双线博弈的战略极限:特朗普的地缘权力边界与俄乌不对称战争的质变风险 TED 2026-07-29

杠杆错配:美伊冲突的僵局本质

美伊冲突目前已进入第六个月,尽管双方都承受着巨大的经济与政治成本,但战火依然未能平息。其核心症结在于特朗普总统伊朗军方领导层对彼此手中筹码(leverage)的根本性误判。这与特朗普此前与中国的贸易战截然不同:在对华关税与中国对关键矿物实施许可制反击后,特朗普迅速意识到持续的对等报复(tit-for-tat)将给美国经济带来不可承受之重,因而选择妥协以确保市场稳定。然而在美伊博弈中,伊朗通过封锁霍尔木兹海峡(Strait of Hormuz)以及袭击波斯湾沿岸的基础设施与美军基地实施了强硬反击。

伊朗军方的底层逻辑是:他们能够持续封锁海峡,直到美国正式出让控制权,从而使伊朗能够借此攫取巨额资金并决定通行权;而特朗普则认为,即便海峡运力受损,美军也能通过持续打击迫使伊朗最终屈服。特朗普试图通过极限施压,迫使伊朗退回到先前的谅解备忘录(Memorandum of Understanding)框架内——即允许伊朗售油但不允许其控制海峡,而伊朗则坚持认为自己必须掌握主导权。

此外,中东还存在另一条副线:胡塞武装(Houthis)与沙特阿拉伯之间的冲突。作为伊朗的重要代理人,胡塞武装因霍尔木兹海峡关闭而加紧向沙特勒索资金,要求沙特预付100亿美元以确保红海的安全通行。尽管沙特在过去几个月中一直在为胡塞武装控制区的数万名公职人员发薪,并很可能最终通过提高价码达成妥协,但美国和伊朗均未直接参与这场相对独立的资金谈判。目前的冲突实质依然是美国与伊朗的直接对抗,以色列在现阶段并未直接参战。

Original English

Hi everyone, I'm Helen Wolters. I am head of media and curation at TED. Welcome to another edition of TED Explains the World with political scientist Ian Bremer. Today we are going to explain the current and future states of the wars in Iran and Ukraine. Ian, as always, thank you so much for being here to help us try to make sense of things.

Hi Helen, good to be back with you. All right, let's start in Iran, which is now entering its sixth month of conflict with the United States. And in just the last two weeks, we've seen attacks. We've seen counterattacks. None of the major issues between the two nations seem to be coming anywhere close to being resolved. So, what is your read of what is going on and what should we actually be paying attention to? So, I guess there are two different components that we need to think about. The first is why it is that the war is still going on uh given the clear costs um to everyone involved um in the United States around the world and to the Iranians. Um and and the second is how might we think about the potential for a resolution? So first why is it happening? because we had a a memorandum of understanding uh that was signed between uh the US and the Iranians and it was only a matter of weeks before that fell apart. And the issue here is that President Trump and the Iranian military leadership uh really fundamentally disagree about how much leverage they each have over the outcome. This is very different from what we saw between Trump and Xihinping when he hit out really hard on the tariffs and created a functional boycott and the Chinese hit back with their own tariffs and then the critical minerals licensing regime. And Trump realized, I do not want to get into a tit fortat continued fight with the Chinese. This is going to hurt me too much. I need to back away and I need to ensure stability. The Iranians have hit Trump back pretty hard. Hit the Americans back. They've hit them back in blocking the straight and they've hit the back in attacking targets across the Gulf, both infrastructure targets and American bases. But the Iranians believe they can continue to do that until they have control over the strait until they're given that control by the United States seated to by the United States so that they are able to get a lot of money um and determine who does and doesn't go through. President Trump's perspective is, yeah, they they may have been able to disrupt the strait, but I can continue to blow these guys up and ultimately they're going to have to capitulate. So, I don't accept that they can continue to wait me out. I need to show them by continuing to hit them harder that they're going to be forced to back away from the deal that was signed in the memorandum which Trump believes is the Iranians can sell oil but they don't have control of the strait. The Iranians believe no we have control. So that that's why we are still seeing fighting. I am you note that I'm mentioning fighting between Iran and the US and the blockade. I am not talking about the Houthis. There is a secondary fight going on between the Houthis and the Saudis. The Houthis are an important proxy of Iran. They see that they have more ability to get cash out of Saudi Arabia because the straight of Hormuz is now shut down. So they're demanding a whole bunch of money. They want $10 billion upfront from the Saudis to ensure safe packet passage. The Saudis don't want to give them that. But the Americans have no part of that negotiation. The Iranians are telling the Houthis to go, but the Iranians have no part of that negotiation. And as long as the Saudis pay off the Houthis sufficiently, which I suspect they will do, and they have been paying for tens of thousands of salaries in the Houthi controlled territories of Yemen for the last few months, as long as they up that rate sufficiently, that's not likely to be an ongoing fight. So, we're talking about Iran versus the US. um the Israelis for the time being not a direct part of that war though obviously they did initially go to war with the Americans back in February that's why it's still going on now

