伊朗的军事和經濟評估
Speaker A: 伊朗今天的實力比戰爭開始之前強大。這就是我們一直在擔憂的最可怕情景。而你現在讓我來這裡的原因是因為在接下來的幾個月裡,世界經濟危機將會擴大。
Original English
Iran is stronger today than it was before the [music] war started. And this is literally the nightmare scenario that we've been worrying about. And the reason you're having me here is because in the next few months, the world economic crisis is going to grow.
Speaker B: 確實,你對你所說的會發生的事情基本上是正確的。
Original English
And it does appear that you've been largely correct about what you said would happen.
Speaker A: 是因為我已經在為伊朗的轟炸進行建模了20年。我一直就不同議題向每個白宮提供了建議,從2001年到2024年。現在我們正進入第三階段預測。我們就像在泰坦尼克號上,我們即將撞上冰山。當冰山撞上時,沒有足夠的救生艇給每個人。所以我們正在敲打世界的門,石油幾乎用完了。除此之外,史蒂芬,我們還有另一組問題。例如,伊朗正在攻擊我们在約旦的基地,我們已經連續第九天轟炸了。消除無人機和導彈威脅的規模比人們意識到的要大得多,因為他們把那些無人機藏在各處。
Original English
It's because I've been modeling the bombing of Iran for 20 years. And I've advised every White House from 2001 to 2024 on different issues related to conflict. And right now we're coming into the stage three prediction. We're like on the Titanic [music] and we're about to hit the iceberg. And when the iceberg hits, there's not enough lifeboats for everybody. So we are knocking on the door of the world literally running out of oil. And then on top of that, Stephen, we have another set of problems. For example, and Iran is attacking our base in Jordan, and we're in our ninth day of bombing in a row. And the scale of eliminating the drone [music] and missile threat is much bigger than people realize because they hide those drones everywhere.
Speaker B: 那麼,美國在伊朗進行一些有地面行動的風險有多大?
Original English
So, how real is the risk that the US will [music] do some kind of limited ground operation with boots on the ground in Iran?
Speaker A: 現在接近70%,可能在本週結束前。但我擔心恐怖攻擊,因為控制本土領土的片段是自殺恐懼最主要的風險因素。所以選擇是我們面對全球經濟危機,可能是衰退,可能是更糟的情況,還是讓伊朗控制霍爾木茲?
Original English
It's bordering on 70% now, probably [music] by the end of this week. But I'm concerned about terrorist attack because controlling pieces of homeland territory is the biggest risk factor [music] for suicide terrorism. So the choice is do we have a global economic crisis, possibly a recession, possibly worse, or do we let Iran control the straight of hormones?
Speaker B: 這不是一個好地方。那麼你認為接下來最有可能發生的事情是什麼?
Original English
This is not a good place to be. So what is the most probable next thing that you think happens? [music]
Speaker A: 我認為那個問題,史蒂芬,是世界上最重要的問題。我認為答案是這對我來說超級有趣。我的團隊給我這個報告,讓我展示有多少人正在觀看這個節目並訂閱。你告訴我們一些根據這個數據,你隨機取消了頻道訂閱。所以請問你們所有人。現在能不能檢查一下你是否按下了訂閱按鈕?如果你是該節目的常規觀眾,而且你喜歡我們在這裡做的事情,我們在訂閱人數方面正接近一個重要的里程碑。所以,如果你能為我們團隊中的每個人提供一個簡單的免費的東西,讓這個節目保持免費,讓它逐年、逐週不斷改進,那就是點擊那個訂閱按鈕並再次檢查你是否點擊了它。這是唯一我會問你的事情。我們有交易嗎?如果你同意,我會告訴你我會做什麼。我會確保每週、每月,我們都會更努力地戰鬥,為了帶給你們你們想聽到的嘉賓和對話。從D of Sio的開始,我就一直堅持這個承諾,我不會讓你失望。請幫助我們。非常感謝。讓我們繼續節目吧。[music]
Original English
I think that question, Stephen, is the most important question in the world. And I think the answer is This is super interesting to me. My team given me this report to show me how many of you that watch this show subscribe. And some of you have told us according to this that you are unsubscribed from the channel randomly. So favor to ask all of you. Please could you check right now if you've hit the subscribe button. If you are a regular viewer of the show and you like what we do here, we're approaching quite a significant landmark on this show in terms of a subscriber number. So, if there was one simple free thing that you could do to help us, my team, everyone here, to keep this show free, to keep it improving year over year and week over week, it is just to hit that subscribe button and to double check if you've hit it. Only thing I'll ever ask of you. Do we have a deal? If you do it, I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll make sure every single week, every single month, we fight harder and harder and harder and harder to bring you the guests and conversations that you want to hear. I've stayed true to that promise since the very beginning of the D of Sio, and I will not let you down. Please help us. Really appreciate it. Let's get on with the show. [music]
Speaker C: 羅伯特·帕普,對於目前伊朗、美伊戰爭以及我在D of CEO上與你進行的兩次過往對話所學的一切,我猜你對我們現在看到的情況並不感到意外。不,我並不意外。我已經在為伊朗的轟炸進行建模了20年。事實是,這個建模一直有效,從我們第一次在這裡時,對於大多數人來說最大的驚訝是我們轟炸了伊朗政權,它仍然屹立不倒。即使我們殺死了最高領導人和他們前137位領導人中的一些人。想想看。那就像如果有人殺死了我們的總統、他的妻子、第一夫人、第一家族成員、半個內閣、五角大廈的領導人、中央情報局的領導人,以及國會三分之一的人。這就是我們在三月份開戰初期對伊朗所做的事情。儘管如此,那個政權仍然倖存了。而這是建模顯示的,基於歷史上空軍力量本身從第一次世界大戰一直沒有推翻過任何政權的實質模式。大多數人並沒有真正聽過這件事。甚至許多軍方人士也沒有完全知道川普總統在歷史重量面前有多麼強勢。然後我們轉變了。我們轉向為期六週的轟炸行動。然後我們做了什麼?我們轉向為期兩個月的封鎖。嗯,那又是另一種懲罰版本。所以美國說他們將封鎖霍爾木茲,基本上是試圖控制它自己,因此懲罰世界其他地區。
Original English
Robert Pap, with everything that's going on with Iran at the moment, the US Iran war, and everything that I've learned from you in the two previous conversations we've had on the D of CEO, I'm guessing that you're not really surprised by what we're seeing now. No, I'm not. I've been modeling the bombing of Iran for 20 years. The uh the fact is the modeling has held up and literally month by month by month uh when we were first here the big surprise for most people was that we bombed the regime in Iran and it still stood. It survived even though uh we killed the supreme leader and something like 137 of their top leaders. Think about that. So that would be like if somebody killed our president, his wife, the first lady, members of the first family, half of the cabinet, all of the leaders in the Pentagon, all of the leaders in the CIA, and about a third of the Congress. That is what we did to Iran in those opening weeks in March. And nonetheless, that regime survived. And that was something that modeling showed for that 20 years that was based on uh substantial um patterns in history where air power alone had never toppled a regime going all the way back to World War I. Most people had not really heard that before. Many people even in the military did not fully know how much President Trump went up against the weight of history. Then we shifted. We shifted to uh six weeks of a bombing campaign. And then what did we do? we shifted over to a two-month blockade. Well, that was another version of punishment. So, the US said that they were going to block the straight of Hormuz, basically trying to take control of it themselves and therefore kind of punishing the rest of the world.
Speaker B: 嗯,他們不是想懲罰世界。他們是想對伊朗進行懲罰。所以他們試圖強迫伊朗政府放棄霍爾木茲的控制權。所以請記住發生了什麼:2月28日那次政權更迭轟炸發生了,持續了幾天,但到3月2日、3日,伊朗就控制了霍爾木茲,僅僅在幾天內,船隻就停下了,基本上除了短暫的時期以微小的規模重新開放。然後你就被困住了。你如何讓伊朗放棄對霍爾木茲的控制權?或者你讓伊朗繼續控制霍爾木茲,直到眼睛能看到的地步為止?這就是我們在三月份第一週以來一直面臨的核心困境,史蒂芬。現在世界已經更清楚了核心困境所在。我們處於道路的分岔口。要麼我們物理上奪回霍爾木茲,那些其他策略都無效了。
Original English
U well, they they didn't want to punish the world. What they were that did happen, but what they wanted to do was punish Iran. So, they were trying to coers Iran to get the government to surrender control of Hormuz. So keep in mind what happened is on February 28th that regime change bombing happened and it went on for a few days but by March 2nd March 3rd Iran controlled Hormuz literally within a few days the ships stopped cold and they basically have not reopened except for teenytiny periods of time in a small in a modest way and then you're stuck. How do you get Iran to give up control of Hormuz? Or do you let Iran continue to uh control Hormuz for as far as the eye can see? That's been the dilemma we've been in, Stephen, since really the first week in March. And now it's become clearer to the world that has the core dilemma. We're at a fork in the road. Either we physically take Hormuz back all those other tactics didn't work.
Speaker A: 呃,那個理解。關於《諒解備忘錄》,我認為副總統萬斯真誠地認為這有機會結束戰爭。但這裡有一個大問題,史蒂芬,當你聽副總統萬斯時,他將這視為一筆商業交易。所以他一直談論如果伊朗提供服務費,他們將獲得的所有利益。我們想開航,如果你打開航道,我們將以不同的方式向你提供金錢。這只是對國際政治的根本性誤解。這在房地產方面可能很有效。我不是說它不行,但在像這樣的大戰中,所爭取的不是權力平衡。是權力平衡。現在我想解釋的是,在戰爭開始之前,在戰爭開始之前,存在一個美國處於優勢的權力平衡,以色列是崛起中的強國,伊朗實際上是在該地區衰落中的強國。幾乎在戰爭開始後的兩週內,當伊朗控制霍爾木茲時,權力平衡發生了戲劇性的轉變。這代表著未來的巨大力量。那種財富,儘管尚未實現,但它等同於不僅是積累金錢,還等同於軍事力量。它等同於影響該地區其他國家建立影響力圈的能力。這是權力政治方面的力量正在發生轉變。所以史蒂芬,當你看看萬斯,JD Vance 似乎我們就可以就他來說,他似乎認為這是一筆商業交易。所以他似乎認為我們將會守住承諾,說3000億美元最終會落到你身上,如果你只是同意做我們想做的事情並表現出行為。對伊朗來說,重要的是那些直接與權力平衡相關的條款,以鞏固伊朗對霍爾木茲的控制,這從根本上是通往伊朗成為該地區霸主的路線圖。
Original English
the memorandum of understanding >> which was the I sat here with JD Vance and he told me that they were about to sign an agreement with Iran to ultimately end the war and they had that agreement. >> Yeah. >> JD told me that it was about to be signed. Couple weeks later here we are. They're back to bombing each other. >> Yeah. There's really two big issues with this Stephen with the memorandum of understanding. Um, I do believe that uh uh Vice President Vance sincerely thought it was going to uh had a good chance of ending the war. Uh, but there's a big problem here, Stephen, which is when you listen to Vice President Vance, he approached this as a business deal. So, he kept talking about all the benefits that were going to come to Iran if they performed a fee for service. We want the straight open and we're going to offer you money in different ways if you will open the straight. Well, this is just a fundamental misunderstanding of international politics. This may work great in real estate. I'm not saying it doesn't, but in a major war like this, what's at stake is the balance of power. The balance of power. Now, I want to explain that before the war, before the war started, there was a balance of power where America was ascended. Israel was the rising power and Iran was actually the declining power in the region. What happened almost within again two weeks of the war starting is the balance of power was shifting dramatically when Iran became in control of form. This represents tremendous power in the future. that wealth, all of the potential that uh even though it hadn't been realized yet, equates to not just money to put in coffers, but it equates to military power. It equates to the ability to influence other states in the region to build a sphere of influence. This is power in terms of major power politics that was shifting here. And so with thou as uh you look at thou JD Vance appears we could just look at it he appears to have thought this was a business deal. So he appears to have thought we're going to hold up the promise of say $300 billion it will eventually fall on you if you will just to agree to do what we want and behave. Those aren't the clauses that matter to Iran. The clauses that mattered to Iran were the clauses which directly relate to the balance of power in solidifying Iran uh its control of Hormuz and essentially thisou is fundamentally a road map to Iran becoming the regional hegemon.
Speaker C: 霸權是什麼意思?
Original English
Hegimon what does that mean? >> The most dominant state in the Persian Gulf in the Middle East. Wait, so you're saying that this
协议的签署与关键条款分析
Speaker A: 他们会使中东成为最主要的国家吗?
Original English
Absolutely.
Speaker B: 那为什么他们不会在心跳之中就签署它呢?
Original English
They did. They did. Iran sign. In fact, most of these points were exactly the points that President Trump said he would never sign in April when Iran presented the initial 14-point plan in April. And the key at war then? Well, well, let me just explain the key the key things that happened here is that number one, notice in article five, it says that Iran will make the arrangements uh with Hormuz, that is the ships with Hormuz. And it will not charge for 60 days. It doesn't say will never charge. It says only 60 days. So, think about that. That this is already written into the agreement that President Trump is signing. And then if you say, well, what's going to happen down the road? It's going to be Iran and Oman who are going to determine the future fees. There's no mention here of the United States. There's no clause to even let the United States wiggle itself in. This is a perfectly clearly written clause. And this is basically gives Iran control of the straight of Hormuz and also of the the discretion to set the fees for as far as I can see with no constraint whatsoever.
Speaker A: 我们如何知道这是实际的文件?
Original English
How do we know that this is the actual document?
Speaker B: 因为伊朗政府和白宫都提出了完全相同的文档,逐字逐句的。所以我们可以真正地逐字逐句地进行比较。所以这就是特朗普总统签署的文件。没有问题说我们有更早的草案。现在,有一些早期的草案被彭博社泄露了。这不是这个。这是最终版。但让我再深入一点,史蒂夫。所以,我们在这里谈论的是伊朗的战略基础。请记住,控制霍尔木兹意味着控制世界石油的20%。那是一个巨大的财富和未来的战略力量可以建立的基础。没有限制说你不能把所有东西都花在导弹上,其他任何东西上。但在这里,以黎巴嫩为第一个条款。所以这里,
Speaker A: 所以当你提到条款时,这份文件包含10个,是10个吗?14个?
Original English
So, when you say article, this document contains 10, is it 10? 14?
Speaker B: 14个不同的条款。当你提到14个不同的条款,并且有三个是真正关键的行动点,那么这个3000亿美元的承诺就是目前为止,你知道,这就像把一些呃有趣的钱留给伊朗人。这些是短期内的事情,因为现在正在发生。
Original English
And when you say 14 different points and there are three points that are really the critical action points that matter here. this promise of $300 billion dollars down the road, this is so far, you know, this is like holding out um uh funny money to the Iranians. These are the things that are actually short-term because this is happening now.
Speaker A: 所以,第一点,你想回到那个,史蒂芬,因为我想解释的是伊朗的战略基础。
Original English
So, point one, you're saying point one I want to come back to, Stephen, because I want to explain this is Iran's strategic base.
Speaker B: 第五点,第五点。但是要成为该地区的主导力量,你需要的不只是一个战略基础。你需要的是一个影响范围。你想要在这里有一个影响范围。我能把它放下来吗?是这样吗?
Original English
Point number five, point number five. But what happens to become the dominant power in the region? You need more than a strategic base. You want a sphere of influence. You want a sphere of influence here. And can I just can we so I'll hold this up here. Is that
Speaker A: 是的,那很好。第五点是控制霍尔木兹航道。但许多不同的国家,包括沙特阿拉伯,你们已经开始建立管道来绕过霍尔木兹航道了。过去有计划做这件事好几年了。当时太贵了。但几乎立刻就开始做了。所以沙特阿拉伯从三月中旬开始就通过一条已经建好但尚未使用的管道,每天向红海输送四到五百万桶石油。那里有一个叫福吉拉的小区域,那里的阿联酋有一条管道,每天近200万桶。所以每天有2000万桶石油通过霍尔木兹,几乎立刻就有700万桶被绕过了。然后还有伊拉克可能会修建一些管道的讨论。这里可能还有其他穿过叙利亚的管道。那么如果你是伊朗人,现在控制了这一点。但请注意,从这个角度看,这是一个正在衰退的资产。如果你只控制霍尔木兹航道五年内,很有可能你的力量就会被削弱。你想要做的是想要一个影响范围。所以伊朗开始谈论的是他们的安全抵抗带,他们想要控制的区域是从地中海到红海再到海湾。这是革命卫队的领导人。为什么你要这样做?因为你想阻止所有绕过霍尔木兹的尝试。而且它们已经在发生了。
Original English
But many of the different countries including Saudi Arabia. You have already started to have pipelines to bypass the straight of hormones. There were plans to do this for years. They were too expensive. But almost immediately uh they started to do that. So the Saud Saudi Arabia started to put out four to five million barrels of oil a day starting in mid-March uh into the Red Sea on a pipeline that had already been built and hadn't been used. There's a a little area here called Fujyra which is where the UAE had a pipeline that's almost 2 million barrels a day. So 20 million barrels a day were going through Hormuz almost immediately 7 million were being bypassed. Then there's all this discussion that Iraq might build some pipelines. There might be other pipelines here going through Syria. So what if you're Iran, you now control this. But notice it's a declining asset that way. If you only control Hormuz within 5 years, good chance your power is going to be whittled away. What you want to do is you want a sphere of influence. So what Iran started to talk about is their security resistance belt where they wanted to control and they said from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea to the Gulf. This was the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard. And why would you do that? Because you want to prevent all of those bypasses to Hormuz. And they're already happening.
