海湾经济体的脆弱性:石油依赖与霍尔木兹海峡的阴影
位于中东的海湾国家,如伊拉克、科威特、巴林、卡塔尔、阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯,其经济命脉在很大程度上依赖于石油。为了规避风险和实现经济多元化,它们也大力发展了航空业等其他领域,并试图成为中东地区的安全避风港。然而,当前的地缘政治冲突,特别是对霍尔木兹海峡的封锁,正以前所未有的方式威胁着这一切。许多人可能尚未完全认识到这场危机对海湾经济的“灾难性”影响。
以卡塔尔为例,其经济约42%依赖石油和天然气,而这些出口几乎全部需要通过霍尔木兹海峡。尽管卡塔尔已成为国际航空枢纽,航空业贡献了其经济的10%以上,旅游业也占据约10%的GDP,这些看似明智的多元化举措,在如今空域和海峡都可能关闭的情况下,意味着至少62%的卡塔尔经济可能陷入完全瘫痪。作为对比,乌克兰2022年经济萎缩了约30%,美国在四年间的大萧条时期也只收缩了29%。虽然卡塔尔是世界上最富裕的国家之一,短期封锁尚可承受,但冲突的持续升级和对关键基础设施(如海水淡化厂)的潜在袭击,尤其是巴林已成为目标,预示着一个更严峻的“灾难情景”:整个国家可能需要被疏散。这不禁引发疑问:海湾经济是否正面临全面崩溃的边缘?伊朗要求美军撤出中东的声明,是否预示着它将通过扼杀海湾经济来迫使美军撤离?
Original English
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. They are literally built their entire economies on oil and then to diversify to the risk, if you will, they build some of the biggest airliners in the world. And they became a so-called safe haven in the Middle East. But now this war and specifically the blockade of Hormuz are threatening all of it at the same time. And honestly, I don't think people realize yet how unfathomably big this crisis is for the Gulf economies. For example, take Qatar. Its economy depends on oil, and especially natural gas for roughly 42%. And almost all of that has to go through the Strait of Hormuz to de-risk. Though Qatar became an international air travel hub, which means now aviation accounts for a little over 10% of its economy and tourism. For another, roughly 10% of GDP seemed very smart just a few months ago. But now, with both its airspace and the strait close, it means that at least 62% of Qatar's entire economy is in a state of total paralysis. But just for context, Ukraine's economy contracted by roughly 30% in 2022. The US economy contracted for 29% during the Great Depression over the course of four years. But of course, Qatar is not Ukraine. It is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. So a month long shutdown was manageable. So if the war ends in a month. A Goldman Sachs economist has estimated that Qatar's economy will only contract by 14% in 2026. Still, that is a substantially bigger recession than happened during Covid. But of course, like after Covid, Qatar will bounce back from this. No problem. However, the thing is, this conflict, it doesn't look like it's getting any better. In fact, I've read some pretty alarming reports that Gulf states like Qatar depend for 99% of their drinking water on these six desalination plants, which have in Bahrain already been targeted in the war. This means that in a true disaster scenario, the entire country may need to be evacuated. So that raises the question are Gulf economies facing a total collapse? Iran has said it wants U.S. troops out of the Middle East. Could it soon forced Gulf economies to eject U.S. troops simply by choking their economies?