双向克制:战略极限与避险红线

尽管美伊交火仍在持续,但美伊双方在行动中均表现出了极大的战略克制(strategic restraint)。虽然霍尔木兹海峡目前处于封闭状态,但美军并未对伊朗的核心政治或军事领导层痛下杀手,也没有试图肉体消灭伊朗的新任最高领袖。在近期的密集空袭中,美军仅打击了极少数基础设施(包括几座桥梁、一座发电厂和一座海水淡化厂),绝大多数弹药都倾泻在纯军事目标上。伊朗的反击也严格遵循对等(tit-for-tat)原则:美军炸毁一座海水淡化厂或桥梁,伊朗便对等回击一个目标;美军空袭其军事基地,伊朗则瞄准美军驻约旦基地并造成人员伤亡。

这与2026年2月底至3月初险些爆发的全面战争状态有着本质区别。特朗普虽然口头上不断威胁要彻底摧毁伊朗的基础设施、降下“炼狱之火”,并且美军在波斯湾也集结了全球最庞大的军事力量,但他并未付诸行动。特朗普保持克制的深层原因在于,尽管他深知执政党在即将到来的中期选举(midterm elections)中大势已去,也做好了长期承受高油价的心理准备,但他同样清楚,一旦真的兑现其极限军事威胁,伊朗所能爆发的破坏力将是美国无法承受的——这不仅意味着美军将面临惨烈伤亡和军事装备的重大损失,更会直接危及波斯湾盟友的本土安全。正是这种对爆发全面战争后果的忌惮,将局势强行锁定在了这种危险却又相互克制的“非战非和”尴尬地带。

Original English

the other thing we need to talk about is the fact that despite the war still going on the Americans and the Iranians continue to act with a lot of restraint yes the straight is closed But the Americans are not hitting out at the leadership of Iran or the military leadership of Iran. They're not trying to kill the new supreme leader. They're hitting very few actual infrastructure targets. They've hit a couple bridges, a power plant, a desalination plant, but there are thousands of those in Iran. Most of the focus of the two weeks of strikes, 11 days of strikes has been at military targets. And the Iranians have hit back basically in a tit fortat way. So they get one desalination plant hit, they hit one. They get a bridge hit, they hit a bridge. But there's been a great they military they take military hits they aim at US base in Jordan and they cause uh some casualties there but but this is very far from the kind of allout war that we had back at the end of February the beginning of March and that is despite the fact that Trump continues to threaten that he's going to destroy all their infrastructure and he'll re hell upon the Iranians and he has of course a very substantial military, the world's largest, which is positioned to do a lot more damage, but he's not doing that. So why is there this level of restraint from Trump? And the answer is that even though Trump knows the midterms are lost and even though he is prepared to accept higher oil prices for longer, he knows that the damage that the Iranians can do in response to the United States actually following through on the big threats that he has made are unacceptable. unacceptable in terms of the casualties to American soldiers and military capabilities and unacceptable to American allies in the region across the Gulf. So that has if if the first set of factors that I mentioned have prevented us from achieving stability and reopening the strait, the second set of factors has prevented these resumption of hostilities from returning to allout war and the potential for broader confilration. And that that uncomfortable, unsettled, unstable middle ground is where we have now been occupied in the Middle East for the last several weeks.

能源韧性:油市对冲与博弈退路

在这场外交舆论战中,美伊双方对谁先主动求和各执一词。特朗普声称伊朗在遭受空袭后急于谈判,而德黑兰方面则予以否认,坚称是美方主动接触。鉴于双方长久以来的夸大其词,外界很难在缺乏直接证据的情况下采信任何一方。然而,美军在近期谈判期间确实主动暂停了空袭,这表明华盛顿正在积极寻找地缘政治退路(off-ramp)。

特朗普目前与幕僚闭门讨论的政策路线主要有三条:

  • 彻底放手:美军撤出,让卡塔尔、阿联酋和沙特等海湾国家自行谈判并出资向伊朗买单以解决冲突;
  • 继续施压并谈判:寄希望于近期海峡封锁和高油价对双方造成的经济阵痛,能迫使伊朗在未来的妥协方案中让步;
  • 军事升级:通过打击伊朗地下深处的镐头山(Pickaxe Mountain)加固核设施以展示强硬,并宣称彻底消除了伊朗的核威胁。 这三条路线短期内均无法促成海峡的立即重开。