Speaker B: 关键的一点在哪里?你没有。你已经把胡塞武装控制住了。你在这里有真主党。但你想确保胡塞武装在这里相当安全,对吧?我们曾在2025年5月与沙特人打过仗,试图让他们撤回红海的临时关闭。我们基本上输了。[笑声]嗯,所以我们打不过他们。但那个大问题是黎巴嫩。我的观点是,他们并不太爱真主党。当然,他们与真主党的意识形态关系已经有几十年的长期关系了。这有一些好的原因,但还有一些其他的权力原因被忽略了,那就是你希望真主党在这里拥有无人机。所以如果有一条管道从这里通过叙利亚出来,如果你有一些其他管道是从这里出来的,你就有了可以充当你的胡塞武装的真主党。他们实际上可以攻击运输船只。所以现在你有了伊朗。你是一个大国。你是该地区的主导力量。你不仅仅控制这个地区和霍尔木兹航道,还有伊朗本身。你有一个弧线,一个安全弧线在这里,它是一个影响范围,但它是一个操作层面的影响范围。这不仅仅是一张纸或可以谈论的东西。这是保证你的东西。你控制所有这些石油,无论是来自波斯湾的石油通过霍尔木兹出来,还是通过叙利亚出来,还是通过红海出来。这就是第一条条款的内容。
Original English
And where's the key one? You don't. You already have the Houthies down here. You have Hezbollah here. But you want to make sure the Houthies are pretty secure right here. It was So just again for the people that can't see. Yeah. So you're saying the Houthies are pretty secure where the Houthies are pretty secure down here in Yemen. They've been fighting uh with the Saudis for quite some time. They've held their own. Uh we fought a war with the uh the Houthies in May 2025 to try to get them to uh pull back from a temporary shutdown of the Red Sea. And we lost essentially. [laughter] Um so we couldn't beat them. But the big one that was at issue was uh Lebanon. And it's and my point is it's not so much that they love Hezbollah. They do of course they've had long time uh decades of relationships with Hezbollah ideologically. There's there uh there's good reasons for that, but there's something else that's a power reason that's being ignored uh here, which is you want Hezbollah to have drones right here in Lebanon. So if there's a pipeline that comes out here through Syria, if you've got some other pipelines that are coming out here, you've got Hezbollah here that can act as your Houthies. They can actually attack the shipping. So now you have a you're you're Iran. You're a major power. You're the dominant power in the region. You don't just control this area here and the straight of >> the straight of Formuz and Iran itself. You have an arc, a security arc here that in uh is a sphere of influence, but it's an operational sphere of influence. This is not just a piece of paper or something to talk about. This is what's guaranteeing you. You control all of that oil whether it the oil from the Persian Gulf comes out through Hormuz, whether it comes out through Syria or whether it comes out through the Red Sea. And that's what article one is about.
Speaker A: 所以,你怎么知道?我不是在听副总统万斯说话,我听过你的采访和其他采访,他是个超级聪明的家伙。好吧,这不是那种问题。好吧。但是他把它看作是一笔商业交易。我们想要霍尔木兹航道开放。这需要付出什么代价?他们并没有考虑这一点。他们关注的是他们想成为一个区域霸主。这是他们的路线图,这就是为什么他们坚持那些目标。但他们签署了这份文件,但战争仍然爆发了,因为发生了什么呢?特朗普总统签署了这份文件。他为它持有了一天。他解释说他签署这份文件的原因是因为就在四周前,世界将会在四周内耗尽石油,而他想开放霍尔木兹航道。所以特朗普总统认为这是尝试开放霍尔木兹航道的一种方式。但特朗普总统签署文件后立即发生了什么?从接下来的48小时开始,特朗普总统和他的政府就开始破坏这份文件,违反了那份文件的条款。所以第一要务是鲁比奥部长在黎巴嫩建立了一个框架协议,这基本上将以色列的军事存在锁定在能看到的地方。而文档第一条说美国将保证黎巴嫩的领土完整,每个人[清嗓子]都会意识到这意味着以色列正在侵犯黎巴嫩的领土完整。它不是确保它。所以那意味着以色列不能被锁在那里,同时仍然遵守第一条。所以框架协议立即违反了第一条。第二件事发生,这发生在框架协议开始鼓励通过霍尔木兹航道,通过南部的航道时不久。有三条路线穿过霍尔木兹航道。以前存在的那条中心路线在战争之前是主要路线,现在那里[TRANSCRIPT_CHUNK_END]
Original English
So how come that's what I'm saying is not when I listen to Vice President Vance, which I've listened to your interview and other interviews, a super smart guy. Okay, this is not a matter of that. Okay. Uh but he's thinking of it as a business deal. We want Hormuz open. what's it going to take to pay? They're not looking at that. They're looking at they want to be a regional hegemon. This is their roadmap and that's why they stuck to those goals. But they signed this document, but then the war has kicked off anyway again because what happened is President Trump signed the document. He owned the document for it for a day. He explained that he signed the document because this was literally four weeks ago because the world was going to run out of oil in four weeks and he wanted to open Hormuz. So, President Trump saw this as a way to try to uh open hormuse. But what happened immediately after President Trump signed the document, literally starting in the next 48 hours is uh President Trump started to and his administration started to undermine the document, violate the clauses in that document. So issue number one was Secretary Rubio establishing a framework accord agreement in Lebanon which essentially would lock in Israel's military presence in Lebanon as far as the eye could see. Whereas article one in the document says that uh the United States would guarantee the territorial integrity of Lebanon which everybody [clears throat] would realize would mean Israel is is violating the territorial integrity of Lebanon. It's not ensuring it. So that would mean Israel can't be locked in there and still be faithful to article one. So the framework agreement immediately violates article one. The second thing that happened and this happened shortly after the framework accord started to encourage uh passage through the straight of formos uh through the southern uh there's three routes through the straight of hormos. The central route which used to be in existence the main route before the war now that's where
航道控制与地缘政治的博弈
Speaker A: 80座油井,所以现在没人使用中央航道了。他们要么是经过南航道,也就是靠近阿曼的那条航道;要么是经过伊朗通道,那这条航道当然离伊朗海岸很近。而特朗普总统所做的就是他开始鼓励这些船绕过或通过霍尔木兹的南航道,但却在没有与伊朗协调的情况下做这件事,甚至经常关闭他们的转播器。事实上,特朗普总统曾吹嘘这是他绕过伊朗对直航控制的一种秘密方式。他在真社交媒体上多次发帖吹嘘这一点。这直接违反了第五条。
Original English
Speaker A: 80 mines are so nobody's using the centra. They're either passing through the southern avenue, which is the one close to uh Oman, or they're passing through the Iranian passage, which is of course near the coast of Iran. And what President Trump did is he started to encourage this passageway ships to um bypass or pass through Hormuz on the southern passageway, but with no coordination with Iran, with no um even um often with their transponders turned off. In fact, President Trump was bragging about this as his secret way to sort of uh bypass Iran's control of the straight of form. He literally bragged about this on multiple posts on true social. Well, that directly uh contravenes article 5.
Speaker A: 第三件事是,如果你看看我们还没有看第11条,但如果我们看第11条,你会看到伊朗由于拥有一些被美国没收并保存了几十年的冻结资产,以及有一句特定的句子赋予伊朗决定这笔钱将如何以及特朗普总统所说的他们可以拥有他们的钱,但前提是他们必须把钱给农民,美国的农民购买美式谷物。这是第三个违规点。所以这里发生了什么?斯蒂芬,特朗普拥有它,他至少忠诚了一天甚至两天,这代表了美国的一个战略性失败,他甚至非常清楚和直白地解释了为什么他接受了这次战略性失败。我称之为承认失败。他承认失败了一两天,但随后他几乎立即试图扭转这种损失,斯蒂芬。这就是我们现在处于战争状态的原因。因为在这个时期发生的重大误判是假设如果特朗普总统不重启战争,战争就会结束。错的什么?谁开始打仗了?谁开始向直航射击船只?是伊朗人。他们为什么这么做?因为我们违反了他们的控制权对霍尔木兹直航的控制。这意味着阻止伊朗成为该地区的强国、崛起中的地区强国,最终是区域霸主。所以这就是他们违规的原因。这与其说是法律上的理解,不如说是大国政治。斯蒂芬,伊朗想要成为该地区的霸主国家。美国不希望伊朗成为该地区的霸主国家。这才是这场战争自三月第一周以来一直围绕着的核心问题,现在已经过去了五个月,我们仍然停留在那个点上。这里应该有一个按钮,如果上面写着订阅,你就已经订阅了。如果写着关注者,那意味着你还没有。如果你没有订阅,请帮个忙,点击一下那个按钮?这能让更多人看到。根据算法,你是一个观看我们节目的观众,但你还没有点击那个按钮。非常感谢。
Original English
Speaker A: Stephen. And that's how we're back at war. Because the big miscalculation that happened in this period was assuming that if President Trump didn't restart the war, the war would be over. The mis what? Who started the war? Who started to shoot the ships in the straight of Formos? It was the Iranians. Why did they do that? Because we were violating their control of the straight of Hormuz. And that means preventing Iran from becoming the regional power, the rising regional power, ultimately the regional hegeimon. So this is why they violated. It wasn't so much a legal understanding. This is great power politics. Stephen, Iran wants to be the dominant state in the region. The United States does not want Iran to be the dominant state in the region. That has what is what this war has been about since the first week in March and now it's 5 months later and we're still at that point. There should be a button just down below here and if it says subscribed, you're already subscribed. If it says subscriber, that means you're not yet. And if you're not subscribed, please could you do us a favor and hit that button? It helps the show more than you know. And according to the algorithm, you're someone that watches our show, but you haven't yet hit that button. Thank you so much.
Speaker B: 伊朗之前是否曾要求人们经过霍尔木兹直航?
Original English
Speaker B: Did Iran charge people to go through the straight of Hormuse before this?
Speaker A: 没有,从来没有。他们控制过直航吗?在战争开始之前,完全没有。在2月28日之前,伊朗并没有控制霍尔木兹直航。伊朗所做的,是从生存转向了野心。所以伊朗看到了一个机会,通过轰炸,因为美国没有军事力量,我们甚至没有海军。根本没有任何手段来抵消伊朗对霍尔木兹直航的控制。伊朗将此视为一个机会,这个机会是夺取权力。因此,可以假设这场战争实际上可能加强了伊朗,因为现在它拥有以前没有的全球能源控制权。
Original English
Speaker A: No, never did. Did they control the straight of horses at all? Well, before uh the war started, not at all. Before the before February 28, Iran did not control the straight of hormones. What Iran did is it moved from survival to ambition. So Iran saw there was an opportunity with the bombing uh because the United States had no mil we didn't even have our navy here. There was no means whatsoever uh to sort of offset this this uh Iran's uh control of the straight of hormoons. Nothing at all. Iran took this as an opportunity and the opportunity was to seize power. So is it fair to hypothesize that actually this war might have strengthened Iran because now it has this control over energy on a global basis that it didn't have before.
Speaker B: 毫无疑问。斯蒂芬,我不是带着任何喜悦说这话的。到这一点上,伊朗比战争开始于2月28日之前更强大,这一点真的没有疑问。这是因为它控制着霍尔木兹海峡,这意味着它可以威胁任何经过霍尔木兹海峡的船只。这已经反复证明了无数次。即使船关闭了他们的转播器,它们仍然能够威胁那些在通过时穿行的船只。每当一艘船试图跑过这个障碍时,它就会遇到无人机、地雷,它会遇到基本上是伊朗的屏障,这就是伊朗的力量。
Original English
Speaker B: Without a doubt. Without a doubt, Stephen. I don't say this with any happiness. There's really no question at this point that Iran is stronger today than it was before the war started on February 28th. And that's because it controls uh the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that it can threaten at will virtually any ship that goes through the Straight of Hormuz. It's demonstrated this over and over and over again. Even when the ships turn off their transponders, they are still able to threaten ships as they go through. And every time a ship tries to run the gauntlet, they run into a drone, a mine, they run into basically Iran's barrier, and that is Iran's power.
Speaker C: 有一条本周病毒式传播的推文是关于这个的。我将在这里阅读这条推文。它说:“我很困惑。美国拥有世界上最强大的军事力量。我们已经对伊朗轰炸了四个月。特朗普说他们的空军、海军和几乎所有的导弹能力都被摧毁了。那么,伊朗现在仍然有能力攻击美国的基地吗?因为他们只需要一小部分无人机库来造成那种损害,以及用于造成那种损害的导弹库。伊朗以数千架进入这场战争,我们认为数万架无人机、弹道导弹、反舰导弹——也就是低空滑翔巡航导弹。即使我们摧毁了他们很大一部分导弹,他们仍然有很多剩余的可以攻击这些目标,因为他们正在进行饱和攻击。他们本质上是在进行蜂群攻击。他们正在饱和我们的防御能力,而且无人机和导弹要穿过足够多的东西来造成损害,以至于我们几乎无法使用它们,如果不是根本无法使用。”
Original English
Speaker C: There was a tweet that went viral this week um about this. I'm going to read the tweet here. It says, "I'm confused. The US has the most powerful military on Earth. We've bombed the hell out of Iran for 4 months. Trump says their air force, navy, and nearly all of their missile capabilities are destroyed. So, how is Iran still capable of hitting US bases right now? Because only a small fraction of its drone arsenal is necessary uh and missile arsenal in order to inflict that damage. Iran entered this war with thousands, we think tens of thousands of drones, missile uh ballistic missiles, anti-shipping missiles, which are lower sea skimming cruise missiles. Um, and even though we have destroyed large fractions of their uh of their missiles, they have plenty left over to hit these uh these targets because they're doing saturation attacks. They're essentially doing swarms. They're saturating our uh our defensive capability and the the drones and missiles to get through plenty enough to damage it to the point we can barely use it if if if at all."
Speaker A: 所以,他们目前用来对霍尔木兹海峡和美国基地进行攻击的主要还是无人机吗?三月份是一次组合。到三月中旬,主要是中程弹道导弹,然后是无人机。直到最近,主要还是无人机,除了以色列被攻击的时候。它非常依赖弹道导弹。但你现在看到的是上周开始出现使用弹道导弹。你看到了巡航导弹的使用。这些就是这里的低空滑翔导弹,它们正在对多个目标使用。所以伊朗拥有的全部弹药库,其全部的弹药范围,看起来是完全在那里,装得满满的,非常充足,而且他们没有显示出弹药耗尽的迹象。如果有人弹药快用完了,那可能是美国拦截器快用完了来击落东西了。但我们不知道这是事实。我认为你看到的是伊朗在部署其导弹方面非常聪明。特朗普说他们没有海军。它被摧毁了。他们没有空军。它也被摧毁了。他们没有空中侦察能力。他们的雷达被摧毁了。几乎所有东西都被摧毁了。他曾在2026年5月的Truth Social上说,如果一切都被摧毁了……
Original English
Speaker A: So is it is it mainly drones that they're using at the moment to conduct these attacks on the straight of Hammuz and on US bases? Uh, it's been a combination in the m in March. It was mostly intermediate range ballistic missiles and then drones since about the middle of March. Um until just quite recently, it's mostly been drones except for Israel when Israel's been attacked. It's it's been very heavily with ballistic missiles. Uh, but what you're seeing now that's just in the last week is you're starting to see the use of ballistic missiles. You're seeing the use of cruise missiles. These are these sea skimming missiles here and they're being used in against multiple targets. So the full arsenal that Iran has the full range of the arsenal it appears to be fully there full stocked very well and they're showing no signs of running out of ammo. If anybody's running out of ammo, it might be America running out of interceptors to shoot things down. Um, but we don't know that as a fact. And I think that what you're seeing is Iran has been highly intelligent intelligent about how it has deployed its its missiles. Trump said they have no navy. It's been knocked out. They have no air force that's been knocked out. They have no air detection that's been knocked out. Their radar has been knocked out. And just about everything's been knocked out. Virtually everything they have has been knocked out. He said that on Truth Social in May 2026. If everything has been knocked out,
Speaker B: 嗯。那么为什么霍尔木兹直航没有安全通道?为什么这个周末我们又看到了更多美国人在伊朗袭击中悲惨死亡?
Original English
Speaker B: Mhm. then how come there's no safe passage through the Straight of Hormoose? How come this weekend we saw more Americans tragically die um because of Iranian attacks?
Speaker A: 因为他们留下的东西,我们无法摧毁,而且有足够的火力造成损害。这是根本问题。我们消灭了容易打掉的东西,但他们不需要它来控制海峡和保持海峡,并开始针对更激进的压力进行防御。底线是,如果不是不可能,就很难消除那种能力。如果我们能立刻做到,我们会毫不犹豫地做到的。
Original English
Speaker A: Because what they have left we can't knock out and is plenty to do the damage. That's the fundamental problem. We took out the easy stuff to hit. they didn't need it in order to seize control of hormones and keep hormones and start to defend themselves against uh more aggressive pressure. And the bottom line is that it's it's very difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate that capability. We would do it in a heartbeat if we could right away.
