回归常识与痛苦耐受:Opendoor 破产边缘的翻盘剧本 The Knowledge Project Podcast 2026-07-21

濒临破产的第一天

肖恩·帕里什: 你需要找出哪些默认设置正在扼杀公司,并以极其强硬的方式去改变它们。绝对不能有什么渐进式的“变革管理”,因为你必须让这种改变产生震荡感。你接管了一家距离破产只有几个月的公司。带我们回到公司内部吧,你在第一天做了什么?

Original English

Shane Parrish: You need to figure out which defaults are killing the company and change them violently. There must not be change management because you want the change to feel jarring. You took over a company that was months away from bankruptcy. Take me inside the company. What did you do on day one?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我离开家飞往旧金山,当时 Opendoor 在那里只有一个办公室。在出门的时候,我对我妻子说:“嘿,亲爱的,我周四就回来。”她对我说:“在你拿到一个能让公司收支平衡的计划之前,别给我回来。”我当时觉得:“哈哈,真幽默,这太好笑了。”但我妻子说:“不,不,我没开玩笑。别回来。”她甚至在亚马逊上买了一个床垫直接寄到了办公室给我。因为我妻子非常清楚,我会在办公室里连续睡上好几天,我的计划是彻底搞清楚到底哪里出了问题。因为基本上,所有的企业失败都有相似的原因,而成功却各有不同。正如那句名言,所有的成功都是独特的,但所有的失败都高度相似。优秀的人才流失,人们失去对创新的控制,管理费用(G&A)飙升,久而久之你开始和你的客户及合作伙伴发生冲突。

这些问题当时都在 Opendoor 发生了。我要求提供一份所有员工的完整名单、每一份合同、公司在过去 12 个月里支付的每一笔款项,他们把所有的账目都交给了我。我说,很好,把公司的真实状况展示给我。我发现的一件事是,缺乏积极的管理竟然会让公司萎缩到如此令人惊讶的程度。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I left home um to fly San Francisco where Open Door had one office. Um and on the way out the door, I told my wife, "Hey sweetheart, I'll be back on Thursday." And she said, "Do not come back until you have a plan to break the company even." And I'm like, "Haha, very funny. This is hilarious." And my wife said, "No, no, I'm not kidding. Do not come back." She went Amazon and ordered a mattress to the office for me. Like I knew I was going to sleep in the office for multiple days in a row because my plan was try to figure out what had gone wrong. Because basically what happens is all companies fail in similar ways. No companies succeed. And I said all success is unique but all failures rhyme. Good people leave. People lose control of innovation. GNA goes up and over time you end up fighting picking fights with your customers and partners. So that had happened at open door. I asked for a full list of all employees, every contract, every payment the company had made for the last 12 months, and they're like all the accounts. Like I'm just cool, give me like the state. And one of the things I realized is that it is actually surprising how lack of active management allows companies to atrophy.

专业寄生虫与官僚腐败

肖恩·帕里什: 你所说的缺乏管理导致萎缩是什么意思?

Original English

Shane Parrish: What do you mean by that?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 如果你的目标仅仅是避免让自己看起来很糟,你就会做一些特定的事情,对吧?所以在很长一段时间里,Opendoor 都在尽一切努力让自己不被注意到,为了不引人注目,这意味着公司基本上已经变成了一家由专业顾问管理的公司。我给你两个具体的例子。在我加入公司并准备主持董事会时,董事会给我发了一份谷歌文档,这是关于我将成为公司 CEO 的官方公告。我读了那份文档,感觉它是由一个极力避免说任何可能冒犯任何人的人写的。于是我接管并进行了修改,但随后有人进去撤销了我的修改,再次更改了文档,使其不具任何攻击性。因此,我在文档顶部用大号粗体字写道:“谁写了这篇文档,谁就不用在 Opendoor 工作了。”我当时并不知道,公司聘请来做公关的两家咨询公司都在那份文档的编辑历史里。结果发生了一个令人愉快的意外,两家咨询公司都非常高调地辞去了这个账户,表示“我们不想和这家公司有任何关系”。这带来了两个好处:第一,我不需要支付 30 天的解约通知金;第二,我的利润表上减少了一笔开支。

我拿到了公司过去 12 个月里支付的每一笔费用明细。通常对于科技公司来说,你对外部供应商的最大开支往往是你的云服务提供商。但对于 Opendoor 来说,排名第一的开支是付给一家大型咨询公司的数百万美元。这家公司进来后,基本上告诉 Opendoor 把每个工作岗位都外包出去,让公司充斥着海量的 G&A 开支,并基本上削减了研发工程——如果你完全不想创造超额收益(Alpha),这就是你字面意思上会做的事。而这基本上就发生在 Opendoor 身上。顺便说一句,我认为这实际上发生在很多创始人不再掌舵的软件公司里。没有大股东真正关心这家公司,所以随着时间的推移,这些公司实质上变成了专业寄生虫的温床,这些寄生虫的工作就是榨干公司,同时让管理层看起来体面。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: If you're trying to avoid looking bad, you do a certain number of certain things, right? So, Open Door for a very long time was doing everything it could in order to not be noticed, in order to not stand out, which meant the company was basically had become a company run by professional consultants. Let me give you two specific examples. So, I got um figured that I was going to join the company and then uh chair the board sent me a Google doc that was going to be my announcement that this guy's going to become the CEO of the company. And I like read the doc and it sounded like it was written by someone trying very hard to avoid saying anything that might offend anyone. So, I took over and made edits and then someone went in and undid my edits and like changed the dock again such that it would be un like not offensive. So, I put in big bold letters on top of the dock. Whoever wrote this dock doesn't work at Open Door anymore. And I didn't realize that both the consulting firms that the company had hired to do PR for it were in the dock. What happened as a happy accident is is both the consulting firms very loudly resigned the account like we would like to have nothing to do with the company which did two good things. One I didn't have to pay 30 days of notice and two I got to have one less expense on my uh on my on my income statement. So I got every expense the company had paid for the last 12 months. And usually for tech companies like your largest expense to an external vendor ends up being like your cloud provider. But for open door number one was millions of dollars written to very large consulting firm. This company had come in and had told open door to basically offshore every job to massively overload the company with GNA and basically cut engineering which is literally what you do if you have zero desire to create alpha. And that basically happened to open door. And by the way, I think this actually happens to a lot of companies where the founders are no longer there. There is no large shareholder that cares a lot about the company. So over time, many of these companies essentially become hosts for professional leeches whose job it is to suck the company dry while making management look good. So I want to go back to day one, too. Like we we started down this track of you got all the expense reports. Like I want you to walk me through and to give me the blueprint of like coming in here and

