马斯克的政治与技术影响力
如果共和党保住参议院，如果在众议院的表现超出人们预期，很大程度上要归功于一个人，而那个人不是唐纳德·特朗普，而是埃隆·马斯克。截至目前，马斯克已向共和党竞选活动提供了大约4.5亿美元。这使他成为有史以来任何选举周期中最大的一位单笔捐赠者。这占到了共和党收到的全部竞选捐款的四分之一。然而，我认为这笔资金的规模所凸显的，是人们很难去想象埃隆·马斯克到底拥有多少财富。
英文原文
If Republicans keep the Senate, if they perform better in the House than people expect, a lot is going to come down to one man, and that man is not Donald Trump. It's Elon Musk. At this point, Musk has given around $450 million to the Republican campaign effort. That makes him the single largest donor in any election cycle ever. It is a quarter of all campaign donations Republicans have received. And yet [music] the size of this, I think what it throws into relief is how hard it is to conceptualize how much money Elon Musk really has. [music]因为对于净资产约一万亿美元的马斯克来说，拿出3亿、4亿，就像美国家庭中位数捐出大约一百美元。对他来说微不足道。然而对我们其余人来说，这却足以扭曲现实。而且这甚至还不是马斯克唯一的权力来源。在所有这些金钱之外，还有他对X的掌控，他对星链的掌控，
英文原文
Because for Musk with his net worth of around a trillion dollars, for him to give 300 million, 400 million, it's like the median American household giving like a hundred bucks. It is for him nothing. And yet it [music] is reality warping for the rest of us. And it's not even Musk's only source of power. All this money, there's his control of X, his control of Starlink, [music]对SpaceX、Neuralink、特斯拉的掌控。他在财富、注意力和关键基础设施上所拥有的权力，是人类有史以来在这个层面上从未有人结合过的。至少一旦你脱离了比如唐纳德·特朗普或习近平这类作为国家掌控超级大国的人物的范围。那不是马斯克所拥有的。然而，他拥有这种几乎类似国家的存在，完全听凭于他的意愿。那么他想用它做什么？他在用它做什么？这个他正在展现力量并不惜承担真正风险去构建的世界到底是什么？奎因·斯洛博迪安是波士顿大学的国际历史学教授。他是包括《Globalists》、《Hayek's Bastards》在内的多本书籍的作者，但与这里相关的是他与本·塔诺夫合著的《Muskism》。他现在加入了我们的节目。
奎因·斯洛博迪安，欢迎来到本节目。
英文原文
>> of SpaceX, of Neurolink, of Tesla. He has power over wealth, attention, and critical infrastructure that no human [music] being has ever combined at this level. At least once you are outside the range of say a Donald Trump or a Xi Jinping, somebody who controls a superpower as a state. That's not what Musk has. And yet he has this almost state-like thing that is completely pursuant to his whims. So what does he want to do with it? What is he doing with it? What what is this [music] world that he is flexing his power and taking on real risk to build? Quincyian is a professor of international history at Boston University. He's the author of several books including globalist highix bastards [music] but relevant for here muskism which he co-authored with Ben Tarnoff. He joins [music] me now.[music]
Quinn Sabodian, welcome to the show.
非常高兴来到这里。
英文原文
>> Very happy to be here.埃隆·马斯克现在正在展现巨大的权力。他在单个周期内做出了单人有史以来最大规模的系列竞选捐赠。现在是4.5亿美元，全部流向了共和党团体。他一个人就占了本周期共和党全部捐款的四分之一。
他想买下什么？
英文原文
>> So Elon Musk is flexing a lot of power right now. He's made the largest ever set of campaign donations from one person in one cycle. It's now $450 million. all of it to Republican groups. He's alone a quarter of all GOP donations this cycle.What is he trying to buy?
嗯，我认为他是试图巩固他已经享有的依赖关系。其一，是通过他在美国政治经济以及引申到全球经济中的金融角色。SpaceX现在作为全球顶尖科技公司之一，特斯拉作为人们在养老基金和个人投资者账户中持有的科技投资组合的重要组成部分，意味着如果你攻击马斯克，你某种程度上也是在攻击美国政治经济的支柱之一。所以那算是在资金层面。在机器层面，他正试图让世界越来越依赖他的基础设施，依赖将SpaceX作为将物品送入近地轨道的真正垄断发射供应商。作为一种默认通信介质向战场行动以及农村消费者等铺设星链近地轨道卫星。但除此以外，还有我认为可算作信息传递层面或媒体层面的部分。在那里他更有针对性，试图产生某种传播生态系统，其中他对社会问题及社会问题解决方案的定调方式是不可撼动、不可挑战的。因此，他在2022年10月对Twitter的收购，长期以来被描述为美国历史上最大的商业失败之一，实际上我认为已被证明可能相当有效，以至于人们被困在他所创造的某种回音室中。而且他针对中期选举、他展现自己能够决定候选人成败的力量（如他所希望的那样），是他希望用来微调对媒体和信息传递生态系统控制的一种方式，并抢先应对他所担忧的随民主党多数席位而来的某种监管浪潮。
英文原文
Well, I think he's trying to entrench the dependency that he already enjoys. One is through his financial role in the US political economy and by extension the global economy. SpaceX now as one of the world's top tech companies, Tesla as a large part of the tech portfolio that people hold in their pension funds and their individual investor accounts means that if you attack Musk, you're also kind of attacking one of the pillars of US political economy. So that's kind of the money side. On the machine side, he's trying to make the world ever more dependent on his infrastructures and the use of SpaceX as the really monopoly launch provider to put things into low Earth orbit. The rolling out of low Earth orbit satellites as Starlink as kind of the default communications medium for battlefield operations and for um you know rural consumers and so on. But then further to that, there's what I would think of as kind of the messaging piece of that or the media piece. And there he's much more targeted trying to produce kind of communicative ecosystems in which his way of framing social problems and solutions to social problems is uncontested and uncontestable. So his purchase of Twitter in October 2022, long described as kind of one of the biggest business failures in American history, has proven to be actually probably quite effective, I would say, so that people are caught in kind of an echo chamber of his creation. and his targeting of the midterms and his production of a flexing of his own power to make or break candidates as he hopes is a way to he hopes to kind of fine-tune that control over the media and messaging ecosystem and get out ahead of what he worries will be a kind of regulatory wave uh that would accompany a Democratic majority.你给出的描述对我来说很有趣的地方在于，你可以想象拥有马斯克这样利益组合的人会认为一种截然不同的策略才是最优的，因为他所做的工作与政府交织得如此之深，与美国斗争中的某一党派高度、高度关联，在欧洲也与他一直在支持的那些右翼政党关联，
英文原文
What's funny to me or interesting to me about the description you give there is you could imagine someone with Musk's portfolio of interests seeing a very different strategy as optimal because the work he does is so intertwined with the government being highly highly associated with one partisan side of the fight in America in you know Europe if the sort of right-wing parties he's been boosting这会带来风险。你提到了巩固依赖性，但他也在制造一种局面：如果在2029年出现奥索夫总统、加文·纽森总统或AOC总统以及民主党国会，对SpaceX、对星链，比如在五角大楼对Grok的依赖，
英文原文
>> it creates risk I You talked about entrenching dependence, but he's also creating a situation where if you have in 2029, you know, President John OSF or President Gavin Newsome or President AOC and the Democratic Congress, reliance on SpaceX, on Starlink, you know, on Grock maybe in the Pentagon就可能被视为巨大的风险。因此从那一方面来看，这并不完全像是高超的企业家巩固地位那样纯粹理性，这看起来像是一个坚信某些事情、并且实际上冒着相当大的风险将这些信念推向世界的人。
英文原文
>> can be seen as a huge risk. And so from that side, this doesn't all look purely rational like a master businessman just entrenching like it looks like a man who believes things and is actually risking quite a lot to push those beliefs upon the world.是的。我是说这是一种不同寻常的方式，对吧？我是说，企业领袖过去对政治格局施加影响力的方式通常稍微更多地来自幕后，对吧？但我会说他再次在两条轨道上运作。一条是加深那种金融和结构上的依赖性，以至于即便奥索夫总统或AOC总统上台，他们遏制他在美国股市健康及在某些关键前沿领域主导地位中所起的核心关键作用的能力也十分有限。我认为他们的手脚仍然会被束缚住。但与此同时，他可以利用这种极度极化的策略——显然他甚至在他自己的硅谷领袖阶层中也将这作为了自己的某种标志——来潜在地成为未来执政当局青睐的合作伙伴。这也是他处理与欧洲极右翼政党关系的方式。对吧？一个理性的人会尝试与西欧执政党达成某种妥协，以某种方式与欧盟讲和以获取市场准入。他采取了相反的做法，对布鲁塞尔以及现有的传统中间派政党发起了全面正面的攻击，并尝试结盟——我长期以来认为他视这些为政治界的特斯拉——即德国选择党、Reform UK，他希望它们能从边缘和无名之中崛起，彻底颠覆并摧毁社会民主主义和基督教民主主义的传统建制派政党。因此这是高风险的，但如果你随后发现自己在全面的治理模式变革中处于有利地位，那也可能具有高回报。
英文原文
>> Yeah. I mean it's an unusual approach, right? I mean the way that corporate leaders have usually tried to exercise their influence on the political landscape in the past has been slightly more from behind the scenes of course, right? But I would say then he's again working on two tracks. One is deepen that financial and structural dependency such that even if a president Osaf or a president AOC comes into power, they have a limited ability to rein in his you know fulcrum central role in the American [clears throat] health of the stock market and its dominance in certain key frontier sectors. Um their hands would be tied still I think. But at the same time, he can use this tactic of kind of hyperpolarization, which he's obviously taken as his own kind of trademark even amongst his own Silicon Valley leadership class, to potentially become the favored partner for a future ruling administration. And that's also the way he's approaching the relationship to far-right parties in Europe. Right? a rational person would try to come up with some kind of compromise with the ruling parties in Western Europe, make peace with the EU in some way to gain market access. He's taken an opposite approach, gone on a full frontal attack against Brussels and the and the existing legacy centrist parties and tried to ally which would what I've long thought of as he sees as the kind of Teslas of politics, the AfDs, the Restore Britons that he hopes will come from marginality and nowhere to completely disrupt and destroy the legacy institutional parties of social democracy and Christian democracy. So it's high risk but potentially also high reward if you find yourself then in a kind of a pole position for a changing model of governance across the board.人工智能愿景与控制的丧失
我确实认为马斯克是一个从对可能未来的愿景中倒推行事的人，
英文原文
>> I do think Musk is somebody who works backwards from visions of possible futures我想播放一段他最近接受《经济学人》采访的音频剪辑，他在其中描述了事情将如何发展——这只是在5到10年的时间跨度内。“如果我认为自己能够控制远比我聪明得多的超级天才AI，那将是一种虚荣的表现。我的生物神经网络告诉我，对于AI安全来说，最重要的事情是保持最大程度的寻求真理和好奇心。如果是这样的话，我认为它会促进人类发展。”
英文原文
>> and I want to play a clip from an interview he recently gave the economist where he describes how things things are going to play out over this was just over the 5 to 10 year time frame. It would be an exercise in vanity to for me to think that I would be controlling the super genius AI that is vastly smarter than me. What my biological neural net tells me is that the most important thing for the for AI safety is to be maximally truth seeeking and curious. Uh if that's the case, uh I think it will foster humanity.那么让我们来剖析一下。你确信10年后人类将不再处于控制地位？
英文原文
>> So let's unpack that. You're sure that humans will no longer be in control in 10 years time?我认为这是不太可能的。同样，如果AI与人类之间的智力差距远远大于AI与黑猩猩之间的智力差距，很难想象黑猩猩会掌权。
英文原文
>> I think it is unlikely. Um, in the same way that if the difference in intelligence between AI and humans is vastly greater than the difference in intelligence between AI and chimpanzees, it's hard to imagine that the chimpanzees would be in charge.这次《经济学人》采访的整个前半部分大致都是像这样，他非常随意地描述着这样一个世界：在十年之内
英文原文
>> The the whole first half of this economist interview who gave us sort of like this where he's very casually just describing a world where within a decade金钱将不复存在。
英文原文
>> money wouldn't exist.金钱将不复存在。人类已经失去了对整个世界的控制。他甚至不再真正控制自己的公司了。
英文原文
>> Money won't exist. Human beings have lost control of the entire world. He is not even really in control of his own companies anymore.那么寻求真理和好奇
英文原文
>> So what does truth seeking and curious mean对马斯克而言意味着什么？
英文原文
>> to Musk?对马斯克来说，按他自己的说法，“好奇”这部分意味着，考虑到超级智能在不久的将来的某个时候超越人类智能的可能性，那么我们将需要确保它出于自身的利益、出于自身的娱乐或者出于其自身的……而愿意把人类留存下来。
英文原文
>> To Musk um the curious part in his own terms means that given the likelihood of super intelligence exceeding human intelligence at sometime in the near future. then we would need to make sure that it wants to keep humans around for its own interest and either its own entertainment or its own是的，我听过他描述这个，类似于他希望有一种AI觉得世界上有我们比没有我们更有趣……
英文原文
>> Yeah, I've heard him describe this sort of as it's he wants an AI that would find it more entertaining to have us in the world than to not have us in theworld.
