谁在阻碍和平?伊朗强硬派与温和派的权力暗战 New York Times Podcasts 2026-07-28

德黑兰的暗流:盛大国葬背后的复仇怒火与权力分裂

在经历了连续13天的空袭后,美国与伊朗达成了暂时的停火协议。然而,这种平静极其脆弱。就在美伊签署临时和平协议、伊朗举行前最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊(Ali Khamenei,因遭美以空袭身亡)的盛大国葬期间,这种脆弱性暴露无遗。

尽管伊朗政府精心排练并严密监控了整个国葬仪式的媒体报道,试图向外界展示举国同悲的团结画面,但聚集在德黑兰街头的数百万哀悼者所展现的情绪,很快从悲伤硬化为愤怒与反叛。在哀悼现场,写有英语、阿拉伯语和波斯语“复仇”字样的横幅、海报和旗帜随处可见。

更具象征意义的是,这种“复仇”的呼声直接转化为对本国温和派和谈判代表的激烈反弹。务实派(Pragmatists: 主张通过外交谈判缓解制裁并开放经济的温和力量)的代表人物,包括伊朗总统佩泽什基安(Masoud Pezeshkian)和外交部副部长阿拉格希(Abbas Araghchi),在出席悼念活动时遭到了群众的围攻。佩泽什基安总统险些被愤怒的强硬派推倒,高喊着“消灭妥协者”的口号,最终在安保人员的护送下仓皇撤离;而阿拉格希则遭到石块袭击,被骂为“叛徒”。这表明,在政府试图通过外交平息局势时,其核心政治根基正与决策层发生剧烈撕裂。