Speaker B: 给我用最简单的术语解释一下为什么消除那种能力如此困难。你知道,我正在看这张图,它显示了一个无人机相对于另一个物体的尺寸。所以我想有两个问题:他们把这些藏在哪里?以及制造其中一个无人机有多容易?所以他们把那些无人机藏在每个地方,斯蒂芬。好吧。
Original English
Speaker B: Explain to me in just simple terms why it's so difficult to remove that capability. You know, I was looking at this picture here which shows the size of a drone relative to another object. So, I guess there was two questions which is like where do they hide these and how easy it is is it to make one of these drones? So, they hide those drones, Stephen, everywhere. Okay. They can they're in drone caverns. They're in warehouses. They're everywhere. They could be. So that drone, just to kind of give you a sense here, would easily fit in this room. But the reason this is so difficult is notice how small that is here. That that drone compared to
威胁的规模与三维问题
Speaker A: scale of where it could be. And this is what I really want to uh show you because this is I think the hardest part to explain to people as I'm talking in whatever format I'm talking is it's the scale of eliminating the drone and missile threat is much bigger than people realize because they're hearing measurements well we've destroyed x% and y% and that's why you're getting the question but if you look at this map this is what they where these drones these shah Heeds 136 could literally be anywhere in this radius, 500 mile area. And notice how huge this area is. This area, this area like this is bigger than California. It's one and a half times the size of California.
Original English
Speaker A: scale of where it could be. And this is what I really want to uh show you because this is I think the hardest part to explain to people as I'm talking in whatever format I'm talking is it's the scale of eliminating the drone and missile threat is much bigger than people realize because they're hearing measurements well we've destroyed x% and y% and that's why you're getting the question but if you look at this map this is what they where these drones these shah Heeds 136 could literally be anywhere in this radius, 500 mile area. And notice how huge this area is. This area, this area like this is bigger than California. It's one and a half times the size of California.
Speaker B: So I guess it's like trying to find a truck in California.
Original English
Speaker B: So I guess it's like trying to find a truck in California.
Speaker A: It's like trying to find a truck in California. These little things here are the Shahed drones. Yeah.
Original English
Speaker A: It's like trying to find a truck in California. These little things here are the Shahed drones. Yeah.
Speaker B: Okay. And what we're doing in this area, which is mountainous. So, this is why we have a a threedimensional, it's not just a two-dimensional problem. It's a threedimensional problem.
Original English
Speaker B: Okay. And what we're doing in this area, which is mountainous. So, this is why we have a a threedimensional, it's not just a two-dimensional problem. It's a threedimensional problem.
Speaker A: We'll show some of these uh visuals on screen now just to show what the train where they're hiding these drones might be like. They could be anywhere in these mountains. There's all kinds. And if we kind of imagine this as a visual. So this is the general problem here we have which is just this stuff could be anywhere. And now these are the drones and this is the terrain that the drones are going to hide in. And notice I've just sprinkled some here. But now I'm going to cover these up with more terrain. And notice you can't see those drones anymore. And now I'm going to put in some more drones somewhere else. And now we're going to put another layer in. And this is this is again it's the three-dimensional part of the problem. Meaning hard to find from the air. Now if I get my people out and I start going in now, I could start to dig them out. But let's just keep doing this for a while. So now I'm putting in another say 20 drones. And I'm going to cover it yet again. And then I'm going to put in uh another set of drones. And I'm covering it yet again.
Original English
Speaker A: We'll show some of these uh visuals on screen now just to show what the train where they're hiding these drones might be like. They could be anywhere in these mountains. There's all kinds. And if we kind of imagine this as a visual. So this is the general problem here we have which is just this stuff could be anywhere. And now these are the drones and this is the terrain that the drones are going to hide in. And notice I've just sprinkled some here. But now I'm going to cover these up with more terrain. And notice you can't see those drones anymore. And now I'm going to put in some more drones somewhere else. And now we're going to put another layer in. And this is this is again it's the three-dimensional part of the problem. Meaning hard to find from the air. Now if I get my people out and I start going in now, I could start to dig them out. But let's just keep doing this for a while. So now I'm putting in another say 20 drones. And I'm going to cover it yet again. And then I'm going to put in uh another set of drones. And I'm covering it yet again.
Speaker B: I guess you could put all the drones in there and you you would still be able to cover them.
Original English
Speaker B: I guess you could put all the drones in there and you you would still be able to cover them.
Speaker A: You would. Yes. But you wouldn't do it in You would do it in layers. So they're going to make it so that if you find one, you're going to have to work really hard. You have to get them drone by drone by drone or at least in clusters of them.
Original English
Speaker A: You would. Yes. But you wouldn't do it in You would do it in layers. So they're going to make it so that if you find one, you're going to have to work really hard. You have to get them drone by drone by drone or at least in clusters of them.
Speaker B: I guess also an important point of context is they're also making new ones this whole time.
Original English
Speaker B: I guess also an important point of context is they're also making new ones this whole time.
Speaker A: Exactly. So our estimates that we have leaked from the Pentagon are in April. That's months ago. these drones, they're they were making u 55,000 a year and giving them to Russia. So just think about that. That's thousands every single month. Why haven't they made uh another 5 or 10,000 drones since April? If you want this to open, so let me just of
Original English
Speaker A: Exactly. So our estimates that we have leaked from the Pentagon are in April. That's months ago. these drones, they're they were making u 55,000 a year and giving them to Russia. So just think about that. That's thousands every single month. Why haven't they made uh another 5 or 10,000 drones since April? If you want this to open, so let me just of
Speaker B: the straight of form. So now let me just explain. So this is our problem. If you want the straight of Formoose to open, it's not good enough to say, "Oh, look. I've found like dozens or hundreds of these drones." You've got to persuade the shipping companies that their ships are safe. They don't obey orders from the Pentagon. You can't order the shippers to go through
Original English
Speaker B: the straight of form. So now let me just explain. So this is our problem. If you want the straight of Formoose to open, it's not good enough to say, "Oh, look. I've found like dozens or hundreds of these drones." You've got to persuade the shipping companies that their ships are safe. They don't obey orders from the Pentagon. You can't order the shippers to go through
Speaker A: because the ships are expensive.
Original English
Speaker A: because the ships are expensive.
Speaker B: The ships are expensive and the crews don't want to Oh, in the many millions. millions and millions of dollars. I don't know the exact amount of these uh tankers, but each tanker will carry between 700,000 and over a million barrels of oil. And so they have quite a just and you can do the math right there to see how much each ship is worth carrying that much uh uh that much oil.
Original English
Speaker B: The ships are expensive and the crews don't want to Oh, in the many millions. millions and millions of dollars. I don't know the exact amount of these uh tankers, but each tanker will carry between 700,000 and over a million barrels of oil. And so they have quite a just and you can do the math right there to see how much each ship is worth carrying that much uh uh that much oil.
Speaker A: I was looking at the cost here. It says when you combine a brand new vessel with a full tank of oil, a sh single tank crossing the straight of Hamuz is a floating asset worth 300 million.
Original English
Speaker A: I was looking at the cost here. It says when you combine a brand new vessel with a full tank of oil, a sh single tank crossing the straight of Hamuz is a floating asset worth 300 million.
Speaker B: Oh wow. See, I didn't that I learned I [clears throat] learned something from you every time. Um, and that's not even the lives on board, which again are going to cause an insurance problem, but also no one wants to people to die. Well, and they don't want to die. So, you're going to have mutants. They're not going to. So, this is why you're seeing more ships leaving than you're seeing ships come in. And the ships that are coming in are very heavily coming to Iran's ports. That's one of the reasons President Trump put the blockade back on. It's because what happened here is theou this whole idea is not opening up the straight of hormones. It's not preventing what's going to come in the next few weeks maybe months which is the world economic crisis. We are knocking on the door of what President Trump told us he was trying to avoid which is the world literally running out of oil. And just today before we started the Houthis which big ally of Iran. So just to come back here and and reshow the map. Uh remember I said that once uh the straight of Hormuz became shut down, there was 2 million of barrels coming out every day through um for the UAE coming out through Fyra and then four to 5 million uh coming out from Saudi Arabian oil going out to the Red Sea. Uh and this is the the port there at the Red Sea. Well, the Houthies have just shut this down literally today. Oh, really?
Original English
Speaker B: Oh wow. See, I didn't that I learned I [clears throat] learned something from you every time. Um, and that's not even the lives on board, which again are going to cause an insurance problem, but also no one wants to people to die. Well, and they don't want to die. So, you're going to have mutants. They're not going to. So, this is why you're seeing more ships leaving than you're seeing ships come in. And the ships that are coming in are very heavily coming to Iran's ports. That's one of the reasons President Trump put the blockade back on. It's because what happened here is theou this whole idea is not opening up the straight of hormones. It's not preventing what's going to come in the next few weeks maybe months which is the world economic crisis. We are knocking on the door of what President Trump told us he was trying to avoid which is the world literally running out of oil. And just today before we started the Houthis which big ally of Iran. So just to come back here and and reshow the map. Uh remember I said that once uh the straight of Hormuz became shut down, there was 2 million of barrels coming out every day through um for the UAE coming out through Fyra and then four to 5 million uh coming out from Saudi Arabian oil going out to the Red Sea. Uh and this is the the port there at the Red Sea. Well, the Houthies have just shut this down literally today. Oh, really?
Speaker A: Literally before we came on, uh happened about 6 hours ago. This has been escalating for several weeks. Iran's been asking for this. This is part of the general escalation that we're seeing. Okay. So, we've got the Straight of Hermoose closed. We've got the Houthis closing, the Red Sea. So, there's no oil flowing through there.
Original English
Speaker A: Literally before we came on, uh happened about 6 hours ago. This has been escalating for several weeks. Iran's been asking for this. This is part of the general escalation that we're seeing. Okay. So, we've got the Straight of Hermoose closed. We've got the Houthis closing, the Red Sea. So, there's no oil flowing through there.
Speaker B: Yeah. So, are we on the verge of an economic crisis if things don't change quickly?
Original English
Speaker B: Yeah. So, are we on the verge of an economic crisis if things don't change quickly?
Speaker A: Yes. Yes. This is a this is literally the nightmare scenario that we've been worrying about and the reason is is this. Go back and let's let's think about this from the 20 million barrels of oil that was going through the straight of Hormuz. So when Iran gained control of the straight of Hormuz, what happened immediately is the uh Saudi Arabia and the UEE started to bypass Hormuz with 7 million barrels a day. So that means only 13 million at issue, right? That's a little that's helpful. The next is the strategic petroleum reserve the United States and we started to release about five or six million barrels a week through the through the strategic oil
Original English
Speaker A: Yes. Yes. This is a this is literally the nightmare scenario that we've been worrying about and the reason is is this. Go back and let's let's think about this from the 20 million barrels of oil that was going through the straight of Hormuz. So when Iran gained control of the straight of Hormuz, what happened immediately is the uh Saudi Arabia and the UEE started to bypass Hormuz with 7 million barrels a day. So that means only 13 million at issue, right? That's a little that's helpful. The next is the strategic petroleum reserve the United States and we started to release about five or six million barrels a week through the through the strategic oil
Speaker B: when uh we started to do this. It's right around the middle of March. I can't remember the exact date, but notice that you put a big dent in that. And so that's one of the reasons the oil markets did not go crazy right away.
Original English
Speaker B: when uh we started to do this. It's right around the middle of March. I can't remember the exact date, but notice that you put a big dent in that. And so that's one of the reasons the oil markets did not go crazy right away.
Speaker A: So I've got some data here. Then it says um President Trump authorized the emergency release of 172 million barrels of oil from the strategic reserve designed to be pumped out over roughly 120 days. This wasn't just a US issue or the US acting alone. The US draw down was part of a massive coordinated effort by 32 member nations of the international energy agency who collectively agreed to release 400 million barrels from their emergency stockpiles. Because these massive releases um were done to offset the Hormuz blockade, the US strategic reserve has been heavily depleted. And as of July 2026, the reserve has dropped down to roughly 300 million barrels, which marks the lowest level the reserve has since 1983, a more than 40year low.
Original English
Speaker A: So I've got some data here. Then it says um President Trump authorized the emergency release of 172 million barrels of oil from the strategic reserve designed to be pumped out over roughly 120 days. This wasn't just a US issue or the US acting alone. The US draw down was part of a massive coordinated effort by 32 member nations of the international energy agency who collectively agreed to release 400 million barrels from their emergency stockpiles. Because these massive releases um were done to offset the Hormuz blockade, the US strategic reserve has been heavily depleted. And as of July 2026, the reserve has dropped down to roughly 300 million barrels, which marks the lowest level the reserve has since 1983, a more than 40year low.
Speaker B: They're being depleted. Once you spend your reserve, you don't get it refilled. And that's what I think President Trump was talking about when he said we're about to run out of oil in four weeks. That was exactly the date because we've just run to the date of uh that that quote what you just read is we're coming to about the 120th day. And so what that means is all of that cushion that we had in the system to protect the g the price of gas already went up. Now you have even more risk. And then on top of that, Stephen, we have another set of problems besides the oil itself, which is refining capacity in the world. So we we don't uh put crude oil in our cars. We put gasoline in our cars, diesel as well. Well, how do you get the gas and the diesel? You refine the crude. So that means the refineries need to work. Well, where are much of the world's
Original English
Speaker B: They're being depleted. Once you spend your reserve, you don't get it refilled. And that's what I think President Trump was talking about when he said we're about to run out of oil in four weeks. That was exactly the date because we've just run to the date of uh that that quote what you just read is we're coming to about the 120th day. And so what that means is all of that cushion that we had in the system to protect the g the price of gas already went up. Now you have even more risk. And then on top of that, Stephen, we have another set of problems besides the oil itself, which is refining capacity in the world. So we we don't uh put crude oil in our cars. We put gasoline in our cars, diesel as well. Well, how do you get the gas and the diesel? You refine the crude. So that means the refineries need to work. Well, where are much of the world's
石油和地缘政治的交织
Speaker A: 炼油厂?在波斯湾。不仅仅是石油通过波斯湾。精炼产品,它们被称为馏分,它们也通过波斯湾。现在,这意味着你关闭了世界约25%或三分之一的炼油能力。现在,让我们把这与俄罗斯和乌克兰炸毁俄罗斯炼油厂的情况联系起来。所以,斯蒂芬,你得到的不仅仅是原油枯竭的问题,而是精炼能力现在受到了沉重的压力和限制,它可能会下降,你知道,40%,我不知道确切数字,但它处于那种顺序上,而你所看到的就是我认为特朗普总统在几个月前看到的,他想开放霍尔木兹海峡,但他也不想拥有L。特朗普总统的决定是,他宁愿冒着世界经济的风险也不愿意拥有L。承担损失。也许他会改变主意。
Original English
Speaker A: refineries? In the Persian Gulf. Not just oil comes through the Persian Gulf. Refined product, they're called distillates, they come through the Persian Gulf as well. Now, so that means you've shut down something like uh 25% or a third of the world's refining capacity. Now, let's marry this to what's happening with Russia and Ukraine's blasting Russia refineries in Russia. So what's happening Stephen is you are getting not just the decline of crude itself is about to run out but the refining capacity now has been heavily uh uh strained and and limited uh it might be down you know 40% I don't know the exact number but it's something on that order and what you're seeing then is what I think President Trump was seeing a month ago which is he wanted the straight of hormuz to open but He also didn't want to own the L. And what President Trump has decided is he'd rather take the risk with the world's economy than own the L. Own the loss. And maybe he'll change his mind.
Speaker B: 他宁愿冒着世界经济的风险也不愿意拥有L。那么在这种情况下,拥有L会是什么?
Original English
Speaker B: He'd rather take the risk with the world's economy than just own the L. So what would owning the L in this scenario?
Speaker A: 拥有L意味着伊朗可以履行第五条。所以如果我们回到第五条,就是控制海峡,就是以其条款控制海峡,但那将为所有这些海峡设定一个先例。是的。围绕世界,这正是如此,你不能有那种情况。
Original English
Speaker A: Owning the L would allow Iran to follow through with Article 5. So if we go back to article to control to control the strait to control the strait on its terms but they that would be set a pre presidents for all of these straits. Yes. Around the world that's exactly right and you can't have that.
Speaker B: 嗯,我们手上有这些选择,斯蒂芬。所以选择是,我们面临一个全球经济危机、可能衰退,或者更糟,还是让伊朗控制霍尔木兹海峡?
Original English
Speaker B: Well these are the choices we have Stephen. So so the choice is do we have um a global economic crisis possibly recession possibly worse or do we let Iran control the straight of foremost?