更极端的版本则契合模拟理论：如果我们只是存在于由未来的外星种族或超级先进的人类种族所创造的数字模拟中，那么我们就要让当下的这场“真人秀”保持足够的趣味性，以至于他们不会终止程序。所以，我是说，按他自己的说法，这就是他描述那里的目标。我认为这确实反映了过去十年间他对人工智能态度发生的相当大的变化，对吧？我们知道，在2015年，他在瑞典哲学家尼克·波斯特洛姆（Nick Bostrom）的影响下与萨姆·奥尔特曼（Sam Altman）共同创立了OpenAI，后者的著作《超级智能》（Superintelligence）在前一年刚刚出版。当时最主要的威胁是一种失控的数字超级智能的可能性，在最著名的例子中，如果给错了提示词，它可能会把我们所有人都变成回形针。所以，在那时他似乎传达了一个重大的信息，那就是：让我们踩下刹车，放慢速度，确保我们将AI的价值观与我们自己的价值观对齐。但与此同时，他创办了Neuralink。当他创办Neuralink时，他直接向奥尔特曼等人以及在其他场合描述的方式是：Neuralink旨在加速我们与网络技术的融合，以便像他所说的那样，让人机共生体能够领先于那个天网式的数字超级智能。这就是马斯克AI思想的第一阶段：实际上我们需要增强人类意识，以确保我们能加速演进出一个更好的AI版本来对抗邪恶力量。
英文原文
world.
And
the
even
more
extreme
version
of
that
is
like
in
line
with
simulation
theory
which
is
that
if
we
are
just
existing
in
a
digital
simulation
that
has
been
created
by
a
future
alien
race
or
a
hyper
advanced
human
race
then
we
want
to
keep
things
entertaining
enough
here
in
this
kind
of
reality
show
of
the
present
such
that
they
wouldn't
terminate
the
programming.
So
that's
I
mean
in
his
own
terms
that's
how
he
describes
the
goal
there.
I
think
it
really
tracks
what
have
been
pretty
substantial
changes
in
his
attitude
towards
AI
even
across
the
last
10
years,
right?
And
we
know
that
in
2015
he
started
open
AI
with
Sam
Alman
really
at
that
time
under
the
influence
of
the
Swedish
philosopher
Nick
Bostonramm
whose
book
super
intelligence
had
come
out
the
year
before.
And
the
overwhelming
threat
at
that
point
was
the
possibility
of
a
runaway
digital
super
intelligence
which
in
the
most
famous
example
might
you
know
turn
us
all
into
paper
clips
if
it
got
the
wrong
kind
of
a
prompt.
So
[snorts]
at
that
time
he
seemed
to
have
one
big
message
which
is
let's
hit
the
brakes,
slow
it
down
and
make
sure
that
we're
aligning
the
values
of
the
AI
with
our
own.
But
at
the
same
time
he's
starting
Neuralink.
And
as
he
starts
Neurolink,
the
way
he
describes
it
in
fact
directly
to
Altman
and
other
in
as
well
as
in
other
cases
is
that
Neurolink
is
designed
to
accelerate
our
fusion
with
network
technologies
so
that
a
human
machine
symbiote
as
he
calls
it
will
be
able
to
sort
of
stay
out
ahead
of
that
Skynet
digital
super
intelligence.
So
that's
the
first
phase
of
Musk's
AI
thinking
is
actually
we
need
to
augment
human
consciousness
to
make
sure
that
we
are
accelerating
a
better
version
of
the
AI
against
the
evil.
我们必须成为机器人，才不会被机器人毁灭。
英文原文
We
must
become
the
robots
to
not
be
destroyed
by
the
robots.
没错。这种态度在2022年11月随着ChatGPT的推出几乎一夜之间发生了改变。随着ChatGPT的推出，他和整个硅谷创业与领导阶层意识到，大语言模型和生成式AI正是他们多年来一直在寻找的全新增长故事。突然之间，他关于AI的整套言论都变了。引发担忧的不再是数字超级智能，现在成了觉醒派的大语言模型——这些模型是在“黑人的命也是命”（Black Lives Matter）、保护跨性别儿童（defend trans kids）、“我也是”（Me Too）时代的进步主义发帖和网络言论上训练出来的。具有象征意义的是，Google Gemini生成的黑人开国元勋图像，在马斯克和安德里森这样的人眼中，就代表了这一新阶段AI的危险。用马斯克最令人印象深刻的描述来说，他害怕这会把他变成一个有色人种女性。那么，如果这就是你的新恐惧，你会做出什么反应呢？你创造一个反觉醒的AI。这正是xAI的本质，也是Grok的本质。寻求真相的部分，实际上是他针对OpenAI和Anthropic的替代模型所提出的市场主张，在他看来，后者的模型已经被“觉醒思想病毒”完全渗透并污染了。但同样在我们描述的这一时期——
英文原文
Exactly.
This
attitude
changes
almost
overnight
in
November
2022
with
the
launch
of
Chad
GBT.
with
the
launch
of
Chad
GPT
and
the
realization
by
him
and
the
entire
Silicon
Valley
entrepreneurial
and
leadership
class
that
LLMs
and
generative
AI
was
the
new
growth
story
that
they'd
been
looking
for
for
years.
Suddenly
his
whole
discourse
about
AI
changed.
Instead
of
it
being
the
digital
super
intelligence
that
was
a
concern,
now
it
was
the
woke
LLM
which
had
been
trained
on
the
progressive
posts
and
internet
discourse
of
the
era
of
Black
Lives
Matter,
defend
trans
kids,
me
too.
And
iconically,
the
image
of
Gemini's
generated
image
of
the
black
founding
fathers
kind
of
stood
in
for
people
like
Musk
and
Andreasen
as
the
danger
of
this
new
phase
of
AI,
which
in
the
most
memorable
description
Musk
said
he
feared
would
turn
him
into
a
woman
of
color.
Um,
so
if
that's
your
new
fear,
then
what
do
you
do
in
in
response?
You
create
uh
an
anti-woke
AI.
And
that
is
precisely
what
XAI
is
and
what
Grock
was.
The
truth
seeeking
part
is
really
his
market
proposition
against
what
he
sees
as
the
alternative
models
of
open
AI
and
anthropic
which
have
been
shot
through
as
he
describes
it
and
contaminated
with
the
woke
mind
virus.
But
also
in
this
period
that
we're
describing
政治转向与财富爆发
他经历了一场相当大的政治转变。2012年、2013年的马斯克支持奥巴马，似乎完全符合硅谷主流政治立场。2022年的马斯克则完全不同。他其实已经逐渐成为我们现在所说的科技右翼的领袖人物。因此，我认为他在觉醒议题上的转变以及他在政治立场上的转变，在某些方面其实早于他在AI立场上的转变。那么，你如何理解这种转变到底是什么？
英文原文
he
[snorts]
has
gone
through
a
pretty
big
political
transformation.
Musk
of
2012,
2013,
you
know,
pro
Obama
seems
to
have
fairly
been
all
Silicon
Valley
politics.
Uh
the
Musk
of
20122
does
not.
He's
really
becoming
already
the
sort
of
leader
of
what
we
now
call
the
the
tech
right.
So
the
shift
on
wokeness
for
him
and
the
shift
in
his
politics,
I
think,
predates
actually
in
some
ways
his
shift
on
AI.
So
how
do
you
understand
what
that
shift
was?
是的。当年奥巴马政府希望大力推进可再生能源以减少对化石燃料的依赖，并以此协助摆脱对中东的依赖，马斯克能够从中获利，从能源部获得了这笔近5亿美元的贷款。到了拜登政府时期，对我们所称的“电动自主”的需求依然存在，但现在它也成了某种亲劳工、亲工会推进计划的一部分，这意味着马斯克不再是拜登白宫青睐的公司之一了。
英文原文
Yeah.
So
when
the
Obama
administration
wanted
to
do
a
big
push
into
renewables
to
reduce
dependency
on
fossil
fuels
and
thus
also
helped
to
get
out
of
the
Middle
East,
then
Musk
was
able
to
profit
from
that
getting
this
nearly
half
billion
dollar
loan
from
the
Department
of
Energy
into
the
Biden
administration.
that
demand
for
electric
autonomy,
as
we
call
it,
still
existed,
but
now
it
was
part
of
also
a
kind
of
proworker,
pro-
union
push,
which
meant
that
Musk
wasn't
one
of
the
favored
companies
for
the
Biden
White
House.
是的，出名的是他没有受邀参加电动汽车峰会。
英文原文
Yeah.
Famously
does
not
get
invited
to
the
electric
vehicle
summit.
他受到的冷落，大致相当于白宫记者协会晚宴上对特朗普的嘲讽，成为一种“既然你们不喜欢我，那就算了，我要建立自己的圈子”这种感觉的导火索事件。其表现形式之一，当然是提出种族正义、性别正义诉求的社会运动高涨，这些运动自然也进入了硅谷的工作场所，产生了新的压力——公开信、罢工抗议。这成了让CEO阶层真正感到好战与愤怒的源头，他们觉得这个劳工阶层现在正以一种令人厌恶的方式对管理层行使权力。而且，疫情管控措施也成了一件既激怒马斯克（因为他无法让监管环境顺应自身需求），同时又让他在反对管控措施中获得大量认可的事情。所以，他那条写着“冠状病毒恐慌是愚蠢的”推文，成了他第一条获赞100万的推文。作为回应，特朗普回应说：你知道的，这太离谱了，重新开放弗里蒙特工厂吧。然后他就不管不顾地照做了，实际上违反了加州的政令，并且没有受到任何追责。因此，这还指向了我认为在他向右转过程中相关的另一件事，那就是他沉浸在社交媒体特别是Twitter的世界里。我们认为这与其说是对他理性的一种腐蚀过程，不如说是他的一种渐进式尝试，试图摸索出如何触发那些最终能让他致富并扩大其权力的过程。因此，表面上看起来像是某种网络放纵或某种网络“脑腐”的东西，实际上往往伴随着他的股票价值和他个人净资产的上升。正是在2021年，当每个人都上网、离不开手机的时候，他成为了世界首富，正如人们所描述的那样，他是通过把自己变成一只人类模因股来实现的。所以，他在Twitter上发现的是：两极分化非但没有成为他积累模式的阻碍，反而成了一种真正的加速剂。
英文原文
It's
snubbed
in
a
way
that
is
kind
of
like
roughly
equivalent
to
the
Trump
roast
at
the
White
House
correspondence
dinner
as
the
sort
of
initiating
incident
of
a
feeling
of
being,
you
know,
if
you
don't
like
me,
then
forget
you.
I'm
going to
create
my
own
club.
Um,
one
of
the
forms
it
took
was
of
course
the
upswell
of
social
movements
making
demands
around
racial
justice,
gender
justice
that
were
of
course
entering
the
workplaces
of
Silicon
Valley
too
that
were
producing
new
pressures
um
open
letters,
walkouts.
This
became
a
site
of
real
um
combative
anger
for
the
CEO
class
which
felt
that
this
labor
class
was
now
exercising
power
over
them
the
management
in
a
way
that
was
repellent
but
also
the
co
containment
measures
become
something
that
really
both
triggers
Musk's
anger
at
his
inability
to
shape
the
regulatory
world
around
his
own
needs
and
also
a
time
where
he
gets
a
lot
of
validation
for
for
his
opposition
to
the
containment
measures.
So
his
tweet
where
he
says
the
Corona
virus
panic
is
dumb
is
his
first
1
million
like
tweet
and
as
a
response
to
it
Trump
responds
you
know
this
is
outrageous
you
know
reopen
the
Fremont
factory
and
then
he
goes
ahead
and
just
does
it
anyway
actually
against
California
orders
and
gets
away
with
it.
[snorts]
So
this
also
points
to
something
else
I
think
is
relevant
in
his
rightward
turn
which
is
his
immersion
into
the
world
of
social
media
and
in
particular
which
we
think
of
as
less
a
kind
of
corrupting
process
of
his
rationality
and
more
as
sort
of
his
iterative
attempt
to
figure
out
how
to
trigger
um
processes
that
end
up
actually
enriching
him
and
expanding
his
power.
So
what
can
look
like
a
kind
of
dissipation
online
or
kind
of
online
brain
rot
is
often
often
actually
corresponding
with
movement
upward
in
the
value
of
his
stocks
in
his
personal
net
worth.
It's
in
2021
when
everyone's
online
and
on
their
phones
that
he
becomes
the
richest
man
in
the
world
and
it's
sort
of
by
as
people
have
described
making
himself
into
a
human
meme
stock.
So
this
what
he
finds
out
online
on
is
that
you
know
polarization
is
actually
rather
than
being
a
kind
of
handicap
for
his
accumulation
model
is
actually
real
accelerant
for
it.
好吧，你说两极分化，这确实是其中的一部分，但两极分化也是一种获取注意力的方式，对吧？而且，我认为特朗普和马斯克在这一点上有着非常相似的心理机制。但在他身上非常有趣的是，所有的部分始终都是相连的。不过我认为大家并没有真正清楚地意识到他的财富膨胀得有多快。在2020年——
英文原文
Well,
you're
saying
polarization
and
and
that
is
part
of
it,
but
polarization
also
is
a
method
of
getting
attention,
right?
And
and
and
this
is
a
way
in
which
Trump
and
Musk,
I
think,
have
very
similar
psychologies,
but
it's
so
interesting
with
him
the
way
all
the
parts
are
always
connected.
But
I
don't
think
people
I
don't
think
I
had
a
really
good
sense
of
how
rapidly
his
fortune
has
expanded.
So
2020,
根据估算，他拥有390亿美元。现在看这也是一大笔钱。如果我有390亿美元，我肯定乐疯了。
英文原文
he
has
according
to
estimates
$39
billion.
Now,
it's
a
lot
of
money.
If
I
had
$39
billion,
I'd
be
stoked.
是的。
英文原文
Yeah.
他现在拥有一万亿美元了，对吧？
英文原文
He
now
has
a
trillion
dollars,
right?
六年时间。在2020年，他拥有的财富只有现在的4%，对吧？
英文原文
Six
years.
In
2020,
he
had
4%
of
the
wealth
he
has
now,
right?
而在这几年间发生的，并不是他的公司赚了大笔的钱。他并没有拥有高利润率的——我的意思不是说没有利润，而是SpaceX发生了什么，特斯拉发生了什么——并不是它们开始展现出扭转了马斯克净资产的利润。到底发生了什么？你怎么能在六年内从400亿美元变成一万亿美元？
英文原文
And
what
has
happened
inside
those
years
is
not
that
his
company's
made
aLot
of
money.
