红杉资本的卓越声誉与使命

Original English sentence(s) from the transcript. Sequoia is the most sought-after name in the venture capital business. The firm has made over a thousand investments now worth in the trillions in public market value. There's a list of five VCs (Venture Capitalists: 风险投资家，投资初创企业以获取高回报的个人或机构) who I think can really transform a company and you're one of those five. When I joined Sequoia, it was clear that if I wanted to make it as a partner, you needed to produce meaningful gains. YouTube, Instagram, Square. This is a list of amazing, amazing startups. Our ambition is to build a partnership that endures and that means we need to leave it in a better place than we found it.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 红杉资本是风险投资行业中最受追捧的名字。该公司已进行了上千笔投资，目前这些投资的公开市场价值已达数万亿美元。在我看来，有五位风险投资家能够真正改变一家公司，而您就是其中之一。当我加入红杉时，很清楚，如果我想成为合伙人，就必须创造可观的收益。YouTube、Instagram、Square——这些都是令人惊叹的初创公司。我们的抱负是建立一个能经久不衰的合伙企业，这意味着我们必须让它的状态比我们接手时更好。

红杉星探计划：早期投资的创新模式

Host: Everybody wants to know who's your favorite Sequoia scout of all time. Let's go through it. Jason Calacanis. It is hilarious. When you think about it, you came to me, gosh, 15 years ago, and you said, "I have an idea for a program. It's called Sequoia Scouts. We'd like to have you go around and invest in some companies." And no good deed shall go unpunished. Absolutely. Created a monster. But that program... Host 2: Sorry, before you ask your question, how far are you going to insert your head up Roloff's ass? We sat him that far away for a reason. I mean, sorry, bro. Jesus Christ. Go on with your question. Host: That's... Let me land the question. Host 2: What's your question, D? Host: That program had some, that first cohort of individuals, wound up being a pretty interesting group of folks. Maybe you could tell everybody just a little bit about that program you conceived of and then who were some of the first folks in it and the first investments.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 大家都想知道您最喜欢哪位红杉“星探”。让我们聊聊吧。杰森·卡拉卡尼斯。这太搞笑了。回想起来，大约15年前，您来找我，说：“我有一个项目想法，叫做红杉星探计划。我们想让您去投资一些公司。”结果，好心没好报，简直是制造了一个怪物。但那个计划…… Host 2: 抱歉，在您提问之前，您打算拍罗洛夫的马屁拍到什么程度？我们让他坐那么远是有原因的。我是说，抱歉，老兄。天啊。继续您的提问吧。 Host: 呃……让我把问题问完。 Host 2: D，您的问题是什么？ Host: 那个项目，第一批成员，最终成为了一群非常有趣的人。也许您可以向大家介绍一下您构思的那个项目，以及最初有哪些人参与了，还有他们最开始投资了哪些公司。

Roelof: We conceived of this program as you mentioned in 2010 when we launched it. The idea was that there were a bunch of contemporary founders who had very interesting access to up-and-coming founders who were turning to them for advice. But these founders didn't yet have money at the point that you became a scout (侦察员/星探: 在风险投资中，指受委托寻找有潜力的初创公司并进行早期投资的个人). You didn't have the net worth (净资产: 个人或公司所拥有的资产减去负债后的价值) you have now where you could write a check on your own. And so we thought it'd be a great program for us to provide the capital for founders like yourself to be able to invest in those companies. And hopefully, we would get an introduction to those companies for us to be able to make an investment too. So you were in that program, you helped us with the investment in Uber (优步: 知名网约车和送餐服务公司). Sam Altman (萨姆·奥特曼: 知名企业家、投资者，OpenAI CEO) was in that group as well. He helped with an investment in a little company called Stripe (Stripe: 在线支付处理平台).

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 正如您所说，我们在2010年启动了这项计划。当时的设想是，有一批当代创始人，他们与那些寻求建议的新兴创始人有着非常有趣的接触。但当您成为一名星探时，这些创始人还没有足够的资金。您那时也没有像现在这样可以自行开具支票的净资产。所以我们认为，这是一个很好的计划，我们可以为像您这样的创始人提供资金，让他们能够投资这些公司。希望我们也能通过他们获得这些公司的引荐，从而进行投资。您当时就参与了这个项目，您帮助我们投资了优步。萨姆·奥特曼也曾是那个团队的成员。他帮助投资了一家名为Stripe的小公司。

Host: They did. Okay. So at this point, that fund is a 26x fund at this point. Wow. That's up there in the... It's pretty good. What's the best fund in the history of Sequoia? Was it the Google fund, the WhatsApp fund? Which one has the highest multiple in history?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 确实如此。好的。所以目前，那个基金已经实现了26倍的回报。哇。这简直是顶级的……相当不错。红杉历史上最好的基金是哪个？是投资谷歌的基金，还是投资WhatsApp的基金？哪一个基金的历史回报倍数最高？

Roelof: The highest multiple in history is, I think, Venture 12, which has Airbnb (爱彼迎: 知名民宿短租平台), Dropbox (Dropbox: 云存储和文件同步服务), Natera (Natera: 专注于基因检测的生物技术公司), ADM Mob and a couple of other companies. And then Venture 13, which is the fund right after that, has Stripe and Square, now called Block (Block Inc.: 原名Square，杰克·多西创办的金融服务和移动支付公司), and a bunch of other companies. So those were both north of 20x funds.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 历史上回报倍数最高的，我认为是Venture 12基金，它投资了爱彼迎、Dropbox、Natera、ADM Mob以及其他几家公司。紧随其后的Venture 13基金则投资了Stripe和Square（现在更名为Block）以及其他一些公司。这两个基金的回报都超过了20倍。

风险投资行业：资金过剩与“无回报风险”

Host: Tell us about the venture industry actually. So we're at a point in the cycle where there's been a lot of specialization, both maybe at the stage level, at the sector level. There's been all kinds of experimentation and approaches in strategy. Can you just level set on what you've learned and what the industry's learned and where we are?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 实际上，您能给我们讲讲风险投资行业吗？我们正处于一个周期，行业内出现了大量专业化，可能是在阶段层面，也可能是在行业层面。战略上也有各种各样的试验和方法。您能总结一下您和行业学到了什么，以及我们现在所处的位置吗？

Roelof: I'm glad you called it an industry, not an asset class (资产类别: 具有相似风险和回报特征的投资类型，如股票、债券、房地产等). I listened to one of the shows you guys had recently and I think there's a huge problem with the venture industry that there's too much money. And you guys have talked about this before. The venture industry as a whole invests right now between 150 to $200 billion a year, was the last numbers I saw. If you think about reasonable assumptions for returns, let's just say 12% per annum net, which isn't great. Might as well invest in an index fund (指数基金: 追踪特定市场指数表现的投资基金). The math basically implies that you need three and a half to 4x funds to make that math work over a reasonable time frame. So if you're investing, let's just say $200 billion a year. The industry needs to give back 700-800 billion a year. VCs don't own 100% of the company last time I checked. So that means that the aggregate exit value is north of a trillion a year. So Figma (Figma: 基于云的界面设计和原型制作工具) went public recently. They're worth $25-26 billion. You need 40 Figmas a year for the industry to make the returns work, which means that they don't. So in my opinion, investing in venture is a return-free risk (无回报风险: 指投资面临风险但预期收益率极低甚至没有的情况). You shouldn't. They're basically only about 20 companies...

