主持人: Don't worry, even if something comes out about Trump, it'll be hard to truly convict him without a real investigation. I just want to say, wasn't Epstein, wasn't Howard Nunick said to be very close to him, and that's why he got involved?

观众: Who?

主持人: Howard Nunick, wasn't he Trump's secretary? Yes. And just these past two days, a lot of news has come out. His donation to Harvard was related to his connection with Martin Nowak. A very famous American mathematician, economist, and behavioral economist, Martin Nowak. One of his books has a decent Chinese translation. Martin Nowak has several good books related to behavioral economics; I've read several of them before. He's always been with math companies. But what I'm most interested in is Trump's relationship with Trump. Didn't he say that Trump knew Trump back in the 80s and 90s? He probably met Trump through Ghislaine Maxwell. He should have met him less often. Trump broke up with him in 2003 over a real estate deal, or so they say, but I don't know if they had private contact, I really don't know. Regarding Martin Nowak, I want to mention that I was quite shocked when I saw his name on a list recently. Because I had read Martin Nowak's book, "Evolutionary Dynamics," before. Yes, that book, many companies, I couldn't get into it either. Anyway, it's a very important book in behavioral economics. So, when I saw Martin Nowak in the Epstein File, I was shocked. And also, for example, regarding Maxwell, wasn't she his ex-girlfriend? Yes, she's a major accomplice in this case. Yes, his ex-girlfriend. Her father had previously translated a book for China, publishing one called "Hua Guofeng." I just found that out today, it's quite interesting. Maxwell's father published a book about Hua Guofeng.

观众: Wow, I really didn't know that.

主持人: He really didn't know. Yes, he was, what you'd call a major foreign propagandist in the UK decades ago. But I think you've added a very important point, which is how you imagine Epstein himself. These people are actually a group of intellectuals. Just like you said, Maxwell's father was also a translator, right? The underlying nature of these people is, even if they're crazy, they're intellectuals. Look at his chat with Steve Bannon, their conversations about Latin and ancient Greek classics, even if it's chuunibyou-ish, it's still that intellectual kind of chuunibyou. Yes, and I think when he discussed with these people, and they asked him how to lobby and so on, he was very articulate. I just want to say, his father wasn't just a translator, his father was a media mogul, involved with the British paper industry.

主持人: I hear you. I just want to say, about secret politics and power-money transactions, I think they have both positive and negative effects. Secret politics also exist in the EU; for example, in recent years, studies of EU politics also included this aspect of secret politics. It speeds up efficiency; although it sacrifices some transparency, I think transparency and accountability also attract a lot of accountability, but it can still accelerate many decision-making processes. Yes, yes. And I also believe that this secret politics is unavoidable in modern democracies. For example, modern democracies have many gatekeeper roles, right? For instance, when the US President nominates anyone, it ultimately needs Senate approval. That Senate approval step is the final step for this secret politics within the system. But before this system, who exactly does the US President nominate? How did the President learn about this person? How were they recommended? Who recommended them? I think these parts are non-institutional. If these parts have institutions, they might be internal party institutions. If there are no institutions, like with Donald Trump or the Epstein File, it's very likely the result of personal connections and political dealings. So, I also believe that, in fact, I think it's the same in China. Just imagine, with so many vacant positions in the Central Military Commission now, who will be the next Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission? This might ultimately involve a certain degree of decision-making process, although it's already determined by members. But who can enter this circle beforehand? Who can be seen? Who can be included in the discussion? This itself is determined by very traditional, interpersonal, feudal elements. I think.

观众: Well, I think, for example, China also has this kind of politics today. For instance, I've recently been looking at information about the princelings, related materials, newspaper articles. The princelings now, wasn't it like that in the 90s too? They were also involved in these, yes, private clubs, like Wang Jun of CITIC, and Poly Group, and so on. They were all operating in this mode of China's crony capitalism, right?

主持人: Yes, when I read the Epstein File, what flashed through my mind were these political-business relationships in China. I think human nature and the operation of power are very similar all over the world. And the princelings, I think, are much more blatant than Epstein. Yes, it can only be worse, not better. This mode of operation is terrifying. Yes, I saw, I saw what you said about this, that Robert Maxwell is Maxwell's father, a British media mogul, very hardcore. Because, yes, he was also a Labour Party member, and even had a title in the Labour Party. Yes. Okay, thank you.

主持人: Okay, next up is Petlus Andrew. That name sounds like someone who might appear in today's story. Zhongli, can you hear me?

Petlus Andrew: I can hear you, please speak. It's like this: why do these American right-wingers, I feel like they have a certain fraternity-like potential and demeanor, a kind of childishness? And not just Trump, Trump and his faction all seem to have an excessive anti-intellectualism and childishness. This is because it's America, but why isn't the European right-wing like that?