Speaker A: 这不是一个好的地方。嗯,那是我告诉你的分叉路口,是三阶段困境。所以,我们三月份就在那里。所以,斯蒂芬,只是为了向你的听众解释一下,因为他们正试图弄清楚我们是如何走到这里的?这就是20年建模真正显示出来的东西。我们会很快到达这个分叉路口。不会花几个月和几个月。它会立刻发生。特朗普总统一直在试图避免升级陷阱。这被称为升级陷阱,他一直在试图避免那个陷阱。他试图通过轰炸六周来避免它。他试图通过封锁来避免它。他试图签署...他让JD Vance提供金钱。而那些实际上都没有起作用。而他现在所处的位置仍然是在这个分叉路口。升级陷阱的困境。要么他拥有损失,这意味着你刚才说的所有内容都会变得为人所知,成为允许不只是海峡形成被控制,而是为其他国家和其他非国家行为者控制其咽喉要道设定先例的总统。或者我们物理上夺回来。我们要物理上夺回来吗?所以,我们会经历阶段,升级陷阱会立刻发生,在我们从这个点之后移动到石油周围。因为我认为我的听众可能不知道这个升级陷阱在历史上是可预测的,而且你已经谈论了很久,它也让我们能确切了解接下来会发生什么。嗯,当你只是说特朗普最近说美国将在4周内耗尽石油时,我感到非常震惊。所以我查看了一些研究,它说在6月G7峰会的近期新闻发布会上,特朗普总统就霍尔木兹海峡危机持续期间全球能源库存水平危险地低的问题做出了一个直言不讳的承认。他的直接引语是:“我们将在大约4周内耗尽储备。”你知道,世界各地都有储备,我们会变得非常、非常低。但我们会耗尽,那时你将无法获取它。那将是灾难性的。
Original English
Speaker A: So, we'll go through the stages and the escalation trap straight away after this after we move on from this point around oil because I think some of my audience might not know that this escalation trap is historically predictable and that you've been talking about this for a long time and it also allows us to understand exactly what happens next. Um, I was quite shocked when you just said that Trump said recently that the US would run out of oil within 4 weeks. So, I did I just looked down at some research here and it says that during a recent press conference at the G7 summit in June 2026, President Trump made a blunt admission about how dangerously low global energy oil stock piles have become due to the ongoing crisis in the straight of Hammoo. His direct quote was, "We run out of reserves at about 4 weeks." You know, there are reserves all over the world and we would run really, really low. But we would run out and there'll be a time when you wouldn't be able to get it. It would be bedum.
Speaker B: 是的。他为什么这么说?难道不是因为...
Original English
Speaker B: Yes. Why is he saying that? Isn't that because
Speaker A: 这不是因为这让他看起来很糟糕吗?它让他……我认为他是直言不讳地说明他签署协议的原因,即为了避免世界经济危机。然而,特朗普总统的问题在于,为了避免灾难性后果,他必须让伊朗控制霍尔木兹海峡,建立我正在解释的那个影响领域,而且在他发表那番言论后不到48小时,就破坏了本可以避免这种情况的东西。如果协议按字面意思实施,我们今天可能不会在这里谈论迫在眉睫的世界危机。我相信我们现在敲门的原因之一是特朗普总统急于开放霍尔木兹海峡。我认为他正在采取低风险高风险的军事选项。我认为他正在追求那些他很可能知道行不通的军事选项,但这是他打开霍尔木兹之前最好的机会。
Original English
Speaker A: It it makes him he's being I think forthright in why he signed thou which is to avoid that bedum the world economic crisis. However, the problem for President Trump is in order to avoid the bedum, he has to let Iran control the straight of Hormuz, establish that sphere of influence I was explaining and he almost immediately after he said that statement within 48 hours undermined thatou that would have avoided that. Had thou just been uh implemented as written, we may not be sitting here today talking about the impending world crisis. And I believe one of the reasons we're knocking on the door of more escalation right now is because President Trump is desperate to open the straight of foremost. I think he's taking lowrisk uh high risk military option mil. I think he's pursuing military options he likely knows are unlikely to work, but they're his best chance to open hormuz before the crisis literally hits.
Speaker B: 但还有另一个前一个,那就是中期选举。
Original English
Speaker B: But there's also another before, which is the midterm elections.
Speaker A: 是的。我是否认为这次中期选举将在三个月后举行?如果届时他的批准率很低,因为战争发生的事情,因为当美国人去加油给他们的车时,他们会注意到价格比平时高得多,这意味着那些在美国参选的中期选举中的美国人将投票给民主党,这意味着他会在国会输掉。所以他基本上需要确保美国人在三个月后是高兴的。他需要采取他能做到的最好的机会来实现这一点。
Original English
Speaker A: Yes. Am I right in thinking that this midterm election takes place in 3 months time and if his approval rating is low at that point because of what's going on with the war because when Americans go to the pump to fill up their cars they notice the prices are way high higher than usual that means those Americans in the election in the midterm elections will vote for the Democrats which means he will lose the Congress. So he basically needs to make sure Americans are happy in three months time. He he needs to take the best chance he can can to make that happen.
Speaker B: 好的。我认为这里发生的事情,斯蒂芬,他的引语,你刚才引用了他,我想是6月17日。
Original English
Speaker B: Okay. And I think that what happened here, Stephen, is he his quote, you just quoted him, I think it was June 17th.
Speaker A: 他说,在4周内这些储备就会耗尽,我们将走向那个灾难性的经济危机,而那已经发生了。他的四周后,我们就在那个轨迹上。那个轨迹没有改变。也许我们多买了一两周的时间,因为一些石油从波斯湾流出来了。不是那么多,但对于这里来说足够了几个星期。所以也许它不会在8月1日发生。也许会是8月15日或17日。但它会发生。这就是他所说的。现在我认为当它发生时,他将失去……有很大的机会共和党将在众议院和参议院失去更多席位。那将使他在他最后两年中成为最可悲的...
Original English
Speaker A: He's saying that within a month those reserves are going to run out and we're heading to that bedum that economic crisis and that is already happening. His s four weeks later, we're right on that trajectory. That trajectory has not changed. Maybe we've bought an extra week or two of time because some oil did get out from the from the Persian Gulf. Not that much, but enough for a few weeks here. So maybe it's it's going to now not fall on August 1st. Maybe it'll be August say 15th or 17th. But it will hit. It's And that's what he was. And now I think he's he sees when it hits he's going to lose uh there's a good chance that the Republicans will lose more seats in the House and in the Senate. That will make him the lamest of lame ducks for his last two years. Uh it may not be that he would be removed from office. That's probably not going to happen. But it could be that he will be impeached again. He will be tied in knots by the uh by the Democratic controlled House or a Democratic controlled House and Senate. And um this is what he's trying to offset.
Speaker B: 他将与民主党控制的众议院或参议院纠缠在一起。而他正试图抵消这一点。但你知道一些我们大多数人可能没有认真对待的东西,那就是世界就像在泰坦尼克号上,我们即将撞上冰山。也许那块冰山稍微远了一点,但我们仍然正朝着撞击那块冰山的轨迹前进,而且它正在来。当冰山撞上来时,生命救援艇不足以救所有人。谁会缺少生命救援艇?共和党人。这就是我为什么认为人们在说“特朗普总统不可能在中期选举前升级”时犯了错误。不可能在几周内,斯蒂芬。我一直在主持关于为什么特朗普总统会在中期选举后升级的节目,也许明年,但他肯定会,我一直试图解释这不正确。而你现在看到的就是这个。你看到的是特朗普总统急于试图开放H海峡。他正在被他的军事部门直接告知这些选项风险很低。它们风险很高。它们不太可能成功。但现在泰坦尼克号要撞上冰山了,他唯一的其他选择是完全退缩并说:“你说得对,奥朗,你控制她的举动。你设定费用。你不需要对你的核计划设置任何限制。你是世界第四大强国。而我,唐纳德·特朗普,在我统治下发生了。这对你的胸部来说是一个巨大的L,斯蒂芬。
Original English
Speaker B: And but there's also another before, which is the midterm elections. Yes. Am I right in thinking that this midterm election takes place in 3 months time and if his approval rating is low at that point because of what's going on with the war because when Americans go to the pump to fill up their cars they notice the prices are way high higher than usual that means those Americans in the election in the midterm elections will vote for the Democrats which means he will lose the Congress. So he basically needs to make sure Americans are happy in three months time. He he needs to take the best chance he can can to make that happen. Okay. And I think that what happened here, Stephen, is he his quote, you just quoted him, I think it was June 17th.
关于升级陷阱的分析与历史类比
Speaker A: 思考任何总统都会面临这样的情况。这就是林登·约翰逊在越南所面对的。现在我们有约翰逊在白宫里做对话时制作的录音带。不仅仅是尼克松在这里制作录音带,约翰逊也在制作录音带。我们现在有约翰逊在决定升级越南战争时的录音带,他解释说他知道这不太可能结束战争。它更有可能让情况恶化。他为什么要这么做?他这样做是因为他试图将他的“伟大社会计划”维持再延长四五个多月。而他希望即使这种升级很可能行不通,也有那么一点微小的机会能成功。在四五个多月内,他将能够从帽子里找出一些东西。他在国内失败了。林登·约翰逊不得不因为越南战争中的升级而退出竞选总统。特朗普总统面临着同样的风险,尽管我相信他这样做是因为他试图给他和共和党争取十一月的胜利提供最好的机会,但这可能不会成功。这就是为什么我认为特朗普总统已经播下了中国干预选举的种子。他已经开始谈论未来可能出现的另一个选举石子——这次可能是外国国家,可能是中国。
Original English
Speaker A: think, for any president. This is what Lynden Johnson faced in Vietnam. Uh, we now have the tapes that Johnson was making in the White House in conversations. It wasn't just Nixon making tapes here. Johnson uh was making tapes. And we now have tapes of Johnson as he's making decisions to escalate the Vietnam War, explaining that he knows this is very unlikely to end the war. It's likely to make it worse. And why is he doing it? He's doing it because he's trying to uh hold on to his uh Great Society program just for another four or five months. And what he's hoping is that even though the escalation is likely not to work, there's some tiny chance it will. And in four or five months, he'll be able to pull a rabbit out of the hat. He became uh it failed domestically. Lyndon Johnson had to uh pull back from running for reelection because of the escalations in the Vietnam War. And President Trump is running the same risk that even though I believe that he's doing this because he's trying to give him him himself and the Republicans the best chance to win uh in November, uh it may not work. That's why I think President Trump already planted the seed of uh China meddling in the elections. He's already started the conversation uh that there's another possible stone election in our future. This time possibly uh by foreign country, possibly China.
Speaker B: 在过去几年里,我经常谈论的一件事,这在商业和内容方面是事实,但对于生活中的一切也是如此,那就是一致性真的会产生巨大的复利效应。在销售中也是如此。当你的团队很小的时候,一致性是自然发生的。团队知道每一笔交易,所以没有什么会被遗漏。但正如我所经历的,当你成长时,这就会开始瓦解,交易开始滑坡。跟进不发生。本该出现的潜在客户变得冷淡。当这种情况发生时,很多领导者会看着它,并认为他们存在一个人的问题。但实际上,这是一个系统问题。我观察到的那些在商业上成功规模化发展的企业,他们的团队每天都在使用一个系统。对我来说,那个系统一直是我们的赞助商——Pipe Drive。它是一个易于使用的智能CRM工具,可以为成长中的销售团队提供对销售渠道中每一笔交易的可见性,以及每个阶段都需要发生什么才能让那笔交易向前推进的实时信息。当我们在五个人的团队时,或者我们的商业团队是五十人时,这能保持我们商业运营的一致性。已经有超过十万家公司在使用它进行销售了。所以,如果你想加入他们,请在 piperive.com/ce 注册,你将获得一个独家的30天免费试用,而不是通常的14天。而且完全不需要信用卡。访问 piperive.com/ceeo。我不会说越南语,但这个展示可以因为我们赞助商 Hey Jen 的人工智能视频技术而实现。我每周都会收到你们听着全世界的困境发来的信息,并表达对它对你和生活的影响有多大。如果这是真的,那么那些对话就不应该只触及英语使用者。Ken 可以拿我的一个录音带,用任何语言进行交付,同时保持我的声音、时机和表达方式不变。但你不需要像这样的工作室才能实现这一点。录下你自己15秒的视频,然后获得一个AI头像,它能以超过175种语言提供工作室级别的视频。我们现在支持20种语言了。而且我们不是唯一使用它的。Hey Jen 已经被3000万用户使用,其中包括4000万富豪榜前百强企业中的85%。无论你是在社交媒体上建立受众、推出在线课程还是在团队中推广培训,都看看 HeyGen 现在。你的前三个视频在 heygen.com/dac 上是完全免费的。那是 heygen.com/doac。在那里见。
Original English
Speaker B: One of the things you've heard me talk about quite a lot over the last couple of years, and this is something that's true in business and content, but also with everything in life, is that consistency is the thing that really, really compounds. The same is true in sales. When your team is small, consistency happens naturally. The team knows of every deal, so nothing gets missed. But as I've experienced, when you grow, this starts to break down, and deals start to slip. Follow-ups don't happen. Leads go cold that shouldn't have. And when this happens, a lot of leaders look at it and think they have a people problem. When actually, it's a systems problem. The businesses that I've watched scale well commercially all have a system their team uses every single day. And for my team, that system has been our sponsor, Pipe Drive. It's an easy-to-use intelligent CRM tool for growing sales teams that gives you visibility of every deal in your sales pipeline at every single stage. And it shows you what needs to happen for that deal to move forward all in real time. It's what keeps our commercial operation consistent when we're a team of five or when our commercial team was a team of 50. Over 100,000 companies are already running their sales on it. So, if you'd like to join them, sign up at piperive.com/ce where you'll get an exclusive 30-day free trial instead of the usual 14 days. And there's no credit card needed at all. Head to piperive.com/ceeo. I don't speak Vietnamese, but this show can because of AI video technology from our sponsor, Hey Jen. I get messages every single week from those of you listening to the dire all around the world, and you express how much impact it's had on you and your life. And if that's true, then those conversations shouldn't only reach people in English. Ken can take one recording of me and deliver it in any language while keeping my voice, timing, and expressions intact. But you don't need a studio like this to make it work for you. Record 15 seconds of yourself and get an AI avatar that delivers studio quality video in over 175 languages. We're up to 20 languages now. And we're not the only ones using it. Hey Jen is already used by 30 million people, including 85% of the Fortune 100. Whether you're building an audience on social media, launching an online course, or rolling out training across your team, check out HeyGen now. Your first three videos are totally free at heygen.com/dac. That's h e y g e n . com / doac. See you there.
升级陷阱的四个阶段
Speaker A: 关于这个升级陷阱,据我所了解,它有几个阶段。是的,我认为你已经有了图景。我们有那个升级梯子。是的。所以我做过这个,我想大概是三月二号或三月三号的时候。好吧。对于那些看不见视觉的人,我们也会解释我们在这里展示的内容,但我们会把屏幕上的内容也放出来供能看到的人看。是的。我所做的就是试图找到一种图形化的方式来展示升级陷阱。对于那些看不见的人来说,它看起来是一个倒置的金字塔。基本上,它从底部开始很小,然后越来越糟,而且随着你到达顶部,变得越来越红、越来越红。在开始时,你从有限的打击开始。那是领导层的轰炸,是杀死领导人。你试图用领导力推翻政权,而这会导致报复。第二阶段。第二阶段的报复是伊朗采取了行动,然后这导致我们进行了一些报复。我仍然会称之为第二阶段。这就是为什么我把我们正在进行的六周轰炸保持相同的颜色。这也是封锁的地方。然后你看到了这个红色阶段。注意,这是经济危机所在。第三阶段真正从这里开始。好吧。现在我们能够抵消那场经济危机。所以当我们三四月份谈论时,情况并不明确,尤其是中国,他们仍在购买。所以那场经济危机在三四月比我们在她停止每天购买五百万桶石油之后更接近。我想强调这一点。而她为此得到了什么?特朗普总统上周只是将他指责为干预我们选举的行为。所以我不太确定她是否认为那是一笔好交易。但现在我们已经到了这个阶段了。这是第三阶段,或者选择是如果你想摆脱升级陷阱,你就必须让伊朗成为地区大国,成为地区的霸主,本质上成为世界第四极,因为一旦它在霍尔木兹拥有影响力,一年或两年后,他们很可能会拥有核武器。所以这说明让伊朗获胜意味着什么。不是说伊朗会赢并且变得友好。伊朗将成为一个非常强大的地区国家。如果我们继续深入,我们实际上升级,并与我将解释现在到中期选举之间真正的核心问题所说的另一个地图相比,那么我们将进入2027年,进入深红,也就是真正的永恒战争。所以很多人本周和下周都会在 Stephen 谈论的很多节目中问:我们真的会陷入一场永恒的战争吗?嗯,那正在发生。好吧。可能。但现在我们正进入第三阶段的问题,即我们是否会第一次真正使用武力来夺回霍尔木兹的部分控制权,以及其他方面,这是个大问题,因为如果我们这样做,这就是为什么我认为目前桌面上真正的核心问题是美国能否在中期选举之前物理上打开霍尔木兹的通道。所以我想,Stephen,这个问题对世界、对世界经济、对针对美国的外交恐怖主义来说是最重要的一个问题,对于我们是否真的会陷入一场永恒战争。这将在现在和中期选举之间决定。而关键问题是我们在现在到中期选举期间能否物理上打开霍尔木兹的通道,我悲伤地认为答案几乎肯定不是。这很滑稽,因为你提到了 LBJ。所以我当时查看了他的一些引文,看看它们是如何联系起来的,因为每个人都知道越南战争是一场持续了永远而且什么都没取得的战争。我的意思是,通常人们读到的就是这个共识。是的。LBJ 在当时说:“我知道我们不应该在那里,但我无法离开。我只是不能成为投降的建筑师。”通过这句话,他知道当前的策略是个错误,但他感到政治上的瘫痪,因为退让将是一场屈辱性的失败,这又与特朗普的情况联系在一起了。
Original English
Speaker A: On this point of the escalation trap, um, it has several stages to it, the escalation trap, as far as I understand.
Speaker B: Uh, yes, I think you have the picture. Do we have the picture? I have a I have the escalation ladder.
