desire to get things done to help people in America that’s almost unique. You say, "Gee, he’s determined to do this." He’s going to find a way to do it. You watch him doing it. Then you say, "He was doing it." When his attention turns to Vietnam, everything falls apart, and his presidency is ruined. The things he started out to do domestically don’t get done in the way he would have done them. But he starts out after the election with the education laws, with the anti-poverty bills to change the country. He’s on his way to doing it. That’s the great tragedy of Johnson and Vietnam.

如果我可以问问关于这一点——如果你不想谈也可以,因为这在下一本书里。但如果你愿意谈谈,从根本上说,为什么约翰逊一直在升级局势,哪怕——

英文原文 If I can ask about that, and it’s okay if you don’t want to talk about this because it’s in the next book. But if you’re willing to talk about it, fundamentally, why did Johnson keep escalating, even when—

回答你这个问题的是:我现在仍然在试图弄清楚这一点,所以我不会——

英文原文 The answer to your question is I’m still trying to figure that out right now, so I’m not going to—

没关系。因为那确实是个谜。

英文原文 That’s fine. Because that’s quite a mystery.

精力、意志与写作节奏

约翰逊和摩西身上都有的一个共同点,是这种使不完的精力,每天工作 16 个小时,有时甚至比这还多。我想知道,你在多大程度上认为这是因为他们的体质不同,就是有着不同的能量储备?还是说你认为这纯粹是因为他们的意志太强了?

英文原文 One of the things that’s true of both Johnson and Moses is this inexhaustible energy, working 16 hours a day, sometimes even more than that. I wonder how much you think that is the fact that they had a different constitution, that they just had different reserves of energy. Or do you think it was just that their will was so strong?

我认为纯粹是他们的意志。许多人都有他们的精力。当你看到罗伯特·摩西睡得极少,表现出只要能按自己的意愿行事、把事情办成,他愿意付出一切,疲惫之类的东西甚至根本不在考虑范围之内。有时我看着某些事情——我随口想不起具体哪一件了——你会说:“约翰逊在凌晨两三点打这通电话。他不睡觉打电话就是为了达到目的。”事实上,有一个有趣的轶事。约翰逊在清晨 5:00 给一位参议员打电话,要他在某件事上投赞成票,那位参议员说:“哦,林登,我正好躺在这里等你的电话呢。”

英文原文 I think it’s just their will. A lot of people have their energy. When you see Robert Moses sleeping very little, showing that he’d do anything to get his way, to get things done, being tired or something doesn’t even seem to figure into the equation. Sometimes I’m looking at something — I can’t remember one off the top of my head — and you’ll say, "Johnson’s making this call at 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning. He’s up making these calls to get his way." In fact, there’s a funny anecdote. Johnson calls one senator at 5:00 AM to ask him for his vote on something, and the senator says, "Oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call."

所以这是他们的意志。我现在想问你一点关于撰写传记的问题。我有一个疑问:你花 5 到 10 年时间写单单一本书。在整个过程中,可能除了你的编辑和你的妻子,就再没有其他人看过手稿了。那么你是如何确保自己走在正确的轨道上的?因为从你开始动笔到获得公众反馈,必须等待太久的时间。你如何确保所有内容都能紧密相扣,并且你正按照自己想要的方式传达信息?

英文原文 So it’s their will. I want to ask you a little bit about writing biography now. One question I have is, you spend 5-10 years writing a single book. Through that process, maybe your editor and your wife are the only people who have seen the manuscript. So how do you make sure you’re on the right track? Because you’ve got to wait so long from when you start to when you get public feedback. How do you make sure that everything’s going to hang together and you’re pursuing the message the way you want to?

你的问题中有一部分是,你如何确信自己走在正确的轨道上?对此的回答是你无法确信。但你如何努力保持在正确的轨道上呢?我确实为此有一个方法。在开始一本书之前——我是通过《权力经纪人》买到了教训才明白这点的,因为我在写《权力经纪人》时没有这么做——我会把我想让这本书成为什么样彻底想清楚,整本书都想透。人们会说:“你的意思是你想透到了结局?”答案是肯定的。然后你会问:“这本书是关于什么的?”