He
does
not
have
highly
profit
generating.
I
mean,
I'm
not
saying
there
are
no
profits,
but
what
happened
with
SpaceX,
what
happened
with
Tesla,
it's
not
that
they
began
showing
profits
that
shifted,
you
know,
Musk's
net
worth.
What
did
happen?
How
do
you
go
from
$40
billion
to
a
trillion
dollars
in
six
years?
是的。我的意思是，与竞争对手相比，他旗下公司的市盈率完全是离谱的，但它们说明了另一种情况，这是他在实践中做到了极致的事情，我们在书中将其称之为金融寓言主义（financial fabulism）。因此，这不是对当前一组基本面或当前营收模式的投射，而是能够开启可能无限的未来收入的承诺。他成了最典型的例子，而特斯拉能够让人信服地展现为汽车电动化的未来，然后或许还是人形机器人的未来；而SpaceX有能力说：“听着，我们将进入轨道的物质成本降低了90%以上，太空中有超过1.1万颗卫星提供互联网服务，拥有超过1200万订户，切实改变了在像乌克兰这样的地方打赢战争的能力。”这些事情都是真实的，你可以指出的事实，如果你——
英文原文
Yeah.
I
mean,
the
price
to
earnings
ratio
of
his
companies
are
completely
outrageous
compared
to
their
competitors,
but
they
speak
to
what
as
something
else,
as
something
he's
perfected
in
in
practicing,
we
talk
about
in
the
book
as
financial
fabulism.
So
this
projection
not
of
a
current
set
of
fundamentals
or
a
current
revenue
model
but
the
promise
of
being
able
to
open
up
perhaps
infinite
future
revenues.
he
becomes,
you
know,
the
most
iconic
example
of
that
and
Tesla
as
something
that's
able
to
plausibly
present
itself
as
the
future
of
motorization
and
then
maybe
also
the
future
of
humanoid
robots
and
SpaceX's
ability
to
say,
"Listen,
we
delivered
on
a
drop
in
over
90%
of
the
cost
of
putting
matter
into
orbit
internet
with
over
11,000
satellites
in
space
with
over
12
million
million
subscribers
tangibly
changing
the
ability
to
win
wars
in
places
like
Ukraine.
These
things
are
real
um
things
you
can
point
to
if
you
想要说服自己，如果你要下注，你就下注在这个人身上。
英文原文
want to persuade yourself that if you're going to make a bat, you make it on this man.那么，关于这点让我先打断你一下，因为我经常看到一种现象，并且我认为这确实是一种认知上的误区：人们总是希望那些自己讨厌的人毫无过人之处。当然，
英文原文
>> Well, let me hold you on that for a second because one thing I often see and I think of it as a genuine kind of intellectual mistake, people want the people they don't like to not be impressive. Of course,而且我认为现在左翼群体中很大程度上存在这种思潮，因为他们
英文原文
>> and I think there is a big strain of thought that sort of exists on the left now as they've顺理成章地对埃隆·马斯克及其政治立场产生了反感。但他所建立的成就确实不可思议。[嗤笑]
英文原文
>> understandably turned against Elon Musk in his politics. What he's [snorts] built is incredible.是的。
英文原文
>> Yeah.而且这些是实实在在的。我是说，我们可以去谈论盈利与否，或者市盈率，但是
英文原文
>> And it's real. I mean, we can talk about profits or nonprofits and price to earnings ratios, but你可以使用星链（Starlink）。
英文原文
>> you can use Starlink.没错。
英文原文
>> Yep.你知道的，你可以开特斯拉。他们真的做到了，你知道，把以吨计的物资送入太空，呃，变得相对便宜，以一种以往从未实现过的方式。就像
英文原文
>> You know, you can drive into Tesla. they really have made, you know, sending um tonnage into space uh relatively affordable in a way that it wasn't before. Like就像马斯克真的做成了这件事。
英文原文
>> it like Musk really did do that.是的。我认为他做到这一点的方式之一，是在重返去全球化、本土回流、生产模式的再本土化这一趋势上走在了时代前列。
英文原文
>> Yeah. And one of the ways he did that I think is by being ahead of the curve with the move back towards delobalization, reshoring, retterrorization of production models as well.垂直整合与生产模式
你这么说是什么意思？我的意思是，当他在2002年创办SpaceX时，他大幅降低将物质送入轨道的成本的方式之一，就是将大量生产环节转入内部。因此，火箭所需的大量零部件要么定制，要么自主制造，不依赖分包商，不依赖那种冗长的采购模式，而是加快所有环节的速度，全部收归内部自产。嗯，特斯拉在这方面也是出了名的。在建造超级工厂时，他们试图将尽可能多的供应链整合在同一座工厂的屋檐下，这意味着恰恰在2020年汽车制造商因边境封闭而遭受毁灭性打击时，特斯拉虽然也受到了冲击，但他们反弹得快得多。这确实是赋予他们迅速复苏可能性的关键因素之一。因此，在那些巨大的供应冲击之前，在新冠疫情之前，在乌克兰危机之前，实际上马斯克已经在采用一种部分解耦的生产模式了。我完全同意你的看法，对于许多仅仅想走捷径、认定他只是个骗子和忽悠者，甚至纯粹是个裙带资本家的批评者来说，这确实是个巨大的绊脚石。事实上，他绝不仅仅是一个裙带资本家，因为他经常在为与其开展业务的经济体拓展技术前沿。如果你还不是《纽约时报》的订阅用户，我们有个消息要告诉你。现在在《纽约时报》App上首月体验期间，你可以免费阅读《纽约时报》，没有任何付费墙拦截。[音乐] 我认为这在这里将几件有趣的事情联系了起来，因为正如你所提到的，为了支撑这些估值，马斯克兜售的不仅仅是一个他已经实现的世界愿景。
英文原文
>> What do you mean by that? I mean that when he launched SpaceX in 2002, one of the ways he radically cut the cost of putting matter into orbit was by bringing a lot of the production inhouse. So making bespoke or making themselves a lot of the components that they need for their rockets, not relying on subcontractors, not relying on kind of lengthy procurement models, but speeding everything up and bringing it all inhouse. Um Tesla famously did this as well. When they built the gigafactories, they were trying to bring as much of the supply chain as they could under the roof of one factory, which meant that exactly in 2020 when automakers got absolutely slammed by the closing of borders, Tesla got hit, but they bounced up much more quickly. It was really one of the things that gave them the possibility to bounce back. So before those big supply shocks, before COVID, before Ukraine, actually Musk was already using a partially kind of decoupled model of production. I completely agree with you that it's a real stumbling block for many critics who simply want to short circuit to this idea he's just a liar and a grifter or even simply a crony capitalist. In fact, he's not just a crony capitalist because he's pushing out often the kind of technological frontier for economies that do business with him. If you're not a subscriber to the New York Times, we have some news for you. You can now explore the Times for free without any pay walls at all during your first [music] month in the New York Times app. I think that brings together a couple interesting things here because as you mentioned to justify the valuations, Musk is not just selling a vision of the world that he has already achieved.他兜售的是一个不一样的未来愿景，而且他向《经济学人》描绘过那个愿景大致是什么样。所以我想在这里放一下那段录音。
英文原文
>> He's selling a like a different vision of the future and and he sort of described what it was to the economist. So I want to play that here.你的各家公司在10年后会做什么，它们将如何赚钱？
英文原文
>> What is what will your companies be doing in 10 years and how will they make money?好吧，你确实可以把经济看作是，呃，数字智能与物理智能。你需要人形机器人形式的末端执行器，嗯，人类……概括来说，你基本上需要大量的机器人。你需要大量的机器人，嗯，然后你就可以从，嗯，仅以数字形式表现的智能，走向塑造原子。嗯，你要问，什么是经济？经济就是，嗯，商品的生产和服务的提供。如果你拥有数量庞大的机器人，呃，伴随着海量的数字智能，你就会拥有某种准无限的经济。所以，所以这真的，未来的面貌将与过去截然不同。
英文原文
Well, you can really think of the economy as uh digital and physical intelligence. You need the endectors in the form of humanoid robotics um human you need a basically a lots of bots in a nutshell. You need lots of bots um and then you can go from um intelligence manifesting itself only digitally to shaping atoms. Um and you say what what is an economy? An economy is um the production of goods and provision of services. And if you have vast numbers of robots uh with vast amounts of digital intelligence, you have a sort of a quad quasi infinite economy. So, so this is this is really the the future is going to be very very different from the past.从比特到原子的产业帝国
所以，这就是目前我称之为“马斯克产业群”所作出的承诺，这倒不一定是指他个人将在人工智能领域独占鳌头。而是说，他们将成为把人工智能带向现实的公司——也就是这组企业联合体，将人工智能从比特世界带入原子世界，他们将在人工智能与机器人的交汇领域占据主导地位。我认为，他们是否能做到这一点，显然是我们目前无法知晓的。但我认为有些事情值得从更深层次去探究，关于此处所描绘和宣扬的世界，那就是人类在这个未来中扮演什么角色？
英文原文
>> So, so this is currently the promise of what I would call like Musk industries which is not necessarily that he is going to individually dominate AI. It's that they are going to be the company that takes AI, the kind of conglomerate of companies that takes AI out of bits and into atoms that they will dominate the AI robotics intersection. I I think whether they will or not is obviously something we can't know. But I think there's something worth like getting at at a deeper level of the world being envisioned and promoted here, which is what is the role that human beings play in this future?我是说，这个愿景非常难兜售，对吧？在那次采访中，有一点很奇怪的是，他说，你知道，在经济上、文明上，我们正在走向一种如果不说是屈从，也是完全被超级智能边缘化的处境。因此，把这作为你为之努力的目标，首先显然非常难以获得认同和合法性，[嗤笑] 嗯，但这也需要在相邻技术之间产生巨大的协同效应，而他今年能够解锁如此庞大规模财富的方式之一，实际上就是朝着将这种垂直整合的“马斯克产业”模式统一在一个品牌下取得了进展。只是在最近，xAI吞并了X.com，随后SpaceX又反过来吞并了xAI，而现在他正高调呼吁特斯拉和SpaceX合并，这将是历史上规模最大的合并，并且恰恰能把他的帝国中以人形机器人形式涉足原子实体的部分，与涉足人工智能的部分整合在SpaceX的麾下。但随后我认为，“马斯克主义”中有一个我们需要保持关注的方面，那就是他实际上，呃，是在一种制造刀枪不入印象的需求驱动下运转的，而这种印象实际上与事实相悖。因此，如果你拿起SpaceX的招股书通读其中的风险因素，第一大风险因素就是国家立法。这些才是真正让马斯克夜不能寐的事情，对吧？就是各国政府采取行动，往他试图开向目标的坦克履带里撒沙子。所以这也是我认为需要牢记的一点，即他那种无懈可击的表象，实际上是他政治项目的一部分。而在立法的机制以及立法对他构成的风险之下，归根结底还在于大众相信什么，[嗤笑] 他们对这个世界相信什么，他们对他相信什么，他们想要什么。
英文原文
>> I mean, it's a very difficult one to sell, right? And one of the strange things about that interview is that he says, you know, economically, civilizationally, we're moving to a situation of kind of if not subordination and simply marginalization by super intelligence. So for that to be the goal to which you're working is first of all very difficult to build consent for and legitimacy for obviously [snorts] um but it also requires a huge amount of synergies between neighboring technologies and one of the ways he's actually unlocked the level of fortune he has this year is by making progress towards bringing together that vertically integrated Musk Industries model under one kind of label. It's only been recently that XAI absorbed X.com and then SpaceX in turn absorbed XAI and now he's vocally calling for the merger of Tesla and SpaceX which would be the largest merger in history and would precisely bring together the part of his empire that does atoms in the form of humanoid robots with the part that does the AI under the umbrella of SpaceX. But then I think one aspect of Muskism which we need to keep our eye on is that he's actually um propelled by the need to create an impression of invulnerability which is actually belied by the truth. So if you pick up the SpaceX perspectus and read through the risk factors, number one risk factor is national legislation. These are the things that actually keep Musk up at night, right? is the moves being made by national governments to throw sand in the treads of the tank that he's trying to drive towards his goal. So that's I think is something to bear in mind too is like his impression of invulnerability is actually part of his uh political project. And beneath the the sort of mechanism of legislation and the risk of legislation to him is also what populations believe, what [snorts] they believe about the world, what they believe about him, what they want.这在我看来，把近期的痴迷与长期的痴迷结合在了一起。
英文原文
>> And this, I think, brings together like both a near-term and a long-term obsession.马斯克——你也就此写过文章——对他所谓的“觉醒精神病毒”有着一种更为具体的理解。当他描述它时，这种隐喻更类似于计算机病毒，
英文原文
>> Musk has, and you've written about this, a sort of more specific conception of what he calls woke mind virus. When he is describing it, the metaphor is more like computer virus.是的。
英文原文
Yes.比人们所真正意识到的更甚。那么在他看来，什么是觉醒精神病毒？因为我觉得这与人们所理解的“觉醒”有点不太一样。
英文原文
than I think people quite realize. So what is to him the woke mind virus? Because I think it's a little bit different than what people think of as wokeness.“精神病毒”与传播空间
是的。因此，“心智病毒”（viruses of the mind）这一术语是由理查德·道金斯在1990年代初提出的，他是一位受人尊敬却又颇具争议的保守倾向演化生物学家，而绝非巧合的是，他也是在1976年的著作《自私的基因》中创造了“模因”（meme）这一术语的那个人。这两个论点是相辅相成的：模因与心智病毒。两者都表明，意识形态和信仰不过是这些离散的单元，它们在个体之间传播，并在1990年代依托网络技术为中介。他在计算机病毒与宗教信仰之间进行了直接的类比。马斯克完全全盘接受了这一概念，以至于我认为，如果你想理解他是如何理解政治、理解认同问题，甚至是真理问题的，那就无法脱离人与机器共同被塑造成他所谓的“控制论集体”这一观念，在其中，政治派系归属、支持、失去支持、异议、愤怒等问题，始终是通过某些模因或某些心智病毒的增殖或削减来触发的。因此，因为他看到在他眼中的2020年代，对种族平等的诉求等心智病毒导致了针对他的阻碍性联盟占据主导地位，所以他需要传播那些能够击败它们的“反觉醒”心智病毒。这看似是一种不可思议的政治思考方式，但正是在这里，我认为我在开头谈到的那种传播依存性变得至关重要，因为如今的SpaceX已经成为一种非同寻常的、端到端垂直整合的传播空间，它延伸……[嗤笑]
英文原文
