AI 进化困境:从强化学习到类人智能的漫长征途 Dwarkesh Patel 2025-12-23

AI 进化困境:当前路线的迷思与未来路径

当前AI领域存在一个令人困惑的现象:一方面,部分观点预言通用人工智能(AGI)即将到来,对强化学习(Reinforcement Learning, RL)的规模化投入持乐观态度;另一方面,如果AI已接近类人学习者(Human-like Learner)的水平,那么当前基于可验证结果训练的RL方法似乎注定要失败。当前的AI研究机构(labs)正投入大量资源,通过中期训练(mid-training)将各种技能“硬编码”进模型。这包括构建专门的RL环境,以训练模型掌握如浏览网页(web browser)使用Excel(use Excel)等具体操作,用于构建金融模型。然而,这引出了一个根本性的选择:这些模型要么能在未来实现自主学习(self-directed way),使当前的预训练变得徒劳;要么它们无法做到,这意味着AGI的实现并非近在眼前。人类的学习过程与此截然不同,我们无需经历一个特殊的训练阶段来反复演练可能用到的每一种软件。正如Baron Millig在其博客文章中所指出的,当我们看到前沿模型在各项基准测试中取得进步时,我们不应只看到模型规模的扩大和巧妙的ML研究,更应认识到为了精确训练这些能力,付给博士、医学博士及其他专家撰写问题、提供示例答案和推理的数十亿美元。这种紧张关系在**机器人(robotics)**领域尤为明显:从根本上说,机器人学是一个算法问题,而非硬件或数据问题。一个普通人只需极少训练就能学会操作现有硬件完成有用的工作。若我们拥有类人学习者,机器人学将很大程度上成为一个已解决的问题。但事实是,我们尚未拥有这样的学习者,这迫使我们在千家万户中反复练习百万次如何拿起盘子或折叠衣物。

Original English

I'm confused why some people have super short timelines yet at the same time are bullish on scaling up reinforcement learning a top LLMs. If we're actually close to a humanlike learner, then this whole approach of training on verifiable outcomes is doomed.

Now, currently the labs are trying to bake in a bunch of skills into these models through mid-training. There's an entire supply chain of companies that are building RL environments which teach the model how to navigate a web browser or use Excel to build financial models.

Now either these models will soon learn on the job in a self-directed way which will make all this freebaking pointless or they won't which means that AGI is not imminent. Humans don't have to go through the special training phase where they need to rehearse every single piece of software that they might ever need to use on the job. Baron Millig made an interesting point about this in a recent blog post he wrote. He writes, quote, "When we see frontier models improving at various benchmarks, we should think not just about the increased scale and the clever ML research ideas, but the billions of dollars that are paid to PhDs, MDs, and other experts to write questions and provide example answers and reasoning targeting these precise capabilities. You can see this tension most vividly in robotics. In some fundamental sense, robotics is an algorithms problem, not a hardware or a data problem. With very little training, a human can learn how to tell or operate current hardware to do useful work. So if you actually had a humanlike learner, robotics would be in large part a solved problem. But the fact that we don't have such a learner makes it necessary to go out into a thousand different homes and practice a million times on how to pick up dishes or fold laundry.

预训练的效率之辩与人类适应性的核心价值

一种常见的反驳是,我们必须进行这些笨拙的RL训练,其目的是为了构建一个超人工智能研究员(superhuman AI researcher),然后数百万个这样的自动化“助手”可以自行解决**稳健且高效的学习(robust and efficient learning)问题。但这听起来像是“我们每笔销售都在亏损,但我们会通过销量弥补”的老笑话。一个自动化的研究员将如何找到AGI的算法——这是人类奋斗了近半个世纪却仍未解决的问题,而它们却缺乏儿童具备的基本学习能力?这似乎极不可信。更何况,即使这是你的信念,它也未能解释当前的实验室是如何在从可验证的奖励中进行强化学习的。你不需要预先“烘焙”一个能够制作PowerPoint幻灯片(PowerPoint slides)的咨询技能,来自动化AI研究员。因此,实验室的行为清晰地暗示了一种世界观:这些模型将在泛化(generalization)即时学习(on the job learning)**方面表现不佳,从而有必要预先构建那些我们期望具有经济价值的技能。