英文原文 Part of your question is, how do you be sure you’re on the right track? The answer to that is you’re not. But how do you try to stay on the right track? I do have a device for that. Before I start a book — I learned this the hard way with The Power Broker, because I didn’t do it with The Power Broker — I think through what I want the book to be, the whole book. People say, "You mean you think it through to the end?" The answer is yes. Then you say, "What is this book about?"

在开始写作之前,我有时会在那张书桌前坐很久思考这本书,只是以这样或那样的方式问自己:“这本书是关于什么的?”你必须把它压缩成一句话。你说:“你不可能把它压缩成一句话。”然后你说:“是的,但是鲍勃,你吸取了教训,你最好把它缩成一句话,否则三年后你一边写着,一边就会自言自语说:‘我到底在试图做什么?’”在动笔写一本书之前,我试着把它压缩成一句话,或者最多一段话,然后说:“归根结底,这本书是关于什么的?”我努力让所有的一切都围绕着那一点紧密联系在一起。

英文原文 I sit at that desk sometimes for a long time before I start writing, when I’m thinking about the book, just asking myself in one way or another, "What is this book about?" You’ve got to get it down to one sentence. You say, "You can’t get it down to one sentence." Then you say, "Yeah, but Bob, you learned you better get it down to one sentence, or three years from now you’re going to be writing and you’re going to be saying, ‘What am I trying to do?’" Before I start a book, I try to get it down to a sentence or at most a paragraph and say, "Really, what is this book about?" I try to make everything hang together around that point.

早在八月份,我的赞助商 Jane Street 发布了一款神秘芯片的设计文件,并向我的听众发起挑战,要求搞清其真正用途。挑战已经结束,Jane Street 发布了一篇博文,重点介绍了他们最喜欢的一些提交方案。他们还揭示了这款 ASIC 的用途。我在这里就不剧透了,但如果你好奇,我已经把链接放在了节目笔记里。协助设计该谜题的阿尼什向我介绍了一些最佳的分析报告。

英文原文 Back in August, my sponsor, Jane Street, released the design files for a mystery chip and challenged my audience to figure out its true purpose. The challenge is over, and Jane Street has released a blog post highlighting some of their favorite submissions. They also reveal the ASIC's purpose. I won't spoil it here, but if you're curious, I've linked to it in the show notes. Anish, who helped design the puzzle, walked me through some of the best write-ups.

我想我最喜欢的提交作品可能是由 Kjartan van Driel 和 Leander Post 制作的这个疯狂的可视化,他们一开始用 3D 展示了芯片是如何由标准单元制造的,所有金属层是如何拼合在一起以实际构成芯片的逻辑,然后展示了我们谜题设计的每个组件、它的作用以及他们是如何对其进行逆向工程的,最后再展示这一切是如何重新拼合回谜题之中的。

英文原文 I think my favorite submission was probably this insane visualization made by Kjartan van Driel and Leander Post, who started by showing in 3D how a chip is made from standard cells, how all of the metal layers fit together to actually comprise the logic of the chip, and then showed each component of our puzzle design, what it does, and how they reverse-engineered it, before then showing how it all fits back together into the puzzle.

如果你错过了这次挑战,别担心。现在有一个新的挑战正在进行。这个新挑战的目标是,我们希望人们设计一款硬件协议模拟器芯片,可用于分析和模拟不同的通信协议。作为额外奖励,我们将出资制造我们最喜欢的提交作品,你实际上会拿回你的芯片,安装在电路板上,随时供你在现实生活中进行测试。比赛一直开放到 1 月 18 日。访问 janestreet.com/dwarkesh 即可开始。

英文原文 Don't worry if you missed this challenge. There's a new one live right now. So the goal with this new challenge is we want people to design a hardware protocol emulator chip that can be used to analyze and emulate different communication protocols. And as a bonus, we're going to pay to fabricate our favorite submissions, and you'll actually get your chip back, mounted on a board, ready for you to test in real life. The competition is open until January 18th. Go to janestreet.com/dwarkesh to get started.

