全球央行分化与主权债务隐忧:日银加息博弈、英国QT权力让渡与法国利差危机 Joseph Wang 2026-09-19

全球央行分化与主权债务隐忧:日银加息博弈、英国QT权力让渡与法国利差危机

4 节

日银鸽派加息:政治博弈掣肘与美日利差压制

日本央行(Bank of Japan: 日本中央银行)近期将政策基准利率上调至 1.25%,然而这一加息举措不仅未能有效提振日元,反而引发了市场的普遍失望与日元新一轮贬值。究其根本,日银的紧缩节奏受到深层宏观与政治因素的双重掣肘:一方面,日本经济经历了数十年长期的通缩与低通胀(Deflation & Disinflation: 整体物价持续下跌或物价涨幅极低的宏观经济状态),导致决策层在采取任何限制性货币政策时都极为谨慎;另一方面,政坛施压显性化,日本首相高市早苗(Sanae Takaichi)普遍被认为对日银施加压力以阻止激进加息,其政策取向更倾向于容忍弱势日元以支撑经济。尽管美国财政部长贝森特(Scott Bessent)多次抱怨日元过度疲软并施压日方加息,但日银内部的政治分歧已公之于众——在本次加息决议中,有两位具有高市背景的审议委员明确投出反对票,这种央行独立性受政治角力的现象让市场进一步确信未来加息路径将更加缓慢与迟滞。

从跨市场联动与利率预期来看,决定日元汇率的核心底层逻辑依然是美日利差(Interest Rate Differential: 两种货币所代表的基准利率或国债收益率之间的绝对差值)。虽然市场预期日银在未来12个月内可能再加息两次,但同期市场对美联储(Federal Reserve: 美国联邦储备系统)的加息预期更为激进(计入了多达三次加息)。以两国对政策利率最敏感的 2年期国债收益率 为基准,美债收益率的攀升幅度明显压倒日债,导致美日利差持续处于高位甚至走阔,彻底锁死了日元内生性反弹的空间。不过,值得庆幸的系统性边际改善在于,日本长期国债(JGB: Japanese Government Bonds)近期的市场表现趋于平稳,此前因日元暴跌引发长端日债抛售、进而通过全球主权债联动波及美债长端的恶性传导链条已明显缓解。

英文原文

Hello my friends. Today is September 19th and this is Markets Weekly. All right guys, so last week of course the big news was the Fed. We already have an entire episode on that and for those of you following this channel, you guys would have known weeks in advance that the Fed was going to hike. Now last week though, we also had some interesting news from other central banks. So today, first let's talk about the Bank of Japan hiking to 1.25% and yet still disappointing the market. Secondly, let's talk about the Bank of England. Now the Bank of England did not hike but they did do something pretty interesting when it comes to their QT program. So in a sense they are similar to the Fed allowing their government to decide the maturity structure of the debt and seemingly reverting to I guess a more neutral position when it comes to the bond market. And lastly now many of you have been looking for a debt crisis. Now, honestly, I don't think you're going to find that in the United States, but maybe, and I mean maybe, you might find that in France. So, let's talk about what's happening in the French debt market.

All right, starting with Japan. So, as many of you know, over the past few months, the yen has been depreciating pretty rapidly, and it's pretty obvious why. Now the Bank of Japan even though they've had inflation above target dropped a little bit but still moving up they have kept interest rates to be very very accommodative. Now the slowness in their hiking cycle in part has to do with the fact that they dealt for decades of deflation disinflation and are hesitant to do anything that is too restrictive and in part is because Prime Minister Takiichi is widely perceived to be putting pressure on the Bank of Japan to not hike rates. She is willing to accept a weaker currency. Now, Secretary Basson has been mentioning that's been complaining about the weakness of the yen and there are reports suggesting that he also is putting some pressure on Japan to hike rates. But in any case, it was widely perceived the Bank of Japan would have hiked rates and they did to 1.25%. Again, guys, here at the Fed, we're like 4% and the Bank of Japan is at 1.25%. And inflation in Japan really isn't that low. So the Bank of Japan is definitely definitely slow.

Now this is something that the market anticipated and was something people hoped would give some stability to the Japanese yen. But the thing is the way that the decision was announced. Now if you look at this excerpt from the decision, you can see that even though they hiked rates, there were two people who dissented and those two people were Takichi appointees. So it's just like the US when not too long ago you could have Trump appointees basically consistently voting for say well dissenting for 25 or 50 basis point cuts. So there's something similar going on over there. The government is putting pressure on central bank. Now the market didn't like that and it perceived that further tightening was going to be maybe a little bit slower than the market perceived and so you saw the Japanese yen basically weakened notably.