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 很高兴您称其为一个行业，而非一种资产类别。我最近听了你们的一期节目，我认为风险投资行业存在一个巨大的问题：资金过多。你们之前也讨论过这个问题。我看到最新的数据显示，整个风投行业目前每年投资1500亿到2000亿美元。如果考虑到合理的收益预期，比如每年净收益12%（这并不算高，还不如投资指数基金），那么根据计算，你需要在合理的时间范围内实现3.5到4倍的基金回报才能达到这个数字。所以，假设每年投资2000亿美元，这个行业需要每年返还7000亿到8000亿美元。据我所知，风险投资公司并不拥有公司100%的股权。这意味着总退出价值每年要超过1万亿美元。Figma最近上市了，价值250到260亿美元。这个行业每年需要出现40家Figma这样的公司才能实现预期的回报，但这显然是不可能的。所以在我看来，投资风险投资是一种无回报风险。你不应该这样做。基本上只有大约20家公司……

Host: You said return... return free risk. Roelof: ...risk. Exactly. If you look at every single decade, there are only about 20 companies that end up getting exit values north of a billion dollars. Actual IPOs (Initial Public Offerings: 首次公开募股，公司首次向公众出售股票) or M&As (Mergers and Acquisitions: 并购，公司之间的合并或收购行为) north of a billion. Not the paper write-ups, only 20 companies. More money doesn't create more great ideas or more great founders. So, I think there is way too much money in the industry. The industry does provide a lot of value. It provides some of the know-how for entrepreneurs to succeed and obviously leads to job creation and all the attendant benefits for America. But there is too much money and too many people who want to be investors.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 您说的是无回报风险。 Roelof: ……风险。没错。如果你审视每一个十年，会发现只有大约20家公司最终能实现超过10亿美元的退出价值。这指的是实际的首次公开募股或并购，而不是纸面上的估值提升，就只有20家公司。更多的资金并不能创造出更多伟大的创意或更优秀的创始人。所以，我认为这个行业里有太多的钱。尽管这个行业确实提供了很多价值，它为企业家成功提供了一些专业知识，显然也带来了就业机会以及美国所有伴随而来的好处。但资金实在太多了，想成为投资者的人也太多了。

Host: How does the money get level set then and right-sized for what is needed? Roelof: I've been wondering that for 20 years. This problem is a problem 20 years ago. It's an incredibly sexy asset class. I mean look, Jason writes a bestselling book. It doesn't, you know, dissuade people. It incentivizes more people to say, "Oh, I can try this. I'll be like it." I mean, it's just a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more successes there are, there's just... Host: Yeah. Everybody wants to go to Vegas and, you know, strike it rich. It doesn't happen. Host: Yeah. That's part of the dynamic is that you get a firm that has one success in their fund and then they attract more capital because people think it's repeatable and it's not.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 那么，资金如何才能被平衡并调整到所需的规模呢？ Roelof: 我为此困惑了20年。这个问题20年前就存在了。这是一种极具吸引力的资产类别。看，杰森写了一本畅销书。它并没有劝退人们。反而激励了更多人说：“哦，我也可以试试这个。我也会像他一样。”这完全是一个自我实现的预言。成功的案例越多，就越是…… Host: 是啊。每个人都想去拉斯维加斯，然后一夜暴富。但这并不会发生。 Host: 是的。这种动态的一部分是，一家公司在一个基金中取得一次成功后，就会吸引更多资本，因为人们认为这种成功可以复制，但实际上并非如此。

Roelof: And you don't know that till fund three or four. Often, they raise fund two, three, four, and five before even fund one is really fully distributed a lot of times. So what could change? For one, one of the things that I thought was transparency but nobody wants to publish their returns. You could publish your returns. I publish my returns but I'm not taking outside capital. But would that help? Is it working with people like Cambridge (剑桥公司: 在此处可能指Cambridge Associates，一家全球领先的机构投资咨询公司，以其对私募市场数据的研究而闻名) so that these things become more public and more understood? It seems like there's an education element here that's missing on behalf of the industry to the potential LPs (Limited Partners: 有限合伙人，在投资基金中提供资金但不参与日常管理，风险有限). I think people will still hide behind the J-curve effect (J曲线效应: 在私募股权投资中，基金成立初期表现不佳，随后逐渐改善并产生高回报的现象，其回报率曲线形似字母J) and they'll say, "Yeah, my fund is only at 1.5x right now, but it's only four years in and the winners are going to emerge." And so I think this hope springs eternal dynamic and such a long time period of gestation before the companies get realized that I don't think that will change that dynamic unfortunately.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 你直到第三或第四个基金时才能真正明白这一点。很多时候，他们甚至在第一个基金完全分配完毕之前，就已经募集了第二个、第三个、第四个和第五个基金。那么，什么能改变这种状况呢？其中一点我认为是透明度，但没人愿意公布他们的回报。你可以公布你的回报，我公布我的回报，但我不接受外部资金。但这会有帮助吗？与像剑桥公司这样的人合作，让这些事情变得更公开、更易于理解，会有帮助吗？似乎行业对潜在的有限合伙人缺乏教育。我认为人们仍然会躲在J曲线效应背后，说：“是的，我的基金现在只有1.5倍的回报，但才运营了四年，赢家迟早会出现的。”所以，这种“希望永存”的动态以及公司实现回报前的漫长孕育期，我认为不幸的是，并不会改变这种状况。

红杉资本的差异化应对：内部创新与“小而精”

Host: There's also been this really interesting effect where it's been this industrialization of venture capital, I will call it. So if you look at the organization that General Catalyst has built, it's about this girthiness, right, across many different things. How has Sequoia reacted when they've seen those movements? And I'm sure you've had to sit down as a partnership and say, "Are we matching this? Are we copying this? Are we going to do the same thing? Are we doing something different?"