主持人: Hmm, that's a very interesting question, I'll respond to it. First, let me say that Epstein actually had closer ties to the left. Of course, we'll talk about the right-wing in a moment. Steve Bannon is definitely a right-winger, but Epstein's entire circle, because of his New York connections, was much closer to the Democratic Party. The people he was closest to, like Bill Clinton, Bill Gates, and in the political sphere, Stacey Plaskett, and Obama's advisor KC Rumler—these are all Democrats. His own political image, you can see he always spoke of Donald Trump in a way that showed dislike. So I think this person, including Chomsky, is actually someone with closer ties to the Democratic Party. Although many people are willing to use him to bring down Donald Trump, in this matter, I truly feel that Donald Trump's relationship with him was not as close as the Democrats' relationship with him. Of course, whether this means the Democrats are kicking someone when they're down is another conspiracy theory. But on the other hand, regarding the American right-wing versus the European right-wing, does the European right-wing have a more realistic approach? It really does. For example, a very good example of a quite realistic European right-winger is the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni. Meloni is also a right-winger, a Christian right-winger, and she's involved in conservatism. But I'm quite impressed with Meloni on any policy, including Ukraine policy, CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference), and NATO affairs. I think she truly plays both sides well. She can stand with conservatives, to a certain extent appeasing the US, and also stand with the EU, as a key EU country, capable of uniting the EU. So I think the European right-wing, especially the right-wing that can stably govern in Europe, has a stronger realistic streak than the American one. But I think my own understanding of this is quite simple: why are they a bit stronger? The reason is, why can people like Steve Bannon have such political fantasies? To some extent, it's because America's political influence is truly too strong. That is to say, if we want to appoint a NATO official, or a Slovakian to be a NATO official, we still need to find Bolton, or a Secretary of State like Pompeo, or a National Security Advisor to be the core driver behind the scenes. And if you happen to have a personal relationship with this National Security Advisor or Secretary of State, you really can decide that position. In Europe, you don't have that ability. In Europe, to decide that position, you have to engage in more significant political maneuvering behind the scenes; you have to do major political maneuvering to achieve it. In the US, you can still use personal connections to push things through. And now with Donald Trump, it's even more so. Many people have good relationships with Donald Trump, and you can use personal connections to achieve a lot of commercial or political influence, for example, if Elon Musk has a good personal relationship. So I believe, based on this principle, European conservatives also have their own European political traditions. Or let's put it this way, if you look at this Davos Summit, you can see that, whether it's Scholz's speech, Carney's speech, or Macron's speech, you'll realize that because we usually hear Donald Trump's speeches too much, you might think politicians are all scoundrels. But when you listen to these people speak, you'll find that politicians are actually quite elitist, very intellectual. Like Carney, he extensively quoted Havel in his speech. These traditional European politicians still have a strong old-school politician's character; these people are not that crazy. But American politicians, whether it's the American right-wing, especially the Tech Right represented by people like Peter Thiel, these people lack both the aristocratic tradition and the cultivation of traditional knowledge systems. They are first and foremost successful businessmen, like Trump at the time; he was indeed very successful, very wealthy, and had real influence. But without those things as a foundation, I think they tend to go crazy, to get hot-headed and feel like they can stir up global situations, just like Steve Bannon, and start thinking these things. Europeans, whether it's Europe's own capabilities, are not that strong, and secondly, they still have political traditions. I think Europe is indeed a bit more reliable.

Petlus Andrew: Also, I feel that American politics, especially these right-wing politicians, why do they generally present a unique American, or not unique but prominent, culture, that fraternity-like atmosphere and feeling? Is this also because some right-wingers are leaning towards the resurgence of this current trend of male supremacy?

主持人: There are two kinds of fraternities, I won't let you say which one. The first kind of fraternity is like the Skull and Bones societies in American universities, which are high-level elite circles composed mainly of male university students. Many American politicians in the past came from such Skull and Bones societies or similar organizations. But this kind of fraternity is not quite the same as today's "Manosphere" type of male-supremacist fraternities. Which kind of political-business relationship that Epstein operated is it more like? I think it's more like the old American university Skull and Bones societies, where very elite people could join, support each other, and form a social circle. This social circle would help each other out in the future. The sex scandal aspect makes it easy for people to think it's more like today's Manosphere part. But this part, I think it definitely exists in the US, and Epstein isn't the original special or unique example. But overall, although his case came from this, if you look at the Epstein File, its overall operational vibe isn't really like that. You'll find a lot of dirty jokes in it, he made some adult jokes and so on, but the quantity isn't that large. Their main interests and their main conversational interests are not in that direction.

Petlus Andrew: No, what I mean is actually that Bannon and Epstein, for example, their political fantasies, I think some of them, how should I put it, they might imagine themselves as modern-day Machiavellis, as conspiratorial politicians. But in reality, they're just cosplaying; they simply don't have the ability to achieve it, maybe 20 or 30 percent of what they want, but not the full extent of what they imagine.

主持人: Oh, yes, I do have an explanation for how this came about. I think this is a degraded version of traditional American Republican conservatism. In the past, the US was actually able to influence global situations, right? For example, Kissinger was able to influence the Cold War situation. And in the past, the US didn't just use diplomatic means like Kissinger; it could also influence the Middle East through war. So, can the US influence global situations? Yes, it can. Of course, to influence global situations, you need to rely on institutional political operations to achieve it. But later, as you know, the American right-wing recently produced many right-wing philosophers, like Peter Thiel, Curtis Yarvin, and so on. That is, the US produced a large number of people who are very radical in their thinking—I find it hard to say whether they are radical or naive—they have a lot of philosophical ailments, believing that the world is very simple, or that the world has a certain pattern, etc. Recently, the US has produced many people based on populism, like Steve Bannon. Compared to this global fantasy, Steve Bannon's larger political主張 is populism, or national populism. The US has produced many new political ideologies, and these new political ideologies are all quite radical. So, I believe Steve Bannon's global fantasy is a product of the traditional American conservative global hawkish, global influence faction, combined with this new political radicalism. It's a degraded version, an overly simplistic and naive imagination of American influence.

Petlus Andrew: Okay, okay, thank you.

主持人: That's it. Okay, Rom Cal.

Rom Cal: Hello, Teacher Li, can you hear me?

主持人: I can hear you.

