Wu Lü: Hong Kong won't work.

Hou Chen: So Hong Kong won't work again?

Wu Lü: I think Hong Kong won't work. You say Hainan won't work, no place works, then it's just great unification again. I think China, with such great diversity, it must exist.

Host: Alright, it's time for our comment reading show. And we're reading comments from our debate, so it's a good opportunity for Teacher Jia to participate in our debate remotely. Did you watch the debate show that day?

Teacher Jia: I did.

Host: So, how did you feel? Did you also want to scold us two?

Teacher Jia: I didn't want to scold you. I just felt that this topic, as soon as we left, you discussed such a serious topic, and I felt a deep sense of jealousy, that I couldn't participate.

Host: Well, I think, for example, today, before we read the comments, you can first talk about your views on that topic from that day, do you have any?

Teacher Jia: I don't know. I think anything is possible, and we respect such possibilities. And, I believe, this is a common saying, from the beginning of "Romance of the Three Kingdoms": "The world's affairs, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide." History is fluid, borders are fluid, populations are fluid. And if we compare ourselves to the sun, moon, and stars, our human activities on Earth, sometimes I feel they are all insignificant. How it changes, how it transforms, how it evolves, I think it's all normal.

Wu Lü: You're abstracting time to a high degree.

Hou Chen: Mainly, if you stretch the timeline so long, then, for example, after a thousand years, even a thousand years becomes meaningless.

Wu Lü: Yes, my recent tendency is to stretch the time scale, and it also alleviates my current anxiety.

Hou Chen: Ever since Professor Yi Fuxian came on our show, (it felt like) China itself would be gone, and you're saying a thousand years is meaningless.

Wu Lü: Exactly.

Hou Chen: So 150 years is also meaningless.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Hou Chen: Even the sun's existence is meaningless.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Host: OK, alright. Let's read this comment, and then we can express our views in between.

Host: There are many comments here, and we'll start with one. Many people believe that China cannot split, but their view is that China cannot split due to people's mindsets. They say: "From an educational perspective, I think we have to wait until everyone born before 2000 has died out before the scenario you're talking about will appear." They argue that collective consciousness is a manifestation of many people, and those who grew up under China's authoritarian system naturally have such authoritarian ideas. So, because you live in a unified country, you have unified thoughts, and your unified thoughts lead to China being unable to split. Therefore, many people view China's fragmentation as a decision based on whether ordinary people understand great unification. Because most people grow up in a unified environment and receive such education, it leads to China being unable to split. What do you think is the relationship between the general public's notion of whether China should remain a unified country and its fragmentation?

Wu Lü: I'll go back to my own perspective on that question.

Hou Chen: I thought you were going to say, "I'd still like to consult this political expert."

Wu Lü: Yes.

Hou Chen: And then Teacher Jia will speak first.

Wu Lü: Yes, tell me what you were just thinking of saying.

Hou Chen: I believe that throughout the entire process of democratization, there isn't a standard model of "ordinary people." People in Shenzhen, Xinjiang, and the Northeast all consider different issues. And I think that during the entire democratic transition, the relationship between individuals, localities, and the state, and with the central government, needs to be redefined. So, with the diversification of interests, it's not impossible that, genuinely, our Shandong province could just declare independence, truly just like that.

Host: OK, Teacher Jia, how do you view the relationship between ordinary people's notions of great unification or independence and the fragmentation of the state?

Teacher Jia: In fact, throughout Chinese history, from unification to fragmentation, and then from fragmentation back to unification, most of the time it had nothing to do with ordinary people. Yes, it was determined by the will of warlords, by a few warlords, by intellectual elites, wealthy elites, or military elites—it was decided by the elite class. And ordinary people simply drifted with the tide, never truly able to control their own destiny. For example, from the Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, the country had already fragmented, because Outer Mongolia, right? Yes, and Tibet, which had already signed with the British at that time, in 1913. Xinjiang also had an agreement with the Soviet Union, one could say. Yes, during such major upheavals, instability in the border regions, or their separation, has been a constant in Chinese history.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Teacher Jia: Hmm, I think if that day ever comes, it actually depends on how the local people view their relationship with distant Beijing. If there are, for example, let's assume, everything is based on assumption. For instance, if the Tibetan areas in Sichuan have a higher degree of Sinicization and a higher identification with Beijing, then it's possible that when change comes, the attitude of the Sichuan Tibetan areas will be different from that of Ü-Tsang. Ah, Qinghai Tibetan areas, have you noticed that Qinghai and Sichuan both have small Tibetan areas delineated within their provinces, right? That's because they are, yes, they are administratively managed, just like the Central Plains. So their identification with Beijing might be higher than that of the Ü-Tsang region. It's possible that even among Tibetans, there could be fragmentation. For example, the Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai might lean towards identifying with Beijing, while Ü-Tsang, the original Tibetan area, might lean towards independence or maintaining a higher level of autonomy. I don't know, so I think we might need to have more imagination for future politics and discuss what those spaces could be. Take Xinjiang, for example, is Xinjiang a monolithic entity? Xinjiang is not monolithic. The Han population in northern Xinjiang is greater than that of Uyghurs, yes. The Han population in northern Xinjiang is greater than, not Tibetans, but Uyghurs, and southern Xinjiang is predominantly Uyghur, over 80%. So, are the views of southern Xinjiang and northern Xinjiang the same? What about the Kazakhs within the borders? What about the Hui people? In fact, things could become very fragmented, even within a single province.

Wu Lü: I estimate that Deyang and Leshan might not even have the same ideas.

Teacher Jia: Oh, it seems likely they would be similar, but I don't know.

Wu Lü: It seems Teacher Jia and I share similar views.

Teacher Jia: For example, Qi-Lu, Qi-Lu. What did you study in Shandong? Your Shandong might split into Qi and Lu.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: Right, I still can't figure out if my hometown was part of the State of Qi or the State of Lu.

Teacher Jia: Now, about this matter, you see, it's too long ago, so long ago that even Li Bai couldn't distinguish, which is why Li Bai wrote "Qi and Lu, the green is endless," right?

Hou Chen: Hey, let me tell you something that confuses me. I've been reading these past two days and only just realized, wow, the Southern Song dynasty, their so-called Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun were never actually under their control.

Wu Lü: Right.

Hou Chen: Wasn't the Northern Song dynasty destroyed precisely because it was so fixated on recovering the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun?

Teacher Jia: Yes, the Northern Song dynasty indeed fell for the sake of national unity, that's true.

Hou Chen: Yes, for two hundred, one hundred seventy years, they kept thinking about how to unify, and whoever wanted unification ended up losing their country again. It seems there's a view like that, whoever wants to pursue great unification ends up losing their country again. This is part of your political theology.

Wu Lü: Hey, but I think it makes sense. Because this is what the Chinese order talks about, and it's also discussed in Ge Jianxiong's book "Unity and Division," which states that there were 54% of fragmentation time and 46% of unification time.

Hou Chen: Yes, this refers to historical divisions, but I'll offer a counterpoint. First, I think the classical era doesn't have much reference value for present-day China, because the world has changed tremendously. For example, as Teacher Jia also mentioned, previously, local warlords could indeed decide whether there was unification, because for ordinary people, unification or fragmentation truly had little impact on daily life. They just paid a certain amount of taxes; sometimes during war, taxes were higher, and after the war, taxes might even be lower, and corvée labor was less burdensome, right? It made no difference to ordinary people. But in the current era, the difference for ordinary people would be very significant. Whether unified or fragmented, including many people now, your business is done across provinces, or your orders are taken across provinces, you buy things from across provinces. If China were to fragment, you would buy fewer things on Taobao, or as I said, if the currency were to change, it would be even more troublesome. So, today's unification and fragmentation would have a disruptive impact on ordinary people's lives. Therefore, ordinary people's views must play a role in this. Just like Brexit, ordinary people wanted to leave the EU, but after it happened, the cost was a bit high, and many people no longer wanted to leave. It's because now, with society so closely interconnected, it has a huge impact on ordinary people's lives, so I believe public opinion does play a role in this issue. But I also disagree with this person's statement. I believe the public opinion that matters is definitely not whether they support unification or fragmentation; for many people, I think that's just a game. What truly matters in the end, as I said, and as we discussed in the last episode, is the cost. Ordinary people will look at how much their basic lives are impacted.

Host: This question naturally leads to the second one. Many people are envisioning a scenario related to what I'm saying. Many people say China will definitely fragment, and how will it split? Not in the way we're discussing. They say the reason is that many rich provinces in China will think, "Why should I play with these poor provinces?" Catalonia? Why should I give them transfer payments? So, they believe that if there's any political upheaval in China, eastern provinces like Guangdong and Shanghai will definitely want to abandon the inland provinces and declare independence. Therefore, they believe this will definitely happen, because people in these provinces will form a powerful community of interest, no longer sharing resources and money with other provinces. Southeast Mutual Protection. How do you view this issue?

Wu Lü: Yes, I still maintain my judgment that the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta will tend towards independence.

Hou Chen: So you also believe their motive for independence is, "Why should we play with you?"

Wu Lü: Because without a strong central government, or one backed by violence, you can imagine that people from those regions, under no pressure, would prioritize their own independence. Yes, independence doesn't mean I lose the market that Hou Chen described, because market forces allow everyone to make money. So why shouldn't Shaanxi let me sell things? Why can't I buy their coal? Why shouldn't Shandong let me pass through?

