Hello everyone, welcome to Quark Says, I'm Quark, and in this episode, we're going to talk about the assassination attempt on Charlie Kirk.

Due to my work style and childcare responsibilities, I usually can't provide immediate commentary or describe event details like other YouTubers.

By the time my show goes online, everyone who wanted to watch it would have already seen it, which is a weakness of our channel.

I'd also like to thank our long-time viewers for tolerating this shortcoming.

However, this also gives me an advantage: I have relatively ample time to think about the same event.

Because often, when an event first breaks, the information you get immediately might not be accurate, and there could be further developments later.

Commenting later gives you more time to revise previous opinions.

For instance, when the Charlie Kirk incident first occurred, a lot of information emerged that now seems inaccurate.

For example, it was reported that the assailant's father was a police officer, the assailant himself was MAGA and had voted for Trump, and the motive was that Charlie Kirk wasn't extreme enough, and so on.

Many self-media outlets also rushed to draw unreliable conclusions based on this information.

So, the Charlie Kirk assassination attempt actually gave us a revelation: when something happens, don't rush to conclusions; it's better to wait.

Why is "waiting" so important?

Because the unprecedented division America faces today is largely caused by this impatient, eager-to-conclude mindset.

Some might say, hasn't America always been like this?

There are conflicts between parties, clashes of public opinion, and freedom of speech in a democratic country.

Weren't the Civil War, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Vietnam War all like this?

What's different this time?

It is indeed different.

I've observed a phenomenon: today's American society is so divided that facts can no longer speak for themselves, making it impossible to reach even a minimum level of consensus.

What does that mean?

In the traditional theory of the free market of ideas, we generally believe that as long as all viewpoints compete freely, lies will eventually collapse, and the truth will automatically emerge, guiding the public to a more objective understanding.

Just a quick interjection here, because people often comment on my channel saying that certain statements are extremely wrong and therefore not worth protecting, and even that killing the person who made them would be normal.

This understanding is problematic, because freedom of speech primarily aims to protect potentially erroneous statements.

The reason is simple: a statement that most people in society consider correct doesn't need protection at all; if everyone agrees with you, what is there to protect?

It is precisely because the majority of people disagree with certain statements, and someone might want to silence you or the government might want to imprison you, that protection is needed.

Some might ask, according to your argument, do racial discrimination, discrimination against LGBT individuals, or women also fall under freedom of speech and deserve protection?

Regrettably, according to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, yes.

That is to say, even extremely offensive, provocative, or discriminatory speech should be protected.

For example, in the 2017 Matal v. Tam case, an Asian rock band musician named Tam wanted to register a trademark called "Slant."

Tam's original intention was to use irony to counter certain people's discrimination against Asians.

However, it was rejected by the Trademark Office on the grounds that trademarks with potentially disparaging content could not be registered.

The case eventually went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled against the Trademark Office because it violated the First Amendment, infringing upon the party's freedom of speech.

However, it's important to note that while discriminatory speech is protected, if it escalates into hate speech—meaning it incites violence, makes threats, or constitutes harassment against specific individuals—it remains illegal.

Getting back on track, we support the free competition of ideas, trusting in the rationality of the majority, but recent realities over the past two years have increasingly made us feel that this principle seems to be failing.

Taking the Charlie Kirk assassination attempt as an example, in past incidents of this kind in the United States, regardless of how different people's political views were, there was generally a broad consensus on the facts, and such events could influence the direction of legal policies and historical processes.

For instance, in the often-compared assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., despite various doubts about the motive, the vast majority of people still tended to believe that the assassin, James Earl Ray, had an extreme racist image.

Subsequently, widespread riots and Black labor strikes occurred in over a hundred American cities, which then prompted Congress to pass the Fair Housing Act.

During this process, even original racists, those who hated King the most, rarely denied the assailant's identity and motive.

Simply put, society as a whole was convinced by the facts: a racist killed a civil rights leader, and we should do something to change this atmosphere of hatred.

Similarly, the assassination of John F. Kennedy spurred the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act.

Americans of that era, despite their political differences, were still reasonable.

As Li Leung-kun from "Young and Dangerous" would say, "When you're out in the world, admit your mistakes and stand firm when you get hit."

But what has America become today?

It has become a place where "facts exist, but everyone speaks for themselves," meaning for the same event, the same person, a slogan on a bullet, both sides offer their own narratives and interpretations.

The left says the assailant is far-right, while the right says he is far-left.

