战争的导火索

Basically, America put in this oil embargo and knew that the outcome of failed negotiations on getting rid of that embargo was a total World War of this kind. And it's not even for the main strategic objective, which is, you know, you've got to get Hitler, you've got to get beat Germany.

战略失误与参战原因

Wasn't this just our failure of grand strategy to realize why are we doing this? Hold on, we weren't fighting Germany. The only reason we fought Germany is because Hitler made a major blunder: he had an alliance with Japan that said if Japan was attacked, he would come in.

参战的直接诱因

Now, with Japan attacked someone else, that he would come in. He interprets it broadly, and he declares war on this country. That is how the United States got into World War II. If Hitler had not made that blunder, FDR would have been in a world of trouble trying to explain why he's suddenly going to be fighting Nazis over an attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese. So that's a separate issue.

国际体系的重要性

The main thing that Americans who thought deeply cared about is the International System, that we should deal with each other through laws, through freedom of navigation. So this is how you run your commercial transactions, that big countries don't get to overrun small countries, because if they do, the entire International System goes down. The logic that you're describing is excellent logic.

当前局势的类比

This is what the Japanese were saying: "It's like, why would the Americans care about this?" Americans care deeply about the International System. And it's also like, why, why not let the Russians eat all of Ukraine? Why are the Europeans suddenly all over this problem? Right, right. And they've unified very recently, uh, on this. It's because the whole system is at stake.

和平派的困境

So it is really high stakes at a strategic level. The Japanese were looking at the operational level and going, "Why do you care about these countries?" Uh, we care about the entire system because our prosperity is based on it. So I wonder if the problem here is that America isn't, at least at the time, wasn't willing to give enough concessions to the factions within Japan that care about peace, so that they can save face and actually argue for ending war.

政治博弈与外交误判

Where just the idea that they're going to give up Manchukuo, as well, obviously that's not going to happen. And when Secretary of State Hull just sees these vacillating telegrams from the Japanese, he assumes it's because they're fickle or something. It's like, no, it's a civilian part of the government like trying its best to prevent the military from taking over, and you've got to give them something to save face. You know, um, that faction had already lost, and they lost in 1936.

高桥是清的警告

Takahashi Korekiyo is Japan's longest-serving Finance Minister, and he was a very distinguished man. In fact, he brought the Japanese economy out of the Great Depression before, uh, anyone in the west was doing it, through government spending and trying to get people to spend at home. And he told the Army, he said, "Fellas, if you go on this bent for Empire, you're not going to actually get resources because you're going to spend a lot of money fighting with people's resources doing that, and then it's going to take you years of investments to access these resources."

繁荣之路与军国主义代价

And he said, "Cooperate with in the International System; that is the way to prosperity for Japan." Well, that was the February Young Officer Revolt, where he and I can't remember how many others were murdered. They came to his home in the middle of the night, and as he stood up to talk to them, they literally hacked him apart.

关键人物的预判

They had lost that, that, that whole game is over. But Prince Konoe doesn't like, he knows he's going to the person who's prime minister in 1941 realizes that they're going to lose a war against America, and he doesn't want to do that. It's just that Tojo, the war minister at the time, doesn't answer to him. Like, there are people that the prime minister is like, doesn't want war, and we don't give him enough to save face.

历史的必然与选择

Wait, they have a huge Army there that's more than capable of assassinating people, and they get in the way. So that ship is sailed. That you can make, this is what a pivotal decision is. Once you've made it, there's no going back to the way the world was. And Japan, it lost too many people, and, uh, there are too many figures in the Army. It's, um, we think that it's an inevitable outcome of having the world the way it is now with this Japan, this, uh, wonderful country now at the lead of so many different level areas of human endeavor. And we think, oh, that's the inevitable outcome. It's not.

反事实的思考价值

I guess what I'm trying to ask you is, is there anything America could have done in the immediate years leading up to the war? They could have prevented this outcome? Because you should assume that if there is a World War, things weren't done optimally, right? Doesn't mean everybody's equally at fault, but is there anything that could smoo... but, but like in the years... but this is serious.

关税壁垒的后果

Holy smooth tariff is a game of half-court tennis. You're looking at the United States, it's in a terrible depression. You want to protect jobs here, and so you raise these big tariff walls. And then, okay, what's the other side net going to do? They're going to raise their tariff walls and pay you back. What's that going to do? It's going to cost a lot of American jobs. If you play that game, you need to be talking with other people.

战争的“温室效应”

So, uh, once you have set the conditions, hot house conditions for fascists to take over in Germany and in Japan, you are in a world of hurt. The easy solutions are no longer there anymore. So maybe I'll ask the question this way: the oil embargo, was it a mistake? Because it's the idea is to protect the International System, prevent empire. Well, we got more empire, we got a World War, we got communist taking over in China. Whatever was going to happen if we got rid of the oil embargo can't have been worse than that, right?

罗斯福的担忧与权衡

Well, what, yeah, it was. What Roosevelt was really scared of was that the Japanese would attack Russia. He was so... because then he thought Russia would fall, and Russia fell. He thought the Nazis would win. So at least when the Japanese attacked, they attacked us. That was actually better than attacking Russia. So the oil embargo... um, so let's say you don't do it, and Japan never attacks us, and then the, uh, Russians are down, and you've got, um, Nazis in control of the world. So must be better, doesn't seem.

另一种可能的世界

And but you don't have the World War with America. Like, it doesn't seem insane to think that. And we're still going to find the Nazis. You're not going to have an International System, and the Nazis were gearing up because eventually they're going to fight us.

历史的局限性

To keep pushing back on this, the, I don't have an answer. I've given you what little I can think, but I, hey, I'm not the grand properer in this world. These com, these questions you're asking me are way above my pay grade.

学习历史的方法

So people in the YouTube comment section get mad at me when I, when I keep asking about like counterfactuals. Um, and I understand, you know, obviously I don't understand what's happening at the time. I'm naive about history, whatever. But I do think it's important, what, what, what are we trying to do when we try to understand history? We're trying to understand if we had done things differently, what would have happened? What are the lessons we take?

历史的“重演”

And counter the main way we can do that, yeah, yeah, I'm all for it. Um, we teach by counterfactuals. Is replay it, and can you come up with different options? I think you're in a series of really awful options. It just seems like naturally, if we didn't go to war with them, we might have been allies, as we ended up being later on.

石油主权的争议

Well, they attacked us, and the embargo. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, but the question is like, should we... got the go... But