Hou Chen: Of course, Shaanxi would charge you a 200% tariff.

Wu Lü: If you tax me, then I'd incur a loss, so I wouldn't buy from them.

Hou Chen: For themselves, since you're hostile to Shanghai, you'd actually incur a greater loss. Why? It's just trade, as the show discusses, trade is bilateral. So why is the US collecting tariffs now? How did protectionism come about worldwide? You can't imagine that if there's independence, both sides will stop interacting forever. Of course, independence is actually very difficult.

Wu Lü: My point is, I'm not pursuing independence.

Hou Chen: I'm not pursuing independence, I think you are.

Wu Lü: No, no, no, I mean we can't imagine that in a political entity as large as China, no one would pursue independence. The spirit of independence.

Hou Chen: If he, yes, if he pursues independence, what do you do? You're a neighboring province, you're another province, do you organize an army to fight him?

Wu Lü: I'd organize my people to go there, and he'd say, "Labor is good, come on over."

Hou Chen: No, he didn't want to share wealth with you in the past, and he certainly wouldn't want to support your immigrants. This is a very serious issue. Between us, Chen Jiongming once criticized Sun Yat-sen, writing a long article scolding him, asking if Sun Yat-sen expected one province to support a whole nation. He meant, my province's fiscal revenue is entirely taken by your Republic of China, and this Republic of China of yours is even in opposition to Beijing—it's a rebel faction, this rebellious Republic of China is imposed on my province, sucking my blood. Chen Jiongming advocated for a federation of provinces at the time, largely as a reaction against Sun Yat-sen's desire for centralization.

Wu Lü: So, Wu Lü envisions, Wu Lü envisions that kind of situation, I think, uh, it's possible, but, but I think he, he, he, he, hmm, there's also a possibility that, in fact, I'm more inclined to say, inclined towards the Central Plains issue. Because the four provinces of the mountains and rivers, no, no, no, I'm clearly like this, that is, from the Central-South region, starting from the Three Kingdoms period, for example, when Wang Rui's fleet sailed down to Yizhou, and the Nanjing royal banner proudly declared, why did ships from Chongqing come down to attack Nanjing, hmm, you, the southern regime, all had to surrender. Because you, you often, in the past, when you relied on, uh, resisting the north, you had the Huai River defense line and the Yangtze River defense line, right? If they came up the Yangtze River, you couldn't defend it. Historically, several times Nanjing was attacked, including by Zeng Guofan, who all came up the river to attack Nanjing. Alright, if you want to hold Nanjing, sorry, you have to hold Jiujiang. Hmm, if you want to hold Jiujiang, you also have to hold Wuhan. Hmm, if you want to hold Wuhan, hmm, you also have to hold Chongqing. This, this is all connected, all integrated. And why did Zhuge Liang make six expeditions from Mount Qi, to, to, to occupy Guanzhong? Because at that time Guanzhong was rich, that is, if I occupied Guanzhong, I could exit Guanzhong and destroy these six eastern states, just like Qin Shi Huang did back then. So, in the end, what I calculate, what I reckon is, Jiangnan, uh, Sichuan-Chongqing, uh, and this Guanzhong, and this, uh, and this Yanzhao, and this, uh, and this central Central Plains, ah, that is, Henan and Shandong, ah, are integrated, indivisible. As long as one piece falls, it will be attacked by other places. So, what I'm more inclined to believe is that the Central Plains has a greater possibility of remaining integrated. And then Jiangxi, Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, these, well, I don't want to talk about them.

Hou Chen: Hey, no, besides Jiangnan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other good places, what about the Central Plains? Would the three northeastern provinces become independent? Guangdong, Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi, respect the will of the local people, right?

Wu Lü: Yes.

Hou Chen: I, I think that in modern society, even if China were to have some kind of independence in the future, it's unlikely. The real issue is military threat, or even if it is a military threat, the real threat is unlikely to be a ground army military threat anymore. Missiles, fighter jets, that's not it, this is ancient military geography.

Teacher Jia: Yes, yes, yes, this is ancient military geography.

Hou Chen: Yes, how do you view that point just now, that I believe historical transitions are decided by a minority?

Wu Lü: I've always firmly believed that.

Hou Chen: For example, would Jack Ma establish merchant self-governance in Zhejiang, given the opportunity? Would Shanghai's merchants establish self-governance? And then discuss other things based on that self-governance.

Wu Lü: Yes, don't laugh, there are many ambitious businessmen in China. You can't say everyone will just play dumb. They're playing dumb now, but one day they won't.

Hou Chen: This episode aired, Jack Ma's WeChat.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes, I just casually mentioned Jack Ma, last time we mentioned Pony Ma.

Hou Chen: What I want to say is, in ancient times, if five merchants in a place got together, they might contribute 40-50% of the local tax revenue, and they would have a say. But now, forget about tax revenue; if you confiscate Jack Ma's assets, take out his assets, it's less than one-tenth of Hangzhou. That is, I think the difference between modern society and ancient society is that it's more fragmented, yes, the scale is very large now, and it's more dispersed. These few merchants who are talked about actually can't shake local rule. You don't have that much money to support all the local parks. In ancient times, you could, there weren't many people, and they could rely on self-governance. I think this is the difficulty of modern fragmentation; the scale is truly too large. Even Tibet is the same, how can Tibet sustain itself? How can Taiwan sustain itself?

Wu Lü: Let me tell you, with world trade existing, how could it not sustain itself? I think it's easier to sustain.

Hou Chen: Singapore.

Wu Lü: I also said at the time, first, when Singapore split from Malaysia and Brunei, the complexity of the world economy then was not the same as now. Secondly, Singapore itself is an outward-oriented economy; it started as a US naval port. Yes, it wasn't that dependent on the Malaysian inland market. So, it was easier for them to classify then.

Wu Lü: Based on my observation, for example, why are people in Japan relatively wealthy? Isn't it thanks to world trade? It means I can export my products worldwide, and I can buy food from all over the world. A very important aspect of this world trade is that I can transport food from the world's granaries to places where I don't produce food, so people don't starve. So, if the Shandong Peninsula, that small area, fully engaged in world trade, gradually learning from Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, what's to stop it from succeeding? I'm puzzled, because as long as people don't starve, that place will develop, it will have more money, a talent advantage, and it can be democratic. Why do you insist it won't work?

Hou Chen: Many comments are also refuting my point. I said Shanghai couldn't get electricity or water, and they're saying, "Why couldn't it? It definitely could." So let me explain why I think this "trade theory" might not work domestically in China. We're not discussing this issue now. But since it's being discussed, let me first ask Teacher Jia, do you think this trade theory can solve China's order problem? That is, if it splits anyway, can't we just do business?

Teacher Jia: Domestically, no; internationally, perhaps.

Hou Chen: Why not domestically?

Teacher Jia: Domestically, it will definitely create obstacles. It will definitely create obstacles domestically. That is, Shanghai, or Shenzhen—the best way for Shenzhen is, you say thirty provinces and thirty, for example, transform into thirty countries, these thirty countries will not cooperate, they will all take care of themselves.

Wu Lü: It's impossible to transform into thirty, impossible for thirty. I think it's highly likely to be Mr. Lee Teng-hui's "Seven-Block Theory."

Teacher Jia: Exactly.

Wu Lü: Come, come, introduce the Seven-Block Theory to everyone.

Teacher Jia: Because this could also be a one-block theory. In '96, Lee Teng-hui said that China might split into seven countries. And that would be Manchuria, then Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet—that's four. Taiwan—that's five. The remaining large area would split into two, the Central Plains, and what else? Anyway, it was Southern Yue. Southern Yue, perhaps, anyway, seven blocks. I think the environment in Tibet is very large, it should be.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Teacher Jia: What I want to say is, foreign trade is possible. That is to say, Shanghai, representing Eastern capitalism, and Lingnan capitalism represented by Shenzhen and Hong Kong, and Jiangnan capitalism—you need to align with Western common values, pledge allegiance to Western countries, and offer a "certificate of submission." Then, countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, and these so-called American allies like South Korea, the nearby powers, would be willing to do business with you. That is, and you already have connections in those places.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Teacher Jia: So why wouldn't Shandong do business with them? Well, we Shandong people.

Wu Lü: No, what's in the ground, what's in the ground? It's about trade complementarity, and it's about cost, not geography or proximity. That is, if I'm buying coal from Shanxi and Shaanxi, and Shaanxi charges a 200% tariff while Shanxi charges 120%, I'd definitely buy from Shanxi. Alright, then if the US says, "I'll give you coal for 20," then I'll buy from the US. This depends on cost.

Teacher Jia: Yes.

Wu Lü: But I believe the people in the north will definitely make those city gates incredibly high.

Teacher Jia: I believe so.

Wu Lü: So, so the trade theory, I think the trade theory is half-valid. That is, just now Hou Chen criticized the trade theory, saying it's half-valid, because it needs to be divided into domestic and foreign. Domestically, I think it's largely unfeasible. Because historically, there have been instances where, for example, from one province to another, there were requirements for permits, and taxes, and so on. Why couldn't the nine provinces of the Southeast Mutual Protection collect from the northern provinces at that time? Because the northern provinces were unwilling. The northern provinces were willing to be integrated with Beijing. And their loyalty to Beijing was higher. In the end, of course, these provinces of the Southeast Mutual Protection were later forgiven by Empress Dowager Cixi, but that was out of necessity, because they had money, and she had to let them come out and clean up the mess. But the original intention of the Southeast Mutual Protection was, "You do your thing, I just don't want to deal with you anymore. I don't want Western powers to see this most prosperous area of mine and be threatened by war." That's why there was the Southeast Mutual Protection. The Southeast Mutual Protection showed that when the empire was in crisis, Jiangnan and Lingnan always had the greatest centrifugal force. I think it's still the same today, because they are the two best economic regions in China, no different from the situation in the late Qing Dynasty.

