战胜天性:投资成功的关键在于避免认知陷阱 Big Think 2025-10-24

投资:一个已被解决的问题

我认为很多人没有意识到,投资其实是一个已经被解决了的问题。我们知道股票和固定收益的平均回报率是多少,也了解通货膨胀的长期形态。我们大致清楚经济的运行规律及其波动范围。然而,那个我们尚未解决的变量,那张“王牌”,其实是我们自身的行为。

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I think a lot of people don't realize that investing is a problem that's been solved. We know what the average returns are for equity, for fixed income. We know what inflation looks like over the long haul. We know what the economy broadly does, what the range looks like. The variable, the wild card, that we haven't yet solved for is our own behavior.

市面上有成千上万本书告诉人们“应该如何投资”,但即使你多年来都做对了一切,只要犯下一两个错误,所有的努力都可能付诸东流。所以,与其告诉人们该做什么,不如告诉他们不该做什么。让我带你了解那些你应该警惕的、对你财务健康构成威胁的最大陷阱。

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There have been literally thousands of books telling people, "Here's how to invest," but you could do everything right for years and years and years and if you just make one or two mistakes, all of that hard work goes out the window. Instead of telling people what to do, let's tell them what not to do. Let me walk you through the biggest traps that you should be aware of that are a danger to your financial wellbeing.

我是巴里·里茨霍尔兹(Barry Ritholtz),Ritholtz Wealth Management 的董事长兼首席投资官。我的新书是《如何避免错误投资:那些摧毁财富的理念、数字、行为以及如何规避它们》。

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I'm Barry Ritholtz and I'm chairman and chief investment officer of Ritholtz Wealth Management. My new book is "How Not to Invest: The Ideas, Numbers, and Behaviors that Destroy Wealth and How to Avoid Them."

第一章:为何你的大脑让你成为糟糕的投资者

我们的大脑是一个进化得极为精妙的器官。它占我们体重的不到5%,却消耗了20%的能量。正是我们发达的大脑帮助我们主宰了这个星球。我们是社会性协作物种,在一个充满敌意的世界里不断进化和适应。

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So our brain is this wonderfully evolved organ. It's less than 5% of our body weight, it consumes 20% of our energy, and our big brains are what's helped us essentially dominate the planet. We're a social cooperative species. We've evolved and adapted in a very hostile world.

在过去两百万年的进化历程中,我们学到的所有本能、我们大脑的全部构造,都是为了让我们在那些危险的环境中生存下来。我们对生存威胁高度警觉,倾向于立即采取行动。我们更容易注意到坏消息,而忽略好消息。为什么?因为这些都是在野外成功的生存策略。

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And all of the instinctual lessons we've learned over the past 2 million years, all of the way we're wired, are geared to keep us alive in those sort of dangerous circumstances. We're highly attuned to existential threats. We're primed towards action. We tend to notice really bad news, and we tend to ignore good news. Why? Because these are all successful survival strategies in the wild.

现代市场不过存在了一两个世纪。500年前没有市政债券市场,400年前也几乎没有股票市场。因此,指望两百万年的进化能让你准备好做出投资决策,这简直是天方夜谭。在人类历史的大部分时间里,我们的寿命只有20、25或30年。为未来几十年储蓄和投资的想法,完全超出了我们的认知范畴。

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The modern markets have existed for a century or two. There were no municipal bond markets 500 years ago. There were barely equity markets 400 years ago. And so to imagine that 2 million years of evolution somehow prepares you to make decisions. You know, most of human history, we live 20, 25, 30 years. The idea of having to save and invest for decades in the future, it's just so out of our realm.

当我们看到股票的复利增长时,这些都远远超出了我们的本能经验。我们很难想象这种数学的运作方式,因为指数级增长的数学知识并不能帮助你在非洲大草原上活下来。因此,我们现在处于一种“超说明书用药”的境地——这是制药公司的术语,指将药物用于其最初批准用途之外的病症。我们正在“超说明书”地使用我们的大脑。

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When we look at how stocks compound, these are just far, far outside of our instinctual experience. We simply have a hard time imagining the way that math works because exponential math didn't help keep you alive on the savanna. And so we're in a situation where, the pharmaceutical companies call this off-label when they give you a drug for a reason that's not it's originally intended purpose, we use our brains off-label.

我们的大脑本是用来帮助我们在充满敌意的竞争环境中生存的,而今天我们却用它来挑选股票、进行资产配置和做出长期财务决策。我们根本不是为此而生的。因此,为了在金融市场上取得成功,我们必须保持深思熟虑,理解我们为何会犯这些错误,并尽力避免它们。

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Our brains help keep us alive in a hostile competitive environment. We're using our brains today to pick stocks, to make asset allocations, to make long-term financial decisions. We simply were never built for this. And so it's in our interest to be thoughtful, to understand why we make these errors and to try our best to avoid them if we wanna succeed in the financial markets.

情绪的陷阱:边缘系统与斯波克市场

对于投资者来说,培养一点“蜘蛛侠般的直觉”,即对驱动自身行为的动机有一点自我意识,是非常有用的。让我们来谈谈我们自身的认知错误和偏见是如何导致投资中的糟糕决策的。

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So it's very useful for investors to develop a little bit of a spidey sense, a little bit of a self-awareness as to what's motivating their behavior. So let's talk about how our own cognitive errors and biases lead to bad decision making when it comes to investing.

我们先来谈谈你的边缘系统(Limbic System: 大脑中负责处理情绪和“战或逃”反应的部分)。我想分享我的朋友、神经学家兼投资人威廉·伯恩斯坦博士的一句话,他说:“投资成功的秘诀在于管理好你的边缘系统。学会控制它,否则你将穷困潦倒。”这是一个相当有力的论断,但它来自一个在过去几十年里深入研究此问题的人。我们无法管理好自己的情绪,我们的贪婪和恐慌感常常导致我们做出错误的决定。

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Let's talk about your limbic system. I want to share a quote from a friend, Dr. William Bernstein is a neurologist and investor, and he said the secret to success in investing is managing your limbic system. That's the part of the brain that's responsible for your fight-or-flight response. "Learn to control your limbic system or else you will die poor." That's a pretty strong statement, but it comes from somebody who's studied this over the past few decades. And our inability to manage our emotions, our sense of greed and panic often leads us to bad decisions.

我喜欢用《星际迷航》中的斯波克先生来比喻股票市场。斯波克先生一半是瓦肯人,一半是人类,他的一半思维过程非常逻辑,但他也受到来自母亲一方的情感影响。当我们观察股票市场——这个“斯波克市场”时,我们常常看到理性和逻辑在与情感作斗争。

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I love the metaphor of "Star Trek's" Mr. Spock as a metaphor for the stock market, right? Mr. Spock is half Vulcan, half human, one half of his thought process is very logical, but he's also influenced by his emotions, his mother's side of the equation. And when we see the stock market, the Spock market, we see that very often it's some rationality and logic fighting with emotions.

大多数时候,市场是相当理性的。它是一个未来的贴现机制,它根据对未来收入和利润的最佳估计来定价。然而,有时人类情感的那一半会介入。当市场垂直上涨、变得疯狂时,我们就能看到这种情况。想想1999年底和2000年初,每个人都说“我必须拥有一些互联网公司的股票”,然后蜂拥而入。

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Most of the time the market is fairly rational. It's a future discounting mechanism. It takes stock prices and it says, "Here's what our best estimates are of future revenue and profits. And that means prices should be somewhere along this line." There are times when the human emotional half intervenes. We see it when markets go vertical, when things get crazy. Think about late 1999 and early 2000 when everybody said, "I have to own me some of these dot-coms," and piled in.

有时情感也会将市场推向谷底。想想2009年3月,当时人们确信股票会跌到零。信贷市场冻结,政府束手无策,股票似乎真的要归零了。那些投降的人,那些恐慌性抛售的人,后来都后悔了。当标普500指数在2009年3月初触及666点时,这反映了市场上所有人的恐慌和逃离情绪。15年后的今天,指数几乎上涨了10倍。

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Sometimes it's to the bottom. Think about March, 2009, when people were convinced stocks were going to zero. The credit markets are frozen, the government doesn't know what it's doing, stocks are going to zero. And the people who capitulated, the people who panic sold, they regretted it. When the S&P 500 hit 666 in early March of 2009, that was a reflection of the emotionality of all the people in the market just panicking and fleeing. Here we are 15 years later, almost 10x higher.

逻辑告诉我们,我们需要进行长期投资,并且必须控制我们的情绪,这样才不会在2000年恐慌性追高,又在2009年恐慌性杀跌。

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Logic tells us that we need to be invested for the long term and also tells us that we have to control our emotions so we don't panic chase stocks up in 2000 and then panic sell stocks at the lows in 2009.