Furthermore, even after the FBI released a series of information, including chat records between the assailant, Taylor Robinson, and his trans boyfriend, and confirmed that Taylor had never donated to Trump and was not an active voter, nor had he ever cast a ballot, many people on Twitter and Xiaohongshu continued to spread claims that the assailant was MAGA, had voted for and donated to Trump, and voices emerged questioning whether the FBI had fabricated chat records to smear the left.

This is what I meant earlier by "facts failing."

In the past, we generally believed that when facts and truth were presented, they would prompt people to revise their original views.

However, the current situation is that due to the existence of information echo chambers, you might find it difficult to see the facts, or if you do see them, you might consider them slander, or they might even reinforce your original beliefs.

In the past, such things often only happened in China, like the Tiananmen Square incident, where most Chinese either couldn't see it due to the Great Firewall, or if they did, they considered it slanderous rumor-mongering; the most extreme view was that even if they saw it, they believed the Chinese government was right to act as it did.

But we all know that America is a country without a firewall, so how could this happen there?

The reason is simple: long-term hatred and division have created mental walls for many people, making their self-held beliefs rigid, so even when facts and evidence are presented, many refuse to believe them.

So, how exactly did this division come about?

Let's discuss that now.

When I first started this channel, a reader sent me a letter asking why American universities, especially prestigious ones, including many big names in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, are so left-leaning, particularly when many wealthy individuals are capitalists themselves—isn't that a contradiction?

I wrote a reply at the time, which I can elaborate on a bit here.

Simply put, over the past few decades, the entire Western world, not just the United States, has experienced a decades-long so-called "woke" movement driven by radicalism.

Here, I want to emphasize that most people instinctively associate woke culture with the left, such as Black Lives Matter, feminism, LGBT rights, and so on.

However, other ideologies that are difficult to categorize as left-wing, such as Islamic fundamentalism and nationalism, are broadly also part of woke culture.

Again, I emphasize that radicalism is by no means exclusive to the far-left.

For example, my cousin came to Canada when he was very young and initially never returned to China.

But when we met again after 20 years, I found that he had a very strong nationalist identity.

Simply put, he hated the American and Canadian governments, believing these two countries were fundamentally evil; he thought the US and Canadian governments were weak and incompetent, unlike the Chinese government, which he saw as highly efficient and economically prosperous.

When I mentioned some of China's problems and history, he considered it a smear campaign by Western governments.

Most ironically, his father was a former political prisoner and one of the eyewitnesses to the Tiananmen Square incident.

After I told him many things I had personally experienced, he finally reluctantly admitted that he might have overly idealized China.

But this still didn't change his view that America was an evil empire.

Broadly, his views encompassed both streams of woke culture I mentioned earlier, both left and right, because in the university education he received, these two were logically consistent.

Because Anglo-Saxon whites are colonial oppressors and devils, oppressed nations, ethnic groups, genders, and sexual orientations should unite to resist and overthrow this decadent Western capitalist white patriarchal empire.

You see, white leftists think America is evil, and "little pinks" (Chinese nationalists) also think America is evil; since everyone's goal is the same, let's happily shake hands.

I later thought about the path his ideology took to form, and it's probably something like this: isn't multiculturalism in university campuses about emphasizing inclusion and respect for various minority groups?

This was originally a good thing, but it gradually became an overcorrection.

For example, it's natural for a multi-generational immigrant to not identify with their ancestral homeland, especially in the absence of violence.

But because of that colonial history, it excessively encourages your original identity and so-called uniqueness, to avoid falling into what is termed "cultural genocide."

And we know that this uniqueness can sometimes reject universal values.

What does this lead to?

It leads to the tribalization of minority groups.

Imagine you're Chinese, Black, Muslim, or a woman, or LGBT, and everyone was getting along quite well.

But there's always a group of people constantly whispering in your ear: "Our ancestors wronged you back then; you deserve all sorts of compensation and preferential treatment. If any white man has a conflict with you, it must be racial, gender, or sexual orientation discrimination, and we'll help you take him down—after all, you're always right."

Over time, wouldn't you also start to feel that you are indeed different from them, and thus prefer to hang out with others who are like you?

Consequently, you become more inclined to seek identity within your "own kind" group, drifting further away from the so-called mainstream, and even developing some hostility towards them.

I call this phenomenon "polite racial, gender, and sexual orientation segregation."

It's worth noting that my cousin himself has never experienced racial discrimination in Canada; the oppression he speaks of comes entirely from the indoctrination and imagination fostered by the education system and the internet, especially TikTok and Quora.

This is actually quite similar to how some "Yellow Han" nationalists in China today harbor hatred for the former Qing Dynasty.

