引言：今日中国焦虑与昔日日本恐慌

Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 大家好，欢迎收听《Odd Lots》播客的又一集。

I'm Jill Weisenthal, and I'm Tracy Aloway. 我是Jill Weisenthal，我是Tracy Alloway。

Tracy, here's something I've been thinking about with respect to China and all of the tensions with China, which is that it feels very elite, as in people in DC talk about it, people in obviously in finance and business talk about it. Tracy，关于中国及其所有紧张关系，我一直在思考一件事，那就是它感觉非常精英化，也就是说，华盛顿特区的人在谈论它，金融界和商界的人显然也在谈论它。

It does not strike me that in the broad public that there are a lot of people that it's top of mind for a lot of the public. 在我看来，在广大公众中，很少有人把这件事放在心上。

Weirdly, I think it was probably more top of mind in the past, right? 奇怪的是，我认为在过去，它可能更受关注，对吧？

And the hollowing out of America's manufacturing sector. 以及美国制造业部门的去工业化（De-industrialization: 经济中制造业比重下降的趋势）。

I mean, that argument is kind of what has given rise to a lot of the populist politics (Populist Politics: 一种政治意识形态，通常将社会分为“普通民众”和“精英”两个对立群体，并主张由普通民众的意志来治理国家) that we see nowadays, right? 我的意思是，这种论点某种程度上催生了我们现在看到的许多民粹主义政治，对吧？

Yeah, that's true. 是的，没错。

During the China shock (China Shock: 指中国加入世界贸易组织后对全球，特别是美国制造业和就业市场产生的巨大影响), there were a lot of people aware that their factories or the towns that depended on these factories were getting hollowed out, etc. 在“中国冲击”期间，很多人意识到他们的工厂或者依赖这些工厂的城镇正在被掏空，等等。

But there's so much China, China, China, it's not in the media, right? 但有那么多关于中国、中国、中国的话题，它却不在媒体上，对吧？

It's not like it, or sorry, it's not in the movies. 它不像它，或者说，它不在电影里。

And I'm thinking of like Back to the Future 2, was it, where the main character's dad lost his job, and they had this scene when he was getting laid off by his Japanese boss, etc. 我想到的是《回到未来2》，是不是，主角的父亲失业了，他们有这样一个场景，他被日本老板解雇了，等等。

Oh, you know what my favorite example of this is? 哦，你知道我最喜欢这个例子是什么吗？

Die Hard. 《虎胆龙威》。

Yeah, of course. 是的，当然。

Best Christmas movie ever, but also the Nakatomi Corporation, right? 有史以来最好的圣诞电影，但也有中富公司（Nakatomi Corporation: 电影《虎胆龙威》中一家虚构的日本公司）对吧？

This was like a whole thing in pop culture. 这在流行文化中曾是一件大事。

It's just not at all. 现在根本不是了。

Maybe that has something to do with the fact that studios still want to do, they still distribute. 也许这与电影公司仍然希望发行电影有关。

Are American movies still getting wide distribution in China, like for a while? 美国电影在中国是否仍然有广泛的发行，就像之前一段时间那样？

Like, for a while this was like a big story. 因为有一段时间这曾是一个大新闻。

Or are they not going to talk about certain things because this is partially why we have a bunch of superhero movies by the way, because they're just, they play in international markets and they're not going to like offend anyone too much probably. 或者他们不会谈论某些事情，顺便说一下，这部分解释了为什么我们有这么多超级英雄电影，因为它们只是在国际市场上上映，而且可能不会冒犯任何人太多。

It just doesn't feel to me for that from like a pop culture standpoint that the threats from China, whatever they are, are like getting that much play. 从流行文化的角度来看，我觉得来自中国的威胁，无论是什么，都没有得到那么多关注。

We need a good movie about China developing an AI chatbot that goes rogue and tries to take over the world. 我们需要一部好电影，讲述中国开发了一个失控的人工智能聊天机器人（AI Chatbot: 一种基于人工智能的计算机程序，能通过文本或语音与人类进行对话），并试图接管世界。

I think there was an AI plot in the last Mission Impossible or one of the recent ones. 我想在上一部《碟中谍》或最近的一部中，有一个人工智能的情节。

I haven't seen it. 我没看过。

I don't know who developed the technology. 我不知道是谁开发了这项技术。

Maybe it was China, who knows? 也许是中国，谁知道呢？

It could have been. 可能是。

But anyway, like you said, with Die Hard and there were several others. 但无论如何，就像你说的《虎胆龙威》以及其他几部电影。

I think Michael Keaton had a book that talked about it. 我认为迈克尔·基顿有一本书也谈到了这一点。

And certainly when I was younger, when I was like 11 or 12 and first became aware of the existence of the world around me, you know, I remember I had a teacher who was like really scoldy about people who drove Japanese cars, for example, and she talked about how anti-American. 当然，当我年轻的时候，大概11或12岁，第一次意识到周围世界的存在时，我记得我有一位老师对开日本车的人非常苛刻，例如，她谈到那些不爱国的行为。

Yeah. 是的。

How awful it was that there were people coming into our high school parking lot or whatever that drove Japanese cars, destroying the fabric of America by purchasing a Toyota. 她觉得那些开着日本车，比如丰田车，来到我们高中停车场的人，简直是在摧毁美国的社会结构，这太糟糕了。

Yeah. 是的。

Of course, now you know, buy Toyotas are made in the US, etc. 当然，现在你知道，购买的丰田车是在美国制造的，等等。

No one talks like that with respect to Japan. 没有人会这样谈论日本。

But it is interesting thinking about like similarities and differences between our relationship with China today and our relationship with Japan in the 80s, late 80s, etc., when it seemed like that was going to be the economy that really sort of hollowed out what we. 但有趣的是，思考我们今天与中国的关系，以及我们与80年代、80年代末日本的关系之间的异同，当时日本似乎将成为真正掏空我们经济的国家。

There's a clear parallel here. 这里有一个明显的相似之处。

There are also some key differences. 也有一些关键差异。

I'm sure we'll get into all of that. 我相信我们都会谈到这些。

A land of contradictions, similarities. 一个充满矛盾和相似之处的国度。

Anyway, I'm very excited. 总之，我非常兴奋。

We have a guest I've wanted to talk to for a long time, the perfect guest because he recently wrote about this. 我们请到了一位我久闻其名、很想聊聊的嘉宾，他是最完美的客人，因为他最近正好写了关于这个话题的文章。

We're going to be speaking with John Gans. 我们将与John Gans进行对话。

He is an author and historian. 他是一位作家和历史学家。

He's publisher of The Unpopular Front Substack, which I am a paid subscriber to. 他是《非流行阵线》Substack的出版人，我是他的付费订阅者。

I'm a big fan, and he's also the author of the recent book When the Clock Broke: Conspiracists and how America cracked up in the early 1990s. 我是他的忠实粉丝，他也是最近出版的《当时间崩坏时：阴谋论者与1990年代初美国如何崩溃》一书的作者。

Talk a little, uh, history. 谈谈一点历史。

So, John, thank you so much for coming on Odd Lots. 所以，John，非常感谢你来《Odd Lots》。

Thank you so much for having me. 非常感谢邀请我。

I'm a big fan. 我是个忠实粉丝。

It's very exciting for me. 这对我来说非常兴奋。

Very nice of you to say. 你真好。

Does that seem right to you that like you probably you pay attention to pop culture that just today with the China anxiety? 你大概关注流行文化，你觉得今天关于中国的焦虑，是不是感觉更像华盛顿特区的事，而不是普通大众的事？

It feels like a DC kind of thing more than a general public thing. 它感觉更像是华盛顿特区的事，而不是普通大众的事。

I think that's true. 我认为这是事实。

It does feel sort of a an elite project. 它确实感觉像是一个精英项目。

There's a lot of interest, curiosity about what's going on in China and what they do well both in DC among policy makers and I think also obviously in Silicon Valley. 无论是华盛顿特区的政策制定者，还是硅谷，都对中国正在发生的事情以及他们做得好的地方抱有浓厚的兴趣和好奇心。

Yeah. 是的。

A lot of think tanks are studying China, thinking about China. 许多智库都在研究中国，思考中国。

A lot of business people are very interested in China. 很多商界人士对中国非常感兴趣。

But yeah, I don't know, it's strange because you would think in a in an age that, you know, has a lot of, one might argue, paranoid thinking going on, it doesn't factor that much into a lot of pop culture. 但是，我不知道，这很奇怪，因为你会觉得在一个，有人可能会说，充满偏执思维的时代，它在很多流行文化中却没有多少体现。

I think the movies thing might be a part of that. 我想电影方面可能就是其中一部分。

That wasn't the case. 以前不是这样的。

Just the box office exposure. 只是票房曝光度。

The box office exposure. 票房曝光度。

But I think in the 80s and 90s there was definitely more cultural product which I'm sure we'll discuss more cultural products that brought this kind of fear, curiosity, interest, paranoia to the surface. 但我认为在80年代和90年代，肯定有更多的文化产品——我相信我们会讨论更多——将这种恐惧、好奇、兴趣和偏执浮出水面。

1980年代的日本恐慌：源起与流行文化中的形象

All right, well, why don't we get into the Japan panic of the 1980s and where it actually started? 好的，那我们来谈谈1980年代的日本恐慌以及它实际上是从哪里开始的？

And by the way, I was reading the Substack that you wrote on this particular topic, and I fell into a giant rabbit hole reading the emerging Japanese superstate. 顺便说一句，我当时在读你写的关于这个特定主题的Substack文章，结果陷入了一个巨大的“兔子洞”，阅读了那本《新兴的日本超级大国》。