Speaker A: Yes. So, I made this I think it was uh something like March 2nd or March 3rd.
Speaker B: Okay. So, for people that can't see the visual, we'll also explain what we're showing here, but we will put it on the screen for those that can see.
Speaker A: Yeah. So, what I did um is I was um uh trying to find a way to um graphically show the escalation trap. And what this looks like for those who can't see is an upside down pyramid. So basically it starts small at the bottom and gets worse and worse and more and more red and more and more red as you get through more and more stages as you go to the top. In the beginning you start with limited strike. That's the bombing of leadership bomb. You kill the leader. You kill uh you try to topple the regime with leadership to uh and that leads to retaliation. Stage two. Stage two retaliation is Iran takes hormones and that then leads to us doing some retaliation. I would still call it in stage two by the way. Um that's why I kind of kept it the same color where we're doing the uh 6 weeks bombing. That's also where the blockade is. And notice then you get to this red stage here. Notice it's where economic crisis is. This is where stage three really starts. Okay. Now we were able to offset that economic crisis. So when we talked in March and April, it wasn't clear, especially China, they were still buying. So that economic crisis was a lot closer in um March and April than it became after the summit with she because she stopped buying 5 million barrels of oil a day. I want to underscore that. And what did she get for that? Uh President Trump last week just blamed him for uh meddling in our election. So, I'm not sure she has thought that was a good deal. But still, we're at this point now. And this is where stage three is or the choice is if you want to get off of the escalation trap, you then have to let Iran become uh the gain power, become the rising power in the region, the regional hegeimon and essentially the fourth center of world power because once it um gains power uh with Hormuz has a sphere of influence a year or two from now, Stephen, they're very likely to have nuclear weapons. So this is this this this is what it means to let Iran win. It's not Iran will win and be nice. Iran is going to become a very powerful state in the region. If we go further and this we actually do escalate and with the other map I'll explain what I think the real issues are going to be between now and the midterms. Then we're going to head into 2027 into the deep red which is the actual forever war. So many people this week and next they're going to I'm going to be on a lot of shows Stephen talking about are we in a forever war? Well, that's coming. Okay. Possibly. But right now we're coming into the stage three question which is are we going to physically use force for the first time for real to seize back control of at least part of hormuz and so forth and that is the big question because if we do that and that's why I think the real issue on the table right now is uh can the United States physically open hormos between Now, in the midterms, I think that question, Stephen, is the most important question in the world, for the world, for the world's economy, for international terrorism against Americans, uh, for whether or not we truly will be in a forever war. This is going to be decided between now and the midterms. And the and the and the key issue is can we physically open the straight of horn moves between now and the midterms and I think sadly the answer is almost surely not. It's funny cuz you mentioned LBJ. So I was looking at some of his quotes around the time to see how they link because everybody knows the Vietnam War as being a war that just lasted forever and really achieved nothing. I mean that's generally the consensus that you read about. Yeah. And LBJ said at the time, "I know we ought not be there, but I can't get out. I just can't be the architect of surrender." And by this, he knew that the current strategy was a mistake, but he felt politically paralyzed because backing down would be like a humiliating defeat, which again links to Trump's situation.
Original English
Speaker A: On this point of the escalation trap, um, it has several stages to it, the escalation trap, as far as I understand.
Speaker B: Uh, yes, I think you have the picture. Do we have the picture? I have a I have the escalation ladder.
Speaker A: Yes. So, I made this I think it was uh something like March 2nd or March 3rd.
Speaker B: Okay. So, for people that can't see the visual, we'll also explain what we're showing here, but we will put it on the screen for those that can see.
Speaker A: Yeah. So, what I did um is I was um uh trying to find a way to um graphically show the escalation trap. And what this looks like for those who can't see is an upside down pyramid. So basically it starts small at the bottom and gets worse and worse and more and more red and more and more red as you get through more and more stages as you go to the top. In the beginning you start with limited strike. That's the bombing of leadership bomb. You kill the leader. You kill uh you try to topple the regime with leadership to uh and that leads to retaliation. Stage two. Stage two retaliation is Iran takes hormones and that then leads to us doing some retaliation. I would still call it in stage two by the way. Um that's why I kind of kept it the same color where we're doing the uh 6 weeks bombing. That's also where the blockade is. And notice then you get to this red stage here. Notice it's where economic crisis is. This is where stage three really starts. Okay. Now we were able to offset that economic crisis. So when we talked in March and April, it wasn't clear, especially China, they were still buying. So that economic crisis was a lot closer in um March and April than it became after the summit with she because she stopped buying 5 million barrels of oil a day. I want to underscore that. And what did she get for that? Uh President Trump last week just blamed him for uh meddling in our election. So, I'm not sure she has thought that was a good deal. But still, we're at this point now. And this is where stage three is or the choice is if you want to get off of the escalation trap, you then have to let Iran become uh the gain power, become the rising power in the region, the regional hegeimon and essentially the fourth center of world power because once it um gains power uh with Hormuz has a sphere of influence a year or two from now, Stephen, they're very likely to have nuclear weapons. So this is this this this is what it means to let Iran win. It's not Iran will win and be nice. Iran is going to become a very powerful state in the region. If we go further and this we actually do escalate and and with the other map I'll explain what I think the real issues are going to be between now and the midterms. Then we're going to head into 2027 into the deep red which is the actual forever war. So many people this week and next they're going to I'm going to be on a lot of shows Stephen talking about are we in a forever war? Well, that's coming. Okay. Possibly. But right now we're coming into the stage three question which is are we going to physically use force for the first time for real to seize back control of at least part of hormuz and so forth and that is the big question because if we do that and that's why I think the real issue on the table right now is uh can the United States physically open hormos between Now, in the midterms, I think that question, Stephen, is the most important question in the world, for the world, for the world's economy, for international terrorism against Americans, uh, for whether or not we truly will be in a forever war. This is going to be decided between now and the midterms. And the and the and the key issue is can we physically open the straight of horn moves between now and the midterms and I think sadly the answer is almost surely not. It's funny cuz you mentioned LBJ. So I was looking at some of his quotes around the time to see how they link because everybody knows the Vietnam War as being a war that just lasted forever and really achieved nothing. I mean that's generally the consensus that you read about. Yeah. And LBJ said at the time, "I know we ought not be there, but I can't get out. I just can't be the architect of surrender." And by this, he knew that the current strategy was a mistake, but he felt politically paralyzed because backing down would be like a humiliating defeat, which again links to Trump's situation.
策略的轉變與戰爭的困境
Speaker A: Let's get somebody that wants to do something besides drop a bomb, but that can go in and take in after these damn fellas and run them back where they belong." And by that, he meant relying entirely on overwhelming American air power wasn't actually solving the unconventional ground level problem, which again links to Trump's situation as you've described.
Original English
Speaker A: Let's get somebody that wants to do something besides drop a bomb, but that can go in and take in after these damn fellas and run them back where they belong." And by that, he meant relying entirely on overwhelming American air power wasn't actually solving the unconventional ground level problem, which again links to Trump's situation as you've described.
Speaker B: That's the transition from air power, rolling thunder to the heavier use of ground forces. And both of those of course ultimately fail.
Original English
Speaker B: That's the transition from air power, rolling thunder to the heavier use of ground forces. And both of those of course ultimately fail.
Speaker A: He also said, "I don't," this is again LBJ's comments as president during the Vietnam War. I don't think that we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and get anywhere in that area. It's just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw. By this, he meant trying to project military power halfway across the globe against an enemy fighting in their own backyard is incredibly difficult and likely futile, which again links to the Orange situation. And lastly, LBJ said, "A man can fight if he can see daylight down the road somewhere, but there ain't no daylight in Vietnam. There's not a single bit." And by this he meant that there was no realistic achievable end point or path to victory for its military strategy. And that also links to how like when political pressures change. And you know, Trump's recent admission at the G7 that the world is about to run out of um their energy reserves is a stark realization that the current strategy is hard. It has a deadline and there's no clear solution in sight.
Original English
Speaker A: He also said, "I don't," this is again LBJ's comments as president during the Vietnam War. I don't think that we can fight them 10,000 miles away from home and get anywhere in that area. It's just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw. By this, he meant trying to project military power halfway across the globe against an enemy fighting in their own backyard is incredibly difficult and likely futile, which again links to the Orange situation. And lastly, LBJ said, "A man can fight if he can see daylight down the road somewhere, but there ain't no daylight in Vietnam. There's not a single bit." And by this he meant that there was no realistic achievable end point or path to victory for its military strategy. And that also links to how like when political pressures change. And you know, Trump's recent admission at the G7 that the world is about to run out of um their energy reserves is a stark realization that the current strategy is hard. It has a deadline and there's no clear solution in sight.
Speaker B: Yeah. It's so tragic. It's so tragic that we're essentially replaying the Vietnam War. Trump is replaying the decisions that Lyndon Johnson made and coming to very similar decisions, which is he believes, as Lyndon Johnson did, that even though the military escalation would be a likely loser on the battlefield, that loss would take months and months to play out. So, there was some chance he could pull a rabbit out of a hat. But if he accepted immediate abrupt defeat, that would totally undermine and destroy his domestic political agenda.
Original English
Speaker B: Yeah. It's so tragic. It's so tragic that we're essentially replaying the Vietnam War. Trump is replaying the decisions that Lyndon Johnson made and coming to very similar decisions, which is he believes, as Lyndon Johnson did, that even though the military escalation would be a likely loser on the battlefield, that loss would take months and months to play out. So, there was some chance he could pull a rabbit out of a hat. But if he accepted immediate abrupt defeat, that would totally undermine and destroy his domestic political agenda.
Speaker A: So, I've got I basically before you came, I looked at the top 20 questions that the internet currently wants to know about the Iran war.
Original English
Speaker A: So, I've got I basically before you came, I looked at the top 20 questions that the internet currently wants to know about the Iran war.
Speaker B: Oh, great. And we've knocked off a few of them already. Okay. We've got a couple of them left.
Original English
Speaker B: Oh, great. And we've knocked off a few of them already. Okay. We've got a couple of them left.
Speaker A: Yeah, I love it. Um, one of them is can the United States actually force the straight of Hummus fully open with our current strategy or does Iran now hold lasting leverage over this critical choke point? The answer is um it the United States cannot do it and this would be an opportunity. Stephen, could I have that map back? Let me explain. Yeah, let me let me show you what I think is really in the offing here. So, a lot of people are wondering what are we going to do with 8,000 ground troops? So, we have somewhere around 4,500, 5,000 Marines, somewhere around 4,000 or so troops from the 82nd Airborne. What are these troops actually going to do? And I think that what President Trump is doing here, and I think you can really we can really see this if I kind of explain this is what we are doing is we are concentrating our forces, our naval forces here into the Gulf of Oman. We are not moving them through the straight of Formos. We're constant. Our carriers are in the Gulf of Oman and also our marine expeditionary unit is in the Gulf of Oman. Now, previously these had been further away, way off the board in the Indian Ocean. We moved them here closer. And this is important because these guns are are guns that have range to be able to hit the shore within about 12 miles. So what are you doing with these ships and what are you doing here is you are building a force that might be uh able to take a piece of territory at Charbahar or there's a um uh right in between Bandraas and Charbahar there is a little port town called Jas and this would be exactly the kind of armada you would build in order to take one of those objectives, either Charbahar or Jaskque. And the reason that you would do it politically for President Trump is because this could possibly be a symbolic victory. You could possibly take the territory and hold it for weeks. Now, why would you be able to take the territory and hold it for weeks? It's because this is Pakistan. We haven't even shown the rest of Iran here. Uh, Thran is is is over here. So maybe we want to Yeah, why don't we uh bring the other map here as well. So what we have done, Stephen, is we have concentrated our forces here in the Gulf of Oman. This is our carriers, our destroyers, our battleships, and they can provide some air cover here for ships that might pass through uh the southern part here. So, I'm not saying this is the only possible mission. Uh, but those Marines and the 82nd Airborne, they're not helping. They're not really there to help ships pass through the straight of Hormuz, but they're here. Okay. At least the Marines are here.
Original English
Speaker A: Yeah, I love it. Um, one of them is can the United States actually force the straight of Hummus fully open with our current strategy or does Iran now hold lasting leverage over this critical choke point? The answer is um it the United States cannot do it and this would be an opportunity. Stephen, could I have that map back? Let me explain. Yeah, let me let me show you what I think is really in the offing here. So, a lot of people are wondering what are we going to do with 8,000 ground troops? So, we have somewhere around 4,500, 5,000 Marines, somewhere around 4,000 or so troops from the 82nd Airborne. What are these troops actually going to do? And I think that what President Trump is doing here, and I think you can really we can really see this if I kind of explain this is what we are doing is we are concentrating our forces, our naval forces here into the Gulf of Oman. We are not moving them through the straight of Formos. We're constant. Our carriers are in the Gulf of Oman and also our marine expeditionary unit is in the Gulf of Oman. Now, previously these had been further away, way off the board in the Indian Ocean. We moved them here closer. And this is important because these guns are are guns that have range to be able to hit the shore within about 12 miles. So what are you doing with these ships and what are you doing here is you are building a force that might be uh able to take a piece of territory at Charbahar or there's a um uh right in between Bandraas and Charbahar there is a little port town called Jas and this would be exactly the kind of armada you would build in order to take one of those objectives, either Charbahar or Jaskque. And the reason that you would do it politically for President Trump is because this could possibly be a symbolic victory. You could possibly take the territory and hold it for weeks. Now, why would you be able to take the territory and hold it for weeks? It's because this is Pakistan. We haven't even shown the rest of Iran here. Uh, Thran is is is over here. So maybe we want to Yeah, why don't we uh bring the other map here as well. So what we have done, Stephen, is we have concentrated our forces here in the Gulf of Oman. This is our carriers, our destroyers, our battleships, and they can provide some air cover here for ships that might pass through uh the southern part here. So, I'm not saying this is the only possible mission. Uh, but those Marines and the 82nd Airborne, they're not helping. They're not really there to help ships pass through the straight of Hormuz, but they're here. Okay. At least the Marines are here.
Speaker B: Where?
Original English
Speaker B: Where?
Speaker A: Uh, we don't they're somewhere in the straight of in the Gulf of Oman. We don't know exactly where they are. That would not be good.
Original English
Speaker A: Uh, we don't they're somewhere in the straight of in the Gulf of Oman. We don't know exactly where they are. That would not be good.
Speaker B: I'm just saying that cuz some people can't hear.
Original English
Speaker B: I'm just saying that cuz some people can't hear.
Speaker A: Yeah, that's right. So, they're in the Gulf of Oman uh here, which is to the east of Hormuz. The Gulf, the Persian Gulf is to the west of Hormuz. So Hormuz is the true choke point between these two Gulfs. And the Gulf of Oman here is then what's north of it is the south-eastern coast of Iran, which is the least populated part of Iran. Iran's population is mostly up here around the word Iran. So, you're saying that the US might take a small part of Iran from here?
Original English
Speaker A: Yeah, that's right. So, they're in the Gulf of Oman uh here, which is to the east of Hormuz. The Gulf, the Persian Gulf is to the west of Hormuz. So Hormuz is the true choke point between these two Gulfs. And the Gulf of Oman here is then what's north of it is the south-eastern coast of Iran, which is the least populated part of Iran. Iran's population is mostly up here around the word Iran. So, you're saying that the US might take a small part of Iran from here?
Speaker B: A small part of Iran? With ground troops?
Original English
Speaker B: A small part of Iran? With ground troops?
Speaker A: With ground troops. That's right. And literally hold it here uh in order to get a symbolic victory. And in order for Iran to knock us out, they have to redirect all of their attention to this. Uh and this would be this is why I don't think it's going to work is ultimately they will do this. uh but in the short term in a period of say a few weeks or so this uh there's a there's a chance and I say it's a low chance I'm not trying to tell you I would advocate for this I would not advocate for this I'm trying to explain what these troop these forces are doing here because otherwise there's no point in having these forces here.
Original English
Speaker A: With ground troops. That's right. And literally hold it here uh in order to get a symbolic victory. And in order for Iran to knock us out, they have to redirect all of their attention to this. Uh and this would be this is why I don't think it's going to work is ultimately they will do this. uh but in the short term in a period of say a few weeks or so this uh there's a there's a chance and I say it's a low chance I'm not trying to tell you I would advocate for this I would not advocate for this I'm trying to explain what these troop these forces are doing here because otherwise there's no point in having these forces here.
Speaker B: Okay, so some questions on this then if they if the US do I guess invade Iran from capture port one of these port towns?
Original English
Speaker B: Okay, so some questions on this then if they if the US do I guess invade Iran from capture port one of these port towns?
Speaker A: From the sort of south-east here.
Original English
Speaker A: From the sort of south-east here.
Speaker B: That's right. This would mean that Iran have a target to kill American soldiers.
Original English
Speaker B: That's right. This would mean that Iran have a target to kill American soldiers.
Speaker A: That's right. And the cost of losing American soldiers, especially back home in America, would be tremendous.
Original English
Speaker A: That's right. And the cost of losing American soldiers, especially back home in America, would be tremendous.
Speaker B: You're talking about hundreds dead over a period of at least weeks.
Original English
Speaker B: You're talking about hundreds dead over a period of at least weeks.
Speaker A: And this would be just the terrible politically for boots to be on the ground and be dying in Iran.