Hou Chen: Yes. So let me explain why I think the trade theory won't work. The reason it still won't work is that trade is one thing, and merchants are merchants; merchants have no national borders, nor provincial borders. If it were purely a merchant class, then selling to Shanghai or selling to the US, whoever offers a higher price gets it, that's absolutely no problem. But in China, the public goods that Shanghai and Shenzhen need, including labor, opening my province's market to you, and supplying Shanghai's most needed water and electricity—these are not private enterprises, and it's hard for them to be fully privatized quickly in the future. This leads to a situation where, in other words, China uses rare earths to choke others, and the US uses rare earths to choke others. Yes, under these circumstances, some of the things Shanghai needs most are not controlled by private enterprises, meaning they can't just be sold if Shanghai offers money. In that situation, it becomes something like negotiations between countries.

Wu Lü: Open your imagination! Shanghai would definitely unite with our Jiangsu, why would Shanghai be alone? Shanghai alone would surely die, it would definitely unite with our Jiangsu. I think the Yangtze River Delta largely, in fact, it's already an economic entity, a "free shipping country," a famous "free shipping country," right?

Hou Chen: Then I still have my question, should Hefei and Anhui be included?

Wu Lü: I think anything that can be shipped for free on Taobao can be counted together.

Hou Chen: You can't calculate it that way, Taobao Nation.

Wu Lü: The all-out Taobao Nation.

Hou Chen: The "free shipping country" refers to Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, right? And recently, there's a joke: Do you know which is the happiest city in China? It's Xuzhou, it has free shipping and heating, the only city with both free shipping and heating. So, for example, Anhui, I think, might form a system of competition. For instance, if this so-called "free shipping country" of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai is established, then it would extend an olive branch to Anhui, asking if it wants to join. Anhui would definitely, Anhui, to be honest, Anhui, you see, the Ma'anshan side and the Fuyang side in the north are completely different. So, Ma'anshan and Huizhou would come over, but Fuyang, you can just forget about it, Fuyang is very Shandong-like.

Wu Lü: Yes, then forget about it.

Hou Chen: Just like Shandong. This is what I'm saying, and you haven't split China, or Anhui. This is what I'm saying, because it's not ancient times anymore, so a few prominent clans in Fuyang decide to go with the "free shipping" region, and they go. Now, for example, I'm asking a question: Why is it so hard to imagine fragmentation within a province in China now, but you can imagine cross-provincial fragmentation? What's the reason?

Wu Lü: If there isn't a tyrannical force supporting and maintaining it from behind, I believe fragmentation is at least an option. China is so vast.

Hou Chen: My question is, why do we all think of fragmentation by province, and not by city, or even more fragmented divisions?

Wu Lü: Of course it's possible, because we haven't thought of it yet.

Hou Chen: Then I'd say it's impossible, the reason being that this entire system cannot function for even a day without civil servants. Can you understand that? Or accept it?

Wu Lü: I don't accept that.

Hou Chen: Ah, this is a crucial question for the functioning of a modern state. That is to say, this system cannot operate for a single day without civil servants.

Wu Lü: I said I don't accept it.

Hou Chen: I know you don't accept it.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Hou Chen: I'm just emphasizing it. So why is it easier for us to imagine provinces, but not cities, splitting? It's because China, ever since ancient times, has been structured with provinces as the interface. The same is true for China today. This means we can imagine a city separating from its province, and the next day, the order of many things would break down. Documents, systems, finances—they would all face problems. It lacks the fiscal extraction capacity at the city level. This is a big problem. That's why we often imagine fragmentation at the provincial level. So that's another issue; if you don't accept this point, of course, China could just function at the village level.

Wu Lü: I think Hou Chen has a contradiction here. You just used historical lessons and experiences, but historically, indeed, you say on one hand it can't be referenced, and on the other hand, you treat this historical experience as an achievement.

Hou Chen: This history, I'm strongly explaining why China is currently structured by province. My strong point is that, indeed, the relationship between individuals, localities, and the state was not handled well before; there was only the state, no localities and no individuals. But the problem is, this thing cannot start from scratch; we can't reset everything now and rebuild order, there's no such opportunity.

Wu Lü: I think "difficult" and "impossible" are two different concepts. You're asking if Shenzhen itself has it.

Hou Chen: This is political theology again.

Wu Lü: Yes, you're saying China is so big, for example, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Shanghai, they want to go their own way, and you insist they'll just die. If they're willing to die, then what? If they're willing to die, we'd rather die than be with you domestically.

Hou Chen: The problem is who, you can't make me say it's Zhang San Li now.

Wu Lü: No, no, no, you can't just go and grab him first.

Hou Chen: No, is this a collective decision by Shanghai citizens, or a collective decision by a few prominent families in Shanghai? How would prominent families in Shanghai convince Shanghai citizens? Issue a notice, stating that starting tomorrow, the currency will change.

Wu Lü: I think political transitions have their own characteristics in each place. For example, this place has a Moses, that place has a Franklin, that place has a Davidic line. Each place has its own unique features.

Hou Chen: You're using relativism to eliminate the complexity of this issue. Your conclusion is simply that there's always a way. I'm saying there are so many cities in China, and there will always be people in cities, in provincial capitals, who raise this question. You say it's very difficult. Of course, it's very difficult, but similarly, you say there's no reason to maintain China's unity. Without an army, people can do whatever they want. Can you control a town hospital forming a country? I mean, if I, Laoshan District in Qingdao, form a country, why do you have to control me?

Wu Lü: That's impossible.

Hou Chen: No, it's fine if you form a country tomorrow, but then the power gets cut.

Wu Lü: I'll cut the power directly.

Hou Chen: Cut the power, we won't even use it.

Wu Lü: I'll cut off your natural gas.

Hou Chen: I won't use electricity at all then.

Wu Lü: People, that's ridiculous, you're not joking, would most of you just starve to death?

Hou Chen: No, no, no, establishing a country is to make everyone happier. If your construction, your surroundings also become fascist.

Wu Lü: Not fascist, it's because I supply electricity to your city's power bureau every day because you're part of my system. If you want independence, meaning your power bureau, your utility bureau, is not part of my system, then I'll cut you off before we have an agreement.

Teacher Jia: What Hou Chen is talking about is an issue of administrative reach. Of course, it also has an economic rationality problem. I'm not saying to just take any piece of land. But according to Hou Chen's view, I can withhold electricity from you. I'm upstream, I'm on the upper reaches of the Yellow River, I can block it and not let it flow downstream.

Hou Chen: No, no, I won't give you water, I won't give you electricity, I won't give you internet.

Wu Lü: Yes, it would definitely be very difficult. But I believe if there were no army, people in this place could be persuaded, so why couldn't they be persuaded? I must.

Hou Chen: What a joke. The current national system for horizontal resource allocation and coordination—can you rely on one place? If, let's say Guangdong, can Guangdong be independent? Would an independent Guangdong starve to death? I think, I think you're the one joking.

Wu Lü: Guangdong needs to unite with Hong Kong. I think Hong Kong needs it even more. I think Hong Kong's independence is possible with external order input. Guangdong might be, right? I, I, I.

Host: Well, look, that's great, we've now entered this new debate. It's excellent, it shows everyone still wants to debate, this show has potential. So, I'll say again, and I'm not strongly against it, Teacher Jia's point about the "free shipping country" becoming independent. That is to say, I would argue, as you said, that internal trade is very difficult. The smaller the place, the more it can be self-sufficient with external support. If Pudong New Area insists on independence, and Japan says, "I'll support Pudong New Area, if it lacks natural gas, we can ship a tanker of LNG over, and we'll immediately build a natural gas power plant there. I'll support Pudong New Area." The smaller the place, the easier it is to sustain itself with external order input. The larger the place, for example, if Japan had to supply the "free shipping country," it definitely couldn't. Any internal trade barriers for the "free shipping country" would affect its self-sufficiency and thus its possibility of independence. So, for China's independence, the smaller the entity, the easier it is. But I've also explained why Shanghai can't. Conversely, that's the problem with Guangdong. I said Guangdong can't be too big. It's too big, and its economic and other ties with the interior are too deep. Teacher Jia was right just now; I think internal trade would be a huge problem.

Wu Lü: It's not about trade, is it too big to be independent? Because I'm not clear.

Hou Chen: It's hard for large entities to become independent; the larger it is, the harder it is to become independent. So isn't China, being so large, an independent country? You've already established this system.

Wu Lü: No, China is already this big; you can't confuse what should be with what is.

Hou Chen: That's precisely the point: China is so vast, and we've already established a nationwide dispatch system within this immense scope. You say Tibet can be independent, isn't Tibet large? If all Han people were to return, Tibet's population could be supported by India and the UK. What about Xinjiang? My brother said it could be supported by Turkey and Central Asia.

Wu Lü: Why do you say others want the Han people to return? How do you solve that?