三种情景下的经济冲击:短期瓦解与长期生存力分析
我是尤里,一名经济学教授。我花费数日分析了海湾经济体可能遭受的三种潜在情景影响:一是战争迅速结束,可能是美国获胜,或伊朗迫使海湾国家驱逐美军;二是长期战争,届时需计算各经济体在不依赖霍尔木兹海峡出口收入的情况下能维持多久;三是灾难性情景,即海湾经济体耗尽水源或人口流失(部分国家约90%依赖移民)。
情景一:短期战争 目前的情况符合此情景。理解短期损害,需审视对海湾国家造成的两大最严重扰动:一是依赖霍尔木兹海峡出口的产业(石油、天然气、制造业)的停滞,二是航空旅行和旅游业的实际停摆。
- 巴林:对石油和天然气的依赖度最低(约26%),主要经济支柱为制造业(约15%),但大部分出口也需经霍尔木兹海峡。其旅游业主要服务本地游客,目前尚可。总体而言,约41%的经济目前处于瘫痪状态。
- 科威特:35%的经济依赖石油和天然气,贸易、旅游和制造业相对较小。约38%的经济遭受瘫痪。
- 伊拉克:约55%的GDP依赖石油和天然气,几乎全部通过霍尔木兹海峡出口。然而,伊拉克已重新开放通往土耳其的管道,可转移约20%的石油出口,且价格翻倍。目前,约33%的经济受影响。
- 沙特阿拉伯:34%依赖石油和天然气,33%为制造业,8%为航空,5%为旅游。其经济瘫痪程度难测,部分原因在于其空域、港口和旅游区仍开放,且拥有重要管道能出口60-70%的石油,加上当前油价翻倍,对其有利。我们估计约10%的经济受瘫痪影响。
- 阿联酋:24%依赖石油和天然气,虽有管道能出口43%的石油且价格翻倍,但其航空(18%)和旅游业(11%)几近停摆。据估计,约20%的经济受到影响。
关键的进口中断是另一大冲击。海湾经济体约70%的关键食品和药品进口依赖霍尔木兹海峡。主要港口如伊拉克的Qasr、科威特港、多哈港南部的港口,特别是迪拜的杰贝勒·阿里港,现已基本关闭。进口不得不依赖约旦和沙特等国的陆路,以及阿联酋的富查伊拉港。卡塔尔则转向成本高昂的空运。这导致了港口拥堵和食品、药品进口成本飙升。尽管多国政府禁止超市涨价并拥有大量食品储备,暂时限制了对消费者价格的影响,但更高的进口成本和贸易路线重塑是普遍的痛点。
根据高盛经济学家预测,若战争在四月底结束,卡塔尔和科威特2026年经济将萎缩约14%,阿联酋为-5%,沙特阿拉伯为-3%,巴林和伊拉克居中。虽然这是比疫情期间更严重的衰退,但鉴于这些国家的财富,预计可控。
Original English
Hey, I'm Yuri, I'm a pizza in economics, and I've spent the last days analyzing all of the Gulf economies and how bad they will be affected by three potential scenarios. Scenario number one, a quick end to the war, either because the US wins are because Iran forces them to push out US troops, the Gulf countries, that is. Then there's scenario number two, a long a war, in which case I've calculated how long the various Gulf economies can survive without export revenue through the Strait of Hormuz. And finally, scenario number three, a disaster scenario in which either the Gulf economies run out of water or population given that some rely for almost 90% on immigrants. So let's get into it with scenario number one. A short war, which is exactly what we have been seeing so far. To understand the damage done so far, we have to look at the two biggest disruptions done to the Gulf countries, which is exactly what we have seen so far a short disruption. But to understand the damage that has already been done, we have to look at the two biggest disruptions that to go of countries have faced. First, there's the stencil of industries that depend on the Strait of Hormuz for exports, such as oil and gas and also manufacturing, plus the effective standstill of air travel and tourism, oil and gas. So far, Bahrain is the least dependent on it, with it accounting for roughly 26% of its economy. Actually, its main diversification strategy has been manufacturing, which now accounts for roughly 15% of its economy. But sadly, that is also mostly for exporting through the Strait of Hormuz. Bahrain is the least dependent on oil and gas, with it accounting for roughly 26% of its economy. Its main diversification strategy, though, has been manufacturing, which now accounts for roughly 15%. But sadly, that is also mostly going through the Strait of Hormuz. Bahrain is also a major tourist destination these days, but that is mostly for local tourists, so that seems to be fine so far. So all in all, I'd say that roughly 41% of its economy is paralyzed right now. Compare that to Kuwait, which depends for 35% on oil and gas, while trade, tourism and manufacturing is relatively small. So I'd say that roughly 38% of its economy is paralyzed and its northern neighbor, Iraq, it depends for about 55%. That's quite a lot on oil and gas for its GDP. And almost all of that was exported through her moose. But now Iraq has just reopened its pipeline to Turkey, and that will help it divert about 20% of its oil at this very important, roughly double the price as before. So for them, I'd say that roughly 33% of their economy is paralyzed, much less than Qatar, which we've already discussed to be at 62%. And now moving on to the big boy in the region, Saudi Arabia. It depends for roughly 34% on oil and gas and 33% on manufacturing and 8% on aviation. And 5% on tourism. However, calculating how much of Saudi Arabia's economy is paralyzed is very difficult for two reasons. First, much of their airspace, tourist areas and many of their ports are actually open. Second, they have a hugely important pipeline which allows them to export about 60 to 70% of their oil. But this is more crucial than they think. Again, because