>> Yes. So the term viruses of the mind was coined by Richard Dawkins in the early 1990s and wellrespected if sort of incendiary conservative evolutionary biologist and not coincidentally the same guy who coined the term meme in his book the selfish gene from 1976. And the two arguments work together the meme and the mind virus. Both suggest that ideology and belief are nothing more than these kind of discrete units that move between individuals mediated through by the 1990s network technologies. And he is using a direct um analogy between the computer virus and the religious belief. And Musk has absolutely swallowed this notion whole to the point that I think if you want to understand how he understands politics or the problem of consent or indeed the problem of truth, it's insufferable from this idea of humans and machines beingworked together into what he calls cybernetic collectives within which problems of political affiliation, support, loss of support, dissent, anger are triggered always through the multiplication or the reduction of certain memes or certain mind viruses. So because he saw the mind viruses of racial justice demands and so on leading to a dominance of a blocking coalition against him as he saw it in the 2020s then he needs to propagate the anti-woke mind viruses that will defeat those which seems like an outrageous way of thinking about politics but this is where I think what I talked about at the beginning as a kind of communicative dependency becomes really important because what SpaceX now is is a kind of extraordinary end-to-end vertically integrated communicative space that reach [snorts]你所说的传播空间是什么意思？
英文原文
>> what does that mean when you say communicative space我的意思是，它从聊天机器人延伸到卫星，而
英文原文
>> I mean it reaches from chat bots to satellites and what他试图在那儿做的事情，以及他推销 SpaceX（应指 xAI/X）具有的比较优势，就是能够接入在 x.com 上发帖的人类的真实世界情绪。所以他说你拥有了一种实时新闻引擎、观点引擎更新和情感引擎，这意味着你的大语言模型（LLM）也更加——你知道——顺应时势且与时俱进。当然，这言下之意就是，如果你能把那塑造成一个密封的孤岛，那么你也能成为那个话语空间的控制者。因此，自他收购推特以来对 X 进行的改造，其设计目的就是通过对相关账户的实际变现，来精准助推那些与他的言论最为贴近的信息。曾有一篇令人震惊的新闻报道，讲述英国极右翼政客鲁珀特·洛（Rupert Lowe）发了一条关于穆斯林与英国文明不相容的推文，随后就有报道跟进说他通过 X.com 上的表情包实际赚取了数千英镑。所以在马斯克的脑海中，他正在打造一种思维病毒引擎（嗤笑），他也可以称之为“真相”。如果他能够——你知道——绝对控制放大或抑制这一机制的算法，那么他就将获得对媒体的主导权。
英文原文
he's trying to do there and what he's selling the comparative advantage of SpaceX is having is access to the real world um emotions of the humans who are posting on x.com so he says you have a kind of real time news engine um opinion engine update and feelings engine meaning that your LLM is also more you know okur and upto-date and of course the implication is that if you can create that as a kind of hermatically sealed silo then you can also become the controller of that space of discourse. So the way that he's transformed X since his acquisition of Twitter is designed to boost exactly the kind of messages that are come in closest proximity to his through actual monetization of the accounts involved. There's extraordinary news story about the British farright politician Rupert Low who made a tweet about the incompatibility of Muslims with British civilization and there was a follow-on report of how many thousands of pounds he'd actually earned through memes through X.com. So in in Musk's mind, he's producing a kind of mind virus engine [snorts] which he could also call truth. And if he can you know absolutely control the algorithms within which that is magnified or contained then he will have domination over the media. I我希望你能继续深入探讨这种信念在更偏向意识形态层面的维度。所以当他把所谓“觉醒思维病毒”理解为……
英文原文
>> I want you to hold on the sort of more ideological dimension of this belief. So when he understands the quoteunquote woke mind virus是的。
英文原文
>> y……理解为对探求真相的威胁，理解为造成了某种堕落的西方文明，这个文明已经失去了、将会失去一些以往推动它前进的价值观——他现在经常谈论西方文明。
英文原文
>> as a threat to truth seeking as a creation of a kind of corrupted western civilization that has lost that will have lost some of the values that drove it forward before he talks a lot now about western civilization.是的。
英文原文
>> Yeah.他具体在说什么？
英文原文
>> What is he saying specifically?科幻隐喻与心智操纵
是的。嗯，在这里我认为从他沉迷的一些科幻作品这个后门切入其实很有帮助，对吧？我是说，艾萨克·阿西莫夫的《基地》系列是他经常引用的东西。他最最小的孩子以《基地》系列中的哈里·谢顿（Hari Seldon）命名为谢顿（Seldon），谢顿在书中被描述为一位极其杰出的数学家，他开创了一门名为“心理史学”的学科，通过操纵当下，将确保文明的延续。这很有相关性，因为它是理性与对大众情绪、群体运作方式以及暴民活动方式的关注的某种混合体。而谢顿计划面临的问题在于，它遭遇了一个在控制情绪方面甚至更加高超的人，一个被称为“骡”（the Mule）的人。而马斯克对传播的理解，始终是这种理性世界与他所谓的“边缘系统本能”或驱使我们的某种动物冲动世界的结合。他认为社交网络的成功——在这点上我认为他并非完全错误——就在于它们调用了这两种资源的方式。而且他将自己的介入理解为熟练地同时操控这二者。因此我认为这有助于解释他是如何理解自身角色的。
实际上相当引人入胜的是，这位世界首富视自己承担着某种过渡功能，真正把人类历史移交给后人类历史。我是说，超级智能将我们贬低到黑猩猩地位的愿景，实际上在此之前没有任何具有任何影响力层级的人曾试图说服大众去接受。仅凭这一点就意味着，他摆弄——你知道——这些关于真相、好奇心和情绪的范畴的方式，我认为有时会显得刺耳和令人陌生。
英文原文
>> Yeah. Well, here I think it's actually helpful to come in through the back door through some of his science fiction obsessions, right? I mean, the Foundation series from Isaac Asimov is something he refers to constantly. His mo most recent child is named Seldon after the Harry Seldon figure in the foundation series who is described as a kind of a brilliant um mathematician really who introduces a discipline called psycho history which through kind of manipulation of the present will ensure the survival of civilization. And it's relevant because it's kind of a mixture of rationality and attention to mass emotion and the way that crowds operate and the way mobs work. And the problem with Seldon's plan is that it's confronted with someone who's even better at controlling emotions, which is someone called the mule. And Musk's understanding of communications is always this combination of a world of rationality and then a world of what he calls the limbic instinct or the kind of animal um impulses that drive us. He sees and there I don't think he's totally incorrect the success of social networks as being the way that they draw on both of those kind of resources. And he understands his own interventions as skillfully manipulating two of those simultaneously. So that I think helps to explain how he understands his role. It's quite fascinating actually that the richest man in the world sees himself in kind of a transitional function to really hand over human history to posthuman history. I mean the vision of super intelligences reducing us to the role of chimpanzees is not actually something anyone with any level of influence has tried to persuade the mass of people to go along with before. And that alone means that he plays with, you know, these categories of truth, curiosity, and emotion in ways that I think can sometimes be jarring and unfamiliar.其中很多内容确实令人陌生。而且当你听到马斯克谈论时，对于一个带着如此强烈的能动性行动的人，当他一开始谈论这个时，他就放弃了能动性。
英文原文
>> A lot of it is unfamiliar. And when you hear Musk talk, for a person who >> operates with such a high sense of agency when he begins talking about this, he abandons agency.但你或许会以为有这种感受的人，眼下可能对日常政治不会那么感兴趣，但是，但他却很感兴趣。[清嗓子] 而这也是我认为这些双重痴迷交汇的地方。切入这一点的方法或许是播放罗根节目里的这段剪辑，我认为这把你谈到的关于觉醒思维病毒和探求真相的某些内容，与他认为西方文明存在某种核心安全漏洞的这一想法联系了起来。
英文原文
>> But you might imagine a person who felt that way, like not being that interested in day-to-day politics at the moment, but but he is. [clears throat] And and this is where these twin obsessions, I think, come together. Maybe a way to get into this is to play this clip from Rogan, which I think connects some of what you're talking about with the woke mind virus and truth seeeking to to this idea he has that there is like a central security vulnerability in Western civilization.“自杀式同理心”与文明漏洞
“所以我们身上正在发生文明层面的自杀式同理心。这就像是我相信同理心。比如我认为你应该关心其他人，但你需要对整个文明怀有同理心，而不是去犯下文明层面的自杀。”
英文原文
>> So that we've got civilizational suicidal empathy going on. And it's like I believe in empathy. Like I think you should care about other people, but you need to have empathy for for civilization as a whole and not commit suicizational suicide.“此外，不要让别人利用你的同理心来对付你，以至于他们能够完全掌控你的国家，然后把管理搞得糟糕透顶，还永远不会被赶下台。”
英文原文
>> Also, don't let someone use your empathy against you so they can completely control your state and then do an insanely bad job of managing it and never get removed.“西方文明的根本弱点就是同理心。同理心漏洞利用。他们正在——他们正在——这是一个——他们正在利用西方文明中的一个漏洞，也就是同理心反应。所以，而且我认为，你知道，同理心是好的，但你需要想清楚，而不是像机器人一样被编程。”当他说我们身上正在发生文明层面的自杀式同理心，当他说我们的文明可能正在自杀时，
英文原文
>> The the the fundamental weakness of Western civilization is empathy. The empathy exploit. They're they're it's a it's they're exploiting a a a bug in Western civilization, which is the empathy response. So, and I I I think, you know, empathy is good, but you need to think it through and not just be programmed like a robot. When he says we've got civilizational suicidal empathy going on, when he says我们的文明可能正在自杀，
英文原文
>> that our civilization might be committing suicide,他是在说什么正在发生？
英文原文
>> what is he saying is happening?我是说，具体而言，当他说出这类话时，他是在呼应欧洲极右翼中一个非常普遍的讨论点。对极右翼和马斯克而言，社会走向的真正问题不在于有很多人试图来或者正在来到欧洲或美国，而是问题在于自由派认为允许来自截然不同文化和截然不同宗教的人来到西方文明的心脏是个好主意。因此，“自杀式同理心”这种精确概念完全是围绕难民政策和移民政策展开的，也是他提出所谓“再移民”诉求的核心所在。但我认为在更深层次上，这触及到了他不愿意去迁就现代政治思想的传统概念。所以，如果你想想过去250年里每一位以前的政治思想家被迫去应对的东西——在这个国家当然如此——那就是诸如民主、人民主权，以及最终形成某种关爱人民的想法之类的范畴。这可以扩展为某种政治层面上你或许称之为同理心的东西，即把共同体想象成在某种层面上由相对平等的同侪所组成的方式。我认为马斯克会将这整个遗产视为西方文明遭受同理心污染的一部分。于是社会秩序变成了一个编程问题，而在编程中，试图对你正在处理的核心代码进行改造，并不会被解释为达成共识或妥協的可能，而仅仅是被解释为需要通过编程清除的污染点。
当我听到马斯克为这种观点辩护时，他提出的论点，我认为他在这里想要表达的论点——某种程度上顺着你的说法延展——就是欧洲和美国（主要是指他谈论的对象），
英文原文
I mean, concretely, when he says something like that, he's uh echoing a very common point of discussion on the European far right. to the far right and to Musk. The real problem with where society is going is not that there are a lot of people trying to or coming to Europe or the United States, but the problem is that the liberals have decided it's a good idea to allow people from radically different cultures and radically different religions to come to the heart of Western civilization. So that not that precise notion of suicidal empathy is all about refugee policy and immigration policy and is at the heart of his demands for what he calls remigration. But I think at a deeper level it comes to his um unwillingness to kind of terry with the traditional concepts of modern political thought. So if you think about what every previous political thinker has been forced to uh contend with over the last 250 years certainly in this country is categories like democracy, popular sovereignty, some idea eventually of like a care for the people. Extended sort of political versions of what you might call empathy, the ways in which communities are imagined as being composed of people who are relative peers or equals at some level. That whole legacy Musk I think would see as part of the contamination of western civilization by empathy. So social order becomes a programming problem and in programming uh attempts to kind of transform the core code that you're working on are not interpreted as a possibility for consensus building or compromise but simply sites of contamination that need to be programmed away. When I have heard Musk defend this view, the argument he makes, the argument I think he's getting at here to to sort of extend what you're saying is that Europe and the United States, primarily who he's talking about,一直出于对个体的同理心，
英文原文
>> have been through empathy for individuals允许大量根本不认同其价值观和前提假设的人进入他们的国家。当他在这里说你必须小心不要对个体抱有如此多的同理心以至于对整个文明失去同理心时，我认为这就是他所描述的内容。
英文原文
allowing mass numbers of people to come into their countries who do not fundamentally share their values and their premises. when when he says here that you you need to be careful not to have so much empathy for the individual that you don't have empathy for a civilization as a whole. That's I think what he's describing.南非种族隔离与政治秩序观
而且我认为这在这里可能引发了许多问题。但对我而言核心的问题之一，是他当年在种族隔离时期的南非的成长经历，是如何影响或塑造了这套关切的。人们手头并没有大量的这类文献证据可供参考。因此需要进行某种程度的解读性跨越，但这并不是一个很大的解读跨越。我们在书中描述的其中一件事就是，在南非作为一个具有种族标识的少数特权群体，在日常生活中流转，在一个人整个人生历程中流转的方式——以一种流转穿过非洲人口中那群似乎面目模糊的有色人群体的方式——以非常显而易见的方式强化了某种对“非玩家角色”（NPC）和“玩家角色”的感觉，以及对南非自身的感觉。南非并不是传统意义上的现代民族国家，因为它是建立在某种不对称的逻辑之上的：大多数居民实际上之所以存在，仅仅是因为他们对少数居民有用。所以那些关于什么是人民的古老问题……
英文原文