贪婪与恐惧:情绪如何驱动错误决策

人类进化出情绪是为了帮助我们在大草原上生存。所以当你产生强烈的感觉时,你的自然倾向是采取行动。如果是恐惧,你就想让痛苦消失,想停止这一切。在市场抛售期间,这表现为一丝恐慌,人们因为害怕亏钱而卖出股票。

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So humans evolved emotions as a way to help keep us alive, to keep us alive on the savanna. And so when you have this strong feeling, your natural tendency is to do something about it. If it's fear, well you wanna make the pain go away. You wanna stop. What that manifests itself as during a market sell off is a little bit of panic and people sell because they're afraid they're gonna lose their money.

另一面是贪婪的按钮。我们嫉妒,我们羡慕。我们不仅想要金钱和财富,还想证明自己是聪明和成功的。而我们实现这一点的方式就是购买那些涨得最猛的股票。因此,当市场上涨时,人们有一种蜂拥进入表现最佳股票的倾向。

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The flip side of that is the greed button. We're jealous, we're envious. We wanna have not just money and wealth, but we want to think of ourselves as intelligent and successful. And the way we do that is by buying the stocks that are going up the most. And so when the market is rallying, there is a tendency to stampede into the best performers.

有句老话说得好:“没有什么比看到街对面的傻瓜变富而你却没有更令人沮丧的了。”所以FOMO(Fear Of Missing Out: 错失恐惧症)就是:“我为什么没在50美分时买比特币?我为什么没在2美元时买入英伟达?我为什么没在500美元时买黄金?”这样的例子不胜枚举。答案是,在那些价位,你没有任何理性、合理的依据去购买那些东西。

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You know, the old joke is, there's nothing more frustrating than seeing the idiot down the block become rich when you are not. And so FOMO, the fear of missing out, is simply, "Why didn't I buy Bitcoin at 50 cents? Why aren't I in NVIDIA at $2? Why didn't I buy gold at 500?" On and on it goes. The answer is there was no basis, no rational, reasonable basis for you to buy any of those things at those prices.

我们的情绪会妨碍我们,因为它们不是我们长期计划的一部分,而是我们进化接线,即“湿件”(wetware)的一部分。看看疫情期间GameStop、Hertz以及所有其他那些价值暴涨然后又暴跌的公司。这些不是投资,而是投机性赌博。

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Our emotions get in our way because they're not part of our long-term plan. They're part of our evolutionary wiring, our wetware. Look at what took place during the pandemic with GameStop and Hertz and all of these other companies that skyrocketed in value and then turned around and crashed. These aren't investments, these are speculative bets.

嘿,天佑那些在一美元买入GameStop,然后以10倍、50倍甚至100倍价格卖出的人。我为他们感到高兴。问题是,我们大多数人没有理由认为那是一种投资。事实证明那是一场投机。有些人赚了钱,很多人亏了钱。但底线是,那不是投资,是投机。

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Hey, God bless anybody who bought GameStop, you know, at a buck and sold it, you know, 10 or 50 or a 100x higher. I'm thrilled for people who do that. The problem is most of us had no reason to think that was any sort of investment. It turned out to be a speculation. Some people made money, a lot of people lost money. But the bottom line is, that's not investing, that's speculation.

如何驯服你的“蜥蜴脑”

如果你喜欢那种刺激,我完全赞成设立一个“牛仔账户”(Cowboy Account: 一个专门用于高风险、投机性交易的小额独立账户)。拿出你流动净资产的3%、4%或5%,放到一个交易账户里,尽情去玩吧。买你想交易的所有比特币、GameStop和股票期权,但要明白两件事。

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I am all in favor of setting up a cowboy account if you like that sort of thing. Take 3, 4, 5% of your liquid net worth and put it into a trading account. Have at it. Buy all the Bitcoin and GameStop and stock options you want to trade with, but understand two things.

如果成功了,那很好。但如果那是你的全部资产,结果可能就不会这么好了。想象一下,你的股票配置上涨了2倍、3倍、4倍,人们会开始恐慌,说:“嘿,我得保护这些收益”,而不是着眼于长期投资。但如果只是2%、3%、4%的资金,你可以让它自由驰骋,这并不重要,不会引起那种害怕失去所有钱的恐惧。

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If it works out, well, great. It probably wouldn't have worked out if it was all of your assets. Imagine you have your your stock allocation and it's up 2x, 3x, 4x. People start to panic and say, "Hey, I gotta protect these gains," instead of investing for the long run. With 2, 3, 4%, you could let that run and it doesn't really matter. It's not gonna cause that sort of fear of losing all your money.

另一方面,如果它崩盘了,归零了,那么谢天谢地,那只是你3%的资产,而不是你的全部投资组合。个人账户,或者说“牛仔账户”的好处在于,无论它涨多高或跌多低,只要它能满足我的投机冲动,就能迫使我那愚蠢的“蜥蜴脑”不去动我其余的钱。

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On the other hand, if it crashes and burns, if it goes to zero, well thank goodness it was 3% and not your entire portfolio. The advantage of a personal account, a cowboy account, is it doesn't matter how high it goes or how low it goes, if it scratches that itch from me, it forces my big dumb lizard brain to leave the rest of my money alone.

其他常见的认知偏误

你应该警惕的另一个偏误是“叙事谬误”(Narrative Fallacy: 指人类倾向于将一系列事实串联成一个有说服力的故事,即使这些事实之间并无因果关系)。人类是讲故事的动物。在我们历史的大部分时间里,我们没有书面语言。事实上,直到过去几百年,我们大多数人才学会读写。因此,讲述引人入胜的故事是人与人之间、代与代之间分享信息的重要方式。

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Another bias you should be aware of is narrative fallacy. Look, humans are storytelling animals. We haven't had a written language for most of our history. In fact, it's only over the past few hundred years that most of us know how to read and write. And so telling compelling stories was a really important way to share information person to person, generation to generation.

但问题在于,引人入胜的故事有时会让人直接忽略那些警示危险和问题的数据。我们看到各种各样吸引我们注意力的东西出现:不同的交易应用、NFT、SPAC,所有这些不同的投资产品、金融产品,它们都有自己的高光时刻,吸引我们的眼球。一些早期进入的人做得很好,而所有后来涌入的人,他们就像扑克桌上的冤大头,最终接盘。

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But the problem with that is compelling stories sometimes walk right past data warning against danger, warning against problems. We've seen all sorts of different things come out that attract our attention. Different trading apps, NFTs, SPACs, all these different investing products, these financial products, they have their moment in the sun, they catch our attention. Some people who are in there early do well. Everybody else who plows in late, they're the suckers at the poker table, they're left holding the bag.

我们见过各种各样有着精彩叙事故事的公司,却未能看到支持这些叙事的数据。数字和叙事同样重要,甚至更重要。

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And so we've seen all sorts of companies with a great narrative tale around it fail to see the data supporting that narrative. The numbers matter just as much, if not more, than the narrative.

我们有一种倾向,看到某件事就说:“嘿,这能有多难?”却没有意识到,大多数复杂的事情都需要练习、专业知识和学习,才能做到哪怕是勉强合格。事实上,有一个专门的研究领域叫做“邓宁-克鲁格效应”(Dunning-Kruger Effect: 指能力不足的人无法认识到自身的不足,反而会高估自己的能力)。评估自身技能的能力,也称为“元认知”(Metacognition: 对自身思维过程的认知和理解),本身就是一项独立的技能。

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There's a tendency for us to look at something and say, "Hey, how hard can it be?" Not realizing that most complex endeavors involve practice and expertise and study to become even marginally good at it. In fact, there's an entire field of study called the Dunning-Kruger effect that the ability to evaluate our own skillset, also known as metacognition, is in and of itself a discrete skill.

因此,缺乏某项特定技能的人往往意识不到自己没有这项技能。你可以在体育运动中看到这一点,在投资中也是如此。新手不仅倾向于过度自信,而且对自己技能的缺乏毫无意识。这就是为什么我们应该少做决策,尽量减少非受迫性失误。

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And so very often people who lack a particular skill are unaware that they don't have that skill. And you could see this in sports and we see it in investing. Newbies have a tendency to not only be overconfident, but also to have no set of awareness of how lacking they are in skills. And so this is why we should make fewer decisions and try and make less unforced errors.

