主持人: Is that the sense you get that nations are lining up to cut a deal with us right now? There's a risk premium in US assets that wasn't there before. And the question is, how big is that risk premium going to sell? And where is it going to sell? And that, in part, is going to depend on how coherent the new system is. And is there, does the US credibly commit to a new system or a series of deals?

马克·卡尼: I do believe that there are a series of like-minded countries. We very much like the US to be part of that group, but like-minded countries who will develop deeper trading and security relationships as a consequence of this. It's the world of second best. It's not what we would all want, but it's the logical thing to do.

主持人: The Prime Minister, where does this podcast find you? I'm in Montreal right now. Professor, the majority of the world spends their news is 10 minutes domestic and 20 minutes international. In the US, we're kind of self-absorbed, narcissistic. We don't talk a lot about other countries. I think most people have heard of you, have seen you on TV, but don't know much about you. Can you give us a sort of your backstory, your origin story?

马克·卡尼: Yeah, sure. So I was born in the Arctic, the north of Canada, a place called Fort Smith, Northwest Territories. I grew up in Edmonton, and those who might follow hockey, it was the days of Wayne Gretzky when he was playing for the Oilers. That was when I was a kid. I went away to university in the US, and then I worked on Wall Street, or versions of Wall Street, or worked for Goldman Sachs in London and Tokyo and New York, and ultimately, Canada. And then I went in about 20 years ago to become the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, which is the equivalent of the Federal Reserve in the US. I ended up being the Governor during the financial crisis of 2008. So I worked with, you know, through that process of the financial crisis. We had a good financial crisis, if you can have a good financial crisis in Canada. We got through it better than anyone else, emerged stronger, our bank stayed together. And then ultimately, I kind of slightly bizarrely, I was asked to become Governor of the Bank of England. So I became the first foreigner Governor of the Bank of England, and I did that through the period of the Brexit referendum, as it turned out, and in the aftermath of that. And then came back Canada, 2020, right in the middle of COVID. You had, I think you probably had a better experience during COVID, if I listening to your podcast, if I read it quickly than I did. And then I worked, I did a lot of work on climate change for the United Nations, sort of pro bono, and organizing the financial sector to help address climate change. But also at the same time, I worked for Brookfield, which is a big asset manager. And I was on the board of Bloomberg. And then, as of the start of January, I first ran for the leadership of the Liberal Party, which is one of the main parties here. And winning that became Prime Minister about a month ago, and now I'm running for election. We have, last point, much shorter elections in the United States. Our campaign is 37 days, and we've got two weeks roughly left to go.

主持人: So, a big friend of the pod is Ian Bremmer, the geopolitical strategist. And he was on the pod last week, and he described you as an open quote, generational mind for Canada on the global stage, close quote. In your view, what role does Canada play on the global stage?

马克·卡尼: So, we play, I mean, we play several roles. We're a member of the G7. In fact, we are chair of the G7 this year, so I'm chair of the G7. We're a member of the Commonwealth, which is the old UK grouping. We're member of the Francophonie, which is the obviously the Francophone grouping of about 60 countries. So, we have our role in several different, let's call it organizations, self-appointed organizations or groupings. I think one of the roles we play potentially in the new or the emerging global order is partly based on our assets. We are an energy and emerging energy superpower in all forms of energy. We're one of the largest critical mineral suppliers in the world. We're pretty good in AI. A lot of people claim that, but we're I think legitimately claiming that. And so we can play a role as a country that believes in open markets, open systems, believes in trade, open ideas, diversity. We can play a role with like-minded countries to kind of reconstruct that bit of that bit of the international order, which has been, I'm in Montreal, they would say "boulversé", it's been upended in the course of more intensively in the last few months, but a process that really began with the financial crisis 15 years ago.

主持人: Yeah. And just for our listeners, the elephant in the room is tariffs, I'm going to get to that. But I want to start with if you were to. So typically in the US, I imagine the same way in Canada, when a new leader is elected, assuming you get elected, they have sort of a honeymoon period and an opportunity to get more done in their first year, more grace, if you will, than in the next two or three years. What would you identify as the two or three biggest issues facing Canada? And what's your agenda, if you could pick two or three things, you're really going to go hard at your first year as Prime Minister, what are those things?