The only difference is that Chinese society encourages you to hate others, while Western societies encourage you to hate yourself.

After reading what I've said above, can you understand why so many young Europeans join ISIS, and why many who champion feminism support Hamas alongside Muslim students?

Some, like my cousin, are isolated and pushed towards their "own kind"; others, not wanting to be labeled racist or Islamophobic, act exceptionally progressive and selectively turn a blind eye to issues like the oppression of women in Islamic culture.

So, what is the root cause of this situation?

Friends in China, in particular, might find it puzzling: the CCP incites hatred, wanting you to hate America, Japan, Korea, and the whole world—that's understandable, it's profitable for consolidating power.

But what do these Americans and Europeans gain by hating themselves? Are they sick?

Are they sick?

Here, we need to introduce a theory by Joseph Schumpeter, the former Austrian Minister of Finance and political economist.

What's most widely known about "Brother Bear" (Schumpeter) is probably his theory of creative destruction, which explains the source of corporate profits and essentially trumps Marx's theory of surplus value.

However, he has another theory that seems to align with Marx's, which is the self-destruction tendency of capitalism.

Let me briefly explain this theory: it roughly states that capitalism creates unprecedented civilization and prosperity, but at the same time, it also nurtures its own gravediggers—the intellectual class.

Yes, you heard that right, old Marx said the gravediggers of capitalism are the workers, and intellectuals are weak petty bourgeois.

But with "Brother Bear," it's the opposite; he believes that public intellectuals are the ones holding the shovels.

If you ask me, what's there to argue about?

Anyway, it's all about digging graves, so having more hands taking turns isn't bad, is it?

What's going on?

Because they can't dig holes?

Why are you talking nonsense?

Who can't dig holes?

So, is "Brother Bear's" theory valid?

Yes, and very much so.

I've mentioned before that Canadian university campuses are practically hotbeds for various radical ideologies; classrooms and drawers are filled with brochures for communist, extreme feminist, LGBT, and environmentalist groups recruiting new members.

Note that this doesn't mean being left-leaning or emphasizing religious traditions is radicalism.

Everything in excess is bad; radicalism generally only applies when a certain line is crossed, and violence is emphasized as a solution.

For example, emphasizing environmental protection is good, but going so far as to throw soup on the Mona Lisa at the Louvre is excessive.

So why do these things tend to happen in universities and academic circles?

According to "Brother Bear's" theory, first, it's because the intellectual class in universities, such as professors, occupies a unique ecological niche.

To put it plainly: they gather together, are cultured, have time, but lack money and power.

What does being cultured mean?

It means they can see social problems that many others cannot.

What does gathering together and having time mean?

It means they can engage in academia, write papers, discuss, critique, and disseminate their views.

And what does lacking money and power mean?

It means they are not deeply integrated into the enormous production machine of capitalism, do not actively participate in production and management, do not need to consider profit and corporate survival issues, and do not control actual power and resources.

They don't get rich when companies go public, and they feel nothing when companies go bankrupt.

In short, you have no vested interest in it.

This seemingly esteemed yet actually marginalized and challenging contradictory identity naturally inclines them to question and rebel against the existing order.

Note that this isn't just true for professors; many students are also like this, because even wealthy second-generations, in the presence of their elite parents, are actually marginalized in terms of power and have a natural impulse to criticize and seize power.

Secondly, this group tends to go to extremes; to put it nicely, they are idealistic.

As mentioned earlier, professors and students generally don't concern themselves with practical matters, which means many of them lack an engineer's mindset and don't understand compromise.

For example, if you're designing a building with an engineer's mindset, you would definitely consider the costs, strike a balance, and make trade-offs between artistic appeal and practicality, and between external aesthetics and internal space.

You would consider both cutting-edge design concepts and also account for costs and budget.

This mindset is beneficial because in modern democratic countries, whether you're in politics or business, the most important thing is compromise—it's about considering and calculating costs.

But what would a so-called idealist without an engineering mindset do?

They would do it at all costs, because if you don't have to consider the cost, you just do it.

And "at all costs" is precisely the mindset of radicalism: I see a problem, I have my goal, but I will never compromise, hoping to achieve everything in one go, and whoever stands in my way must be eliminated.

I often say that idealism isn't a good word, and this is what I mean.

The third point is the tendency for empathy to overflow, leading to a sense of moral superiority.

Human nature is such that abundance tends to foster empathy, while scarcity leads to a dog-eat-dog mentality and a lack of compassion.

There's a saying, "Poverty breeds self-interest, wealth fosters benevolence," which means exactly this.