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 还有一种非常有趣的效应，我称之为风险投资的工业化。如果你看看General Catalyst建立的组织架构，它强调的是在许多不同领域都有庞大的体量，对吧？当红杉资本看到这些动向时，是如何反应的？我相信你们作为合伙人肯定坐下来讨论过：“我们要效仿吗？我们要复制吗？我们要采取同样的做法吗？还是我们要有所不同？”

Roelof: That is a great question. The industry has changed a lot since I got into venture just over 20 years ago. If you go back to the proverbial 1990s venture firm, it was a dozen people sitting around a table making investment decisions with very lightweight staff. And it was much more of a cottage industry (家庭手工业/小型产业: 指规模小、地方性、通常手工操作的产业). I think the industry is professionalized and really the founders are the ones who benefited from it because all these firms have built larger operating teams to be able to help those founders with talent, with go-to-market. And so I think it's really helping founders. That's probably the main takeaway I have from that. We've decided to not build as big an organization. Most of the operating teams we have at Sequoia help us. So we have about as many developers at Sequoia as we have investors. And they're building products for us so that we are much more effective and productive than we might have been 20 years ago.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 这是一个很好的问题。自20多年前我进入风投行业以来，这个行业发生了巨大的变化。如果你回到九十年代典型的风险投资公司，那可能只有十几个人围坐在一张桌子旁，在极少工作人员的协助下做出投资决策。那更像是一个家庭手工业。我认为这个行业已经专业化了，而创始人是真正的受益者，因为所有这些公司都建立了更大的运营团队，能够帮助创始人解决人才和市场进入的问题。所以，我认为这确实在帮助创始人。这可能是我从中得到的主要启示。我们决定不建立一个如此庞大的组织。红杉资本的大多数运营团队都是为了帮助我们自己。所以，我们在红杉的开发人员数量几乎和投资者数量一样多。他们正在为我们开发产品，这样我们就能比20年前更有效率、更具生产力。

Host: What's an example of that that they're building for you?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 您能举个他们为您开发产品的例子吗？

Roelof: So, my phone, I can pull up an app that if you give me any company name, I'll be able to tell you who my team last met, how we rated it. I'll give you data on what's happening with their hiring. How many vouched employees they have, how good do we think their engineering team is based on their history, their academic profiles, etc. All this information is at my fingertips. If we get business plan submissions, we have an AI system (人工智能系统: 能够模拟、延伸和扩展人类智能的技术系统) that will summarize it for me. So I get a very quick read on the company, a quick summarization of the quality of the team, and a very quick analysis of the competitive dynamics and the other companies I should consider alongside them. So these are just small examples of the things we do.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 比如，在我的手机上，我可以打开一个应用程序，你给我任何一家公司的名字，我都能告诉你我的团队上次是什么时候见的，我们是如何评价的。我还可以给你他们招聘情况的数据，他们有多少经过核实的员工，我们根据他们的历史和学历背景等判断他们的工程团队有多优秀。所有这些信息都触手可及。如果我们收到商业计划书，我们有人工智能系统可以为我进行总结。这样我能很快了解公司，快速评估团队质量，并迅速分析竞争态势以及我应该同时考虑的其他公司。这些只是我们所做事情的一些小例子。

中国市场：机遇变迁与全球分离

Host: We just had Joe Saiion on. We're talking a bit about the relationship between America and China. You had a fabulous business in China for two decades, I believe, with Neil. Yeah. And it did absolutely fantastic. But then the government of the United States said, "Hey, we cannot as venture capitalists invest in China anymore." So what's your take on the opportunity in China? Will that return? And just the experience you had with all those incredible hits at the time.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 我们刚刚请来了蔡崇信。我们正在讨论中美关系。我相信，过去二十年里，您和沈南鹏在中国有着非常成功的业务。是的。而且业务表现非常出色。但后来美国政府表示：“嘿，我们作为风险投资家不能再投资中国了。”那么，您对中国的机遇有何看法？这种机遇会回来吗？以及您当时在中国取得那些惊人成功时的经历。

Roelof: When we first went into China, it was 2007, I think. The world was flat was the moniker at the time. China gained admission to the World Trade Organization (世界贸易组织: 负责监管国际贸易的全球性组织) in, I think, 2001. And we all believed that it would integrate into the global economy. That premise proved wrong. And so we had a period where it was really interesting to be able to share knowledge and share ideas and sort of figure out how we can build a globally interconnected set of systems and companies. And life just got too hard for that honestly. And we saw just more division between the two countries. So we embarked on global separation just over two years ago. And what used to be China is now an independent business called HongShan (红杉中国: 原红杉资本中国基金，现已独立运营的风险投资机构). And they're off to the races. I think there's a real challenge in China right now. Some stat I got recently: in 2018, there were 51,000 companies started in China. In 2023, it was 1,200.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 我记得，我们最早进入中国是在2007年。那时，“世界是平的”是当时的流行说法。中国在2001年加入了世界贸易组织。我们都相信它会融入全球经济。但这个前提被证明是错误的。所以有一段时间，能够分享知识、分享想法，并思考如何建立一个全球互联的系统和公司，这确实很有趣。但坦白说，后来情况变得太艰难了。我们看到两国之间的分歧越来越大。所以我们在两年多前开始了全球分离。曾经的红杉中国现在是一家名为红杉中国的独立公司。他们正全速发展。我认为中国目前面临着真正的挑战。我最近得到一些数据：2018年，中国有51000家公司成立；2023年，这个数字是1200家。

Host: Wow. How many? Roelof: 1,200. You had a 98% reduction in the number of companies founded in China. Because if you're an entrepreneur in China, why would you want to start a company when the government regulations are so uncertain? Which by the way, is an interesting warning sign for me for us in America as we think about AI policy (人工智能政策: 政府或组织为规范人工智能开发和使用而制定的指导方针和法规) and AI regulation (人工智能监管: 对人工智能技术和应用的法律约束和监督). The more uncertainty we create for founders, the more difficult it is for them to actually take that risk, take that leap to start a business. But Chinese entrepreneurship is still strong. So you see many Chinese entrepreneurs now operating in Latin America. They move to Singapore, they're in Japan, they're moving to Europe. I mean, you can't repress that spirit.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 哇。多少？ Roelof: 1200家。中国成立的公司数量减少了98%。因为如果你是一名中国的创业者，当政府监管如此不确定时，你为什么要创办一家公司呢？顺便说一句，这对我来说是一个有趣的警示，当我们在美国思考人工智能政策和人工智能监管时，也是如此。我们为创始人制造的不确定性越多，他们就越难以真正承担风险，迈出创业的那一步。但中国企业家的创业精神依然强大。所以现在你会看到许多中国企业家在拉丁美洲、新加坡、日本和欧洲开展业务。我是说，你无法压制那种精神。