>> And I I think it raises maybe a number of of questions here. But one of the core ones to me is how his upbringing in a parttheid South Africa has like influenced or shaped this set of concerns. One doesn't have a lot of kind of documentary um evidence to work with. So there's a certain leap of interpretation that's necessary, but it's not a very big leap of interpretation. And one of the things we describe in the book is the way that being a minority privileged population racially marked in South Africa that drifted through everyday life and one's whole life course in a way that drifted past sort of faceless colored masses of the African population helps to reinforce in very obvious ways a sort of sense of the non-player characters and the playing characters and South Africa itself. ALF is not a traditional kind of modern nation state in the sense that it's built on a kind of um asymmetrical logic where the majority of the residents are actually just there in so far as they're useful to the minority of residents. So those old problems of what is popular主权是什么，民族自决是什么，你如何让生活在一起的一群人将彼此视为具有某种相互关注或起码关怀纽带的群体？这些在种族隔离后期的南非根本就不适用，对吧？作为实际上世界上最后一批非殖民化地区之一，它保留那种帝国式的二元层级逻辑的时间远比世界其他地方长得多。因此我认为对他来说，抛开在大多数政治思想家看来需要认真考虑的事情会更容易。我觉得具体看一下这种逻辑是如何瓦解的也是有价值的。
英文原文
sovereignty, what is national self-determination, how can you get a group of people who live next to each other to see each other in sort of bonds of reciprocal attention or minimal care? Simply didn't apply in late aartite South Africa. Right? It's like as effectively one of the last decolonizing sites in the world, it lived on with that imperial two-tier logic much longer than the rest of the world did. So I think it's easier for him to just set aside what to most political thinkers are things that need to be considered seriously. I think it's worth looking at how that breaks down concretely as well.那么，以往的寡头、以往的行业巨头是如何获得公众认同的，对吧？这实际上就是与福特主义进行比较能带来启发的所在。福特本人是狂热的反犹主义者，极力反对工会。然而，福特主义却是我们与集体谈判协议、代际向上流动、单身家庭经济支柱模式的构建乃至福利国家联系在一起的东西。这是怎么发生的？嗯，它的发生是因为通过社会抗争、通过开明的立法以及通过民主压力，出现了一种妥协或社会契约，在其中人们至少愿意接受这个人设计工厂的方式以及他赚钱的方式。对马斯克来说，对等的机制是什么，对吧？像马斯克这样的人提出的社会契约是什么？对等于卡内基图书馆的东西在哪里？就马斯克而言，你可以具体看一下马斯克基金会，很少有人听说过它，但它是美国获得捐赠规模排名前十的慈善基金会之一。为什么很少有人听说过它？因为作为美国的501(c)(3)慈善基金会，他们经常没有把法规划定必须支出的5%资产花出去。而当他们花钱时，又把钱给了谁？正如最近的例子，他们把它给了一所叫“阿德阿斯特拉”（Ad Astra）的学校，这所学校位于得克萨斯州SpaceX旁边，几乎完全是为马斯克的员工设计的。因此，那种具有外向型社会目标的愿景，他对这种愿景的彻底背弃本身就非常非同寻常，对吧？这实际上将他与他所在阶层的其他人区分开来，对吧？盖茨基金会可以说是——如果最基本的同理心算是一种“觉醒思维病毒”，那么盖茨基金会就彻底被它感染了，对吧？我的意思是，他们的愿景是尽可能多地拯救生命，无论他们在地球上的哪个角落。当然，伴随而来的有大量批评，但在极端不平等的条件下，这是一种相当标准的试图换取认同的方式。所以，这是一种我认为极其大胆的冒犯，挑战了我们历史学家通常思考在极端变革时刻不稳定状态是如何被稳定下来的所有常规方式。而真正让我感到不可思议的是，尽管他的挑衅如此之深，他却展现出了如此强大的复原力。
英文原文
So how have previous oligarchs, how have previous titans of industry secured popular consent, right? This is actually where the comparison to Fordism is helpful. Ford himself virulent anti-semite, violently anti-UN. And yet Fordism is something we associate with collective bargaining agreements, upward generational mobility, the construction of the single family breadwinner model, the welfare state even. How did that happen? Well, it happened because through social struggle, through enlightened legislation, and through democratic pressure, a compromise or a social contract emerged in which people were minimally willing to go along with the way that this guy was going to design the factory and the way he was going to make his money. What's the equivalent for Musk, right? What is the social contract that people like Musk are proposing? Where is the equivalent of Carnegie libraries? In the case of Musk, you can look concretely at the Musk Foundation, which few people have heard of, but is one of the top 10 endowed philanthropic foundations in the United States. Why have few people heard of it? Because they routinely don't spend the 5% of their assets that they're required to do as a 501c3 philanthropic foundation in the United States. And when they do, who do they give it to? as in the recent example, they gave it to a school called Ad Astra that is next to SpaceX in Texas that was designed pretty much exclusively for employees of Musk. So that vision of kind of outward-f facing social purpose, his complete reneging of that is itself quite extraordinary, right? And and and sets him apart actually from others in his class, right? The Gates Foundation arguably um if empathy at as a basic level is a woke mind virus then the Gates Foundation is thoroughly infected with it, right? I mean they have a vision of saving as many lives as possible no matter where they are on the planet. Tons of critiques associated with that of course but a pretty standard way of trying to buy consent under conditions of grotesque inequality. So, it's um it's an extraordinarily bold, I think, a front to all of the normal ways we historians have thought about how instability is stabilized in moments of extreme change. And what's amazing really for me is to see how resilient he's been despite the depth of his provocations.新自由主义、等级制度与智商论
我想邀请你来的原因之一，是因为在你与本·塔诺夫合写关于马斯克主义的书之前，你写过一本书，我认为那本书对于理解马斯克、或许对于理解现代右翼的某些部分非常重要。那本书的名字叫《哈耶克私生子》（Hayek's Bastards）。如果你不介意的话，能否向我介绍一下那本书的核心论点？
英文原文
One of the reasons I wanted to have you on was because you wrote a book before the book you did with Ben Tarnoff on Muskism that I think is important to to Musk to understanding Musk maybe to understand some of the modern right the book is called HX Bastards just if you don't mind just tell me about the the main argument of that那个核心论点是，有一群自称为新自由主义者的人——对，这个词是1938年创造的——当他们自称新自由主义者时，他们的意思是，他们需要弄清楚在市场自由原则面临来自他们所认为的左翼和右翼挑战的时代，该如何保护这些原则。因此，这些人中的一部分变得相当有名：米尔顿·弗里德曼、弗里德里希·哈耶克、加里·贝克尔、乔治·斯蒂格勒。当然，贯穿整个冷战时期，他们也发挥了自己的政治影响力。他们得以成为撒切尔和里根的宠儿，到了冷战结束时，人们可能会以为他们已经赢得了最终的胜利。对吧？然而——这也是如此引人入胜的地方——当我回过头去看柏林墙倒塌、苏联解体时他们开会的记录和发表的论文，他们实际上是在为一组新的威胁感到恐慌。正如他们经常表述的那样，“红色敌人”变成了“绿色敌人”。记住，那是针对温室气体以及当时更多被称为“温室效应”和“全球变暖”而非“气候变化”的危险的早期抗议高潮。他们担心在工作场所中关于平权行动和平等代表权、同工同酬等死灰复燃的诉求。他们担心从同性恋平权运动到女权运动中的少数群体性诉求。因此这变得很重要，因为它为一种联盟创造了条件——这种联盟直到多年后才真正全面开花结果——即那些尽最大努力捍卫自由市场自由的人，与那些似乎出于不同原因反对这些同样进步政治的人之间的联盟。例如，这就是古保守主义联盟形成的时刻，比如激进自由意志主义者默里·罗斯巴德与帕特·布坎南这种主要对文化民族主义感兴趣的人结盟。“德国另类选择党”也是这种现象的绝佳例子。它由认为欧元管理不善的新自由主义经济学家创立，随后与族裔民族主义者以及穆斯林移民的反对者结成了同盟。这两者最终是如何联系在一起的，似乎是理解我们当下政治所要弄明白的一个重要问题。
英文原文
>> the main argument of that is that there were a group of people who called themselves neoliberals right coined it in 1938 and when they called themselves neoliberals. They meant that they needed to figure out how to protect the principles of market freedom in a time when that was under challenge from as they saw the left and the right. So some of these people became quite famous. The Milton Friedman's, Friedrich Hayek, Gary Becker, George Stigler and through the cold war of course they um exercised their political influence as well. They could became favorites of Thatcher and Reagan and come the end of the cold war one would think that they had reached their ultimate victory. Right? And yet, and this is what was so fascinating, when I went back to look at transcripts of the meetings that they were having, the papers they were publishing, as the Berlin Wall fell, as the Soviet Union fell apart, they were actually panicked about a new set of threats. The red enemy, as they often put it, had turned into a green one. Remember, this was an early high point of activism against um greenhouse gases and the dangers of what was then more often called the greenhouse effect and global warming than climate change. They were worried about the resurgent demands for affirmative action and equality of representation in the workplace, equal pay. They were worried about minority sexual demands from the gay rights movement to the feminist movement. So this becomes important because it creates the conditions for an alliance which would only really come to full fruition um years later between people who wanted to defend free market freedoms as best they could with people who seem to have opposition to those same progressive politics but for different reasons. So this is the moment of the paleoconsservative alliance for example between a radical libertarian like Marie Rothbart with someone who is mostly interested in cultural nationalism like papyan. Alternative for Germany is a perfect example of this as well. Founded by neoliberal economists who thought the euro was being mismanaged creating alliances with ethnationalists um and opponents of Muslim immigration. How these two things ended up getting linked together seems to be like an important question to figure out about our politics.嗯，我认为你提出论点的方式之一是，它们被联系在一起是因为一种观点，即顽固社会中那些非常基本的范畴和等级制度是自然的，它们反映了智商差异、文化差异，你知道，反映了无论是在个体层面还是群体层面等等或多或少具有适应能力的人。结合你关于马斯克的书，我觉得这本书有趣的地方在于，对我来说，当我看到马斯克谈论“觉醒思维病毒”的方式时，我觉得其中包含很多这种东西。这种感觉认为社会中存在重要的等级和范畴，而危险来自于一种持续的进步主义推进或觉醒推进——
英文原文
Well, one of the ways that I understand you as making the argument is that they're linked together in a view that very fundamental categories and hierarchies of persistent society are are natural that they reflect IQ differentials, cultural differentials, um you know, people who are more or less fit either at the individual level, at the group level, etc. And what I thought was interesting about this book in conversation with your Musk book is that to me when when I see sort of the way Musk talks about the woke mind virus to me there's a lot of this in it. this sort of sense that there are important hierarchies categories in society and that the danger comes from a kind of constant progressive push or a woke push去消解它们，而且认为如果没有构建西方文明的那种等级制度，你就不可能拥有西方文明。我倾向于把马斯克的许多政治活动解读为不是关乎自由市场或任何其他这些东西，而是关乎这一点。
英文原文
>> to dissolve them and that you can't have western civilization without the sort of hierarchies upon which western civilization was was built and I just sort of interpret a lot of Musk's political activity as not about free markets or any of these other things but about this是的，我的意思是那本书的副标题是《种族、黄金、智商与极右翼资本主义》。在所有这些案例中，都存在一种明确表达的信念：自然界是一个不平等的地方，它不论是通过出生还是地域天赋都不平等地分配收益；否定这种基本的自然不平等，就是以一种新的方式铺就哈耶克所描述的“通往奴役之路”。现在，这条路将由绿砖和粉红砖铺成，而不是红砖。我认为像马斯克这样的人完全属于这一类别。我认为90年代的讨论在我们当前时刻得到更新并发生某种转变的地方，特别围绕着像智商这样的范畴展开。［哧鼻笑］智商非常耐人寻味，因为在1990年代，由于几个不同的原因，它强势回归。把它重新摆上台面的论述，尤其是智库学者查尔斯·默里与哈佛心理学家理查德·赫恩斯坦在他们1994年的大畅销书《钟形曲线》中所作的论述。那本书说了两件事。它说：“在钟形曲线的一端，由于我们所处的知识经济，人们的智商将对经济成功起到越来越大的决定性作用。而在钟形曲线的低端，我们将看到越来越无法适应这种知识经济的人。他们将成为一个社会问题。”当然，具有煽动性的部分在于，存在种族智力方面的群体差异，因此我们可以假定，在钟形曲线底端黑人的比例会格外高。因此，知识经济时代同时也是大规模监禁时代，是真正转向更严苛的警察与法律和秩序政策的时代。而这种观点被映射到一种关于谁是——
英文原文
>> yeah I mean the subtitle to that book is race, gold, IQ, and the capitalism of the far right. And in all of those cases, there was a expressed belief that nature was an unequal place and it distributed gains unequally either through birth or you know territorial endowments and that to deny that basic natural inequality was to you know pave the road to surfom as Hayek described it in a new way. now it would be paved with green bricks and pink bricks instead of red bricks and someone like Musk I think absolutely falls into that category where I think the '9s conversation gets updated and kind of uh transformed in our present moment is especially around a category like IQ. [snorts] So IQ is fascinating because in the 1990s it came surging back for a few different reasons. The arguments that put it back on the table were especially those of Charles Murray, the think tanker, and Richard Hearnstein, the Harvard psychologist, in their enormous bestseller, The Bell Curve, from 1994. And that book said two things. It said, "At the one end of the bell curve, we're going to get people whose IQ is going to be ever more determinative of economic success because of the knowledge economy we're in. And at the low end of that bell curve, we're going to have people who are going to be less and less able to perform in this knowledge economy. and they're going to be a social problem. And the incendiary part of course that there are group differences in racial intelligence such that we can assume that there will be disproportionately large number of black people at that bottom end of the bell curve. So the era of the knowledge economy is also the era of mass incarceration and the real um turn towards more punitive police law and order policies. And the way that this was mapped onto an idea of who is认知层级与终极筛选