档案研究与篇幅取舍

你的许多书都是在我们拥有数字档案、互联网以及所有这些可用资源之前写就的。这些资源带来了多大改变?

英文原文 A lot of your books you’ve written before we had digital archives, the internet, and all the resources that made available. How much of a difference have those resources made?

它们现在正在带来很大改变。我正在写的这本书,写的是越南。比方说我想写一场战役,我想详细地写。这刚刚发生:我选了一场我想详细描写的战役,名叫德浪河谷战役。没有人详细写过它。但我可以在电脑前查到参加过那场战役的士兵口述历史在何处,口述历史保存在哪些大学,有哪些文件可用,这是以前无法做到的。

英文原文 They’re making a big difference right now. The book I’m doing now, I’m writing about Vietnam. Let’s say I want to do a battle. I want to write in detail. This just happened. I picked a battle that I wanted to do in detail. It’s called the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. Nobody’s written about it in detail. But I could go to my computer and I could look up where the oral histories are from soldiers who fought in that battle, what colleges the oral histories are at, what documents are available, in a way you couldn’t do before.

你认为在你写前几卷时,这会带来很大改变吗?

英文原文 Do you think it would’ve made a big difference when you were writing the earlier volumes?

不会。它可能会让事情变得更快,但以我的行事方式,我无论如何都会去查看那些文件。现在事情会变快。但我想到你刚才问的问题。前几天我一直在思考这个问题。我很难解释清楚,但我不认为它会有任何加快。我无法确切告诉你原因。当然,你能更快地找到文件。但与阅读文件相比,找到文件只是一件小事。

英文原文 No. It might’ve made things faster, but just the way I am, I would look at the documents anyway. Things would go faster now. But I think about what you just asked. I was thinking about it the other day. It’s difficult for me to explain it, but I don’t think it would’ve gone any faster. I can’t quite tell you why. Certainly you could find the documents faster. But finding them is a small thing compared to reading them.

我脑海中突然浮现出一个问题,我很想知道你的答案。如果我们能够穿越回 1975 年,我如果能告诉当时的罗伯特·卡罗,他即将着手的关于林登·约翰逊的这三卷新书将花费 40 多年时间,你认为 40 多岁的罗伯特·卡罗对此会有什么反应?他会高兴吗?他会害怕吗?

英文原文 A question just occurs to me. I’m curious to get your answer. If we were able to time travel back to ’75 and I could tell Robert Caro then that these three new volumes on Lyndon Johnson he’s about to embark on will take more than 40 years, how do you think 40-something-year-old Robert Caro would have reacted to that? Would he have been happy? Would he have been afraid?

你提的问题棒极了。这个领悟是在我思考约翰逊的时候浮现出来的。我会给你一个长长的回答,但这是准确的回答。我在《权力经纪人》里不得不删掉了太多内容。我删掉了太多本不该删掉的东西。我交给我编辑鲍勃·戈特利布的手稿有 105 万字长。他们能塞进单单一卷里的极限——他确实在这方面下了很大功夫,因为我下定决心只出一卷——是 700 页,或者大约 70 万字,而不是 105 万字,这意味着我们必须删掉 35 万字。

英文原文 You ask terrific questions. The realization came to me when I was thinking about Johnson. I’ll give you a long answer, but this is the accurate answer. I had to cut so much out of The Power Broker. I cut out so much stuff that shouldn’t have been cut out. I gave Bob Gottlieb, my editor, a manuscript that was 1,050,000 words long. The most they could fit into one volume — and he really worked at this, because I was determined it would only be one volume — was 700 pages, or about 700,000 words, instead of 1,050,000 words, which meant we had to cut 350,000 words.