马克·卡尼: Yeah. As you just suggested, I'll set tariffs aside and focus in on three things. First is having free trade, actually, within Canada. We have, you know, basically 13 economies here, 10 different provinces and territories, all with their own rules. It's hard to move credentials, and sometimes goods and services across the country, far harder than it should be. So a process, a very quick process of free trade. And by the way, just to put orders of magnitude on this, you know, a reasonable estimate of the economic benefit of that is bigger than the economic hit from the worst version of the Trump tariffs, so we can kind of give ourselves more than others can. Second thing is we have a huge housing problem here, and particularly, obviously, for younger Canadians. First and foremost, we need to double the rate of housing, and we need to, I won't go into all the details, I'm happy to, but we need some major reforms in order to do that. We can do it in a way that actually leverages, you know, the Canadian supply chain technology and all the lumber, we potentially won't be able to send southbound to the US. And then the third thing, look, the world's fluid, I'm afraid this kind of comes towards tariffs, but I think the trading system is going to get reordered fairly quickly. And so in the course of the first year, the question is, well, who are we going to deepen our relationships with other than United States? And those relationships, last point, are both economic and security. The world's a much more dangerous place. Security concerns are top of the list. So who in Europe, or European Union as a whole, UK, who in Asia, where are we going to partnership? If I can say one last thing, Scott, is you know, just being shaken so hard by what's happening in the United States, Canadians are very open to all of those priorities. Like people are up for big things, they're coming together, and they're willing to do big things because they know they have to do big things because the world's changed so much.

主持人: Well, let's use that as a segue into tariffs. So I haven't checked my Apple Watch in the last two minutes, so I don't know the state of things right now. My understanding Canada's are our largest trading partner. Now we tend to be obsessed with China, but you're our largest trading partner. No, you're our most important. Yeah. So give us the state of play. You're the man representing our largest trading partner, economically, as to the best of your knowledge, describe the state of play between what is happening between the US and Canada. Where does it sit at this moment?

马克·卡尼: So I'll start with the bad news, or as we would call it, the unjustified news, which is what tariffs are in place. We have still in place today, tariffs that were originally justified because of fentanyl coming across the border from Canada. Just for the listeners who haven't tracked this, less than 1% of the fentanyl imported into United States comes from Canada. In fact, you've got a sophisticated audience, so I can say things like 19 basis points of the fentanyl comes across the border from Canada. We've taken major steps to reinforce the border, drones, helicopters, other things, and it's fallen by a further 90% over the course of the last three months. But those tariffs hit a wide range of goods in Canada, hit a wide range of goods. And there's a few carve-outs for that, but it's hitting hundreds of billions of goods. And those are 25% tariffs from the United States. Then we are also caught, secondly, we're also caught in the steel and aluminum tariffs, which are these national security tariffs, so-called 232 tariffs. We are the largest supplier of aluminum in the United States. We're one of the most important suppliers of steel to the United States, and you can roll those up into hundreds of thousands of jobs in the US, depending on Canadian steel and aluminum. And then the third thing is, we are caught in the auto tariffs, as people probably know. But I'll just personalize it. There was something called the Auto Pact, which was signed the year I was born, 60 years ago. And we have had an increasingly integrated auto system with the United States for 60 years. It got tighter with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 40 years ago, and then with NAFTA and the successor. So literally, these companies and the supply chains, the main parts suppliers, they're virtually fully integrated. And now into the middle of this is coming 25% US tariffs, which are, you know, in an industry, as you know, that has, you know, 5, 7% margins. I mean, this is this is absolutely damaging. So we have three sets of tariffs. We are not subject yet to the so-called reciprocal tariffs to the US. So the state of the relationship is strained to say the least, because all of these tariffs are in violation of what you call USMCA, we call CUSMA, the same trade agreement. The good news, or the better news is that three weeks ago or so, President Trump and I spoke. And we agreed that following the Canadian election, there would be the beginning of a negotiation of a comprehensive, a new comprehensive relationship, economic security. So we are, we are in the queue, so to speak, for those discussions.

主持人: It strikes me that these actions are about to inspire what they envision, that is a tremendous amount of deal making, but deal making around us. That is, it just seems logical. This is a thesis, and I want you to validate or nullify it. But if I'm a G7 nation and I have a trading partner that I used to be able to count on that was mutually very prosperous. And now, I just not only can't count on them, but have no idea who I'm waking up next to. That it's incredible motivation to start establishing dialogue with other nations. Is respond to that thesis. Is Canada aggressively and actively trying to reroute around America right now?