清理腐败与重塑办公室文化

肖恩·帕里什: 是的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 你面对的是一个在你不在的时候就已经根深蒂固的旧文化。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: it you find a culture that exists without you.

肖恩·帕里什: 是的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 你如何分辨哪些该保留,哪些该清除?

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: How do you tell what to keep, what to get rid of?

肖恩·帕里什: 当时 Opendoor 已经实行了全员远程办公。

Original English

Shane Parrish: So, Open Door had gone fully remote.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 于是,在那个周一早上 9:00,我告诉整个公司:“嘿,从下周一开始,Opendoor 将重返办公室(RTO)。如果你不打算回到我们其中一个办公室工作,我们感谢你的付出,但你不能再留在这里了。”接着发生的第二件事是,Opendoor 变成了一个人们通过“创造流程”而非“创造结果”来获得成功的地方。所以,当公司转变为高度以结果为导向、极度强调责任制(Ownership)时,很多人主动选择了离开。但是,令人印象深刻且最好的一件意外惊喜是,在最初的几周里,我常常会遇到一些我认为极其卓越的员工,我坦率地问他们:“你为什么还留在这里?”答案是,正是这群默默坚守的个人贡献者(ICs)用他们的肩膀扛起了公司,才让公司活了下来。现在,我们围绕着这些真正做实事的优秀 IC 重新组建了整个公司。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: So, at 9:00 a.m. that Monday, I told the entire company, "Hey, Open Door is going to be back in the office next Monday. If you don't plan to be in one of these offices, we appreciate your help, but you're no longer with us." Then the second thing that happened was that open door had become a place where you succeeded by creating process not outcomes. So a bunch of people chose not to be part of the company because we became so outcome oriented uh because we demanded ownership. But the third thing that was impressive is and this actually was best good surprise of open door. I would every once in a while find someone who I thought was exceptional and I would honestly ask them in that first couple weeks why are you still here and it was a series of these people that had kept the company alive on their shoulders and we've now rebuilt the company around these IC's

肖恩·帕里什: 这里的 IC 是指个人贡献者(Individual Contributors)。

Original English

Shane Parrish: IC's are individual

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的,就是那些真正动手干活的人。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: individual contributors yeah who actually do the actual work

肖恩·帕里什: 所以当时公司其实已经处于垂死挣扎的边缘了。

Original English

Shane Parrish: so it was on life support

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的,如果没有这大约十几个核心 IC,Opendoor 早就倒闭了。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: yeah I see open door would have died had it not been for maybe a dozen

肖恩·帕里什: 这真的很耐人寻味。这大约十二个甚至可能更少的人,凭借一己之力撑起了这家在过去 12 个月里亏损了数亿美元的公司。那么你和这些人进行了一对一的谈话,你告诉他们什么?你从他们那里学到了什么?

Original English

Shane Parrish: Well, so this is fascinating that maybe a dozen people, maybe slightly more, had essentially carried a business that lost hundreds of millions of dollars over the prior 12 months. And you had these one-on-ones with them and you told them what? What did you learn from them?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我主要是倾听。最神奇的是,当你找到一个真正优秀、充满激情的人,而他过去却被淹没在重重管理层之下时,他其实很清楚公司哪里出了问题。他会告诉你:“这个系统之所以坏了,是因为我们在不该花钱的地方花钱,或者那个流程毫无意义。”有一个 IC 告诉我:“我们有几十个内部工具,但其实只需要其中一个,其他的全是无用的管理花哨。”这就是我学到的。所以第一步是停止做那些愚蠢的事。我们取消了成堆的低效流程,把权力直接下放给具体做事的人,这样他们不需要层层审批就可以做出决策。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I mostly listened. And the beautiful thing about finding someone who is exceptional and caring and has been buried by layers of management is they know exactly what's wrong. They will tell you, "This thing is broken because of this, or that process makes no sense." One IC told me, "We have dozens of internal tools, but we really only need one, and the rest is just administrative bloat." That's what I learned. So step one was to stop doing the dumb things. We eliminated piles of inefficient processes and pushed the decision-making authority down to the people actually doing the work, so they don't have to wait for multiple levels of managers to approve a simple decision.