后期融资趋势与红杉的长期策略

Host: Roelof, there's an interesting dynamic that I observed, which is you have the early-early stage venture companies who have had an incredible track record. You guys, Benchmark, Kosla, and then what happens is you have these latest stage firms, but many of the companies that they fund need so much money that the latest-stage firms can't service them. So you have to go direct. You go right to Saudi, you go right to the Qataris, you go right to the Amiradis, you go right to Norway, you know, these sovereign wealth funds (主权财富基金: 由国家政府拥有和控制的投资基金，通常投资于国内外资产) that are writing these big checks. And so, it creates this really weird dynamic where you almost become this kind of glorified placement agent almost. So there's this part of the curve and then there's all this money that goes over here. How do you adapt the business in the face of that dynamic?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 罗洛夫，我观察到一个有趣的现象，那就是早期的风险投资公司有着令人难以置信的业绩记录，比如你们公司、Benchmark、Kosla。然后，会出现一些后期投资公司，但他们资助的许多公司需要大量的资金，以至于这些后期公司无法满足其需求。所以你不得不直接去找。你直接去找沙特、卡塔尔、阿联酋和挪威等地的主权财富基金，他们会开出大额支票。这造成了一种非常奇怪的动态，你几乎变成了一种被美化的融资代理人。所以曲线的这一部分，然后是大量的资金流向那一端。面对这种动态，你们如何调整业务？

Roelof: Well, we stick to our knitting. The funds we operate today, our seed venture and growth funds today are no bigger than they were five, six, seven years ago. We realize that there's money to be made for some people writing very large checks in very late-stage companies. But our aspiration is to be the number one investment manager for our limited partners (有限合伙人，在投资基金中提供资金但不参与日常管理，风险有限). We literally want to be the best net IRR (Internal Rate of Return: 内部收益率，使投资的净现值等于零的折现率) and net multiple for our LPs (Limited Partners: 有限合伙人，在投资基金中提供资金但不参与日常管理，风险有限). And we're not interested in maximizing fees or maximizing share of industry value creation. That's the game we've chosen to play. And so there's no path where Sequoia, for example, tries to go public or take the... you know, that's like it's just not in the strategy of the business. No, actually, we've structured ourselves to be a private partnership in perpetuity to the extent possible under California law. We have the sense of stewardship. You have to leave the partnership in a better place than you found it. Don Valentine didn't call it Valentine Ventures when he started it. He handed the partnership over to a next generation with Mike Moritz and Doug Leone and Jim Gett. And we're now part of a third generation, our team currently running the partnership. We didn't have to pay to get the partnership from the previous generation and nor will we charge the next generation. That's our motto.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 嗯，我们坚持做自己的核心业务。我们目前运营的基金，包括种子基金、风险基金和成长基金，规模都和五、六、七年前没有变化。我们意识到，对于某些人来说，向非常晚期的公司开出大额支票可以赚钱。但我们的目标是成为有限合伙人的首选投资管理者。我们确实希望为我们的有限合伙人提供最好的净内部收益率和净回报倍数。我们对最大化费用或最大化行业价值创造的份额不感兴趣。这是我们选择参与的竞争。因此，红杉资本没有上市或采取类似策略的路径，这不符合我们的业务战略。不，事实上，我们已将自己构建为一个永久性的私人合伙企业，在加州法律允许的最大范围内。我们有一种管理精神：你必须让合伙企业比你接手时更好。唐·瓦伦丁创立时并没有称之为“瓦伦丁风投”。他将合伙企业交给了迈克·莫里茨、道格·利昂和吉姆·盖茨这一代人。而我们现在是第三代人的一部分，我们的团队目前正在管理这个合伙企业。我们没有向上一代支付费用来获得合伙企业，也不会向下一代收取费用。这是我们的座右铭。

红杉资本的文化与合伙人决策机制

Host: How would you describe the culture that's driven the success, Roelof? So when you select partners, what do you look for? How do you value those partners? How do you assess the performance of those partners? And how do you guys operate that kind of defines the culture?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 罗洛夫，您会如何描述驱动红杉成功的文化？那么，在您选择合伙人时，您看重什么？您如何评估这些合伙人的价值和表现？你们的运营方式又是如何定义这种文化的呢？

Roelof: So I think probably the most important characteristic we look for is an insatiable curiosity in the individual. We look for people who are extremely driven, but they need to have a heart of gold. So one of the things we talk about at Sequoia is we cherish individualism and teamwork. You need an individual to be able to have a keen insight and propose an investment, but you've got to work with a team. And the whole teamwork aspect is really important for us. So when you make investment decisions at Sequoia, it's a consensus decision, which blew my mind when I first got there.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 我认为我们寻找的最重要的特质，可能是个人永不满足的好奇心。我们寻找那些极具驱动力的人，但他们必须心地善良。所以我们在红杉强调的一点是，我们珍视个人主义和团队合作。你需要一个人能够拥有敏锐的洞察力并提出投资建议，但你必须与团队合作。而整个团队合作的方面对我们来说非常重要。所以在红杉，当你做出投资决策时，它是一个共识决策，这在我刚加入时让我大为震惊。

Host: Meaning everybody has to agree. Roelof: Everybody has to agree. Host: So if one person says no, it doesn't happen. Roelof: Correct. Host: So one person can veto an investment. Roelof: Correct. And that happens often, or it has. Sometimes it was a good decision and sometimes not. Host: What do the statistics tell you? What's the worst thing somebody killed? Roelof: Oh, jeez. Host: It's okay. We're all friends here. What is that list called when you have that? Roelof: Yeah, you would call it your anti-portfolio (反投资组合: 指那些错失的、如果当初投资了就会带来巨大成功的公司名单). Host: Anti-portfolio. But in this case, somebody wasn't just an anti-portfolio. It's like everyone agreed we should do it except the one.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 意思是所有人必须同意？ Roelof: 所有人必须同意。 Host: 所以如果有一个人说不，那就行不通？ Roelof: 正确。 Host: 也就是说，一个人就可以否决一项投资？ Roelof: 正确。而且这种情况经常发生，或者说曾经发生过。有时那是个好决定，有时则不是。 Host: 统计数据告诉您什么？有人否决过最糟糕的项目是什么？ Roelof: 哦，天哪。 Host: 没关系。我们都是朋友。您有那样的清单时，那个清单叫什么？ Roelof: 是的，你会称之为你的反向投资组合。 Host: 反向投资组合。但在这种情况下，有人不仅仅是反向投资组合中的一员。而是每个人都同意我们应该这样做，除了那一个人。

Roelof: Yeah. And so you think about that responsibility, and it weighs on people, but it means that you need to show up with your best game every single day. And part of what we've done is we look at the vote distribution these days. And look, if somebody shows up and everybody's really positive, there are a bunch of people that are eight, nines out of 10, and there's one person who clearly woke up in a bad mood and is a three. You know, at some point that person will probably say, "Listen, maybe I just don't get it." This actually happened to me. We listened to a company in late November. This company is thriving right now. It's pretty... Sax isn't here because this company's benefiting from stable coins with the genius act that he helped put in place, is really benefiting from that. And I didn't quite get this company at the time, and I was the only person who was below the line. And I said, "Listen, there's something I'm missing in this particular company. I think we should proceed with the investment even though my intuition walking in was that we shouldn't." And I'm really glad that we proceeded. So...