他曾说过:“我删掉了我读过的很多最好的东西。”我感觉自己删掉的很多东西,没有人知晓是一场悲剧。直到今天,人们还会向我询问某些事情。我说:“哦,我写过那个。”然后他们说:“可谁也没读过。”但以我的性格,我不知道这是否会改变什么,因为当我写这本书时,我在说:“哦,这太长了。这会太长了。

英文原文 He has said, "I cut a lot of the best stuff I ever read." I felt a lot of the stuff that I cut out, it’s tragic that no one knows it. To this day, people ask me about things. I say, "Oh, I wrote that." Then they say, "Well, no one ever read it." But the way I am, I don’t know that it would’ve changed anything, because as I’m writing the book, I’m saying, "Oh, this is too long. This is going to be too long.

“我得删掉这么多内容。”

但我似乎就是没办法不去写我认为该写的东西,哪怕我明知道其中有那么多的内容最终都不得不删掉。

英文原文

I’m going to have to cut so much."

But I don’t seem to have the ability not to

write the stuff that I think should be written,

even though I know so much of

it is going to have to be cut.

说到这个,在这儿的另一个房间里,你有一柜又一柜的采访笔记、工作时的笔记,那些全都是之前从未发表过的东西。最终其他历史学家将能够研究这些你在职业生涯中汇编的笔记和档案。你希望他们拿这些做什么?你期待带来什么样的学术研究?

英文原文

Speaking of which, you have, in the other

room here, cabinets and cabinets of notes on

interviews, notes as you’re working, things

which have never been published before.

Eventually other historians will be able

to study those notes and those documents

that you have compiled over your career.

What is it that you hope they do with it?

What kind of scholarship do you hope for?

未入书稿的档案与研究遗产

我从书里删掉了太多我希望人们能够知道的东西。有时你在读某些报道时会想:“哎,要是当年我写过那件事,报纸就不会那样去报道了,人们对其理解就会完全不同。”

英文原文

I cut out so much stuff from

the books that I wish people knew.

Sometimes you’re reading something and you’re

saying, "Oh, if I had written about that, the

newspapers wouldn’t be covering it the same way.

There’d be a different understanding of it."

我给你举个简单的例子:萨姆·雷伯恩(Sam Rayburn)。我在书里写过短短的一章介绍雷伯恩。但雷伯恩是美国历史上一位伟大的人物。关于萨姆·雷伯恩并没有什么优秀的传记,但他当年却执掌着众议院。他促成了罗斯福许多法案以及其他法案的通过。他为美国做了那么多事,对我来说,无人知晓这些简直是一场悲剧。

英文原文

I’ll give you an easy example.

Sam Rayburn. I have a brief

chapter on Rayburn in my books.

But Rayburn is a great figure in American history.

There’s no good biography of Sam Rayburn,

yet he ran the House of Representatives.

He passed so many of Roosevelt’s

bills and other bills.

He did so much for America

that it’s a tragedy for me that nobody knows it.

了解这些的材料全都在那些柜子里。恰好有很多这类事情的例子,我当时会说:“哇,那些东西最终没能放进书里,”但它们确实就在那里。

英文原文

The material to know it is in those cabinets.

There happen to be a lot of examples of things

where I said, "Whoa, that stuff didn’t make it

into the books," but they’re there.

我有数百份采访。我想单单《权能掮客》(The Power Broker)我就做了700次采访。那些采访的笔记都在文件柜里:详尽的、打字打出来的笔记。所以我认为那里有大量的材料,能够帮助人们理解纽约是如何演变成后来那个模样的。

英文原文

I have hundreds of interviews.

I think I have 700 interviews

for The Power Broker alone.

The notes for those interviews are in the

file cabinets: detailed, typed-up notes.

So there’s a lot of material there

that I think would help people

understand how New York evolved the way it did.