Oh. 哦。

And coverage of it. 以及对它的报道。

So I didn't know the author of one of the first provocative Japan is going to take over the world type books was a guy called Herman Kahn, I think, and he is the inspiration for Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. 所以我不知道最早那些挑衅性的“日本将要统治世界”之类的书的作者，我想是一个叫赫尔曼·卡恩（Herman Kahn: 美国未来学家、系统理论家，曾为兰德公司工作，对核战略、军事战略和未来学有深远影响）的人，他是斯坦利·库布里克电影《奇爱博士》的灵感来源。

I didn't know that. 我不知道。

Yeah. 是的。

And if you read some of the coverage of his book that came out in the 1970s, it's really funny because it's just stuff that you would never get away with writing today. 如果你读一读他1970年代出版的书的一些评论，会觉得很有趣，因为那些内容是你今天绝对无法再写出来的。

The New York Times, New York Times review actually starts out by saying a bullied Herman Kahn who boasts that under all these 300 lb of friendly fat there lies a lean and senue intellect. 《纽约时报》的评论实际上是这样开头的：一个被欺负的赫尔曼·卡恩，他自称在300磅友善的脂肪下，隐藏着一个精瘦而有力的智力。

I don't think I don't think you could start a book review by saying the author is talking about the author's weight. 我想你不能以谈论作者体重的方式开始一篇书评。

Yeah. 是的。

No, that's true. 不，那是真的。

Yeah, Herman Kahn is a really strange and interesting character. 是的，赫尔曼·卡恩是一个非常奇怪而有趣的人物。

He is one of the models for Dr. Strangelove. 他是《奇爱博士》的原型之一。

He wrote a book called On Thermonuclear War (Thermonuclear War: 指通过核聚变反应释放巨大能量的战争，即核战争), which is probably one of the strangest books you'll ever read, and it's extremely cheerful book about thermonuclear war, basically kind of saying it wouldn't be that bad and saying that you know, yeah, and I think this is where the term he may have originated the term mega deaths (Mega Deaths: 指以百万计的人员死亡，用于描述大规模灾难或战争造成的巨大伤亡), and saying, you know, yeah, we'll get a little messed up, but actually there's so many people in this country who were so productive, how bad would it really be? 他写了一本书叫《论热核战争》，这可能是你读过的最奇怪的书之一，它是一本极其乐观地谈论热核战争的书，基本上是在说那不会太糟糕，而且你知道，是的，我认为“巨量死亡”这个词可能就是他创造的，他说，你知道，是的，我们会有点乱，但实际上这个国家有那么多有生产力的人，那到底会糟糕到什么程度呢？

We'll have some mega deaths, don't worry about. 我们会有些巨量死亡，不用担心。

We'll have a few mega deaths, but I don't think, and he thought that the United States shouldn't be so fearful about it. 我们会有一点巨量死亡，但我不认为，他认为美国不应该对此如此恐惧。

But there's another weird interpretation of the book that this was kind of like some signaling strategy that the United States, because in the book he said, you can't show that you're afraid to actually pull the trigger, because then the other side will push you around. 但对这本书还有另一种奇怪的解读，认为这有点像美国的一种信号策略，因为他在书中说，你不能表现出害怕扣动扳机，因为那样对方就会欺负你。

So in a way the book was some kind of signaling strategy in his game theory mind to be like, hey, man, we're not worried, we're writing books that say thermonuclear war is not that big of a deal. 所以在某种程度上，这本书在他的博弈论思维中是一种信号策略，就像在说，嘿，伙计，我们不担心，我们写书说热核战争没那么大不了。

Very, very bizarre figure, and I think some people consider him very sinister, obviously, but a real eccentric. 一个非常非常怪异的人物，我认为有些人显然认为他非常险恶，但他确实是个真正的怪人。

But he was actually worried about Japan. 但他实际上担心的是日本。

Yeah, I think he was worried about Japan, and he was a little ahead of the curve actually, because he wrote his book in the, I think it was in the late 1960s, and it came out in the 19, early 1970s, and he was describing Japan and its institutions and predicted that by the year 2000 that Japan would be the first economy in the world and overtake the United States. 是的，我认为他担心日本，而且他实际上有点超前，因为他是在1960年代末写的这本书，并在1970年代初出版，他描述了日本及其制度，并预测到2000年，日本将成为世界第一大经济体，超越美国。

This was a little bit before now the later books make a little more sense. 这有点早，后来的书才显得更有道理。

This is really before you start to see the economic problems of the United States that would make this kind of interest, and also before the trade deficit with the United States had really exploded. 这确实是在你开始看到美国经济问题，从而引发这种兴趣之前，也是在美国对日贸易逆差真正爆发之前。

So he was a kind of visionary not in that he got it right, but he kind of prefigured a genre of books that would only really hit about a decade or so later. 所以他是一个有远见的人，不是因为他预测对了，而是他预示了一种文学类型，这种类型直到大约十年后才真正流行起来。

Yeah, Joe, I clipped this, but reading some of the book now, it's kind of quaint, but he says his best estimate is his medium scenario. 是的，Joe，我剪下了这段，但现在读这本书，感觉有点古雅，但他说是他的最佳估计是他的中等情景。

And the medium scenario is that Japan probably passes the US in per capita income around 1990. 而中等情景是日本可能在1990年左右在人均收入上超越美国。

Okay. 好的。

And probably equals the US in gross national product by about the year 2000. 到2000年左右，其国民生产总值（Gross National Product: 一个国家所有公民在一定时期内生产的所有最终商品和服务的总价值）可能与美国持平。

That's the media. 那是中等情景。

The media. 中等情景。

So it could have been. 所以可能发生。

He's being conservative. 他很保守。

But it sounds interesting because it's very easy to say, oh, this is going to be a big problem once the trade deficit is gigantic, right? 但这听起来很有趣，因为当贸易逆差变得巨大时，很容易说“哦，这将是一个大问题”，对吧？

Like, oh, we're really dependent, we're, you know, up a creek, etc. 比如，哦，我们真的依赖，我们，你知道，陷入困境，等等。

But he seemed to have some intuition that there was something there in Japan that was like, okay, there's some going to be some great out competing in terms of just based on their productivity. 但他似乎有某种直觉，觉得日本那里有些东西，就像是，好吧，基于他们的生产力，将会有一些巨大的竞争力。

Yeah, I think that he observed correctly that Japan had made a miraculous comeback after the war. 是的，我认为他正确地观察到，日本在战后实现了奇迹般的复兴。

They had transformed themselves from being totally destroyed in the world and to being from being kind of a producer of goods that were considered kind of cheap, just in the way we used to think made in China or made in Taiwan weren't necessarily signs of quality, and then Japan becomes, you know, a place where it manufactures items that are still not terribly expensive but are known for engineering feats and are quite good. 他们从战后完全被摧毁，转变为曾经生产被认为是廉价的商品——就像我们过去认为中国制造或台湾制造不一定是质量的标志——然后日本成为了一个生产不太昂贵但以卓越工程技术闻名且质量相当好的商品的地方。

And he also gets into some things, you know, we might today call orientalist or centralizing, but he had these what he thought were sociological insights about the solidity of Japanese society, of their education system, of the relationships between the state and businesses, and other writers kind of develop these themes in different directions. 他还深入探讨了一些我们今天可能称之为东方主义（Orientalist: 指一种将东方文化视为神秘、异域且带有刻板印象的西方视角）或集中的事物，但他拥有他认为的社会学洞见，关于日本社会的稳固性、教育体系，以及国家与企业之间的关系，其他作家也以不同的方向发展了这些主题。

Maybe we'll get into this. 也许我们会深入探讨这个。

Peter Navarro's book Death by China came out in 2011. 彼得·纳瓦罗的《致命中国》一书于2011年出版。

He was pretty ahead of the curve in terms of, you know, 2011, not certainly not as much as people are talking about today. 就2011年而言，他相当超前，当然，当时人们的讨论远不如今天这么多。

But in a way it wasn't the real China shock in the US. 但从某种意义上说，这并非美国真正经历的中国冲击。

Definitely. 肯定是的。

Yeah. 是的。

That was like the whole WTO thing. 那就像是整个世界贸易组织（WTO: World Trade Organization，一个监管国际贸易的政府间组织）的事情。

I feel like that was really when it kind of peaked. 我觉得那真的是它达到顶峰的时候。

You mentioned the cultural aspects of this, and it is funny reading again some of the coverage where everyone's like, I read the chrysanthemum and the sword or I read Mishima and now I've cracked the code of Japanese economic success. 你提到了这方面的文化层面，再次阅读一些报道时很有趣，每个人都说，“我读了《菊与刀》或者我读了三岛由纪夫，现在我破解了日本经济成功的密码。”

But so much of the panic was actually trying to figure out how Japan had done this. 但大部分恐慌实际上是试图弄清楚日本是如何做到这一点的。

Before we get into all those different interpretations, what's your story of the Japanese economic miracle in the 1980s? 在我们深入探讨所有这些不同解释之前，你对1980年代日本经济奇迹的看法是什么？

You know, I think that you have it's there's obviously the actual economic facts and the relationship of the United States with Japan and then there is the discourse about it. 你知道，我认为你拥有的是，显然有实际的经济事实和美国与日本的关系，然后是关于它的论述。

I think what happened is you had a situation where you had the beginnings of de-industrialization in the United States. 我认为发生的情况是，你面临着美国开始去工业化的局面。

You had a very strong dollar. 你拥有一个非常坚挺的美元。

You had a lot of products that were coming in that were extremely high quality and attractive to American consumers. 你有很多进口产品，质量极高，对美国消费者很有吸引力。

You also had some policies that are very strange. 你也有一些非常奇怪的政策。

Caterpillar was a big competitor with Komatsu. 卡特彼勒是小松的强劲竞争对手。

They went to the Reagan administration. 他们去找了里根政府。

They brought this economic study to the Reagan administration, and they said, "Well, we want to open up Japan's financial markets because the the difference in our currencies is causing this problem." 他们向里根政府提交了这份经济研究报告，说：“我们想开放日本的金融市场，因为我们货币的汇率差异正在导致这个问题。”