If you were truly wealthy, you might also donate money or give a homeless person on the street hundreds of dollars.

But if you were in the midst of a three-year famine, and your entire family only had half a biscuit, and someone on the roadside was starving to death, would you sympathize and share half with them?

Most likely not.

And university campuses are places where empathy is extremely prone to "breeding"—note that I use the word "breeding" because this empathy is often imagined, an unreal overflow.

For instance, you can extend your sympathy to unknown refugees in the distant Middle East, call for them all to be brought over, and even shed tears for them, because it doesn't require you to directly open your wallet.

But then, your roommate might ask to borrow $500, and you wouldn't lend it.

Why?

Because showing empathy can satisfy a sense of moral superiority, thereby compensating for a perceived disorder in the power structure.

As for the costs behind empathy, as mentioned above, you don't need to consider the costs or practical implementation.

The superposition of these three points determines that this group will inevitably criticize the capitalist system.

Because criticizing the strong and the so-called elite on behalf of the weak is the easiest and safest way to seize the moral high ground.

But note, this kind of thing can only happen in a relatively free capitalist world; in places like China, two iron fists would crush you.

And once this criticism goes too far, it can easily evolve into radicalism and spread rapidly through clustered university campuses and social media, because students are naturally active and like to voice their opinions.

After hearing the above, I know many friends who identify as leftists are probably itching to curse.

I know you're anxious, but please don't be.

Because radicalism, empathy, and moral superiority have never been the exclusive domain of the left as commonly understood; their essence is a "narrative of oppression."

What does that mean?

It means that any type of radicalism, whether far-left or far-right, essentially tells you: "Our group has been oppressed, and now we've had enough; we must awaken, revolt, and eliminate those vested interest groups who exploit others.

To achieve this, we must unite the whole world; our group is one family; our group does not fight our group; our group helps our group."

And to achieve this great goal, collective interests must take precedence, temporarily sacrificing some freedoms and individual rights, and no words that hinder unity should be spoken.

In this process, they will go to great lengths to portray the opposition as despicable devils, constantly reinforcing this adversarial relationship until a muscle memory forms within the group, and there is no longer any patience for self-reflection.

As for who belongs to "our group" and who belongs to "that vested interest group," if you fill in the blanks yourself, you'll be able to capture all forms of radicalism.

It's important to specifically point out that the narrative of oppression itself isn't necessarily wrong, because apart from communism, which is a purely deceptive and fabricated theory, most other forms of oppression, such as those based on race, gender, and sexual orientation, genuinely exist.

However, whether it's radical or not primarily depends on whether the method of change you advocate is reform or revolution; whether it's sitting down to talk and de-escalate conflicts, or endlessly exaggerating and inciting hatred, advocating for the deprivation of others' freedom, interests, or even right to life.

Besides Schumpeter, many other scholars have expressed similar views.

For example, Karl Mannheim stated that unattached intellectuals, those outside existing interest groups, are most prone to utopian ideologies.

Alexis de Tocqueville also said that the most fervent revolutionary demands often do not come from the most oppressed social strata but from students and intellectuals who are on the rise, exposed to more ideas, yet dissatisfied with reality.

Hannah Arendt explained this most thoroughly; in her book "The Origins of Totalitarianism," she noted that intellectuals and young people often become the first adherents of totalitarian movements because they find meaning and a sense of belonging in such movements.

Thinking back to the young people who flocked to Yan'an 90 years ago, including earlier figures like Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Lu Xun, don't they all fit this description?

Some might argue that even if what you say is true, why do these people remain so radical and impractical after leaving school, or even after becoming wealthy and successful?

Because if you form political tendencies in a radical environment when you're young, it's actually very difficult to change them if your life goes smoothly, unless you encounter a major event that prompts reflection.

If you don't believe me, think back to the young people who went to Yan'an in the early days—many of them were communist fighters at first, weren't they?

It was only after one political campaign after another, when they and their friends and family were persecuted, that they began to reflect and gradually shifted to the right—wasn't Li Rui the most typical example?

Returning to the United States, it is precisely because America has enjoyed a long period of peace and prosperity that it provided the ideal conditions of light, humidity, and nutrients for universities to become hotbeds of radicalism, allowing it to permeate and solidify through generations, eroding the very foundations of the United States.

Many people have previously left comments for me saying, "You don't understand what true left or right is, what big government or small government is, high welfare or low welfare, tax increases or tax cuts."

But the reality is that the level of division in America today has become so severe that these issues are no longer the main points of contention, or at least not primarily.

Because these are still policy-level, negotiation-oriented issues; if you can discuss them, it means you're still bargaining over interests.