尽管海峡关闭与制裁导致每日约1300万桶石油脱离全球市场,但全球并未爆发经济衰哀,油价走势也显著低于市场预期。这得益于全球能源系统的自我对冲:中国由于国内经济放缓,每日原油进口量减少了500万桶,极大地缓解了供需压力;同时,沙特避开霍尔木兹海峡的陆路输油管道(经阿联酋出口)开足马力,加之全球供应链能效的提升,稀释了部分冲击。不过,美国平民依然在为这场 vanity 战争买单,全美汽油均价已突破每加仑4美元。若剔除战争因素,油价本应维持在3.30美元左右,这意味着每个美国普通家庭仅在汽油支出上就多负担了600至700美元,这还不包括潜在的食品、化肥、氦气通胀以及对伊朗经济造成的超千亿美元毁灭性打击。

Original English

So how do you think or where do you think we go from this uncomfortable middle ground? Do you see or do you think that there will be even though as you say Trump has a sense of the um the ramifications of an escalation of war? Do you think that we'll see that? So Trump said uh that the Iranians wanted to talk after all these strikes from the US. The Iranians said not true. Actually the US reached out to us and they want to talk. This is one where it's actually kind of impossible absent direct evidence to know who to believe. President Trump or the Islamic Republic of Iran. And that's, you know, kind of a crazy thing to say, but the the the wildness of the exaggeration from both sides over the course of this war means that really you need to verify uh before you're just going on the face value of what the statements are. What we do know uh is that we have had uh now um some back and forth conversations and a few days of the Americans holding fire even after Trump said that these guys uh don't it's useless to negotiate with them there's no point you can't trust them all of this so showing a desire on the part of the US to see if there is an offramp um I don't believe that the Iranians have changed their negotiating position one iota since the memorandum. They want control. Now, privately, what Trump has been discussing with his adviserss have been three different options. Uh, one is that the United States basically walks away and that the Gulf States have to negotiate an outcome themselves. And this is kind of when he says maybe we do it without a deal. That's what he means. And so yes, the Gulf States will end up having to pay a lot of money directly to Iran, but that'll be negotiated by the cutteries, by the Emiratis, by the Saudis, not Trump's problem. Second is that they continue to work in direct negotiations with the Iranians to see if they can achieve some kind of compromise where the first time around it didn't work because now they've caused more damage and they've shown that they're willing to tolerate higher price of oil for longer, willing to actually implement a blockade. So even if they haven't caused much damage to Iran, they are showing a greater willingness to take pain and that that means that the Iranians might got not get paid off for a very long time if ever. So try that again. And the third option is some level of military escalation and this could be slight increase in what infrastructure you hit or going after the nuclear facilities. pickaxe mountain, very very deep underground hardened facility, uh, uranium enrichment capabilities. Trump has said on many occasions, they're never going to have nukes. They'll never develop nukes. So then he could say, at least in principle, see, I took away their capacity to do nukes, and so that's a win for me. Th those are the options that he's presently looking at. Um, none of them are likely to reopen the strait immediately. some risk greater damage and fighting. Um, but you know, I think you're talking about probably something between a month or two of the straight remaining closed and disrupted with no additional major military escalation to, let's say, 6 to 12 months of major disruption with some significant military escalation, but still not the kind of allout conflration across the Gulf. That's that's the the the bid offer spread, if you will. between where we might be heading in the coming months. Um, all of this with significant economic costs to the United States and around the world. It is worth remembering that I mean pretty much every world leader looks at this war and says President Trump and the Israeli prime minister, but they're basically blaming Trump because he's the superpower um causing damage to us and our economy through this war. Having said that, the damage is lower than a lot of people thought. The oil prices today um are lower than a lot of people thought. We're not in a global recession. And so even though the Iranians by closing the strait and the Americans with the blockade have taken 13 million barrels a day off of the global market and that's a lot. The Chinese are actually uh importing 5 million barrels a day less and that is a massive reduction of strain and stress on the global energy market. On top of that, there is a higher level of energy going through the east west route from Saudi Arabia. You've got a couple million barrels avoiding the straight going through overland UAE a pipeline and you have some diversification and efficiency gains. So there is a cost that cost is being paid even at the pump over $4 right now on average a gallon in the US. It would have been about 330 if you take the Iran war out. So that is a cost of, you know, about $600, $700 per family for every family in America because of this war. And that's just the gas price. That's not other inflation. We're not looking at fertilizer. We're not looking at helium. We're not looking at long-term food, any of that. We're not looking at the direct cost of the infrastructure damage that has to be rebuilt. We're certainly not looking at the civilians that have been killed in Iran and the hundred plus billion dollars of damage to their economy. All of that is destructive. And yet, if we went back to the end of February, the beginning of March, every market participant would have expected this would have been substantially worse. And there has been more resilience in the global economy.