they are currently selling that oil at almost double the price than they were before the war. Finally, there's the UAE, which depends for roughly 24% on oil and gas. But like Saudi Arabia, it has a pipeline that has been estimated to help itself 43% of its oil. And again, because the prices are roughly double than that they were before the war, it means that they roughly have the same revenue from oil as they had before. But much like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, they have major manufacturing sector, and they also have a lot of mining, unlike these economies. And a lot of this is actually exposed to their biggest port being closed. That's right over here. That being said, the UAE and especially of course Dubai relies heavily on aviation 18% and tourism 11%, which have both mostly been paralyzed. So for these two countries is really anyone's guess. But let's say just for the sake of argument, that the UAE has 20% of its economy being paralyzed and Saudi Arabia ten. Of course, it's more in reality, but both of them are really profiting now from much higher oil prices. But of course, stuff doesn't just go out through the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, the Gulf economies also used the Strait of Hormuz for about 70% of their crucial food and medicine imports. However, after the main imports, ports such as and I hope I'm going to pronounce this correctly, Qasr in Iraq or the port in the city of Kuwait, or the port south of Doha, and especially, most importantly, the port in Dubai known as Jebel Ali, are essentially now shut down. Now they have to rely for these imports on land routes via Jordan and via Saudi Arabia, and finally, of course, via the ports of Fujairah in the UAE. Meanwhile, Qatar has largely started importing via air, which is much more expensive, and the result of all of this, these imports has been long traffic jams at ports not made for such high volumes of goods, and therefore a big spike in the cost of food and medicine imports. But crucially, because many Gulf governments have prohibited supermarkets from price gouging, and because many of them have large food reserves, so far the damage from this has been limited and consumer prices have not gone up by as much as you would have expected. So these are, I think, the main pain points for the Gulf countries so far. All of them are facing far higher import costs for food and medicine, and a chaotic reshuffling of trade routes. Qatar and Kuwait. So Qatar and Kuwait have been hit the hardest so far, while Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent the UAE have been doing fairly okay so far due to them getting a much higher price for the oil that is still being exported through their pipelines. And therefore, I think it makes sense that Goldman Sachs economist Farouk Snoozer muddled in early March that if the war ends late April, so fairly soon, the 2026 economies of Qatar and Kuwait will contract both by roughly minus 14%. On the other hand, the UAE would only shrink by minus 5% in 2026 and Saudi Arabia by minus 3%. Given what we've seen, I think Bahrain and Iraq will then land somewhere in between these numbers. Now, all of that is very substantial. It is a bigger hit than during Covid. But honestly, me as well as most analysts think that this will be manageable given how rich these countries are. However, will the war actually end late April? That assumption is looking increasingly unlikely, and this brings us to scenario number two a long war.
长期战争情景:财富储备是抵御经济崩溃的终极防线
当战争演变为长期拉锯战时,评估海湾经济体的生存能力,关键在于其赚取国际货币以维持战争开销和满足民生需求的能力。鉴于它们高度依赖食品、药品进口,以及可能在长期战争中需购入大量防御物资,对进口需求的维持至关重要。尽管卡塔尔、巴林和科威特经济对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖占其GDP的比例低于或约等于一半,但出口收入的95%却高度依赖此通道。伊拉克的北部管道使其出口收入的风险敞口降至约80%。对于沙特和阿联酋,尽管数据难以精确估算,但凭借其管道运输和油价上涨(尤其在长期战争中),我们保守估计沙特出口收入将面临20%的打击,阿联酋则为30%。
然而,一个值得关注的现象是,海湾货币(如沙特里亚尔、科威特第纳尔、阿联酋迪拉姆)表现出惊人的稳定,与美元挂钩的沙特里亚尔尤为如此。这种稳定并非偶然,而是源于它们雄厚的财富积累。例如,伊拉克的财富基金约60亿美元,但中央银行储备高达8000亿美元。科威特的财富基金达1万亿美元,中央银行储备为540亿美元。卡塔尔拥有5500亿美元的财富基金及720亿美元的额外储备。相对而言,巴林财富基金为170亿美元,中央银行储备仅40亿美元,显得较为贫穷。沙特阿拉伯的财富基金约1万亿美元,央行储备5000亿美元。阿联酋则拥有约2万亿美元的财富基金及2270亿美元的央行储备。