Original English
Speaker A: And this would be just the terrible politically for boots to be on the ground and be dying in Iran.
Speaker B: Well, it will be divisive politically. So for people that are opposed to the war, this will make them even more opposed to the war. But for people that are supporting the war, and this is the part of the politics that I study, Stephen, uh it's important to understand that there's a large part of MAGA that is incredibly supportive of this war. In fact, the opinion polls uh uh tend to show that more MAGA supports regime change uh for Iran than oppose it. So this is not like MAGA has become Tucker Carlson country or something. This is still Trump country here and they want Trump to win. Well, what you are seeing here is that if there are if there are troops that are killed, you are likely going to see and you're seeing this on Fox News this morning after three more died over the weekend. You're seeing a tremendous amount of support for our troops and therefore the war. Okay, so I've got some numbers here about public support. Based on recent polling from mid 2026, the ongoing military conflict with Iran remains highly unpopular with the general American public, but support is sharply divided along political lines. Overall, [snorts] roughly 27 to 34% of Americans support the war, while a solid majority of 53 to 57% oppose it. But then when you look at MAGA, it says that 77% to 85% of MAGA support the war. There's a MAGA Republicans and only 5% to 14% of MAGA Republicans oppose the war.
Original English
Speaker B: Well, it will be divisive politically. So for people that are opposed to the war, this will make them even more opposed to the war. But for people that are supporting the war, and this is the part of the politics that I study, Stephen, uh it's important to understand that there's a large part of MAGA that is incredibly supportive of this war. In fact, the opinion polls uh uh tend to show that more MAGA supports regime change uh for Iran than oppose it. So this is not like MAGA has become Tucker Carlson country or something. This is still Trump country here and they want Trump to win. Well, what you are seeing here is that if there are if there are troops that are killed, you are likely going to see and you're seeing this on Fox News this morning after three more died over the weekend. You're seeing a tremendous amount of support for our troops and therefore the war. Okay, so I've got some numbers here about public support. Based on recent polling from mid 2026, the ongoing military conflict with Iran remains highly unpopular with the general American public, but support is sharply divided along political lines. Overall, [snorts] roughly 27 to 34% of Americans support the war, while a solid majority of 53 to 57% oppose it. But then when you look at MAGA, it says that 77% to 85% of MAGA support the war. There's a MAGA Republicans and only 5% to 14% of MAGA Republicans oppose the war.
战争对地区分裂的影响与军事风险评估
Speaker A: 我们国家多年来一直在建设的那些分裂,在这次战争中仍然存在,并且正在变得更加坚硬。而且如果死亡发生,这很可能会使这个分裂更加坚固,而不是让MAGA转向反战立场,至少不是转向太多。
Original English
Speaker A: are seeing is the divisions in our country which have been building for years are still in existence with this war and they're becoming hardened in this war. And if as deaths occur, this is likely to harden the division, not shift, at least not shift much of MAGA to the anti-war position.
Speaker B: 原因是,正如特朗普在拜登总统从阿富汗撤出时抱怨的那样,如果他撤军,这对特朗普来说不仅仅是损失。这将被视为对那些死去的民众的侮辱。所以人们会说:“如果我们离开,那些人是不是因为做错了事而死了?那是个错误吗?他们的死亡难道毫无价值吗?”这很艰难。这也是当部队在战争中战斗数月时,这种现象可以使支持战争变得更加坚固,甚至可能使其增长的原因之一。随着时间的推移,是的,它倾向于缩小,但在短期内,死亡实际上可以使对战争的支持更加坚定。这是大多数人还没有完全理解的一件事。
Original English
Speaker B: And the reason is because just as Trump complained when President Biden pulled out from uh Afghanistan there, this is going to be uh not just a loss for Trump if he pulls out. This will be viewed as a as an insult to the people who died. And so people will say, "So if we leave, did those people die as a mistake? Was it a mistake? Is their death were their deaths worthless?" That's a hard thing. And that's one of the reasons why when troops die in war for months, this can harden support for a war, possibly even grow it. Over time, yes, it tends to whittle down, but in the in the near term, deaths can actually harden support for the war. And that's a thing that most people aren't really fully grasping yet.
伊朗的军事行动与经济危机升级
Speaker A: 美国在伊朗进行某种有限的地面行动,比如在伊拉克的地面部队上部署步兵的风险有多大?嗯,超过50%。我认为现在接近70%。原因有几个:第一,特朗普总统试图阻止的经济危机已经开始固化了。因此,未来会给他带来经济成本的东西已经开始变得不可逆转了。你今天早上听到的关于胡塞武装封锁约旦河地区的管道,也就是红海中的那个港口城市,那里有4到5百万桶沙特原油正在涌出。你听到的那件事将使经济危机更加固化,除非它立即被扭转。即使明天立即扭转了,第二天之后也可能再次扭转。这正在失控地螺旋上升,因为它不仅仅是特朗普总统现在要把这个“精怪”放回瓶子里。特朗普总统实际上仍然可以撤军,但现在伊朗必须停止升级。它必须让红海的石油流动起来。它必须允许从霍尔木兹输油船只通行。伊朗不是为了报复而处于那种情绪中。伊朗的情绪正在流淌,但这并不会导致伊朗后退。它会导致伊朗想要报复。
Original English
Speaker A: How real is the risk that the US will do some kind of limited ground operation with boots on the ground in Iran? uh well over 50%. I think it's uh bordering on 70% now. Um and the reasons are that uh number one, the economic crisis that President Trump was trying to prevent and therefore the economic costs that will hurt him later is already starting to become baked in. what you're hearing this morning with the Houthis closing the pipeline area around Yon Buu it's called this port city in the Red Sea where the uh 4 to 5 million barrels of Saudi oil is coming out. What you're hear what that is going to do is make the economic crisis even more baked in even more likely unless it's immediately reversed. And even if it was immediately reversed tomorrow, that could be reversed again the next day after that. this is starting to spiral out of control because it's not just up to President Trump now to to put this genie back in the bottle. President Trump can actually still uh can withdraw and uh but right now Iran has to stop the escalation. It has to let the Red Sea oil flow. It has to allow ships to flow from Hormuz. And Iran is not is in a mood for revenge. Iran is uh there is emotions coursing through Iran, but it's not um causing Iran to uh uh pull back. Uh it's causing Iran to want revenge.
伊朗的升级态势与对美国军事行动的担忧
Speaker A: 最高领导人几天前发表的声明,周六,两名美国士兵在约旦被悲剧性地杀害。他称最高领导人所做的是将要向美国传达不可磨灭的教训的措辞。不可磨灭的教训就是最高领导人在周末说的确切措辞。你在这里看到的,斯蒂芬,正如我们基本上伊朗开始向船只射击试图加强特朗普总统的立场一样。现在我们已经连续第九周、第九天进行轰炸了。现在伊朗正在升级攻击。伊朗正通过多种方式升级攻击。它正在攻击我们在约旦的基地,这自三月以来很少发生过。现在由于胡塞武装封锁了红海。而且我们还没有谈到科威特。我们应该谈谈周末在科威特发生的事情,因为这是即将到来的事情的前兆,因为它显示了伊朗愤怒的凶猛程度以及阻止这种升级螺旋上升有多困难。这就是导致特朗普总统认真考虑部署地面部队的原因之一,因为我们现在没有做出独立决定。
Original English
Speaker A: And the leader statement, the Supreme Leader statement just of a couple days ago, this was Saturday, uh two uh US soldiers were tragically killed in Jordan. Um he called it uh what the Supreme Leader did was uh used the phrase that he's going to deliver unforgettable lessons to America. Unforgettable lessons is the exact phrase by the Supreme Leader over the weekend. What you are seeing here, Stephen, is as we have essentially as Iran um started to shoot at ships here to try to reinforce theou, President Trump up the ante. Now we're in our ninth week, ninth day of bombing in a row. Now Iran is upping the Annie. And Iran is upping the Annie in multiple ways. It's attacking our base in Jordan, which it only rarely done since uh since March, actually. It's now with the Houthis closing the Red Sea. And we haven't yet talked about Kuwait. And we should talk about what happened here over the weekend here in Kuwait because this is a harbinger of what's to come because it shows how ferocious the anger is by Iran and how hard it's going to be to stop this spiral of escalation. And that is what is one of the the that's what's going to lead to President Trump thinking long and hard about putting those ground forces in because we're not making an independent decision now.
潜在的军事风险与恐怖主义威胁分析
Speaker B: 所以你说有70%的机会,是的。部队可能被部署到伊朗地面上。是的。我认为在下个月内,甚至可能比那更短的时间内。这甚至可能在本周末结束之前就发生。这是我为你做的东西。我意识到DVIO的受众是我们要实现的宏大目标。我学到的事情之一是,当你瞄准那个大大的大目标时,它会让人感到极其心理上的不适,因为它有点像站在珠穆朗玛峰脚下向上看。实现你的目标的途径是将它们分解成微小的步骤。我们在我们的团队中称之为1%。实际上,这种理念对我们这里的成功起到了极大的作用。所以我们所做的事情,这样你在家就可以实现你拥有的任何大目标,就是我们制定了这些1%的日记,并在去年发布了它们,而且它们都卖光了。所以我反复要求我的团队把日记带回来,但也要求他们引入一些新颜色,对日记进行一些小的调整。所以现在我们为你提供了更好的选择。所以,如果你心中有一个大目标,你需要一个框架、一个流程和一些动力,那么我强烈建议你在这些日记卖光之前就弄到其中一个。你可以在diary.com上买到你的。如果你想要链接,链接在下面的描述中。
Original English
Speaker B: So you said there's a 70% chance Yes. that troops could be put on the ground in Iran. Yes. I think within I think probably uh within the next month, maybe even shorter than that. It could even be by the end of this week. This is something that I've made for you. I've realized that the DVIO audience are strivals that we want to accomplish. And one of the things I've learned is that when you aim at the big big big goal, it can feel incredibly psychologically uncomfortable because it's kind of like being stood at the foot of Mount Everest and looking upwards. The way to accomplish your goals is by breaking them down into tiny small steps. And we call this in our team the 1%. And actually this philosophy is highly responsible for much of our success here. So what we've done so that you at home can accomplish any big goal that you have is we've made these 1% diaries and we released these last year and they all sold out. So I asked my team over and over again to bring the diaries back but also to introduce some new colors and to make some minor tweaks to the diary. So now we have a better range for you. So, if you have a big goal in mind and you need a framework and a process and some motivation, then I highly recommend you get one of these diaries before they will sell out once again. And you can get yours at the diary.com. And if you want the link, the link is in the description below.
Speaker A: 你在图表上向我展示了升级阶梯,你可以称之为,以及我们现在的位置。你认为这场战争接下来最可能发生的事情是什么?我最担心的是针对美军或美国平民的大规模伤亡袭击。
Original English
Speaker A: You've shown me on the graph that you've just shown the escalation ladder, you can call it, and and where we are now. What is the most probable next thing that you think happens with this war? The biggest thing I'm worried about is a mass casualty attack against American troops or American civilians.
Speaker B: 哇。针对中东的美国部队,但我特别担心的是对我们在阿曼湾的军舰的弹道导弹轰炸。伊朗通过其目标选择显示了它已经一直在做的事情,而且它有非常精细的能力来精确打击,我们不确定他们是否能够追踪我们在阿曼湾的军舰的移动,或者他们是否得到了中国或俄罗斯的帮助来实现这一点。但我特别担心的是随着局势升级,他们刚刚封锁了红海。如果我们继续前进,我们会发现特朗普是否会撤退,但如果我们继续前进,我本周、下周最担心的事之一将是针对一艘船的袭击。我认为那将是一场炮击攻击。我担心的第二件事是因为我们现在实际上正在威胁地面占领。这是我在研究自杀袭击25年经验中最大的风险因素。我们还没有谈论过这个问题,斯蒂芬。我们没有谈论它的原因是我们离如何发起大规模自杀恐怖主义活动这个大风险因素还很远。这现在正在改变。我向我的子版块谈过这件事了。很高兴现在能和你谈谈。但我担心的是针对美国人的大规模伤亡袭击。这可能针对一架美国客机。它可能针对,我是说针对商业客机的美国人。这可能针对呃,比如在阿夸巴的商人。所以你可能会知道最近在阿夸巴发生过袭击,这是一个非常漂亮的度假胜地。我从未去过那里。而且事实是,现在有美国商界人士正在中东四处流动,以建造这些管道。所以我可以想象对那些住在德国和英国大使馆的酒店的恐怖袭击。美国国务院在上周末发布了针对美国人离开该地区的建议。但我担心的是恐怖袭击,因为威胁或实际上进行地面控制,控制国土的一部分是自杀恐怖主义最大的风险因素。这导致人们比任何其他事情都更愿意装上炸弹来杀死他人,而他们自己却在杀死自己。所以在我们详细解释之前,所以当你对我说斯蒂芬,我接下来的几周想看到什么时,
Original English
Speaker B: Wow. Against American troops in the Middle East, but I'm specifically worrying about a barrage of ballistic missiles against our uh naval ships in the Gulf of Oman. So the Iran is showing a uh through its the targeting it's that it's already been doing in the last uh week and a half an exquisite ability to precisely target and um we don't know for sure they're able to track the movement of our naval ships in the Gulf of Oman uh or they're getting help with either the ch from the Chinese or the Russians in doing that. But I'm specifically worried that as this escalates, they've just closed the straight. They've just closed the Red Sea. If we keep going forward, and we'll find out if we're going to if Trump will pull back or not, but if we keep going forward, one of the big things I'm concerned about this week, next week, would be an attack on a ship. Uh, and I think it would be a barrage attack. The second thing I'm concerned about is uh because we are now um literally threatening ground occupation. That's the biggest risk factor for suicide terrorism in my 25 years of studying suicide attacks. We haven't talked about that, Stephen. And the reason we haven't talked about it is because we were pretty far away from the big risk factor of how you start a big suicide terrorist campaign. That is now changing. Um I've talked to my substack about this. glad to talk to you about it now. Uh, but I'm concerned about a mass casualty attack against Americans. This could be against an American airliner. It could be against I mean Americans on a commercial airliner. This could be um against uh uh Americans say business uh men in uh Aquaba. So you you might know there have been attacks recently in Aquaba, which is this really lovely resort town. I've never been there. And the uh and the fact is um there are business American businessmen um uh moving all around the Middle East now to build these pipelines. And so I can imagine there being terrorist attacks against the uh the hotels that are staying at uh the um German and um British embassies have just ordered their evacuation. America State Department has issued an advisory over the weekend for Americans to start leaving the region. But I'm concerned about terrorist attack because threatening in or actually doing ground control, controlling pieces of homeland territory is the biggest risk factor for suicide terrorism. That's what causes people more than anything else to strap on bombs to kill others while they're killing themselves. So before we explain in detail, so when you say Stephen, what I'm looking for in the next few weeks,
Speaker A: 我看到升级螺旋正在发生。这是一个双向螺旋。不只是特朗普总统。伊朗也在升级,如果不是更多的话。在这个升级的螺旋中,可能会有针对我们的部队或美国平民的大规模伤亡袭击。
Original English
Speaker A: I'm seeing the spiral of escalation now occurring. It's a two-sided spiral. It's not just President Trump. Iran is uh uh escalating here as much as Trump, if not more. And uh in this spiral of escalation, there could be a mass casualty attack either against our troops or against American civilians.