Now this doesn't even make sense in economic theory. 现在这在经济理论上甚至说不通。

What actually happened is Japan is the country with excess savings. 实际上发生的是，日本是一个拥有过剩储蓄的国家。

So Japanese investments began to flow into the United States. 因此，日本的投资开始流入美国。

Caterpillar suddenly finds Komatsu with a plant next door to it. 卡特彼勒突然发现小松在它旁边建了工厂。

So this little scheme to undermine its competitors through through currency wizardry didn't work. 所以这个通过货币魔术来削弱竞争对手的小计谋并没有奏效。

The Reagan administration was open to it because they were into free trade stuff. 里根政府对此持开放态度，因为他们支持自由贸易。

So it didn't really break with their ideology, but it was a strange move that backfired. 所以这并没有真正违背他们的意识形态，但这是一个奇怪的、适得其反的举动。

And then also Japanese investors were used to very meager returns, and the United States had very attractive investments going on at that time, like treasuries because of the Volcker policies had very high returns. 此外，日本投资者习惯于非常微薄的回报，而美国当时有非常有吸引力的投资，比如由于沃尔克政策（Volcker Policies: 1970年代末至1980年代初，美联储主席保罗·沃尔克实施的旨在抑制高通胀的紧缩货币政策）的影响，国债回报率非常高。

So Japanese savers were very interested in them. 所以日本储户对它们非常感兴趣。

And Japanese investors also started to look at real assets like they started to look at real estate and the returns on those things were so fantastic compared to the way things were in Japan. 日本投资者也开始关注房地产等实物资产，这些资产的回报率与日本的情况相比非常可观。

Oh yeah. 哦，是的。

Mitsubishi bought the Rockefeller Center. 三菱买下了洛克菲勒中心。

They bought the Rockefeller Center. 他们买下了洛克菲勒中心。

There was talk of Nintendo buying the Seattle Mariners. 当时有传言说任天堂要收购西雅图水手队。

There was there was a lot of purchasing, a lot of downtown LA. 当时有很多收购，很多洛杉矶市中心。

You mentioned the Nakatomi Tower, like there was all this idea of Japan investing in American real estate and buying quintessentially American properties, and this was kind of upsetting to people. 你提到了中富大厦，就像当时所有关于日本投资美国房地产和购买典型美国财产的想法，这让人们感到不安。

So the trade deficit was obviously upsetting people who actually had a skin in the game of the industries, workers, the businesses. 因此，贸易逆差显然让那些在工业、工人、企业中有实际利益的人感到不安。

Lee Iacocca was not very happy about it. 李·艾科卡（Lee Iacocca: 美国著名商业主管，曾任福特汽车公司总裁和克莱斯勒汽车公司董事长）对此很不高兴。

He wrote about it and complained about it on TV. 他在电视上撰文并抱怨此事。

But the actual purchasing of American like these kind of symbols of Americana made people kind of get more tense about this nationalistic fervor. 但实际购买像这些美国象征性的财产，让人们对这种民族主义狂热感到更加紧张。

So yeah, the money was just flowing in, and at that time with the United States had a lot of deficit spending, and we were pumping out ships and military equipment, and the interest in Japanese savers in American treasuries just came along at the right time. 所以，是的，资金源源不断地流入，当时美国有大量的赤字支出，我们正在大量生产船只和军事装备，而日本储户对美国国债的兴趣恰逢其时。

Paul Tsongas, who was I don't know how many of your listeners are going to remember him. 保罗·桑加斯，我不知道有多少听众会记得他。

I do. 我记得。

Okay. 好的。

So, he was kind of I don't centrist business-friendly democratic politician who was a candidate for president. 所以，他是一位中立、对商业友好的民主党政治家，曾是总统候选人。

Not someone you would expect to kind of like demagogue on populist terms, but he said in a speech to the UAW, "The Cold War is over and Japan won." 他不是那种你会期望在民粹主义方面煽动的人，但他在对美国汽车工人联合会（UAW: United Auto Workers，美国的一个主要工会，代表汽车制造业的工人）的演讲中说：“冷战结束了，日本赢了。”

This is obviously a huge exaggeration, but it was more like the Cold War ended and Japan kind of paid for it. 这显然是极大的夸张，但更像是冷战结束了，而日本某种程度上为此付出了代价。

So, I can understand from the perspective of Japan when they're seeing these things bubble up and anger bubble up in America, they're like, "We thought we were competitors a little bit, but right." 所以，我能理解从日本的角度来看，当他们看到这些事情在美国发酵，愤怒情绪高涨时，他们会觉得：“我们以为我们只是有点竞争关系，但是……”

But, but not this much. 但是，没有这么严重。

Mostly friendly. 大部分是友好的。

Mostly friendly. 大部分是友好的。

Yeah. 是的。

What was Trump doing this time? 特朗普这个时候在做什么？

Did he have where was Trump in all this? 他在这一切中扮演什么角色？

He was extremely upset about both the trade deficits with Japan and the investment in Japanese. 他对与日本的贸易逆差和在日本的投资都感到非常不满。

He's been very consistent. 他一直非常一致。

He's been extremely consistent. 他一直非常一致。

He published ads in the newspaper. 他在报纸上刊登广告。

He went on TV and complained about it. 他上电视抱怨此事。

He said Japanese Japan was ripping us off and Japan was buying all these wonderful American things that should belong to us. 他说日本在敲诈我们，日本正在购买所有这些本应属于我们的美国好东西。

So that economic nationalism (Economic Nationalism: 一种强调国内控制经济、劳动力和资本形成的意识形态，通常通过关税和其他限制来保护本国经济) goes way back when. 所以这种经济民族主义可以追溯到很久以前。

And there might be an argument that his pretextious instincts were really shaped by that encounter with Japan as a potential rival. 而且可能有人认为，他那些貌似有理的直觉实际上是由那次将日本视为潜在对手的经历所塑造的。

So I think that, you know, the Japan panic and Trump kind of being of another age in a certain way. 所以我认为，日本恐慌和特朗普在某种程度上属于不同的时代。

Although again, some of these things apply well to, to It's like left its fingerprints on American society, hasn't it? 尽管如此，其中一些事情依然适用，它就像在美国社会留下了印记，不是吗？

Absolutely. 确实如此。

Absolutely. 确实如此。

So, I think that weirdly those unconscious impressions or institutional knowledge or just hang-ups that stick with individuals definitely. 所以，我认为奇怪的是，那些无意识的印象、制度性知识或者仅仅是纠缠个人的困扰，确实如此。

And, you know, he may just still be thinking of Japan, Japan, Japan. 而且，你知道，他可能仍然在想着日本、日本、日本。

日本与中国的“威胁”：流行文化的差异呈现

It's interesting because with the China anxiety these days, like the fear is right, some breakthrough is going to happen with semiconductors or something in China and the American companies will just sort of go out of business, etc. 这很有趣，因为最近对中国的焦虑，比如那种担忧是正确的，中国在半导体（Semiconductors: 指导电性介于导体和绝缘体之间的材料，是电子设备的核心元件）或其他方面将出现突破，然后美国公司就会倒闭，等等。

But in the anxiety with Japan was like your boss is going to be Japanese or the name of the office building that you go to will be renamed Japanese, etc. 但在对日本的焦虑中，却是你的老板会是日本人，或者你办公的大楼会改名为日本名字，等等。

That's very different because people don't really talk about that we're all going to be working for Chinese international corporations in the future, right? 这非常不同，因为人们现在并不真正谈论未来我们都将为中国国际公司工作，对吧？

And if you look at the image of dystopia in the 80s, like in cyberpunk literature (Cyberpunk Literature: 一种科幻小说类型，以高科技、低生活为特点，通常描绘未来反乌托邦社会中人工智能、赛博格和大型企业的影响), or in Blade Runner, it's a lot of Japanese company signage and a city of mixed ethnic makeup that looks very chaotic. 如果你看看80年代反乌托邦的形象，比如在赛博朋克文学或《银翼杀手》中，有很多日本公司的招牌，以及一个看起来非常混乱、民族构成复杂的城市。

It looks a lot like cities in Japan. 它看起来很像日本的城市。

So yeah, I think people were really thought, and I think it was just kind of common sense. 所以，是的，我认为人们当时真的这么想，而且我觉得这有点像常识。

If you got into a if you took an airplane ride and you got into a conversation with businessman next to you, guy who owned a small business, he had read in magazines, newspapers, books, he everyone kind of like the mi I'm sorry to use this meme, the midwake at the time was sort of like Japan is going to take over the United States. 如果你坐飞机，和旁边一个商人、小企业主聊天，他会在杂志、报纸、书里读到，每个人都觉得——抱歉用这个梗——当时的“弥天大谎”就是日本要接管美国。

Yeah. 是的。

Okay. 好的。

So clearly that did not happen. 所以很明显，那并没有发生。

No. 不。

And the per capita income of Japan is still a lot lower than the US. 而且日本的人均收入仍然远低于美国。

Walk us through like I guess the bursting of the bubble and what exactly like why this vision of Japan as a superstate or whatever did not come to pass. 请你为我们解释一下，泡沫是如何破裂的，以及为什么日本作为一个超级大国的愿景最终没有实现。

You know what's really interesting is that the that the panic coincided not with the peak of Japanese power but with about the asset bubble (Asset Bubble: 资产价格在短时间内脱离其内在价值迅速上涨，形成泡沫，最终破裂) bursting. 你知道最有趣的是，恐慌发生的时间并非日本国力巅峰，而是资产泡沫破裂之时。

So you see in 1992, Rising Sun, the Michael Crichton book come out and then and that also, you top ticked it, huh? 所以你看到1992年，迈克尔·克莱顿的小说《旭日东升》出版了，然后它也——你最高点卖出了，是吗？