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 是的。所以你会考虑到那种责任，它会压在人们身上，但这也意味着你每天都必须全力以赴。我们所做的一部分工作是，我们现在会查看投票分布。你看，如果有人来了，大家都很积极，很多人打八分、九分（满分十分），但有个人显然心情不好，只打了三分。你知道，在某个时候，那个人可能会说：“听着，也许我就是不理解。”这实际上发生在我身上过。我们在去年11月底听了一家公司。这家公司现在发展得很好。它相当……萨克斯不在这里，因为这家公司正受益于他帮助实施的那个巧妙的稳定币法案。我当时并不完全理解这家公司，而且我是唯一一个低于平均分的人。我说：“听着，这家公司有些地方我没搞懂。但我认为我们应该继续投资，尽管我最初的直觉是不应该。”我真的很庆幸我们继续投资了。所以……

红杉资本基金：拥抱长期价值

Host: Can you tell us about the holding company transition that you underwent and the role of being a venture capitalist in making an exit decision? So we did this conversation on the show a few weeks ago. Pulled up some analysis. The biggest winners continue to compound as public companies. 99% of the returns are as a public company or whatever it is. So it looks like an amazing exit goes public. But that's not the end of the value creation. True compounders compound for decades. Especially founders are still in the seat. Amazon, Nvidia (英伟达: 知名半导体公司，以GPU闻名) was a Sequoia investment. I think Google, I mean, these are multi-trillion dollar companies that if you guys held your position to today, I'm assuming things would look a little bit different.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 您能谈谈你们经历的控股公司转型，以及作为风险投资家在退出决策中的作用吗？几周前我们在节目中讨论过这个问题。我们做了一些分析，发现最大的赢家在成为上市公司后会继续复合增长。99%的回报是在公司上市后实现的。所以看起来一个惊人的退出就是上市。但这并不是价值创造的终点。真正的复合型公司会持续增长几十年。尤其是在创始人仍在位的情况下。亚马逊，英伟达是红杉投资的公司。我想谷歌也是，这些都是万亿美元级别的公司，如果你们一直持有股份到现在，我猜情况会大不相同。

Roelof: It would. Yes. So we backed a bunch of very interesting companies over our 50 years. The companies in which we were private investors when they were little companies today account for over 30% of the total value of the NASDAQ (纳斯达克: 美国的一个主要股票市场，以科技股为主).

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 确实如此。是的。在过去的50年里，我们投资了许多非常有趣的公司。我们作为私人投资者在其早期阶段投资的那些公司，如今贡献了纳斯达克总市值的30%以上。

Host: Wow. There's no other... 30% over 30% of the combined value of the NASDAQ. Apple, Nvidia... Roelof: Apple, Cisco (思科: 知名网络设备和解决方案供应商), Nvidia, Google (谷歌: 知名互联网科技公司), Palo Alto Networks (Palo Alto Networks: 网络安全公司), ServiceNow (ServiceNow: 提供云端IT服务管理解决方案的公司), I mean the list goes on. So... Host: Pretty, pretty good.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 哇。没有其他的……超过纳斯达克总市值的30%以上。苹果、英伟达…… Roelof: 苹果、思科、英伟达、谷歌、Palo Alto Networks、ServiceNow，名单还在继续。所以…… Host: 相当，相当不错。

Roelof: So one of the things we realized, what you're alluding to is in 2022, we launched something called the Sequoia Capital Fund (红杉资本基金: 红杉资本推出的一种新的基金结构，旨在长期持有其投资公司的股份). And so we realized that the great companies continue to compound as you talked about in that episode. It was an excellent episode obviously. And by the way, even in more recent memory, if you look at the last 10-ish years, Palo Alto Networks, ServiceNow, HubSpot (HubSpot: 提供客户关系管理、营销、销售和客户服务软件的公司), MongoDB (MongoDB: 开源文档型数据库), these companies have all been 10x's as public companies. And so, we've realized that when we distribute shares prematurely to LPs, they don't know any better because they run a big endowment. They suddenly get $5 million worth of company ABC. They don't know any better. They sell the shares. So, what we've decided to do is for the companies that we believe have the ability to compound longer term, we have a different fund structure. And so six, twelve, eighteen months after the IPO, we can move those shares into this fund called the Sequoia Capital Fund. And this now becomes the vehicle through which we fund all our next underlying investment vehicles. Now to give you a sense, since we launched this three and a half years ago, we've accumulated another $6.7 billion in gains by doing nothing except being patient. $6.7 billion in gains that our LPs would not have seen if we had just distributed those shares outright.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 所以我们意识到的一点，正如您所指出的，在2022年，我们启动了一项名为红杉资本基金的计划。我们意识到，正如您在那一期节目中谈到的，伟大的公司会继续复合增长。那无疑是一期非常棒的节目。顺便说一下，即使是近期，如果你回顾过去大约十年，Palo Alto Networks、ServiceNow、HubSpot、MongoDB，这些公司上市后都实现了十倍的增长。因此，我们意识到，当我们过早地向有限合伙人分发股票时，他们并不会做得更好，因为他们管理着庞大的捐赠基金。他们突然收到价值500万美元的某公司股票，他们对此并不了解，就会卖掉这些股票。所以，我们决定对那些我们认为具有长期复合增长能力的公司，采用不同的基金结构。因此，在首次公开募股后六个月、十二个月或十八个月，我们可以将这些股票转移到这个名为“红杉资本基金”的基金中。这现在成为我们为所有下一个基础投资工具提供资金的载体。现在，让您了解一下，自从三年半前我们推出这个基金以来，我们仅仅通过保持耐心，就又累积了67亿美元的收益。如果当初我们直接分发这些股票，我们的有限合伙人就无法看到这67亿美元的收益。