Hou Chen: Xinjiang cannot become independent if the Han people don't return, because the Han population in Xinjiang is the majority, too large and too many. Why don't southern and northern Xinjiang separate?

Wu Lü: That's possible, Kashgar and its surrounding areas in Xinjiang could become independent. I'm saying your concepts of large and small are not absolute; is ten million people a lot, or is five million people a lot?

Hou Chen: The concept is that if his internal trade and—no, the word "trade" isn't even right—if his internal resource allocation goes wrong, the possibility of outsiders supporting him is too great. Given China's population density, it would be impossible; from food to natural gas, nothing could be managed.

Wu Lü: I'm puzzled, why do you just recommend one outcome: "I won't supply you with electricity, I won't supply you with oil," and this situation arises. Why would all highways stop? Why can't both sides do business to solve this problem?

Hou Chen: The problem is this: many other provinces in China are currently supported by Shanghai's transfer payments. So, Shanghai getting rid of them means it no longer wants to give them transfer payments. Can Shanghai say, "Alright, for thirty years, I'll give you this much money annually, as long as you support me"? Is there such a possibility? You always say no, so it's always no?

Wu Lü: The reason there isn't is because the current system doesn't operate on commercial principles at all; it's completed through national coordination. It's a matter of administrative power. In the end, you're not buying resources with money, but buying power with money.

Hou Chen: I still know Hou Chen has been brainwashed by our party, meaning without our party, it's impossible to manage things.

Wu Lü: No, no, no, on the contrary, I think independence like this would be good, everyone would be fine, and the economy would be more vibrant.

Teacher Jia: Wu Lü, it's like this: you know that from the Qin Dynasty onwards, China began to contend for Vietnam, and using what Mr. Shi Nianhai called the "Three River Basins"—the Yellow River Basin, the Yangtze River Basin, and the Pearl River Basin—they integrated very early on. Why did they integrate? It was actually due to the need for river management, the need to control river channels. For example, when the Yellow River flooded, especially concerning these three rivers and four provinces, a single province's capacity was insufficient to prevent the Yellow River from flooding. Because it easily changes course, it easily causes siltation, and so on. It absolutely required four, or even six, provinces to unite to solve the problem of the Yellow River changing its course. This is what Hou Chen said: there must be a transcendent power, a force above it, to bring it all together. And what Hou Chen is saying now is that this transcendent power, under the conditions you describe, still has to exist. For example, the South-to-North Water Diversion, you have to pass through so many provinces. West-to-East Gas Pipeline and West-to-East Electricity Transmission. If this transcendent power weren't there, then everyone would definitely encounter resource scarcity issues. We are not scarce now because there is this transcendent power, greater than any single province, coordinating things. That's the meaning.

Wu Lü: So, is it possible that after these provinces become independent, they could equally distribute the overall governance responsibilities? Is it possible? If you say it's absolutely impossible, I think that's unlikely. Alright, during the Song Dynasty, the Song, Jin, Liao, and Western Xia dynasties coexisted there, how could they survive for hundreds of years? Their interdependence back then was much lower than it is now. Back then, they relied on border trade, and two seasons a year were enough.

Teacher Jia: Not exactly. The Yellow River has always been, it's been in one, except before the Qin Dynasty, after the Qin, the Yellow River has always been within one country. There was no separation into two countries based on the upper and lower reaches of the Yellow River. At that time, there was a need to manage the Yellow River.

Hou Chen: But now, managing the Yellow River might be considered a minor issue, even manageable with human effort. But the current problem is the South-to-North Water Diversion, West-to-East Gas Pipeline, West-to-East Electricity Transmission, West-to-East Computing Resources, East-to-West Computing Resources, and even the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway—all these coordinations. And these coordinations could be marketized; if China marketizes, it can be marketized. But the problem is that the state currently doesn't engage in marketization; it engages in administrative coordination. With administrative coordination, this province suffers huge losses, and that province relies on transfer payments. Transfer payments aren't clearly calculable in monetary terms. Transfer payments are the national and local tax systems. So, you say, "Alright, tomorrow, I won't pay national taxes, it's all local taxes." The power will be cut off tomorrow, you know? It's because, because the central government you imagine controls the West-to-East Gas Pipeline, West-to-East Electricity Transmission. As long as you don't pay taxes tomorrow, I'm still very hard to convince.

Wu Lü: So you're saying that through the process of democratization, individual provinces can't solve this problem, and a central government must coordinate to resolve it. Is that your meaning?

Hou Chen: What I want to say is, if the central government also democratized, Shanghai would have no need to split.

Wu Lü: No, how can you, how can you, the central government, no, how can you necessarily make this judgment for others? If everyone is democratic, they won't need independence. No, I'm just Shanghai, why isn't there democracy?

Hou Chen: I think so too.

Wu Lü: Because what about Shenzhen? If the central government becomes democratic, we won't need to.

Hou Chen: Now, now it's not a problem.

Wu Lü: Suppose, you say so many cities, wouldn't there be a single independent one?

Hou Chen: No, what Hou Chen means, listen to me. What Hou Chen means is that if there's no consensus within China on the issue of unification or fragmentation, then, for example, the Greater Nanyue and the Free Shipping Nation, which have advanced ideas, would want to be independent. What then? At that point, you would encounter very malicious restrictions from surrounding provinces. Restrictions.

Wu Lü: You wouldn't be able to write anymore.

Hou Chen: Yes, it would. But you're talking about negotiations. I believe, why can't things like everyone sitting together and talking happen? It's because we don't have this concept, we're not aligned. I'd die before I believe that in such a vast territory like China, not a single place could achieve it. Dalian, Liaodong Peninsula, the Northeast, don't even think about it.

Wu Lü: No, you're saying no place can do it.

Hou Chen: Well, no, no, no, I'm saying it's possible for some to achieve it. But as you said, for example, if everyone were to sit down and discuss the gas pipelines, oil pipelines, and high-speed rail pricing and dispatch methods, that wouldn't work. It definitely wouldn't work. Then there can only be a central government.

Wu Lü: Can it be solved after democratization?

Hou Chen: Democratization can solve it. If you give me more money, can I solve it? And we won't have war.

Wu Lü: Wait, democratization doesn't mean no central government. The US is a democratic country, it has a central government, and it has transfer payments. Yes, many Southern states also rely on transfer payments. But your proposition just now was that after democratization, it might not become independent. Of course, it's possible, I think some might still become independent. It's impossible to say that every one would be harmed like that; what if people just want independence, what then?

Hou Chen: After democratization, independence is possible. That's what I just said, people just want independence. No matter how poor I am, if you don't give me anything, I'll become independent.

Wu Lü: I believe that in China now, your previous vision was for Shanghai to democratize first, because other parts of China couldn't democratize. You only mentioned Shanghai as an example, right?

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: I mean, what I want to say is, I believe Shanghai people's view of the current situation, or people in any other Chinese province's view of the current situation, if China became a democratic country, able to elect the Shanghai City Council, able to elect representatives for the whole nation, or national legislative bodies, what would be the benefit of Shanghai's independence?

Hou Chen: No, and you insist on asking about the American Civil War; the South wanted independence because people had democracy, and they wanted to maintain slavery. Independence itself was the benefit; you insist on calculating the economic cost. For example, five years from now, I won't, the benefit of my independence.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes, we need to calculate the economic cost. I think you have a local independent perspective; in your value judgment, you believe independence is good.

Hou Chen: No, I'm saying you can't make decisions for everyone on these 9.6 million square kilometers.

Wu Lü: The South wanted independence precisely because it wanted to maintain its efforts.

Hou Chen: Shenzhen might become independent, for example, if Yunnan wants to be independent, you insist on asking what benefits it would have for them. They might say, "I don't care about benefits, I'm independent, I live well on my own, I'm not calculating economic costs with you." My point is, is there such a possibility? Theoretically, yes, but in reality, I haven't seen any place in China, apart from Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet, with such a strong inclination.

Wu Lü: Can't you see it now? No one dares to speak up.

Hou Chen: So, Wu Lü, I understand, this, this, I think Shanghai, because last time when we got familiar with Friedrich, he also advocated for Shanghai independence on Twitter. Yes, yes, a series of articles. He would explain, he would, he would, he would be a bit like what Wu Lü said, that is, for example, the Greater Nanyue and the Free Shipping Nation, they would each become independent, and then engage in institutional competition. And this institutional competition means, whose constitution is better, or whose operation is smoother.

Wu Lü: Yes, there would be a red flag effect on the periphery.

Hou Chen: Yes, it would be attractive to the surrounding areas. And for example, Anhui says, "I want to join the Free Shipping Nation." Then Jiangxi, Jiangxi would be in an awkward position. Jiangxi would be calculating, "Should I join the Free Shipping Nation, or should I join the Greater Nanyue?" And after some calculation, it might find that over 40% of its annual GDP comes from the south. Then it might join the Greater Nanyue. So it's very possible that, slowly but surely, their territories would grow larger and larger. Eventually, it would become two or three large blocs, as Lee Teng-hui said, two or three large blocs competing there. At this point, how it evolves next, that's unknown. Perhaps after these two or three large blocs stabilize internally, they would then elect parliaments, and then discuss whether to restore, say, the Great Qing, or the Republic of China, or the People's Republic of China. Whatever.