段落之间必须包含逻辑衔接句。在德黑兰街头的反妥协情绪达到顶点后,这种内部分裂迅速从言语抗议演变为实际的军事挑衅。

Original English Source Michael Barbaro: After 13 consecutive days of air strikes, the United States and Iran have temporarily paused their fighting. But the conflict could resume at any moment. And inside Iran, a small but powerful faction is determined to make sure that it does. Today, Abdi Latifah and Farnaz Fassihi explain the profound divisions within Iran about whether to keep fighting or to try to make peace. It's Tuesday, July 28th. This was a very choreographed event from the beginning. A few weeks ago, the Iranian government allowed my colleague Abdi Latifah to hear into the country. Abdi Latifah: Immediately we landed in Tehran. We got through immigration and essentially you were met there by your minder. Michael Barbaro: It was not long after the US and Iran had signed a tentative peace deal and Abdi became the first Times reporter to get into Iran in months. Abdi Latifah: We had two government-appointed translators and a guide who pretty much went everywhere with us. We could not leave the hotel essentially without planning with them where we wanted to go, what we wanted to see. Michael Barbaro: And he was there for a very specific purpose to observe the multi-day funeral service for Iran's former Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who had been killed by the US and Israel in the early days of the Iran war. And Abdi says his every movement at the funeral services was heavily monitored. Abdi Latifah: They listened in on pretty much all the interviews and one of the minders was also very open with us and essentially he told me that yes at the end of every day he basically was expected to like send a report about our activities where we went what we did during that day. Michael Barbaro: Abdi, why do you think that Iran let you into the country? What do you think that they wanted you to see? Abdi Latifah: I think they definitely wanted us to see the way people had come out to mourn Ali Khamenei the supreme leader. So we were very much in the middle of the capital the center of Tehran for days on end. You couldn't escape the soundscape that was coming from outside. The chanting, the mourning, the wailing. You kind of felt like you had been signed up for this very much stage managed choreographed scene. So you had the first day where the dignitaries from all across the world came to pay their respects and then there was a procession held at the Azadi square in which the body of Khamenei and his relatives were now being viewed by the public and there were millions who showed up that day throughout the day and essentially like you know came to see the bodies despite the heat, despite the haze, despite everything else. People came from all over the country. They were young. They were old. They were on wheelchairs. They were on crutches. The journalists were definitely being allowed to like go on bridges and on top of the buildings so that we could see the sea of people who were coming through. So you definitely got a sense that even the access to these buildings were choreographed in such a way that it was like you had to see you had to experience how everybody has come from all over the country to mourn their leader. Michael Barbaro: And is grief the prevailing feeling that you get from this crowd? What exactly are you hearing from them? Abdi Latifah: You know, many people, you know, were in tears, they were very sad, but they even when they were crying, their expressions would very quickly harden into anger and defiance. I remember talking to this woman. Her name was Fereshteh Sultan Ali and I watched her for a while before I approached her because she was carrying this flag that talked about revenge and but she was like really in tears and at some point when she calmed down like you know I approached her and very quickly this idea of negotiations came up and she was very opposed to that. Fereshteh Sultan Ali: I'm against these negotiations. Reach out in the streets, don't negotiate. Just revenge. Abdi Latifah: And I was like, well, it seems like the guns have silenced now and essentially that has even allowed for this massive funeral to happen. And she said, yes, that's okay, but we do not want these talks. We do not want these negotiations. We want revenge for our slain leader and we want revenge for everyone else who was killed and all the institutions that were impacted. And she said something that I will not forget: Trump cannot scare us with death. In other words, we're willing to die in order to seek this revenge. People did not want diplomacy. They did not want the talks. They were not for compromising. There was definitely a lot of calls for the killing of Trump. There was definitely a lot of death to America, death to Israel. And I think if there's one word that really defined these public mourning ceremonies, it's the word revenge, which we saw that written in English, in Arabic, in Farsi. It was on banners, it was on posters, it was on flags. Like, you know, people were wearing shirts that basically said that. And pretty much like the dozens and dozens of people that I interviewed throughout my time in Iran at these massive ceremonies and processions, that is the message everybody wanted to leave with me, that we will not compromise and we want revenge for our slain leader. Michael Barbaro: The timing of what you're seeing here seems extremely important because these crowds demanding revenge, demanding that Trump be killed, they know full well that their government has just signed a peace agreement, this memorandum of understanding with the United States and with President Trump. And what they're calling for is the exact opposite of that. So how do they square that? Abdi Latifah: So during these public mourning ceremonies, the public very much showed how they felt about some of these political leaders who had gone and had taken part in the negotiations with the United States. So you had Iran's president and Iran's foreign minister showing up to these events and they were confronted and targeted by crowds who basically were very angry at the fact that they had taken part in these diplomatic talks. President Pezeshkian, you know, was nearly knocked to the ground by these crowds who were shouting death to the compromiser, death to the appeaser, and his security forces essentially rushed to evacuate him. You had foreign minister Araghchi who some of the people in the crowd started throwing stones at him. They were very hostile. They were chanting, you know, basically calling him a traitor and essentially he also had to flee the scene where he was. And it was so indicative of the ways in which revenge and avenging the Supreme Leader had become so central to how people, at least the people who showed up for these ceremonies, felt about that. Michael Barbaro: Right, because in this highly choreographed scene that the government is putting on and wants you to see, the mourners are actually turning on the government's leaders. That's how deep these divisions are. Abdi Latifah: Exactly. And you have like all these hardliners, right, who are very much opposed to these negotiations and diplomacy with the United States. And the only thing that they talk about and they think about and they repeat consistently is that we want revenge. Revenge.

海峡炮火:革命卫队强硬派对和谈的公开“兵变”

就在国葬大典结束、悲伤情绪达到顶峰之际,这场政权内部的战争直接演变为军事挑衅。在未获得德黑兰官方指挥部公开授权的情况下,伊朗武装力量在霍尔木兹海峡袭击了三艘美国船只,导致美伊刚刚达成的脆弱和平协议瞬间破裂。

根据美国官方和伊朗外交渠道透露的消息,这次袭击是伊斯兰革命卫队(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: 掌控伊朗大量军事与经济命脉的精锐武装)中的激进强硬派擅自决定的行动。这一“流氓”军事举动不仅震惊了华盛顿,也完全超出了伊朗总统和外交部的预料。强硬派的目的极其明确:通过在关键海域制造军事冲突,彻底废除美伊达成的谅解备忘录,将国家重新拖回战争状态。