用 AI 构建企业骨骼

肖恩·帕里什: 让我们谈谈技术在其中的作用。很多人在讨论 AI 是如何改变企业的,你是如何将 AI 应用于 Opendoor 的重塑的?你认为 AI 是在取代人力,还是在增强个体的能力?

Original English

Shane Parrish: Let's talk about the role of technology in this. A lot of people are talking about how AI is changing businesses. How did you apply AI to the rebuilding of Open Door? Do you think of AI as replacing people and labor or do you think of it as amplifying the ability of a particular person?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我认为这是一个全新的公司,因为 AI 使它变成了与以往完全不同的实体。对于 Opendoor 的业务来说,最难的部分是什么?是物理资产的运营复杂度。你需要什么来消除这种复杂度?你需要极低成本、极其快速的决策,以及基于数据的大规模执行。我们为 Opendoor 的每个员工建立了一个 AI 骨骼系统,使他们的效率能够达到普通人的 3 到 4 倍。给你一个直观的概念,上个季度我们买入和售出的房屋数量,与以前买入同样多房屋时相比,Opendoor 的运营费用(OPEX)降到了当时的一半以下。在如今人力成本不断上升的世界里,我们的效率却提升了一倍。

我认为 AI 做了两件事:第一,它降低了公司对人类管理层的需求。在任何公司中,你最终都会遇到一条极长的管理链条,经理管经理,一层叠一层,最后才有真正做事的人。而 AI 因为极大地降低了沟通障碍,让我们能够更广泛、更高效地共享信息,从而直接压扁了公司的层级链条。第二,AI 根本性地改变了谁赢谁输。那些能用好 AI 的人将会胜出,而且他们的数量会增加。如今 Opendoor 的工程师数量甚至比我刚加入时还要多,正是因为我们很好地利用了 AI。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I think it's a new company because AI has made this a different company because look what what about open doors business is difficult. The operational complexity of the physical asset and what do you need to make that operational complexity go away? You need very lowcost fast decision making at scale with data. We have built an AI exoskeleton around every human being at Open Door such that they can be 3 4x more efficient than everyone else. To give you a sense, the last time Open bought as many homes as we bought last quarter, Open Door's OPEX was more than twice as high. In a world where prices have gone up for human beings, we've become twice as efficient. I think what AI does is two things. One, it lowers the lowers the need for human management, right? If you look at any company, you end up with these very long tales of managers managing managers before anyone does any actual work. And AI because it takes the communication barrier down so much, we can share more information more broadly, it just collapses the company um chains of the company. The second thing it does and what it has done at Open Door is AI fundamentally changes who wins and who loses. That people who use AI well will win and there'll be more of them. Open Joint has more engineers today than I did when I joined because we use AI well.

核心思维模型:摩擦、地图与疆域

肖恩·帕里什: 你发现自己一次又一次回想并运用的、最强大的思维模型(Mental Models)是什么?

Original English

Shane Parrish: What are the most powerful mental models that you find yourself coming back to over and over again?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 其实,你挺了解我的,所以你知道这是真的,我有把它们写下来。第一,“摩擦被低估了”;第二,“地图不是疆域”;第三,“事实重于感受”。这就是最核心的三个。

让我先说第一个。每个人一生中都见过供求关系曲线,但人们往往低估了摩擦这一无形之手对曲线交点的影响。如果没有降低摩擦,沃尔玛的总体市场规模、亚马逊的市场规模以及谷歌的市场规模在早期都会被严重低估。因为在这些事物存在之前,每个人都觉得市场很小,就是因为市场中的摩擦力太大了。当你在一个系统中减少摩擦时,被减少摩擦的事物就会呈现爆发式增长。

如果你看一下 Opendoor 的平行对比,在我来 Opendoor 之前,从你在我们主页上输入房屋地址,到你拿到最终报价,这中间要经过 11 个人,经历漫长的日子、无数的流程和成堆的文档。这中间充满了摩擦。而我们去除的每一个摩擦,都直接带来了需求的增长。我们本周购买的房屋数量是去年同期的 6 到 7 倍,这几乎完全是因为我们消除了流程中的摩擦。

第二个模型是“地图不是疆域”——这是我最希望能教会整个美国企业界的模型。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Actually, you you know me a bit so you know this is true. Uh I I have these written down. First, friction is underestimated. Two, uh map is not the train. Three, truth over feelings. Those are like the three. So let me give you the first one. Everyone has seen uh the supply and demand graph in their life and but people underestimate the uh invisible hand of friction on where those two things cross. The total market size of Walmart would have been massively underestimated. Same with Amazon, same with Google. Because before these things existed, everyone thought the market was smaller because there was so much friction in the market. When you reduce friction in a system, you just get a lot more of whatever you reduce friction on, right? And if you look at the open door parallel before I got to open door from the time you entered your phone address into our homepage to the time you got an offer there'd be 11 people in the path many many days many many processes many many docs all of that friction and every one of these we removed increased demand we're buying six to seven times more homes this week than we did last year this week and it's almost entirely because we restriction the second one is like the map is not the train which is like I find the one that I wish I could teach corporate America.

肖恩·帕里什: 嗯。

Original English

Shane Parrish: M

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我认为哈耶克(Hayek)通常被严重低估了。他发表过一篇名为《知识的傲慢》的演讲,整篇演讲基本上都在阐述这样一个观点:我们所有人都容易把“地图”误认为是“疆域”(原文口误为“火车”)。如果你在发现新大陆之前的欧洲,你会看着专家绘制的地图并完全信任它,对吧?