马克·卡尼: Yeah. Well, I would say, you know, trade is a world of "and." So, you know, it's a positive sum game. As you know, both, you do it right, both sides win. It's not a zero sum game. So I might not choose the phrase "around America." But obviously, you, look, if we're, if we've got excess capacity, or we have things we're going to develop, I'll use the example of critical minerals, where we're a big player, who, with whom are we going to trade? Who can we rely on? You know, we're sitting here, we supply 70% of the potash to the United States. You know, one of the most important components of fertilizer, 70%. And there is a 25% tariff being put on potash. So when you think about it, well, geez, maybe I might want to take another, I'll call it a commodity, even though critical metals and minerals are more than that. If we're going to develop those, maybe we want to develop them with a supply chain to someone who's not going to slap a tariff like that on. So that validating your thesis. We, we, yeah, we have begun to intensify discussions with other, other countries, other trading blocks. We have a pretty good set of trading trade deals in place. We have free trade deal with Europe. We have free trade. We're part of the what was called the Trans-Pacific Part in Asia. So we have a number of those, but we're we're looking to reinforce them. And look, we're, we are hopeful, maybe hopeful isn't the right word, but we're open to, open is a better way to put it, to a restart of the US trading relationship provided there's willingness on the other side, and we can come to one of those positive sum deals.

主持人: So I would imagine you speak to a lot of other G7 or G20 leaders. What's the general consensus around American leadership right now? And I realize that you have more restraint and are a bit more or diplomatic. But what is the thesis among this group of world leaders around what is going on here? How do they explain it? How do you explain it to each other? Or can you explain it to each other? Because quite frankly, here in the US, a lot of this doesn't even make sense to us, and this is our leadership.

马克·卡尼: Well, I think the first thing is to recognize, as I have said, and a number of those other leaders have said, including G7 leaders, is that the system as we knew it is over. Right? When the anchor of the system has done a series of measures that the US has done, but also set out a series of objectives, and I'll come back to that, but set out a series of objectives that are just inconsistent with the way the system has been operating for decades, right? Basically, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, intensified since then. So, you recognize that that system anchored on the US is over. That then leads to how do you react to it? There's partly the negotiation with the US, and which you've been focused on. But then it's also how do we deal with each other, which we've also touched on in terms of what the US is trying to accomplish. I think it's, you know, I take, go back to Peter Thiel of 10 years ago, saying, "Take Donald Trump literally and seriously," but taking literally and seriously, and, you know, they're looking to balance, where to extent possible, to balance trade, which is not the way we think about things, but is the way the US thinks about things. And, you know, you do get into odd situations like Canada, where we actually run a, America has a trade surplus with Canada in goods. The only reason there's an overall deficit with Canada is because of basically oil imports. Well, if you don't want our oil imports, that will be a bit of a problem for a period of time because, you know, the only other option for the refineries that take Canadian oil is Venezuela. And that's, you know, they're just banned those, those imports as well. So there, it's not the logic isn't entirely consistent. Let's put it that way. But I think at the core, recognizing this desire for more balanced trade. And so from the US administration, the question, I think, in our mind, is there are some industries, autos, particularly, aerospace would have another element of this, and then a number of commodities. And there are a couple industries that are so integrated that it's hard to see why for US competitiveness, let alone North American competitiveness, it makes sense to pull them apart. That would be our argument. And then there's other industries, forest products, steel, aluminum as three big examples, where we're agriculture, potash, I gave that example, nickel, I could go on, where we're such huge suppliers and such a safe, secure supplier. Again, it doesn't really, to us, make sense that that would be displaced or tariffed. So, you know, we've seen that this, the trade policy is evolving as some of these choke points become more evident. And, you know, I suspect, I suspect, we will see more. Maybe I'll say one other thing if I could, which is, it strikes me a bit, what in the consistencies of US policy is a desire to have some minimum tariff, if possible, which has a revenue raising element to it. And I think, you know, tied into US tax policy, that is that is also a possibility here.

主持人: My understanding is about 99% of our trade is tariff-free, and that 1% is around things like dairy. Haven't we largely been kind of a trade-free zone between Canada and the US today?