Wu Lü: Let me add something to your point. My core view is, not just what was said just now, but that China is so vast, you can't predict the future, and you can't speak for all regions by saying that as long as democracy is good, as long as the economy is good, no one will seek independence. I think this idea itself is problematic. Let me just give an example: people on Hainan Island might feel that their island is quite good, they want to be like Taiwan, they want to develop, they don't want any interaction with the mainland. So, for Hainan Island's real estate and the people from the Northeast, and the tourists from the Northeast, you can't always have one outcome, that you just become independent and it's over.

Hou Chen: Wu Lü, it's like this: no matter what grand words we're using now—democracy, freedom, independence—what is our underlying goal? The goal is to make people happier and more prosperous.

Wu Lü: They also say that our independence would lead to a better life. But if independence isn't good, why pursue it? You can't infer that; you, Shanghai, can infer that independence isn't good. You, Hangzhou, can infer that it's not good. But even Hainan Island says it wants independence, and we don't know about others. You can't say you don't know about others, but Shaanxi's independence would definitely be bad. You can't say that independence is bad for all places. I'm saying, in a country as vast as China, is there any place like Macau, or Hong Kong, or Taiwan, where I would be better off if I became independent? Not anymore. All the places you mentioned originally had foreign influences.

Teacher Jia: Yes.

Hou Chen: It's just that the economic ties between the various provinces are too close now.

Wu Lü: But honestly, I think our Shandong's independent vitality is very good. It has resources, it has energy.

Hou Chen: Then your Shandong, let me tell you, can only be the eastern half. If it becomes the independent state of Lu, it would still need South Korean support.

Wu Lü: That's how it is.

Hou Chen: No, why are you so focused on Shandong? Shandong has so many processing enterprises. Does Shandong have rare earth mines? Shandong doesn't have rare earth mines. If rare earths are cut off, your Shandong's BYD factories, production, production. Your Dongying's oil-derived powder would be gone.

Wu Lü: You always assume this outcome, of course it would be blocked. What if it's not blocked?

Hou Chen: Does Shandong have rare earth mines? What if it does?

Wu Lü: No, no. Even if it did, establishing rare earth refineries takes a very long time.

Hou Chen: No, I'm saying you always set up a scenario where, "this won't work either, you'll be blocked," which I find incomprehensible.

Wu Lü: No, Wu Lü, it's like this: why do you first set up a block? No, because this is a nation-building endeavor, you have to consider the worst-case scenario. And you have to consider the realistic situation.

Hou Chen: I'm saying, can't you imagine a place in China that just becomes independent? I'm Mao Zedong.

Wu Lü: Hong Kong.

Hou Chen: I can imagine that.

Wu Lü: Hong Kong won't work.

Hou Chen: Hong Kong, so Hong Kong won't work again.

Wu Lü: Hong Kong won't work. I think Hong Kong, I think the UK would.

Hou Chen: You say Hainan won't work either, no place works, then, then it's just great unification.

Wu Lü: Well, I think China, with such great diversity, it must exist.

Hou Chen: Alright, alright, alright.

Host: Yes, let me talk about another thing, the theory of institutional competition, which I think is quite difficult in China. Because I think that theory of institutional competition, where both sides, for example, the Greater Bay Area Nation and the Free Shipping Nation, engage in institutional competition and attract surrounding areas to join. This is somewhat like the current EU, right? Many Eastern European countries joined the EU, Ukraine joined the EU. But in reality, the EU's strength itself isn't necessarily due to institutional competition. Because the EU currently has quite a few institutional problems, including its debt. It's a bit like NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are defense systems; I don't think they're economic integrations. The EU is more similar, many Eastern European countries want to join the EU, like the EU and ASEAN. Yes, so why do many countries join the EU? It's not necessarily because the EU's institutions are strong; it's because these countries are making a choice. They originally had a binary choice of systems; they were originally countries in the Russian/Eastern European system, and now joining the EU system is actually a very, very important reason for truly achieving prosperity. So, as we just hypothesized, if the Free Shipping Nation and the Greater Bay Area Nation became independent because they didn't want to make transfer payments to other regions, and they felt they could do better on their own. Then the implication is that their motivation to absorb neighboring regions is far smaller than the EU's. In reality, the EU absorbing well-performing Eastern European countries is a political consideration. For example, the EU now wants to absorb Ukraine, largely due to political considerations with Russia. If the EU didn't have this political consideration, and if it were a population burden, it would be troublesome. Yes, there would be no need to absorb Ukraine. But in China, for Shanghai and the Greater Bay Area Nation, why would I absorb Jiangxi? Why would I absorb Jiangxi?

Wu Lü: That's how it is in the sea.

Host: Exactly, I just don't want to give you transfer payments, so why would I absorb you? So I think.

Wu Lü: Well, you can absorb those whose balance sheets are positive. Only Shanghai's balance sheet is positive.

Host: Shanghai's Jiangsu, right?

Wu Lü: Yes.

Host: You see Shanghai is positive now, but after democratization, the policy situation might not necessarily be.

Hou Chen: Hou Chen, there wouldn't be as many stability maintenance costs, and the difference might not be that significant.

Wu Lü: Stability maintenance costs are small money, but pensions and civil servant salaries are big money. Compared to that, stability maintenance costs are small.

Host: Haven't people been saying online that Hegang could easily transform, with 100,000 yuan houses, and then be placed under Japanese management? I think as long as there's a new system, becoming a new Israel isn't impossible.

Hou Chen: Hegang, you can't assume that the people there will always be backward. For example, isn't the Northeast almost empty now?

Wu Lü: Yes.

Hou Chen: In seventy years, there will be no more people in the Northeast. Because their birth rate will lead to extinction. Currently, Heilongjiang's birth rate is 0.53. An extinction-level birth rate.

Wu Lü: If you restore Manchukuo, maybe.

Hou Chen: According to later accounts, it couldn't be restored, because of all sorts of obstacles again.

Wu Lü: Manchukuo, no matter how you think about it, it just won't work.

Hou Chen: No, no, Manchukuo really can't be restored. Do you know why? Because North and South Korea are in opposition. Back then, blood could be supplied to Manchukuo because others opened the way. Now North and South Korea are in opposition, can't you get past North Korea?

Wu Lü: I actually think Sichuan already is.

Hou Chen: That's right, the Great Western Kingdom. Let me first address Manchukuo. Let me first explain why Manchukuo cannot be independent. Manchuria currently has almost the highest aging rate in the country. And the fewest newborns. Net population outflow. Can these places pay out pensions? It all relies on central transfer payments. As soon as it becomes independent, this group of elderly people will demand pensions tomorrow. How will it manage? This is why Hegang cannot become Israel. So, first, Israel at that time, Israel fits what I just said: Israel was a country established under external order input. Without the UK and US pouring blood into it right after its founding, Israel wouldn't be where it is today.

Wu Lü: Actually, to be honest, I don't think the people of the Northeast need pensions that much.

Hou Chen: What are you talking about? Elderly people don't need pensions? What do they need?

Wu Lü: Based on my observation, you're not insulting China. What's wrong with you?

Hou Chen: Tokyo, Tokyo's. Based on my observation of the Northeast, each family has several plots of land, fifty mu of land. That land can completely support them. Those in the countryside.

Wu Lü: Who in the countryside has gold? Who in the countryside has gold? You claim to be from the countryside. Now I ask you one question: how many jin of wheat does one mu of land in Shandong yield now?

Hou Chen: I don't know.

Wu Lü: Then that's it.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: Then how can you say fifty mu of land can support people?

Hou Chen: Hey, now they have, the current situation in the Northeast is that every family has land. Harbin city, every family has land. Changchun is probably the same. I don't care about those workers. I'm just saying.

Wu Lü: Then they're just waiting for pension life. You can't say that after independence, it will immediately disappear.

Hou Chen: What do you think of this conclusion? After their independence, of course it's gone. Because Shanghai won't give them transfer payments anymore.

Wu Lü: No, they themselves can't produce anymore. No money.

Hou Chen: Is there food then?

Wu Lü: Hey, can't the US and Japan bring him money? Because you're going to be independent, you're going to democratize. Hey, I just said, I can imagine.

Hou Chen: Can't they borrow money from the international market?

Wu Lü: It's like this, I can imagine the UK supporting Hong Kong. I can imagine Turkey supporting Xinjiang. What would the US support the Northeast for?

Hou Chen: The southeastern provinces, they still have mines, right? I know there are many iron mines in Jixi.

Wu Lü: They also have mines.

Hou Chen: I'm almost done. The Northeast has quite a few mines, many iron mines. From the World Bank.

Wu Lü: Resource depletion type. With this aging population structure, what would the World Bank give him money for? What can he do?

Hou Chen: I'm just saying, fewer people, there's an advantage to having fewer people.

Wu Lü: I think in that case, Wu Lü would just let the Northeast, let the Northeast naturally go extinct. And then, like "beating pheasants with sticks, catching fish with hooks," just restore the natural ecosystem, that would be good too.

Hou Chen: You can't say that as soon as it becomes independent, it can't survive. I actually don't quite believe that. Our Shaanxi definitely couldn't survive independently.

Wu Lü: This is, this is truly a fiscal problem.

Hou Chen: Yes, it's a place. I think it's an institutional problem. If it becomes democratic, countless Korean companies might invest there. Because you've democratized, right? But it's all an aging population there. All young people are prohibited from leaving. If Korea invests there, where would the aging population come from?

Wu Lü: Isn't that the problem? These are all real-world issues.

Hou Chen: Are there no people left? It's all elderly people. That place is all dead. All elderly people.