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I think Hayek is just generally underappreciated. He gave a speech called pretense of knowledge but the entire speech is basically about this idea that all of us confuse the map for the train for a train that's like the land. If you were in Europe pre-discovery of the new world, you would look at a map from an expert and trust it, right?

肖恩·帕里什: 是的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 因为每个人都这么做。但问题在于,除非你意识到自己看到的只是事实的“一阶导数”,而不是事实本身,否则你建立的世界模型必然会逐渐偏离现实。这就是为什么公司随着时间的推移会破产,因为他们不断在导数之上建立模型,模型套模型,却没有任何人站出来说:“打扰一下,我们距离真实发生的事实到底有多远?”

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Cuz everyone did. It just so happens that unless you recognize you're looking at a first derivative of a fact, not the actual fact, you almost always will build models of the world that end up drifting from reality. And this is how companies go bankrupt over time because they continually drift more more derivative, more derivative. They build models upon models and no one says, "Uh, excuse me." Like, how far am I from the fact?

数据仪表盘的局限与深潜一线

肖恩·帕里什: 但作为一家公司,你该如何避免这种情况?如何与现实保持最直接的接触?

Original English

Shane Parrish: But how do you do that as a company? How do you stay in contact with reality?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 数据仪表盘(Dashboards)是极好的东西,但大多数公司的管理层完全是在靠数据仪表盘来管理整家公司。那是事实的衍生品,不是事实本身。你就像在玩《模拟城市》。你并没有真正摸到土地。当你不知道环境何时发生变化时,你就彻底失去了对业务的感觉。雷·克罗克(Ray Kroc,麦当劳创始人)过去常常去店里亲自检查垃圾箱,甚至说:“这番茄酱挤得太多了。”这种对微小细节的执着,才能让你看到真实。

我们经常看《卧底老板》(Undercover Boss)这样的节目,节目里的老板们总是对自己公司一线真实发生的事情感到无比震惊。这本身就说明了问题。为什么会震惊?因为他们一直活在自己构建的二级、三级导数的地图里。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Dashboards are wonderful things, but most corporate executives run the entire company on dashboards. And it is a derivative of facts. It's not the facts. You're playing like Sim City and you don't know when the environment changes. You end up losing a feeling for the business. Ray Kroc used to visit the stores and inspect the garbage cans and he'd be like, "That's too much ketchup." You watch Undercover Boss and they're always surprised by what's happening at the front line. That's a sign.

肖恩·帕里什: 那么你作为一个公司的 CEO,具体是怎么做的呢?

Original English

Shane Parrish: But how do you do that as a company? How

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我每周都亲自和我们的客户通电话。每一次都是直接倾听真实的反馈。当你直接和一线的客户沟通时,它会给你提供一个无比庞大且真实的上下文窗口

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I talk to our customers every single week. Every single week I'm on the phone. And it gives you a huge context window.

肖恩·帕里什: 确实如此。你必须亲自去做,别无他法。

Original English

Shane Parrish: It does. You just have to just have to do

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错。但很多公司管理者总觉得去接触这些微不足道的琐事很丢脸,或者他们误以为事实会伤害到员工的感情。于是,他们宁愿活在被重重粉饰的汇报里。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: and they're assuming that people are offended by facts. And

远程办公的文化陷阱与单一文化优势

肖恩·帕里什: 我想回到关于你接手重组的话题。在加入 Opendoor 之前,你在 Shopify 工作,而 Shopify 曾推行过非常著名的远程工作文化。

Original English

Shane Parrish: I want to come back to the turnaround for one

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的,Shopify 确实是远程工作的倡导者。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Shopify was a remote work culture. Yeah. Yeah.

肖恩·帕里什: 而你接管 Opendoor 后,做的第一件事就是取消远程,强力要求员工重返办公室。

Original English

Shane Parrish: And one of the first things you said you did

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah.

肖恩·帕里什: 为什么?

Original English

Shane Parrish: Why?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 首先,我不认为远程办公普遍有效。它在极少数特定类型的工作或高度自治的单兵作战中可能有效,但对于绝大多数需要高强度协作、快速迭代并处于危机转型期的公司来说,远程办公就是灾难。你失去了太多的非正式沟通、失去了文化的凝聚力。你很难通过屏幕去建立那种深度的信任和共识。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: First of all, I don't think remote works generally. It loses a lot of culture. It's very hard to build trust and alignment when you're just staring at a screen.

肖恩·帕里什: 确实。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 这太令人惊叹了。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Amazing.

肖恩·帕里什: 我们正在做一件极其艰难的事情。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah. And look, we do a very hard thing, but

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 一家公司不能同时拥有多种文化。它们就是做不到。当你允许远程和办公室混合时,你实际上在公司内部创造了两个阶层,一个是每天见面的办公室圈子,一个是散落各地的远程圈子。这会导致大量的无形摩擦。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Companies cannot have multiple cultures. They just can't. They just

肖恩·帕里什: 结果你花在协调和沟通这两种文化上的时间,远超了干正事的时间。

Original English

Shane Parrish: and you end up spending a lot of time aligning

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错。所以,维持一个单一文化(Uniculture)的公司要容易得多。要么全员远程,要么全员到岗。而对我们来说,我们需要那种坐在同一个房间里、面对白板直接争论、不掩饰情绪只追求真理的物理现场感。这极大地加快了决策速度。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: and it's much easier to have a uniculture company much easier to run and align.