另一种反驳认为,即使模型能够边工作边学习这些技能,一次性在训练阶段完成也比为每个用户和每个公司重复学习要高效得多(much more efficient)。诚然,对于诸如浏览器(browsers)终端(terminals)等通用工具,让模型在训练时就熟练掌握是合乎逻辑的。事实上,AGI的一个关键优势在于其跨副本共享知识的强大能力。然而,人们往往低估了完成大多数工作所需的公司特定和上下文特定技能(company and context specific skills)的重要性。目前,尚无可靠且高效的方法供AI获取这些技能。最近一次与一位AI研究员和一位生物学家的晚宴上,生物学家提出了一个长远的时间线(long timelines)。当被问及原因时,她提到最近实验室的一项工作涉及查看显微镜下的细胞切片(slides),并判断点状结构是**巨噬细胞(macrofage)**还是仅仅看起来像。AI研究员对此回应道:“看,**图像分类(image classification)是一个经典的深度学习问题,这正是我们可以训练模型解决的核心问题。” 这次交流之所以引人深思,是因为它鲜明地揭示了我与那些期望在未来几年内看到变革性经济影响(transformative economic impact)的人们之间的核心分歧。人类劳动者的价值恰恰在于,我们不需要为他们工作的每个细微环节都进行定制化的“训练彩排”。为识别特定实验室准备切片的巨噬细胞(macrophages)而构建定制化训练流水线,再为下一个实验室特定的微任务建立另一个训练循环,这并非净生产力。真正需要的是一个能够从语义反馈(semantic feedback)自我指导式经验(self-directed experience)**中学习,并像人类一样进行泛化的AI。每天,我们都要处理上百件需要判断力、**情境意识(situational awareness)**和在工作中习得的技能与语境的任务。这些任务不仅因人而异,甚至对同一个人而言,每天的侧重点也可能不同。仅仅通过预设一套技能,是不可能自动化任何一项工作的,更遑论所有工作。

Original English

Now, one counter argument I've heard from the people who think we're going to have a takeoff within the next 5 years is that we have to do all this cludgy RL in service of building a superhuman AI researcher. And then the million copies of this automated Ilia can go figure out how to solve robust and efficient learning from experience. This just gives me the vibes of that old joke, we're losing money on every sale, but we'll make it up in volume. Somehow, this automated researcher is going to figure out the algorithm for AGI, which is a problem that humans have been banging their head against for the better half of a century, while not having the basic learning capabilities that children have. I find it super implausible. Besides, even if that's what you believe, it doesn't describe how the labs are approaching reinforcement learning from verifiable reward. You don't need to pre-bake in a consultant skill at crafting PowerPoint slides in order to automate Ilia. So clearly, the lab's actions hint at a worldview where these models will continue to fare poorly at generalization and on the job learning, thus making it necessary to build in the skills that we hope will be economically useful beforehand into these models.

Another counter argument you can make is that even if the model could learn these skills on the job, it is just so much more efficient to build in these skills once during trading rather than again for each user and each company. And look, it makes a ton of sense to just bake influency with common tools like browsers and terminals. And indeed, one of the key advantages that AGIS will have is this greater capacity to share knowledge across copies. But people are really underrating how much company and context specific skills are required to do most jobs. And there just isn't currently a robust efficient way for AIS to pick up these skills.

I was recently at a dinner with a AI researcher and a biologist. And it turned out the biologist had long timelines. And so we were asking about why she had these long timelines. And then she said, you know, one part of work recently in the lab has involved looking at slides and deciding if the dot in that slide is actually a macroofage or just looks like a macroofage. And the AI researcher, as you might anticipate, responded, look, image classification is a textbook deep learning problem. This is death center in the kind of thing that we could train these models to do. And I thought this is a very interesting exchange because it illustrated a key crux between me and the people who expect transformative economic impact within the next few years. Human workers are valuable precisely because we don't need to build in the schley training bloops for every single part of their job. It's not net productive to build a custom training pipeline to identify what macrofages look like given the specific way that this lab prepares slides and then another training loop for the next lab specific microtask and so on. What you actually need is an AI that can learn from semantic feedback or from self-directed experience and then generalize the way a human does. Every day you have to do a 100 things that require judgment, situational awareness, and skills and context that are learned on the job. These tasks differ not just across different people but even from one day to the next for the same person. It is not possible to automate even a single job by just baking in a predefined set of skills let alone all the jobs.