马克·卡尼: Yeah, yeah, we have. And then we have, you know, like any trading partners, you get the odd trade irritant and, you know, trade dispute, but we have processes to deal with those. And so we had a, you know, we have ongoing things around forest products, sometimes steel and aluminum, and that's handled. But yeah, trade is basically tariff-free. And you, when it's your biggest trading partner, pulling that apart is is quite costly, is costly for both. You know, from a Canadian perspective, and, you know, I'm out on the road, I'm running for office, I'm talking to lots of Canadians up and down. There is a very strong sense of, yeah, this is going to cost us. But we're willing to take the price to restructure our economy in a different direction. Like, it's been such a sense of, I mean, the word that's used is "betrayal." So, you know, we signed a deal. We've had this partnership. We observe it in good faith. We set up businesses. You know, we know lots of Americans, would like Americans, but listen to American podcasts. You know, there's such a sense of, and all of a sudden, you know, we get these, you know, these attacks, which is the way these, this is viewed, is, okay, so it's going to cost us for a period of time, and we'll build out and build with others.

主持人: You were the first non-Brit to serve to run the Bank of England. You're sort of the Bo Jackson of global economic leadership. I've compared this, and it might be a crude analogy, but I want you to, I want you to add some color, fill in the blanks here. I've described these tariffs as the biggest own goal since Brexit. What similarities do you see? And how does that inform A, how you respond to this and B, what you think ultimately, the outcome is?

马克·卡尼: Well, I think there's, there are a lot of similarities, and it starts with the economics, the economics of what's happening. Actually, briefly describe Brexit. Because just give us the headline news on Brexit. So, the headline on Brexit is for a variety of reasons, and many of them not to do with economics, although it was sold as an economic win, but a lot of people know because of reasons of identity and others, voted in 2018, if I'll get my dates right, 2016, I guess, for the UK to leave the European Union. And the UK was even more tightly bound in trade and economic relationships with the European Union than Canada is with the United States, including free movement of labor, easy movement of capital, huge trade going both ways. You never had to get your product, if your product met the product standard in the UK, didn't have to worry about, you could sell any country in Europe. And so the decision taken, as I say, for a variety of reasons, narrowly, but taken to leave the European Union. I remember when it happened in our view at the time, and remember, this was during a period where it was interest rates were at rock bottom. Inflation was too low. People were worried about deflation, blah, blah. Our view was, okay, what's going to happen is the economy is going to slow, unemployment's going to go up, inflation is going to go up. And we at the Bank of England are going to have to raise interest rates when this happens. And by the way, the currency will also go down. The currency went down by 20, 25%. It's still on the floor relative to where it was, still on the floor because you had a big negative trade shock, a big loss of wealth, basically future wealth in the currency market, priced it first. And exactly what we expected to happen, happened. I mean, it happened to happen roughly at the same time as COVID was finishing, but yet a big, yeah, again, I'm relying on your audience, a big negative supply shock to the economy because you ripped up trading relationships, and the productive capacity went down relative to where demand was. So that was inflationary. And combination of that meant UK rates are higher, and it's got a bigger inflation problem. It has had another economies.

马克·卡尼: When you look at what's happened in the US, the friction put into its trading relationships is going to cause the same thing. It is going to slow the rate of growth of that economy. It is going to affect the dollar. It has affected the dollar negatively, as we've seen. It's going to push up prices on the margin. And so slower economy, higher inflation, higher interest rates, all things being equal. Now, there's a big caveat with what I do, or there's a qualifier is a better way to put it. The UK was a much more open economy, much more dependent on Europe. The US is more of a closed economy. It depends on the world, but it is, it's different orders of magnitude. So it's same direction, different orders of magnitude. So there's, I think there are a lot of a lot of parallels here. And I guess maybe the other parallel, if I can add one more, which remains to be seen. But the UK, I would say, and you'll get, I'll get hate mail from UK, some UK listeners, but I would say, based on the polling, it's pretty well understood that the economic impact of Brexit has been negative in the UK. Let's say, two-thirds of the people now understand that. But the path back to being closer to Europe is very difficult politically. It's hard to build rebuild that consensus. They move very slowly. And you think about the situation in the world right now for the UK, boy, there's a lot of logic being closer to Europe from trade perspective. And even from a security perspective, they built this sort of what's called a coalition of the willing with respect to Ukraine because the UK, the US is pulling back from support for Ukraine. By the way, Canada has stepped up and is part of that largely European coalition of the willing alongside Australia. So there's a logic to going back to that, but it's hard to go back once you've broken up these relationships. And so the next six, yes, 12 months in my judgment, are going to be quite important for the United States and for the global trading system. Because the question is, okay, we understand that there's a there, there is a big change or big break with the old system. But how much of a break is it going to be? And is there going to be a relatively open trading system for, yeah, I'm using quotations here for those listening, like-minded countries, broadly like-minded countries? You know, I think of the G7 as being pretty like-minded countries. Not surprisingly, you know, we value liberty, free speech, open markets in general. So are we going to have a relatively open system amongst ourselves? Or is it only going to be with a few countries? Or is it going to be with no countries? I mean, that's kind of what to play for here. And but the system won't, it won't revert to what it was previously.