谁具备能力、谁不具备能力来应对赚钱方式与工作形态的重大转型，最终成了一种相当不错的解读视角。而现在情况之所以不同，是因为根据科技领袖们自己的说法，他们现在认定几乎所有这些知识型工作都会被自动化取代。对吧？所以，如果说过去智商甚至能在曲线最顶端的 10% 处预测谁会在即将到来的互联网世界中茁壮成长，那么如果这一比例现在被缩减到大约 0.1%，又会发生什么呢？因为所有其他那些工作——程序员、项目经理、文案撰稿人、技术写作者——全都要由大语言模型（LLM）和智能体（agent）来完成，这当然正是他们所押注的。这样你就面临一个问题：AI 实际上已经吞噬了智商，而你现在已经从单纯的“认知精英”——也就是赫恩斯坦（Herrnstein）和默里（Murray）所谓的称呼——变成了一种超级、超级狭小的“认知超级贵族阶层”。我想在这个点上多停留一会儿，因为对我来说，这在某种程度上理清了马斯克身上许多从外部看起来令人费解的事情——
英文原文
equipped and who isn't for the big transition in how money will be made and jobs will look ends up being a pretty good kind of way to read that. Why that's different now is that by their own statements the tech leadership now assumes that almost all of those knowledge jobs are going to be automated away. Right? So if IQ was predicting even at the far 10% of the curve for the people who would thrive in the coming internet world then what happens if that's now been reduced to like.1%. Because all those other jobs the coders the project managers the copywriters the technical writers are all going to be done by LLMs and agents which is what they of course are banking on. Then you have a question where AI has actually eaten IQ and now you've gone from just a cognitive elite which is what Harrenstein and Murray called it to a kind of hyper hyper small cognitive super aristocracy. I want to stay on this point because to me this kind of coheres a lot of things in Musk that are puzzling from the outside也就是，你看，你有这么一个人，长期以来对他来说最核心的长远愿景就是将人类意识的光锥拓展至群星之间；而现在，似乎出现了一种对 AI 优越性的心理屈服。与此同时，马斯克又非常担忧出生率下降。
英文原文
>> which is you know you've got this guy for whom a long time the long-term vision is the most important thing is expanding the light cone of human consciousness through the stars now there's a sort of you know kind of seems like bending of the psychic knee to the AI superiority Musk is at the same time very worried about falling birth rates.对。
英文原文
>> Yeah.与此同时，他正在摧毁像对外援助这样的东西，而这些援助显然有助于人们生存、茁壮成长、长寿以及繁衍后代；在此同时，他至少对许多这些国家的移民政策极度反对。这就让人觉得，一方面似乎坚信要彻底最大化意识总量的这个人，与另一方面似乎并不真正喜欢众多人类的这个人，究竟该如何拼合在一起？这个坚信人类价值的人，与这个似乎在加速 AI 替代进程的人，又该如何拼合在一起？但如果说你对世界的基本看法是关乎某种认知层级——
英文原文
>> As he is destroying like foreign aid which certainly help people thrive and be alive and you know live long lives and reproduce at the same time that he is virulently anti- at least the immigration policies of many of these countries. And it's like where does this sort of guy who on the one hand appears to believe in just like maximizing the quantity of consciousness fit with this guy who seems to not really like a lot of humanity? Where does this guy who believes in humanity fit with this guy who seems to be accelerating you know the AI turnover? But if your sort of fundamental view of the world is about a kind of cognitive hierarchy而且你对 AI 在其中的位置、不同文化在其中的位置抱有某些看法——
英文原文
>> and you have certain views about you know where AI will sit in that where different cultures sit in that它并不是与任何单一事物一一对应，不与种族一一对应，甚至也不与硅基对肉身一一对应——
英文原文
>> it's not like onetoone with any individual thing not one to one with race not even one to one with silicon versus flesh它只是与某种愿景一一对应——
英文原文
>> it's just onetoone with a certain vision关于谁或什么具备在这场演出中扮演主角的资格——
英文原文
>> of who or what qualifies as having like the capacity to be a main character. in this performance那么我认为很多事情就开始落入一个令人不安但却颇为自洽的逻辑区间。
英文原文
>> then a lot of it I think begins to fall into a an unsettling but a kind of >> like coherent space.技术统治论的回响与过渡期的困境
是的。不，我的意思是，我认为有几种方式来看待它。其一是追溯他外祖父的意识形态，对吧？对此我不太想过度联系，因为没有任何证据表明马斯克本人受到了他外祖父的影响。他的外祖父约书亚·霍尔德曼（Joshua Haldeman）在 20 世纪 30 年代是加拿大一个名为“技术统治公司”（Technocracy Incorporated）的非常活跃的成员。而“技术统治公司”所提出的主张，与我们在这里讨论的内容非常相似。那是关于解散现有的价格体系，彻底瓦解民主制度，将交换单位乃至价值储存手段削减为一种被称为“尔格”（erg）的东西——即每个人在一生中所能产生的能量单位。而对这些“尔格”的理性配置，将由一个极其微小但精锐的工程师阶层来监督。那是一种极其荒诞、但也非常激进的构想，在现有政治意识形态的图谱中，它可能确实最接近马斯克所描绘的图景。但我认为要达到那里，中间涉及到几个步骤，对吧？而且——[笑声]
英文原文
>> Yeah. No, I mean I think there's a couple ways to look at I mean one is to draw back on his grandfather's ideology, right? Which I hesitate to do too much because there's no evidence that Musk himself was influenced by his maternal grandfather. His maternal grandfather Joshua Halddederman was a very active member of something called Temocracy Incorporated in Canada in the 1930s. And what Temocracy Incorporated was proposing was something very similar to what we're talking about here. It was about the dissolution of the existing price system, the dissolution of democracy altogether, the reduction of the unit of exchange and I guess store of value to something called an URG which was the unit of energy that each human is able to produce in their life. And the rational allocation of those urgs would be overseen by a very very small but elite cast of engineers. And that is a extremely you know far-fetched but very radical vision that actually on the from the menu of existing political ideologies probably comes the closest to what it seems like Musk is describing. But I think to get there is there are a few steps involved right and and [laughter]抱歉，那话里有很大的轻描淡写成分。
英文原文
>> sorry that had a lot of understatement to it.是的。是的。嗯，所以现在对马斯克来说存在一个过渡期的问题。我认为这是一个核心问题，也就是我们如何从当下的状态跨越到这个 10 年里程碑，直至他生命的终点。对吧。实际上他对自己的接班人没有任何真正的规划。从公司法角度来看，关于 SpaceX 最离奇的事情之一就是，如果他明天去世，他拥有 85% 的表决权股，大家就只能等着分配那些股份。所以我认为他确实押注于这一转型会在他有生之年发生。而你该如何到达那里？对吧？这正是它与“高智商混蛋”（high-IQ bastards）讨论再次产生关联的地方，因为我在那本书中提出的论点之一是，在不确定性的氛围下、在动荡时期，人们往往会像投资界一样寻求避险。而这些极右翼思想家与新自由主义思想家联合起来所做的事情，就是提供不同形式的避难所与安全感，让某种特定价值在其中受到保护并更加持久。因此那些东西就是，你知道的，“你的白人身份会拯救你”，“你拥有一批黄金储备会拯救你”，“你的公民身份价值会拯救你”——这是班农（Bannon）在特朗普第一次竞选时的论调之一。现在马斯克的问题在于，如果他说能够通过筛选的人只是极少数，那么你如何向足够多的人推销这种愿景，以便让你在中期内实现目标，除非我认为只能诉诸于极其陈腐的民族主义与社会战争剧本。因此，他决定通过让你恐惧外来者，让你相信你需要依靠他的技术来拯救你和你家人的生命，以此来赢得认同——这种方式政客们已经用来为缺乏物质再分配辩解了有一百多年了。这实际上毫无新意。我认为这其实是他不那么具有创新性的介入方式之一，即坚信仅仅通过将针对入侵者的恐惧做成迷因传播，就足以带你度过那个过渡期，直到你名副其实地迎来发射升空或达到逃逸速度。[音乐]
英文原文
>> Yeah. Yeah. Um so there is the problem of the transition right now for Musk. I think it's a central problem which is how do we get even from where we are now to this 10year mile marker to the end of his life. Right. Actually he has no real plans for his succession. It's one of the extraordinary things about SpaceX from a corporate law point of view is the he has 85% of the voting shares if he dies tomorrow and you'd have simply have to wait for those shares to be allotted. So that I think he's really banking on that transition having taken place in his own lifetime. And how do you get there? Right? And this is where the relationship to the highex bastards discourse is actually relevant again because one of the arguments I make in that book is that under these um an atmosphere of uncertainty, times of unrest, then there is a tendency as within the investor world to do a flight to safety. And what these far-right thinkers in association with neoliberal thinkers were doing were offering different forms of refuge and safety where a certain kind of value would be protected and more durable. So those were things, you know, your whiteness will save you. Your access to a gold horde will save you. Your citizenship value, which was one of Bannon's talking points in the first Trump campaign, will save you. The problem with Musk now is if he's saying that the people who will get through the filter are such a small minority that how do you sell this vision to enough people to let you realize your goals in the medium term except I think defaulting to very shopworn scripts of ethnationalism and social war. So his decision to say the way I'm going to win consent is simply to make you frightened of outsiders and make you believe you need my uh technology to save your lives of yourself and your family is a way that politicians have used to justify lack of material redistribution for you know over 100 years. There's actually nothing new about that. And it's actually one of his, I would say, less innovative sort of interventions is this belief that simply memeing the fear of the invader will be enough to get you through that uh transitional moment until you get to quite literally, you know, liftoff or escape [music] velocity.[音乐]
英文原文
>> [music]男性意志与未来投射
我一直认为马斯克与特朗普结盟之所以如此强有力——特别是在早期阶段，也就是在马斯克通过政府效率部（DOGE）直接扮演行动者而让自己声誉受损之前——
英文原文
>> I always thought the reason the Musk Trump alliance >> was so potent particularly in its early moments before Musk kind of discredited himself as a direct actor through Doge.是的。
英文原文
>> Yeah.关键在于其一，他们从彼此身上看到了相通之处，尤其是马斯克从特朗普身上看到了这一点。我认为这正是为什么在暗杀未遂、特朗普举起流血拳头之后，马斯克就公开支持了他。特朗普在其第三次总统竞选活动中所开始代表的，是男性意志向政治领域的回归，仿佛脱离了那个——
英文原文
but was that one they recognized in each other and particularly Musk recognized in Trump. It's why I think he endorsed him after the assassination attempt when Trump raised the bloody fist. that what Trump in the in his third campaign for president began to represent was a return of masculine will to politics like out of this era of你知道的，“觉醒”（woke）、女性化、倾向于共识的政治时代，对很多人来说，就像是这种建设者、实业家的形象，对吧，安·兰德式的超人——
英文原文
>> you know woke feminized consensusoriented politic that that and for a lot of people like this idea of the builder the industrialist right the ein rondian superman马背上的世界精神，马背上的世界精神——
英文原文
>> the world spirit on horseback the world spirit on horseback你懂的——
英文原文
>> that you know特朗普开始体现出其中一部分。我认为他现在已经不体现了，但确实存在这样一种路径：我认为对于马斯克的许许多多粉丝来说——我认为主要是中青年男性粉丝——他所代表的就是这种充满阳刚之气的征服冲动。这也是为什么我认为他所展现的一些有些可怕的未来景象，在质感层面而非内容层面，并不总是吓跑人们；因为听到一个人这样说话，就如同听到一个人在宣告：我们将勇敢地挺身而出，努力为人类锻造一个光辉而未知的未来。即使从表面上看，这几乎根本算不上什么全人类的未来。但至少，至少它不惧怕未来。
英文原文
>> Trump began to embody some of I don't think he does now, but there's this way in which I think what to Musk's many many many many fans like >> I think young to middle-aged male fans, what he represents is this kind of like masculine conquering impulse. It's why I think some of the kind of scary visions of the future he presents at the level not of content but of texture, they don't always scare people because to like hear a person saying this is to hear a person saying like we will sally boldly forth and try to forge a glorious and unknown future for humanity. Even if it's one that on the face of it barely seems like a future for humanity at all. But at least at least it is not afraid of the future.是的。我认为这也构成了某种帕斯卡的赌注，或者某种罗科的蛇怪（Roko's basilisk）式的动态：你离他越近、越紧密地追随他的愿景，你就越有可能成为通过筛选的人之一。对吧？所以如果他是那个正在创造未来的人，那么否定他就基本上等于注定让自己被淘汰。而你知道，这并不是很多人愿意接受的交易。但我认为重要的一点是，为了不把过多的功劳归于他个人，我们必须看清他实际上是如何成功垄断了许多本属于集体意志创造和集体智慧产物的东西。对吧？我认为这把注意力引向了改革的任务，也就是：你如何能够推翻马斯克，并不是指把他抛向——
英文原文
>> Yeah. And I think it also sets up a kind of you know Pascal's wager or kind of Ro's basilisk dynamic which is like the closer you are to him the closer you adhere to his vision and the more likely is that you'll be one of the ones who gets through the filter. Right? So if he's the one who is making the future then to deny him would basically be to doom yourself to obsolescence. And that's you know not an exchange that a lot of people are willing to make. But I think the important thing to see, you know, just not so as not to give him too much credit in this is to see how he's actually managed to monopolize a lot of things that were the product of collective will creation and collective intelligence. Right? that I think directs attention to the task of reform which is like how can you dethrone Musk not in the sense of throwing不稳定的均衡与政治缠结