Wu Lü: The three northeastern provinces, including Sanya. You know, there are elderly people, and they also have needs.

Hou Chen: Pension needs, right? And pension needs require a pension system to support this industry. Just like Japan's pension system. The three northeastern provinces rely on pensions. Otherwise, if you become independent, all the elderly people will flee inland. No one would want them.

Wu Lü: It's also possible that the elderly would flee, leaving only the young. But the problem is, independence means borders. So, I'm Hebei Province, I don't know, during the great escape from Hong Kong, they set up machine guns and just shot people.

Hou Chen: Flee back to the Northeast.

Wu Lü: I always feel that if a place, if you, you beat Japan, beat China. I'm a bit confused, I'll go first.

Hou Chen: I think that any place, any place, will face aging problems, and various other problems, but after democratization, the system will have an appeal, and it can solve them to some extent.

Teacher Jia: I think Wu Lü is a staunch institutionalist and a believer.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Teacher Jia: Wu Lü's belief is particularly strong, and Wu Lü believes democracy is a panacea. As long as a democratic system comes, everything can be solved.

Hou Chen: I think this, the issue we're discussing, actually has a big background. That is, this idea of a panacea, the party-state has actually been discrediting and destroying this narrative in the past. And for the past 35 years, many overseas democracy activists have also talked about a package solution like that. Now it seems, a package solution won't work. That is, it's not a panacea. Democracy really isn't a panacea, it's not omnipotent. It cannot solve China's border issues, ethnic issues, religious issues. It cannot solve this fiscal problem. Especially the fiscal problem.

Wu Lü: But I feel democracy can solve it. Because besides democracy, what other method do you have to solve this problem?

Hou Chen: No, you're asking what other methods there are besides democracy? We're not talking about black and white, going to the extreme. Rather, for example, between unification and independence, or in a situation where one can try, but the method might not be the "all-or-nothing" electoral democracy you just mentioned. It might be a half-and-half approach, or one-third, one-third. For example, Shanghai, let's say they lack labor, they might go negotiate with Jiangsu. That might not work out. Then Shanghai goes to negotiate with Shandong, and if that doesn't work out, then I go.

Wu Lü: The problem I'm talking about is that Hou Chen says independence is impossible everywhere. Either the population won't work, or there's no energy to supply electricity. Or Shenzhen won't work either. That's what he's saying. That is, as long as there's independence, everyone will starve to death.

Hou Chen: Yes, how could that be possible? It's because China is currently a national resource exchange system coordinated by administration, not a commercial system. This system was built from scratch, and in its initial stages, before it was fully established, its institutional costs were very, very high. Even with democracy, early institutional costs are high. That is, this is the view from the book "The Exhibition of Freedom." Institutions can only drift; they can only change little by little. It can't be ten today, and tomorrow we directly start with FTSE. Because at the FTSE point, the democracy problem is solved. That's the point.

Wu Lü: That's what I mean. What about Sichuan? As a Sichuanese, I'm telling you, if Sichuan were to become independent, it would be doomed.

Hou Chen: What about Tibet?

Wu Lü: Tibet would be doomed. Because of India.

Hou Chen: Where would Tibet go, to which border? You say to Ngari, where would it go then? That's a technical issue.

Wu Lü: No, let me tell you why Sichuan can't be independent. Because Sichuan is currently a province entirely reliant on industrial transfers from the east. Sichuan now has a lot of semiconductors, relatively backward semiconductors, and relatively backward chemicals. In the big era.

Hou Chen: Like TX.

Wu Lü: Yes. And Sichuan has a large amount of computing power, data centers, etc., going west and east. So, if Sichuan province were to detach from the entire eastern system, it wouldn't survive. Guizhou too. And Sichuan is a super large labor-exporting province.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: Sichuan would become strenuous.

Hou Chen: Why would independence necessarily lead to separation?

Teacher Jia: Wu Lü, we're talking about a technical issue. That is, when I first started, I asked if independence means an iron wall between fellow villagers?

Hou Chen: No, no, no, listen to me. Listen to me. What I just said about Shi Nianhai's point, from the perspective of historical geography, or historical military geography, is that these several blocks are intertwined and indivisible. Why indivisible? Because they would be very easily attacked militarily. Therefore, they are indivisible. Only when a certain dynasty occupied the entire Central Plains, facing the fierce border regions, at that time, it would encounter external enemies from the north, and there would be no internal enemies. Because the interior was already integrated. This integration, and the integration Hou Chen is talking about now, are actually two sides of the same coin. That is to say, the reasons are different, so the reasons are different, but the pattern is the same. The pattern is the same. That is to say, due to various administrative factors, administrative legacies, and various industrial connections, population connections, cultural connections, it leads to it being intricately intertwined. Linked together. That is to say, it is probable that no single province can independently complete the task of nation-building. I can understand that this is what Hou Chen is saying.

Wu Lü: For example, uh, Shaanxi and Henan are definitely out of the picture. Because Shaanxi and Henan are inherently China. You can't become independent, right?

Hou Chen: Alright.

Wu Lü: Then your Shanxi is a resource-depleted area.

Hou Chen: Establish the Jin Dynasty.

Wu Lü: No, no, no, Shanxi is a resource-depleted city. It doesn't have very good, very good industries. If it were to become independent, it would be over. It can only huddle together with its neighbors. For example, it could say to Hebei, "Hey, you have iron, I have coal, let's trade." Neither needs to be independent. Or they could form a Yanzhao (historical region). Whatever. It's because these past ties are too strong. This leads to the possibility of individual provinces becoming independent being extremely, extremely low. Either there's not enough labor, or not enough market, or not enough electricity, or not enough labor force. Because it's not like now. Or not enough government credit.

Wu Lü: Actually, I think the possibility of independence for coastal cities, or certain coastal economic regions, is relatively high. Uh, but facing Hou Chen's "absolutely impossible," I have no choice. Because I can't.

Hou Chen: I still think China is so vast, how can you say that this place, for example, uh, people here just want independence, and you insist it won't work, they'll starve to death.

Wu Lü: No, he can be independent, but he will encounter many, many difficulties, and then he will give up in the end.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: Yes, that's the result.

Hou Chen: Or, will all places give up? Do you firmly believe that?

Wu Lü: I'm talking about Hainan Island.

Hou Chen: It depends.

Wu Lü: It's hard to fall. I think it depends on the situation. I think as soon as he negotiates a little with reality, he'll realize it's simply impossible. For example, if Shanghai were to become independent, and the people of Shanghai elected a Shanghai autonomous government, and this Shanghai autonomous government elected Jack Ma. So Jack Ma becomes the chairman of the Shanghai autonomous government. And then Jack Ma says, "I want to negotiate with the surrounding provinces about the fruits and vegetables you supply to Shanghai, these things. And Shanghai now has borders, and since we'll be collecting tariffs in the future, people can't, they'll need visas, and so on." We need to discuss this whole package of solutions. And Jack Ma would employ vertical and horizontal alliances, breaking them one by one, asking for electricity from you, asking for food from you. And then Jack Ma would find that it's impossible to negotiate. It simply won't work. For example, Jack Ma would find, "Oh, the biggest problem is, they cut off my People's Bank of China system." I find that my currency, Shanghai's currency, is pegged to the US dollar, and then I come to you to do transactions. You'd find, where's your gold reserve?

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: And I won't settle in US dollars with you. For my banking system here, you must first sign a currency swap with me using Shanghai currency. That is, he himself cannot. Since he's independent, he cannot issue currency himself.

Hou Chen: He can discover.

Wu Lü: He can discover. Why would I recognize your currency? That is, you're independent. If I think your currency will become worthless paper in three months, I can still trade with you. But, that is, the exchange rate would be terrifyingly high. In the end, we can only choose to use US dollars. Both sides trade in US dollars.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: So if Shanghai is creative, is it a big port? It's impossible for everyone to blockade it, right? Like, everyone, I'll blockade you.

Hou Chen: But that's what I said last time. A large number of goods exported from Shanghai port are from the inland. If you come, I'll export from Ningbo. Shanghai is not, Shanghai is actually a transit point.

Wu Lü: I'll ship everything to Ningbo, or to your Shandong port. That is.

Hou Chen: Then eliminate the store. But what I'm saying now is, where is the advantage of the service industry? That is, my father is from Shanghai, and I have no advantage in the service industry at all.

Wu Lü: It's about having, having, having, having the advantage of going to KTV in the Bund, and then going to bars, these things.

Hou Chen: It would be attractive to the surrounding areas.

Wu Lü: The advantage of Shanghai's service industry, many investment banks in Shanghai, is because Shanghai is a stock market.

Hou Chen: Exactly.

Wu Lü: It's because inland stocks go public in Shanghai. So this service industry has an advantage. If Shanghai cuts off from it, then I, the central bank, would immediately move Shanghai's stock market to Ningbo, or to Hangzhou. Why would you protect Shanghai's stock market?

Hou Chen: If the stock market moves to Hangzhou, then Shanghai loses this advantage. Capital would leave.

Wu Lü: There are many invisible connections within it. It's just too tightly connected. That's the problem.

Hou Chen: It's integrated.

Teacher Jia: Actually, it's one question: why does the state, why does the party-state govern Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan? It's because their centrifugal force is strong enough. The party-state has never said that Tongzhou is an inseparable part of the People's Republic of China, right? Because it's confident that Tongzhou won't.