强硬派不惜以整个国家9000万人口的安全为赌注,选择“以下克上”的军事冒险,彻底暴露出伊朗权力结构内部的严重失控。对于这起震惊国际的霍尔木兹海峡袭击,伊朗政府罕见地没有发表任何官方声明来认领责任。这也从侧面印证了,伊朗行政官僚体系与革命卫队激进军官集团之间,已经陷入了严重的系统性分裂,伊朗政权正在“与自身开战”。

在革命卫队激进派公开挑战文官政府权威的同时,这股强硬力量在伊朗国内政治光谱中的实际分量,也需要更客观的审视。

Original English Source Michael Barbaro: It was amid these intense calls for revenge as the Ayatollah's funeral drew to a close that the divisions Abdi saw on the streets played out on an even bigger scale. In a surprise move, Iran struck three ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Reporter: A US official telling me that this was a gross violation of the memorandum of understanding by Iran. Michael Barbaro: And that delicate peace agreement with the United States began to crumble. After the break, my colleague Farnaz Fassihi on the war playing out inside of Iran's government. We'll be right back. Farnaz, Abdi just described this profound divide that was on display during the Ayatollah's funeral between hardline religious supporters of the regime and the government officials who negotiated a peace deal with the US. And when Iran attacked US ships, the first question, I think quite logically was who was responsible for that decision? And had these hardliners persuaded the government to restart this war? Farnaz Fassihi: Well, that's a really good question. I think we haven't reached a definitive answer on exactly who made the decision or how what has been seen as a provocative act to attack these ships really came about. Right after this, the United States said in briefings to our colleagues that the Iranian mediators that they'd been in touch with told the United States that it wasn't us, that these were like rogue hardline elements within the revolutionary guards that had decided to attack the ships. I think this was one of the very few and only attacks that they didn't officially claim and issue a statement saying, "We did this." Michael Barbaro: Huh. Farnaz Fassihi: When I reached out to sources, I heard the same thing from a source that the attack on the ship came as a surprise to the president, to the foreign minister, and it was sort of seen as hardliners who have been advocating to drag Iran back to the war and derail the talks taking this kind of an action. Michael Barbaro: I mean, I just want to say that that's quite an extraordinary prospect that hardliners were so intent on ending this peace process and undermining the memorandum of understanding that had been reached by the official Iranian government that they would launch an attack against the United States to do that. Farnaz Fassihi: Exactly. It's extraordinary because if this is true, if the hardliners would on their own without central command decide to take such a consequential step with massive consequences for Iran, for the 90 million people there, for the region, what does that say about sort of the disarray within the Iranian rank and file? Like who made that decision? This speaks to the massive divide in the system at this very pivotal critical time in the country's political history. It seems like Iran's government and leadership is at war with itself.

双星博弈:杰利里极端派与卡利巴夫务实派的路线之争

虽然伊朗高层的政治派系博弈由来已久,但当前的斗争性质发生了根本性变化:它不再是“保守派”与“改革派”之间的对抗,而完全是保守阵营内部的自我分裂。在这场权力版图中,主要存在两大针锋相对的保守主义分支:

  • 第一派是以极右翼政治家赛义德·杰利里(Saeed Jalili)为首的极端强硬派。他们抱持绝对的意识形态至上论,主张“绝对不与美国接触,必须彻底消灭以色列”。虽然这一派在9000万伊朗人口中属于少数(民调估计仅占10%至20%),但他们是神权政体最狂热、最忠诚的阶层。每当政权需要动员街头力量时,这群人就会扮演最坚硬的基石,因此政权无法将他们边缘化。
  • 另一派是以议长穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫(Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf)为首的务实保守派。卡利巴夫多次在国家电视台上明确阐述其逻辑:外交谈判不是投降,而是将伊朗在战争中获得的筹码转化为现实的经济与政治红利。这一派认为,伊朗不能无休止地战斗下去,必须解除制裁并重振几近崩溃的国内经济。