Yeah. 是的。

And has anyone read it? 有人读过吗？

I have seen the movie. 我看过电影。

I have read the book partially when I was doing research for the book for my book. 我为我的书做研究时，部分地读过这本书。

And at the end of the book, he included a bibliography of books he had written he had read about Japan that that detailed the the the threat. 在书的最后，他附上了一份他读过的关于日本的书目，这些书详细描述了日本的威胁。

The book is not subtle. 这本书并不含蓄。

A group of Japanese businessmen are involved in the murder of a very beautiful blonde woman. 一群日本商人卷入了一名非常美丽的金发女子的谋杀案。

Uh, and the detective is tasked to find this out, and he has a meeting with a senator, and the senator they talk about maybe the possibility of dropping another bomb on Japan. 嗯，侦探的任务是查明真相，他与一位参议员会面，他们谈论了是否可能再向日本投下一颗炸弹。

That's another thing to remember is that Japan, United States and Japan in living memory had fought a war and there was Pearl Harbor which Americans felt very sensitive about. 另一件需要记住的事情是，在人们的记忆中，美国和日本曾打过一场战争，还有珍珠港事件，美国人对此非常敏感。

So what happened was there was a credit-fueled bubble in Japan, and it burst, and it was followed by a banking crisis, deflation (Deflation: 经济中物价普遍持续下降的现象，通常伴随经济衰退) and then all of a sudden everything that everyone believed was so wonderful about Japanese capitalism. 所以当时日本出现了一个信贷驱动的泡沫，它破裂了，随后是银行危机、通货紧缩，然后突然之间，每个人都认为日本资本主义如此美妙的一切都变了。

So in in 1982, Charles Johnson wrote a book called MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry: 日本经济产业省的前身，在二战后日本经济发展中扮演了关键角色) in the Japanese miracle. 所以1982年，查尔斯·约翰逊写了一本名为《日本奇迹中的通产省》的书。

And they said, okay, well, the reason why they did it is because they had this wonderful industrial policy (Industrial Policy: 政府干预经济，通过支持特定产业或部门来促进经济增长和结构调整的战略), which coordinated investment, protected industries, guided firms, and it was kind of a mixture of state intervention and private capitalism. 他们说，好吧，他们之所以能做到，是因为他们有这种出色的产业政策，它协调投资，保护产业，引导企业，是国家干预和私人资本主义的混合体。

That was one theory that was a little different from the theories that said, "Oh, the Japanese have some special cultural uh Confucianism or whatever." 那是一种理论，与那些说“哦，日本人有某种特殊的文化，比如儒家思想（Confucianism: 中国古代思想家孔子创立的学说，强调道德、伦理和社会秩序）或其他什么”的理论略有不同。

Shinto Buddhism (Shinto Buddhism: 日本本土信仰神道与佛教融合的现象) that was making them do this, and everyone said, "Oh, well, Japanese firms are insulated from financial markets, right?" 是神道教和佛教（Shinto Buddhism: 日本神道和佛教融合的宗教形式）让他们这么做的，每个人都说，“哦，日本公司与金融市场隔绝，对吧？”

"Because they have this close relationship with banks." “因为他们与银行有这种密切的关系。”

"They don't have to do they don't have to raise funds on capital markets." “他们不必在资本市场上筹集资金。”

"They have these long-standing relationships." “他们有长期的合作关系。”

"So, they can do these great long-term development projects, research and development projects." “所以，他们可以进行这些伟大的长期开发项目，研发项目。”

"They're not exposed to the quarterly pressures of American companies, so on and so forth." “他们不像美国公司那样面临季度压力，等等。”

Then after the bubble crashes, everyone looks at all this stuff. 然后泡沫破裂后，每个人都重新审视所有这些。

It's like, "Oh, wait." 就像，“哦，等等。”

They say, "Oh, this was a horrible system of crony capitalism (Crony Capitalism: 一种经济体系，其中商业上的成功取决于企业与政府官员之间的亲密关系，而非市场竞争), where the government was protecting people and there were bad loans on the books, and if there had been functioning markets and a lot of these things wouldn't happen." 他们说：“哦，这是一种可怕的裙带资本主义制度，政府保护人民，账面上有坏账，如果市场运作良好，很多事情就不会发生。”

So suddenly all of the things that appeared, most of the things, not all of them, but many of the things that appeared really impressive about Japanese capitalism, all of a sudden people discovered what the downsides were. 所以突然之间，所有那些——大部分，不是全部，但很多——看起来非常令人印象深刻的日本资本主义的优点，人们突然发现了它们的缺点。

But this didn't set in in the United States. 但这种想法并没有在美国扎根。

Japan was there was an outflow. 日本出现了资金外流。

There was a sudden huge outflow of Japanese funds. 日本资金突然大量外流。

They had invested. 他们曾投资。

Yeah. 是的。

I mean between 1988 to the end of 1990, Japanese investors invested about $52 billion in the United States from, you know, that includes everything from buying companies to real estate to new factories. 我的意思是，从1988年到1990年底，日本投资者在美国投资了大约520亿美元，你知道，这包括从购买公司到房地产再到新建工厂的一切。

And then in the first few months of 1992, that figure had dropped to 2.3 billion, and they made a net investment of 30 almost $31 billion in securities, and by 1992 they were net sellers of government securities. 而在1992年的头几个月，这一数字已降至23亿美元，他们在证券方面的净投资为近310亿美元，到1992年，他们已成为政府证券的净卖家。

They took some real baths, like this financier Manuro Isutani. 他们遭受了一些真正的损失，就像这位金融家Manuro Isutani一样。

He, and this was one of these things that upset Americans. 他，这也是让美国人不满的事情之一。

He bought Pebble Beach. 他买下了卵石滩。

He sold it for a loss of about $350 million. 他以大约3.5亿美元的损失卖掉了它。

政治与社会影响：1992年大选与罗斯·佩罗

Yeah. 是的。

So, by the early 1990s, the tide was kind of going out, but the upset wasn't. 所以，到1990年代初，大势已去，但人们的不满情绪并未消散。

And part of why this happened was the United States still had a close economic relationship, but there was an election going on and a Japanese pole election the United States and a Japanese politician made a very immoderate remark about the appearance and abilities of American workers. 而之所以发生这种情况，部分原因是美国与日本仍然保持着密切的经济关系，但当时正值美国大选，一位日本政治家对美国工人的外貌和能力发表了非常不当的言论。

He said that they were not able to read in many cases, that they were overweight, and this caused a massive rage in the United States, and a lot of politicians going into the election year obviously gin this up. 他说他们很多情况下不识字，而且超重，这在美国引起了巨大的愤怒，许多进入选举年的政治家显然借此煽动情绪。

We talk about '92 here. 我们这里谈论的是92年。

This is this is in 1992. 这是在1992年。

Oh, is this the whole Atari Democrat (Atari Democrat: 指1980年代初美国民主党中主张发展高科技产业以重振经济的派别) thing? 哦，这是整个“雅达利民主党人”的事情吗？

The Atari Democrats are a little different. 雅达利民主党人有点不同。

They wanted they were among the people who were really curious about I think state industrial policy in Japan. 他们是那些真正对日本的国家产业政策（State Industrial Policy: 政府通过一系列政策和措施干预经济，引导产业发展，以实现国家特定经济目标的策略）感到好奇的人。

I missed this whole era of American history, by the way. 顺便说一句，我错过了美国历史的这个整个时代。

Firstly, because I was like 8 years old, but secondly, because I was in Japan. 首先，因为我当时才8岁，其次，因为我当时在日本。

We didn't hear a lot about it. 我们对此知之甚少。

So, well, you were there as it as the bubble popped. 好吧，你当时在日本，正好赶上泡沫破裂。

Yeah. 是的。

So, I never I have no memories of experiencing this feeling of Japanese supremacy. 所以，我从未有过体验日本至高无上感觉的记忆。

I have a lot of memories of feeling like the economy was very downbeat. 我有很多关于经济非常低迷的记忆。

Oh, wow. 哦，哇。

In the sort of early 2000s when I came back and when I was actually a teenager and sort of aware of my surroundings. 大概在2000年代初，当我回来时，当时我还是个青少年，对周围环境有了一定的认识。

Yeah. 是的。

Did you ever get the sense that they felt like it was a miss it was a lost golden era or a missed opportunity? 你是否曾觉得他们认为那是一个错过的黄金时代，或者是一个错失的机会？

I mean I think there was a little bit of nostalgia certainly in the finance community. 我的意思是，我认为在金融界肯定有一点怀旧情绪。

Um, you know, people could remember what the dealmaking days were actually like, but beyond that I'm not entirely sure. 嗯，你知道，人们能回忆起当年的交易是怎样的，但除此之外，我不太确定。

Gotcha. 明白了。

This summer, all the bros read Ezra Vogel's Deng Shop biography, but he also wrote, and I think you talk about he wrote a Japan book in 1979, Japan is number one lessons for America, which I think you talk about. 这个夏天，所有的兄弟们都读了傅高义（Ezra Vogel）的《邓小平传》，但他还写了一本书——我想你也谈到了——他在1979年写了一本关于日本的书，叫做《日本第一：对美国的启示》，我想你提过这本书。

Is that does that book hold up? 那本书经得起考验吗？

Was it good? 它好吗？

I think that that book is one of the one of the more serious books. 我认为那本书是比较严肃的书之一。

I mean, you know, he's a real scholar and and it was more a real analysis of institutions. 我的意思是，你知道，他是一个真正的学者，那更多是对制度的真正分析。

It doesn't get into the kind of there may be a little armchair sociology in there about Japanese cultural mores, but there's definitely much more hard analysis of the relationship between government and business in Japan. 它没有深入到那种可能有一些纸上谈兵的社会学，关于日本的文化习俗，但它肯定对日本政府和企业之间的关系进行了更深入的硬核分析。