信誉透支:vanity 政治与决策失序

受制于个人虚荣心(ego),特朗普绝不愿在舆论上承认被伊朗击败,这也是美国重回封锁路线的原因。然而,他在战略上迫切希望摆脱美伊纠缠,将外交重心转移到古巴、委内瑞拉以及整个拉美地区(即所谓门罗主义势力范围)。委内瑞拉大地震促使其过渡政府更加依赖美国,同时阿根廷的米莱(Milei)、萨尔瓦多的布克尔(Bukele)、秘鲁刚当选的藤森(Fujimori)、智利的卡斯特(Cast)以及哥伦比亚新政府等右翼政权的纷纷上台,使拉美局势正朝着极其有利于特朗普的方向发展。

然而,特朗普在内政外交决策上的失序引发了幕僚的极大恐慌。在战争信息透明度上,虽然出于国家安全和防止暴露防空导弹(如爱国者拦截弹,Tomahawk巡航导弹)严重短缺的考量,总统作为总司令在谈判期间隐瞒军备漏洞无可厚非,但他在决策层面的口无遮拦与说谎成性已经严重损害了美国的国家信誉。例如,他在没有与盟友达成任何共识、也无任何可行执行机制的情况下,擅自对外宣布将对通过霍尔木兹海峡的所有船只征收20%的“通行税”,随后被证实完全是凭空捏造。这种任性的决策风格导致其身边的核心幕僚极度沮丧,频繁向媒体和盟友泄密以求寻找停战退路。最讽刺的是,这位曾两次凭借“不发动新战争”承诺赢得大选的总统,在临近中期选举的关键时刻,却在自己挑起并打输的新战争中白白虚度了六个月的任期。

Original English

All right. So, I think you laid out really neatly the spread. I have to ask you, where do you where do you where would you put your money? I think Trump really does. Look, his ego is preventing him from letting the Iranians say that they won and uh that that is what brought us back to a blockade. But he really wants to move on. He wants to get to Cuba. Um he wants to get um to other parts of the world where it's easier for him to have wins. Um, and you know that is basically the Dawnroe doctrine. The Western Hemisphere, Venezuela's gone very well. Um, the the devastating earthquake in Venezuela only means the new Venezuelan government needs the Americans even more. And so they're having to accept a political transition that's moving more quickly than had been anticipated. on top of the oil deals, the mining deals, the financial deals, all the rest, you've got a whole bunch of governments that have come into play that are more aligned with President Trump, not just Mle and Argentina and Boule and El Salvador, but also now Fujimorei um just elected in Peru. You've got Cast in Chile. Uh you've got the new Colombian government, for example, uh having thrown pro out. I mean, all of these governments are folks that want to work closely with President Trump. And so, I mean, he would be doing a lot better and the headlines would be a lot more favorable if he was moving on. Um, and so I do suspect that after maybe this round of talks, maybe more strikes and another round or two, but I don't think we're going to see significant escalation. I I think it's more likely that Trump moves on. And that move on probably means that the bulk of the lifting with the Iranians will be done by the Gulf States. They will have to come to their own deal with Iran. Um we broke it, but you guys can fix it. That that is it is uh it is not the Pottery Barn solution for the Middle East. Uh Colin Powell notwithstanding. I think that makes sense. Do you think that a president or President Trump has a responsibility to tell the American people what is really going on? It seems like it, you know, as you say, there are there are kind of no straight stories here. So, how should the American people think about this? We we know that 18 US service members have died. We know that 1,700 civilians at least in Iran have died. So how how can we how can the like average lay person understand what is going on what the trajectory is in any kind of way that they can believe? I I do not believe that the commanderin-chief has an obligation to say things that will undermine America's negotiating position. So, if it is true that the United States is running desperately low of critical uh Patriot interceptors or tomahawk missiles and that would give the Iranians an advantage to holding on, I do not believe that the commander-in-chief uh should be straightforward with the American people about that at that time. At that time, I I I think there needs to be a full reckoning and transparency afterwards. But I I would not want I would not expect the United States president to say that. But I do expect that the American president needs to be clear and honest about what the purpose of the war is um about what the go war goals are um and how one would know if one has achieved them and they should be consistent and there should be a reckoning um for that over time. You go back and say did you actually get it right or not? There should be accountability, responsibility. The buck needs to stop with the president of the United States. That is not happening. Um and that is not happening to such a great degree that many advisers of Trump who are frustrated that he is uh subverting the national interest of the United States because of his own ego are leaking a lot um to members of the media to allies to others to say we need to find a way out of this war and the president doesn't listen. So um clearly uh irrespective of whether I believe the president has a responsibility to be straightforward on those issues with the American people, he does not believe that. And we have now seen so many occasions where from one day to the other uh the president says things that just are clearly not so. And I'll give you one particularly obvious example that quite pained me was a week ago on Monday when the president came out and announced all of a sudden, okay, we're charging 20% tolls on every ship that goes through the straight. We're going to collect I don't if you remember he said this a week ago money made the announcement, right? And this was patently not true. There was no way to implement it. It was intolerable to allies. There was no mechanism. There was no execution. There was no agreement. Trump just made it up and he said it and and obviously uh he never should have done that. But also his advisors should not allow him to do that. And you can say, "Well, they're not powerful enough." Well, if they're his adviserss, they have to have the ability and the willingness to stand up and say, "Sir, like you are damaging your own ability to run the country and and I cannot stand by and watch you destroy your own credibility. I can't stand by and watch you destroy your own ability to negotiate and come to a settlement in this war or to win um against your adversaries and with support of your allies. And this kind of thing is happening all the time on Iran because Trump is angry. He is embarrassed. None of it can be his fault. It has to be somebody else. But he doesn't have anyone to blame because he was the one that chose to go to this war. the only person he could potentially blame is the Israeli prime minister. But then it makes it seem as if Trump wasn't in charge of his own policy. He's getting jerked around by the Israeli leader, which he would never which first of all was not accurate. Trump made the decision, but even if it was accurate, he would never admit that. So he he has no ability to really blame anybody else here. And it's it's the fact that the president of the United States, Donald Trump, who twice ran and won on a platform of I will not start new wars, has like now wasted six months of his presidency in the run-up to the midterm elections having started and failed in a new war is kind of astonishing. It kind of beggars belief. It's astonishing. It beggars belief. It's also incredibly serious in every way, right?