现在我们来谈谈“确认偏误”(Confirmation Bias: 指人们倾向于寻找、解释和记住那些证实自己既有信念的信息)。世界不是黑白分明的,它充满了细微差别和灰色地带。无论你对某只股票、某个行业或任何你想投资的东西持何种立场,找到支持或反对该投资的论据都不难。

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So let's talk about confirmation bias. The world is not black and white. It's full of nuance and shades of gray. No matter what position you're taking about this stock or this sector or whatever it is you want to put your money into, it's not that hard to find arguments either in favor of that investment or against that investment.

当我们考虑将资金投入特定资产,然后去寻找只支持我们观点的信息时,确认偏误就成了一个问题。我们不是在做研究,只是在让自己对购买这个东西感觉更好。这就是确认偏误。

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Confirmation is a problem when we're thinking about deploying capital into a specific asset and then go out seeking information that just supports our view. We're not doing research, we're just making ourselves feel better about buying this. That's what confirmation bias is.

我们学到的是,当想购买某只股票、债券或资产时,我们不应该寻求确认性信息,而应该寻求证伪性信息。也就是说:“好吧,我想买这个。让我去找找所有我不应该买这个的理由。风险是什么?危险是什么?除了这个,我还应该关注什么?”

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What we've learned is that when we wanna buy a particular stock or bond or asset, we shouldn't seek confirming information. We should seek disconfirming information, meaning, "All right, I want to buy this. Let me go out and find all the reasons why I shouldn't buy this. What are the risks? What are the dangers? What else should I be looking at instead of this?"

当我们试图证伪自己的信念时,这是一种更客观、更公正的研究方法。如果你在做了证伪性研究后,反过来说:“嘿,我找不到一个有说服力的理由不买这个”,这比仅仅筛选所有信息,只阅读那些与你观点一致的东西,是更好的决策。

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When we go out and try and disconfirm our beliefs, it's a more objective, fair approach to doing research. If we turn around and say, "Hey, I can't find a compelling reason not to buy this," after you've done your disconfirming research, that's a better decision than just sifting through all the stuff that's out there and only reading the things that agree with your point of view.

我们都倾向于生活在自己快乐的小气泡里,我们快乐的确认偏误气泡里。我们看同样的电视频道,读同样的东西。我们寻找那些告诉我们“你很聪明,你是对的,你这样做是正确的”的信息。这不是筛选新闻的最佳方式,也不是最有效的方式。你应该能够对你投资组合中的每一项投资,都能说出支持和反对的理由。如果你不能,你就没有真正做好研究。

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We all have this tendency to live in our happy little bubble, our happy little confirmation-bias bubble. We watch the same TV channels, we read the same things. We look for information that tells us, "You're smart, you're right. You're doing this the correct way." That's not the best way, that's not the most effective way to sift through news. You should be able to make the argument, pro or con, on every investment in your portfolio. If you can't argue for and against it, you really haven't done the research.

从众本能与损失厌恶

我小时候常看《奥马哈互助社的野生王国》。节目开场是非洲大草原的全景,有角马、各种生物、斑马和瞪羚。总有那么一只瞪羚在兽群的边缘,你知道接下来会发生什么。数量多才安全,在兽群中才安全。当你独自一人时,你最终会成为别人的午餐。

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When I was a kid, I used to watch "Mutual of Omaha's Wild Kingdom," and the show would open with this panorama of the African savanna and there'd be wildebeests and all sorts of creatures and zebras and gazelle's. There was always that one gazelle on the outside of the pack, outside of the herd. And you knew what was gonna happen. There's safety in numbers. There's safety in the herd. When you're by yourself, you eventually become somebody's lunch.

人类是作为社会性生物进化的。一个独自在丛林中的人活不了多久。我们没有獠牙、利爪或盔甲。独自一人时我们非常脆弱。但作为部落、群体的一员,我们可以合作互助。这就是为什么我们有信任他人、相信他人的偏见。作为合作性的社会灵长类动物,这对我们非常有益。

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Humans evolved as social creatures. You know, a human alone in the jungle doesn't survive very long. We don't have fangs or claws or armor. By ourself we're very vulnerable. But as part of a tribe, as part as a troop, we can be cooperative and help ourselves get along. That's why we have a bias towards trusting other people, towards believing other people. Being a cooperative social primate, it's really been enormously beneficial to us.

然而,在市场上,当人群开始抛售,当人们开始恐慌时,这种本能就开始伤害我们。世界上最难做的事情就是逆向而行。人们常说“低买高卖”,但低买意味着在大多数人都在卖出时买入,而你的本能是跟随他们,而不是逆势而为。这真的非常非常难。

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Where that starts to hurt us in the market is when the crowd is starting to sell, when people start to panic, the hardest thing in the world to do is to go in the other direction. And so people talk about, "Let's buy low and sell high." Buying low means buying when most of your fellow you people are selling and your instinct is to go along with them, not lean against it. It's really, really hard to do.

损失厌恶”(Loss Aversion: 一种认知偏误,指人们对损失的感受强度大约是同等收益的两倍)是另一个有趣的进化产物。当我们开始亏损时,市场的波动会点燃我们的身体,让我们担心会失去我们的钱和投资。因此,损失厌恶常常导致我们做出糟糕的冲动决定,因为“嘿,我们跌了5%,我们最好做点什么,否则就要跌10%了。”

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So loss aversion is this interesting evolutionary development that we feel losses just about twice as intensely as we enjoy gains. And when you think about what that means, when the markets begin to wobble, when they sell off, it sends our bodies aflame. It makes us concerned that we're gonna lose our money, we're gonna lose our investments. And so loss aversion often leads us to make bad spontaneous decisions because, "Hey, we're down 5%, we better do something, or we're gonna be down 10%."

我们真正需要学习的是,市场每年下跌5%的情况会发生两三次,大约每三年中有两年会下跌10%。市场有涨有跌。风险和回报是同一枚硬币的两面。如果你想长期持有以获得回报,你就必须经历风险、经历回撤、经历困难时期。这就是为什么理解你的损失厌恶变得非常重要。你可能永远无法完全控制它,但理解它并防止它影响你的决策至关重要。

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What we really need to learn is that markets are down 5%, you know, two, three times a year, they're down 10% just about two out of every three years. Markets go up and down. Risk and reward are two sides of the same coin. And if you wanna be in it for the long term to garner the reward, you have to go through the risk, through the drawdown, through the difficult periods. And that's where getting your loss aversion, at least understanding it, you may never be able to get under control, but understanding it and preventing it from affecting your decision making becomes really important.

锚定、政治与近因效应

锚定效应”(Anchoring: 指人们在做决策时,会过度依赖接收到的第一个信息)在市场中经常出现。有人买了一只股票,然后突然这只股票亏损了,价格低于他们的买入价。我听过无数次这样的话:“求求了,只要让我回本,我就卖掉。”人们被那个买入价锚定了。它影响了他们看待这只股票和这项资产的方式。我们固执于数字,并让它们影响我们。

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So the way anchoring comes up frequently in markets is someone will buy a particular stock and then turn around and suddenly the stock is a loser. It's below what they paid for it. And I can't tell you how many times I've heard this, "Please just let me get back to break even and I'll get back." People get anchored on that price. It affects how they look at the stock, how they look at the asset. We fixate on numbers and allow them to affect us.

你为一只股票付了多少钱,与它的未来价格走势毫无关系。你应该问自己的问题是:“嘿,如果我现在有新的资金可以投资,我会以这个价格买这只股票吗?”如果答案是否定的,那么无论你当初花了多少钱买它,都应该卖掉。

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What you paid for a stock has absolutely zero relevance to where that price is gonna go. The question you should ask yourself is, "Hey, if I had fresh capital to invest, would I buy this stock at this price?" If the answer is no, it doesn't matter what you paid for it, then get out of that stock.

政治是人们最不关注但确实应该密切关注的一个因素。我们看到有研究分析了某个邮政编码区在总统选举中的投票情况,并将其与该地区居民的投资组合进行交叉比对。结果发现,当你支持的候选人输掉总统选举时,你所在的地区作为一个整体,倾向于抛售股票。反之亦然,当你支持的候选人获胜时,你对经济和市场的看法会突然变得非常乐观。

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Perhaps the one that people pay the least amount of attention to but really should pay close attention to are just something as simple as politics. You know, we've seen studies when we analyze how a zip code has voted in a presidential election and then cross reference with that with how their portfolios are invested. This is all done anonymously based on just zip codes. Nobody's names are involved in this. But it turns out that when your guy loses in the presidential election and most of your zip code voted for that guy, you have a tendency as a group to get outta stocks. And the reverse is true. When your guy wins and you're subsequently asked, "How do you think the economy is doing? How is the market doing?" Suddenly your view of the world goes way up.