Rom Cal: This, I want to comment on the previous friend's answer; I still have some thoughts on this question. That is, the comparison between European and American right-wingers, I also believe they are different. Because the reason I give for this is that their historical foundations are different. The European right-wing, to me, the feeling I get now is that they more often pursue the kind of diplomatic policy similar to the "vertical and horizontal alliances" of the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast, the American right-wing leans more towards last century's Monroe Doctrine. Their core ideological composition is different, that's my feeling. Second, about this criminal record thing, this Epstein thing, I believe that as long as the profession of intermediary exists, the profession of having a criminal record, or people like Epstein, will definitely exist. This certainly cannot be prohibited, it's just a matter of how much influence they have. After that, I have two questions, and I want to ask for your opinion. The first question is, why did Trump want to release this document? I saw your statement that this document did not have a small impact on Trump. Did he not have any psychological expectation for this? Is that how it is, or did he really not understand the overall structure of all these documents? But if that were the case, since he had interacted with Epstein before, he should have had this psychological expectation. I want to hear your opinion.

主持人: Yes, I think for Trump, to use an internet slang term, it's a true boomerang, a true boomerang. First, this was Trump's campaign promise: I will release the Epstein File on my first day in office. Why? Because I want to document the Democratic "deep state," I want to document the sins of these Democrats. That is to say, during the 2024 campaign, Trump talked about the Epstein File every single day. Trump claimed there was a "deep state," that these people were pedophiles, that they were evil, a morally depraved group. He said that these people, protected by the "deep state," prevented the Epstein case from being fully disclosed. He promised that on his first day in office, he would release it to expose the pedophilia scandal of this Democratic group. That's how it was. But why didn't he release it after taking office? Because even now, I believe there might be news of underage sex trafficking in it, it's very possible. But whether that's the main thing, and whether that island served that purpose, it's really not. Whether those things happened on the plane, it might not be. There certainly were sex acts, but these were mainly centered around the adult industry, that's for sure. So, of course, everyone knew in their hearts that it was just campaign rhetoric. So, after he took office, everyone knew that even if it was released, it would be useless. After you release it, there won't be enough solid material to prove the existence of such things. For example, the Bill Gates matter has been widely discussed these past two days. Regardless of whether it's true or false, from the incident itself, Bill Gates was involved with an adult Russian woman, it wasn't a pedophilia incident, right? But it was still a scandal. But first, this scandal did not involve institutional Democratic high-ranking officials. Second, it did not involve the moral degradation he initially claimed. So, Trump didn't want to talk about it at the time because it would be useless. However, as time went on, the MAGA base became increasingly dissatisfied. Because a very important mobilizing issue for the MAGA base was the Epstein File. If it was never released, the MAGA base would increasingly be unable to deliver. So, last October, didn't the entire MAGA base and Donald Trump have a big online argument about releasing the Epstein File? At that time, Donald Trump even said the Epstein File was a Democratic hoax, a Democratic trap. He said anyone who believed it had problems with their brain and should focus on his great economic achievements, and not bring up the Epstein File to him, calling it a Democratic conspiracy. He was the one who talked about it, then he turned around and called it a conspiracy. But the more he said that, the harder it became to back down. So later, he tacitly allowed both parties to pass the bill. And I believe that one reason he let it pass so quickly was the consideration that the faster it passed, the more the potential energy would be released, and the less it would affect the midterm elections. For example, if it dragged on until June, and was then released, the hype for half a year would ruin the midterm elections, right? So I think under those circumstances, first, he couldn't explain it to his MAGA base anymore. Second, if this matter dragged on until the midterm elections next year, it would be very troublesome for the midterm elections. So, I think these are the reasons that led to its release. The immense pressure to release it was also the result of his own constant hype during the election campaign.

Rom Cal: And the second question, the second question is, why didn't the Biden administration choose to release this? Because I don't know the Biden administration's source of information, but I think they should have known that this matter wouldn't have that big an impact. So, if they just went with the flow and released it, from the perspective of partisan politics, it wouldn't really matter.

主持人: Personally, I think, first of all, the Democratic government is a highly institutionalized government. As a highly institutionalized government, when facing a judicial case, the more important thing for this judicial case is the judicial process, right? But should the judicial content behind this judicial process be 100% fully disclosed? I actually think, honestly, that 100% full disclosure has significant legal flaws. For example, in a judicial matter, if I, say, Bill Clinton or Bill Gates, am neither a plaintiff nor a defendant in this case. If you disclose it, it's equivalent to disclosing my information. So, when it's disclosed, should my information be redacted? If it's not redacted, does that infringe on my privacy? I think this matter actually has legal loopholes. It's just that this issue is too political now; no matter who it involves, it has become a major global political event. I guess Bill Gates would now be too embarrassed to sue the Department of Justice or anything. I don't know if anyone will sue later, maybe someone will. That is to say, because the number of people involved in this document is very, very large, a large number of people are not involved in the case at all. A large number of people are completely uninvolved, simply because Epstein's case is still related to sex trafficking. So many people here are actually unrelated to sex trafficking. If what they said to Epstein is disclosed, it's all a violation of their privacy. Including Larry Summers, the former Harvard president. So I think the reason it wasn't disclosed before, in my view, is mainly based on this.

Rom Cal: Thank you, Teacher Li.

Rom Cal: This, I'd also like to ask you to evaluate what I just said, about the comparison between European and American right-wingers, what do you think? This is my last question, I'd like to hear your opinion on it.