持续学习:通往真正AGI的必由之路

事实上,我认为人们低估了AI的实际威力,因为他们仅仅是在想象当前模式的延伸。他们没有考虑到服务器上数十亿个能够复制和融合所有学习成果的类人智能。我预期在未来十年或二十年内,我们将看到真正的类脑智能(brain-like intelligences)出现。有时,人们会说,AI之所以现在能在企业中得到更广泛的部署并提供大量非编码价值,是因为技术需要很长时间才能扩散(diffuse)。我同意这种说法,但认为这是一种“阿Q式精神胜利法(cope)”。人们用这种理由来掩盖一个事实:这些模型仅仅缺乏广泛经济价值所需的关键能力。如果这些模型真的像服务器上的类人生物,它们的扩散速度会快得多。事实上,它们比普通人类员工更容易集成和上手。它们能在几分钟内阅读你所有的Slack信息,并立即提炼出其他AI员工所拥有的所有技能。此外,人类的招聘市场就像一个“柠檬市场(lemons market)”,事先很难辨别出谁是优秀人才,而雇佣表现不佳的员工则成本高昂。如果只是启动另一个经过验证的高质量模型实例,你将不会面临或担心这种动态。因此,AI劳动力的扩散将比雇佣人类员工容易得多,而公司一直在雇佣人类。如果AI的能力真的达到AGI级别,人们将愿意每年花费数万亿美元购买其模型产生的Token。全球知识工作者每年累积的工资高达数十万亿美元。而目前,AI实验室的收入与这一数字相去甚远,根本原因在于模型的能力远不如人类知识工作者。

你可能会问:标准怎么会突然变成实验室每年必须赚取数万亿美元的收入?(直到最近,人们还在讨论模型是否能推理(reason),是否拥有常识(common sense),或者它们仅仅是进行模式识别(pattern recognition)。)显然,AI的乐观主义者批评AI的悲观主义者反复移动“目标(goalpost)”,这常常是公平的。我们很容易低估AI在过去十年中的进展。但某些程度上的目标移动是合理的。如果我在2020年看到Gemini 3,我一定会确信它能自动化半数以上的知识工作。我们不断解决我们认为阻碍AGI发展的瓶颈:模型拥有通用理解能力(general understanding)少样本学习(few-shot learning)推理能力(reasoning)。然而,我们仍然没有AGI。那么,面对这种情况,一个理性的回应是什么?我认为,完全合理的回应是认识到:“哦,原来**智能(intelligence)劳动力(labor)比我之前认识到的要复杂得多。” 尽管我们在许多方面已经接近甚至超越了我过去对AGI的定义,但模型公司未能实现AGI所隐含的数万亿美元收入,这清晰地表明我之前的AGI定义过于狭隘。我预计这种情况将持续下去。到2030年,各实验室将在我长期关注的领域——持续学习(continual learning)上取得重大进展,模型年收入将达数百亿美元,但它们仍无法自动化所有知识工作。届时,我可能会说:“我们取得了很大进展,但尚未达到AGI,模型还需要X、Y、Z能力。” 模型在短期预测者期望的速度(rate)上变得越来越令人印象深刻,但在长期预测者期望的有用性(useful)**上,其进步则更为缓慢。

我们值得思考:我们到底在通过**预训练(pre-training)扩展什么?我们曾观察到一个极其清晰且普遍的趋势:在计算量指数级增长的背景下,模型损失(loss)持续下降。尽管这是一种幂律增长(power law),其强度远不及指数增长。但人们试图借用预训练规模化带来的声望——这种声望几乎像宇宙物理定律一样可预测——来为从可验证奖励中进行强化学习(reinforcement learning from verifiable reward)的预测提供依据,而后者我们却未曾公开知晓任何可靠的趋势。当勇敢的研究者们试图从稀疏的公开数据点中拼凑出其含义时,他们得到的结果相当悲观。例如,Toby Board在一篇精彩的博文中,巧妙地连接了不同的O系列基准测试,并暗示“为了达到类似GPT单个模型级别的提升,我们需要数百万倍(millionx)**的总RL计算量”。

Original English

In fact, I think people are really underestimating how big a deal actual AI will be because they are just imagining more of this current regime. They're not thinking about billions of humanlike intelligences on a server which can copy and merge all the learnings. And to be clear, I expect this, which is to say I expect actual brain-like intelligences within the next decade or two, which is pretty [ __ ] crazy.