若综合分析这些数据,即使保守估计,仅40%的石油基金可轻易售出而不导致全球市场崩溃,海湾国家也能维持相当长的生存期。沙特阿拉伯凭借其管道,理论上可“永远”维持。高度依赖出口的科威特,凭仗其庞大的财富基金,也能支撑长达十年。卡塔尔和阿联酋亦分别可维持约八年和七年半的进口能力,这得益于其巨大的财富储备、管道以及替代港口。伊拉克则依靠其对土耳其的管道和庞大的中央银行储备,可维持近两年。只有巴林显得尤为脆弱,其对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖和有限的财富基金,使其仅能维持约七个月,但沙特阿拉伯或许有能力提供援助。
Original English
But while Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait's economies may depend on the Strait of Hormuz for less than or about half their GDP, their export revenues depend on it. For a whopping 95%. On the other hand, Iraq's northern pipeline now means that it has about an exposure of 80% when it comes to export revenues. Meanwhile, again, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are difficult to estimate, but thanks to their pipelines and the increased price of oil, especially if there is a long war, for simplicity, I will assume that the Saudis only take a 20% hit and the UAE takes a 30% hit to their export to revenues. But I feel a lot, honestly, that would cause an immediate currency collapse for 90% of economies around the world, especially if they lose 95% of their export revenue. But as you can see here, the Gulf currencies look surprisingly stable. For example, the Saudi Riyadh is nice and tied to the U.S. dollar. The Kuwaiti dinar is very stable and the Emirati dirham is also extremely stable. It may not look very stable like this, but if you look at these numbers over here, it's just tiny, tiny, tiny movements. These currencies are absolutely fine. So why is that the case? Well, it's because they are extremely wealthy. Everybody knows that. But how wealthy? Let's go back to our map. Let's go from north to south. Iraq has the smallest, a wealth fund estimated at roughly $6 billion worth. It's tiny, but a central bank. A war chest is actually pretty full at roughly 800 billion USD. Next, let's go to their small southern neighbor, Kuwait. Their wealth fund is absolutely massive, with $1 trillion in assets. However, its central bank only has half of what Iraq has at 54 billion. Meanwhile, Qatar has about $550 billion in its wealth fund and about 72 on top of that in reserves. Now, compared to that, Bahrain looks very poor indeed, with only 17 billion in its wealth fund and just 4 billion in central bank reserves. Saudi Arabia, the giant, is surprisingly not the richest country. It's famous wealth funds. The piss has an estimated 1 trillion, so still way, way more than Bahrain. In its assets. And then the central bank has about 500 billion in reserves. And next the UAE is surprisingly richer. It has about 2 trillion in all of its wealth funds combined, and then about 227 billion in the central bank reserves. But of course, me drawing these numbers on the screen by themselves, they are meaningless, right? Just big numbers. Bahrain may look poorer, but it also has a much smaller population than, for example, Saudi Arabia. So it doesn't need to import as much. So what we need to do now is to put all of that together and calculate how many years each Gulf country can keep importing stuff while exporting way less, and in some cases, almost nothing. And this simple exercise will actually reveal why Gulf currencies look as stable as ever. That is, even if we assume, conservatively, that only 40% of their oil funds can be sold fairly easily without absolutely crashing global markets. We will find that Saudi Arabia can survive actually forever, thanks to its pipeline. Hyper exposed Kuwait also quite surprisingly so 95% less export revenue. It can still survive a whopping ten years based on its massive wealth fund, which is almost as big as that of Saudi Arabia, which is of course, much bigger. Qatar also very wealthy. No more exports almost can survive for almost eight years just based on its massive wealth. Similarly, the UAE can hold out for about seven and a half years despite the destruction of Dubai's entire business model thanks to its wealth and, of course, its pipeline and alternative harbors. Over here. Iraq can hold out almost for two years, mostly thanks to now its pipeline to Turkey and its big central bank of artists. And it's only really Bahrain that looks very vulnerable, being able to survive only for a seven months due to its reliance on Hormuz and relatively small wealth funds. But honestly, Bahrain is so small that Saudi Arabia could simply bail it out if need it.