主持人: Yes, I think, I think what you said is correct. The right, so-called right, in these two countries, its conservatism, its direction of conservatism, is different. I think you made a very important point here, which is that behind the different rights in these two places, there are different imaginations of global order. The American right is Monroe Doctrine; the global order of Monroe Doctrine is that it doesn't confront the complexity of global order, it contracts within a relatively small scope to maintain American dominance over that region. And we can also say that the current American imagination of the Indo-Pacific is also a Monroe Doctrine one. The conservative right-wing in Europe, it faces the politics of the European continent, and it doesn't pursue an egalitarian, idealistic approach like the left-wing. The European right-wing truly confronts the complexities of politics and geopolitics, like Metternich. So I think, of course, there's this tradition. Of course, I don't know if what you call the American-style right also exists in Europe now. I think Germany's AfD (Alternative for Germany), I think Germany's AfD has not inherited that European tradition of playing both sides. Who has inherited it? People like Meloni, Orbán. Although Orbán is very annoying, he is a very flexible person in diplomacy. These are what he has inherited.

Rom Cal: Thank you, thank you, Teacher Li. I have no more questions, thank you.

主持人: Next up, Ethan Winters.

Ethan Winters: By the way, Prime Minister, regarding the Epstein File, even if not all the content in it is true, I think if there isn't further investigation into the relevant individuals and they aren't held accountable, wouldn't that be beneficial for authoritarian regimes? How would something like "Whataboutism" become so prevalent? I've seen these "little pinks" say, "Look, Chinese officials are treated too strictly; even if you have an extramarital affair, you'll be condemned, but Westerners play so big. Morally, it's infuriating for the West."

主持人: Personally, I think this outcome is certain. Because everything about America can be criticized now. Even Zhang Weiwei can say that America is the only country where people can eat rice and vegetables. So, because of the Epstein File, let's say about America, China is the only country where people can eat rice and vegetables. Because of the Epstein File, China wins again. This outcome is inevitable. China is a moral country, America is a fallen country; this is unavoidable. This is even combined with the "kill line" and "low-level" arguments. Low-level already had a bad reputation.

Ethan Winters: Yes, because Epstein got hot again.

Ethan Winters: Yes, Prime Minister, I was thinking, if the Democratic candidate in 2016 hadn't been Hillary, would Trump have had less of an advantage? Because with Epstein and Clinton, there's also a lot of suspicion involved. Trump wanted to accuse Hillary, and Hillary wanted to accuse Trump back, but the problem is that there's no moral leverage.

主持人: I think, I think first of all, it's very difficult to make hypothetical assumptions about history. Hillary Clinton had a significant advantage at the time. Compared to everyone else in the Democratic Party, she was Secretary of State, meaning she was well-known in politics. Her diplomacy in the US at the time was also remarkable. And she was also the former First Lady. So, overall, for electoral politics, name recognition is an extremely important thing. So, the Democratic Party's choice of her at the time made sense. And her popular vote in 2016 was higher than Donald Trump's, right? So, generally speaking, from the perspective of the electoral structure, choosing her was not wrong. Of course, it's very difficult to have a woman as president in the US. But, choosing Hillary Clinton at the time was a good choice, not a bad one. Because sometimes we tend to think, if the outcome isn't good, "Oh, if only so-and-so had run, they would have won," and so on, which turns into the absurd situation of last year or the year before, where one side says, "Oh, if Biden were still there, he would win," and the other side says, "Oh, if Biden had stepped down earlier, he would win." So, I don't know if Biden is a net asset or a net liability anymore. But I'll counter.

Ethan Winters: Yes, and also.

Ethan Winters: Yes, there's also another outcome, in 1911, Biden's son didn't pass away, and Biden ran for president, that's also a possibility.

主持人: Yes, yes, yes. So what I mean is, these hypotheses might not be that important. But I want to answer your first question in reverse: will the people involved in this now file lawsuits against him? Let's put it this way, in any normal rule-of-law country, under what circumstances would a lawsuit be filed against someone? Right? That is to say, the prosecution needs to have certain evidence to file a lawsuit against that person. But China is not like that; in China, as long as you think there's a problem, as long as the online public opinion is strong enough, anyone can be arrested and prosecuted. But in a rule-of-law country, from the perspective of presumption of innocence, to file a lawsuit against someone, initiate an arrest, or start an investigation that truly affects their life, the threshold is very, very high. So, in the Epstein File, for example, if Bill Gates is mentioned, or if Bill Gates mentions anyone who might have a risk of child sex trafficking. I believe that, because the Epstein case is not new, it's been many years. Anyone involved in child sex trafficking in this case should have already been investigated in the judicial inquiry. If others in the file are not found to be involved in underage sex trafficking or the risk of sex acts, it's very difficult to bring charges and investigations against them just because it appears they were involved in sex acts. I think that's very difficult. On the other hand, many people feel that China's rule of law is so good, and Chinese officials are truly, truly moral. Are you kidding me? Think about the Peng Shuai incident, right? Think about Zhang Gaoli and Peng Shuai; did anything come of someone like Zhang Gaoli? So, you think.

Ethan Winters: Can't touch the topic.

主持人: Exactly. So, of course, now, if someone in China thinks that way, I can't do anything about it. The "kill line" has appeared. Even Chinese people are starting to believe that China's welfare system is the best in the world, and only China has a social safety net. If you can believe that China has a social safety net, then it's not surprising that you believe Chinese officials have the highest moral character, right? I think Chinese people are having these fantasies now, and I don't think we can stop it. It's not something we can stop with a few words.

Ethan Winters: Do they like to talk like this? Like students who've taken time off, and some "little pink" international students.

主持人: There's nothing to be done about that, nothing to be done. I don't think I can stop that.

Ethan Winters: Right. Okay, thank you, Prime Minister.

主持人: Okay, thank you. Next is Royal 99.