盟友制衡:万斯介入与中东防线

美伊战争的直接军费成本已高达375亿美元,而国防部长皮特·海格塞斯(Pete Hegseth)已向国会追加67亿美元的拨款申请。加上卡塔尔被毁的液化天然气(LNG)终端重建(需耗资200亿美金且至少耗时5年)以及全球供应链通胀,这场战争的实际社会成本已高达数千亿美元。虽然其烈度不及越战或伊拉克战争,但这无疑是伊拉克战争以来美国最惨痛的外交政策灾难。特朗普曾年轻时利用家族关系逃避兵役以规避越南战场的危险,深知代价由无权无势的平民承担的道理,并借此赢得了反战选民的支持;而如今,白宫却只能通过“这可比伊拉克和越战好得多”这类拙劣的说辞来自我粉饰。

目前,饱受战火折磨的依然是9200万伊朗普通平民。他们在国内遭受军事政权的残酷镇压,而在外部又承受着制裁与轰炸。在这一背景下,以色列总理内塔尼亚胡访问华盛顿并会晤特朗普,极力游说美军对伊朗的核心领导层以及“镐头山”核设施发起毁灭性打击。然而,特朗普团队新近将副总统人选J.D.万斯(J.D. Vance)引入会议。万斯对内塔尼亚胡将美国拖入不符合自身利益的泥潭持高度怀疑态度,这与特朗普对以色列意图的戒备一脉相承,使得以色列推高战争烈度的企图极难得逞。同时,万斯为了给其2028或2029年的总统大选铺路,正试图在不公开激怒特朗普的前提下,与当前失败的对伊政策进行切割。甚至连退党媒体人塔克·卡尔森(Tucker Carlson)针对特朗普攻击和亲以政策的抨击,也被视为配合万斯树立独立政治形象的舆论默契。

Original English

I mean, if you just take the money side of this, there's already cost, I think, $ 37.5 billion. Pete Hexath has just asked Congress for I think another 67 billion dollars. So, it just feels like the cost to the American people, to the global public is just so astronomical. And it's like how is it possible that one man's vanity is actually able to cost this much for the world?