Opendoor 的做市商定位与商业模式

肖恩·帕里什: 你们推出了房贷产品(Mortgage)。

Original English

Shane Parrish: You started mortgage

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的,房贷业务、买方产品以及我们全新的现金买房服务(Cash Offer)。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: mortgage uh our buyer product and our new product cash

肖恩·帕里什: 在房地产领域,做一个做市商(Market Maker)意味着什么?

Original English

Shane Parrish: What does it mean to be a market maker in

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 如果你回顾资产交易的历史,你会发现流动性才是王道。无论是 eBay 之于二手商品、PayPal 之于在线支付,还是金融市场的做市商,他们存在的唯一目的就是提供“确定性”和“即时性”。在传统房产交易中,买卖一套房子平均需要 60 到 90 天,期间伴随着无数次的看房、估价和交易随时流产的违约风险。我们所做的事,就是作为做市商介入,直接用现金买下卖家的房子,承担持存风险,为卖家提供即时的流动性和确定性。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah. So if you look at the history of assets, liquidity is everything. Discovering prices, providing certainty, and matching buyers and sellers. eBay, PayPal, they all did this for different asset classes.

肖恩·帕里什: 这确实是一个极佳的例子。比如 eBay、发现渠道(Discovery)、PayPal 等都是这样成功的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: is a great example of this. actually eBay, Discovery, PayPal,

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 是的。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yep.

肖恩·帕里什: 而行业里的第三个参与者往往很容易被边缘化,最后被前两名吞噬。

Original English

Shane Parrish: And the third player almost always tends to be someone who gets left behind or eaten by the big guys.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah.

肖恩·帕里什: 但显然这在亚马逊和房产这类复杂的实体交易中并没有发生。亚马逊之所以能赢,是因为它解决了物流和确定性的问题。

Original English

Shane Parrish: But clearly has not happened. Amazon won because it solved

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错,亚马逊做重了资产,建立了庞大的履约网络。我们也一样,我们不是在做房产信息聚合的“轻资产”平台,我们是在做真金白银买卖房产的“重资产”做市商。这需要极其深厚的技术、数据模型以及承担物理风险的痛觉承受力。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: But clearly has not happened. Amazon won because it solved the hard physical fulfillment problem. And we are doing the same for residential real estate. It's not a listing site; it's market making.

肖恩·帕里什: 那么,Opendoor 具体是如何赚钱的?你们的盈利模式是怎样的?

Original English

Shane Parrish: So, how does Open Door make money then? Like, how

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我们主要通过两种方式赚钱:第一,我们在买入和卖出之间收取一定的服务费或差价,这类似于做市商的点差;第二,我们向买家或卖家提供增值服务,例如我们的房贷服务、过户所有权保险等。我们的目标不是寄希望于房价暴涨来获利,我们不炒房。我们追求的是转手速度,即通过极高频的周转来赚取微小但稳定的流动性溢价。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: We make our money in two ways. First, we make it through the fee we charge for the convenience and certainty of the transaction, which is like a spread. Second, we make money by offering adjacent services like title, escrow, and mortgage. We don't bet on home price appreciation. We want to be market neutral and make money on the volume and velocity of transactions.

极简化管理:减少说“不”的人

肖恩·帕里什: 你是怎么学到这套商业和管理概念的?你是一直在观察,还是通过实践总结出来的?

Original English

Shane Parrish: How did you learn this concept? I've just been always

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 主要是通过实战。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah.

肖恩·帕里什: 很多公司把大量精力花在空谈上,而不是真正地付诸行动。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Right. That's not how businesses work. No one trusts someone who just writes memos without running the experiments.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错。大部分企业的工作方式是:先告诉人们你要做什么,然后再做。你有一个绝妙的点子,然后你得花好几个月的时间写备忘录,四处宣贯,争取各个部门的赞同(Buy-in),接着你要开无数次会,去找一个拥有审批权的人。在这个长达数月的漫长流程走完之前,你什么都做不了。这种庞大的官僚指挥链条被设计出来的唯一目的就是“最小化风险”。

要应对这种官僚链条,通常有两种方式:第一种是亚马逊倡导的方式——将公司默认设置为“Yes”。大多数公司默认都是“No”,因为说“No”不需要承担做错事的风险。而亚马逊强行规定“我们是一家默认说 Yes 的公司”,这运转得极好。

但我认为有更彻底的方法:那就是直接干掉这套指挥链条,把能说“No”的人的数量缩减到最少。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Like it's most companies is tell people then do things. In most companies, this is what happens. You have an idea, you spend a lot of time writing memos about that idea to get buy in about that idea before you can have a meeting, someone that can approve that idea. And there's a whole process that takes many months before you can do the thing. There's a chain of command designed to minimize risk. And there's two ways to deal with that chain of command. The first is to do what Amazon said. Amazon became a default yes. Most companies are default no. The chain of command is designed to reduce risk and say no to many things. Right? That's what it does. Amazon said, "No, no, no. We're a default yes company." Which worked incredibly well for Amazon. But I think a better way to deal with this problem is to not have the chain of command like to minimize the number of people who can say no.