Royal 99: I want to talk about Epstein's background. If you look closely at the Epstein case, there's a very strange point: Epstein died, but his girlfriend didn't. And not only did his girlfriend not die, but she could also negotiate with the Department of Justice to get a deal; that is, the Department of Justice would actively offer her a deal, saying if you talk, we can reduce your sentence or something. Anyway, this involves some conspiracy theories. That is to say, although her father was a media mogul in the UK, and also someone who seemed to have a noble title, her father was someone who, although there's no substantial proof, all indications suggest he was among the founders of Israel's Mossad. When her father died, he was given an Israeli state funeral. The Israeli Prime Minister delivered a eulogy at his funeral. All the top figures from Mossad attended his funeral. Then his daughter returned to Israel from the UK, stayed for about two or three years, and then went to New York. It wasn't until she went to New York that Epstein gradually transformed from an ordinary financier into what he is today. This is just background information. And regarding that, so people believe Epstein was an asset. Why do they say that? At least in the US, there were two or three review records and witness testimonies mentioning that he was an asset. This was mentioned in an NPR or NYT podcast. I always heard it while driving. But anyway, this is just background. But whether you believe it or not is up to you. But the fact that her father had a state funeral should not be a big problem; it should be verifiable. That's all.

主持人: Nothing to him. This, this involves a big conspiracy theory in this matter, which is whether Epstein's death was a conspiracy? Was Epstein's death meant to cover something up? This is a very important matter. Of course, Trump has always said that Epstein's death was to cover something up, which is the basis of his claims. I would argue that the evidence behind that story is relatively less. That is, Epstein's girlfriend's father was a high-ranking official with very close ties to Israel, and these people held high positions. Of course, you ask if his time in the US perfectly aligns with Epstein's rise? I think Epstein's rise seems to have started in the mid-1980s. According to Wikipedia's introduction of him and his girlfriend's father, it might not perfectly match up. Of course, I haven't fully researched it either. Because he was introduced to his girlfriend's father, Robert Maxwell, by Steven Hoffenberg, whom he met in London in '85. He first met Steven Hoffenberg, then met John Mitchell, whom we just mentioned, and then slowly came to know American defense secretaries like John Mitchell and others. So, according to Wikipedia, Robert Maxwell was introduced after he had already established quite a few political and business connections in London, and then went on to meet Steven Hoffenberg. So, I think that story is a narrative, but the biggest core of whether you believe this narrative is whether Epstein's death was a conspiracy. I tend to believe that Epstein's death was not a conspiracy. Okay.

主持人: Next up is Jikang. Jikang, Jikang has joined our show across generations. Hello, Teacher Li, can you hear me?

鸡康: Hello, I can hear you. You did a show before when Miao Hua and Wei Dongzuo Ma were there. I've forgotten the content now, I just checked my notes. I remember two conclusions you made at the time: one was that the supervisory system reacted too much, and the other was that person, like Chairman Hua, was already coming to an end. But now we see, it's not like that. Yes, that person, no one can stop him from going crazy. I was just thinking, you talked about why the American right-wing is different from the European right-wing. Is it a matter of the degree of democracy? Because the American president has such great power, like China's authoritarianism, the American president's current great power was mainly created during Franklin D. Roosevelt's era. To fight wars, to wage war, to concentrate national resources. Later presidents, although they imposed some restrictions on presidential power, it is still very strong. Unlike Europe, where power is more constrained, and the degree of democratization is higher. Do you think this is the reason?

主持人: I think the correlation between these two consecutive examples is relatively low. I don't think that's entirely the reason. While the US President has great power, Roosevelt was certainly a very important pivotal figure. But besides Roosevelt, there were many others. For example, the former US President Andrew Jackson was the one who initiated universal direct elections. The overall increase in populism and federal power in the US began with him. This includes the Nixon era in '79, where Nixon used the pretext of security, and security powers, to expand presidential power. So, US presidential power grew step by step. Roosevelt was a key figure, but that doesn't necessarily explain everything. From another perspective, the checks and balances of power in the US, compared to European countries, are stronger in many areas than those in European countries. This includes the significant checks and balances between US states and the federal government, plus the checks and balances of the US bicameral legislature. Many European countries that adopt a unicameral system do not have bicameral checks and balances. Many European countries, like the UK, have a bicameral system, but the power of the upper house in the UK is really too small to play the same checking role as the US Senate. So, I tend to believe that the differences between the American and European right-wings are largely not due to excessive presidential power. We have discussed in previous programs that the excessive power of the US President is largely related to Donald Trump's personal character. You ask if past US presidents had such great power? Actually, yes. But past political figures didn't have the audacity to use presidential power to this extent, didn't dare to use it in this way. But Donald Trump did. Plus, his luck, he had too many opportunities to appoint Supreme Court justices during his first term. So, he is a political outsider who dared to use it this way. From this perspective, I think Donald Trump's madness, as I also mentioned in a previous program, might not easily lead to the conclusion that the American democratic system is inherently bad. But the US does have big problems; by rights, a democratic system, well, I don't know how to say "by rights," many people think a democratic system should be able to cope with all situations. I think Donald Trump's situation is quite special. If the American democratic system has not been able to cope well, this is certainly an urgent problem for the US now. But it doesn't mean the system itself is bad. I still think the differences between the American and European right-wings are related to deep-rooted cultural and ideological resource differences. For example, let me add another significant difference between the American and European right-wings: the American right-wing has two ideological resources that Europe doesn't particularly possess. The first ideological resource is white racism. In Europe, there is anti-immigrant sentiment, Islamophobia, but less white racism. This has a tradition in the US, like the Ku Klux Klan. The fierce civil rights competition between whites and blacks that formed during the US civil rights movement. So, the American right-wing has this point of white supremacism. This point itself is very important. Because white supremacism is linked to social Darwinism, and other such extreme ideologies. So, it exists in the US today. The second point is that the American right-wing has the tradition of evangelical Christianity. For example, why do Americans support Israel so much? It's because of Christian Zionism. The religious right in Europe, the European religious right is relatively smaller. Because the Catholic tradition in Europe is too strong. The European religious right, at most, is Catholic. It's difficult for a tradition like the evangelical right-wing to emerge there as it did after the American religious awakenings. And the anti-intellectualism of the evangelical right-wing versus Catholicism? Catholicism doesn't really have an anti-intellectual tradition. But the evangelical anti-intellectual tradition has become a very important part of the American right-wing. So, I think this comprehensive situation of the American right-wing, in my view, is still a result of American culture and political tradition, rather than, for example, the result of the US President having too much power. But this is my opinion.