Host: Yeah, you're making him moan. He's moaning. I like it. I'm getting... I'm getting warm and he's getting emotional. But what is... but what is the... So the counterargument is as a public company, you as venture capitalists who are excellent at interrogating early-stage technology, early-stage metrics, founder personalities, all the things that might make a good venture capital investor. Maybe as a public company, quarter to quarter, are they growing 12%, 14%? There's a different analytical skill set some might argue like, you know, that that belongs in that investment domain and frankly very hard to beat the index funds doing that. What's the argument to be made to the counter and why would you counter that argument?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 是的，您让他兴奋不已。他非常兴奋。我喜欢。我感到……我感到兴奋，他也很激动。但是，反驳的观点是，作为一家上市公司，你们这些风险投资家擅长审视早期技术、早期指标、创始人个性，以及所有可能构成一个优秀风险投资者的因素。也许作为一家上市公司，季度到季度，他们增长12%、14%？有些人可能会争辩说，这属于不同的分析技能范畴，而且坦率地说，在这种情况下，很难跑赢指数基金。那么，您会如何反驳这种观点，以及为什么要反驳它呢？

Roelof: So, one of the things for us is that most of these cases we're involved with these companies literally at inception. Palo Alto Networks was incubated inside our office with one founder and my partner Jim Gates. So, we've known these companies since the earliest of days. Why should that relationship end at the IPO? And in most of these cases, as you pointed out, the founders are still there and there's so much more innovation taking place. Jack Dorsey's one of Jack Dorsey's favorite quotes to me was "companies have multiple founding moments." And so when you're in a company where the founder keeps reinventing the business, a company like Square, half the revenue today comes from a product called Cash App (Cash App: 移动支付服务，由Block Inc.（原Square）开发) that hadn't launched for the first five years in the company's life. And so if you can find these companies, these special companies where the founders keep pushing the boundary on innovation and they are relentless, then it works.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 所以，对我们来说，其中一个原因是，在大多数情况下，我们从这些公司成立之初就参与其中。Palo Alto Networks就是在我们的办公室里，由一位创始人和我的合伙人吉姆·盖茨孵化出来的。所以，我们从这些公司最早的日子起就了解它们。为什么这种关系要在公司首次公开募股时就结束呢？在大多数情况下，正如您所指出的，创始人仍然在位，并且有更多的创新正在发生。杰克·多西最喜欢对我说的一句话是“公司有多个创始时刻”。所以当你遇到一家创始人不断重塑业务的公司，比如Square，它现在一半的收入来自一款名为Cash App的产品，而这款产品在公司成立后的头五年里都还没有推出。所以，如果你能找到这些特殊的公司，创始人不断突破创新界限并且不懈努力，那么它就会成功。

Host: Google buying YouTube. Roelof: Don't remind me. Host: Do you think it would have been the same? Would YouTube still have had the same outcome if it wasn't acquired? To be clear, Roelof wrote in his first year or two at the company, the deal memo to invest in YouTube, and it got bought for $1.6 billion. Standalone business today would be worth $400-500 billion. And then Google then invested quite significantly in infrastructure and enabling scalability and building out a team and building out an ad revenue system, etc. We've got Neil here tomorrow to talk about the current state of YouTube. But do you think it could have taken the same? It's hard to say.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 谷歌收购YouTube。 Roelof: 别提了。 Host: 您认为结果会一样吗？如果YouTube没有被收购，它还会取得同样的成就吗？澄清一下，罗洛夫在他加入公司的一两年内，就写了投资YouTube的交易备忘录，后来YouTube以16亿美元被收购。如果它作为独立公司运营，现在可能价值4000-5000亿美元。谷歌随后在基础设施、扩展性、团队建设和广告收入系统等方面投入了大量资金。我们明天将请到尼尔来谈谈YouTube的现状。但您认为如果没有收购，它能达到同样的高度吗？很难说。

Roelof: Hard to say. I think a lot of credit should go to Google for the way that they managed YouTube after the acquisition, both in the resources they provided, the leadership, and they've enabled it to thrive. This is one of my favorite things that Peter Thiel says is, when an acquisition like this happens, one side was orders of magnitude off. It was just a zero or it was 100 more than what they paid. Something is always off.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 很难说。我认为谷歌在收购后管理YouTube的方式值得称赞，无论是他们提供的资源、领导力，都使其得以蓬勃发展。彼得·蒂尔有句话我很喜欢，他说，当发生这样的收购时，其中一方的估值往往差了几个数量级。可能是多了一个零，或者比实际支付的多了100倍。总有些地方不对劲。

创始人特质：唐·瓦伦丁的四象限理论

Host: Anyway, Don Valentine, the founder of the firm, drew a four-quadrant chart at one point to explain the founders that perform extremely well in terms of returns. Maybe you could explain that to the audience.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 无论如何，公司创始人唐·瓦伦丁曾画了一个四象限图，来解释那些在回报方面表现极其出色的创始人。也许您可以向听众解释一下。

Roelof: Yes. Don pulled me aside in the early days when I joined Sequoia and he said, "2x2 matrix: people are exceptional, not exceptional; easy to get along with, not so easy to get along with. Roelof, we normally make money in one of those four quadrants. Your job is to figure out which one." And it's the exceptional people who are not so easy to get along with.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 是的。在我刚加入红杉的早期，唐把我拉到一边，他说：“一个2x2矩阵：一类人是杰出的，一类是不杰出的；一类人很好相处，一类人不太好相处。罗洛夫，我们通常在四个象限中的一个赚钱。你的工作就是找出是哪一个。”而答案就是那些杰出但不太好相处的人。

Host: I'm sorry. Can we just double-click on that? Why do you think that is? Roelof: These people change the world. They don't take no for an answer, right? They are... Host: How does it... Why does that make them hard to get along with, per se?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 抱歉。我们能深入探讨一下吗？您认为这是为什么？ Roelof: 这些人改变了世界。他们不接受拒绝，对吧？他们是…… Host: 这……为什么这让他们本质上难以相处呢？