Now there were rumors of another rate check. So the government trying to do things to stop the yen from becoming too weak. But the fact is that the interest rate differential between the dollar and the yen is just wide. And unless that narrows a bit, it's very difficult to see how the yen could strengthen. Now the market continues to price in about two more hikes from the Bank of Japan in the next 12 months. And that should be supportive if not for the fact the market is actually pricing in an even more aggressive hiking cycle from the Fed. Now looking at the expectation of interest rates as proxied by the 2-year yields in the US and Japan, you can see that although the Japanese 2-year yield has risen in anticipation of more hikes, the US 2-year has simply risen more. And in fact, the market is surprisingly pricing in three more hikes from the Fed even after the past week. So again, both central banks are hiking, but the market is thinking that the Fed will out hike the BOJ. And so that argues for further dollar strength, yen weakness. The good news though is that the Japanese bonds, the long end in Japan is well is better behaved now than in the past. One of the reasons people thought that Besson cared about the strength of the Japanese yen was that the weak yen was spooking long-ended JGBs and that of course being since sovereign debt is a global market that of course has been impacting long-dated treasuries as well. Now even though the yen is still not seemingly on the precipice of continued weakness the long JGBs have been better behaved and so that is a positive development.

英国QT范式重构:久期管理主导权向财政部回归

在经历全球能源冲击的背景下,英格兰银行(Bank of England: 英国中央银行)在上周议息会议上维持利率不变。英国央行判断,当前能源价格上涨尚未诱发工资上涨等第二轮通胀效应(Second-round Effects: 初始价格冲击通过工资增长或通胀预期扩散至整体物价的连锁反应),整体宏观通胀态势仍处于可控区间。本次会议最具战略意义的看点在于其对量化紧缩(Quantitative Tightening: 央行通过停止再投资或主动抛售资产以缩减资产负债表规模的紧缩政策)执行机制做出的根本性调整。在后疫情时代各央行普遍采取被动到期不续做的常态下,英国央行此前采取了直接在二级市场主动抛售国债的激进缩表模式,这加剧了英国国债(Gilts: 英国政府发行的主权债务工具)长端收益率的剧烈攀升,甚至埋下了此前特拉斯预算风波时的市场流动性危机隐患。

为了消除长端收益率持续失控的风险,英国央行对QT操作进行了两重结构性重塑:

  • 下调主动缩表配额: 全面放缓资产出售节奏,降低对债券市场的流动性抽吸力度。
  • 将抛售对手方限定为英国财政部: 央行不再向私人市场直接倾销长端国债,而是仅向财政部定向卖出资产;财政部则通过自主发行新债(例如增发3个月期超短端国债)来置换并注销央行手中的长端国债。

这一精妙的制度调整标志着债券久期结构控制权(Maturity Structure Control: 决定向私人市场供给短期与长期债券比例的核心权力)从央行重新回归至民选政府财政部门。这与美国凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)倡导的央行缩表理论不谋而合——在量化宽松(QE)与无序QT时代,央行的大规模购债实质上剥夺了财政部调节国债期限溢价的主动权;而通过央行缩减资产负债表与回归定向交易,财政部(如美国财政部倾向于大幅依赖短端国债融资)得以重新夺回面向私人市场的久期定价权。中央银行逐步退守至仅调节隔夜基准利率的“中性通道”,这一“财政主导与央行回归常态”的全球范式重构正在加速确立。

英文原文

Now the second thing that I want to talk about is what's happening in the Bank of England. Now the Bank of England had their meeting but they did not hike last week. There is a global energy shock the UK is of course vulnerable to this but according to the Bank of England they're not seeing second round effects. So that is to say even though energy prices are rising they're not seeing that bleed into say things like wages they don't see the inflationary impulse bonding to other aspects. So so far they're upbeat on that. What was interesting though is that they did a tweak to their QT program.

Now recall over the past decade central banks around the world especially during the pandemic bought a whole ton of sovereign debt trying to add accommodation to their economies. After the pandemic, QT was basically a global thing. Central banks trying to shrink their balance sheet, get ahead of inflation. Now, something that is special about the Bank of England is that although they did QT, they did it in a more aggressive fashion compared to say the Fed. The Fed just let their portfolio passively run off, but the Bank of England actually actively sold some of their securities. So, it was a much more aggressive form of QT. Now, gilt yields over the past couple years of course have trended higher. We did have that notable kerfuffle in the gilt market after Liz Truss announced her budget and you know she's doing her tours in her podcast in part blaming the Bank of England. Maybe she's right. I don't know. But in any case, the UK gilt yields have been steadily rising and Bank of England is changing how it's doing QT by doing I think two things actually. One of course is that they are revising their QT schedule to be less aggressive which makes total sense when you have elongated yields keep going higher and higher and maybe some degree of instability.