Let's talk a little bit more about actually 1992 and the politics of that time. 让我们再多谈谈1992年以及当时的政治。

You mentioned Paul Tsongas. 你提到了保罗·桑加斯。

Yeah. 是的。

He did win a primary somewhere, didn't he? 他确实在某个地方赢得了初选，不是吗？

Like win New Hampshire or something. 比如赢了新罕布什尔州什么的。

Anyway, but more importantly, that was also the year that Ross Perot (Ross Perot: 美国商人、亿万富翁，曾于1992年和1996年作为独立候选人竞选美国总统) ran as an independent and then he dropped out and then he got back in the race and he had a pretty good showing. 总之，更重要的是，那也是罗斯·佩罗作为独立候选人参选的一年，他后来退选又重新加入竞选，表现相当不错。

He may have tipped the election to Clinton. 他可能让克林顿赢得了大选。

I think there's some debate about that. 我认为对此有一些争议。

I know his main focus was NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement: 北美自由贸易协定，旨在消除美国、加拿大和墨西哥之间的大部分贸易壁垒). 我知道他的主要关注点是《北美自由贸易协定》。

But was this was the was there a Japan element to his populism? 但是他的民粹主义中是否有日本的因素？

There was no one in in in politics at that time who was worried about the future of American economy, industry, even our political supremacy in the world that was not fixated or focused or had a comment to say about Japan. 当时在政界，没有人不担心美国经济、工业甚至我们在世界上的政治霸权，没有人不关注日本，不谈论日本。

And Ross Perot was not an exception. 罗斯·佩罗也不例外。

He was both a protectionist (Protectionist: 主张通过关税、进口配额等贸易壁壁垒来保护国内产业和就业的经济政策支持者). 他既是一个贸易保护主义者。

So he thought that the United States's trade policies were giving us were leaving us in a bad place with regards to not only Japan but also at that time West Germany, German unification had just happened and South Korea. 所以他认为美国的贸易政策让我们处于一个不利的境地，不仅对日本如此，对当时的西德——德国统一刚刚发生——和韩国也是如此。

But he also was very curious about the way he believed, he wasn't really much he was a big capitalist not much of a free trader, so he was really attracted to the close relationship between business and government in Japan. 但他也非常好奇他所相信的方式，他虽然是个大资本家，但并非一个自由贸易主义者，所以他非常被日本商业与政府之间的密切关系所吸引。

And he also was very proud of the close-knit nature of his companies. 他也非常自豪于自己公司紧密团结的特性。

A delegation of Japanese businessmen, I think from Toyota, came to visit Electronic Data Systems, his his firm, and they praised him, and they said, "You're of all the companies in the United States, you're the most Japanese." 一个日本商人代表团，我想是来自丰田的，来参观了他的公司电子数据系统（Electronic Data Systems: EDS，由罗斯·佩罗创立的美国信息技术服务公司），他们赞扬了他，说：“在美国所有公司中，你们是最像日本公司的。”

I bet they said that to everyone. 我敢打赌他们对每个人都这么说。

Maybe, probably. 也许，很可能。

But he was extremely proud. 但他非常自豪。

He was like, he said, "Every worker is a brother. 他就像是，他说：“每个工人都是兄弟。

That's my that's the way Japanese companies run, and that's the way I run." 这就是日本公司的运作方式，也是我经营的方式。”

So he thought we needed to adopt policies more like Japan of between cooperation of business and government. 所以他认为我们需要采取更多像日本那样，商业和政府之间合作的政策。

日本模式的争议：共识与集权的感知转变

This is something I find so interesting because in the Japan panic at that time, like one of the thoughts was, well, Japan is very bureaucratic but in a good way. 这让我觉得非常有趣，因为在当时的日本恐慌中，其中一个想法是，日本非常官僚化，但却是以一种好的方式。

It's very like consensus driven and we have big groups of people who get together and make a decision that's good for everyone. 它非常像共识驱动，我们有一大群人聚在一起，做出对每个人都有益的决定。

And then when you fast forward to today and all the angst about China, it's very much like, well, China has an authoritarian system of government, and China can decide by a single person, what it's going to do. 然后当你快进到今天，所有对中国的焦虑，就变成了：中国有一个威权政府体系，中国可以由一个人决定它要做什么。

It's going to build like a huge high-speed rail, and that's not consensus driven. 它将建造像巨大的高速铁路，那不是共识驱动的。

It's funny how it kind of flipped. 这很有趣，它竟然反过来了。

Yeah, that is interesting. 是的，那很有趣。

I there wasn't the sense that there was direction or command and there was like a really strong political system behind all this. 我当时并没有觉得这一切背后有方向、有指挥，或者有一个真正强大的政治体系。

It was a series of, you know, on the smarter end, really good institutions and great education. 从更聪明的角度来看，它是一系列优秀的制度和卓越的教育。

On the more pulpy, poppy end of cultural essential features that made them extremely good at this. 从更通俗、更流行文化的角度来看，是那些文化上的本质特征，使得他们在这方面表现出色。

The way that they presented Japan was like there's no center of power. 他们呈现日本的方式是，那里没有权力中心。

This is an interlocking Borg-like corporations (Borg-like Corporations: 借用《星际迷航》中的“博格人”概念，形容企业之间互相连接、协同作战，形成一个统一的集体实体), and businesses are all cooperating in different ways. 这是一个相互交织的博格式企业（Borg-like Corporations: 形容企业之间相互连接、协同作战，形成一个统一的集体实体），企业都以不同的方式进行合作。

It wasn't like, oh, there's an authoritarian state with a leader. 不像，“哦，有一个有领导者的威权国家”。

This leaderless authoritarianism. 这种无领导者的威权主义。

And there was some kind of fears that were reminiscent, maybe you got to also remember that the cold war is winding up. 而且有一些令人联想到恐惧，也许你还得记住冷战即将结束。

The Soviet Union is no longer the primary opponent or rival United States. 苏联不再是美国的主要对手或竞争者。

So the collectivism of Japan becomes the thing that's set against American free enterprise and rugged individualism. 所以日本的集体主义成为与美国自由企业和坚韧不拔的个人主义对立的事物。

Some people view that in a it's a it's an interesting mix of admiration and envy and also kind of fear and saying, "Oh, we're not like that as Americans." 有些人以一种有趣的混杂着钦佩、嫉妒以及某种恐惧的方式看待它，并说：“哦，作为美国人，我们不是那样的。”

So, it's a little bit different. 所以，这有点不同。

I mean, it's also different because the United States and Japan were ostensibly military allies. 我的意思是，它也不同，因为美国和日本表面上是军事盟友。

They were in the same kind of block in the Cold War. 他们在冷战中属于同一个阵营。

They were arguably part of our empire, kind of under our protection. 他们可以说是我们帝国的一部分，某种程度上在我们的保护之下。

The discourse was that the that Japan was sneakily kind of getting out from under American hegemony (Hegemony: 指一个国家或群体在国际关系中拥有支配性的权力或影响力) to set up their own. 当时的论调是，日本正在悄悄地摆脱美国霸权，建立自己的霸权。

And that doesn't make a whole lot of sense in historical retrospect or even was a possibility. 从历史回顾来看，这并无多大意义，甚至也不可能发生。

No. 不。

China was obviously never had that kind of relationship with the United States. 中国显然从未与美国有过这种关系。

They were always I mean they were we organized a reproachment with them but they were never an ally or even one might say I don't I think vassal state (Vassal State: 指在政治、军事或经济上从属于另一个更强大国家的附庸国) is putting it far too strongly but but a part of the western block. 我的意思是，我们与他们组织了和解，但他们从未成为盟友，甚至可以说，我认为“附庸国”这个词用得太重了，但他们确实是西方阵营的一部分。

中日焦虑：军事维度与文化影响

This is I want this is exactly where I wanted to go to because one obvious difference besides the pop culture and everything else with US China is that today in 2025, there are people who are very worried about war with China. 这正是我想要探讨的，因为除了流行文化和其他一切之外，美中关系的一个明显区别在于，在2025年的今天，有人非常担心与中国发生战争。

If China were to forcibly were to blockade Taiwan, would DC feel impelled to enter a war? 如果中国武力封锁台湾，华盛顿特区会觉得被迫参战吗？

Is the Chinese industrial might going to sort of hollow out our capacity to even like build weapons at some point because we don't have any efficient factories in the United States? 中国的工业实力是否会在某个时候掏空我们甚至制造武器的能力，因为美国没有任何高效的工厂？

I mean, that is a very that's very different, right? 我的意思是，这非常不同，对吧？

Were there shades of that? 有那种迹象吗？

There were some very small shades of it. 有一些非常微小的迹象。

The more hysterical books imagined a shooting war between the United States and Japan, a Japanese total re-industrialization (Re-industrialization: 指一个国家或地区重新发展和振兴其制造业基础的进程) that included remilitarization (Remilitarization: 指一个国家重新建立或增强其军事力量，尤其是在曾经被限制军力后). 那些更歇斯底里的书描绘了美国和日本之间的一场热战，以及日本的全面再工业化（Re-industrialization: 指一个国家或地区重新发展和振兴其制造业基础的进程），包括再军事化（Remilitarization: 指一个国家重新建立或增强其军事力量，尤其是在曾经被限制军力后）。

This doesn't make a lot of sense because Japan is very insistent on his pacifism. 这没有太大意义，因为日本非常坚持其和平主义。

I mean, that might be changing now, but this that fear was really not one of the more realistic ones projections. 我的意思是，现在情况可能正在改变，但这种恐惧确实不是更现实的预测之一。