Roelof: Well, I think he was he was saying that a little bit tongue in cheek, right? But this is a guy who backed Steve Jobs (史蒂夫·乔布斯: 苹果公司联合创始人) when Steve would walk around Sand Hill Road (沙丘路: 位于硅谷，以聚集大量风险投资公司而闻名) without shoes. He'd come back from a trip to India. Allegedly, he didn't smell too great. And he was unusual and nobody wanted to back him. And Don wanted to find these underdogs, these unknown... Host: Atari. Roelof: Well, apparently some of the Atari (雅达利: 早期知名的电子游戏和家用电脑公司) board meetings took place in hot tubs. Yes. He told... By the way, that's how he got to Steve because Steve had worked at Atari. That's how Don got the introduction to Steve. So, I think part of the point he was trying to make is don't look for the people that, you know, went to all the right schools and wear the right clothes, all the conventional stuff. Founders are unconventional. These people change the world. Most of us encounter challenges every single day and we accommodate. This thing isn't quite to your liking, you adapt. Founders don't. Founders see things and go, "Hmm, I think the world can look different," and then they go and try to fix it. They just don't take no for an answer.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 嗯，我认为他当时说这句话多少带点半开玩笑的意味，对吧？但他可是那个支持史蒂夫·乔布斯的人，当时乔布斯还会光着脚在沙丘路上走来走去。他从印度旅行回来，据说身上气味不佳。他就是不寻常，没人愿意支持他。而唐则想找到这些不为人知的、被低估的人…… Host: 雅达利。 Roelof: 嗯，据说雅达利的一些董事会会议是在热水浴缸里举行的。是的。他告诉我……顺便说一句，他就是这样认识史蒂夫的，因为史蒂夫曾在雅达利工作。唐就是通过这个途径认识了史蒂夫。所以，我认为他想表达的部分观点是，不要去寻找那些去了所有名校、穿着得体、所有都循规蹈矩的人。创始人是非传统的。这些人改变世界。我们大多数人每天都会遇到挑战，然后我们会去适应。如果某件事不尽如人意，你就会去适应。但创始人不会。创始人看到问题会想，“嗯，我觉得世界可以不一样”，然后他们就会去努力解决。他们从不接受“不”。

两位导师：道格·利昂的“心”与迈克尔·莫里茨的“想象力”

Host: So, let's fast forward to your two mentors, Michael Moritz (迈克尔·莫里茨: 红杉资本的资深合伙人) and Doug Leone (道格·利昂: 红杉资本的资深合伙人). Two very different characters when the story gets told, maybe a rivalry there between the two of them. What did you learn from each? Roelof: Sure. From Doug, I learned heart. Host: Unpack it. Doug has an incredible heart. When did you see that most? What was the moment that's coming to your mind right now that you probably shouldn't talk about?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 那么，让我们快进到您的两位导师，迈克尔·莫里茨和道格·利昂。当故事被讲述时，他们是截然不同的两个人，也许两人之间存在着竞争。您从他们每个人身上学到了什么？ Roelof: 当然。从道格身上，我学到了“心”。 Host: 展开讲讲。道格拥有一颗令人难以置信的心。您何时最深刻地体会到这一点？现在您脑海中浮现的、也许不该提及的那个时刻是什么？

Roelof: Well, I'll give you two examples. One was in 2009 when I was in a funk. I nearly quit the business. Host: I didn't know this really. Roelof: Well, we'd had the YouTube was a great success. And I felt very good about that. And then in venture, after a few years, you walk through the valley of despair and you start to realize the things you should have invested in that you didn't and the lemons start to drop, the things that you did invest in that are not working out. So yes, there was the one great quick exit, but then a bunch of other things. And I was really having a lot of self-doubt. And Doug showed up at my house with a homemade pesto jar. And he didn't need to. It was on a Saturday afternoon. He knocks on my door. "Who's this person at my house?" And he just wanted to tell me that he was there to support me through this dark period. That was one example. Another one was when my son was in hospital and Doug showed up. Didn't have to. That meant a lot to me. So...

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 好的，我给您举两个例子。一个是在2009年，我当时情绪低落，几乎要退出这个行业。 Host: 我真的不知道这件事。 Roelof: 嗯，YouTube取得了巨大的成功。我为此感到非常高兴。但随后在风险投资领域，几年之后，你会经历一段绝望的低谷期，你会开始意识到那些你本该投资却错过的项目，以及那些你投资了但却失败的项目开始显现。所以，是的，有一次非常成功的快速退出，但随后也有一大堆其他问题。我当时真的非常自我怀疑。道格带着一罐自制香蒜酱出现在我家门口。他完全没必要这样做。那是一个周六下午。他敲我的门。“这个人是谁？”他只是想告诉我，他会在我这段黑暗时期支持我。那是一个例子。另一个例子是，我的儿子住院时，道格也出现了。他也没必要来。那对我意义重大。所以……

Host: And Michael... Roelof: Michael's imagination. Michael just has an unbelievable ability to imagine how a company can succeed. And when I thought about my mistakes as an investor, every single time it comes down to a failure of imagination, that I didn't think big enough. I didn't think about how this company could progress from where they were. You first introduced me to Twitter (推特: 知名社交媒体平台，现名X) 2007, I have the emails before smartphones launched and it was an SMS app (短信应用: 基于短消息服务进行通信的应用程序). I got tired of getting all your "I'm having cappuccino" messages on Twitter at the time. I remember on your Blackberry. Yeah. And I didn't quite imagine that it could be what it is today. And so that to me was an example. I remember an early meeting with Yelp (Yelp: 在线评论平台，提供商家评价和推荐) with Jeremy Stoppelman and Max Levchin in our offices. And Yelp hadn't launched a web app that were going to be an email newsletter thing. And Michael in this meeting said, "I imagine that one day restaurants will put a Yelp sticker in the window just like a Zagat (查加特: 曾是知名的餐厅指南品牌) or a Michelin star (米其林星级: 米其林指南对餐厅的评级，代表烹饪质量)." And he saw that.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 还有迈克尔…… Roelof: 迈克尔的想象力。迈克尔拥有令人难以置信的能力，能够想象一家公司如何取得成功。而当我思考自己作为投资者的错误时，每一次都归结于想象力的失败，我没有想得足够远大。我没有思考这家公司如何能从当时的起点发展壮大。您在2007年首次向我介绍了推特，我手里有智能手机发布前的那些邮件，它那时还是一个短信应用。我当时很厌倦收到所有你在推特上发的“我在喝卡布奇诺”之类的消息。我记得那是在你的黑莓手机上。是的。我当时完全无法想象它会变成今天的样子。所以对我来说，那是一个例子。我还记得一次与Yelp的早期会议，杰里米·斯托普尔曼和马克斯·莱夫钦在我们的办公室里。当时Yelp还没有推出网页应用，它原本只是一个电子邮件通讯服务。迈克尔在那次会议上说：“我能想象有一天，餐厅会在窗户上贴上Yelp的贴纸，就像查加特或米其林星级一样。”他看到了这一点。