主持人: When we're talking about these tariffs, there's a general sense that, or a talk track from the Trump administration, that the US has been taken advantage of by trading partners, including Canada, that they've just got the better end of the deal. And the tariffs will help restore some sort of parity or equity in the relationship. Respond to that.

马克·卡尼: Well, I mean, we don't obviously, we don't see it. We don't see it in the following respects, because really, again, the way the Trump administration is defined. Being quote, "taken advantage of" is, do you run a trade deficit? And we can argue about that definition, I wouldn't. If I lead on my economic training and my experience, I would say, well, that isn't being taken advantage of, it's mutual exchange. But the US runs a surplus with us. US sells more. What if anyone's being taken advantage of, we're being taken advantage of, right, because I mean, by that definition? And the only place where they run a deficit is, yes, we do ship oil to the United States. Now we happen to ship oil to the United States at a big discount to global prices. So we're being taken advantage of again on that definition. On the, on the goods trade side. And we're getting taking advantage because we're selling oil at below good prices. So, we, you know, we, we want our money back. No, we don't where we still see the broader benefits of the relationship. And, you know, I don't think that I'll go back to the auto sector. Yeah. It's not going to feel taken advantage of as if these tariffs stay in place. And you know, as you say, you got to check your phone every once in a while, just to see where things stand. There's a possible exemption on the auto parts side that's coming in in the United States, which we would have said, right, what we did say, right from the start, would have to happen because the whole system will grind into a halt without it. So some of the mutual advantages will become more, or becoming more apparent, and hopefully, the US administration can continue to be nimble.

主持人: Yeah. My understanding is that you ship us cheap energy or cheap oil. You're, obviously, a very resource abundant nation. We apply our IP and refining capability, and then we sell it at three times the cost. It sounds like it's been pretty mutually beneficial.

马克·卡尼: Yep, no, that's absolutely right.

主持人: How do you see this playing out? If you were attempted to speculate what the relationship is around global trade and tariffs on a macro level, and then specifically with Canada and the US. When, when you try to plan an economy similar to way the CEO tries to plan a business. What are you expecting? You have to do scenario planning. Nobody knows. But, what do you think are the most likely scenarios for how this plays out? Because I mean, this is seriously Prime Minister. We're all befuddled by this. The majority of people who understand economics are having a difficult time seeing how this is a big win for the US. We're just, we're having a difficult time understanding how we win here. Maybe more people come to the today. They claim there's 75 nations lining up to cut deals with them. Is that the sense you get that nations are lining up to cut a deal with us right now?

马克·卡尼: Well, short answer, I don't know. This "I don't know" is on that second question. There's a few things that happen here. One is that there's a risk premium in US assets that wasn't there before. And the question is, how big is that risk premium going to sell? Where is it going to sell? And that, in part, is going to depend on how coherent the new system is, you. And is there, does the US credibly commit to a new system or a series of deals? Remember, we're, you know, we have, we have a trading deal with US that was signed by the current president and which isn't being observed. So I think that's one thing, is there's a risk premium on US assets. And if there's a risk premium on US assets, then the cost of all other assets around the world is greater, right? Like since we're still priced off of, price off of US treasuries, for example. So that's one thing, I think.

马克·卡尼: Second is I do believe that there are a series of like-minded countries. We very much like the US to be part of that group, but like-minded countries who will develop deeper trading and security relationships as a consequence of this. It's the world of second best. It's not what we would all want, but it's the logical thing to do. Third thing that's going to happen is that there is going to be much greater focus, and I know this for a fact, well, this will be a fact if my party is successful in the elections, a much greater focus on domestic drivers of demand. So building at home, building big infrastructure, building millions of houses, building, building out our own economies, more domestic procurement, right? In a world where we've got excess steel and aluminum capacity, which we will. If the US doesn't change on trade. Well, guess whose steel and aluminum we're going to buy for a variety of things? Guess what defense procurement we're going to do? Right now, we spend about 75% of our defense dollars go to the United States. That, you know, doesn't make a lot of sense if we settle out in a in a more arm's length relationship with the US. And that's true. If it's true for us, it's true for Europe, it's true for the UK. And so we'll all move more domestic and more with each other. And the degree to which that happens. So this is a world, just to be clear, and you, I think you intuitively understand what you get this from the start. We've got a world where we have higher risk of premium, right? It's cost of capital is more expensive. And we've got a world where people are doing second best things. Countries are doing second best things. So it's a world that's more expensive. And it's more, it's not autarkic, to use a fancy word. Like, it's not totally in and of yourself, but it's you're putting much greater emphasis on taking care of yourself. We'll do that and we'll do it with like-minded countries. And move forward.