谁赢得总统选举并不重要。如果你进行长期投资,你的表现会更好。事实上,研究表明,无论是民主党还是共和党入主白宫,对股市的长期表现都没有实质性影响。总统在经济好时被过度赞誉,在经济差时被过度指责。真正重要的是几十年的复利能力。因此,那种部落主义,那种用你的钱为你支持的队伍加油助威,似乎从来没有好结果。

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It doesn't matter who wins the presidential election. If you're invested over the long haul, you're gonna do better. In fact, studies have shown that whether a Democrat is in the White House or a Republican is in the White House, it really makes no difference to the long-term performance of the stock market. Presidents get way too much credit for when things go well. They get way too much blame when things go poorly. What really matters is the ability to compound over decades. And so that sort of tribalism, that sort of rooting for your team with your dollars never seems to work out well.

近因效应”(Recency Effect: 指人们倾向于更重视最近发生的事情)是我最喜欢的偏误之一。每个月我们都会得到像非农就业数据(Nonfarm Payrolls: 美国一项关键的月度经济指标,反映就业市场状况)这样的数据点。这些数据是基于模型、可能被修正且有些嘈杂的。但我们为什么会花这么多时间关注最近一次的非农就业报告呢?

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The recency effect is one of my favorites. Every month we get a data point like nonfarm payrolls, and month after month, year after year, these come out in a string. They're based on a model, it's subject to revision, it's kind of noisy. More or less it gets it right. Really, when you think about the data, why do we spend so much time paying attention to the most recent nonfarm payroll?

美国有3.3亿人口,约1.65亿劳动力。每个月,有三四百万人离职,同时又有三四百万人开始工作。这两者之间的差额,基本上就是非农就业报告。在一个1.65亿工人的基数上,5万、10万、20万人的变化其实是一个非常小的数字。我们真正想知道的是,我们是否仍在趋势线上?当数据开始出现显著变化时,那才是需要注意的时候。

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Well, there's 330 million people in America, about 165 million people in the labor force. Each month, 3, 4 million people leave their jobs. Some quit, some retire, some go on sabbatical or maternity or paternity leave. Some people just shuffle off this mortal coil and join the choir invisible. At the same time, another 3 or 4 million people start work. They graduate school, they switch jobs, they return from maternity leave or sabbatical. And the difference between those job quitters and those job starters, that's essentially the nonfarm payroll report. How many new bodies are in the labor force and working over what that number looked like last month. So when you think about it, 50,000, 100,000, 200,000 people out of 165 million workers, out of 330 million people, it's a really tiny number. And the model isn't perfect. You know, the old joke is all models are wrong, but some are useful. So when we get the Bureau of Labor statistic data, really what we wanna know is, are we still on trend? Are we still operating within the same, more or less, parameters we've seen? Most of the time, the answer is yes. When we start to see things roll over, when we start to see the data change significantly from prior months, that's when you pay attention and say, "All right, this looks like something significant is happening."

人们活在当下,我们存在于此时此刻,刚刚发生的事情占据了我们的思想。因此,我们倾向于过分强调今天、本周市场上发生的事情,而忽略长期趋势。我们不会想象自己10年、20年后的样子和需求。这就是我们的生活方式,是人类的天性。

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People live in the here and now, we exist in this moment, and what just happened very much occupies our minds. And so we have a tendency to overemphasize whatever's going on in the market this day, this week. We tend to ignore long-term trends. We tend not to picture ourselves 10, 20 years in the future and what our needs are gonna be. This is just how we live. This is just the nature of of human beings.

每当我想评估某个投资者的风险承受能力时,我都很清楚,如果市场在上涨,他们会说:“哦,我能接受风险,我是长期投资者,我很激进。”如果市场在过去几周一直在下跌,同一个人会给你一个完全不同的答案:“我有点保守,我不太喜欢波动和风险。”他们并没有揭示自己的真实本性,他们只是在告诉你最近发生了什么。我们需要学会“长期贪婪”,思考几十年,而不是“短期贪婪”,只考虑接下来的10分钟。

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Whenever I wanna figure out the risk tolerance of a particular investor, I'm very cognizant that if the market's going up, they tend to say, "Oh, I'm okay with risk. I'm a long-term investor. I'm aggressive." If the market's been going down for the past few weeks, the same person will give you a very different answer. You know, "I'm a little conservative. I'm a little averse to volatility and risk." They're not revealing their true nature. They're essentially telling you what's been happening. We have a tendency to overemphasize what's just happened because that's the moment we live in. We live in the here and now and it affects how we interpret everything that's going around us. You know, we need to learn to be long-term greedy, to think about decades, not short-term greedy, thinking about the next 10 minutes.

第二章:投资是一场“输家的游戏”,这是赢的方法

我们为什么要投资?我们想让我们的钱为我们工作,因为20、30、40年后,我们将停止工作并退休,我们需要一些东西来支付我们的账单。我们大多数人无法仅靠社会保障生活。因此,我们让钱去工作,让它以比通货膨胀更快的速度复利增长。而作为投资者,你的工作就是不要干扰你的投资组合在这段时间内的复利能力。

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So why do we even invest? We wanna put our money to work because 20, 30, 40 years from now, we're gonna stop working and retire and we're gonna need something to pay our bills. Most of us aren't gonna be able to live on just social security. And so we put our money to work so that it'll compound faster than the rate of inflation. And really it's your job as an investor to not interfere with your portfolio's ability to compound over that time.

“输家的游戏”是查理·埃利斯(Charlie Ellis)在三四十年前的一篇论文中提出的概念,后来成为一本名为《赢得输家的游戏》的书。埃利斯注意到,投资和网球非常相似,它们都是一体两面的游戏:有赢家的游戏,也有输家的游戏。

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The loser's game is a concept created by Charlie Ellis in a paper he wrote 30, 40 years ago. Eventually it became a book called "Winning the Loser's Game." And Ellis, legendary guy, chairman of the Yale Endowment, on the Board of Directors of the Vanguard Group. Ellis noticed that investing and tennis were both very similar in that they're two games in one. There's a winner's game and a loser's game.

这是什么意思呢?让我们用埃利斯的网球例子来说明。网球有两种游戏:一种是职业选手玩的游戏,即顶尖0.01%的球员;另一种是我们其余99.9%的业余爱好者玩的游戏。职业选手如何比赛?他们玩的是“赢家的游戏”,通过得分来获胜。他们发球得分(ace),击球充满力量和精准度。

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What does that mean? Well, let's use tennis as Ellis's example. There are two games in tennis, the game the professionals play, the top 0.01% of players, and then there's the game the rest of us play, us 99.9% of the world who are amateurs. How do the professionals play? They play the winning game. They win by scoring points. They serve aces, they hit with power and accuracy, they kiss the line, they do fancy drop shots, lots of top spin. They keep the ball away from their opponent.

但“输家的游戏”不是这么玩的。我们业余爱好者如何比赛?我们通过“非受迫性失误”输掉比赛。我们双发失误,因为想发力过猛;我们把球打出界,打到网里。我们业余网球选手不应该试图超越自己的能力,而应该只是把球回过去,保持在场内。如果你能减少非受迫性失误,让你的对手犯错,你就能通过少犯错来赢得这场“输家的游戏”。

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That's not how the loser's game is played. That's not how the amateur plays. How do us amateurs play? We lose through unforced errors. What sort of unforced errors? We double fault 'cause we're trying to serve too hard, we hit the ball long, we hit it wide, we hit it into the net, we hit it right to our opponent. Instead of trying to play outside ourselves beyond our own ability, us amateur tennis players just return the ball, just keep it in play. Don't try and kill it. Don't try and hit the line. You are not skillful enough to do that. If you make fewer unforced errors and you let your opponent make those mistakes, you will win the loser's game by making less errors.

埃利斯将网球与投资进行比较,发现了一个非常有趣的现象。少数专业人士,极少数人,他们可以挑选股票并知道何时卖出,可以识别投资哪个行业或国家,可以把握市场时机。那是0.01%的人,比如沃伦·巴菲特或彼得·林奇,他们是家喻户晓的异类。

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And so Ellis compared tennis to investing and he found something really fascinating. A handful of professionals, a tiny number of people, they can pick stocks and know when to sell them. They can identify which sector or country to invest in. They can time the markets. That's the 0.01% of people. And they're household names. You know who Warren Buffet or Peter Lynch is because they're such outliers.