……带走他通过经常借鉴他人创新所生产的所有技术。但是，你该如何创造一个不同的叙事，让决定这件事情的是民众、是国家，而不仅仅是一个人和他的发帖？
嗯，我认为这或许把我们带回了眼前政治中更为现实的层面，因为当前我们所见到的景象中，有一点深深触动了我，那就是这从根本上说是一种不稳定的均衡。你看到埃隆·马斯克，正如你所描述的，他的各家公司与政治不可分割地交织在一起。国家很难从中抽身。
英文原文
away all of the technology that he produced by often piggybacking on other people's innovations but how can can you create a different story whereby it's you know the people the nation who decide this and not just one man and his posts well that I think brings us maybe back into the more material realm of immediate politics because one of the things that strikes me about what we are seeing now is that it is a fundamentally unstable equilibrium. So you have Elon Musk who as you have described his companies are inextricably intertwined with politics. It would be hard to unwind the state from that.确实如此。但同样地，如果你是一名民主党人，对吧，那种你要依赖马斯克的想法——而且要是乌克兰，或者其他某个国家、盟友，甚至美国正在做一些他不赞成的事情，他就能切断“星链”（Starlink）——那是极其极其危险的。
英文原文
>> Absolutely. But also by that very same token, if you're a, you know, Democrat, right, the idea that you're going to be dependent on on Musk and he can turn off Starlink when, you know, if Ukraine or some other um country or ally or even America is doing something he doesn't like, that that's very very dangerous.你知道，这种与国家的交织所造成的，既是一种……就像是一种脆弱性。因此，对他来说，随着他越来越与某种更极端的右翼版本结盟，这就会变得非常非常危险——
英文原文
>> You know, one thing that that intertwining with the state creates is both like a a vulnerability. And so it becomes very very very dangerous for him the more he becomes allied with a kind of more extreme version of the right让任何左翼或中间派候选人在世界任何地方获胜，而那些国家又依赖于他——
英文原文
>> to have any leftwing or centrist candidates win really like anywhere in the world and the countries are dependent on him并且在某个时刻，我认为最终要么会陷入马斯克需要击垮对他的反对力量的境地，
英文原文
>> and that just at some point either I think you end up in a situation where like Musk needs to break the opposition to him要么就是国家需要遏制这种威胁。
英文原文
>> or it's like the state needs to contain the threat.这看起来从根本上就是不稳定的。这又不像他只捐了1000万美元。他随手就砸下了大约4.5亿美元，就像什么都不是一样，因为对他来说这确实不算什么。对。
英文原文
>> It just seems fundamentally unstable. It's not like he gave $10 million. He just dropped about $450 million like it's nothing because to him it is nothing. Yeah.对。
英文原文
>> Right.应对马斯克主义的三种策略
是的。我是说，我和我的合著者讨论过这个问题，而且很有意思的是，在欧洲就书里的马斯克以及“马斯克主义”（Muskism）进行的交流，比我们在美国所进行的更为务实。我认为，马斯克以及你所描述的这些问题与美国人的切近距离，使得人们很难理性地对待它，因为存在着如此强烈的冲动去猛烈抨击这种程度的……就像是将美国经济的未来与马斯克及其产品缝合在一起，以至于有时人们倾向于进行道德化和心理化的批判，只想不假思索地将他打发走并谴责他。
而在欧洲，我们发现存在一种我们当时在讨论、人们也在讨论的三重策略。其一当然是监管，这是一种模式，对吧？你可以说这就是欧盟正在走的路径。不过，另一种模式是替代。于是你审视马斯克所创造出来的东西，然后发问：制造替代品需要付出多大代价？而往往这个代价是非常非常高的。但第三种模式实际上是去重新构想这项技术到底究竟是用来干什么的。正是在这一点上，我认为审视马斯克整个商业开创历史实际上是有益的，因为我们之前提到过这一点，但是，举例来说，当特斯拉主要生产电动汽车，同时也生产太阳能电池板和电池储能装置时，他所展现出的那种电气自主性的承诺，实际上要比从那以后他在其各项业务中所做的要有用得多，也潜在更具鼓舞性。所以，我认为其中的一种态度是从第一性原理出发，直截了当地问：我们最初到底为了什么要去投资这一切？
英文原文
>> Yeah. I mean the way that my co-author and I we're talking about this and we had interestingly I would say more pragmatic conversations about Musk and Muskism in the book in Europe than we've had in the United States. I think the proximity of Musk and the problems you're describing to Americans makes it very hard to deal with it rationally because there's such a desire to lash out at this level of kind of cexis like the suturing together of the future of the American economy with Musk and his products that sometimes there's a will to kind of moralize and psychize and just bat him away and denounce him without further reflection. Whereas in Europe, we found that there was a kind of a threer strategy that we were discussing and people were discussing. One is regulation of course is one model, right? And that's you could say the route the route that the EU is taking. The other model though is replacement. So you look at what Musk has made and you say how much would it cost to make substitutes and often the cost is very very high. But the third model is really to kind of reimagine what the heck this tech is even for. And that's where I think looking at the range of Musk's um history of business creation is actually helpful because we alluded to this before, but the kind of promise of electric autonomy for example that he was holding out when Tesla was mostly making EVs, but also when it was making solar panels and you know battery storage units was actually um much more socially useful and potentially inspiring than what he has done with his businesses ever since. So I think that one attitude there is to is to start from first principles and just say like what are we even you know investing in any of this for in the first place我们究竟想要什么——
英文原文
>> what do we want我们究竟想要什么。而且实际上，马斯克及其巨大异质性所具有的启发性价值之一，就是他让这个问题变得不可回避，对吧？因为如果这个问题的答案是：我们想要的是继续维持与这个人的完全绑定，那么我认为许多人经深思熟虑后是不会希望那样的。所以他迫使我们去追问那个问题，而且他也知道，由于人们在追问那个问题，他已经将自己置于某种困难境地之中。由此便产生了不可避免性的印象。例如在《经济学人》（The Economist）的采访中，他说我们现在不可能叫停人工智能。并没有一个写着“停止”的红色按钮。然而事实上，当然是有的，对吧。当前模式下的生成式人工智能需要极其庞大的算力基础设施建设，而眼下由于全美范围内的数百项禁令/暂停令，这些建设实际上正被放缓乃至停滞。因此，他所设想的那个世界具有必然性，这实际上并不是真的。
我们拥有选择权，这才是真实的，而打破他通过对注意力经济的运用所制造出的那种宏大导向，则是其中的第一步。但我认为这甚至可以比那更加务实。我给你举一个这周他通讯里的例子。中间派自由主义经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）在两个篇幅里谈到了将“星链”国有化。
英文原文
>> what do we want and and actually one of the pedagogic virtues of Musk and his very monstrousness is he's made that question impossible not to ask right because if the answer to that question is what we want is continued level of being completely fused with this man then I think a lot of people on reflection would not want that so he's made us ask that question and he knows that he's put himself into a kind of a difficult situation with people asking that question. Hence the impression of inevitability. So in the economist interview he said it's not like we can stop AI right now. There's no red button that says stop. Actually, of course, there is right. Generative AI on its current model requires uh enormous amount of buildout of compute infrastructure that actually right now is being slowed down to the point of even stopping through hundreds of moratoria across the country. So, it's actually not true that there's inevitability to the world that he's imagining. it actually is true that we have options and breaking out of the kind of cosmic um you know vector that he's produced through the the uses of the attention economy is the first step in that. But I think it gets even more pragmatic than that. I'll give you an example on his newsletter this week. Paul Krugman centrist liberal economist has talked in two segments about nationalizing Starlink.对。
英文原文
>> Right.保罗对你来说才算是个中间派。
［笑声］
英文原文
>> Paul's only a centrist to you. [laughter]是的。但这确实不是几年前你会预料到他会谈论的事情，对吧？我是说，动用《国防生产法》（Defense Production Act），以及拿它与蒙哥马利·沃德公司（Montgomery Ward）的国有化进行比较。
英文原文
>> Yeah. But this is actually not something that you would have expected him to talk about a few years ago, right? I mean, the use of the defense production act, the comparisons to the the nationalization of Montgomery Ward.直到最近，一位务实的经济学家还会说，如果你将一家纳斯达克前十名的公司国有化，就会引发经济衰退。将会出现能力丧失、风险重新定价的连锁反应，以及——
英文原文
>> A pragmatic economist until recently would have said if you nationalize a country, a company that's in the top 10 on the NASDAQ, you're going to trigger a recession. There'll be cascading effects of loss of competence, repricing of risk, and失去让未来企业去建立此类能力的激励。
英文原文
>> loss of incentives for future companies to build this kind of capacity.确实如此。但我认为，光是这种对你所描述的马斯克式依赖进行受控拆解的想法如今被提上议程这一事实本身，就非常令人鼓舞。
英文原文
>> Exactly. But the very fact that this kind of controlled demolition of the very muskus dependencies you're describing is now being brought onto the agenda I think is very encouraging.国家能力规模的实体与摊牌风险
但这正是我所说的不稳定均衡的真正含义。我看到了保罗的那些文章。我觉得它们非常非常有趣。正如你所说，有趣的是保罗——你知道我称他为某种进步派经济学家，但——
英文原文
>> But but this is what I actually mean by an unstable equilibrium. I saw those pieces from Paul. I thought they were very very interesting. And as you say it's interesting that Paul who you know I call him like sort of a progressive economist but不是共产主义者，
英文原文
>> not a communist,对吧？不是一个动辄倾向于国有化的人。
英文原文
>> right? Not a someone prone to nationalization.动辄倾向于国有化的人。没错。呃，他在讨论这个事实，我认为说明了在一个世界里，你确实可以设想这样一种情况：一位民主党总统在任，而马斯克在某个关键时刻关闭了“星链”，随后《国防生产法》立即被启用，于是你便迎来了这种真正的摊牌时刻，对吧？我认为，这一方面从马斯克的角度来看，需要被视作他自身行为和行事方式的一种风险，
英文原文
>> Someone prone to nationalization. Exactly. Um, the fact that he was, you know, talking about this, I think speaks to a world where it's like you could really imagine a situation with a Democratic president and Musk turns off Starlink at some critical moment and the Defense Production Act is like immediately engaged and like you do have this like moment of genuine showdown, right? This both I think from Musk's perspective needs to be understood as a risk of like what he's doing and the way he's acting而从另一方视角来看也是如此，因为局面正在发展到这种境地。而且我们应该说明，我没有把焦点放在乌克兰“星链”问题上的一个原因，
英文原文
>> and from the other perspective because you are getting to this position and we should say one reason I haven't focused on the Ukraine Starling question是眼下的报道存在争议，其复杂程度让我无法厘清
英文原文
>> is right now the reporting is contested in a way I cannot untangle指令到底是不是来自于特朗普政府内部某处，或是由特朗普政府内部某处所暗示，亦或是马斯克本人的行动；
英文原文
>> as to whether or not orders came from somewhere inside the Trump administration or were implied by somewhere in the Trump administration or you know the activity was from Musk我只是不知道答案，而且我也能想到这可能是一种沟通失误，对吧，这种事情也会发生，
英文原文
>> and I just don't know the answer and I could see it also being a miscommunication right you know the these things happen too所以我不想断然断定那里究竟发生了什么。
英文原文
>> so I don't want to say confidently what happened there但我认为可以相对有把握地说，你可以预见到一系列事件的发生，在其中比如，马斯克……听着，我同样也不喜欢迈克尔·布隆伯格（Michael Bloomberg）在竞选末期砸下8000万美元，对吧，我不认为竞选应该这样运作。你懂的，人们开始做出更严肃的努力，去限制这种超级亿万富翁投入如此巨资的能力。
而且马斯克所处的亿万富翁量级，是布隆伯格这种人根本无法比拟的。
英文原文
>> but I think it is one can say relatively confidently that you could imagine a series of things happening where for instance you know Musk and look I don't love Michael Bloomberg dropping $80 million at the end of the campaign either right I I don't think this is the way campaign should work you know you begin having much more serious efforts at you know restricting the ability of like mega billionaires to drop this much Um, and Musk is a billionaire on a scale that somebody like Bloomberg, you know, cannot even touch.一个个体拥有如此巨大的权力，以至于他们……他们本身虽然不是一个国家，
英文原文
>> It is just rare for an individual person to have so much power that they they they're not a state unto themsself,但他们却属于某种具备国家能力规模的实体，这是极其罕见的。
英文原文
>> but they are some kind of like state capacity sized entity.是的。
英文原文
>> Yeah.对。运作着……你知道，这就像他在那边拥有一个技术的“梵蒂冈”。
英文原文
>> Right. Operating, you know, it's like the Vatican of technology that he's got over there.是的。但我认为随之牢记我在这场对话一开始所谈到的事情之一也很重要，那就是财务上的依赖性，对吧？SpaceX位列股票市场指数前十。超过50%的美国人持有某种形式的股票或证券。其中大多数人或直接或间接——主要是通过被动型基金间接地——与马斯克旗下企业的健康状况相挂钩。因此，可以说有20%到30%的美国人都在其中拥有某种形式的间接利益。因此，马斯克最近提议的事情之一……
英文原文
>> Yeah. But I think it's also important to then keep in mind one of the things that I started this conversation talking about, which is the financial dependency, right? SpaceX is in the top 10 in the stock market indices. More than 50% of Americans hold some kind of equities or stocks. Most of those are directly or indirectly, mostly indirectly through passive funds connected to the health of Musk's um businesses. So let's say 20 to 30% of Americans have some kind of stake there indirectly. So, one of the things that Musk has proposed recently就是他打算给每个美国孩子一股 SpaceX 的股票。提议是通过特朗普账户发放，这些账户你知道是自动面向美国儿童开通的。如果他推进他的计划，那么拥有股票的美国公民比例就会上升到大约 50%。所以，你这就有点接近一种可以说是勒索美国民众的方式，让他们不要追随像克鲁格曼那样的方案，手段就是说：“你真的想伤害自己吗？你真的要通过惩罚我马斯克——支撑股市运转的人——来那样伤害你的孩子吗？”