灾难情景下的生存极限与核心脆弱性:水资源安全的关键挑战
即使在最严峻的“灾难情景”下,如伊朗通过轰炸破坏海湾国家的石油管道或阿联酋临近伊朗的替代港口,其经济韧性依然令人惊讶。在这种情况下,阿联酋可能像卡塔尔一样受阻,但由于人均财富相对较低,其生存期可能缩短至不到两年。而沙特阿拉伯,即使失去管道,凭借其红海沿岸的港口仍能维持约20%的出口能力,并凭借庞大的财富支撑约五年半的经济运转。
然而,一个不容忽视的巨大风险是海湾国家对外国移民的高度依赖。阿联酋和卡塔尔约88%的人口为移民,科威特约70%,巴林53%。如果战争升级,大量移民可能回国,短期内可能导致经济动荡,但长期来看,这将大幅降低对进口商品的需求,从而延长国家的经济生存期。
真正具有“生存威胁”(existential weakness)的是水资源问题,尤其是对海水淡化厂的依赖。卡塔尔99%的饮用水来自这些设施,巴林为90%,阿联酋和科威特也超过一半。这些工厂形同“活靶子”,一旦被摧毁,将引发严重的人道主义危机,可能导致整个城市被疏散。尽管如此,即使在这种极端情况下,海湾国家(特别是拥有全球化财富基金和强大石油基础的沙特)的经济核心——财富和石油资源——仍将得以保留。这些基础设施的损失可以重建,而伊朗政权被移除后,经济复苏的可能性依然存在。因此,即使在最糟糕的灾难情景下,海湾经济体的整体抗压能力可能比最初设想的更为坚韧。
Original English
Unless, of course, you can goes truly scorched earth on the Gulf, bringing us to scenario number three a disastrous war. Total war in this scenario, Iran tries to break Gulf economies export capacities by bombing their pipelines, which is, of course possible. And on top of that, they could really bomb the alternative ports that the UAE has, which are fairly close to Iran. Now, in that case, the UAE may become just as blocked as Qatar, but because it is less wealthy per person, it would now be able to survive for a little under two years. On the other hand, thanks to its red seaports all across the coast over there, Saudi Arabia, even if it no longer has its pipeline, it would still have some export capacity left 20%, roughly allowing it to hold out for about five and a half years purely on their massive wealth. That is still quite a long time. So okay, now Iran again escalates bombing major population centers. This exposes yet another big weakness in the Gulf economies, namely their massive, massive reliance on immigrants. Specifically, the UAE consists of about 88% immigrants. The Da also 88% immigrants. Roughly Kuwait's 70% immigrants. Still, Bahrain 50 3 a.m. running out of space to draw on. But you get the point. And Saudi Arabia way less 41% immigrants. Iraq. It does have immigrants, but these are mostly Syrian refugees which are less affected by this crisis. So yeah, if the war escalates, a lot of these could be leaving, going back home, often to South Asia crashing or Britain crashing. The Gulf economies. However, from a pure war economy perspective, the upside would then be that the Gulf economies would need a lot fewer imports, meaning that they could hold out quite a bit longer. So if the war truly escalates, it may not be in Iran's best interest to actually bomb all of these population centers and send the immigrants home. Honestly, the only real existential weakness that I see right now are the water desalination plants, especially Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE rely on more than half roughly for their entire water supply on the Asian plants, which is this red bar. So these are sitting ducks. And for drinking water, it's even worse. 99% of Qatar's drinking water comes from these plants, 90% in Bahrain. And while in Saudi Arabia it is way less. I'm still betting that you will see a humanitarian disaster if Iran destroys them all. Entire cities would have to be evacuated. It would be terrible. Yet again, this could then also mean that the immigrants go home while the native population are evacuated. Yet then again, this could also mean that the immigrants will go home while the native population will be evacuated to further inland Saudi Arabia. From there, they could regroup. And because their central bank wealth and wealth funds will be unaffected. After all, these are global. On top of that, the foundation of their economy is their massive oil wealth. It will all still be there on the ground. A lot of that infrastructure then there will be lost. Of course, now could be rebuilt once the Iranian regime is out. So honestly, even in a complete disaster scenario, the Gulf countries look more resilient than I initially thought.