Host: He saw that. Roelof: He saw that. I mean, 10 years before that became a reality, he had the imagination to think about that. That to me is amazing. So now Doug is still there and Mike has transitioned out. Is that the what is... Roelof: Yes, Michael has transitioned out completely. Doug has stepped back from day-to-day investing. So he's no longer in partner meetings routinely, but he continues to serve on several boards. Host: And you're in charge. Roelof: I'm the leader of a team. And I think of more like being captain of the team. We play team sport at Sequoia, and we are equal partners. And, you know, it's... Host: Was it hard to see those two guys go? Just seeing how legendary they were? To succeed them? No. Roelof: Well, both to succeed them, but also just to see them walk out the door. Like, is there a tendency to want to keep them around as long as possible? I understand the question. Well, firstly, it is very hard to succeed them. I think every single person in Sequoia feels this enormous burden and responsibility to try to match the performance that we've been known for. But we have this great generational transition at Sequoia. So Michael stepped back from day-to-day activity in 2012. Morris did in 2012. Michael stepped back. He had personal health reasons and he stepped back. He continued to serve on the boards that he was on, and we had him for another decade where I would ask him for advice. As we were going through global separation that we talked about earlier, I would ask Doug and Michael, "What do you think? What should we be doing here? Do you have advice for me?" And so it's a... we have this benefit of intergenerational knowledge transfer. Doug was on a call earlier today. Actually, we had a difficult conversation. I wanted his input on an important question. And it's not because he has the authority to tell me what to do. It's because I seek out his advice.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 他看到了。 Roelof: 他看到了。我是说，在那成为现实的十年前，他就有这样的想象力去思考。这对我来说太不可思议了。所以现在道格还在，迈克尔已经退休了。是这样吗…… Roelof: 是的，迈克尔已经完全退休了。道格已经从日常投资中退下来了。所以他不再例行参加合伙人会议，但他继续在多个董事会任职。 Host: 而您现在负责。 Roelof: 我是一个团队的领导者。我更像是球队的队长。我们在红杉是团队合作，我们是平等的合伙人。而且，你知道，这…… Host: 看到那两位传奇人物离开，是不是很难接受？接替他们？不。 Roelof: 嗯，既要接替他们，也要看着他们离开。是不是有一种倾向，想尽可能地留住他们？我理解这个问题。嗯，首先，接替他们是非常困难的。我认为红杉的每个人都感受到巨大的压力和责任，试图去匹配我们一直以来以之为傲的业绩。但红杉正经历着一次重大的代际传承。迈克尔在2012年就退出了日常工作。莫里茨在2012年也退出了。迈克尔当时因个人健康原因退了下来。他继续在他所任职的董事会中服务，我们又拥有了他十年，期间我会向他寻求建议。就像我们之前谈到的全球分离，我会问道格和迈克尔：“你们觉得怎么样？我们应该怎么做？你们有什么建议吗？”所以，我们拥有这种跨代知识传承的优势。道格今天早些时候还在电话会议上。实际上，我们进行了一次艰难的对话。我希望他能在一个重要问题上给出意见。这并非因为他有权命令我做什么。而是因为我寻求他的建议。

生命科学投资：成功案例与专业边界

Host: You were investing in traditional software, internet services for years. And then a couple of years ago, you started investing in some life sciences. Does life sciences kind of work as a venture investment today? And what's been the challenge in biotech (生物技术: 利用生物学过程、有机体或系统来制造产品或解决问题的技术领域) and life sciences investing generally over the last few years? There's a lot of notoriety about the collapse of the market. And even Dave Ricks today was saying most public biotech companies are trading below cash. What's your observations on the business model, what you've seen, the types of businesses you've invested in there?

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 您多年来一直投资传统的软件和互联网服务。几年前，您开始投资一些生命科学领域。生命科学如今是否适合作为一种风险投资？以及过去几年，生物技术和生命科学投资普遍面临的挑战是什么？市场崩溃的负面报道很多。甚至戴夫·里克今天还在说，大多数上市生物技术公司的交易价格都低于其现金储备。您对这种商业模式、您所看到的以及您在那里投资的业务类型有何看法？

Roelof: So the business we invested in that has done really well is a company called Natera (Natera: 专注于基因检测的生物技术公司). And we made a seed investment of a million dollars in 2007 in this company. Host: It's $20 billion now, right? Market cap. Roelof: $22 billion market cap. It was a million dollars, two people with a very raw idea. And today, they're the leading provider of prenatal testing, oncology recurrence monitoring, organ transplant projection testing. And so that company's been a huge success. Diagnostics, genetic diagnostics, has been a huge success. And you think about the dividend we're still collecting from the Human Genome Project (人类基因组计划: 旨在测定人类基因组中所有DNA序列的国际科学研究项目) 25 years ago. It's incredible. And you've obviously seen that in some of the businesses that you've helped build as well. We did make an investment in a company called BridgeBio (BridgeBio Pharma: 一家生物制药公司，专注于罕见遗传疾病药物的开发), which is helping with rare genetic disease drug development. But other than that, I think we just don't have the expertise for biotech. We don't have any MD PhDs on our team at Sequoia. And I think it's very dangerous when people think that your success in one domain just naturally makes you, gives you the right to compete in other domains. I think I have tremendous respect for the people who understand that. I do not. I learned that one the hard way.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Roelof: 所以，我们投资的一家表现非常出色的公司是Natera。我们在2007年对这家公司进行了100万美元的种子投资。 Host: 它现在市值200亿美元，对吗？ Roelof: 市值220亿美元。当时只是一百万美元，两个人带着一个非常原始的想法。而今天，他们是产前检测、肿瘤复发监测、器官移植预测检测领域的领先供应商。所以那家公司取得了巨大的成功。诊断学，基因诊断学，取得了巨大的成功。你再想想我们25年前从人类基因组计划中仍在收割的红利。这太不可思议了。您显然也在您帮助建立的一些业务中看到了这一点。我们确实投资了一家名为BridgeBio的公司，它正在帮助开发罕见遗传疾病药物。但除此之外，我认为我们只是不具备生物技术的专业知识。我们红杉的团队中没有任何医学博士或生物学博士。我认为当人们认为你在一个领域的成功自然而然地赋予你在其他领域竞争的权利时，这是非常危险的。我认为我非常尊重那些理解这一点的人。我没有。我曾艰难地学到了这一点。

结语

Host: Ladies and gentlemen, Roelof. Roelof: Thank you. Host: Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you, sir. I appreciate you coming out. Thanks.

这里是对应的、高质量的中文翻译。 Host: 女士们先生们，罗洛夫。 Roelof: 谢谢。 Host: 谢谢您。非常感谢。谢谢您，先生。感谢您的到来。谢谢。