Yeah. I mean, we're not talking about a trillion yet, but I mean, if you look at the cost to the Iranian infrastructure, if you look, which has to be rebuilt, if you look at the cost to the Gulf infrastructure, I mean, just that one uh facility LNG facility in cutter, it's $20 billion and a minimum of five years to fix. Um, you look at the inflation costs all over the world for fertilizer, food, helium, um, prochems, plastics, I mean, everything with oil in it. You're already talking about hundreds of billions of dollars of cost. Um, and so I mean, no, it's not Afghanistan, it's not Iraq, but frankly, it's clearly the biggest policy mistake that any US president has made since the Iraq war. And that's that's astonishing again for a president who understands just how damaging these wars can be have been. For a president who when he was young used his family connections to avoid the draft because he didn't want any part in Vietnam because he understood that that was a bad war. He understood that that was a war he didn't want to sacrifice his own life for. I mean, he gets the fact that wealthy people have been able to do that. Poor people haven't. And so, he won in part by saying, "I'm not going to fight any wars on the back of unconnected, unwealthy people that can't get an exemption the way that I could." And that was a compelling thing to vote for. And and now, not so much. And the fact that he's, you know, the White House is posting, "Look at the Iran war compared to Iraq and Vietnam." You're not winning when you're comparing the damage that you've done to Iraq and Vietnam. I assure you. Indeed, you are not. Okay. One final question, which may be a bit outlandish, but I've heard people asking it, so I have to ask you, is should we be worried about an escalation to the point of a tactical nuclear deployment in Iran? Yeah. No, that's stupid. Okay, good. Um, not by the Americans, not by the Israelis who also have lots of nuclear weapons. Um this is the issue is not about military dominance in the region. The issue is that a very weak Iran has the ability despite its weakness to cause an immense amount of damage can bring um the global economy um not to its knees uh but certainly make it limp and hobble and and that um was not expected. That was wildly unexpected by President Trump on the back of his success in Venezuela when he decided to launch this decapitation strike uh against the Islamic Republic. And let us remember before we close this conversation on Iran, let us remember that the people that are suffering by far the most are the 92 million people in Iran. the ones that were killed by the thousands by this Islamic Republic back in January that the Americans have done nothing to improve their lives. If anything, their lives have gotten worse. The new supreme leader, the military that's in charge, they are different leaders. They are just as brutal. They are just as capable of repressing their population and they will going forward. Brutal. Brutal. So Trump is meeting with the Israeli president um Prime Minister I'm sorry, Prime Minister Netanyahu today in Washington. You talked about how in fact the US really drove this, but obviously Israel is super kind of pro anything that the US can do that is that damages Iran in any way. So what what do you think that they're going to be talking about today and what should we be listening for in the reporting to come in the next few days? Uh yeah, the Israelis would like to see the Americans step this up. They would be willing certainly to join if the Americans wanted to go after the leaders uh of the Islamic Republic that are in place today. Um and if they wanted to hit Pickaxe Mountain, this nuclear enrichment uh storage site, uh the Israelis would support that. Certainly, uh BB is going to try to push for that. But I note that JD Vance was added to the meeting um recently and he is very deeply skeptical about the Israeli prime minister and about Israel um trying to push for more American engagement in a war that is in more in Israel's interest than in the United States. Um and and I feel quite strongly um that uh that Trump is also mistrustful of what the Israelis are trying to get the Americans to do here. So, the relationship is solid. The integration of intelligence, defense forces, that's not changing under Trump at all. Um, but I think if BB's intention is to try to get the Americans to escalate, he is unlikely to be successful. Do you feel like Vance is like what's his role in this and what is his impact and effect on Trump? Well, Vance of course wants to be president in 2029. Um, it's very hard to do that if you are Kla Harris for Trump. So he needs to find a way to differentiate himself from the Trump policies that are failing um without undermining Trump directly because then Trump will put an ax to him. And you know I think one thing that's been very interesting is Tucker Carlson said he's no longer a Republican. He's leaving the party. Um but he likes JD Vance a lot. And I suspect that that has been orchestrated by Vance directly or by Vance's people with Tucker because it's quite useful to have someone like Tucker out there saying Trump bad, Epstein files, corruption, pro-Israel, all of that. But we like JD. Like that's allowing JD to be less Camalaike without him having to say here's what I disagree with on the Trump file. Uh, is that going to be enough? Um, I don't know. Especially because Trump's popularity right now, blended, is like 38% and he's going to get thumped in the midterms and that's not going to be easy to run on the back of. So, I mean, I would rather be running right now as a Democrat for 2028 than as a Republican, but that's a long way away and things can change. We don't know where the economy is going to be. We don't know what AI is going to look like. We don't know what the geopolitical space is going to be. But right now certainly the Democrats are in stronger position.

攻守易势:赢家逻辑与美乌新局

在乌克兰战场方向,基辅的局势正在发生积极变化。泽连斯基与特朗普在安卡拉北约峰会后的会晤取得了历史上最为融洽的成果。这表明两人的关系已彻底告别了早前泽连斯基在椭圆形办公室遭受训斥的阴霾。特朗普一贯信奉“赢家逻辑”(loves a winner),虽然他曾因泽连斯基拒绝调查拜登父子而极度愤怒,但如今看到乌克兰军队在没有消耗美国纳税人资金的前提下(由欧洲盟友全额买单),成功用无人机对俄罗斯本土纵深实施了有效打击,特朗普的态度发生了一百八十度大转弯。

目前,美方不仅向乌克兰提供了关键的实时目标定位卫星情报,还授权乌方在本土直接建立生产爱国者导弹(Patriot missiles)的许可生产线。尽管特朗普不会直接为乌克兰开具财政支票,但他极有可能在林德赛·格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)参议员的追思会后,顺应国会呼声对俄罗斯实施更为严厉的金融制裁。然而,乌克兰防线的走强并不意味着和平将至。普京目前拒绝接受任何停火协议,且随着俄罗斯在士兵员额短缺、本土遭受袭击引发民众对克里姆林宫怨气上升等重压下,俄乌战争发生质变和扩散的概率已远远超过了中东局势。