而我们其余的人,都在玩“输家的游戏”。不幸的是,我们的表现不佳,因为我们犯了所有这些错误:我们情绪化,过度交易,不关注成本,忽略税收。我们犯了所有这些错误,只要我们能避免它们,我们就会做得好得多。这就是为什么埃利斯认为投资和网球如此相似。我们大多数人都在玩“输家的游戏”,而且玩得很糟糕。如果我们能减少非受迫性失误,我们的境况就会好得多。

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The rest of us, we're playing the loser's game. We're unfortunately underperforming because we're making all of these errors. We get emotional, we overtrade, we don't pay attention to costs, we ignore taxes. We make all of these mistakes that if only we avoided them, we would do so much better. That's why Ellis thought investing and tennis were so similar. Most of us are playing the loser's game and playing it badly. If we make fewer unforced errors, we would just be so much better off.

为什么选股如此之难

多项学术研究发现,推动市场回报的股票比例出奇地少。亚利桑那州立大学的亨德里克·贝森宾德教授的一项研究发现,在过去75年里,仅有2%的股票贡献了所有的市场回报。

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So a number of academic studies have found that a surprisingly few percentage of stocks are actually driving market returns. Professor Hendrik Bessembinder at Arizona State University did a study and he found that just 2% of stocks are responsible for all the returns that we've seen over the past 75 years. Depending on the country you look at maybe it's a little more, a little less, but it averages around 2%.

这怎么可能?嗯,有些股票每年涨一点,有些跌一点,有些持平,它们大致相互抵消。少数股票跌幅巨大,有些甚至跌至零。这就使得只有极少数股票成为推动回报的巨大赢家。

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How is that possible? Well, some stocks are up a little each year. Some stocks are down a little each year. Some stocks are flat. They all kind of cancel out. A handful of stocks are down a lot. Some stocks get crushed and go to zero. That leaves very few stocks that are the giant winners that drive returns.

在“输家的游戏”中,我们希望少犯错误。我们做的每一个决定都是另一个犯错的机会。鉴于赔率对我们如此不利——如果只有2%的股票在推动大部分回报,我们挑中那五十分之一的大赢家的几率有多大?

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In the context of the loser's game where we wanna make fewer mistakes every decision we make is another opportunity for error. And given how much the odds are stacked against us, if only 2% of stocks are driving most of the returns, what are the odds that we're gonna pick that 1 in 50 stocks that's gonna be a big winner?

首先,你必须识别出一家在未来1、3、5、10年内收入和利润都会增长的公司。这很难。其次,你必须在正确的时间以正确的价格买入那只股票。第三,你必须愿意在公司经历的所有起伏中持有它。知道何时只是暂时回调,何时是辉煌不再,这是一个非常困难的事情。

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First, you have to identify a company that over the next 1, 3, 5, 10 years is gonna grow its revenue and its profits. That's hard to do. Secondly, you have to buy that stock at the right time and at the right price. Overpaying for a stock isn't gonna help you at all. Third, you have to be willing to hold that through all the ups and downs that company is gonna go through. Economic cycles, missed revenue expectations, missed profits. Stocks don't go up in a straight line. They're up and down. And sometimes when stocks pull back, it's just a temporary setback and eventually they recover. Knowing when something is just pulling back temporarily or that its best days are behind it and it's on the way down permanently, that's a really difficult thing to do.

情感上,我们在这只股票上投入了所有的沉没成本。我们研究过它,调查过它,它帮助我们赚了钱。我们不愿意放弃它,因为我们被套牢了。这就是“禀赋效应”:“我拥有它,所以它一定很好。”

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Emotionally we have all these sunk costs in that stock. We've researched it, we've investigated it, it's helped make us money. We're loath to cut it loose because, hey, we're tied up. It's the endowment effect. "I own it, therefore, it has to be pretty good."

要区分微软和英特尔是非常困难的。25年前,这两家公司同时被纳入道琼斯工业平均指数。微软表现出色,而英特尔则不然。你怎么能提前识别出来呢?成为道指成分股就像是说:“嘿,你成功了。”但现在我们看这两只股票的表现,它们走向了完全不同的方向。

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It's very, very difficult to tell the difference between a Microsoft and an Intel both added to the Dow Jones Industrial 25 years ago. Microsoft has done exceedingly well. Intel not so much. How can you identify that in advance? Being added to the Dow is like, "Hey, you've made it." This is the top group of stocks as decided by the editors of Dow Jones. And now when we look at the performance of these two stocks, they've gone in completely different degrees.

作为选股者,赔率对你非常不利。让我们用一些数字来说明这一点。看看专业的共同基金经理。在任何一年,不到一半的人能跑赢他们的基准指数。这意味着,实际上能比一个无聊、廉价的指数基金表现更好的选股者不到50%。把时间拉长到五年,80%的基金经理未能跑赢基准。拉长到十年,这个比例超过90%。二十年后,几乎没有人能做到。

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The odds are stacked against you being a successful stock picker. And to put some numbers to that, let's take a look at professional mutual fund managers. In any given year, less than half of them beat their benchmark, meaning they're gonna do better than the market. So that's telling us fewer than 50% are actually picking stocks better than just a boring, cheap index is performing. You take that one year and expand that out to five years, it turns out 80% of them fail to beat their benchmark. You take that to 10 years and it's over 90%, net of fees and taxes, less than 1 in 10 mutual fund managers beat their benchmark. And over 20 years, it's virtually nobody.

因此,理解作为选股者面临的巨大困难,是指数化投资如今如此流行的原因。人们已经明白:“我不会试图去挑选下一个英伟达,我会买下所有股票,这样我就保证能拥有它。”这能防止你的行为错误干扰你的投资组合。你不会过早卖出股票,也不会择时。如果你定期进行美元成本平均法(Dollar Cost Averaging: 一种投资策略,即定期定额投资于特定资产,以平滑市场波动),从长远来看,你保证会比99%的投资者做得更好。

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And so understanding how much the odds are stacked against you as a stock picker is why indexing has become so popular these days. People have figured out, "I'm not gonna try and pick the next NVIDIA, I'm gonna buy all the stocks and that way I'm guaranteed to own that." And it prevents you from allowing your behavioral errors to interfere with your portfolio. You are not selling a stock prematurely. You're not timing the market. If you do regular dollar cost average, if you buy a chunk of stock, you buy a specific index every month, every paycheck, you're guaranteed over the long haul to do better than 99% of your fellow investors.

赢得“输家游戏”的具体步骤

当你考虑向市场投入资金时,你需要一个计划。我试图列出一些你可以采取的具体步骤,以防止自己干扰资金在市场中的复利能力。

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So when you're thinking about putting money in the market, you need to have a plan. And I try and lay out a number of specific steps you can take really to prevent yourself from interfering with your money's ability to compound in the market.

  1. 自动化流程:将情绪排除在外。通过你的401k或403b等税收递延储蓄计划,你每次发薪水都在缴款。如果市场上涨,很好;如果市场下跌,也很好,你正在以更优惠的价格买入更多。从长远来看,这种美元成本平均法是为未来投资最有效的方式。诺贝尔奖得主保罗·萨缪尔森曾说:“投资应该很无聊,就像看着油漆变干或草地生长。如果你想找点乐子,就带800美元去拉斯维加斯赌博,不要用你的投资组合去赌。”

  2. 多元化:投资是一项非常 humbling 的活动。我们都必须承认,我们不知道哪只股票、哪个商品、哪个行业、哪个国家或哪个资产类别今年会表现最好。每年的市场表现 quilt 图都显示,表现最好的行业每年都完全不同。因此,与其投飞镖或猜测,我们不如拥有一个广泛多元化的投资组合,拥有一点点每一样东西。这意味着你总能参与到正在上涨的行业中。Vanguard 集团的创始人杰克·博格尔有句名言:“与其在草堆里找一根针,不如把整个草堆都买下来。”

  3. 关注成本:这是简单的数学。你为共同基金或ETF支付的费用越多,对你业绩的拖累就越大。研究表明,在25到30年的时间里,一个高成本的投资组合,在其他条件相同的情况下,最终产生的价值会比低成本的投资组合少20%。所谓的“博格尔效应”已经为投资者节省了数万亿美元的费用。

  4. 不要频繁查看:科技让我们能够每时每刻关注我们的投资组合,但这太过火了。你应该偶尔检查一下你的投资组合,看看它的表现如何。每月一次可能就足够了。如果你开始更频繁地检查,这可能是一个警报,表明你可能承担了过多的风险。

  5. 理解再平衡:再平衡的想法是,当市场下跌时,你的股票比例可能会下降。我们建议人们在这种时候进行再平衡,卖掉一些上涨的债券,买入一些下跌的股票。这本质上是“高卖低买”。进行再平衡的最佳时机是在市场深度回调或下跌20%、30%、40%的时候。大多数时候,你不应该过多地担心再平衡。