鸡康: I just checked a webpage. In 2018, in Hebei Tianshan, let me speed up, something happened in Hebei Tianshan: their deputy chief of the municipal public security bureau was brought down. 2018 wasn't that long ago. Then local triad gangs trafficked many women and supplied them to local officials and businessmen. This isn't something I made up; Phoenix TV reported it. Phoenix TV said there were dozens of people involved, including this deputy chief of the public security bureau. He suppressed this matter at the time. After he was brought down, the incident was exposed. But after the exposure, the news quickly had no follow-up. We don't know who was involved, but it said dozens of people, dozens of people involved. But you just said that such things might happen in China. Why do you think it's possible? Such things would definitely happen more terribly under China's system.

主持人: Of course. First, because "more terrible" needs a comparison. So, we don't actually know how terrible Epstein's case truly is. China definitely has, China certainly has such things. I believe this. Every country has perverts. In China, under circumstances where power is unchecked, there must be a closer relationship between power and the sexual trafficking of minors. This definitely exists in China, I believe this.

鸡康: Yes, speaking of the case you mentioned, you accept it. I just checked my notes, you previously said that Taiwan's civic virtue is not very good. Could you explain that if you have time? Because I might have forgotten it from before.

主持人: We'll discuss that next time on the Taiwan program. Because we generally don't extend to answer other questions. Sorry, we usually keep things quite tight. Okay, thank you.

鸡康: Thank you.

主持人: Okay, Ben Herman. Please.

Ben Herman: Hello, I can respond to what someone else said about China, that because of the Epstein file, it seems to be morally superior. This is about China using this to create a moral nation. I'll respond to that point.

主持人: Hmm, sure.

Ben Herman: I just want to say that in Chinese society, there's a phenomenon, I personally feel, of moral abuse. What is moral abuse? Let me give an example. For instance, in China, you often see propaganda, especially on WeChat official accounts and some other places, some official local media, saying that Westernization is wrong, that Westernization will lead to moral decay or something like that. It's targeting a specific ideology, saying that certain values will make you immoral or something. It's a bit of moral abuse, I feel. Because, in my opinion, morality can be very subjective, and it can be very objective. The judgment of whether something is moral or not should be: did it involve murder, right? Did it involve human trafficking, did it involve theft, did it involve deception? But in China, morality has become something that is abused, you know? It's abused to become an ideological tool. For example, if they say, "Oh, this child, don't circumvent the firewall, or don't read Western books," that's immoral or something. There's that feeling, a feeling of moral abuse. And another point is, recently I was scrolling through short videos on Instagram, and I saw a video that inspired me, giving me a new perspective on this matter of morality. That is, a Muslim man was sitting on a wooden bench in a park, and he was talking about something. What was it? He said, "If I smell smoke on my Muslim brother, I will first assume that someone else was smoking near him. If I smell alcohol on my Muslim brother, I will first assume that someone else secretly put alcohol on him." Right? What was this story about? He was expressing that in Islamic teachings, we have "seventy reasons to forgive." We always go to be tolerant of others, always, that kind of not preemptively assuming others are guilty. That kind of, because he said, because he said, one day, right? After you die, you will beg Allah to forgive you, right? That kind of mentality, that kind of mindset, seems to be absent in China. That kind of mindset, you see, including the Chinese official government, and also the people, they all have a phenomenon of being very harsh and intolerant towards others. And this phenomenon leads to them abusing morality. I'm done, I don't know if you got my point. I might have explained it.