肖恩·帕里什: 是的,并且只留下那些你完全信任、且有能力独立做出决策并行动的人。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah. and only have people that you want and trust to do things.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错,这绝不仅仅是一个理论。我给你举一个非常具体的真实案例。我刚接手 Opendoor 时,发现我们买下的很大一部分房子,在交房给客户的那天,屋里的电居然是断的。当负责管理该房产的员工发现断电时,他会收到一条提示,然后他必须登录 Salesforce 系统,填写一份长长的表单。表单会通过邮件发送给另一个人,另一个人看后,需要向他的经理申请批准去缴费通电。经理批准后,他们才能打电话给电力公司缴费,这期间的邮件往来和层层审批涉及了三到四个经理。

我觉得这简直是世界上最荒谬、最疯狂的事情。于是,我们收回了繁琐的表单,给每一个一线管房子的员工发了企业信用卡,并告诉他们:“如果你看到一所房子没电,你只需要在 Slack 里输入房子地址,系统就会自动返回你应该拨打的电力公司电话、我们的账户,以及可以直接付款的信用卡号。”我们可是北美最大的单一住房买家啊!

顺便说一句,以前在 Opendoor 管理这些流程的并不是笨蛋,他们都是履历光鲜、学历极高的聪明人。但是,几乎所有公司的通用激励机制都是“不惜一切代价地规避风险”。而规避风险的最简单手段就是增加流程、增加参与决策的人数。结果就是,“把事情做成”变得无比困难。没有任何人会希望在设计之初就把公司变成这种充满束缚的窒息状态,但随着规模变大,这却成了大家默默接受的默认设置。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: This, by the way, is not people. This not a theoretical thing. I want to give you this very specific example. I got to open door and I realized that for a substantial number of homes we had bought, the person who was supposed to benefit would show up and the power would not be on in the home. And when this happened, the person who was managing home would get a note saying, "Hey, power isn't on, and who this person would have to go to Salesforce, fill out a form. That form would get emailed to someone else. They would look at it. Then they would ask for permission from the manager to turn the power on. Then they would call the utility company, turn the power on, they would mail, and there would be a back and forth that involved three or four managers." And I thought this was the nuttiest thing ever. So, we literally gave everyone corporate cards and said, "Hey, if you see a home whose power is not on, if you type in the address into Slack, you will get back the phone number you're supposed to call, the account number you're supposed to say, and the credit card number you can give them to turn on power." We're the largest buyers of home in North America. And by the way, Open Door was not run by uh unintelligent people. They were highly credentialed people. But the general incentive inside every company is to reduce risk as much as possible. And the way you reduce risk is more process, more people in the path. So do things becomes actually difficult. I think of this is like nobody would want to wake up in that state, right? Like you would never create the end state that they were operating in as like the goal.

微小偏差的灾难性累积

肖恩·帕里什: 所以在某个地方,公司只要偏离了轨道哪怕仅仅 1 度,随着时间的推移,这 1 度的偏差就会开始疯狂地自我复利,最后导致面目全非。

Original English

Shane Parrish: So somewhere it just gets like one degree off course, you know? And that one degree starts to compound as time goes on and on and on.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我想借用另一个飞行员的例子。我一直想成为一名飞行员,但我妻子不让我去。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: This I think I'm I'll use another pilot example. I want to be a pilot. My wife won't let me.

肖恩·帕里什: 嗯。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Um

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 聪明的决定。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: smart.

肖恩·帕里什: 听老婆的准没错。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Uh I listen to your wife.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我确实很听她的话。我有一大堆关于飞机的模拟,其中有一个现象在新飞行员身上非常真实。当新飞行员飞入云层,完全失去视觉地标时,他们会非常非常轻微地侧倾飞机,1度、2度地侧倾。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I have a bunch of plane analogies. But there's a very real thing happens to new pilots. New pilots go into like into clouds and they turn slightly slightly slightly slightly.

肖恩·帕里什: 嗯。

Original English

Shane Parrish: M

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 很多新飞行员在穿出云层时,会极其震惊地发现自己其实处于完全倒飞(Inverted)的状态。因为你是 1 度 1 度极其缓慢地颠倒过来的,你的内耳前庭根本感觉不到变化。

这正是发生在每家公司身上的真实写照。如果你想知道你的公司是否已经倒过来了,有一个非常简单且准确的指标:缩写词(Acronyms)。如果你的公司内部充斥着大量的缩写词,那么这几乎可以肯定你们已经处于颠倒状态了。因为从定义上讲,缩写词是人们用来在公司内部创造“圈内文化”和“圈外文化”的工具。当公司充斥着这些只有少数圈内人懂的黑话时,圈外的人,甚至连公司的 CEO 都会失去评判事物真实面貌的能力,因为没有人能轻易看出对方是否已经飞颠倒了。

而唯一能判断公司是否飞颠倒的,是必须能看清链条两端的深度管理者。不幸的是,大多数公司的 CEO 都不愿意下沉得这么深,他们只愿意舒适地盯着数据仪表盘。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: and people say you'd be surprised by a number of new pilots who come out of sky clouds fully inverted cuz you basically end up upside down one degree at a time. That's basically what happens to every company. This is a very good sign that your company is upside down. If you have acronyms, if you have lots of acronyms, the odds are you're upside down as a company. Because acronyms are things that people do when they want to create in cultures and out cultures by definition. So if you have acronyms, the odds are what you have done is create so many inroups and outroups that no one can tell if anyone else is inverted. And the only one who can tell if someone is inverted is someone above the chain who can look at both of these things. Unfortunately, most corporate CEOs don't go that deep, right? They they manage the dashboards.