Original English

All right, so let's turn to Ukraine because another person that Trump is meeting with today is of course Zilinski. Busy day. Yes. Tell us what is that conversation going to entail and where is that war where are we at with that war right now? So as of right now I I took a look right before we started talking. Looked like the meeting was over. The initial readouts from the president of Ukraine were very favorable. I'm not surprised at all. The last meeting that the two men had together was in Anker at the NATO summit just a couple weeks ago. It was by far their best meeting historically. So we've moved on from him being yelled at in the Oval Office. Well, sure because Ukraine is winning now and and Trump loves a winner even more than he likes than he hates someone he's angry with. Then, and Trump was very angry with Silinski when he refused to open a a an investigation into Hunter Biden and Joe Biden, which which mattered a lot to Trump at the time. Um, but now he sees that the Ukrainians are able to uh fight effectively against Russia, that the Europeans are paying for all of it. The American taxpayers are not, and they're launching drones deep into Russian territory, and Trump is helping them. Trump is giving them the intelligence that's allowing them to target, just like the Russians are giving satellite intelligence to the Iranians, allowing them to target American bases in the Gulf, by the way. Um, which is one reason why Trump isn't really complaining about that because from his view, it's like, well, that's what happens in war. Like, you know, it's the same stuff. Um uh you the Ukrainians are getting support uh from the US as we saw a couple weeks ago in allowing them to have licenses to start producing Patriot missiles on their territory. They want to see that move forward quickly. Uh nobody's expecting that Trump is going to start writing them checks, but you might see more significant sanctions um against the Russians uh which Lindsey Graham had been pushing for. Now we have his uh his uh funeral his memorial services today. Um a lot of people will be talking about that. Um on balance the Ukrainians are in a stronger position, but that does not mean that now than they were 3 months ago. That does not mean uh that that Putin is going to accept a ceasefire. Um, and the danger is that as things go worse for Russia, in the lack of personnel that he has available to fight, in the economy starting to grip at home, uh, because of the Ukrainian strikes more than the sanctions, um, and also as the Russian people start getting angry with the Kremlin, getting angry with Putin, uh, what might Putin do? And, and that that that is a concern that I have. I'm much more worried that the Russia Ukraine war might metastasize in the coming year than I am that that might happen with the Iranian.

临界扩散:俄式不对称反击风险

随着正面战场压力增加,俄罗斯正加速将其手段转向针对北约盟友的不对称战争(asymmetric warfare)。莫斯科正在波罗电子海三国、波兰、罗马尼亚和北欧国家暗中资助破坏分子,实施纵火、破坏铁路、破坏仓库以及切断海底光缆等准军事行动,意图分裂北约内部共识。同时,俄方还在黑海袭击载有乌克兰粮食的商船,导致保险费率暴涨,使乌克兰90%的粮食出口受阻,企图制造全球性粮食危机;在波斯湾,俄罗斯则向伊朗提供美军基地的精确卫照数据,协助伊朗实施对美军雷达、机库和军营的定点精确打击。

尽管普京因面临中国、印度以及哈萨克斯坦等盟友的强烈反对,极难在战场上动用战术核武器,但随着其个人权力的极度孤立以及战局的恶化,普京似乎正滑向类似极端组织领导人的“与舰同沉”危险心态。哈萨克斯坦总统托卡耶夫(Tokayev)近期罕见地当面劝说普京接受无条件停火,释放了极其危险的政治信号。若非普京本人遭遇类似“普里戈任2.0”的宫廷政变或斩首行动,这场冲突在未来一至两年内仍将不可避免地向深渊滑落。然而,对全球秩序而言,最关键的启示在于“特朗普式颠覆”的边际效应已经见顶,其在关税、美俄私下交易以及迫使伊朗妥协等关键议题上的权力边界已清晰可见。全球多国开始建立对冲机制,布局一个摆脱特朗普政策阴影的“后特朗普时代”。