Wu Lü: I think if we liken "Super Boy" to something unconquerable or insurmountable, then this problem will never be solved.

Hou Chen: It's not a difficulty, it's reality.

Wu Lü: The reality is, I might have the belief that there are always solutions. I might think that if these countries simultaneously became independent, then everyone would solve it in a market-oriented way, or in a transactional way.

Hou Chen: That's called provincial autonomy.

Wu Lü: The problem is military force, the problem is here. The problem is you cannot suddenly establish a market mechanism on a purely administrative coordination basis.

Hou Chen: Isn't this administrative rule backed by the military?

Wu Lü: No, no, no, no, no, many are various ministries and commissions of the State Council.

Hou Chen: Yes.

Wu Lü: Ministries and large central state-owned enterprises.

Hou Chen: Aren't they all the military?

Wu Lü: No, they're not.

Hou Chen: What ministries are there without an army?

Wu Lü: How could that be?

Hou Chen: No, if you don't have an army, why should I listen to you? Why should Shanghai take money?

Wu Lü: That's not right.

Hou Chen: That's not right.

Wu Lü: Exactly, if you don't have an army, why should I listen to your Beijing? That's really not it.

Hou Chen: It's really not.

Wu Lü: It's because you provide these administrative resources, you provide this system, you provide the State Council's management, you provide resources, you provide this tax system.

Hou Chen: Now you haven't provided anything either. For example, my entire Yangtze River Delta, can my Yangtze River Delta be independent? I, the Yangtze River Delta, am independent. Because you, you don't have an army fighting me. I can discuss anything now.

Wu Lü: Last time I immediately entered the national tool.

Hou Chen: I told you last time, truly, modern states are not maintained by the military.

Wu Lü: No, behind it must be the military. Because if I'm fully independent, you'll fight me.

Hou Chen: You could say that fundamentally, the military is the last resort, but there's no need to use it. Military means, that is, administrative capacity is very important in today's society.

Wu Lü: Why is there no need to move? If Xinjiang says it's independent now, they'll immediately attack you. That's what they want most.

Hou Chen: Now it's the military.

Wu Lü: Wu Lü assumes this situation: you say Shanghai is independent now, and then the whole city loses signal.

Hou Chen: Wu Lü, people aren't that foolish. Everyone blockading is independence. Because first, a central government has collapsed, and then everyone wants democracy, everyone wants independence. We start discussing how to democratize.

Wu Lü: How foolish of me. Everyone is coming to kill me with knives. I declare independence.

Hou Chen: Then you're actually suited to make connections in various provinces. First, it's a problem after an authoritarian government collapses. If the authoritarian government doesn't collapse, you enter a, you enter a chicken-and-egg problem. All established authoritarian governments. If the Greater Nanyue and the Free Shipping Nation don't declare independence, how can the central government collapse? These are two separate issues.

Wu Lü: There are many reasons for collapse.

Hou Chen: That's right. There are many reasons for collapse. The lowest-cost way to democratize in China is for everyone to enter democracy together. That's the grand coalition you're talking about.

Wu Lü: The grand democratic coalition you mentioned.

Hou Chen: I still say, after the central government collapses, there will be a place that wants to declare independence. They will declare independence at all costs. You think it's completely impossible. I certainly don't believe that.

Wu Lü: I think we can do an episode on this. Let's make another wish. That is to say, we've heard countless theories about China's collapse. But has anyone really thought about what that day would be like if China truly collapsed? You often see many people in the comments section saying China will be carved up by warlords. I say that's imagining the present based on the early 20th century. Where are the warlords? China didn't even have warlord fragmentation in the 20th century. It was all low-grade.

Hou Chen: Very low-grade.

Wu Lü: But at least there were provincial military leaders back then. Now, what about the commander of the Eastern Theater Command? Can he really understand? Does he really control the Eastern Theater Command? How is that possible? Where are the warlords now?

Hou Chen: But this is, that is to say, I think, I won't talk about this. I think the key question is, what does "China's collapse" mean? This is a very interesting question. I think regarding this kind of authoritarian government, central authoritarianism, it no longer exists. Or fragmentation.

Wu Lü: Wait, what we're imagining is what the signs of collapse would look like before that day. Would police nationwide suddenly stop working? Or would there be a nationwide power outage? Or would the Shanghai stock market crash? Or would all the parks be taken over by private enterprises? Or what? That is, for a modern country like China, how far can it collapse?

Hou Chen: At this point, you're a marriage offender at the civil affairs bureau. The civil affairs bureau is already closed.

Wu Lü: So if you think that way, will the Communist Party's rule last forever, for ten thousand years?

Hou Chen: Not necessarily. But this country, China, if you say it will be unified for ten thousand years, we won't discuss history anymore.

Wu Lü: No.

Hou Chen: Communist Party rule won't unify for ten thousand years. But China, as a basic administrative capacity, will always be maintained. China will absolutely never experience a day of administrative capacity vacuum. Are you talking about the concept of "pro-partner"? Is that it? The concept of mainland China.

Wu Lü: The concept of "pro-partner." You could say that. That is, China, apart from Jiangxi, Tibet, and Hong Kong, will absolutely never experience a day when this country suddenly has an administrative capacity vacuum; it won't happen. It can be non-Communist, it can be a democratic government, either is fine. But this country will absolutely not collapse to the point where administrative services are publicly listed.

Hou Chen: As long as it's not the Communist Party, that place takes too much tax, bears too much responsibility for the country, and there's no army ruling it. People say, "My region, the Yangtze River Delta, I want a popular duke, I want to establish a Yangtze River Delta Republic, or a Pearl River Delta Republic." And then you don't have an army to fight them, so how do you control it? Do you let the surrounding people blockade them? The surrounding people still want to do business with them. You don't have an army.

Wu Lü: This country doesn't even need to rely on the military. Because the state controls the power grid, controls PetroChina and Sinopec, controls China Telecom, and controls the power companies in surrounding provinces. Can't it just cut off your power?

Hou Chen: No, that's too simplistic. If Yunnan cuts off my power, Jiangxi might still be able to transmit electricity.

Wu Lü: What Jiangxi? You're assuming only Shanghai is independent. The rest of the places are still maintained by the central government.

Hou Chen: Yes. The central government. I'm saying if the central government exists, there's not even a possibility of independence. Because, as soon as you say independence, I'll immediately destroy you with the army.

Wu Lü: What you're saying about the central government is also a bit different from what Hou Chen said.

Hou Chen: And it's like this, I also don't believe that if any part of China became independent, the central government would send in the army to fight.

Wu Lü: Right now, whoever talks about independence gets attacked. I'll take Shanghai, if you don't believe me, kill twenty million people.

Hou Chen: If you don't believe that Shanghai would become an independent nation, those few people would be immediately arrested upon returning to the country. Would an army even be needed for that? It's something a police station could handle.

Wu Lü: But if it becomes an organized action, if the police station can't arrest you, and a large number of people go. The army would definitely have to go.

Hou Chen: This is not an army-level matter at all.

Wu Lü: I think the military is the only factor behind it. If this authoritarian factor of the military is gone, I think you're still looking at modern states with a 19th-century mindset. That is, citizens want independence, and the king dispatches the army to deal with them. That's the 19th century.

Hou Chen: Really.

Wu Lü: This question, I think we.

Hou Chen: I think China is a, China is actually, though backward, has many modern characteristics. These modern characteristics cannot be ignored. For example, uh, using the most advanced computer technology, and through this bureaucratic system, controlling what is almost the most complex and disproportionately large financial system and financial products globally. This is very developed globally. This aspect of China is very developed globally. So I would say, it's really possible that, for example, our control over surrounding minority regions might be lost, but the Central Plains Han majority, yes, I think this area will most likely be preserved.

Wu Lü: For the future, I'm saying, for example, if Guangxi wants to self-determine, ethnic self-determination, what do you do? If it's not an authoritarian policy.

Hou Chen: The Zhuang people were invented. So it might not happen.

Wu Lü: I'm saying, just for example, if they want ethnic self-determination, do you believe some places will pursue ethnic self-determination?

Hou Chen: Tomorrow, the central bank's seven-day, this seven-day short-term lending will stop. China's central bank, that is, all ICBC branches in Guangxi, the four major banks, will stop. No money can be withdrawn. What then?

Wu Lü: What then?

Hou Chen: Because China Construction Bank's Guangxi provincial branch definitely listens to the head office of China Construction Bank. Tomorrow, no money can be withdrawn. All ATMs are dead.

Wu Lü: You're talking about a problem.

Hou Chen: You can't get food, so you exchange for food.

Wu Lü: You can't. If your own province wants independence, who do you trade with? Do you trade with your own people?

Host: Alright, since this was originally a comment reading show, this issue has turned into a debate question. It's become a whole debate. But I think this question is very interesting. I think we can find an opportunity to discuss it next time. That is, if China truly collapses, and its finances go wrong, how far can it collapse? Because what Liu Zhongjing offers is the Great Flood, which is truly a complete loss of order. I think that's a bit scary.

Teacher Jia: Yes.

Host: You see, whether in the era of Comrade Keqiang or in the era of Li Qiang, the various ministries and commissions of the State Council and the Central Political Bureau spent a lot of time not working. What does it mean that it's the same with or without them? That is, how far can China's power vacuum go? Can it vacuum to the point where spontaneous order forms? Because I think the seriousness of this issue lies in the fact that we can imagine spontaneous social order, but spontaneous social order indeed requires a significant retreat of the government's administrative capacity to create space. Let me say something that might pain Wu Lü: even if China collapses, your Shanxi provincial governor will still be a Communist Party member.