至于约翰逊,嗯,我目前正在写,写他在总统任内发生的事情。对那段历史有了更多的理解。它不会被写进我的书里了。但那些材料会在那里。那就是为什么我把我的档案馆藏捐给了纽约历史学会(New-York Historical Society)。

英文原文

With Johnson, well, I’m writing about it now,

things that happened under his presidency.

There’s more understanding of it.

It’s not going to make its way into my books.

But they’re going to be there.

That’s why I gave my archive to

the New-York Historical Society.

说实话,当时其他机构开出过高得多的价钱。但我接受了少得多的钱,少了一大笔钱,一笔对我来说分量很重的金额,因为我希望这些档案能够容易获取。我希望它们留在纽约。我不希望它们留在得克萨斯大学,那样你还得专程坐飞机去那里。我希望它留在纽约。

英文原文

Now, I have to say, I was offered

a lot more money by other places.

But I took a lot less money, a great deal less

money, an amount that mattered a lot to me,

because I wanted them to be easily accessible.

I wanted them to be in New York.

I didn’t want them to be at the University

of Texas, where you have to fly down there.

I wanted it to be in New York.

很多我从没能放进书里的内容,其材料都在那里。但只要有人想看,它就在那里。我给你举个例子。我写过的内容远比书里的多得多。我采访了那么多参议员、那么多参议员助理,试图以此来写参议院。随后我不得不删掉、或者不写、甚至完全不涉足我所了解到的绝大多数内容——我不想说是90%,因为我确实不知道确切百分比——这些都没在书里,但都在文件柜里。所以它们放在那里供人查阅。这就是为什么我的档案放在纽约。

英文原文

The material is there for a lot of

stuff that I never got to put in my books.

But it’s there if somebody wants it.

I’ll give you an example.

I wrote so much more.

I interviewed so many senators, so many assistants

to senators, to try and write about the Senate.

Then I had to cut out or not write or not even go

into the vast majority — I don’t want to say 90%,

because I don’t really know a percent — of

what I learned that is not in the books,

but is in the file cabinets.

So they are there for someone to look at.

That's why my archives are in New York.

得知这项研究将在未来几代学者中持续产生深远益处,真是太好了。

英文原文

It’s great to know that that research will pay

dividends through many generations of scholars.

嗯,希望如此。

英文原文

Well, hope so.

因为显然,人们已经不可能再去采访那些你在60年代、70年代和80年代采访过的人了。这让我想到一点:为了描绘出你所书写的那段时代,以及塑造了摩西和约翰逊的那些时代,在《权能掮客》中你谈到了纽约的黄金海岸(Gold Coast)和廉租公寓;在约翰逊传记中,你谈到了拓荒定居时期丘陵地区(Hill Country)的样貌。

英文原文

Because obviously it

will not be possible to interview the folks you

interviewed in the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s again.

This makes me wonder. In order to paint a

picture of the era that you’re writing about,

and the eras which shaped Moses and Johnson, in

The Power Broker you talk about the Gold Coast

in New York and the tenements.

In the Johnson biographies,

you talk about what the Hill Country was

like when the frontier was being settled.

很有趣的一点是,即便约翰逊当初没有成为总统,丘陵地区当年发生的故事本身也依然引人入胜。这是个奇怪的想法,但这让我好奇,你是否能花上10到20年的时间去写一个彻头彻尾的普通人的传记,因为关于约翰逊的许多真实过往,哪怕他的仕途最终没有走到后来那个位置,也依然会极具魅力。

英文原文

One thing that’s interesting is that

even if Johnson had not become president,

the story of what was happening in the

Hill Country would still be fascinating.

It’s an odd thought, but it makes me wonder

if you could spend 10-20 years writing the

biography of a totally ordinary person, because

a lot of what was true about Johnson would have

still been fascinating even if his

career didn’t end up where it did.