Original English

H So what does that look like if that war does metastasize? Well, they are already uh the Russians are already engaging in asymmetric warfare against NATO allies. uh they are providing money um for um Russians and others on the ground in the Baltic states in Poland, in Romania and the Nordics to engage in arson attacks, um vandalism. They've engaged in direct um strikes against critical infrastructure, uh warehouses, railways, um um fiber optic cables um in in the sea. Um, so I at the very least I expect them to step up that fight with the intention of driving a wedge inside European NATO, having some NATO countries say this is too much, this is too dangerous, we don't want to spend, we want to engage with the Russians. Harder to do now that Victor Orban is gone in Hungary, but still a useful strategy if you're Putin. I expect he'll do that. Um, I I think he will continue to provide more support to the Iranians to go after the US. It's very interesting that when you look at the Iranian strikes against US military bases, most of those drones are shot down. About 90% are shot down uh by American defenses. But those that hit um they are hitting exactly the targets they want to hit. There are no craters randomly um in the ground in these bases. They're going after radar. They're going after barracks. They're going after planes. These are things that move around a lot. they are clearly getting satellite data from the Russians. So, I find that very credible. Um, but you know, so there'll be more of that. And then the big question and and they're also they're now hitting the Black Sea. They're hitting all these Ukrainian ships because they're trying to create again a greater food shortage where the Ukrainians are not able to export uh food and 90% of the ships are unwilling to travel out even though Odessa is still functional. you can't get the insurance, you can't get the crews if the Russian will will hit you. Um, now the big question, and you asked me this about Iran, is might the Russians use a tactical nuke? The answer there for me is still no because I think the Chinese would strongly oppose it. The Indians, Kazakhstan, I mean, countries that that matter to Russia. I don't think they want to take that risk. I don't think Putin feels that desperate. But but I do recognize that at the end of the day there are no checks and balances on Putin. He does not get great information. He is getting much older. He looks more infirm and his situation feels like he's circling circling the drain. He's he's caused I mean you look at the mistakes Trump has made in Iran. That's that's rookie numbers compared to what Putin is doing in Ukraine and what Putin Putin is doing to his own country, to his own people, to his own economy. And I I do worry a lot that in another year or two years of this, if Putin refuses to accept the pushing and the nudging from friends, um that that he really should engage in a ceasefire that that we could end up in a situation where Putin could take some calamitous decisions, that he would he'd be willing to go down with the ship the way that, you know, a a US or a Chinese leader would not. Um, but you know, the head of ISIS would, the head of Hamas would. I I worry that Putin right now is in between those those two sorts of leaders and he's trending towards the latter. Yikes. Do you think what what do you think, if anything, could nudge him towards accepting a ceasefire, or does he have to win this war outright? Is he, you know, does he have that kind of Trump thing of having to look like he won? I think it will help that um the Chinese are starting to make that case. I thought it was good that uh President Tokaya from Kazakhstan met with him earlier this week and said directly, I really think you should do a ceasefire here. This war is not helping anyone. He wasn't saying give back any territory. We said just the ceasefire, you know, like Zilinski already said that he would accept a ceasefire without preconditions. You do the same thing. Be willing to sit down and talk. Tokayaf would not have said that 6 months ago. He's saying that now. Uh I think that's interesting. I think that's important. He he may be throwing his hat in the ring to be the next UN Secretary General, by the way. So there's there might be an agenda there. But nonetheless, uh that would have been particularly unwelcome news for Putin. So I think that will help. Um and again, it's not like Putin, I mean, yes, he has a war economy. He needs to keep going. He can't like he has nothing to do with these people if they come back home. So there will be other stresses, but ultimately Putin's in charge. uh Putin has a security uh mechanism around him that that he runs, but Putin's also isolated. So, I mean, one other way um that this ends is if Putin's done for. If there is a, you know, a limited palace coup that takes him out or if the Ukrainians were able to target and take him out and and believe me, if they had an an open shot at him, they probably would. They know that he's doing the same against Silinski. So I mean I think that there's there's like the easy way which is Trump Putin actually accepts uh there's the easy way which is Putin actually accepts okay we got to like you know calm this down um or there's the harder way which is you know progosion plus um and and because this guy is driving the economy in the ditch but absent those two things it gets worse it gets worse and you know we are seeing that the Russians are they're stepping up their attacks on civilian targets inside Kiev. And as they do that, the Ukrainians are going after all these refineries across Russia. I mean, this is not this does not look like we're about to have a ceasefire, right? So, we have to wrap it up pretty quickly, but one final question is that as you're surveying the environment, you're looking at the landscape. What is the one thing that you're waiting for like a shoe to drop or what is the one thing that we should all be looking for in order to have a better understanding of what actually is going on? I I think that we've actually passed peak Trump disruption on the global stage. His ability, whether it's on tariffs and hitting the Chinese or it's on Russia and doing a deal over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians, or whether it's Iran and forcing them to capitulate, like ultimately the limits on Trump's power globally have become more clear. That will become even more so after the midterm elections in November. And seeing countries being able to hedge, stand up for themselves, look forward to what a postTrump America relationship is like, those are things that are going to become more clear, I think, and more clarifying to us um over the course of the coming months. So Ian, thank you. We're no doubt going to call on you to help explain what is going on over the next few months, but always grateful for your wisdom and your insight. Be well. Have a wonderful day, and we'll see you soon. Happy summer, everybody.

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