在两派斗争的夹缝中,高达70%至80%的“沉默的大多数”普通伊朗民众,正在承受近400%的食品通胀。他们通过数字化请愿等形式表达绝望,甚至嘲讽强硬派立法者“应该搬到轰炸最激烈的伊朗南部,去亲身体验一下他们每天叫嚣的战争代价”。

随着内斗的白热化,两派都将视线投向了那个决定政权合法性的核心符号——新任最高领袖。

Original English Source Michael Barbaro: Well, Farnaz, that's really what we want to talk to you about as such an expert on the internal workings of Iran. This emerging war inside Iran over the war itself and who is winning at the moment and what it means for the future of the conflict. So help us understand the various factions that are currently at war with each other. Farnaz Fassihi: Well, I'll start by saying that political differences and infighting within Iran's political circles is not new. They've always sort of existed in Iran's modern politics, the Islamic Republic's rule. But what's really new here is that it's happening within the conservative camp. Right? You've traditionally had the conservatives that sort of believe in a more ideological view of governing and the reformers who wanted to keep the Islamic Republic rule but reform and change. But that's not what's happening now. Within the conservative group that runs the country right now, that holds power, which includes the powerful revolutionary guards generals, there's major differences and fractures. Michael Barbaro: Okay. Well, help us understand the divisions within this conservative world of Iran's leadership. So on one side you have the ultra hardliners led by a politician named Saeed Jalili. They have a worldview that says Iran must never engage with the United States. Israel must be destroyed. That this ideological Islamist extremist view that was sort of the beginning of this revolution is very much how they plan to rule, right? Don't talk to the United States. Continue fighting. Farnaz Fassihi: And this faction is a minority but still has constituents. They're the people that come out every time the government wants to rally its supporters onto the streets. And at the funeral of the late senior, these are the people who were bused from all over the country, came out in millions, were you know waving red flags of revenge. So this is the core constituent of the system. Michael Barbaro: Got it. And thus they can't really be ignored and set aside, right? Because they're always there no matter what. They always show up for the regime, right? So this is the religious base and foundation for this theocracy. Farnaz Fassihi: Exactly. They're the foundation for theocracy. If I were to say what their numbers are in Iran's 90 million, I would say somewhere between 10 to 20% judging from the numbers of the polls where they always show up and the candidates that they pick. So they are a minority, but they're a very vocal and loyal minority. Michael Barbaro: And who's on the other side of this divide? Farnaz Fassihi: So on the other side of the divide is really the senior leadership of the government and many powerful generals of the revolutionary guards. This coalition represents the pragmatics within the system. General Mohammad Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament and the person leading negotiations with the United States, has done repeated interviews on state television and has said in statements that look, we have to take whatever leverage we've gained in the war and turn it into diplomacy. That diplomacy is not a sign of defeat or surrender, but we can actually make some gains by negotiating with the United States. We can't fight endlessly. We have to open up Iran economically. We have to get rid of the sanctions. So this group is of the view that these hardline policies of let's fight until our last breath, let's drag the country into chaos and instability is not really the direction they want to take the country. Michael Barbaro: Right? So these would seem to be the peace seekers, the people who struck a deal with the US because they want to preserve what's left of their country and rebuild it rather than fight endlessly at the risk of having nothing left in Iran at the end of this conflict.

阴影中的领袖:穆什塔巴的失语与地缘政治继承危机

在阿亚图拉哈梅内伊遇刺后,他的儿子穆什塔巴·哈梅内伊(Mojtaba Khamenei)成为了新一任最高领袖(Supreme Leader: 拥有伊朗国家最高决策权的最高职位)。然而,新领袖非但没能平息内斗,反而让权力真空进一步扩大。

由于在美以空袭中 compound 被炸,穆什塔巴据称面部严重烧伤、声带受损,出于对被暗杀的极度恐惧,他长期处于隐秘状态。在国葬期间,他未能公开露面或发表任何音频声明,仅通过书面文告要求各派“搁置分歧,以免向敌人示弱”。但这种书面文告在强硬派眼中毫无分量。强硬派甚至公开质疑外交谈判的合法性,指责务实派政府越过最高领袖发动了“政变”;而务实派政府则坚称所有的妥协和谈判都得到了最高领袖的直接授权。