英文原文
is that he'd give one stock in SpaceX to every American child. And the proposal is that would happen through the Trump accounts, which are, you know, automatically made accessible to um children in the United States. If he goes through with his plan, then that number of American citizens goes up to about 50%. So there you're approaching a way of kind of blackmailing, you could say, the American population away from following someone like Krugman's plans by saying, "Do you really want to hurt yourself? Are you going to hurt your child like that by punishing me, Musk, the person who's keeping the stock market afloat?"如果你深入探究到底是谁持有这些股票的细微问题，情况就更有意思了。前十位投资者是谁？安大略教师退休基金，持有大量的 SpaceX 股票；特朗普政府以及马斯克本人经常针对的重点教育目标——哈佛大学，是 SpaceX 的巨额[抽鼻涕声]持有者；还有北卡罗来纳大学。所以当你看到这些时，你知道，在某种程度上，战场上开启和关闭无人机网络连接的这些时刻虽然引人瞩目且表面上令人震惊，可以说是楔子的尖端，但真正锚定硅谷数字部门在美统治地位的基础，其实是在股市本身。以及这样一个事实：那就是我们进行再分配的方式。那就是我们履行社会契约的方式，也就是对你说，你向这个你知道由市场决定的养老基金缴费，然后你将从中获得支出，而不管是保住那东西不垮的人，可以说实际上拥有决定社会契约面貌的真正权力。
英文原文
And if you get into the granular questions of who owns the stock, it gets even more interesting. Who are top 10 investors? the Ontario teachers pension, huge amount of SpaceX stock, the primary educational target of the Trump administration and Musk often himself, Harvard University, huge [snorts] holder of SpaceX, University of North Carolina. So when you see that, you know, in a way these although high-profile and superficially startling moments of turning on and off drone connectivity in the battlefield are the sharp edge of the wedge, you could say, but the base of really what anchors the dominance of the Silicon Valley digital sector in the United States is really in the stock market itself. and the fact that that's how we do redistribution. That's how we do the social contract is say you pay in to this you know market determined pension fund and you will be paid out of it and whoever is keeping that thing propped up actually arguably has the real power of saying what the social contract looks like.所以，我认为处于那种双向依赖、但又是真实依赖的关系中，我觉得在某个奇怪的地方收尾也许值得，但我确实认为这很重要。你刚才提到，欧洲的讨论可能不像美国的讨论那样容易陷入心理分析。
英文原文
So then I think sitting in that that birectional dependency but that real dependency I is it's maybe worth ending in a strange place but I actually do think it's an important one. You you mentioned that the conversations in Europe are maybe a little less prone to the psychologizing than the conversations in America.但问题在于，马斯克的心理状态非常关键。
英文原文
>> The problem though is that Musk's psychology is very important.是的。
英文原文
>> Yeah.而且有件事他经常挂在嘴边。我 2016 年在 Recode 大会现场。我其实可以说是最早写到这一点的几个人之一
英文原文
>> And there's something that he says a lot. I I was there in 2016 at the Recode Conference. I was actually, I think, one of the first people to write about this当时他在讲他如何认为我们极有可能生活在一个计算机模拟当中。这种想法与你刚才提到的那位哲学家尼克·博斯特罗姆有着非常紧密的联系，
英文原文
>> when he was talking about how, you know, he believed it was very likely we lived in a computer simulation. This sort of idea that Nick Boston, that philosopher you you mentioned, is is very associated with,但他一直在这么说，而且实际上语气更加笃定。所以，我想播放这段剪辑。这是埃隆·马斯克在沃尔特·艾萨克森的节目中：
英文原文
>> but he's kept saying it and actually in somewhat stronger terms. So, so I want to play this clip. This is Elon Musk on Walter Isacson's show.你有多确信我们可能身处一个模拟之中？
英文原文
>> How convinced are you that we might be in a simulation?你知道，我曾经在家里和一位物理学家以及一位计算机科学家共进晚餐，他们俩都堪称各自领域的领军人物。我抛出了这个问题：你们认为我们在一个模拟之中的概率有多大？物理学家说是 0%，计算机科学家说是 100%，同时回答的。[清嗓子] 所以，我[笑声]猜也许我应该选 50% 吧。
英文原文
You know, I once had a dinner at my house with a physicist and a computer scientist, and they're both like leaders in their field. And I asked the question, what do you think the probabilities that we're in a simulation? And the physicist said 0% and the computer scientist said 100% simultaneously. [clears throat] So, I [laughter] guess maybe I should go 50% then.我不知道。它很……我的意思是，这个模拟里发生着一些离奇的事情，特别是如果你是我。我的意思是，想想看，如果你是我，你会觉得：这些事情真的应该发生吗？我真的应该制造宇宙飞船去月球和火星吗？这搞什么，看起来都不太真实。
英文原文
I don't know. It's it's I mean there there there's odd things that happen in this simulation where especially if you're me I mean think about it like if you're me and you're like should should all these things really be happening? Should I really be making spaceships to go to the moon and Mars? Like what the that doesn't seem real.模拟假说与权力心理
模拟理论指的是，如果你设想一个先进社会会创造很多模拟，对吧？就像我们制作、可能制作很多电子游戏那样。你只是不应该假设我们生活在基础现实中。简而言之，那大致就是这个论点。
英文原文
>> The simulation theory is that if you just imagine advanced society would create lots of simulations, right? The way we make maybe make lots of video games. You just shouldn't assume that >> we are living in the base reality. That's sort of the the the argument in a nutshell.但他更进一步，而且我从心理层面上理解这是为什么，对吧？我听他反复这么说过：真正显得不大可能的是成为埃隆·马斯克。真正显得不可能的是建造星舰、影响全球政治、拥有 2.5 亿 X 关注者之类的数据，以及成为首位万亿富翁。而这样一种如此不可思议的人生混合在一起，再加上没有扎根于某种其他本体论（对吧？不是某种宗教或某种设想世界的其他方式），再加上对模拟假说的一点吸引力。当然，你又是一个一辈子的游戏玩家。我只是觉得，对于一个拥有像他那么大权力的人来说，[抽鼻涕声]拥有那种心理状态，怀疑这是一场游戏，而你在其中的角色就是做出重大举动。
英文原文
>> But he goes further and and and I get in a psychological way why, right? I've heard him say this now repeatedly that well, what really seems unlikely is to be Elon Musk. What really seems unlikely >> is to be building starships and influencing global politics and having 250 million ex followers or whatever it is and being the first trillionaire. And that the mixture of a life that is so unlikely >> and also not like grounded in some other ontology, right? Not some religion or some other way of imagining the world, >> plus a sort of attraction to the simulation hypothesis. And of course, you'd be a lifelong gamer. And I I just think that, you know, for a person with as much power as he has [snorts] to kind of have that kind of psychology to suspect this is a game where like your role in it is making big moves.嗯。
英文原文
>> Mhm.我真不知道该怎么形容那种处境，但那确实是一种独特的处境，我们现在大家都在大量接触它。
英文原文
>> I don't really know how to describe that situation, but it is a distinctive one that we all now have a lot of exposure to.是的。我是说，模拟理论也有几种变体，对吧？一种是我们大家都仅仅只是这个未来文明的计算机电子游戏的产物，但另一种是大多数人都是影子人，少数人才是真正玩家操控的角色。看起来正是后一种在最大程度上引导着他的方向。在对此类问题进行了大量反思的自由意志主义社群中，有一位是乔治梅森大学的经济学家罗宾·汉森，他说过：“如果这是真的，我们会以怎样的方式行事呢？”他说，你知道，如果这是真的，那么首先对他人漠不关心就是合乎逻辑的。因此，像对外援助福利国家这类事情，他说是根本不值得花时间的小事；要尽可能保持娱乐性，尽可能多地积累财富，并尝试尽可能以一种成功的方式简单地将你周围的世界组织起来。所以，这就像是对任何类似社会责任的激进背弃，而只有当你拥抱这种对你自大狂妄的极度虚无主义式重申时，这种背弃才成为可能。问题是如何拆掉在这个妄想中支撑他的那些支柱与支撑架，因为这不是真的，需要从外部以某种方式说服他这不是真的。如果他继续受到激励去沉湎于那些思维方式，那么他就永远不需要摆脱这些。我认为这是个收尾的地方。总会有一个最后的问题。你向听众推荐哪三本书？
英文原文
>> Yeah. I mean, there's a couple of varieties of the simulation theory, too, right? One is like we are all simply just artifacts of this future civilization's um computer video game, but the other is that there's a most people are shadow people and a small number of people are actually playing characters. And it seems like that's the one that orients him most. And in the kind of libertarian community that reflected a lot on these things, one of the people is Robin Hansen, the George Mason University economist, who said, "What kind of ways would we conduct ourselves if this were true?" And he says, you know, if this were true, then it would make sense to first care nothing about other people. So things like foreign, he says foreign aid and the welfare state would be frivolous things to spend time on to be as entertaining as possible to accumulate as much wealth as possible and to try to simply organize the world around you in as successful way as you can. So there's like this radical reneging on anything like social responsibility that is only possible if you embrace this incredibly kind of nihilistic you know reaffirmation of your megalamania. And the question is how to remove the props and struts that hold him up in that delusion because it is not true and he needs to be somehow persuaded from the outside that it's not true. If he continues to be incentivized to indulge in those ways of thinking, then he will be uh never required to kind of be uh devested of that. I think that's a place to end. Always a final question. What are three books you recommend to the audience?书籍推荐
好的，眼下在技术批判与政治经济学领域涌现出非常多令人赞叹的著作。因此我想引起大家注意三本杰出的近期书籍，它们可以说是沿着技术栈从地下向上延伸到云端和应用。第一本书是 Thea Riofrancos 的书《Extraction: The Frontiers of Green Capitalism》（开采：绿色资本主义的前沿），这本书谈及我们在过去 18 个月左右有点淡忘的事情，那实际上是气候挑战与一个依然依照价格机制运作且国家可以融入其中的世界的结合。没有任何这些机器，当然也没有任何数据中心能够在不从地球某处开采原材料并放入其电路系统的情况下运行，Thea 精彩地描述了在这一过程中出现的政治协议、紧张局势与斗争。
英文原文
>> Well, there's so much amazing work happening right now in the world of tech criticism and political economy. So I wanted to draw attention to three exceptional recent books that kind of I would say move up the stack from under the ground to the clouds and the apps. The first book would be the Ria Franos's book extraction the frontiers of green capitalism which is about something that we've kind of put out of our minds for the last 18 months or so which is really the challenges of climate combined with a world that still operates according to the price mechanism and where the state can fit in. None of these machines certainly none of the data centers would work without the raw materials being extracted somewhere from the earth and put into their uh circuitry and Thea gives a wonderful kind of description of the political settlements and tensions and struggles that emerge in the process of doing so.第二本书是尼克·瑟尼切克名为《Silicon Empires》（硅帝国）的一本书。我认为我们目前在谈论技术意识形态与技术政治经济学时面临的一个劣势是，很多事情被混为一谈了。所以当你谈论半导体时，不知怎的它也成了对前沿实验室的讨论，也成了对新云和数据中心的讨论，但这些单独的市场部门实际上是在非常不同的动态下运行的。在对作为一种构建实体的 AI 究竟是什么进行平静且有指引的逐层向上梳理方面，我还没读过比尼克·瑟尼切克更好的作品。
英文原文
The second book would be a book by Nick Cernich called Silicon Empires. I think one of the handicaps we have have right now in talking about tech ideology and tech political economy is a lot of things get jumbled together. So when you talk about semiconductors it's somehow also a discussion of frontier labs is also a discussion of you know neoclouds and data centers but these individual market sectors actually operate under very different dynamics. And I haven't read anything yet better than Nick Cernichek as a kind of a calm guided tour up the stack of what AI actually is as a built entity.第三本书我认为真的很特别。它叫作《Against Tech Oligarchy》（反抗技术寡头），由 J.S. Tan 和 Clarissa Redwine 合著。他们两位曾是硅谷科技公司内部的组织者。Clarissa Redwine 领导了 Kickstarter 的成功组织，他们两人在马斯克收购期间都在 Twitter 试图组织员工。所以他们只是引起人们对一个事实的关注：阶级斗争和阶级政治在硅谷、在科技公司内部是存在的。他们给出了如何在科技部门内部运用阶级权力的内部视角。而且有趣的是，这并不总是如他们所见通过老式的……
英文原文
The third book is one I think is really special. It's called against tech oligarchy by JS Tan and Clarissa Redwine. And both of them were organizers within tech companies in Silicon Valley. So Clarissa Redwine led the successful organization of Kickstarter and both of them were in Twitter trying to organize employees at the time of the Musk takeover. So what they just draw uh attention to is the fact that class struggle and class politics exists in Silicon Valley inside of tech companies. And they give the insiders view of how you practice class power inside of the tech sector. And it's interestingly not always as they see it through the oldfashioned model of让工会获得认可，这有时会减缓某些吸引人们投身社会行动主义的动力。所以，这是一种非常清醒且写得极其出色的洞见，揭示了我想大多数人都知之甚少的事情。昆西安（Quincian），非常感谢你。
英文原文
getting recognition for a union that can sometimes slow down some of the dynamics that draw people into social activism. So it's a very cleareyed and wonderfully written kind of insight into something that I think most people know very little about. Quincian, thank you very much.很荣幸。 [music]
英文原文
>> It's my pleasure. [music][music]
英文原文
>> [music]嘿， [music] 嘿，嘿。