Sometimes people will say that the reason that AIs are more widely deployed right now across firms and already providing lots of value outside of coding is that technology takes a long time to diffuse. And I think this is cope. I think people are using this code to gloss over the fact that these models just lack the capabilities that are necessary for broad economic value. If these models actually were like humans on a server, they'd diffuse incredibly quickly. In fact, they'd be so much easier to integrate and onboard than a normal human employee is. They could read your entire Slack and drive within minutes. And they could immediately distill all the skills that your other AI employees have. Plus, the hiring market for humans is very much like a lemons market where it's hard to tell who the good people are beforehand. And then obviously hiring somebody who turns out to be bad is very costly. This is just not a dynamic that you would have to face or worry about if you're just spinning up another instance of a vetted hi model. So for these reasons, I expect it's going to be much easier to diffuse AI labor into firms than it is to hire a person. And companies hire people all the time. If the capabilities were actually at AGI level, people would be willing to spend trillions of dollars a year buying tokens that these models produce. Knowledge workers across the world cumulatively earn tens of trillions of dollars a year in wages. And the reason that labs are orders of magnitude off this figure right now is that the models are nowhere near as capable as human knowledge workers.

Now you might be like look how can the standard have suddenly become labs have to earn tens of trillions of dollars of revenue a year right like until recently people were saying can these models reason do these models have common sense are they just doing pattern recognition and obviously AI bulls are right to criticize AI bears for repeatedly moving these goalpost and this is very often fair it's easy to underestimate the progress that AI has made over the last decade but some amount of goalpost shifting is actually justified if If you showed me Gemini 3 in 2020, I would have been certain that it could automate half of knowledge work. And so we keep solving what we thought were the sufficient bottlenecks to AGI. We have models that have general understanding. They have few shot learning. They have reasoning. And yet we still don't have AGI. So what is a rational response to observing this? I think it's totally reasonable to look at this and say, "Oh, actually there's much more to intelligence and labor than I previously realized." And while we're really close and in many ways have surpassed what I would have previously defined as AGI in the past, the fact that model companies are not making the trillions of dollars in revenue that would be implied by AGI clearly reveals that my previous definition of AGI was too narrow. And I expect this to keep happening into the future. I expect that by 2030, the labs will have made significant progress on my hobby horse of continual learning and the models will be earning hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue a year, but they won't have automated all knowledge work. And I'll be like, look, we made a lot of progress, but we haven't hit AGI yet. We also need these other capabilities. We need X, Y, and Z capabilities in these models. Models keep getting more impressive at the rate that the short timelines people predict, but more useful at the rate that the long timelines people predict.

It's worth asking what are we scaling with pre-trading? We had this extremely clean and general trend in improvement in loss across multiples orders of magnitude in compute. Albeit this was on a power law which is as weak as exponential growth is strong. But people are trying to launder the prestige that three training scaling has, which is almost as predictable as a physical law of the universe to justify bullish predictions about reinforcement learning from verifiable reward for which we have no welfare publicly known trend. And when intrepid researchers do try to piece together the implications from scarce public data points, they get pretty bearish results. For example, Toby Board has a great post where he cleverly connects the dots between the different O series benchmarks and this suggested to him that quote we need something like a millionx scale up in total RL compute to give a boost similar to a single GPT level. End quote.

持续学习:AI发展的下一个前沿

人们常常讨论软件奇点(software singularity)——AI模型编写代码以生成更智能的后继系统,或软硬件一体奇点(software plus hardware singularity)——AI也同时改进其后继系统的计算硬件。然而,所有这些情景都忽视了我所认为的,将驱动AGI进一步提升的关键因素:持续学习(continual learning)。再次思考人类是如何变得比任何事物都更强大?这主要源于在相关领域的经验(experience)。在一次对话中,Baron Miller提出了一个有趣的观点:未来可能是一种**持续学习的智能体(continual learning agents)**的模式,它们各自外出工作,创造价值,然后将所有学习成果带回一个“蜂巢思维(hive mind)”模型,该模型会对所有智能体进行一种“批次蒸馏(bash distillation)”。这些智能体本身可以高度专业化,包含Karpathi所称的“认知核心(cognitive core)”,加上与其被部署工作相关的知识和技能。