边疆定居与刻骨的孤独

你举的那个关于丘陵地区当年是什么样的例子。我们看过所有那些西部片等等。但当我开始了解到当年定居约翰逊城(Johnson City)的那些人——林登·约翰逊的祖辈,但也仅仅是他前一代人,或者最多是他前面两代人——你会说:“天哪,当年那是怎样的一种生活,太令人着迷了。”那是怎样的一种生活?我想写这本书。带上家人搬到边疆去生活,究竟是怎样的一种体验?在某种层面上,举家搬迁到印第安人的地界,某天你可能会发现家人惨遭屠杀,还有所有那些其他的艰难险阻。

英文原文

The example that you give of

what the Hill Country was like.

We see all these Western movies and all.

But when I started to learn about the people

who settled Johnson City — Lyndon Johnson’s

ancestors, but only the generation before him,

or at most two generations before him — you say,

"God is this fascinating, what it was like."

What was it like? I wanted to do this book.

What was it like to take your

family and move them to the frontier?

To move them, on one level, to Indian country,

where you might find your family massacred

one day, and all these other difficulties.

那些都记在我的笔记里,因为当我与人们交谈时,他们会谈起自己的祖父,或是祖父曾告诉过他们的事。当我和他们谈论约翰逊时,我了解到了那个时代的生活面貌。我说:“这是一个多么不可思议、惊心动魄的故事啊。”你会说:“哎,关于这方面的书已经有很多了。”我恰恰认为还远远不够。

英文原文

That’s in my notes, because when I was talking to

people, they would talk about their grandfathers,

or what their grandfathers told them.

When I’m talking to them about Johnson, I’m

learning all about what life was like in that era.

I said, "What an amazing, amazing story this is."

You say, "Well, there are a lot of books on it."

I happen to think there are not enough.

同样令人惊叹的,就是当时的国家跟后来相比反差有多大。想想约翰逊在约翰逊城长大,在这样一个狭小孤寂的小镇上,甚至还住在距离市镇几十英里之外的牧场里,对比一下60年代的美国。那是完全不同的地方。我好奇约翰逊是否曾对自己成长经历与自己所领导的国家之间如此巨大的差异感到过某种震惊。

英文原文

What’s also so amazing is just

how different of a country it was.

You think about Johnson growing up in Johnson

City, in this tiny little lonely town, and

even then being on a ranch that is tens of miles

away from the city, versus America in the ’60s.

It’s such a different place.

I wonder if Johnson ever felt some

shock at how different his upbringing

was from the country he was leading.

答案是肯定的。他深切地意识到边疆的存在,知道他祖父的那片土地是什么样子的。当他在约翰逊城长大时——在约翰逊牧场的外围,毕竟离约翰逊城还有18英里远——在那样的一座牧场上长大是怎样的一种感觉……在很多方面它都是不同的。它以一种不同的方式塑造了你的性格。

英文原文

The answer is yes. He was very aware of the

frontier, of what his grandfather’s land was like.

When he grew up in Johnson City — in

the outskirts on the Johnson Ranch,

which after all was 18 miles beyond Johnson

City — what it was like to grow up on a ranch

like that… In so many ways it was different.

It formed your character in a different way.

孤独是一件大事。我曾写过一个章节,后来不得不压缩到大概三页左右,是关于他的母亲以及她是多么孤独。人们在周围空无一人的地方开垦农场和牧场,究竟是怎样的一种生活。我想我书里有一句话,说她下午走出去,爬上一座小山坡,举目四望除了连绵的群山什么都看不见。附近根本没有其他房屋。

英文原文

Loneliness is a big deal.

I wrote a section,

and then I had to cut it down to about three

pages, on his mother and how lonely she was.

What it was like for people to settle their farms

and ranches where there was nobody around you.

I think I have a line where she could walk

out in the afternoon and walk up on a hill,

and there was nothing to see but more hills.

There were no other houses near there.

我自己当时都很震惊。我当时试图去采访所有与林登·约翰逊一起长大的人,所以他们都是上了年纪的老人。你打电话给一位老太太,她会说:“你从奥斯汀开车出来22英里,看你左手边,会看到一道防牲畜格栅。那里有一条泥土路。你在泥土路向左拐,再走22英里就到我们的农场了。”你会说:“我开了22英里,路上没经过另一栋房子,也没碰到另一个人。”而这位妇女一辈子都住在那里。

英文原文

I myself was shocked. I was trying to

interview everybody who grew up with

Lyndon Johnson, so they were elderly people.