Wu Lü: I'm not from Shanxi.

Host: Shandong.

Wu Lü: My thinking is that China's current unification is maintained by the military. It's not.

Host: I think it is.

Wu Lü: Your view is.

Host: I think it is.

Wu Lü: We can't ask again. Like the Soviet Union back then, the Soviet Union could also collapse. The Soviet Union was also a vast empire. So it could also collapse. But we.

Host: The Russian Federation cannot split.

Wu Lü: We are discussing now.

Host: You can't.

Wu Lü: Didn't Ukraine leave?

Host: That's not the Russian Federation.

Wu Lü: It's not of one ethnicity.

Host: No, he was the Soviet Union. He was also, at that time, a constituent republic. And they were.

Wu Lü: It's just a matter of time.

Host: All forms are the same.

Wu Lü: Their central governance system was not on the same scale as China's at all.

Host: You're talking about the later period.

Wu Lü: No, I'm talking about the early period.

Host: I think during Stalin's time, the rule was still very strict.

Wu Lü: It was also very strict.

Host: During Stalin's time, their autonomy was very high. Their self-governance was very strong. The Union Republics. This goes back to last episode's question.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Host: Never mind, I'm not a gambling theorist anymore.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes. But we're showing that I think this debate show can be done. Everyone's enthusiasm for debate is very high.

Host: Yes, yes. Otherwise, are your two positions preset?

Wu Lü: Yes, this is our own.

Host: Do you need to act? Or are you playing yourselves?

Wu Lü: My basic view is that the current unification is the result of authoritarian dictatorship. And it's the result of the military.

Host: I disagree.

Wu Lü: I disagree.

Host: Yes.

Wu Lü: If there isn't a military force behind it, it simply can't unify.

Teacher Jia: Wu Lü, you're half right. For example, why was China prone to fragmentation during the Eastern Jin, and then the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period? It was because of the power of cavalry weapons, and how much intervention capability they had to control a vast country. But then you'll find, why was there great unification after the Yuan Dynasty? From the Yuan Dynasty until now, 850 years of great unification. Why?

Wu Lü: The Yuan was unified by others.

Teacher Jia: We were unified by the Yuan. Both the Yuan and Qing were unified by others. Your case can only be made using the Ming Dynasty. But the Chinese part of the Yuan and Qing, that is, the Yuan Dynasty was not the Mongol Empire, it was also integrated.

Wu Lü: It's also integrated.

Teacher Jia: What I mean by this integration, its formation after the Yuan, this integration formed and became stable, was due to firearms, cavalry, and then the emergence of hot weapons. The Yuan Dynasty was already steeped in it, you know? It was steeped in the emergence of hot weapons. And its military capability was able to control such a large area. Alright, now it's not about military capability. Now it's various vertical and horizontal connections beyond military capability that make this area indivisible.

Wu Lü: My question is, if we remove this so-called indivisibility, would those places be better off in the future?

Host: This question is, going back to what I just said, how far can China collapse? That is, all these coordinations and administrations in China now, will there be a day, speaking realistically, will there be a day when China collapses to the point where these things are gone, leading to opportunities for various places to establish spontaneous order and maintain their own order?

Wu Lü: My opinion is that, for example, Hainan, more capital might have gone to Hainan, foreign capital might have gone, more people might have gone to that place. So it prospered. The three northeastern provinces might not necessarily be, that is, elderly, that is, completely failed enterprises, throwing stones at them. I think that's too pessimistic as well.

Host: Well, I think the first question we can discuss next time is, what do you imagine China's financial collapse would look like?

Wu Lü: Alright.

Host: No, I object to such discussions. I object to such discussions. The reason is that if we are a casual chat show, with some real-time commentary, then I shouldn't include speculative segments. Of course, we can speculate, occasionally. But I still prefer to comment on established facts. This is one type of commentary.

Wu Lü: But I think this isn't speculation.

Host: I think the reason it's not speculation.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Host: I think the reason it's not speculation is because, I understand what you mean. You want to design a path for China's future.

Wu Lü: No, he's not. Liu Zhongjing is a completely self-contained system. All of Liu Zhongjing's concepts—the Great Flood, this, this, uh, county-level middle schools, Wafangdian—are about China's entire internal system. That is, his system doesn't engage with external reality. Right? He doesn't need to engage. He thinks.

Host: Hmm.

Wu Lü: In the end, it's a whole. He even has an independent academic system. But I would say, I'm really not influenced by Liu Zhongjing.

Host: I know, I know.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Host: But I want to say that the reason this isn't speculation for us is because, at the very least, we are trying to engage in dialogue with present-day China. For example, why can't it become independent? We're talking about, uh, the West-to-East Gas Pipeline, the South-to-North Water Diversion. To what extent China will collapse, we're not trying to invent something—I understand you ultimately want to return to reality, of course, to reality. What we're discussing is its continuous relationship with reality. So I want to clarify that I am mainly influenced by Fukuyama. He says that the transition of a centralized, unified great power always comes at the cost of fragmenting into several smaller states.

Wu Lü: I, I, I even doubt Fukuyama ever said that.

Host: Is that what it means?

Wu Lü: I'll look it up for you later.

Host: Today I saw the chief designer and deputy chief designer of New China.

Wu Lü: No, no, no, no, no.

Host: Hey, absolutely not.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

Host: Life has hope again.

Wu Lü: Go back to China, go back to China.

Host: Alright, then we'll stop here. This episode was a very unqualified comment reading show, with two extra. It ended up extending the debate and changing it again. I think you two need to fight.

Wu Lü: So I'll solve it with violence, right?

Host: It means if culture doesn't work, then use force.

Wu Lü: I think this is a duel.

Host: Yes, a water gun duel.

Wu Lü: Water gun duel. But on these issues, I think the differences are huge, really huge differences.

Host: A divergence between belief and reality.

Wu Lü: Yes, yes.

Host: I think your inner strength is incredibly powerful. Truly powerful. Sometimes.

Wu Lü: Yes, I always feel that many people think. I think China's transformation requires such strong inner strength.

Host: No, I think the kind of transformation Chinese people imagine is like flipping a big pancake. This big pancake is still flipped over like this.

Wu Lü: I always think there's a problem with that.

Host: You need to cut the cake.

Wu Lü: I'm not cutting the cake.

Host: I'm not pursuing it either.

Wu Lü: But if it's cut into small pieces, it's easier to flip.

Host: I always believe that in a country as vast as China, there will always be factors of change within it.

Wu Lü: No, no. You must say there's a factor of change. For example, what kind of situation have I imagined? For example, uh, our current revered Dalai Lama has passed away. Then the Yuan sacrifice. He's already 90 years old, right? Hmm. Then perhaps the Tibetan mountainous areas, ah, would rise up completely, just like the 314 incident back then. You would have to deploy armed police from the Sichuan-Gansu line into Tibet. Hmm. Alright, then Sichuan and Gansu would be empty. There would be incidents like the Jiangyou incident. And then there would be the Wen'an incident. Alright, you'd have to deploy Hubei. Deploy armed police from the Hubei-Shaanxi-Jiangxi central line. You enter Sichuan and Guizhou. Alright, your central line is empty again. At this point, there would be thorny incidents. These mass incidents in the central provinces. All the way to the Pudong incident. Yes. And then you start deploying again. Deploy armed police from the eastern coast. You enter the central line. Once you enter the central line, the eastern coast is empty. At this point, what kind of direct incidents would you have? These in Hangzhou. These happen. At this point, there would be no armed police to deploy. What then?

Host: Military personnel.

Wu Lü: Only then can the "Free Shipping Nation" be established. Otherwise, there are no such conditions.

Host: I saw a second preview of the Boxer Rebellion.

Wu Lü: Almost. Yes, yes, yes. It's a step-by-step process. Otherwise, you'd suppress everything completely.

Host: Yes.

Wu Lü: See, I've made up for Wu Lü's army.

Host: I think next time, let's change the debate's endpoint. The focus. Let's ask, is the Communist Party's centralized rule maintained by the military?

Wu Lü: No.

Host: I think it's by the military.

Wu Lü: Okay, okay.

Host: I think it's by the machinery of violence.

Wu Lü: Next time, I'll tell you it's not this.

Host: Yes.

Wu Lü: I agree more with Hou Chen.

Host: Yes.

Wu Lü: Hmm.

Host: I don't think so either. Because he has too many tools in his toolbox.

Wu Lü: Hmm.

Host: Well, the military could be that toolbox. The military could be the body of that toolbox. Without that military, he couldn't even use that toolbox.

Wu Lü: I also say. We have logical discourse. The military is necessary but insufficient in this matter. Necessary, but far, far, far, far from sufficient. Without an army, he would be overthrown and cease to exist.

Host: Impossible.

Wu Lü: All sorts of our imaginations have appeared.

Host: He wouldn't be overthrown without an army. We can discuss this issue next time.

Wu Lü: OK.

Host: Alright, let's not get endlessly entangled here.

Wu Lü: Tomorrow there will be no army.

Host: Yes.

Wu Lü: Because I see.

Host: Tomorrow there will be no army. If it doesn't work now, Wu Lei will have to discuss this issue with me and others now.

Wu Lü: Yes.

Host: We'll debate this issue next time. It's been two and a half years.