However, today's American polarization is more like a struggle over fundamental national values—a battle over moral views and the right to define lifestyles.

The opposition between the two sides has escalated from rivals to enemies.

If you don't believe me, look at the most core issues: abortion rights, gun rights, whether children in schools can choose to transition—these are not about money.

The emergence of social media has further acted as a catalyst for this division.

As I said at the beginning, "one America, different narratives"—people physically live in the same country, but their minds inhabit two parallel worlds.

For the same Charlie Kirk, some see him as a saint, while others consider him scum.

For the same Barack Obama, some view him as a life idol, while others believe he is the mastermind behind America's chaos.

And everyone believes their own ideas are self-evident, that everyone thinks this way, and if you don't, you must be a dinosaur, right?

Besides social media, another significant driving force behind this division is China, acting as an external threat.

Some might wonder, wasn't the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War even more tense?

So why didn't the Soviet Union lead to America's division, but instead fostered more internal consensus?

Because the past US-Soviet relationship and today's US-China relationship are two entirely different ecosystems.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had almost no economic interaction; the confrontation was pure: military confrontation, ideological confrontation, with a simple and crude narrative—they were communism, we were the free world, leaving little room for ambiguity.

But today's China is different; it's already America's second-largest trading partner and a core part of the supply chain.

The cheap daily necessities you buy at Walmart, your iPhone, and even Shanghai Disneyland all have China's shadow behind them.

When you call for decoupling from China, manufacturing workers might cheer, but California tech companies, Wall Street capitalists, and consumers will frown.

The unity of the Cold War era has fractured into today's question of "who will pay the price for decoupling."

At the same time, ideological differences also seem less clearly defined.

The CCP has ostensibly abandoned the Soviet-style pure planned economy, which is very confusing for many Americans.

At the same time, when the CCP attacks the United States, it no longer harps on communist rhetoric but instead talks extensively about globalization, American hegemony, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and diversity, playing the identity politics card—a whole set of arguments that more than half of Americans actually believe.

In this situation, how can your American government be tough on that authoritarian rogue regime across the way?

If you criticize Xi Jinping, a group of Chinese Americans will take to the streets, accusing you of racism.

If you state the plain truth that the virus came from Wuhan, a group of far-right extremists will take to the streets to attack Asian faces, and you'll be labeled a racist.

The result is that external threats haven't forged consensus; instead, they've transformed into internal problems, leading to infighting.

At the end of the program, I'd like to share some thoughts on the United States and the future direction of US-China relations.

In the foreseeable future, I don't believe this division in America can naturally heal, as no one seems to have a solution.

The only suggestion I can think of is to recommend that all social media news feeds adjust their current recommendation algorithms.

For example, current algorithms analyze your past behavior, such as likes, time spent, and sharing history, to determine your preferences and then feed you content you're interested in.

If you liked Sima Nan, then it continues to push Zhang Weiwei, Wu Jing, Unit 731, the 9/3 Military Parade, and students with tears in their eyes raising the national flag.

Over time, you might have started out only half-crippled, but now you've become a full-blown U-lock nationalist.

So what would be a better algorithm?

For example, if you watched a so-called military news report from a "head-clamping blogger" claiming that the Russian army crushed NATO, annihilated six brigades, and shot down a bunch of American F-35s, then it would immediately push a completely opposite debunking.

If you could hear different voices every time, you would naturally form your own judgment about what's true and what's false.

Next is US-China relations; my view is that a war between the US and China is almost certain to break out, with the only uncertainties being when and where it will begin.

Previously, friends from within the Great Firewall would often comment, challenging me: "You always talk about reform and don't advocate revolution; how can you reform a rogue regime like the CCP?

There's only one path: mutually assured destruction."

I want to say, there is actually a third way.

Because, as you say, reform is for decent people; it's useless against thugs.

But revolution is also for bones that can be chewed; if it's too tough and might break your teeth, don't rush in to block the bullet hole.

First, you can't chew it off; second, even if you manage to chew it off, if it's done in a radical way, it's highly likely that the CCP's spirit will be resurrected in a new form, stuck in a loop.

China's best path to democracy in the future is actually the Japan model.

After defeat, cleanse away the communist and Nazi remnants, transplant the entire constitutional model, wait for two generations, and by the time the post-2010 militarized generation grows old and the lingering toxins diminish, it will heal.

This might not necessarily be a bad thing for the United States either; after all, if Pearl Harbor hadn't been bombed and there hadn't been missiles in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, many Americans would still be living in a state of naive ignorance.