宏观经济风险传导与伊朗的战略困境
总而言之,海湾经济体确实面临着巨大的风险敞口。若冲突持续,可能引发规模空前的经济破坏,迪拜、卡塔尔、巴林多年来为实现经济多元化所做的努力,以及作为一个全球安全港的地位,正面临严峻考验。对海水淡化厂的依赖,可能导致严峻的人道主义灾难。然而,在最极端的战争情景下,海湾经济体的崩溃可能性,比最初分析霍尔木兹海峡依赖度时预期的要低。这正如朋友失业并损失一半财富,但仍保有其法拉利收藏,其整体状况并非一无所有。迪拜的商业模式岌岌可危,沙特阿拉伯的“线性城市”(The Line)等昂贵项目也面临不确定性。
即使在乐观情景下,海湾国家仍将经历严重衰退,复苏之路可能漫长。更糟糕的是,若其被迫出售财富,或大量低收入的南亚移民被迫离开,将对埃及、约旦、巴基斯坦和孟加拉国等负债累累的国家造成巨大冲击。
与此同时,伊朗自身也存在诸多脆弱性。其石油出口同样高度依赖霍尔木兹海峡,且能源设施高度集中在一个岛屿上。伊朗也依赖沿海的水电站,并且缺乏海湾国家那样的金融缓冲。为了更深入理解这些复杂动态,强烈推荐参考《经济学人》的分析,特别是关于伊朗如何通过霍尔木兹海峡赚取石油出口收入,以及伊朗是否会因战争拖延而“过度出牌”的分析。此外,关于在当前海湾战争中,水资源可能与石油同等关键的分析,也揭示了伊朗的脆弱性。这些文章能够提供更广阔的视野,帮助读者独立思考。
Original English
So in conclusion, yes, the Gulf economies are exceptionally exposed. If this war continues, we could see an economic destruction on a truly gigantic scale. All the economic diversification efforts of Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain, all what they've worked for for years, even decades, it is now truly all at risk. And given their dependance on desalination plants for water, we could even see a major humanitarian disaster if the war escalates. However, honestly, in a true all out war scenario, the Gulf economies are less likely to collapse than I thought. When I first started my analysis and found out how much they depended on the Strait of Hormuz. It's like if you hear that your friend just lost his job and half his wealth. Of course, your first reaction might be that you think that he is ruined until you find out he still has half of his Ferrari collection left. I think that analogy kind of sums it up for me. Those are the Gulf states. That being said, these guys have worked for years and years to become a global safe haven, and that status is now truly under threat. Dubai's entire business model looks very shaky indeed. And what will happen to Saudi Arabia's ultra expensive megaprojects like the line? Even in our optimistic scenario, the Gulf states are still facing a major recession, and it may take years for them to recover. But perhaps even worse, if they are forced to start selling their wealth. And if many poor South Asian immigrants are forced to leave the Gulf states and go back home, who is really in trouble? That's right. Poor and indebted countries like Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. But I have to do a follow up analysis on that soon. So let me know if you want to see that. Finally, there is, of course, Iran itself, which has many of the same vulnerabilities that the Gulf has its oil also has to go through the Strait of Hormuz, and it's all concentrated on a single island. And it also relies a lot on water desalination plants all across its ghosts. And very crucially, it does not have the same financial buffers that the Gulf countries do. So to get a better sense of that, I highly recommend you check out the excellent analysis by our advertising sponsor, The Economist. Specifically, I urge you to read this analysis on how Iran is still making lots of money from its oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. And on this analysis on how not just the US. Also, Iran still risks overplaying its hand by dragging the war out longer. And then to better understand the ultimate doom scenario, I recommend you read their take on why, in the current Gulf War, water may prove as decisive as oil, which goes into why Iran is vulnerable as well as these article show, The Economist delivers insights to let you see the bigger picture and think for yourself. This is why I have almost always relied on their analysis for my research, and it's why I highly recommend you subscribe to The Economist, which I'm excited to say has agreed to give a special 35% discount exclusively for money and macro viewers. Whether you want daily journalism in the Economist app, or you are like me and prefer to catch up on the global economy during the weekend with a nice cup of coffee and the paper edition, you'll always stay on top of the latest global developments and support journalism that values factual information, integrity and an independent point of view. So don't miss out! Click the link in the description or top comment below, or head over to economist.com/money Macro to claim your exclusive 35% discount today.
📌 文中提及的人物和组织
公司/组织: Goldman Sachs, The Economist