一线实感与极度自责的复盘力量

肖恩·帕里什: 这又回到了我们前面说到的,管理者必须亲自去触碰现实、深入细节,拥有一个更庞大的微观认知。

Original English

Shane Parrish: This comes back to sort of like trying to touch reality and being in the weeds and having a bigger

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我自己就亲自动手去帮房子接通水电,亲自处理过工单。作为 CEO,你必须这么做。否则,你根本无法指导业务。马斯克(Elon Musk)在工厂里睡觉,人们以为这只是一个公关噱头,或者是一个单纯的表情包。我非常确信他绝对不是在作秀。因为如果你想让事情以极高的速度推进,这真的是唯一可行的方法。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I've literally turned on utilities. I've uh fixed the work orders. I've like you have to do it otherwise I don't know how you like I mean Elon famously sleeps at the factory and people think it's like a meme. People think he does it for show. I don't think he does it for show. I think it's literally the only way to do things.

肖恩·帕里什: 如果你必须在两种人中做选择:一种是遇到问题时总是极其自责(Self-blame),哪怕不是他们的错也觉得是自己没做好;另一种是遇到问题时总是寻找外部原因,比如市场不好、竞争对手太强。你会选哪一种?

Original English

Shane Parrish: If you had to choose between someone who is self-blaming and someone who externalizes, who would you choose?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我绝对选择第一种。一个健康的企业复盘,第一步永远是承担责任(Taking Ownership),对吧?哪怕这个原因是由外部引起的,你也必须问自己:“我本可以做些什么来防止这个结果发生?”这就像匿名戒酒会(AA)之所以如此行之有效,就是因为它的第一步是让你站起来,当着所有人的面承认并接纳:“我就是问题的根源。”这是一种极其痛苦但绝对必要的灵魂洗礼。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: The first step is taking ownership over the problem, right? They're taking ownership. I understand there are things I can do, right? There's a reason why um AA works so well, right? Cuz you do that deeply uncomfortable moment of truth.

肖恩·帕里什: 是的,只有当你觉得责任在己时,你才拥有了改变它的主动权。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 只要你长此以往地坚持这种极度诚实的态度,“比分最终会自己照顾自己”(The score takes care of itself)。我认为这个规律在任何行业、甚至在个人的成长中都是百分之百可以重复显现的。只要你对自己说:“我是我自己所有问题的唯一根源。”尽管这极其刺痛,但它是你通往强大的唯一起点。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: gain and the score tends to take care of itself over a very long period of time. And I think that pattern tends to be one that is repeatable over and over again. If you look at yourself and say, "I am to blame for my problems." It's hard. And it's repeatable um in companies as as it is in people.

克服失败的恐惧与生存的逼仄

肖恩·帕里什: 那你如何避免被这种巨大的自责击垮?很多人在犯错之后,即使他们承认了错误,他们也会陷入一种深深的创伤后应激反应,被害怕再次失败的恐惧所彻底瘫痪。

Original English

Shane Parrish: How do you not hang on to that? A lot of people go through that. They make a mistake. They'll even admit that they made a mistake and then they become paralyzed by fear.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我对陷入这种境地的人抱有极大的同情心。真的,我非常理解他们。作为一名公司创始人——这也是为什么创始人是一个极其独特的群体——你几乎每一个月都会经历一两次距离“无法支付员工工资(Payroll)”只差一口气的濒死时刻。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I have high degree of sympathy to people who do that. I really do. One of the best parts about being a founder, which is why I think founders are such unique characters, basically every founder has been a month away from like not being able to make payroll.

肖恩·帕里什: 是的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 这种接近死亡的极致体验,会把你脑子里的所有杂音震个粉碎。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: And that usually shakes you pretty good.

肖恩·帕里什: 的确。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 因为你心里非常清楚:如果你现在什么都不做,你就彻底死了。这就是保罗·格雷厄姆(Paul Graham)在文章里写到的默认死亡(Default Dead)状态。在那种绝境下,你别无选择,你必须立刻采取行动。因为“行动能创造信息”,行动是唯一的解药。

当公司距离破产只有几个月,或者你只剩下最后几次发工资的现金时,你根本不会去在乎这个决定看起来美不美观,你只在乎它能不能起作用。你从虚假的地图中被硬生生地拽了出来,扔进了最残酷的现实泥潭里。

在这个时候,解决前半段的问题其实很简单:直接拿起铲子开始干活。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Cuz if you do nothing, you're dead. like your de like Paul Graham has this essay where he calls it default dead and you just have to do something like action creates information you have to do something. And if you look at a balance sheet, you're like, "Holy God, I only have x number of payrolls left." You do not care at all what it looks like. You just care about what it is. You realize that the first bit is really easy to solve. Just grab a shovel.

肖恩·帕里什: 是的。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 后面更深层次的精细化重构才需要显微镜和手术刀。但一开始,绝对是粗重的体力活。就像我们祖父辈的智慧所说的那样:“当你发现自己掉进了一个深坑里时,第一步是立刻停止继续往下挖。”

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: The last bit requires a bunch of microscopes and analysis but the first bit is shovel territory, man. It's like your grandfather's wisdom, right? When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.

肖恩·帕里什: 哈哈,没错,这太真实了。

这让我联想到了当年苹果公司的史蒂夫·乔布斯(Steve Jobs)。如果有某一个瞬间,让乔布斯真正蜕变为了后来那个无坚不摧的领袖,那绝对是在他被苹果驱逐、经历 NeXT 的挣扎,以及后来重返苹果面临几个月内破产的边缘。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, it's real. It's interesting you sort of mentioned not making payroll. And you know what that made me think of is the moment Steve Jobs, if there was one moment where Steve Jobs became the Steve Jobs that we know, it was the moment where he started to change his behavior.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 在那部传记电影里,有一个非常著名的桥段。当时乔布斯强行裁撤了 Apple II 的研发团队,联合创始人沃兹(Steve Wozniak)愤怒地质问乔布斯:“你必须给这些默默奉献的工程师应有的认可!他们付出了极大的努力!”