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So first step is to automate the process. Take the emotions out of it. With your 401k or 403b or whatever your tax-deferred saving plan is, you are making contributions every paycheck. If the market goes up, great. It means what you bought before is higher. If the market goes down, great. You're buying more at a better price. Over the fullness of time that sort of dollar cost averaging, every paycheck every month, means that you are buying regardless and the math tells us that's the most effective way to invest for the future. Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson once said. "Investing should be boring. It should be like watching paint dry or grass grow. If you wanna have some fun, take $800 and go to Vegas and gamble. Don't gamble with your portfolio." Let's talk about diversification. Investing is really a very humbling exercise. We all have to admit to ourselves we don't know what stock, what commodity, what sector, what country, what asset class is gonna do best this year. You know, you get this quilt, this patchwork showing year by year what have been the best-performing sectors in the market. And it's completely different year by year. One year, REITs are at the top of the league table. The next year, it's tech stocks. The next year, it's small cap value. It's all but impossible to predict. And so rather than throw darts, rather than guess, we own a broad diversified portfolio. We own a little bit of everything. And that means you're always participating in the sector that's going up. You probably wish you had more of it this year, and then next year when it's not doing well, you're happy that you didn't overload that particular sector. Diversification means you're broadly participating in every asset class rather than speculating, rather than guessing. It's the best way to make sure you own the best-performing assets. You know, Jack Bogle, founder of Vanguard Group, famously said, "Instead of hunting for a needle in a haystack, just buy the whole haystack." You have to be aware of costs. That's just simple math. The more you're paying for a mutual funder and ETF, the more that drags on your performance. In fact, we've seen a number of studies over the years that over the course of 25, 30 years, a high-cost portfolio, everything else being equal, will generate 20% less value at the end of those 25, 30 years than a low-cost portfolio. A study on the Bogle Effect, Jack Bogle was the founder of Vanguard, that specializes in very low-cost funds. You could look at BlackRock and State Street are similarly low-cost funds are known for that. The Vanguard Effect has identified that by 2016, Vanguard fee pressure had essentially saved investors $1 trillion over the previous 30 years since Vanguard launched in the mid 1970s. Since 2016, over the next decade, it's about another trillion dollars in fees that have been saved by the Vanguard effect. It's that much more money in portfolios, it's that much more money that's compound and that investors own. And so fees matter a great deal. Go back to the bad old days of the 1960s and '70s, mutual funds used to cost one, one and a half, 2 % of your assets. Some funds came with a front end load of 5%. In other words, you give the fund company $100 and they invest $95 of it for you. Think about what a drag that is on returns. And really the technology didn't exist for us to understand this easily. People just saw the markets were going up from World War II to, let's call it 1966, was a really substantial gain in assets. Nobody really focused on what's driving these gains and what are the headwinds we're up against. And then something similar took place in the 1980s and '90s. We had a big bull market. Around the '70s and '80s was when we first started paying attention to the data as to the drag fees put on performance. So it's not just mutual funds, it's transaction costs. You know, it used to cost 3, 4, $500 to buy a stock. It's free today. We deregulated the markets in the early '70s and that allowed brokers to compete on fees. And we went from a few hundred bucks to a hundred bucks. I remember the commercials for the various online trading shops, $8 transactions. Eventually that became free trading. And so the cost structure of that is gone. And then when we look at what's taken place with mutual funds and ETFs, it used to be one, one and a half, 2% to buy those. They're well under half a percent today. You could buy a broad index like the S&P 500 or the Vanguard Total Market. It's five bips. The cost is practically nothing and that just compounds in your favor. The lower your cost, the more you keep at the end of your investing life. You know, back in the bad old days, you would get a quarterly update of your portfolio, you'd get a statement and it was a big deal. Everybody sat around waiting for their statements to arrive and you would see how well you did. And that was probably too extreme in one direction. Technology has given us the ability to watch our portfolios second by second, tick by tick. That's too far in the other direction. You should check your portfolio occasionally just to see how it's doing. Monthly is probably plenty. If you are concerned about something in particular and you start noticing yourself checking your portfolio more frequently, sometimes that's a little bit of an alert that, hey, maybe you have too much risk on and you're too concerned about your exposure, or maybe we're entering a period of market volatility and that's gonna create an opportunity for you to buy stocks at a cheaper price. People talk about the importance of rebalancing. Let me give you a little context of what rebalancing means and how you should think about it. The idea is that stocks go up over the long run. And so if you have a portfolio that, let's say, is 70% equities and 30% bonds, in the event of a market sell off, hey, maybe you end up 60% equities and 40% bonds because of how those two asset classes have moved. What we suggest to people is that they rebalance into equities. You sell a little bit of the bonds that ran up, you buy a little bit of the equities that ran down. And essentially what you're doing is selling bonds high and buying stocks low. It's sort of counterintuitive. The time to rebalance into equities are when we have these deep market corrections or drawdowns, down 20, 30, 40%. That's where you wanna engage that. Most of the time you shouldn't really be worrying too much about rebalancing. I don't think it's that important for the average investor's portfolio.

为什么预测和择时是徒劳的

“没有人知道任何事情”,这句话来自编剧威廉·高德曼。他曾写过一篇关于好莱坞高管在预测哪些电影会成功方面有多糟糕的尖锐自白。几乎所有制片厂都拒绝了《星球大战》、《夺宝奇兵》和《E.T.》。

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So, "Nobody knows anything," comes from William Goldman, who was a screenwriter in the '60s, '70s, '80s. And he wrote a pretty scathing confessional about Hollywood and how bad executives in the various studios were at predicting which films would do well. Almost all the studios passed on "Star Wars," on "Raiders of the Lost Ark," on "E.T." And it's only when one random person says, "All right, let's give this a shot," that some of these movies go on to become blockbusters, despite most of Hollywood not thinking there was anything there.

将同样的概念应用到预测世界。当我们回顾专家预测的历史时,事实证明专家们并不比我们任何人强。沃顿商学院教授菲利普·泰特洛克对此进行了研究,他发现专家的预测并不比普通人的预测更好,而普通人的预测相当糟糕。

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Taking that same concept to the world of forecasts. Forecasts are when a market professional or expert or talking head or pundit says, "I believe this asset class will be this price at this time." Specific assets, specific time and date, specific price. And when we look back through the history of expert forecasts, it turns out that the experts are no better than any of us. Wharton professor Philip Tetlock did a study on this. He looked at thousands and thousands of forecasts. He found they were no better than the average person's prediction. And the average person's prediction's pretty bad.

看看过去几年:进入2020年,没有人预测到大流行会导致经济关闭,然后市场从3月到年底大涨69%。没有人预测到2022年美联储会加息500个基点。未来充满了随机事件和意想不到的事情,做出一年的预测真的是徒劳之举。

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Just take a look at the past few years. Heading into 2020, nobody had a pandemic closing the economy. Oh, and by the way, from March till the end of the year, the market's gonna rip up 69%. That wasn't in anybody's forecast. Nobody had the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2021. 2022, nobody had the Federal Reserve raising interest rates 500 basis points, sending stocks and bonds down double digits. That's a very rare occurrence for stocks and bonds to both be down that much in the same year. Hadn't happened for 40 years. And so it turns out the future is just so filled with random events and unanticipated things occurring that making forecasts out a year, it's really a fool's errand. And if we make our investments based on these forecasts, we're really destined to do poorly.

我们必须警惕市场择时,不要在每次市场回调时都变得恐惧和情绪化。我们认为自己可以择时,但市场的效率相当高。如果你在网站、电视或报纸上看到某个消息,那么市场上其他有资本风险的人很可能不仅看到了,而且已经采取了行动,这个消息已经反映在股价中了。你是在根据旧信息进行交易。

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We have to be aware of our market timing and becoming fearful and emotional every time the market has a pullback. We look at the history of markets, they're down 5% twice a year, they're down 10% two out of every three years, and they're down 20% fairly regularly. If you respond to every time the market twitches, you're gonna prevent your portfolio from compounding over time. We think we could time markets. Here's the fascinating thing about news and market timing. Markets are pretty efficient. You know, they're not 100% perfectly efficient, but if you're seeing something on a website, on TV, in a newspaper, the odds are that every other person with capital at risk in the markets has not only seen it, but acted on that and that news is already reflected in stock prices. So you see the cover of a magazine or the headline in "The Wall Street Journal," that information is already in the price. To imagine that you're gonna read that and then act on it in a way that's gonna be beneficial to you, you're essentially trading on old information. I know we call it news, it's news to you, but it's old to the market.