And the second tweak they're doing is much more interesting and that is they're still doing outright sales but they are selling only to the government. That is to say that when they're doing their QT sales they sell to the government and how will the government finance that? Well of course the government will sell gilts. Now the difference of course is that in this circumstance the government controls the maturity structure of the debt rather than the Bank of England. Now if the Bank of England were just selling say 10-year gilts because they want to do QT shrink their balance sheet then that's them deciding how much duration the private market receives. Now by just selling only to the government then the government will decide how it wants to finance those purchases. The UK Treasury could for example issue say three-month gilts to buy long-dated gilts from the Bank of England and thus from their perspective would have control over the maturity structure of the debt that the private sector faces. So this is very similar to what we hear from Chair Warsh where one of his arguments for shrinking the balance sheet at the Fed is because he thinks that the government should control the maturity structure of treasuries that the private sector faces and not the central bank. Now during the QE era the Fed would just go and buy all this long-dated debt and thus they would take that decision away from the US Treasury. Now when you have a smaller balance sheet that decision goes back to the US Treasury and Besson as we all know has been issuing primarily in the short end or at least to a greater extent than before. The UK it seems like they're following a similar template where the Bank of England is shrinking their presence, reverting who decides the maturity structure of UK gilts back to the Treasury. And so it seems like this is a global movement where the government of course is going to be more prominent and maybe just taking back power that was initially theirs and the central banks continue to play a smaller role primarily toggling with the overnight rate which of course shapes the expectation of the path of policy. So I thought that was interesting.

欧债深层隐患:法国利差走阔与缺乏货币主权的财政死局

在主权债务的潜在系统性风险上,真正的脆弱性不在拥有无限印钞权与AI经济红利的美国,而在缺乏主权货币发行权的欧元区,尤其是法国。近期市场核心指标——法国国债与德国国债利差(OAT-Bund Spread: 法国10年期国债与欧元区无风险基准德国10年期国债之间的收益率息差)已剧烈扩大至 100个基点 左右,创下过去十四年以来的历史最高水平。这一走势的本质原因在于,欧元区成员国并不具备货币主权(Monetary Sovereignty: 国家独立发行法定货币并由本国央行作为终极兜底买家的地位),法国受制于欧洲央行(ECB),无法自主通过央行印钞全额兜底本国国债。一旦财政赤字失控,其债务性质在资本市场眼中便无限趋近于一家“没有印钞权的企业”,必须完全靠更高的信用风险溢价来平衡。

法国当下面临几乎不可调和的财政与政治死局,主要体现在以下三维困境:

  • 赤字高企缺乏增长引擎: 法国财政赤字率高达 5%-6%,规模虽与美国相当,但法国既缺乏美国强劲的GDP增长支撑,也没有生成式AI产业带来的资本狂潮与乐观预期。
  • 福利刚性与税负天花板: 削减开支在法国面临巨大的政治阻力(如历史上的黄马甲运动与全民罢工);而增税空间已彻底见顶——在巴黎年收入百万欧元阶层的实际综合有效税率(Effective Tax Rate)已超过 50%(远高于美国内华达等无州税地区不足40%的水平),过高税率已导致杰拉尔·德帕迪约等大量富豪向比利时等低税管辖区流亡。
  • 政治极右翼化与边缘国家反噬: 法国即将迎来关键大选,玛丽娜·勒庞(Marine Le Pen)等极右翼政权上台的不确定性加剧了国际投资者的恐慌;与此同时,曾在欧债危机中被迫接受严苛紧缩的希腊等外围国家财长反过来敦促德法等“核心欧洲”推行财政改革,欧洲内部地缘与财政博弈已陷入深刻裂痕。
英文原文

Last thing we want to talk about is of course what's happening in France. Now I think this chart would tell you everything you need to know. So this is a chart of French OATs, so French bonds as a spread to German Bunds. Now in Euroland because every European government has their own bond market but the German bonds are perceived to be the safest. So they are considered to be the standard of European sovereign debt the safest basically. And you can see that the spread between French OATs and German Bunds has been steadily widening. Now it's around 100 basis points, highest it's been in like 14 years. Now Europe is different from the US in that these European countries are not monetary sovereigns. They don't have their own printing press. They are bound to the euro which is controlled from the ECB which they have representation on but don't fully control. So you're never going to have a sovereign debt crisis in the US because at the end of the day the Fed can always buy it all. Right? That no one's just going to let their own bond market implode. That's very dumb. Fed can always buy it all. Now in Europe though, that's different because France doesn't have its own printing press. They are bound by the euro. So what's going to happen then if they have some kind of sovereign debt problem.