主持人: The survey, as Everett said, that two-thirds of Americans still think of Canada as an ally. We sort of, I, you know, Trump, let boys will be boys. We still love Canadians, but two-thirds plus of Canadians no longer see the US as an ally. I mean, quite frankly, it feels like Canadians are just pissed off that they feel the term used was betrayed. And that even if we're, even if we're able to establish, go back to normal, hasn't the knife, you know, isn't it? The knife gets pulled halfway out of the back. But this injury takes years or decades to heal. I mean, what is the vibe, if you will, around how Canadians feel about Americans? And how long do you think it gets, it takes us to repair this relationship?

马克·卡尼: I certainly recognize those figures. There is a feeling here that, that he, it's the actions of the US. There's, there's several things. One is the trade action. Secondly, was this long period. And I'm, I'm not going to repeat the phrases that were used, but these threats to our sovereignty, our very sovereignty, which, you know, kind of unique. There's us and Denmark, who've suffered, yeah, actual threats to sovereignty. I guess Panama, we roll ourselves in with that. And that's, you know, on your hierarchy of betrayals, threatening somebody else's sovereignty pretty much to the top. I guess the top is acting on that threat. So, so that's all mixed in. I think. Secondly, what has been striking has been the relatively muted response in the broader US to these steps, right? You know, the CEO class, if I can put it that way, the other major influencers, stakeholders. And the, that's changing a bit. But it was pretty quiet for a long period of time. So, you know, and when you look at that from this side of the board, you think, oh, okay, well, this is more deeply held, or the friendship is less firmly rooted. It's like any relationship, I think if it's when you have a loss of trust. You, it can be repaired to a degree. It takes a period of time, and it takes action to repair, right? But, you know, it's more than more than five words. I, I think that, that action can start with in May, the Prime Minister of Canada at that point will meet with President Trump. I want to be the Prime Minister of Canada at that point, I'm working hard to get there, and they'll sit down and start a process of redefining that relationship and building trust out from that.

主持人: We're back with more from Prime Minister Carney. So, just as a means of not or taking advantage of the fact that we have you on this podcast, we have real problems in the US around income inequality. For the first time in our nation's history, a 30-year-old isn't doing as well as his or her parents was at 30. Tremendous polarization politically. People don't like each other. And I would argue that comparatively, the nation's actually done quite well. But what ails us, the cause coming from inside of the house, we don't like each other within America. You're asked to be a journeyman and come be Treasury Secretary, head of the Fed. What policy plans do you think the US should adopt? And then I want to use that as a jumping off point to what are the biggest economic challenges Canada faces and how you plan to address them?

马克·卡尼: Well, I think the, okay, you go to the heart of, I mean, that's a big, big question. I guess the way I look at it is as follows. I, I'm going to come at this from an odd angle, maybe, but when I look at what's going to drive economic prosperity, productivity growth for the next 25 years? What are the big drivers of that? I put down three big drivers: AI, no insight. I put at the top of the list, probably the life sciences revolution, where I'm less less expert, and, and I would put carbon. I would put drive towards lower carbon. The US has taken a step back from that for the moment, but it's going to come back because the underlying issues around are there. And so, okay, if those are some of the big things that are going to drive economies going forward, and the US can have mastery in all of those. But the question is, how broadly that's going to be shared within the US across various social strata? And how ready people are going to be to take advantage of it, right? So, you know, is AI going to be, you know, purely an elite or largely an elite operation? Or is AI going to be used to train a lot of people to do a number of things? I mean, I know that sounds very Panglossian and, you know, techno optimistic. But it is the question is whether it's a deliberate policy that's steered by by the federal and local governments in a way that are going to ensure that, you know, in Appalachia, you're learning skills that are consistent with that. And or, you know, the energy transition over time, but it's not a term that's used anymore in the US, as far as I can tell, but it will come back. If I can flip it back to us. We have the same set of issues or set of drivers. Those are global drivers. On top of that, we have a series of things, such as I mentioned critical minerals. We have large conventional energy. So how are we balancing all that in a way that builds the jobs as we move out?