对恐怖主义和战争的分析
civilian: 袭击可以发生在世界任何地方。它可能在印度尼西亚,也可能在伦敦。它可能在任何地方。如果发生那种大规模伤亡事件,我认为你将看到的是这很可能会导致我们在美国讨论的那个分裂——对战争的支持会更加坚定。你将获得强烈的支持,以继续战争,现在来阻止伊朗未来的大规模伤亡袭击。
Original English
civilian: attack could be anywhere in the world. It could be in Indonesia. It could be London. It could be anywhere. And if that mass casualty event happens, I think what you're going to see is that this is likely going to cause that division we just discussed here in America, support for the war to harden even more. And you're going to get though intense support for continuing the war now to stop uh mass casualty attacks by Iran in the future.
civilian: 你在研究恐怖袭击,特别是自杀式恐怖袭击。是的。给我看看你做的那项研究的工作。你写了一本书关于这个。两本书。然后告诉我那与我们现在所处的时刻有什么关系。所以,在9/11之后不久,请记住,美国遭受了发生在纽约世界贸易中心、五角大楼的恐怖袭击。那天近3000名美国人丧生。我想了解原因,我想了解更多。我研究得越多,我注意到9/11是一次自杀式袭击。它不仅仅是一次恐怖袭击。所以我开始收集全球所有自杀袭击的第一套完整数据集。我在芝加哥大学做了这件事。我与几位研究助理一起做这个,基本上是研究学生。自杀式恐怖主义,我研究它的原因,斯蒂芬,是因为它是恐怖主义的“肺癌”。自杀式袭击在恐怖主义这一类别中杀死的人比所有其他不同类型的恐怖主义加起来都多。自杀式袭击是最大的杀手。它就像肺癌一样。我们有其他种癌症,但肺癌是最大的杀手。那么,自杀式恐怖主义的肺癌的关键风险因素是什么?是军事战斗存在于恐怖主义目标领土上。
Original English
civilian: and I guess suicide terrorist attacks specifically. Yes. Give me a view into the research the work you've done there. You've written a book on it. Two two books on it. And then ladder me up to how that's relevant to the moment we're in now. So, shortly after 9/11, this was, remember, America was hit with a terrorist attack here in uh New York, the World Trade Center, the Pentagon. Uh nearly 3,000 Americans died that day. I wanted to understand why, and I wanted to understand more. The more I studied it, I noticed that 9/11 was a suicide attack. It wasn't just a terrorist attack. So, I started to collect what became the first complete data set of all suicide attacks around the world. Uh I did this uh at the University of Chicago. I did this with a few research assistants, basically work study students. The suicide terrorism, the reason I studied it, Stephen, was because it's the lung cancer of terrorism. Suicide attacks kill more people in the category of terrorism than all the other different kinds of terrorism combined. The suicide attacks are the biggest killer. Uh it's like lung cancer. We have other kinds of cancers, but lung cancer is the biggest killer. And what is the key risk factor for the lung cancer of suicide terrorism? It's military combat presence on territory the terrorist prize.
civilian: 所以,对于自杀式恐怖主义来说,阻止它很难吗?因为你知道,我们似乎可以很好地拦截来袭的导弹,但自杀式恐怖主义似乎是一种完全不同的挑战。自杀式恐怖主义就像是精确制导武器一样,把一个人变成一种精确制导武器,因为字面上没有什么比在人群中、在一个建筑中找到最脆弱的点、设置爆炸装置的最佳时机更有效。
Original English
civilian: So with suicide terrorism, is it hard to stop? Because you know, we can intercept missiles that are coming over pretty well it seems, but suicide terrorism seems to be a completely different type of challenge. Suicide terrorism is like a precision guided is like turning a person into a precision guided weapon because literally nothing can better identify the most vulnerable point in a crowd, the most vulnerable point in a building, the exact split second to set off the the explosive better than a human.
civilian: 那么美国,例如,你是在说两件事。你当时说那袭击可能在美国发生,但它不一定非要发生在那里。它可以在那些理论上人口密度高的美籍或西方人地区发生。对。因为你知道,美国人可能会说:“嗯,我们不会让来自那些地区的任何人进来。我们会更勤奋地进行护照检查,无论如何。”那会在战争之后发生。上帝禁止,我希望我错了,斯蒂芬,但如果第一次袭击发生,你将看到所有这些。你会看到什么?你会看到我们可以做什么的想法吗?我们可以做护照检查吗?我们可以做X或Y吗?911之后,类似的事情发生了。让我们希望不会发生那么大的事情。但让我进一步解释一下,当我编译那个数据库并做出一个具体的预测时,它预测如果我们要入侵和占领伊拉克,我们将触动现代最大的自杀式恐怖主义运动。这是什么?关于什么的?好吧,特别是在入侵他们的国家与轰炸他们的国家之间导致自杀式恐怖袭击的因素是什么?比如,从天空中轰炸他们杀死的人,这不重要。重要的是地面部队带来的政治控制部分。所以使用地面部队的原因是施加政治控制。
Original English
civilian: And the how does the US, for example, you're saying two things. was saying that that attack could happen in the United States, but also it doesn't have to. It could happen anywhere in those regions where there's a high density of Americans or Westerners theoretically. That's right. Because you know the Americans could say, "Well, we're not going to let in anybody from those regions. We're going to get more diligent with passport checks, whatever." That will happen after the fir, God forbid, I hope I'm wrong, Stephen, but if and when that first attack happens, you're going to see all that come out. You're going to see what can you're going to see all the idea of what can we do? Can we do passport checks? Can we do X or Y? What this is right after 911, similar thing happened. Let's hope nothing that large would would happen. But let me just further explain that when I when I um compiled that database and it made a specific prediction. It predicted then that if we invaded and occupied Iraq, we would touch off the largest suicide terrorist campaign in modern times. What is it? What is it about okay invading their country in particular versus bombing their country in particular that causes suicide terrorist attacks from your research? Like what is it? Because bombing them from the sky is is killing people that it's not the killing people part of this that matters. It's the political control part that comes with the ground forces. So the reason to use the ground forces is to impose political control.
civilian: 所以,斯蒂芬,那不只是杀人。美国部署地面部队的原因是获得政治控制,而这种政治控制意味着被控制的群体不能控制他们生活的方方面面。这被视为一种更深层次的侵犯。这最终就是它吗?它是一种对当地人口不受控制的更深层次的侵犯。所以当我们把地面部队派到阿富汗后推翻塔利班时,我们是通过他们的力量推翻了塔利班,但直到我们开始向阿富汗投入地面部队之前,我们在阿富汗不会遭受太多自杀式袭击。那是在我们推翻塔利班之后几年才开始的。因为那时我们正在部署地面部队。所以唐纳德·特朗普最近在Truth Social上发帖说,每当伊朗杀死一名美国士兵时,他们就会为此付出很多次代价。这个指令已经传达给了国防部长皮特·赫克斯、联合参谋长和他的其他军事领导人。显然,这是对失去一个美国生命的反应。他正在我们谈论战争的时候非常积极地发推文,一推文接着一推文在Truth Social上。它……我只是不知道这里有没有一个可实现的终局或退路,可以恢复通过赫尔穆兹的直通航道,但同时允许美国撤退而不会显得遭受了战略上的失败。不,斯蒂芬,没有可行的退路。那个船是在你总统特朗普决定在三月份的第一周不宣布他可以宣布——我的建议是,在那一周三月第一周宣布胜利并走开——要对伊朗进行教训的时候航行了。你杀死了最高领导人,一群其他领导人。现在让我们回到谈判伊朗核计划的……我当时给你的建议是军事上遏制以色列。那个建议是保持一个封口。以色列正在进入黎巴嫩,做其他事情。在军事上对以色列保持封口。特朗普已经采纳了这些想法,我不是说因为我说过它们,但他把那些想法推迟了好几个月。如果你看看我认为特朗普现在试图用这种方式军事遏制以色列,我确实认为他曾试图宣布胜利并走开。但问题在于这里,斯蒂芬,是这些现在太晚了,而且钱不够了。它们还不够好。所以如果你想回到谈判轨道上来,你将向伊朗提供什么来让他们回到餐桌?同样的说法:“哦,当然。我们将继续我们已经签署的,然后我们一次又一次地违反。”这不可信。
Original English
civilian: So, is this the forever war? No, we're not yet in the forever war stage. But you said there's no way out. There's the way out would be if the midterms come and the Democrats win either the House or the House and the Senate and they shut down the money for the war. Oh, that is a way out. Oh, they can do that. So, this is Yes. That's what happened in Vietnam. They they they can shut down the money for the war. They can shut down the That's what Congress did. Yes. Congress has the power. It doesn't use it very often. And the last time it did this was in 1974. The reason I, as I showed you on that escalation ladder, I said there is a stage five, a forever war. We're not at a forever war yet. What would be a forever war would be um uh where that will come. And and the reason I'm defining the the escalation period between now and the midterms as the most crucial period right now. This is going to determine everything. And the and what's going to determine the outcome of the next few months is can America open the straight of form physically. What could easily happen between now and the midterms is President Trump tries to open the straight of form moves or he allows Iran by the way to um he pulls back. He could actually pull back. Either way, at this point, Stephen, there's um uh there's a good chance he
关于中期选举、战争资金和政治格局的分析
Speaker A: 如果在中期选举中输掉,这意味着共和党将在国会失去一个或两个议院席位。如果这种情况发生,那么接管控制权的人将是民主党人。他们会非常反战。而且这里将会有巨大的努力来关闭战争,也就是关闭战争的资金。所以,这总是关乎金钱。
Original English
Speaker A: will uh lose in the midterms, meaning that the Republicans will lose one or both houses in Congress. And if that happens, then uh whoever takes over control will be a Democrat. They'll be hotly um anti-war. And there will be uh great efforts here to shut down the war, meaning shut down the money for the war. So, it's always about the money.
Speaker B: 我需要了解这个角色的作用。所以中期选举、金钱和战争之间的这种联系。
Original English
Speaker B: I need to get an understanding of the role. So this sort of link between the midterms, the money, and then the war.
Speaker A: 所以中期选举将改变国会中谁在控制。
Original English
Speaker A: So the midterms are going to change who's in Congress.
Speaker B: 是的。
Original English
Speaker B: Yes.
Speaker A: 然后是控制它的人。
Original English
Speaker A: And then the people in who controls it.
Speaker B: 国会里的那些人决定军队能得到多少钱。
Original English
Speaker B: And the people in Congress, they decide how much money the military get.
Speaker A: 他们决定是否……嗯,他们能否通过法律,而这在1974年发生了,是为了防止资金被用于战争。
Original English
Speaker A: They decide whether or not um they can pass laws, and this is what happened in 1974, uh to prevent money from being spent on the war.
Speaker B: 但特朗普不能过度这样做。他可以尝试绕过它。嗯,然后可能会有最高法院的案件等等。
Original English
Speaker B: And Trump can't overdo that. He he can try to work around it. Uh there can be then Supreme Court cases and so forth and so on.
Speaker A: 所以,即使民主党赢得中期选举并试图阻止战争,特朗普也可以绕过他们,因为他作为总司令拥有巨大的宪法优势。他可以简单地否决国会通过的任何战争权力决议或资金限制,这将需要两院都以极其困难的2/3多数票才能推翻。此外,模仿自理查德·尼克松以来几乎每一位总统的论点,特朗普可以诉诸他的第二条宪法授权,声称他有权在不需要立法批准的情况下保卫美国的利益和军队。最后,即使国会拒绝授权新的资金,总统也可以使用紧急转移权力(emergency transfer authorities)和创造性会计(creative accounting)来重新分配现有的五角大楼预算资金,以短期内维持军事行动的运转。你刚刚定义了一个宪法危机。国会会认为它有权这样做。特朗普总统会认为他有权这样做。这就是宪法危机。这也是为什么这些中期选举,在我……嗯,不完全在这个背景下这么说,但你知道我有一本书即将出版,我们最可怕的敌人。前言被称为我们一生中最危险的选举之一。这就是为什么即将到来的这次选举将是我们一生中最危险的选举,因为现在的紧张局势正在加剧。除此之外,它们并没有平息那些水面上的平静。伊朗战争让一切变得更糟。而你刚刚读到的就是这里的紧张局势,这可能会……(哼了一声)因为民主党不想让它成为永久战争。而且一旦他们控制了一个或两个议院,他们很可能会非常努力地战斗。特朗普总统将为了他的遗产和他的国内议程——包括驱逐,包括移民及海关执法局(ICE)——而非常努力地战斗。所以,这一切都会汇集起来。在进入中期选举的过程中,这些不会被分割成孤立的问题。这就是我说的我们正走向中期选举,中期选举。我们不是走向一个只关心海外军事基地发生了什么未来的地方。它只是关于海外的船只发生了什么,霍尔木兹发生了什么。这些线,美国的国内政治暴力,我称之为暴力民粹主义时代,以及对伊朗战争日益增长的国家紧张局势。这两条线,国内危机和国际危机即将汇合。正如我在2024年夏天告诉我的研究团队和我刚在芝加哥发表的演讲中提到的那样,我的噩梦,他们问我的噩梦情景是什么。这是在2024年秋天。我说:“我的噩梦情景是我们在2024年秋天的选举和国际危机同时存在。我们真的没有那样的情况。现在我们有了。而这正将进入2026年秋天。”这一直是我噩梦的情景。
Original English
Speaker A: That's why I'm saying that we're coming the midterms, the midterms, the midterms. We're not heading to a future where it's just about what happens to military bases overseas. It's just about what happens to ships overseas, what's happened in Hormuz. these lines, the domestic political violence in the United States, I call this the era of violent populism and the growing tensions in the country over the Iran war. These two lines, the domestic crisis and the international crisis are about to come together. And as I told my research team in the summer of 2024 and talks I gave in Chicago, my nightmare, they asked me what my nightmare scenario was. This was in the fall of 2024. And I said, "My nightmare scenario is we have uh an international crisis at the same time as we have an election in the fall of 2024. We really didn't have that. Now we do. And this is we're heading into the fall of 2026." And this was always my nightmare scenario.
Speaker B: 为什么?那意味着什么?这两个东西碰撞会是什么样子?
Original English
Speaker B: Why? What does that mean? What are those two things colliding?
Speaker A: 这两个东西的碰撞开始看起来像20世纪60年代。那在20世纪60年代发生了什么?我们有大规模示威活动。我们有反战暴力。我们有地下反战恐怖主义。发生了多次暗杀事件。马丁·路德·金,鲍勃·肯尼迪被暗杀了。芝加哥的会议上,只是大规模示威。芝加哥市长戴利下达了枪击命令。我已经告诉过你们地下反战运动。嗯,他们设置了一串炸弹。所以我们在20世纪60年代面临的是国内政治紧张局势与不受欢迎的战争之间的碰撞。这就是1960年的混乱是如何发生的。我在书中有一整章是关于20世纪60年代以及为什么它如此激烈。
Original English
Speaker A: Those two things colliding start to look like the 1960s. And what happened in the 1960s? The 1960s we had mass uh demonstrations. We had anti-war violence. We had anti-war terrorism with the weather underground. We had multiple assassinations uh that occurred. Martin Luther King, it was uh Bobby Kennedy was assassinated. The convention in Chicago, there was just mass uh demonstration. Mayor Daly in Chicago gave a shoot to kill order. I already mentioned to you the Weather Underground. um uh string of bombs that they set off. So what we faced in the 1960s was the collision of domestic uh political tension with an unpopular war. That's how you got the chaos of the 1960. I have a whole chapter in the book about the 1960s and why it was so particularly intense.
Speaker B: 所以你认为在目前的局势下,特朗普很有可能会输掉中期选举吗?你认为共和党很有可能会输掉……这里是重点。如果……如果我们发生大规模伤亡袭击,这将增加特朗普和共和党赢得中期选举的几率。而且我认为如果我们经历一场没有大规模伤亡袭击的全球经济危机,那么我认为共和党很可能会在中期选举中输掉。
Original English
Speaker B: So do you think that Trump is likely to lose the midterms as things stand? Do you think the Republicans are likely to lose here? Here's here's the thing. If um if we have a mass casualty attack, this will increase the odds of Trump uh and the Republicans winning in the midterms. And I think if uh we have a world economic crisis without the mass casualty attack, uh then I think it's likely that the Republicans will lose in the midterms.
Speaker A: 好的。所以我想我们有我无法给你一个明确答案的原因,我知道人们想要这个答案,因为我们现在面临着多个具体问题,这些问题现在是螺旋式升级暴力的部分。而且三个月并不算很长。
Original English
Speaker A: Okay. So I think we have the reason I can't give you a clean uh answer to this which I know people want they they would because we have multiple specific issues here that are now as part of the spiraling violence and three 3 months isn't awful long.
Speaker B: 这很长,因为大规模伤亡袭击可能发生在十月,而且它不一定需要由伊朗指挥。它可以是……可以发生针对美国人的大规模伤亡袭击,因为它可能是受鼓舞的袭击。伊朗最高领导人发表的声明听起来几乎就像巴格达的领导人发布了旨在鼓励受鼓舞袭击的声明一样。那是在2015年11月巴黎发生的那些导致数百人死亡的自杀袭击。那是圣伯纳迪诺。所以我们……我们看到了领导人激发袭击之前,最高领导人的声明就几乎是同样的词汇。
Original English
Speaker B: It's a long time because that mass casualty attack could happen in in October and it doesn't have to be command directed by Iran. It can be it can occur the mass casualty attack against Americans uh can occur because it's an inspired attack. The Iran the supreme leader is issuing statements that sound almost like Baghdadi that was the leader of ISIS issuing statements to encourage inspired attacks. That was the suicide uh attacks in Paris in November 2015 that killed over a hundred people. That was San Bernardino. So we we we saw leaders inspire attacks before and the Supreme Leader statements are just are eerily close to the same words.
Speaker A: 当前的美国空袭活动是可持续的吗?你之前暗示过这一点,实际上美国可能正在用尽一些武器。估计这场战争每天对美国的成本约为20亿美元。伊朗继续进行这种不对称袭击的能力并不像这样高昂的成本那样……从你之前关于碗的例子来看,似乎更可持续。
Original English
Speaker A: Is the current US air campaign sustainable? You hinted at this earlier on that actually the US might be running out of some of their their weapons. Um, it's estimated that the daily cost of this this war for America is around $2 billion a day and Iran's ability to continue these sort of asymmetric attacks with drones and other things doesn't come as at such a high cost and seems from the example you gave with the bowl earlier on to be more sustainable.
Speaker B: 所以这里真的存在美国会用完武器的风险吗?嗯,我认为我们有可能会用完拦截导弹来击落导弹的风险,但这相当低,因为真正发生在我们武器库中的情况是,史蒂芬,我们正在使用大量的拦截器,特别是像“先锋”导弹拦截器来击落来袭弹道导弹,但我们是从亚洲和欧洲的库存中调用的。这是扎林斯基无法获得“先锋”导弹的一个原因。至少不是很多。因为它现在将大部分库存转移到波斯湾这里了。所以,我认为我们可能会用完那些拦截器。但即使在那里,我也认为风险很低。
Original English
Speaker B: So, is there actually a risk here that the US will run out of weapons? Um, I think that there's a risk we'll run out of interceptors to shoot down missiles, but even that's pretty low because what's really happening in our arsenal of weapons, Stephen, is we are using a lot of interceptors, especially say Patriot missile interceptors to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles, but we're drawing from stocks um in Asia and in Europe. This is one of the reasons Zalinsky can't get Patriot missiles. Uh, at least not very many of them. It's because we're now moving most of the stocks here for the Persian Gulf. So, I think that there's some chance we'll run out of the uh those interceptors. But even there, I think it's low.