You’d call an elderly woman, and she’d say,

"You drive out of Austin 22 miles and look

on your left, you’ll find a cattle guard.

There’s a dirt road there.

You turn left on the dirt road,

and it’s 22 miles to our farm."

And you say, "I drove 22 miles.

I didn’t pass another house.

I didn’t pass another person."

And this woman is living there all her life.

尽管写了那么多精彩的书籍,我仍然不确定美国是否真正理解那种英雄主义——抛开印第安人和袭击者不谈——仅仅是这些人生活所面对的那种彻骨孤独。

英文原文

With all the wonderful books that have been

written, I’m not sure that America understands

the heroism of, forgetting Indians and raiders,

just the loneliness of what

life was like for these people.

我想就以这个话题作为结尾,关于孤独。因为显而易见,你并不是生活在荒无人烟的牧场上,你生活在纽约市。但你和伊娜(Ina)长久以来基本上都是两个人独自在一块儿工作。孤独对你的工作以及你的生活产生了怎样的影响?

英文原文

I want to close on that, on loneliness,

because obviously you’re not living on a

ranch in the middle of nowhere.

You’re living in New York City.

But you and Ina have together basically

been working alone for so long.

How has loneliness affected

your work and also your life?

问得很好。影响很大。让我想想该怎么表达。我早上来到这里。我把电话关掉。我一整天都不会和任何人说话。我是个待人友好的人,事实上,有时仅仅是关电话这件事情本身就很难。你想拿起电话找个人聊聊天,但你会对自己说:“我正在专心写书。我不能那么做,那会打断专注。”这听起来像是很虚伪的托词,但你会说:“我真不能那样做,我正在努力思考另一件事。”

英文原文

Great question. A lot. Let

me think how I can say this.

I come here in the morning.

I turn off my telephone.

I’m not going to talk to anybody all day.

I’m a friendly guy.

Sometimes that very fact is

hard, as a matter of fact.

You’d like to pick up the phone and

chat with somebody, but you say,

"I’m concentrating on the book.

I can’t do that. It’s going

to break the concentration."

That sounds like such a phony thing.

But you say, "I can’t really do that.

I’m trying to think about this other thing."

我认为这影响了我的一生。有些人能理解,但也有些人无法理解你为什么不给他们回电话。如果有人给我打电话,我不到一天结束是不会给他们回过去的。我有能体谅这点的朋友,但很多人并不理解。所以这是我生活中的一个现实。

英文原文

I think it’s impacted my entire life.

Some people understand, but some people

don’t understand that you don’t call them back.

If people call me, I’m not going to call

them back till the end of the day.

I have friends who understand that,

but a lot of people don’t understand that.

So that’s a fact of my life.

罗伯特·卡洛(Robert Caro),我无法向你言表这对我来说是多么莫大的荣幸。在这档播客开播的六年里,人们经常会问我:“在你还没邀请过的嘉宾中,你最希望谁来上你的播客?”每一次,我的回答都是罗伯特·卡洛。所以,这真是一份巨大的、无上的荣幸。非常感谢你接受这次采访。这是一次非常棒的对谈。

英文原文

Robert Caro, I can’t tell you

how much of an honor it’s been.

For six years that I’ve had this podcast, people

will ask me, "Who is the person you most want to

have on that you haven’t had on the podcast?"

Every single time, I’ve said Robert Caro.

So it’s a huge, huge honor.

Thank you so much for doing this.

It was a terrific interview.

非常感谢你。

英文原文

Thank you very much.

文中提及的人物和组织

人物: Robert Caro, Lyndon Johnson, Robert Moses, John Connally

公司/组织: WorkOS

产品/模型: Airlock

媒体/书籍: The Power Broker