So, there was a little bit of worry about that. 所以，对此有一些担忧。

I think people were fantasizing and imagining Japan as a rival to the United States that would eventually be a military rival or could be a military rival. 我认为人们当时幻想和想象日本是美国的竞争对手，最终会成为军事竞争对手，或者有可能成为军事竞争对手。

But no, from so far as I know, there was one book, The Coming War with Japan. 但是，据我所知，有一本书叫《对日战争即将来临》。

Most of the others viewed it as an economic war and a cultural war. 其他大部分人都将其视为一场经济战和文化战。

But the fantasy of like they were going to do Pat Buchanan had an essay in a book about trade policy where he talked about they've decided after losing World War II they're going to take the economic road to build their empire. 但那种幻想，就像帕特·布坎南在一本关于贸易政策的书中有一篇文章，他谈到日本在二战失败后，决定走经济道路来建立他们的帝国。

So it was more like using war as a metaphor, but there was I think fewer worries about the actual military might which makes sense. 所以这更像是将战争作为一种比喻，但我认为对实际军事力量的担忧较少，这很合理。

日本恐慌的真实影响与历史回响

Can I push back on one thing, which is the premise of this entire conversation, please? 我可以反驳一点吗，那就是这场对话的全部前提？

No, but the way we started out we were talking about like the Japan panic really resonated with America, and I guess my question is like, yes, there were books. 不，但我们开始时，我们谈论的是日本恐慌在美国引起了强烈共鸣，我想我的问题是，是的，有书籍。

Yes, there were some characters in movies and things like that, but did it actually resonate in the political or social sense? 是的，电影中也有一些角色等等，但它真的在政治或社会意义上引起共鸣了吗？

Because, you know, I'm looking at a headline right now from 1992, and it says, "Harsh views on Japan may help fuel Perot campaign." 因为，你知道，我正在看1992年的一条新闻标题，上面写着：“对日本的严厉看法可能有助于佩罗的竞选。”

Well, Perot ran unsuccessfully for president. 然而，佩罗竞选总统失败了。

So, I would argue they did not in fact help him. 所以，我会说他们实际上并没有帮助他。

Well, I would say that he had the most successful third party candidate in recent about 20% of the vote, which is significant. 嗯，我会说他是最近最成功的第三方候选人，获得了大约20%的选票，这非常重要。

I think about two-thirds of Americans by 1989 believed, I mean, there's reason for this because the Soviet Union looked like it was on its last legs, but believed that Japan was a bigger threat than the Soviet Union, and a lot of politicians went on the stump. 我认为到1989年，大约三分之二的美国人相信——当然这有原因，因为苏联看起来已经摇摇欲坠——但他们相信日本比苏联更大的威胁，许多政治家都在竞选中大肆宣传。

Tsongas tried to Japan bash as they called it. 桑加斯试图进行他们所谓的“日本抨击”。

Pat Buchanan went to pan bashing Clinton less so, but I would say there was a side of Clinton's campaign and a side of his eventual staffing of his of his administration that was definitely a lot closer in thinking to the people who are worried both worried about and and admiring of Japan. 帕特·布坎南也进行了一番抨击，克林顿则没那么严重，但我想说，克林顿竞选团队以及他最终组建的政府中，有一部分人的想法无疑更接近那些既担忧又钦佩日本的人。

They went in with the intention of being really hard-nosed about certain trade negotiations, and they also, and this is not we talk a lot about industrial policy. 他们带着在某些贸易谈判中采取强硬立场的意图进入，而且他们也——这并非我们经常谈论的产业政策。

There was discussion of industrial policy back then. 当时就有关于产业政策的讨论。

There was a side of the Clinton administration that looked at Japanese industrial policy and protectionism and said this looked very interesting. 克林顿政府中有一部分人审视了日本的产业政策和保护主义，认为这看起来非常有趣。

We may be living in a very different world if the bubble doesn't pop in Japan and those policies start to make more sense. 如果日本的泡沫没有破裂，而且那些政策开始变得更有意义，我们可能生活在一个非常不同的世界。

So the side of the Clinton administration, I mean, that that is both interested and wants to take a tougher eye on Japan, it kind of becomes a moot point as Japanese economy kind of collapses and fades away. 所以克林顿政府中，那些既对日本感兴趣又想对日本采取更强硬态度的派别，随着日本经济的崩溃和衰落，这在某种程度上变成了一个无关紧要的问题。

So it was a really pivotal moment, and yeah, I think that it's such a strange thing that it was everybody was fixated on it. 所以那是一个非常关键的时刻，是的，我认为这很奇怪，每个人都对此着迷。

It was such common sense. 这简直是常识。

Politicians ran on it, arguably demagogued on it. 政治家以此为竞选纲领，甚至可以说以此煽动民心。

And then it's kind of a historical curiosity. 然后它就变成了一种历史的好奇心。

M yeah no. 嗯，是的，不。

Can I ask one more question, which I don't know if you'll have the answer to this, but I've always wondered about it. 我能再问一个问题吗，我不知道你是否有答案，但我一直很好奇。

Why was there not as much hand ringing over Korea, say, because on the face of it, this is a country that also very rapidly developed economically, also had similar relationships with the US, US military presence and some US investment and things like that, but it all seemed to be directed at Japan rather than Korea. 为什么对韩国没有那么多的担忧，比如说，表面上看，这个国家经济发展也非常迅速，与美国也有类似的关系，包括美国军事存在和一些美国投资等等，但所有的关注似乎都指向了日本而不是韩国。

I think that that is because of the United States's history with Japan and the war, which had it in our imagination. 我认为这是因为美国与日本的历史以及战争，这在我们的想象中留下了印记。

I think also Japan at that time was a kind of cultural hegemon (Cultural Hegemon: 指一个国家或文化在价值观、思想和生活方式方面对其他国家或文化具有支配性影响力) in East Asia, in the way that maybe South Korea is now in terms of their exports of pop culture and video games and art and music and so on and so forth. 我认为当时日本在东亚也是一种文化霸权，就像现在韩国在流行文化、视频游戏、艺术和音乐等方面的输出一样。

I think that's a big part of it. 我认为那是一个重要原因。

I think also there's a great book by an author Drew McKivik called Consuming Japan. 我认为还有一本由作家Drew McKivik写的很棒的书，叫做《消费日本》。

I think Japan in a way was a lot of Americans' first, and he argues that Japan in a way was a lot of Americans' first contact with globalization (Globalization: 指世界各国经济、文化、技术等日益紧密联系和相互依赖的过程). 我认为日本在某种程度上是许多美国人的第一次，他认为日本在某种程度上是许多美国人第一次接触全球化。

And it was both very interesting but also a little scary and alien, and I think perhaps China, the rise of China, the rise of South Korea, it doesn't look so weird anymore because we went through the experience of Japan and also because the experience of Japan kind of turned into a nothing so perhaps some of the culture memory of that or the familiarity we have with other cultures from Japan. 它既非常有趣又有点吓人且陌生，我想也许中国、中国的崛起、韩国的崛起，现在看起来不再那么奇怪了，因为我们经历了日本的经验，而且日本的经验最终也化为乌有，所以也许那段文化记忆或者我们从日本那里对其他文化的熟悉感。

I don't think we we Americans are so used to are more cosmopolitan than I would say than we are at the beginning of the 80s. 我认为我们美国人现在比80年代初期更加习惯于世界主义，或者说更加世界化了。

Yeah. 是的。

Japan throughout all of this. 日本自始至终。

I mean it was cool, right? 我的意思是它很酷，对吧？

Like Sony Walkman were always cool in the United States. 比如索尼随身听在美国一直很酷。

People look at this the Chinese EVs (EVs: Electric Vehicles，电动汽车) and they're very impressive, right? 人们看到这些中国电动汽车，它们非常令人印象深刻，对吧？

I don't know if any of them are like cool. 我不知道它们中有没有哪个很酷。

Like we don't really have Chinese branded other than Li-Ning actually, which I think is like the first time there was a specific Chinese-made Capital B brand that sort of. 我们实际上并没有什么中国品牌，除了李宁（Li-Ning: 中国本土体育用品品牌），我认为这就像是第一次出现一个专门的中国制造的大品牌，那种……

I was going to say like we joked about doing a Li-Ning episode before, but like I think we actually should because this is probably China's like biggest cultural export. 我本来想说我们之前开玩笑说要做一集关于李宁的节目，但我觉得我们真的应该做，因为这可能是中国最大的文化输出。

Ever thing. 有史以来。

But like Japan is just so cool that they created a lot of really inexpensive but extremely interesting and fun devices. 但日本就是这么酷，他们创造了许多价格低廉但极其有趣好玩的设备。

I mean, and I missed my Game Boy. 我的意思是，我怀念我的Game Boy。

I got to say, I missed my Minidisc player, and it wasn't even that useful. 我得说，我怀念我的迷你光盘播放器，它甚至没有那么实用。

It was just really it was just really neat. 它只是真的很，它只是真的很棒。

Yeah. 是的。

Nintendo, right? 任天堂，对吧？

Nintendo, Sega. 任天堂，世嘉。

The design was terrific. 设计非常棒。

I think one thing that Japan, and this was also American businesses, were really curious about how Japan did. 我认为日本有一件事，也是美国企业非常好奇日本是如何做到的。

They said, "Oh, they have all these wonderful craft traditions, and all these wonderful craft traditions are not left behind. 他们说：“哦，他们有所有这些出色的传统手工艺，而所有这些出色的传统手工艺并没有被抛弃。

They're incorporated into industrial production." 它们被融入了工业生产。”

Detail oriented. 注重细节。

Detail oriented engineering. 注重细节的工程。

A lot of paying attention to design and aesthetics. 非常注重设计和美学。

So that I think was a big reason why a lot of those products were really nicely designed. 所以我认为这是许多产品设计得非常好的一个重要原因。