乔布斯的回答极其冷酷但极其深刻:“我们唯一的工作就是交付卓越的产品。我不在乎你付出了多少努力,如果产品是垃圾,努力一文不值。我们要的是结果,不是努力的过程。”

当你真正经历过公司瀕临死亡的痛楚时,你就会对这种理念产生最强烈的共鸣。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: In the movie, there's this very famous scene where Steve Jobs had fired uh the Apple 2 team and W is like you have to recognize these people like they worked hard. You have to recognize that they built this company. And Steve's point was like, no, you don't. The only thing that matters is building great products. Results matter, not how hard you tried. And that's a very real thing that if you have come close to death, you understand.

卓越是承受痛苦的能力

肖恩·帕里什: 这种冷酷的客观性,是不是意味着管理者必须拥有一种“不在乎被他人讨厌”的勇气?我知道很多管理者在做决策时,首要考虑的是“我怎样才能不被员工或外界讨厌”,而不是“怎样做才能达成目标”。

Original English

Shane Parrish: Is part of that sort of not caring what other people think. like the courage to be disliked. I'm thinking like so many people optimize their life in order not to be disliked versus on mission or towards a goal or

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 首先,《被讨厌的勇气》是一本极其伟大的书,我向所有人强烈推荐。但非常真实的一点是,大多数人的局限性完全是自己强加给自己的。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: first of all courage to be dislike is an excellent book. Everyone should read it but it's a very real thing where most people's limitations are self-imposed.

肖恩·帕里什: 我们其实有能力做到比我们想象的要多得多。

Original English

Shane Parrish: We're capable of so much more.

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 没错。所有人都是如此。而且,你心里所感受到的绝大部分痛苦,其实都只是由于你的想象而被无限放大的。当你观察别人时,你能非常理智、清醒地意识到这一点。但一旦轮到你自己,你就会深陷其中,无法自拔。

就像我根本不在乎《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)怎么写我。我真的无所谓。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah. Like everyone is and everyone's pain uh is more imagined than you think it is. And this, you intuitively understand it when it comes to everyone else. But in yourself, you have a hard time ignoring it. Like I don't care what the Wall Street Journal says about you.

肖恩·帕里什: 我真的从来都不在乎。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I just don't. I've never cared.

肖恩·帕里什: 这种心态是后天习得的,还是天生就刻在你基因里的?

Original English

Shane Parrish: Is that learned or something you

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我觉得这与我的成长经历密切相关。我是从伊朗移民过来的,当时我们全家为了躲避战乱和政治迫害逃离了伊朗。当我们搬到这里时,我还只是个十几岁的少年。我不会说英语,我无法融入任何主流的圈子和社交俱乐部。当我长大成人,终于有资格并被邀请加入这些所谓的主流俱乐部时,我心里想:“去你们的,在我最需要的时候你们排斥我,现在我早就不在乎了。”

这让我想起了黄仁勋(Jensen Huang)在斯坦福大学毕业典礼演讲里说的的一句话,他说:“卓越并不是来自于智商,卓越是承受痛苦的能力(Excellence is the capacity to take pain)。”

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I just think what happened was I immigrated from Iran. My family fled Iran and when we moved, I was a teenager. and I didn't get into any clubs. And by the time I was I grown up and I could get into those clubs, I was like, you know what, I don't need them anymore. And Jensen Huang said in his speech, "Excellence is the capacity to take pain."

肖恩·帕里什: 你完全同意这个观点吗?

Original English

Shane Parrish: Do you agree with that?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我非常同意。在极长的时间跨度里,谁能把手放在烈火上烤得最久,谁往往就能笑到最后。把一件事做到极致,与仅仅是做到及格,这中间唯一的差别就是你忍受痛苦的阈值。然而不幸的是,现代社会的优渥生活,在很大程度上让人们对痛苦毫无准备。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: Yeah. Yeah. Over a very long period of time. By the way, the person who can hold their hand over the fire the longest tends to be the winner. The difference between doing something incredibly well and just okay is just how much pain you can tolerate. I think the modern world has underprepared people for pain.

成功的终极定义:孩子眼中的父亲

肖恩·帕里什: 我们总是用同一个问题来结束我们的访谈:对你而言,什么是真正的成功?

Original English

Shane Parrish: We always end these interviews with the same question. which is what is success for you?

卡兹·内贾蒂安: 我有四个孩子,他们分别是七岁、五岁、三岁和两岁。我唯一极其在乎的事,就是几十年后,当他们对他们的孩子谈起他们的父亲时,他们会怎么评价我。

当我和我妻子结婚时,我们达成了一个绝对的共识:我们在这个世界上所做的一切,都是为了让我们的孩子为拥有我们这样的父母而感到无比骄傲,并且我们承诺会一直对自己保持这种最极致的问责制(Accountability)。

Original English

Kaz Nejatian: I have four kids. Um they're seven, five, three, and two. And I care a great deal about what they say to their kids that their dad did. When my wife and I got married, we agreed that we would hold myself accountable and thankfully my wife also holds me accountable to that end.

📌 文中提及的人物和组织

公司/组织: Opendoor, Shopify, Amazon

媒体/书籍: 被讨厌的勇气

关键字: business-turnaround corporate-culture operational-efficiency mental-models pain-tolerance