马克·卡尼: One of the things, I'll say two other things, which are related but distinct. We've got to sort out our housing issues in this country. We have a massive economic, we have an absolute social need, but we have a massive economic opportunity to create a new industry, new way of building houses and at scale and driving that. And we're going to, we're going to shoot on that. And I guess the last thing I'd say, which, yeah, candidly worries me a bit about the United States and gives me greater comfort or strength in Canada is a word I'm not sure you like to use anymore, which is around diversity. We have a huge, huge opportunity here because we're one of the most diverse countries in the world. You value diversity, again, give a very strong sense of equal rights in a broad sense. We can be a magnet for talent. And as the US is pushing out brains, if you will, and, you know, it's quite a hostile environment in the academic world in the United States. Now, we can take advantage of that. And then that cascades down through, you know, the AI revolution, life sciences, other other elements.

主持人: Yeah. Podcasters, creative class, Scott, come up here. Whether it's now, it's now above zero. Creative has done a lot of work in that. So, and Prime Minister. So that look, you have a housing crisis. We have a housing crisis. And it seems like leaders have agreed that it's a crisis for the last 10 years. Now, I read that housing of Vancouver as a percentage of the average salary is the third most expensive city in the world. And that so much of it is in zoning and NIMBYism. And your, the previous Prime Minister, you know, they wanted to address the housing crisis. What's the friction point? Is it capital? Is it labor? Is it zoning? What is different about what you're proposing that is going to register any more progress than previous administrations?

马克·卡尼: So, it's it's all of the above. And so you attack it in in a comprehensive way. I'm going to simplify in terms of restrict zoning development charges. And we work at multiple levels of government is part of the reason why those costs are there. They come from the municipal side. And so in effect, we put up a bunch of money, just put up a bunch of money to commit to cut the development charges in half. Okay. So and that's subject to a series of other restrictions being removed. But we will, we at the federal level will pay for that to be cut in half. The second thing, I mean, we believe very strongly that productivity in the Canadian housing sector, construction sector, basically is flatlined for the last 20 years. We're still building houses like we did before. And, given the scale of what we need to do, we got to move much more rapidly, particularly in urban density and other things. So modular prefab, housing, mass timber, other innovations that there they exist. And so one of the things we're going to do to kickstart that industry, and this is Canada's not the United States. We have a different attitude toward these things. We have a problem with deeply affordable housing, right? Social, certain countries, you might call social housing. We just have not built that for decades, basically in effect. And so we need to, we need to catch up. And so what we're doing, part of what we're doing is we're going to build huge amount at that level and set the the specs, if you will. For that. Yeah. We're going to build and we're going to build by, you know, on our balance sheet as a developer, and we'll set the specs for that, which drive the industry upstream in prefab, mass, timber, et cetera, which gets the economies to scale there. But, by and large, we will rely on private sector build, will make a bunch of land available, of make cheap capital, 25 billion for developers in this case, which is bigger money up here, cut those development charges in half, drive that. And then we will give tax breaks to people buying their first time home. So basically, they're getting 5% off their first first time home, which, from a down payment perspective, starts starts to add up. So attacking it both on the supply demand side. The way we look at it. Is, this is generational. Like the scale of the problem is generational, such that we are building out a huge pipeline of apprentices in the skilled trades, and one of the core messages I give up virtually every time I speak, so I'm going to do it now, is this is going to be a great time for a career in the skilled trades in Canada because we're going to build for the next 25, 30 years. Like we are going to add, if we get this right, and we intend to, three to four points of GDP of investment. That's a huge number, right? It's possible. We used to invest at that scale relative to GDP. In the early 70s. We can do it again. We know we can finance it. We've got all the pension funds. We've got lots of money to finance it, but we need to, we need to kickstart it. And of course, it's not, it's housing. We start with housing. It's not just housing. It's energy. It's other other elements, but that's what we're going to do. So we want to get young people into the skilled trades at scale. We're going to pay for all their apprenticeships. We're going to work with the unions to pull them through. We're adding a bunch of capacity at post-secondary education. So they can get these trades at a scale. So we're getting to hundreds of thousands, which again, in the US doesn't seem like a lot. And in Canada, these are big numbers.