I think it's a sad thing in a way. 我觉得这在某种程度上是件悲伤的事。

I think there's a little bit of of China of people think starting to think Chinese cars are cool. 我认为有一些中国人开始觉得中国汽车很酷。

Japanese cars were always like that's reliable and well-built. 日本汽车一直以来都给人可靠和制造精良的印象。

But they weren't like they were kind of like it's a little boring. 但它们不像，它们有点无聊。

Okay. 好的。

To own a Japanese car. 拥有一辆日本车。

Japanese electronics I think were always like, "This is really neat." 日本电子产品我觉得一直都让人觉得“这真棒”。

I think it was not necessarily maybe Lexus was the exception, right? 我认为不一定，也许雷克萨斯是个例外，对吧？

But Toyota, Honda, I think these were, "Oh, this very practical practical choice." 但丰田、本田，我认为这些都是，“哦，这是非常实际的选择。”

I think there's a little bit of chi of Chinese car culture starting that's like, oh yeah, they're really making some cool looking stuff over there now. 我认为中国的汽车文化正在开始形成一点点这样的感觉，就是，哦，是的，他们现在真的在那里制造一些看起来很酷的东西。

And also, there is a beginning, you know, you see lots of TikToks and Reels and so on and so forth of Japanese of of I'm sorry, Chinese cities. 而且，也开始有了，你知道，你会在TikTok和Reels上看到很多关于日本——抱歉，是关于中国城市的视频等等。

Yeah. 是的。

So, I think there's a beginning of, I don't know, want to call it China chic, but definitely like, wow, amazing things are happening in China. 所以，我认为这是一种开始，我不知道，是不是想称之为“中国时尚”，但绝对是那种“哇，中国正在发生令人惊叹的事情”。

So, I think there's a little bit of that. 所以，我认为有那么一点点。

I'm not a young person anymore. 我不再是年轻人了。

So, I'm not and I I think there's also just like, you know, Apple is so dominant in in consumer electronics, and you don't need that many devices anymore, right? 所以，我不是，而且我觉得，你知道，苹果在消费电子产品领域如此主导，你不再需要那么多设备了，对吧？

So the fact is we don't need CD players, we don't need Walkman, we don't need Minidiscs, we don't need all these different things. 所以事实是，我们不需要CD播放器，不需要随身听，不需要MD机，不需要所有这些不同的东西。

So there there was this like kind of wonderful market that had all these different interesting gadgets in it. 所以当时存在这样一个美好的市场，里面有各种各样有趣的小玩意。

And I think that that fascinated people, and your phone or your computer does all of that now. 我认为这吸引了人们，而现在你的手机或电脑就能完成所有这些功能。

I find that to be I mean this is just a factor totally of aging and nostalgia, but as we were just saying, I find that to be a little sad and thought those devices were actually better in certain ways. 我发现这——我的意思是，这完全是衰老和怀旧的因素——但就像我们刚才说的，我发现这有点悲伤，并且认为那些设备在某些方面实际上更好。

Yeah. 是的。

Joe, I just remember the car my mom had in Tokyo in the early 1990s. Joe，我只是记得我妈妈1990年代初在东京开的那辆车。

What was it? 那是什么车？

It was called My Fair Lady. 它叫“窈窕淑女”。

Wait, what? 等等，什么？

It was manufactured by Nissan, and it was actually a really cool looking car, but it had a terrible name. 那是日产制造的，实际上它看起来真的很酷，但名字却很糟糕。

So, I don't know if it would be considered cool or not. 所以，我不知道它是否会被认为是酷的。

They often switch names. 他们经常换名字。

I think when they came to the United States, they would have consultants tell them that branding would. 我想当他们进入美国时，会有顾问告诉他们品牌定位会。

Nissan Fair Lady Z. 日产淑女Z。

I think so. 我想是的。

I'd have to like really nice looking car. 我得说，那是一款非常好看的车。

It was some sort of sports car. 那是一种跑车。

Like a Citroën almost. 几乎像一辆雪铁龙。

That looks cooler than I would associate with a typical. 那看起来比我通常联想到的要酷。

Yeah. 是的。

I thought it was going to be some kind of like minivan or Suburban. 我以为它会是某种像迷你厢型车或豪华休旅车。

Yeah. 是的。

Wow. 哇。

Yeah. 是的。

Very cool. 非常酷。

That's an extremely cool looking car. 那是一辆看起来非常酷的车。

Yeah. 是的。

Yeah, it was. 是的，它是。

It just had a very strange name. 它只是有一个非常奇怪的名字。

I always remember that. 我总是记得那个。

I remember like staring at the steering wheel because I think it was like printed on it. 我记得我盯着方向盘，因为它上面好像印着字。

Anyway, back to the topic at hand. 总之，回到我们手头的话题。

So there are clearly parallels between the Japan panic and a lot of the fear around China at the moment. 所以，日本恐慌和目前围绕中国的许多担忧之间显然存在相似之处。

On the other hand, there do seem to be a lot of big differences. 另一方面，也确实存在许多重大差异。

Number one, China is not a tiny island with a lack of natural resources and farmable land and things like that. 首先，中国不是一个缺乏自然资源和可耕地的弹丸小岛。

It has a much bigger population. 它拥有更大的人口。

Walk us through where you see the biggest areas, I guess, of similarity and difference. 请你为我们分析一下，你认为最大的相似点和不同点在哪里。

I mean, exports were a big part of the growth of both. 我的意思是，出口是两者增长的重要组成部分。

There's obviously a strong state in both. 两者显然都有一个强大的国家。

In one case, it's more of this vaunted Japanese bureaucracy, which then turned out not to be so great. 在一种情况下，更多的是这种受人吹捧的日本官僚体制，后来证明它并没有那么出色。

In the other side, it's the Communist Party and state banks. 另一方面，则是共产党和国有银行。

Big trade surplus is a big part of it. 巨额贸易顺差是其中一个重要部分。

But there a big difference. 但有一个巨大的差异。

I mean, China's a lot bigger, has a way bigger population. 我的意思是，中国大得多，人口也多得多。

I think its political system as you were saying it can kind of make things happen and prevent things from happening make really radical intrusions in the financial system. 我认为它的政治体系，就像你说的，能够促成事情发生，也能阻止事情发生，对金融系统进行非常激进的干预。

It doesn't have infinite power in that regard. 在这方面，它并非拥有无限权力。

I think I've heard you guys discuss that on on but I think they have definitely a little more political economic firepower than Japan has and I think part of that is you know the strength of the communist party as an institution and the size of the population. 我想我听你们讨论过这一点，但我认为他们肯定比日本拥有更多的政治经济影响力，而且我认为部分原因在于共产党的制度实力和人口规模。

It is interesting to think like here in 2025, we could have a conversation and be like, you know what, China's really successful because it coordinates its banks with its manufacturers. 有趣的是，我们现在是2025年，我们可以进行一次对话，说，你知道吗，中国之所以如此成功，是因为它协调银行与制造商的关系。

They have this very intense ideological grooming such that executives are major. 他们有这种非常强烈的意识形态培养，以至于高管们都是精英。

They believe in the Chinese Communist National Project and they're willing to sacrifice returns. 他们相信中国的共产主义国家项目，并且愿意牺牲回报。

Willing to sacrifice returns and all these things. 愿意牺牲回报以及所有这些。

And in theory, and I don't know what's going to happen, but in theory in two years, we could go back and say, oh, they had all these corrupt relationships between the companies and the banks. 理论上，我不知道会发生什么，但理论上两年后，我们可以回过头来说，哦，这些公司和银行之间存在各种腐败关系。

It was all this crony capitalism, etc. 那都是裙带资本主义，等等。

It is hard to know in real time what factors are real in success because I do find when I read stories about the degree to which like the CEO of Huawei like deeply believes in the CCP and the sort of nationalist agenda like yeah wow that's it's very compelling. 实时判断成功中的真实因素很难，因为我确实发现，当我读到关于华为CEO如何深信中国共产党（CCP: Chinese Communist Party，中国唯一的执政党）和民族主义议程的故事时，会觉得，哇，这非常有说服力。

I could see how there's this alignment but then you know something could happen in a few years later you're like, oh, that was really silly how they like you right it's hard to know in real time. 我能理解这种契合，但几年后可能会发生什么，你会觉得，哦，他们那样做真傻，对吧，实时判断很难。

Yeah, I think that's absolutely true. 是的，我认为这绝对是真的。

I I don't think, you know, we should be complacent or but but I think it's an interesting lesson of the history here is just things can go from being common sensical the biggest threat everybody knows that they're going to they're going to win everybody knows that they have a better system and then a few years later everyone is like what were we thinking why did we think that and we could there they had so many internal problems that were just out of this and that's kind of the same way with financial bubbles bursting I guess you could talk about these as also as like political bubb bubbles is that everyone's like, "Oh, wow. 是的，我认为这绝对是真的。我不认为，你知道，我们应该自满，但是我认为这里的历史有一个有趣的教训，那就是事情可以从常识变成最大的威胁，每个人都知道他们会赢，每个人都知道他们有更好的系统，然后几年后，每个人都会想，我们当时在想什么？为什么我们会那样想？而且我们也可以，他们有那么多内部问题，这和金融泡沫破裂有点相似，我想你可以把这些也看作是政治泡沫，就是每个人都觉得，“哦，哇。

Look at this big combine, this big system that's kind of humming along and then things are going on behind the behind the scenes that are like, oh, there's an intrinsic flaw that's making its way to the surface and then it kind of manifests itself." 看看这个庞大的联合体，这个庞大的系统正在运转，然后幕后发生的事情就像，哦，有一个内在的缺陷正在浮出水面，然后它就显现出来了。”