主持人: I got it. I think your second point is more interesting than your first. Your first point is that Chinese society has moral generalization, but I don't think it's quite what you're saying. You're still a bit confused about the concepts of morality and law. But moving on, first, I think your second point is quite interesting. This point, I think, has a very interesting branch: the Muslim tradition of forgiveness also comes from Judaism. That is, Muslims, Christians, and Jews are all Abrahamic religions. Abrahamic religions have the concept of original sin. Based on the concept of original sin, original sin is a particularly strong foundation for people to forgive others. So, Abrahamic religions all have a bit of a concept of original sin. Because of this concept of original sin, or a strong sense of self-reflection, relatively speaking, their culture emphasizes forgiveness a bit more. But do you mean Chinese culture doesn't emphasize forgiveness? Actually, that's not true. I remember in the "Analects," Yan Hui asked Confucius, "Teacher," (I'll translate it into vernacular) "Teacher, is there one word that can be practiced for life?" Confucius said, "Yes, reciprocity (恕) only." Right? The Way of Reciprocity is a very important part of Confucianism. Of course, after China, as Professor Qin Hui explained, because of the "outer Confucianism, inner Legalism," the entire Legalist tradition is absolutely unforgiving. The Legalist tradition is that every offense must be punished, and equality under punishment became a characteristic of Legalism. So, fundamentally, China truly lacks this traditional foundation of forgiveness and understanding, due to the implementation of Legalism in China, or perhaps imperial power, the implementation of the imperial legal system. This is the first point. But I particularly want to make a second point: I believe that the formation of forgiveness and understanding in a society is simply human nature. That is to say, the Chinese people's capacity for forgiveness and understanding is not absent, but suppressed. So, how do I think the Chinese people's capacity for forgiveness and understanding is suppressed? If a country, how do we make everyone unwilling to forgive at all? We put everyone in a state of moral deficit. We put everyone in a state of moral hunger. We put everyone in a state of crisis where their moral status is not recognized at all. As long as we keep people in a moral crisis, because of this extreme lack of morality, they cannot have any moral leeway to forgive and understand others. And China is such a society. In Chinese society, all reasonable morals are deemed illegal by the government. Almost. In China, you can't help people. You can't be responsible. You can't be brave. You can't be kind. I'm not kidding at all. In this country, China, in any country, if you see this country putting a million people of a certain ethnicity into concentration camps, of course, if you were to talk about it, but in China, the prerequisite for all morality is loyalty to the Party. And with loyalty to the Party, morality is hijacked by loyalty. Okay. But loyalty is actually a huge suppression of people. Everyone knows, from ancient times to modern times, why could Confucianism emphasize loyalty? Confucian loyalty is reciprocal, "the ruler acts as a ruler, the minister as a minister, the father as a father, the son as a son," meaning the ruler must act like a ruler for the minister to act like a minister. So, Confucianism strongly emphasizes reciprocal loyalty, meaning the ruler's responsibility to the minister in exchange for the minister's loyalty to the ruler. But after China's imperial power, loyalty became completely one-sided. Especially after the Ming Dynasty, which so many people love, but the Ming Dynasty was a society of purely one-sided loyalty. The emperor had no responsibility to his officials, but the officials had unlimited loyalty obligations to the emperor. It's the same even now. So, anyway, all the potential conditions for morality in China today are loyalty. But loyalty is an absolutely one-sided self-suppression. Under these circumstances, anyone who performs loyalty, whether it's hating Japan or hating America out of loyalty, or loving the head of state or the general secretary out of loyalty, you are in a state of moral deficit. When a person is in extreme moral hunger and moral crisis, you have no ability to forgive and understand others. Under these circumstances, you can only retaliate for every grievance, haggle over every penny. I think the Chinese tradition definitely played a role in this to some extent. But I believe this is the fundamental reason why Chinese society is so lacking in tolerance, and why people are so strongly sensitive and eager to retaliate against others morally. This is my opinion.

Ben Herman: Hello, do you have any related books you can recommend? I'd like to read some, I'm quite curious about this area.

主持人: Yes, yes, there are many books on moral ethics. And I think the best book is Professor Chen Jiaying's "What is a Good Life." It uses relatively everyday language to discuss moral concepts. I think starting with this book, you should be able to derive and find many other books to read from his discussions and his own writings. Because there are many books like "Introduction to Ethics," "Principles of Ethics," Kant, and so on. But I think those are a bit too abstract. I think ethical principles should still start from a more concrete perspective.

Ben Herman: Yes, what I mean is, are there any books that discuss this phenomenon of moral scarcity in Chinese society? The phenomenon you just talked about, I'm quite interested in that, and I don't know if there are such books.

主持人: That book is called "A Year of Governance" (《一年济世》). I'm not kidding, that book is called "A Year of Governance." Because this book discusses why Chinese people were in such a moral state in 2022. This book not only talks about the moral scarcity of Chinese people—moral scarcity is a particularly important part of the fourth chapter of this book. This book also discusses how Chinese people's morality was unable to function due to a lack of life experience before that. What I can think of right now is "A Year of Governance." I've already put it in the comments section. I think this is indeed a book that can answer your question. I'm not taking the opportunity, I'm not taking the opportunity to recommend myself, but it is indeed this book.

Ben Herman: "A Year of Governance" is, one two one, and then "A Year of Governance" is that governance from the Republic of China era, the governance of the nation, right?

主持人: Yes, it's that governance. But "Yi" is the "epidemic" character. Epidemic "A Year of Governance."

Ben Herman: OK. Very, very good. Many people claim this is after the actual calculation. I give up.

主持人: OK, last one, Wang Kai. Kai Wang. Hello, Teacher Li.

汪凯: Hello, hello. I'd like to discuss what's perhaps an observation today. I want to ask, how do you view the increasingly low political standards that American voters have for candidates or presidential political figures in recent years? Because I think we can look back to the 1990s when Clinton was president, and there was the Oval Office scandal. But Clinton managed the economy very well, so his approval ratings remained very high. And I think right up to Trump's first election, when that recording, the "Grab Her by the Pussy" incident, was exposed. I feel that voters' reaction to such things, even perhaps by the midterm elections or the next general election, will be more like a lot of thunder but little rain. I think voters will pay less and less attention to such matters later on. But if you talk about elections in Asia, say in Taiwan or Japan, a candidate, never mind what they do, if they have an extramarital affair, they wouldn't even be considered for election. But if you talk about Western societies, this state of differing moral standards, I'd like to hear your thoughts on it.