主持人: Let's talk a little bit about climate and energy. You've evolved from being a climate finance advocate to scrapping the consumer carbon tax and calling for Canada to be an energy superpower. How have your views changed on those?

马克·卡尼: Yeah. I wouldn't, I wouldn't say my views have changed to be honest. So, I mean, it's, it's very results oriented. So the consumer carbon tax in Canada was responsible for about 6% of our emissions reduction. So 94% of the work was being done elsewhere. Now, it sent a signal to households. But it, it, it just wasn't, yeah, that important. But it was quite divisive, because people, you know, viewed it as a tax, and they they saw the tax with the tax. They didn't all give credit to the rebates that they were getting. So it politically was unhelpful, was undercutting the overall message. So we got rid of that a few months ago, was first thing I did actually, when I got into office. But, what we, what we are doing is making sure that the carbon market for large emitters works well. Yeah. So. And and we large emitters work well. And as a consequence of that, we're getting them in effect to pay people for, this is what will happen if we're elected, to pay people for, you know, driving EVs, retrofitting their homes, the other, you know, climate smart choices.

马克·卡尼: And then on top of that, there is a big element, big IRA type element to our climate strategy, investment tax and credits and others. So we're looking basically and having reasonable success with this, where we're putting out, you know, a dollar federally, and we're getting four to five dollars of private investment on top of that. And, you know, what's really relevant to us? Aside from caring about the climate and people up here, do care about the climate as a whole. Is that we think that this is going to be a fundamental driver of competitiveness. And if you look at who we're going to be trading with more over time, Europeans, the Brits, others, guess what they care about this? In fact, as you know, carbon border adjustment mechanism is coming into in Europe. And so we take a view that, okay, we've got to do this medium long term for competitiveness because that's where the world's going. Secondly, the Europeans and others are going to want us to do this. Thirdly, actually, we've got a lot of the technology. So part of being an energy superpower is around small modular reactors. I mean, we're big hydropower. We're decent on hydrogen. We could get better carbon capture and storage. All these things we can do. And I guess the last point, which goes back to the US is, you know, right now, and I'm going to grossly generalize, the US doesn't care about climate. Six months ago, we cared about climate. Guess what? You're going to care about climate again down the road. And when you care about climate down the road again, we want to be in a position where we're much more competitive and maybe have leapfrogged a number of US companies.

主持人: So I just want to do a quick lightning round. Advice to your 25-year-old self, you 10, 15 seconds with your 25-year-old self, what would you say to yourself?

马克·卡尼: You know, relax and stay focused on what you like. I mean, I probably spent more time doing things I didn't really love than I should have.

主持人: You got a chance to go back and meet with someone who you've lost or who's no longer around, who would that person be? And what would you say to them?

马克·卡尼: Well, I think with, I, you know, be I be my father. I'd say love them.

主持人: You at the end of your life, not going to walk on the beach again, not going to get to hang out with your wife, your kids. What does success look like for you when you, when you look back, what is the box you want to have checked?

马克·卡尼: I think strongly, the answer to that is that you're, you're proud of the values of your children and people who worked with you. I mean, I think that is the only real legacy, the extent to which you have influenced how others treat others in the world, and how they, how they react in the world. That's, I wrote a book, and that was the that was the conclusion of that.

主持人: Mark Carney is Canada's 24th Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party, sworn in this March. As an economist, Prime Minister Carney steered the Bank of Canada through the financial crisis, and later became the first non-Brit to run the Bank of England. Between those roles, he served as UN Special Envoy to Climate Action and Finance, and as Vice Chair of Brookfield Asset Management. I trust a lot of Canadians are listening. And I feel comfortable speaking for a lot of people, and that is Americans understand the largest undefended border in the world is the US Canadian border. That's for a reason. I love that question that a Warren Buffett's friend was a Holocaust survivor, said, "The way I judge my friends is I asked one question: who would hide me?" A lot of Americans remember that Canadians hid Americans in the Iran hostage crisis. And I hope that your listeners and your voters recognize there is a huge swath of Americans that think of you not not of even as a friend, but as siblings. And that we hope and are committed to maintaining what is arguably one of the strongest alliances in history that I don't want to say, don't take what's going on seriously, you have to, but there are a lot of Americans down here who are brothers and sisters in arms in Canada. We really do think of you as a sibling. Thank you, Scott.