Now the origins of this rise in French OATs as they're spread to Bunds, it's pretty obvious. Now if you look at the French budget deficit, it's pretty wide, right? They have a fiscal deficit of about five or six percent. Comparable to the United States. However, in the US, the US does have stronger growth. They have that AI boom going on. A lot of people have a lot of optimism and it does seem like to be a pretty important technology. You don't really see that nearly to the same extent in France. And of course, the US has a printing press which France does not. And so troubles in the budget will have to manifest in higher spreads in the sense that they're kind of like a corporation because the corporation also does not have their own printing press. Now common ways of addressing this of course would be to spend less and raise taxes like higher revenue. Now it's really hard to spend less in France as we all know. We had for example yellow jacket protests a few years ago. If you try to cut benefits just a little bit, it's very very common in the political culture there to go on strike and then nothing works and it's very difficult to do any reforms. It's also difficult to raise taxes because taxes are already very high. We've talked about this a few times over the past, but I asked AI to make this chart so that you have a good comparison about the after tax or the effective tax rates of someone who's making a million dollars, a million euros, a million CAD. So on the one hand you have people who live in the United States in a no income tax state like Nevada or someone looking in Las Vegas for example for a million dollars their effective tax rate is in the high 30s. In someone living in Paris though making a million euros their effective tax rate is over 50%. Right? So what that is is the government taking most of your money. That's a very very high effective tax rate and when you're already paying such a high effective tax rate it's hard to go even higher. Over the past few years you've had people like Gérard Depardieu famous French actor basically leave the country, a lot of them go to places like Belgium, less likely to go to places like Russia, but you know people can just leave especially when you're in Europe and you have so many competing jurisdictions around you. So higher taxes is probably not available to the French government. And if you can't raise taxes, you can't print money, you can't cut benefits, you're in big trouble. And you see that in the Bund-OAT spread and of course upcoming political elections where you could potentially have big changes in government where Marine Le Pen comes to power and she's going to take the country on a different direction and that is going to I think maybe cause some investors unease as well.

So, where you want to think about potential sovereign debt issues, you want to look in Euroland, not in the US or or even in Japan, actually. So, one interesting news I saw the past week is the Greek finance minister telling the German finance minister, you guys should implement financial reforms. For those of you around the European debt crisis a decade ago, it was these small countries like Spain, like Portugal basically getting bullied by the core European countries telling them to do reforms which they had no choice but to do which totally imploded their economy but did put them on a sounder fiscal footing. Now they're turning around and telling Core Europe that they have to do the same thing. Core Europe of course is in a different position because they have more political power. So I don't know if they'll follow that but totally interesting developments that is actually something worth watching going forward.

短期资产博弈:中东地缘拐点与美国中期选举的AI叙事转向

随着市场平稳度过9月期权交割日(OpEx: 期权合约到期结算日,通常伴随衍生品Gamma压制解除与现货波动率释放),大盘短期定价权将主要由中东地缘政治局势主导。若中东冲突能够达成实质性和平决议,原油价格与美债收益率将应声大幅回落,标普500指数有望迅速向 8,000点 历史高位发起冲刺;然而,若美国行政当局选择升级冲突以求速胜,油价与长端收益率的剧烈跳升将对权益市场带来沉重打击。展望中期选举之后,若民主党实现对参众两院的全面控制(“蓝色海啸”),国会对 AI数据中心建设能耗 的审视以及对 前沿大模型安全监管 的态度转向,或将成为重塑未来AI科技股交易逻辑的最关键系统性变量。

英文原文

Now the last thing that I'll mention is that I think that over the past few weeks okay starting after next week we'll have we passed September OpEx the market is going to have more freedom to move but I think it's going to be driven primarily by what happens in the Middle East. So if you look at oil prices and you look at geopolitical developments, it really does seem like we are at a pretty dangerous position. Whereas if we could have some kind of positive resolution in the Middle East, honestly S&P 500 is going to go to 8,000 in the blink of an eye. Yields will come down significantly and it will be tremendously tremendously bullish. However though that will require the president taking a loss and although I was thinking that maybe you know we could just have an easy way to end this market goes up helpful in the midterms and so forth. It is also possible that the president decides that in order to quickly end this war he has to escalate. That would be a really bad thing for the markets. You could have oil surge, yields surge in market. So I think we should pay more attention to what happens in the Middle East in deciding for the next few weeks, what happens before the midterms.

And after the midterms though, there is a possibility that you could have a blue tsunami where the Democrats take the Senate and the House. And then I think what we're hearing right now from many of the leading candidates is people that are a bit more wary of the AI data center buildout and a bit more pro-AI model regulation. And so that political turn could have big impacts on the AI trade. So that's what I would focus on in the coming weeks. All right, talk to you guys next week.

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