So George Soros gave a great speech one time making this exact point that there is a similarity between what you he would call financial bubbles and like political bubbles where you believe in a system and then something emerges that sort of irrevocably shakes your confidence in the system. 所以乔治·索罗斯曾发表过一次精彩演讲，精准地指出你所称的金融泡沫和政治泡沫之间存在相似之处，即你相信某个系统，然后出现一些事物，不可逆转地动摇你对该系统的信心。

So I think I find that analogy very compelling. 所以我认为我发现这个比喻非常有说服力。

Yeah. 是的。

But Japan didn't cease to exist. 但日本并没有停止存在。

It's still one of the richest, thriving, peaceful, prosperous. 它仍然是最富裕、繁荣、和平、富饶的国家之一。

It's not a terrible place to live. 这不是一个糟糕的居住地。

Yeah. 是的。

It's not like it went back to the stone age. 它又没回到石器时代。

So I think that that's also just very growth mindset, but it's still I think has an extremely low rate of unemployment, healthy, relatively healthy population, good education, not a terrible place to live. 所以我认为那也只是非常注重成长的心态，但它仍然拥有极低的失业率，健康、相对健康的人口，良好的教育，不是一个糟糕的居住地。

日本的“错误转向”：软件与硬件的抉择

Just on this point though, why didn't Japan get into the sort of software side of technology as much as it did on the sort of hardware side in the 80s and 90s? 就这一点而言，为什么日本在80年代和90年代没有像在硬件方面那样，大量进入技术领域的软件方面呢？

You know, I think that that is a question I don't exactly know the answer for, but that's often given as the big mistake that they made, right? 你知道，我认为这是一个我不太清楚答案的问题，但这通常被认为是他们犯下的一个大错误，对吧？

So Japanese companies made an investment decision at just the wrong time that that hardware, and I think it was partially because they were always just really good at developing hardware, and they had developed a lot of institutional knowledge about making devices and improving devices, improving hardware, and they were like, look, this is what we're good at. 所以日本公司在一个错误的时机做出了投资硬件的决定，我认为部分原因是他们一直都非常擅长开发硬件，并且积累了大量关于制造设备、改进设备、改进硬件的机构知识，他们就觉得，看，这就是我们擅长的。

I also think that there is a certain to not to get into too many cultural explanation, but there is a certain conservatism in Japan about tools about about devices and things that are seen to work aren't quickly gotten rid of. 我还认为，我不想过多地进行文化解释，但在日本对于工具和设备存在一定的保守主义，那些被认为有效的东西不会很快被淘汰。

The Japanese government just had to kind of wage an internal jihad to get people to get its own bureaucracy to stop using floppy discs. 日本政府不得不进行一场内部圣战，以让人们，包括其自身的官僚机构，停止使用软盘。

Japanese companies still often use fax machines. 日本公司仍然经常使用传真机。

Yes. 是的。

As Tracy knows. 正如Tracy所知。

I know I used to part of my job used to be monitoring a fax machine for press releases, and most of them that came in were from Japan. 我知道我以前的工作有一部分是监控传真机接收新闻稿，而收到的新闻稿大部分都来自日本。

And this was like the mid-2000s. 而这大概是在2000年代中期。

Yeah. 是的。

And I think that there's that that sense that some things, some ways of doing things, some processes, some technologies are good, and there's not any real reason to replace them. 而且我认为存在这样一种观念，即有些事物、有些做事方式、有些流程、有些技术是好的，并且没有真正的理由去取代它们。

And obviously like when productivity is your number one goal, that's not necessarily again, it may make in some way I find it very charming, and I find it also one theory I've read is that the reason why unemployment is very low is because somebody has to be there to get those faxes and they're not that Japanese companies are not that keen to adopt software that might replace a worker. 显然，当生产力是你的首要目标时，那不一定，从某种程度上说，我发现它很有魅力，我还读过一种理论，认为失业率很低的原因是必须有人在那里接收那些传真，而且日本公司对采用可能取代工人的软件并不那么热衷。

So there's a certain kind of pro-social attitude and not and not doing these upgrades. 所以存在一种亲社会态度，而不是进行这些升级。

But yeah, the the transition to the software age was one of those places where Japan is thought to have made a wrong turn. 但是的，向软件时代的过渡是日本被认为走错路的地方之一。

Yeah. 是的。

New Jersey, they still don't let you pump your own gas. 新泽西州，他们仍然不让你自己加油。

Right. 对。

We we have our own cultural own cultural dimensions. 我们有我们自己的文化维度。

New Jersey famously socially oriented. 新泽西州以其社会导向性而闻名。

That's right. 没错。

John Gans, author of The Unpopular Front, Substack, and the recent book When the Clock Broke. John Gans，Substack上《非流行阵线》的作者，以及新书《当时间崩坏时》的作者。

Thank you so much for, uh, coming on Odd Lot. 非常感谢你来《Odd Lots》。

Thrilled that we made this happen. 很高兴我们促成了这次对话。

Yeah, thank you. 是的，谢谢你。

Thank you so much, Tracy. 非常感谢你，Tracy。

That was a lot of fun. 那很有趣。

I do think that Japanese stuff seemed really cool back then in a way again. 我确实认为日本的东西在当时看起来确实很酷。

And maybe we should talk more soon about the rise of China, the brand, and whether there's whether it will break through. 也许我们很快应该更多地谈谈中国的崛起、品牌，以及它是否会突破。

Let's just do the Li-Ning. 那我们就谈谈李宁吧。

Yeah, we'll do it. 是的，我们会做的。

We'll do it. 我们会做的。

Um, just give in. 嗯，就妥协吧。

It's inevitable. 这是不可避免的。

Someone told me that if you go to the, um, the running shoe subreddit, there's a lot more mentions of there's I think there's Anta is like the Nike of Japan that you see more mentions of them on like I I tried to build a scraper of brand mentions over time. 有人告诉我，如果你去那个，嗯，跑鞋的Reddit子版块，会提到更多——我认为安踏就像日本的耐克，你会在那里看到更多关于它们的提及，就像我试图建立一个品牌提及随时间变化的抓取工具。

I couldn't get it done on Reddit. 我在Reddit上没能完成。

So I do think we should talk about that. 所以我觉得我们应该讨论一下。

But, you know, that was this whole aspect of Walkman, Nintendo, those were cool brands the whole time. 但是，你知道，那就是随身听、任天堂的整个方面，那些一直都是很酷的品牌。

You know what's interesting about Nike and China is that there was a big push back domestically against Nike products because of rising nationalism in China and the idea that maybe Nike had made some missteps that like offended policy makers or people there. 你知道耐克和中国之间有趣的是，由于中国民族主义的兴起，以及耐克可能犯了一些冒犯政策制定者或当地民众的错误，国内对耐克产品产生了巨大的抵制。

But no, overall like having this conversation from 2025, given what we know about Japan today, the whole thing seems like, wow, that's, you know, it seems very surreal. 但是，不，总的来说，从2025年的角度来看这次对话，考虑到我们今天对日本的了解，整件事都显得，哇，你知道，它显得非常超现实。

Seems very quaint. 看起来很古雅。

It feels very like this idea that we were really worried that a relatively small island was going to take over military that we had a base on, right? 这感觉很像是，我们曾真的担心一个相对较小的岛国会占领我们设有军事基地的国家，对吧？

That more than one base, just to be clear, multiple bases on that we were as military related that there was that much anxiety. 不止一个基地，澄清一下，我们在那里有多个军事基地，而且我们与军事相关，所以才会有那么多的焦虑。

A sort of interesting chapter in our history. 我们历史中一个有趣的篇章。

结语：历史的摆动与认知的反转

I do think it's also interesting again to think about like how much a lot of the strengths and weaknesses have flipped in perception. 我确实觉得再次思考很多优势和劣势在认知上是如何反转的，这很有趣。

The idea that bureaucracy and consensus decision making was once seen as this competitive advantage, and now it's totally the opposite. 官僚主义和共识决策曾被视为竞争优势，而现在却完全相反了。

I mean in every context, right? 我的意思是在每种情况下都是这样，对吧？

You say, oh, one of the great things about the US, we have all these great checks and balances, etc. 你会说，哦，美国的一个伟大之处在于我们有所有这些出色的制衡机制等等。

And then suddenly we like can't build anything or get any laws passed. 然后突然间我们什么都建不了，也通过不了任何法律。

Oh, one of the big problems with the US is there are so many veto points and you can't get anything done. 哦，美国的一个大问题是，有太多的否决点，你什么都做不成。

It's just whatever the mood is at the time, the same set of conditions will either be get the blame or the credit. 这只是取决于当时的心情，同一套条件要么被指责，要么被归功。

It's just a giant pendulum swinging back and forth. 这就像一个巨大的钟摆来回摆动。

Markets and politics. 市场和政治。

That's right. 没错。

All right. 好的。

Shall we leave it there? 我们就到这里吧？

Let's leave it there. 就到这里吧。

This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 这是《Odd Lots》播客的又一集。

I'm Tracy Aloway. 我是Tracy Aloway。

You can follow me at Traceeway. 你可以在Traceeway关注我。

And I'm Joe Weisenthal. 我是Joe Weisenthal。

You can follow me at the stalwart. 你可以在stalwart关注我。

Follow John Gans. 关注John Gans。

He's at Lionel_trolling. 他在Lionel_trolling。

Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez, at Carmen Arman, Dashelbennet at Dashbot, and Kaleb Brooks at Kalebrooks. 关注我们的制作人，Carmen Rodriguez，她的账号是Carmen Arman；Dashelbennet，账号是Dashbot；以及Kaleb Brooks，账号是Kalebrooks。

For more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/odlots. 获取更多《Odd Lots》内容，请访问bloomberg.com/odlots。

We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. 我们有每日时事通讯和所有节目。

And you can chat about all of these topics 24/7 in our Discord, discord.gg/odlots. 你可以在我们的Discord频道discord.gg/odlots中24/7讨论所有这些话题。

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Thanks for listening. 感谢收听。