研究表明,在市场低点恐慌性抛售的人中,约有30%再也没有回到股市。想想2009年1月、2月、3月恐慌性抛售的人们。市场在接下来的15年里经历了惊人的上涨,而近三分之一在低点卖出的人再也没有回到股市。这对投资组合的表现是毁灭性的。避免这些非受迫性失误,制定计划并坚持下去,这才是赢得“输家的游戏”的秘诀。

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What studies have shown us about people who sell when markets make a low, in other words, they panic sell into a crash. About 30% of these people never return to equities ever again. That's an amazing statistic. Think about what happened when people panic sold January, February, March, 2009. The market has had an incredible run over the next 15 years, and nearly a third of people who sold into those lows never got back into equities. That's devastating to a portfolio's performance. Avoiding these unforced errors, having a plan and sticking to it, that's the secret of winning the loser's game.

第三章:金融媒体如何为投资者设下失败的陷阱

金融媒体的商业模式,人们似乎认为是销售内容、新闻和分析。这完全错了。其模式是媒体将受众卖给广告商。换句话说,他们卖的不是内容,而是你。他们聚集所有这些观众、读者、听众,然后把你们卖给广告商。

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So the financial media business model, people seem to think it's selling content, selling news, selling analysis. That's completely wrong. The model is the media sells an audience to advertisers. In other words, they're not selling content, they're selling you. You aggregate all these viewers, readers, listeners, watchers, and you sell them to a buying audience of advertisers.

这个模式的问题在于,它在过去25、30年里一直受到技术的冲击。市场上的残酷竞争迫使许多媒体变得越来越夸张,标题越来越“点击诱饵”。他们知道自己现在在与社交媒体的算法竞争。它变得越来越耸人听闻,而且是由算法驱动的。

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The problem with this model is that it has been under assault from technology for 25, 30 years. The brutal competition in the marketplace has forced a lot of media to become increasingly, for lack of a better word, histrionic. Very, very clickbait type headlines. They know that they're now competing with algorithms on social media. It's become increasingly sensational and not just in the way it was sensational a century ago. It's driven by algorithms. We're checking multiple headlines to see what gets the best response. We know how TikTok and Instagram's algos work. They're constantly running through millions and millions of users. They're identifying what's gonna keep them engaged longer. And so it's not about providing news or information, it's about whatever holds your attention.

我们身处“注意力经济”时代。这意味着,我们通常认为媒体在为我们提供服务,但实际上,我们是他们的服务。我们是他们收割并卖给广告商的庄稼。这对我们消费者来说既重要又危险,因为一切都被呈现为生存威胁。

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We are in the attention economy. And what this means is we think of media generally as providing a service for us. In reality, we are the service for them. We are the crop that they harvest and sell for advertisers. What's so important and so dangerous about this to us as consumers is that everything is presented as an existential threat.

大约10到15年前,我开始不断收到邮件说:“纽约证券交易所的保证金债务创历史新高。”这让我很紧张。研究后发现,保证金债务是指以你的股票价值为抵押进行借款的能力。事实证明,股市越高,人们可以借贷的价值就越多。这并不能提供任何关于市场未来走向或经济状况的信息。

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The one that I saw about 10, 15 years ago started getting emails over and over again, "New York Stock Exchange margin debt is at an all time high." That makes me nervous. And I don't know who was spreading this news, but after you get the third email from a client saying, "Hey, what do you guys think about this?" Well, you go back and you research it. What is margin debt? Margin debt is the ability to borrow against the value of your stock. I'm not a big fan of people borrowing against their portfolios to go spend their money elsewhere, but it's a data point that everybody seems to track. As it turns out, that the higher the stock market goes, well, there's more value for people to borrow against. It doesn't give you any information about what the market's gonna do in the future. Where are we gonna go? The state of the economy. high margin debt just tells you stocks have risen to the point where there's more value to borrow against.

我们必须能够将2025年某个周四发生的事情置于“如果我2040年或2050年退休,这对我意味着什么?”的背景下。大多数时候,这些事情毫无意义。但由于媒体是如此 relentless 的噪音和干扰的消防水管,他们知道如何触动我们的神经,知道如何让我们兴奋。

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And so we have to be able to put what happens on a random Thursday in 2025 into context for, "What does this mean if I'm retiring in 2040 or 2050?" Most of the time it's pretty meaningless. But because it's such a relentless fire hose of noise and distractions, they know how to push our buttons, they know how to get you excited, and we're wired for this.

好消息悄悄溜走,没人真正注意。我最喜欢的例子是,在莱特兄弟首次实现重于空气的飞行后,报纸花了大约15年才真正开始谈论飞行。而另一方面,每一条坏消息,每一个可怕的统计数据,每一次潜在的战争,每一次对经济的威胁,都以一种本能的方式攻击我们。我们天生对坏消息敏感,而坏消息又激发了我们的行动偏见。大多数时候,这些行动与我们在市场中的最佳利益相悖。交易台上的老笑话是:“不要只是做点什么,坐在那里。”意思是不要跟随每一个抽搐,每一条新闻,不要干扰你的投资组合的复利能力。

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Good news slips by, nobody really pays attention. My favorite example is it took the newspapers something like 15 years to really talk about flying after the Wright Brothers first achieved heavier-than-air flight. It's kind of an amazing thing. Think about how flying has changed the world. Eh, it really didn't matter. On the other hand, every piece of bad news, every terrifying statistic, every potential war, every threat to the economy, it attacks us at a visceral way. We are primed for bad news and bad news primes us towards our bias to action. Most of the time, those actions are contradictory to our best interest in the markets. You know, the old joke on the trading desk was, "Don't just do something, sit there." Meaning don't follow every twitch, every news story, every TikTok, every Instagram, don't interfere with your portfolio's ability to compound. Yet we're hardwired to make that mistake. It's kept us alive on the savanna for millions of years and allowed us to become the most successful species on the planet. It just doesn't work very well when you're trying to figure out your asset allocation or which municipal bond portfolio to buy.

媒体如何滥用数字

大多数时候,你会得到一个巨大而可怕的数字,但它没有上下文。我最喜欢的例子是:“市场今天上涨了500点”或“市场暴跌了500点。”哪个市场?是标普500吗?那是一个巨大的波动。是道琼斯指数吗?那还不到1%,是正常的交易范围。

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So let's talk a little bit about how the media abuses numbers. Most of the time you'll get a big scary number and it'll be out of context. There'll be no framing or context to explain what that number is. My favorite example is, "The market was up 500 points today" or, "The market dove 500 points." Which market? Is that the S&P 500? Well, that's a huge move. That's a nearly 8% move. That's very, very worrisome. Is it the Dow Jones? Well, if it's the Dow, it's less than 1%. That's a normal trading range.

我们在经济数据中也经常看到这种情况。“这家公司裁员1万人。”这算多还是少?除非我知道这家公司有多少员工,否则我无法回答这个问题。如果是一家拥有2.5万名员工的区域性制造商,那么裁员1万人是巨大的。如果是拥有超过200万员工的沃尔玛,那就像每五家沃尔玛店里有一个人辞职,无足轻重。

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We see it in economic data all the time. "This firm laid off 10,000 people." Is that a lot or a little? I can't answer that question unless I know how many people work for that firm. If it's a regional manufacturer with 25,000 employees, well, 10,000 people laid off is giant. If it's Walmart with over 2 million employees, that's like one person quitting every fifth Walmart store. Not very significant.

这有一个专业术语,叫做“分母失明症”(Denominator Blindness: 指人们只关注分子(事件发生的次数)而忽略了分母(事件发生的总机会)的认知偏误)。你得到了数字的变化,但没有得到上下文,没有得到分数的分母部分。我最喜欢的例子是电影《大白鲨》50周年纪念。人们害怕下海。但当你看看鲨鱼的危险性时,事实证明鲨鱼袭击极为罕见。去年全球约有50起鲨鱼袭击事件。在美国,去年从床上掉下来摔死的人比被鲨鱼咬死的人还多。但你不会从媒体那里得到这种背景信息。他们喜欢大、刺激、情绪化和可怕的东西。

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And so there's literally a technical term for this. It's called denominator blindness. It's when you get the change in numbers plus 5%, minus 100, whatever it is but you don't get the context, don't get the framing, you don't get the denominator, the bottom half of the fraction. My favorite example of big scary numbers wildly outta context came along this summer. It's the 50th anniversary of the movie "Jaws." I was a kid when "Jaws" came out. People were terrified to step in the ocean. But when you look at the dangers of sharks, and the media certainly played that up all summer, it turns out that shark attacks are exceedingly rare. There were about 50 shark attacks last year worldwide. One fatality in 2024, 2 in 2023. Most of the time there's a shark attack, it's a surfer in a black wetsuit. To a shark they look like a seal and they're just taking a bite. When it turns out that it doesn't taste like a seal, they tend to move on. That gets reported everywhere. What doesn't get reported? It turns out in the United States, more people died last year falling out of bed than were killed by sharks. And you don't get that sort of context, you don't get that sort of data from the media. They like things that are big, exciting, emotional, and scary. Sharks were tailor-made for the media. People dying rolling outta bed? No one could be bothered with that. It's not scary or exciting enough.