主持人: I think if it were Ko Wen-je in Taiwan now, it wouldn't affect him either. He doesn't have an extramarital affair, but his issues don't stop KMT supporters from backing him. There truly is an answer to this question, which is polarization and political radicalization. That is to say, what kind of person do I think can make a judgment about a politician's morality? It's someone who is in a relatively safe, relatively neutral position. For example, if I'm a Democrat, and I'm relatively safe, and a Democratic president messes up, I'll remove him. But if Democrats are in a situation of extreme partisan confrontation, and the Democratic Party is in a crisis of survival, I hate—that is, I hate the other side, I hate Republicans far more than I hate a moral degenerate, right? Then I'd rather have this moral degenerate than let a Republican come to power. I think Donald Trump is exactly like this. Because Donald Trump successfully turned America into MAGA versus non-MAGA, successfully turned America into American populists versus non-American populists. So American populists grit their teeth and support Donald Trump. They even grit their teeth and overlook any moral stains on Donald Trump. Because Donald Trump was embroiled in lawsuits before last year's election. He sexually assaulted women, defamed women, and paid as much as eighty million dollars in damages. Are you kidding me? And he still got elected. Because in that situation, many people would somewhat defend him, saying it's political persecution. Just like in Taiwan today with Ko Wen-je. People think Ko Wen-je's situation is political persecution, that he has no problems. Even though the TPP's overall financial issues and Ko Wen-je's campaign office's Mooke PR, his own campaign image licensing fees, and his use of campaign funds to buy commercial properties are all there. People still close their eyes and say it's political persecution. The reason is that as long as political polarization and partisan confrontation are strong enough, the biggest impulse in your heart is hatred for the other side. In the US, it's Republicans hating Democrats, and Democrats hating Republicans. In Taiwan, it's hatred for the DPP, and conversely, hatred for the KMT. As long as this emotion is the strongest, morality simply doesn't matter. Even if you have to accept a moral degenerate, you don't want the other side to gain power. That is, you grit your teeth, you'll pay any price, as long as the other side fails, as long as the other side doesn't gain power. So, this is a big problem with populism. As long as society turns into partisan confrontation, into us versus them, then within our own ranks, morality simply doesn't matter. Morality is the least important thing. And once morality is weaponized, that is, our moralization completely turns into partisan confrontation. As long as it's the opposing camp, their morality is bad, their morality is evil. We invent all sorts of ways to say they're bad in this way and that way. So, this rhetorical method actually hollows out morality in reverse. Morality becomes completely weaponized, and the essence of morality is hollowed out by weaponized moral confrontation; it's gone.

汪凯: Understood. I have another question I'd like your opinion on. That is, for the next US presidential election, do you think there are any notable candidates on the Democratic side? Because I personally feel that the Democratic Party might want to push someone like the Governor of California, but I think Newsom's connection with voters isn't that great. Because I feel he's not particularly grounded, not particularly sincere. You could say he looks perfect, but I think one thing during the pandemic hurt him badly. At that time, California required everyone to wear masks, but then reporters photographed him having a birthday party at a Michelin three-star restaurant in California on his birthday, and no one was wearing masks. I think the more such incidents occur, I wonder if the Democratic Party will also need to field a more grassroots candidate, like Trump?

主持人: Right now, it's hard to say because there are still over two years. But at this point, if the presidential election were tomorrow, I think it would basically be Gavin Newsom. Gavin Newsom perfectly fits the pattern we just discussed. The Democratic Party isn't looking to put forward a respectable person or a grassroots person right now. The next Democratic presidential candidate must have two important qualities. First, he must be an economic populist. Second, this person must be the best at challenging Trump and the American right-wing. Now, Gavin Newsom is slowly working on the former in California; he's not a typical economic populist, but the entire Democratic camp already has Mandani and other economic populists who can elevate him. Second, within the entire Democratic camp right now, the one who can challenge Trump really well, and even do social media somewhat decently like Trump, is Gavin Newsom. So I would think, of course, who else will emerge in the next two years, who will rise, I don't know. But if the election were now, I'd guess it would be Gavin Newsom.

汪凯: OK. I'm just sharing something because I myself live in New York. And the industry I'm in is more of a Pro Culture, a Finance Pro Culture. So, during the New York market elections, Mandani—my colleagues, they definitely support Republicans, they're more right-wing. But during the New York market elections, they actually went and supported Mandani. Because they felt that Republicans always tried to demonize Cuomo by saying he had communist leanings. But I think they didn't really care about that. Because they just hated Cuomo too much. Cuomo was really too dirty. So they would rather vote for Mandani than for Cuomo. And after Mandani took office, his policies weren't as radical as they were during the election. He was still quite smooth in his dealings. He even, right-wing with right-wing.

主持人: Exactly, he even went to the White House chatting and laughing with Donald Trump.

汪凯: Yes, yes, yes. And I think my Pro Culture colleagues around me generally think this person is very smart, at least he can get things done, not just talk. I think it seems that America now tends to support this kind of person who might not be so ideological, but needs to make some changes, and these changes can be seen as good or bad.

主持人: Yes, yes, first is change. Second is that strong social media skills are essential. Mandani is a typical example of someone with very, very strong social skills. Yes, yes, good. That's what I wanted to say today.

汪凯: Thank you.

主持人: Okay, thank you. Alright, we'll wrap up our connections here today. This is the first time in our history that we've connected with everyone who wanted to join. That's because not many people connected today. Because with the Epstein File, everyone might vaguely know about it, but perhaps not in great detail. So, fewer people connected. So, today was great, we connected with everyone. So, no one was left out today. Alright, one last time, this show will not have paid memberships. All my content, like Wikipedia, is free for everyone to use. Including articles, books, and so on. So, I hope everyone can support this creation through Patreon, which will allow me to do this better. OK. Then we'll see you on Thursday evening. And I welcome everyone to continue following the Epstein File in the future. I also hope everyone can try to look at this issue from the perspective of feudalism, personalization, and political dealings in high-level American politics. Alright, then we'll see you in the next episode. Thank you for believing, thank you for sharing the details, I wish everyone a pleasant day, bye-bye.