Speaker A: 但就炸弹而言,期望我们用完飞机上的炸弹是严重的夸大。有两个原因。为了制造精确炸弹,大多数人不知道需要什么,这是真的。我们可以花费大量金钱来制造一个精确炸弹,但我们可以把普通的、500磅的普通炸弹拿出来,给它们绑一个背包,让它连接到GPS上,并用小电缆连接到炸弹的尾翼,以便将一个普通炸弹变成一个精确炸弹。这些背包大约要2万块钱,也许是25块。所以我们可以比人们想象的更容易制造它们。
Original English
Speaker A: But literally, in terms of the bombs, it's it's an gross exaggeration to expect that uh we are going to run out of bombs to drop from aircraft. And there's two reasons for that. in order to make a precision bomb. Most people don't know what it takes these days, and it's true. We can spend a lot of money making a precision bomb, but we can literally take dumb bombs, 500 lb dumb bombs, and strap a backpack on them that will uh connect with GPS and have little uh cords to the fins of the bombs in order to turn a dumb bomb into a precision bomb. Those fanny packs are about 20,000 bucks, maybe 25. So, we can make them much more easily than people think.
Speaker B: 所以,你认为美国/特朗普的在这个特定时间点的目标是什么?比如,目标是什么?真正的目标是什么?因为我看到很多新闻发布会,他们说它是核武器、这是这个,那是那个。
Original English
Speaker B: So, what do you think the United States/Trump's objective is at this particular point? Like, what is the goal? The the real goal? Cuz there's lots of press conferences I see where they say it's nuclear weapons, it's this, that, and the other.
Speaker A: 我认为特朗普在现在到中期选举之间的目标非常简单。一个象征性的胜利。那会是什么样子?那将看起来像一次……(此处中断)
Original English
Speaker A: I think President Trump's goal between now and the midterms is very simple. A symbolic victory. And what would that look like? That would look like a victory that [TRANSCRIPT_CHUNK_END]
对特朗普支持者的叙事和战略思考
Speaker A: 如果我们能坚持一个星期,也许两个星期,那将是一个展示特朗普总统反击能力的契机。我认为这就是特朗普的支持者以及那些支持战争的人会如何构建这个叙事的框架。我个人认为,特朗普可能会说:“这表明如果我们赢了,我们可以做些什么。”(发出轻蔑的笑声)
Original English
Speaker A: would hold for uh a week, maybe two weeks, and that would be uh an opportunity to show that President Trump fought back. I think that's how this would be framed by uh uh President Trump's supporters and those who support the war. And it would be uh I think President Trump would say, "And this shows what we can do if you let us win." [snorts]
Speaker B: 我认为他的话会有点不同。
Original English
Speaker A: I think his words would be a little different.
Speaker C: 你觉得他被困住了吗?
Original English
Speaker B: Do you think he's stuck?
Speaker D: 他知道自己被困住了吗?
Original English
Speaker C: Do you think he knows he's stuck?
Speaker E: 我从来没有见过特朗普总统。嗯,我在这里的研究,斯蒂芬,一直都关注决策者的实际言论。我可以告诉你的是他的激励因素是什么样子。而我列出的那些激励因素已经相当具有预测性地反映了他的行为。
Original English
Speaker D: I've never met President Trump. Um, my research here, Stephen, has always looked at the actual words by decision-makers. What I can tell you is what his incentives look like. And the incentives that I've laid out have been quite predictive of his behavior.
Speaker F: 你想让他给你打电话吗?
Original English
Speaker E: Do you want him to call you?
Speaker G: 是的。
Original English
Speaker B: Yes.
Speaker H: 如果他给你打电话,你会给他关于下一步该做什么的建议是什么?
Original English
Speaker F: And if he calls you, what is the advice you would give him on what to do next?
Speaker I: 我会做的是尝试设计一个多年的战略,以在地区建立更好的权力平衡,从而在一个时间段内稳定世界和稳定该地区。我认为现在被忽略的重大问题就在这里。
Original English
Speaker G: Uh what I would do is try to design a several year strategy to build a better balance of power in the region that we could over a period of time uh stabilize the world and stabilize the region. And I think that is the big issue that's being missed right now.
Speaker J: 但如果他这么说:“听着,罗伯特,我接下来三个月该怎么办?因为我马上要面临中期选举?”
Original English
Speaker H: But if he says, "Listen, Robert, what do I do in the next three months because I've got these midterms coming up?"
Speaker K: 那么答案就是别给我打电话。我希望帮助特朗普总统,但我真正想帮助美国。这些事情不一定处于对立面,但这里的底线是,关于接下来的三个月我要对特朗普总统说的所有事情,我们已经在这个播客上做了,斯蒂芬。但我非常乐意谈论如何为美国和海湾建立更安全的美好未来。而且我并不认为那会发生。
Original English
Speaker I: Then the answer is don't call me. I want to help President Trump, but I want to help America for real. Uh these are not necessarily at odds, but the bottom line here is that um everything I have to say to President Trump about the next three months, we've just done on this podcast, Stephen. Um, but I am absolutely delighted to talk about how to actually build a more secure future for America and for the Gulf. And I just don't think that's that's happening.
Speaker L: 而且我不认为这种压力必然会导致特朗普总统的选举胜利,从而使美国和海湾的真正安全变得更有可能。事实上,情况会走向相反的方向。它会鼓励升级陷阱。这就是我被升级陷阱的逻辑困住的原因。我们必须超越那种只有保证个人政治成功的选项才是可接受的,即使这意味着要成为美国总统的想法。
Original English
Speaker L: And I don't think the uh the pressure that this must lead to an electoral victory for President Trump is likely to uh uh make the the true security for America and the Gulf more likely. In fact, it's going to go the other way around. It will encourage the escalation trap. So, that's why I'm I am I'm stuck by my own logic of the escalation trap uh here. It's literally um we we have to move past the idea that uh the only acceptable option is an option that guarantees um political success for an individual even if it means the president of the United States.
Speaker M: 你认为俄罗斯和中国,这两个通常被定位为美国对手的国家,现在在想什么?他们想要发生什么?你知道,我猜中国受到了石油局势的伤害。俄罗斯则有它自己的乌克兰问题。他们在想什么?
Original English
Speaker K: What do you think Russia and China who are often positioned as adversaries of the United States? What do you think they're thinking right now? And what do they what do they want to happen? You know, I guess China's being hurt by the oil situation. Russia's got their own situation going on with the Ukraine. What are they thinking?
Speaker N: 我认为中国不希望全球出现不稳定。但同时,他们也不希望伊朗被彻底摧毁。我认为那根本不在他们的计划之内。我也认为中国不会以非常强硬的方式介入。我认为伊朗可能会爆发并军事支持美国,或者用自己的军队进行军事支持,这不太可能发生。所以我不认为他们想让伊朗被摧毁。
Original English
Speaker N: Uh I think China does not want there to be global instability. Uh but at the same time, they don't want this to be uh a situation where Iran comes out smashed. I think that is um uh that's that's simply not in the cart. I also don't think China is going to insert itself in a very forceful way. I think the idea that Iran might come out and militarily support the United States here or militarily support with its own forces Iran is not likely to happen. So I think that what you were
Speaker O: 为什么他们不希望伊朗被摧毁?
Original English
Speaker N: Why don't they want Iran smashed to China?
Speaker P: 对于习近平总统来说,他在峰会上解释了相当一部分。他告诉特朗普总统:“你是一个衰落的强国。你将陷入他所说的‘愚蠢陷阱’吗?也就是说,你是否会针对亚洲对中国发动预防性战争?”这就是习近平总统所说的。
Original English
Speaker P: For President Xi um he explained quite a bit of this at the summit. He said to President Trump, "You're a declining power. Are you going to uh fall into what he called the Thusidity trap? Meaning, are you going to launch a preventive war against China in Asia?" And that's what President Xi said.
Speaker Q: 那俄罗斯呢?
Original English
Speaker P: What about Russia?
Speaker R: 俄罗斯看到的是一个挤压欧洲经济的机会。所以,我相信最近几周、上个月发生的事情是乌克兰不仅获得了无人机方面的实力,而且在克里米亚这个特定地区——也就是俄罗斯和普京在2014年夺取的地区——发生了大规模的流离失所。乌克兰正在对流入克里米亚以及从俄罗斯流入乌克兰的供应链施加越来越多的压力。我认为普京想要发生的是,他可能会升级冲突,在世界经济危机因伊朗而增长的时候,对欧洲施加更大的压力。这将使欧洲难以履行他们刚刚向扎林斯基承诺的额外800亿美元的义务。
Original English
Speaker R: What Russia is seeing is an opportunity to squeeze Europe economically. Uh so I believe that what has been happening in the last few weeks here, the last month is that Ukraine has actually been gaining uh uh not just strength with drones but in a specific area called Crimea in uh which uh Russia took and Putin took in 2014. There's been a mass exodus out of Crimea in the last weeks. Ukraine is putting more and more pressure on the supply lines coming into Crimea and also coming into Ukraine from Russia. And what Putin, I think, is uh is is uh wants to have happen is that um he will likely escalate more, put more pressure on Europe at exactly the time in the fall when the world economic crisis is growing because of Iran. And that is going to squeeze Europe, make it hard for Europe to fulfill the commitment they just made to uh Zalinsky of 80 billion more dollars.
Speaker S: 我的最后一个问题,在我去日记之前,如果你要预测接下来的几个月会如何发展,你的预测是什么?这是一个关于一个概率的预测,51% 的可能性。接下来会发生什么?我认为在接下来的几个月里,我们将跨越一个门槛,将地面行动引入伊朗的一个岛屿或沿海部分,因为世界经济危机将会增长。美国汽油价格可能会上涨,特朗普总统将更加迫切地试图找到一种方法来看起来好像他有一个打开霍尔木兹的计划。这可能不是真的。它可能只是象征性的。但我认为斯蒂芬,我们正朝着这个方向前进,危机越大,世界经济危机越大,如果发生大规模伤亡袭击,危机越大,特朗普总统就越有压力要展示他有打开霍尔木兹的方法,即使那很遥远,他也需要一笔首付。他需要一些看得见的东西来证明,我认为这就是他们跨入第三阶段的压力来源。
Original English
Speaker S: I guess my last question then before I go to the diary is um if you were to predict how the next couple of months play out, what would your prediction be? And this is a on a on probability, 51% probability of outcomes. What happens next? I I think we're going to uh in the next few months cross the threshold with ground operations into either one of the islands or uh part of the coast of Iran because the world economic crisis is going to grow. The price of gasoline in the United States is likely to grow and President Trump is going to be even more desperate to try to find a way to look make it at least appear as if he has a plan to open hormones. It may not be real. It may only be symbolic. But I think Stephen that the uh where we are heading is um uh the more the crisis the world economic crisis increases and if there's a mass casualty attack the more that crisis increases the more President Trump is under pressure to demonstrate he has a way to open Hormuz even if it's far off and he needs a down payment on that. He needs something to show tangibly and I think that's where the pressure will come from for crossing into stage three.
Speaker T: 我认为在这些对话中也值得一提的是,目前有超过9000万伊朗人生活在伊朗,正处于这种疯狂和混乱之中。有时在这些对话中,我们并没有真正思考一个事实:有一个国家比我来自的国家——英国——大得多,而他们就在这个核心地带。所以每当特朗普说他在周末轰炸了更多的人,或者他正在发射炸弹时,我总会想到那些被卷入这一切的真实家庭,那些没有选择这场战争,正生活在一个炸弹降临头上的环境中。而且我认为对于世界上所有听这个节目的每一个人,无论你身在英国还是美国、澳大利亚、加拿大,或者你在哪里——南美洲、亚洲、非洲,无论在哪里——想象一下如果知道美国正在对你生活的国家轰炸大量的炸弹,那会是什么感觉,这对你的孩子来说会是什么感觉,对你自己来说会是什么感觉,它将如何影响你的一天。还有我猜不确定性,不知道什么时候结束,如果它要结束,以及听到这个‘升级陷阱’这个术语并想,你知道,这实际上会升级,军队会进入我的国家。所以这其中存在着真实的人道代价,有时我们在这些对话中会忽略这一点。
Original English
Speaker T: And I have students um uh and at the University of Chicago who um are Iranian. They have families in Iran. Uh and they ask me questions about this all the time. And sadly, what I have to tell them is that real hope for the Iranian people is five or 10 years away. And as this war escalates, it pushes closer to 10 than five. We have a closing tradition on this podcast with the last guest leader question for the next. The question left for you is if you could go back to a certain time and see something occur or ask someone something you've always wondered about, what slash who would that person slash place be and why?
Speaker U: 我认为我会问的关键人物是富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福。他在我们投下原子弹之前就去世了。我想从他那里了解他在开发和支持原子弹的时候,当时他想象那个由原子弹创造的世界会是什么样子?因为在我的一生中,战争一直是我的工作的决定性特征。但核战争的前景一直远远超过我们的工作。我们永远不想达到那种状态。但我希望从那位拥有最多权威的权力的人那里了解。
Original English
Speaker U: I think the key person I would ask would be uh Franklin Delanor Roosevelt. He died before we dropped the atomic bombs. I would want to know from him when he was developing uh and supporting the atomic bombs. Did he imagine the world that would be created by the atomic bombs? Because in my lifetime, war has been a defining feature of my work. Uh but uh the prospects of nuclear war have always overhung quite a bit of our work. We never want to get to anything like that. But I'd like to know from the person who had the most authority power
对未来的预见与领导力的思考
Speaker A: 那些未来会发生的事情,谁都没看到,但却知道它要来。我想从他那里了解,他认为到底会发生什么?因为我认为这对于我们是否应该让我们的领导者真正地能看清和理解他们能看得有多远,以及他们今天的决策将塑造世界未来几十年的影响,是非常有用的信息。
Original English
make that future happen who never even saw it, didn't even see it happen, but knew it was coming. i'd like to know from him what did he think was truly going to come because i think that this would be uh uh extremely useful to know whether or not our leaders truly truly how far out they can really see and understand how much their decisions today shape the world for decades to come.
Speaker B: Robert,谢谢你。嗯,我们对你的书非常期待,9月22日发布。所以,我们有预购链接了吗?它已经上线了。实际上,真的,它已经上线了。是的。
Original English
Robert, thank you. Um we're very excited for your book September 22nd. So, do we have a pre-order link yet? It's just up. Actually, literally, it's just up. So, yes,
Speaker A: 我必须说,当我们第一次坐下来的时候,你提出了很多关于接下来会发生的事情。但我不太确定我是否相信了他们全部,因为我对战争一无所知。而且你们和他们从来没有真正思考过在家里,也思考过炸弹正在落下的地方的心理变化。但看起来你对你说的情况是相当正确的。这种跨所有战争发生的升级现象,也发生在乌克兰和俄罗斯同时发生的时候,但现在我们正在伊朗那里看到它的发展。所以我必须给你点赞,因为你很不幸地——我应该说我同意“不幸”这个词。所以,这对我来说是……我很高兴的,但事实是,这正是我跟我97岁的婆婆谈论的事情。我告诉她你又邀请我了。她九十七岁了,连床都下不来,Stephen。我告诉她这是我不得不同意的最悲伤的事情之一。这是因为它的真正含义。你让我在这里的原因是,我们的国家的情况很糟,我只希望情况能对我们国家更好。
Original English
I have to say when we first sat down, you said a bunch of things in terms of what would happen next. And I'm not sure I believed them all because I don't know anything about war. And they and you never really think about the psychology changes both at home, but also where the bombs are dropping. And it does appear that you've been largely correct about what you what you said would happen. this escalation that happens across all wars that has happened also in Ukraine and Russia at the same time but now we're seeing play out in Iran. So I have to give you your credit because you have been unfortunately you've been right I should say I would agree with the word unfortunately. So, this is uh um part of me would like to be happy about this, but the truth is uh and this is what i just was talking to my 97year-old mother-in-law about is um uh i told her that you had invited me again. She's 97 years old, can't even get out of bed, Stephen. And I told her that um it was it was one of the saddest things i had to agree to. And it's because of what it really means. The reason you're having me here is because things are bad for our country and i want nothing more than for things to be better for our country.
Speaker B: 嗯,Robert,非常感谢你回来。嗯,你知道,如果我们再次回来并会聚,我希望下次条件更好,因为我们正在分析这一切如何为每个人带来了和平,特别是那些现在生活在周围的人。
Original English
Well, Robert, thank you so much for coming back and um you know, if we do come back again and convene, I hope next time it's on better terms because we're analyzing how it all resulted in peace for everybody, especially the people that are living and around right now.
Speaker B: 谢谢你。
Original English
Thank you.
Speaker C: YouTube 有这个新的疯狂算法,他们根据人工智能和你的所有观看行为知道你接下来想看哪个视频。而算法说这个视频是为你量身定做的完美视频。对现在看的人来说,这对于每个人都是不同的。去看看这个视频吧,我敢打赌你会喜欢的。
Original English
YouTube have this new crazy algorithm where they know exactly what video you would like to watch next based on AI and all of your viewing behavior. And the algorithm says that this video is the perfect video for you. It's different for everybody looking right now. Check this video out and I bet you you might love it.