如何筛选信息和顾问

我们想要自信的领导者告诉我们将会发生什么。所以当我们在电视上看到两个人辩论市场走向时,一个非常具体和精确地说:“明年道指将达到53575点”,我们不仅想相信他们,而且倾向于相信他们。而另一个模棱两可的人说:“嗯,一年很长,可能会发生很多随机事件……谁知道呢?”每个人都讨厌诚实的回答:“我不知道。”研究表明,我们不仅倾向于跟随那个非常具体的人,而且那个人往往比说“我们不知道”的人错得更频繁。

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We want confident leaders who are gonna tell us what's gonna happen, and here's what we need to do to survive. So when we flip on the TV or open a website, and there are two people debating where the market's gonna go, someone who's really specific and precise, "Next year the Dow is gonna be 53,575," not only do we wanna believe them, we tend to believe them. The person who's more ambiguous, "Well, a year is a really long time. So many random events can happen. Markets on average give us 10%. Hey, if there isn't any other geopolitical problems or issues with inflation or consumer spending, maybe we're eight or 10% higher. But who really knows?" Everybody hates the honest answer, "I don't know." And they really like the specific answer. Studies have shown us not only do we tend to follow the person who's being very specific, that person tends to be wrong much more frequently than the person who says, "Really, we don't know where the market's gonna be a year from now. But on average, 8, 10% seems to be a reasonable forecast."

作为新闻的消费者,我有一套我遵循的规则。我关注的是那些已经证明值得我关注、能增加价值的人。他们的资格是:首先,性情冷静。其次,他们有一个可辩护、可重复的流程。第三,他们经历过几个周期。最后,他们在某个我没有专业知识的领域有专长并能增加价值。

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As a consumer of news, I have a set of rules that I follow. It's not that I pay attention to any one masthead, publication, newspaper, television show, et cetera. I pay specific attention to the people who have demonstrated that they're worthy of my attention, that they're value add. And what those qualifications are is, first, temperament. I wanna follow someone who's fairly cool and calm. I want them to have a defendable, repeatable process, right? As opposed to someone who just got lucky once. I want them to have lived through a few cycles. Having lived through it a few times, they have an expectation of what's most likely to happen over the long term. And finally, I want them to have an expertise and to add value to a space where I don't have an expertise. I wanna learn from people who understand market structure or are experts in ETFs, who understand real estate, who've analyzed the economy or inflation and bring some value to the table. Not because I'm gonna change my portfolio in response to these things, just because it brings me a little bit more understanding of what's going on in the world.

当你关注这些人时,你必须问自己:“这个人应该在我的全明星团队里吗?”我总是问自己:“这个人是谁?他们在卖什么?他们有什么利益冲突?他们的往绩如何?”然后对于他们的建议,我总是问自己:“这个建议适合我吗?这个人不知道我的收入、储蓄、税率。我真的应该听取他们的建议吗?”

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You have to ask yourself when you're paying attention to these people, "Is this a person that should be on my all-star team?" I always ask myself, "Who is this person? What are they selling? What conflicts of interest do they have? And what's their track record like?" And then their advice, I always have to ask myself, "Is this advice suitable for me? This person doesn't know my income, my savings, my tax rate. Should I really be paying attention to their advice?" And always ask yourself, "What are the opportunity costs for tying up money in this investment when I could just be following my plan and that I have a high degree of confidence will work out over the long term?"

如果你想把钱给他们,我的建议是,始终确保他们是受托人(Fiduciary: 在法律上有义务将客户利益置于首位的人或机构)。

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If you want to give them your money, my suggestion is always make sure they're a fiduciary. Make sure they're legally obligated to put your interests first.

社交媒体的狂野西部

当我转向社交媒体领域时,那里的无能、错误信息、欺诈和愚蠢建议达到了一个全新的水平。传统媒体至少有把关人和编辑,而社交媒体上没有这样的把关人。

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So I've been critical of regular media, but when you move towards the realm of social media, it's a whole nother level of incompetency, bad information, grifting, and just simply dumb advice. At least traditional media has gatekeepers and editors and someone saying, "Hey, can we really say that? That seems to be outrageous and wrong." There's no such gatekeepers on social media.

我最近注意到的一个例子是:“如何将100美元变成100万美元。你只需要每天赚1%,持续250个交易日,就能得到100万美元。订阅我的通讯只需2000美元。”想想这数学有多荒谬。专业基金经理的平均回报率都跑不赢市场每年约10%的回报。想象一下你每天复利1%持续250天,这简直是天方夜谭。

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I find it really fascinating to delve into some of the worst aspects of this. One of my favorite accounts on Twitter is called TikTokInvestors. And this person, who is an anonymous investing professional, goes out to TikTok and Instagram and Facebook and finds the dumbest, worst advice they can find and shares it on Twitter. And some of the stuff is just hilarious. The one I noticed most recently was, "Here's how you turn a hundred dollars into a million dollars. All you need to do is follow my advice and just make 1% a day. 1% a day compounded for 250 trading days is $1 million and it just costs you $2,000. Sign up for my newsletter." Stop and think about how ridiculous the math is there. The average return for a professional mutual fund manager or ETF manager underperforms the market, which gives us about 10% a year. More than half of professional mutual fund managers underperform their benchmark each year, and that benchmark is about 10%. To imagine that you're gonna compound at 1% a day for 250 days is just ridiculous.

其中的破绽在于:“订阅我的通讯,只要2000美元,我将分享这个秘密。”现实是,如果你有把100美元变成100万的秘密,你为什么要卖给任何人?你为什么不自己把100美元变成100万,然后变成1亿?当人们向你推销某样东西时,那是因为他们无法实现他们所承诺的,他们赚钱的方式是通过你的订阅费。

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The tell is, "Subscribe to my newsletter. It's only $2,000. I'll share the secret." The reality is, if you had a secret of turning a hundred dollars into a million, why would you sell that to anyone? Why wouldn't you just turn a hundred into a million and then a million into a hundred million? If it's that effective, shut up and deploy your own capital. But the reality is, when people are selling you something, it's because they cannot achieve what they're promising. And the way they're gonna make money is through your subscription dollars.

不仅仅是投资建议,还有房地产建议、职业建议。税务建议是我们在TikTok和其他地方看到的最离谱的事情之一。情况已经糟糕到美国国税局(IRS)不得不发布一份清单,列出了社交媒体上发现的47条错误建议,这些建议会导致利息、罚款,甚至在某些情况下会导致监禁。

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It's not just investing, it's real estate advice, it's career advice. Tax advice is one of the most outrageous things we see on TikTok and elsewhere. It's gotten so bad that the Internal Revenue Service had to produce a list of 47 pieces of advice found on social media that are wrong, that will lead to interest, penalties, and in some cases, jail time. Know if you're in international waters on a boat on April 15th, that doesn't mean you don't owe taxes. Some of the advice that's given is just absurd, unsupported. Nobody is vetting these people. The fact that the IRS had to put out a document saying, "All this advice is terrible and costly," tells you just how bad the sort of Wild West of social media can get.

总结

总而言之,你需要有自我意识。你需要了解我们都会犯的那些错误。这并不是说你愚蠢,也不是说你是个糟糕的投资者,你只是一个人类,会屈服于我们所有人都会犯的同样的认知错误。

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So to sum up, you need to have self-awareness. You need to understand the sort of errors we all make. It's not that you're dumb, It's not that you're a bad investor, you are a human being and you succumb to the same cognitive errors, the same mistakes, that all of us make.

因此,你要防止你的大脑妨碍你的投资组合的复利能力。你实现这一点的方式是制定一个财务计划。它是一个由广泛资产组成的多元化投资组合。你让它随着时间的推移而复利增长。你自动化投资过程,然后不频繁地检查它,只要不挡自己的道就行了。

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And so you wanna prevent your brain from getting in the way of your portfolio's ability to compound. And the way you do that is you have a financial plan. It's a diversified portfolio of broad assets. You allow it to compound over time. You automate the investing process and then you check it in frequently and just stay out of your own way.