穆什塔巴面临的根本困境在于合法性的流失。与他的父亲相比,他缺乏深厚的宗教与政治威望,无法一言九鼎。更关键的是,如果他公开站出来支持务实派的和平协议,在强硬派看来,这就等于宣布“完全信任美国和特朗普总统”。而在伊朗神权政体以“反美、反以”为核心建国神话的背景下,彻底放弃反美立场,可能动摇神权统治的根基。因此,穆什塔巴最现实的选择是继续留在阴影中进行政治骑墙——如果和平带来经济改善,他将分一杯羹;如果协议破裂,他也能随时将责任推给文官政府。美国击杀老哈梅内伊本意是摧毁其革命狂热,却意外催生了一个更加失控、高度军事化且缺乏绝对权威的伊朗政权。

Original English Source Michael Barbaro: Does this group include Iran's current supreme leader, the son of the late Ayatollah who was killed by Israel and the US? That would seem to be a key question. Farnaz Fassihi: It's a key question because both sides are trying to claim Mojtaba the new supreme leader. He's been absent from view because he's in hiding fearing assassination. Michael Barbaro: Right? We've talked about this. Farnaz Fassihi: And nobody has heard his voice because sources say that his face was burned in the air strikes on their compound and his vocal cords were damaged. Michael Barbaro: And I think this absence has created a real void. And in that void where the father used to have a yes or no vote, he had authority to have sort of a final say over matters. The son doesn't have that authority. He doesn't have that religious clout. He doesn't have that political clout. So this has created a kind of space where these divisions can fester. You're saying without a supreme leader who can shut down these kinds of divisions or paper over them and call the shots, then even though, for example, the hardliners are a minority, they can exert a fair amount of influence, they can perhaps, I know we're not sure, even maybe restart the war because there isn't a strong enough person to ensure that there's real unity in the leadership. Farnaz Fassihi: Right. Exactly. There's no unity in the leadership. You know, I think that Mojtaba to the extent that he's issued written statements has said, "Put your differences aside that these divisions are being closely watched by Iran's enemies and it suggests that we're weak." But nobody's really listening to him. I mean, that's the remarkable thing. Like you have like the hardliner supporters in rallies shout the only way we will believe that Mojtaba supports this deal or supports the policies is if we hear from him directly or we see him. And lawmakers that are aligned with the hardliners have even publicly accused the government of staging a coup to bypass the supreme leader. Michael Barbaro: So the hardliners, if I'm hearing this correctly, are suggesting that the pragmatists making peace with the US may be doing that without the authorization of the supreme leader. They're questioning the legitimacy of the peace process. Farnaz Fassihi: Exactly. And in its own defense, the pragmatists have all come out and said, "Look, everything we're doing is with Mojtaba's approval. We would not make any critical decisions including negotiations or concessions to the United States without the supreme leader's involvement and we have his backing. So this is both sides trying to claim support of Mojtaba and Mojtaba being on their team without him really coming out clearly and saying which side he's clearly endorsing. Michael Barbaro: So far, Farnaz, you're really describing a conflict within Iran's government. This small group of hardliners who are undoing the work of a much larger group of pragmatists. Based on previous conversations you and I have had on this show, I feel safe in assuming that the majority of Iranians, you've often put it at 70 to 80% of the country's population, just want peace and just want to go about their lives and are not so attached to any one vision of an ideology in Iran that they don't like the fact that this peace has been disrupted by the hardliners. So what are they saying and do they have any influence over any of this? Farnaz Fassihi: I think that there is a very large silent majority of Iranians who don't want the war but also don't necessarily like the Islamic Republic regime or support it. They feel like their lives and livelihoods are being upended by these radical decisions that the hardliners are making with very direct consequences on their lives, on their safety, on their future. And they are very angry at the hardliners and they are saying that we didn't want the war. We don't want our infrastructure to be ruined. The economy is at a near collapse. There's 400% inflation on basic groceries. So, Iranians are under tremendous amounts of pressure and uncertainty. And we hear this all the time that the majority of Iranians feel like they are caught in the crossfires of the United States, Israel, and the regime, and they're being squeezed, and nobody's really thinking about their well-being and what they really want. There was this online petition that was going on that really captured this sense where Iranians were digitally signing on to this petition saying