解决持续学习问题不会是一次性的成就。它将类似于解决上下文学习(in-context learning)。早在2020年,GPT-3就已经展示了上下文学习的强大潜力。GPT-3的上下文学习能力如此出色,以至于其论文标题即是“语言模型是少样本学习者(few-shot learners)”。当然,GPT-3的出现并未“解决”上下文学习问题。事实上,从理解能力到上下文长度,仍有大量进展需要实现。我预计持续学习将经历类似的演进过程。各实验室可能在明年发布某种被称作“持续学习”的成果,并将其视为朝着持续学习迈进的一步。但达到人类水平的在职学习可能还需要5到10年才能完善。这也是为什么我不预期第一个突破持续学习模式的模型会带来某种失控式收益(runaway gains),尽管它会越来越广泛部署且能力更强。如果某个实验室突然完全解决了持续学习问题,那么正如SAT在播客中对我关于这一“身体残疾”的提问时所言,这可能就是“游戏结束、胜负已定”的时刻。但这不太可能发生。更有可能的是,某个实验室会找到突破该问题的初步方法,然后通过对该功能的探索,其实现方式会变得清晰。随后,其他实验室将迅速复制这一突破并稍作改进。此外,我还有一种预感,即各模型公司之间的**竞争(competition)**将保持异常激烈。这种预感基于观察:所有先前所谓的“飞轮效应(flywheels)”,无论是用户在聊天中的参与度、合成数据,还是其他因素,都未能显著减弱模型公司之间日益激烈的竞争。

几乎每个月,三大模型公司都会轮流站在领奖台上,而其他竞争者也并非落后太远。似乎存在某种力量——可能是人才挖角(talent poaching),可能是旧金山的传言(rumor mill SF),又或者是正常的逆向工程(reverse engineering)——至今已抵消了任何单一实验室可能获得的、失控式的优势。这段内容源自我在dwarcash.com博客上发表的一篇论文的叙述。我将发布更多论文,发现这在面试前梳理思路时非常有帮助。如果你想及时了解这些内容,可以订阅ash.com。否则,我们下期播客再见。

Original English

So people have spent a lot of time talking about the possibility of a software in the singularity where AI models will write the code that generates a smarter successor system or a software plus hardware singularity where AIs also improve their successor's computing hardware. However, all these scenarios neglect what I think will be the main driver of further improvements at top AGI continual learning. Again, think about how humans become more capable than anything. It's mostly from experience in the relevant domain. Over conversation, Baron Miller made this interesting suggestion that the future might look like continual learning agents who are all going out and they're doing different jobs and they're generating value and then they're bringing back all their learnings to the hive mind model which does some kind of bash distillation on all of these agents. The agents themselves could be quite specialized containing what Karpathi called the cognitive core plus knowledge and skills relevant to the job they're being deployed to do. Solving continual learning won't be a singular one and done achievement. Instead, it will feel like solving in context learning. Now, GBT3 already demonstrated in context learning could be very powerful in 2020. It's uh in context learning capabilities were so remarkable. The title of the GPT3 paper was language models are a few shot learners. But of course, we didn't solve in context learning when GPD3 came out. And indeed, there's still plenty of progress that still has to be made from comprehension to context length. I expect a similar progression with continual learning. Labs will probably release something next year which they call continual learning and which will in fact count as progress towards continual learning. But human level on the job learning may take another 5 to 10 years to iron out. This is why I don't expect some kind of runaway gains from the first model that cracks continual learning that's getting more and more widely deployed and capable. If you had fully solved continual learning drop out of nowhere, then sure, it might be game set match as SAT put it on the podcast when I asked him about this body disability. But that's probably not what's going to happen. Instead, some lab is going to figure out how to get some initial traction on this problem and then playing around with this feature will make it clear how it was implemented and then other labs will soon replicate the breakthrough and improve it slightly. Besides, I just have some prior that the competition will stay pretty fierce between all these model companies. And this is informed by the observation that all these previous supposed flywheels, whether that's user engagement on chat or synthetic data or whatever, have done very little to diminish the greater and greater competition between model companies. Every month or so, the big three model companies will rotate around the podium, and the other competitors are not that far behind. There seems to be some force, and this is potentially talent poaching. It's potentially the rumor mill SF or just normal reverse engineering which has so far neutralized any runaway advantage that a single lab might have had. This was an narration of an essay that I originally released on my blog at dwarcash.com. I'm going be publishing a lot more essays. I found it's actually quite helpful in ironing out my thoughts before interviews. If you want to stay up to date with those, you can subscribe atash.com. Otherwise, I'll see you for the next podcast. Cheers.

📌 文中提及的人物和组织

产品/模型: LLMs, GPT-3, Gemini 3