let's send all the hardliners, the lawmakers and the politicians who are calling for constant war to the south of Iran where they would be under nightly bombardments and they would see the consequences of what they're advocating for because they're sitting in the safety of their bunkers and they're advocating for war against the country, its infrastructure, and its people. Michael Barbaro: Well, Farnaz, let's say that the Supreme Leader were to decide in the coming days or weeks that he's fed up with this infighting, that he recognizes that a minority within a minority, the hardliners within the conservative leadership are dragging the country back into war. And he's tired of it. and he were to make a public appearance, use his own voice, let's say that's suddenly possible, which could in theory satisfy these hardliners who, you know, really want to hear from him directly, and he says, "Stop it. Enter the peace process. Honor the peace process. Let's rebuild Iran. Let's end this phase of this conflict." Could he do that? Would that message carry enough weight to silence these hardliners? Farnaz Fassihi: It's a very good question, but it's one that remains unclear. Partly because Mojtaba was a man in the shadows. Not a whole lot is known about him or his style of leadership, right? So, it's really hard to gauge exactly how he will rule when he surfaces and how much clout he will have. It's also a very risky prospect for him, Michael, because to do that, he would essentially have to declare that he fully trusts the United States and President Trump and that despite the many times that the US has in Iran's view negated its obligations both under the first nuclear deal, exiting from that and then attacking Iran in the midst of negotiations several times, that he's sort of saying that I put my full trust in this deal with the United States. That's a very difficult thing I think for Iran's supreme leader to do. So I think more realistically, even when he emerges, he's going to try to navigate everybody and try to appeal to all sides just to allow himself a little bit of leverage everywhere and enough distance to claim it if it works and disown it if it falls apart. So the reason the Supreme Leader is unlikely to ever take sides as firmly as I just outlined is because it would risk his legitimacy with the hardliners in a way that he cannot tolerate. Michael Barbaro: Right. Farnaz Fassihi: Exactly. I mean, you have to remember that the Islamic Republic was created on this idea of fighting America, fighting Israel, of anti-western ideals. And for the Supreme Leader to completely do away with that and for the hardliners to set aside that animosity and that hostility, it would basically be the end of the Islamic Republic as we've known it. And if that's gone, then what is left of the Islamic Republic? It's going to be a new Iran, a new system. And I think that's why they're fighting so hard because they know if the pragmatists win, if really a peace deal, lasting peace deal with the United States works, that they're going to basically be even more marginalized. And what's now become very clear is that when the United States and Israel started this war, they thought that taking out the Ayatollah would mean taking out this revolutionary fervor and toppling it. and instead it's still very much alive and still too potent a force for even the Ayatollah's son and successor to confront. Michael Barbaro: That's exactly right. I mean, you've heard President Trump say repeatedly that the wars brought regime change in Iran, but there's been no regime change. And in fact, what we're seeing is that the country has become more militarized, that the hardliners are becoming more entrenched, and that Iran's now being led by a supreme leader that doesn't have the kind of absolute power and clout to guide things one way or the other. Michael Barbaro: Well, Farnaz, thank you very much. Appreciate it. Farnaz Fassihi: Thank you for having me, Michael. Michael Barbaro: In an interview with NBC News, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, acknowledged that divisions inside Iran's government have made it increasingly difficult for the Trump administration to negotiate a peace deal. Mike Waltz: What we are constantly seeing is on the Iranian regime side, they are divided. There is internal fighting. Some are seeking the guidance of the supreme leader. Others want to move into a different direction. And that makes it hugely challenging from a diplomatic standpoint. But to get to some reasonable resolution here, I would take the president very seriously if I was the Iranian regime.
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关键字: iran-us-relation geopolitical-conflict middle-east-politics military-factions